IR 05000354/1985057

Preoperational Security Program Review Insp Rept 50-354/85-57 on 851112-15.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Implementing Procedures.Portions Deleted (Ref 10CFR2.790 & 73.21)

ML20137G711
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	01/08/1986
From:	Bailey R, Dunlap J, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137G689	List: IR 05000354/1985057 ML20137G683
References
50-354-85-57, IEB-77-08, IEB-77-8, IEIN-80-18, IEIN-82-07, IEIN-82-46, IEIN-82-7, IEIN-83-15, IEIN-83-27, IEIN-83-36, NUDOCS 8601210172
Download: ML20137G711 (9)

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Region I Report N /85-57 Docket N License No. CPPR-120 Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company Mail Code T154 Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating Station Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted: November 12-15, 1985 Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: May 14-17, 1985 Type of Inspection: reoperat_iongr9 Security Program Review Inspectors: _ d /-6/[

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% Y. - / #S- Sb y M. Dunlap, Physical / Security Inspector date Approved By: _$ c /,s-84 p. Kefinig, ief, guards Section, DRSS date Inspection Summary: Preoperational Security Program Review on November 12-15, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-354/85-57)

Areas Reviewed

Status of: Security Plan and Implementing Procedures; Security 3 Program Audit; Physical Barriers (Protected and Vital Areas); Lighting; Assess-

ment Aids; Training and Qualification Plan; followup on previously identified inspection items; and, followup on Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins, Circulars and Notices. The review involved 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> onsite by two region-based inspector Four hours of the inspection were conducted during non-regular hours.

[ Results: Development and implementation of the licensee's security program are progressing as scheduled.

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DETAILS 1. Key Persons Contacted

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P. Moeller, General Manager, Nuclear Services J. Bay 11sh, Nuclear Security Manager M. Ivanick, Nuclear Security Coordinator C. Adkinson, Site Engineering R. Companella, Site Licensing The inspectors also interviewed other Public Service Electric and Gas Company employees and members of the Yoh contract security forc . MC 30703 - Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on November 15, 1985. The purpose, scope and findings of the inspection were reviewed. The licensee acknow-ledged the finding At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

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3. MC 92701 - Status of Inspector Followup Items, (0 pen)InspectorFollowupItem(50-352/85-25-01): During NRC Region I Inspection No. 85-25, the Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station Physical Security Plan, Revision.3 and proposed Revision 4 were reviewed onsite by the NRC inspectors with licensee representatives. The observations and findings were discussed with the licensee who agreed to consider them in the development cf the security program. The licensee had addressed all but two issues and was aggressively pursuing resolution of those issue The two outstanding issues will be reviewed during future preoperational security program review . MC 81018 - Security Plan and Implementing Procedures Prior to this inspection, portions of Revision 10 (dated July 8,1985) to the Salem Generating Station Physical Security Plan, which are also applicable to the Hope Creek Generating Station and were submitted to NRC under 10 CFR 50.54(p), were reviewed by the inspectors. The changes in that revision were discussed with licensee representatives during this inspection to ensure a clear understanding of the licensee's intent rela-tive to the changes. The results of NRC's review of Revision 10 will be formally transmitted to the licensee when the 10 CFR 50.54(p) review process is complete . . . _ _ . .

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Additionally, during this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the development and progress of written security and contingency procedures that implement the HCGS physical security and security contingency plan The inspectors observed that there were no written procedures for two security contingencies, i.e., Designated Defensive Positions to Protect Vital Areas, and Implementation of the Security Force Recall Plan. The licensee acknowledged this observation and stated that these procedures will be prepared and approved prior to requesting an operating license for the plant. The licensee advised the inspectors that preparation of post orders was 50% complet Inspector Followup Item 50-354/85-57-01 5. MC 81034 - Security Program Audit During discussions with licensee representatives on the general scope of the security program audits, the inspectors stated that the program audits must include the handling and control of safeguards information. The inspector also stated that a complete security program audit should be conducted prior to issuance of an operating license to ensure that all program elements are in place and in accordance with the NRC approved security program plans. The licensee acknowledged these statement Inspector Followup Item 50-354/85-57-02 6. MC 81052 - Physical Barriers (PA)

During a tour of the protected area with licensee representatives, the inspectors observed several potential security weaknesses that required attention. The licensee acknowledged these and stated that the following actions would be taken: w 7. ,_

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l' . , UJ F D :3 U ~ T . OR Fm LIc DI:C L :.II13 II IE1 TIC;;/ LD LJT BLT.:: Provide an additional description in the physical security plan (PSP) of the outriggers that are attached to gates in the protected area barrier. These are not currently attached as described in the PS Provide a description in the PSP of the barrier above the entry / exit turnstiles in the Main Guard House. In addition, describe the material used for this barrie ..

The inspectors stated that these actions would be reviewed during subse-quent preoperational program reviews. Inspector Followup Item 50-354/85-57-0 . MC 81054 - Physical Barriers (Vital Areas)

nuring a tour of the vital areas with licensee representatives, the inspectors questioned the lack of certain integrity features on the following two vital area doors:

THIS FAMcRAF:1 c0Nrt.IUS 2.70J(d) II:FOINATIo:s /SD I3 IDT F03

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TUBLIC DIO:LN .. IT IS IIITENTIOM i J EJI E W Tills PAna:aar:I co:inIn12.700(d)

ICFORMATIO7/.:D 13Nr 233 FUBLIC DI3CLOLJ-. II f 3 IIJTENTION!Lil LOT mi.+ :.

The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's observations and stated that corrective actions would be taken. Inspector Followup Item 50-354/85-57-04 MC 81062 - Lighting During a tour of the prntected area with licensee representatives, the inspectors observed that, during the hours of darkness, additional illum-ination is required around the main transformer area and another area east of the Service Water Building where the concrete mixing staging area was located. The licensee measured these areas with a calibrated light meter and acknowledged that these areas had insufficient illumination. The licensee representatives stated that corrective actions would be imple-mente Inspector Followup Item 50-354/85-57-0 . MC 81066 - Assessment Aids THIS PARAc3ATI! CO:i!AIg3 2.790(d)

INFORIOT105A2 I3 E U FUELIC DIECLU '" . II 13 p37prir : 1. ~ ' J.D:.

Inspector Followup Item 50-354/85-57-06, 10. MC 81501 - Training and~ Qualification Plan During a review of the training and qualification program, the ins;ectors found that an additional 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of security training was administered to members of the existing security force at Salem, to acquaint them with the Hope Creek site. In addition, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of field training in search and alarm response procedures was conducted. The licensee representatives stated that extensive practical training in armed response and security contingencies would be conducted for guard force members at both site '

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The liconsee also stated that the security force contractor, Yoh Security Inc., conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the Salem / Hope Creek security force training program. The inspectors reviewed a summary of the evaluation which indicated that the existing training program was in accordance with the NRC approved Training and Qualification Pla v. - .

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L .. .__1 < . . 92703 - Followup on Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins, Circulars and Notices The following inspector findings contain information concerning the licen-see's considerations with respect to previously issued NRC security related bulletins, circulars and information notices. These notifications were forwarded by NRC to all nuclear power reactor facility licensees for their information and/or action, IE Circular No. 77-04: Inadequate Lock Assembly, dated March 18, 1977 Description of Circumstances:

Physical security inspections at nuclear fuel cycle and reactor facilities discovered that lock assemblies securing some material access areas and vital areas were inadequate, improperly installed, or inoperable due to a lack of maintenanc HCGS Action:

7pis rf RAG 3Aril Ccur,'130 2.700(d)

IUFDDIA IION AU I FUI',LIcDIL'LO3E~;E' 1= IS

INTEUTICU LLY The licensee also established a maintenance program to support the security progra The inspector verified that actions described above had been take THIS P/3AGRAFH CONTAINS 2.790(d)

INFOR:: $ T10] AND IS G3I F0il PUBLIC DISCLOSUEE. IT IS IUTENTIONALLY LEFI BLANL

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b .- IE Bulletin No. 77-08: Assurance of Safety and Safeguards During an Emergency - Locking Systems, dated December 28, 1977 Description of Circumstances:

Under emergency conditions, prompt ingress into certain safety-related areas must be assured to enable safe shutdown of a nuclear power plant, and unimpeded egress from all parts of the facility must be assured in the interest of life safet HCGS Action:

THIS PARAGIMPH CONTAINS 2.790(d)

IUFORMATION ED IS NOT FOR I"J3LIC DISCLT 'T.E. II IS IUTE::TIG: ELM LETI EI' E- IE Circular No. 80-09 and 83-83: Problems with Plant Internal Communications Systems, dated April 28, 1980 and Use of Portable Rapid Transmitters inside Nuclear Power Plants dated December 19, 1983 Description of Circumstances:

A nuclear power plant lost offsite power to its 4160V non-safeguards buses which caused a dagradation of it on-site communications syste While in the degraded mode, the licensee used two-way portable radios for internal communications. The radios performed satisfactorily; however, when transmit _ ting in the vicinity of certain electronic equipment, they induced false signals into the equipmen THIS PARAG7.APH CONTAINS 0.703(d)

IEFOT3fAIIOT. AND 15 NOT FOR FUBLIC DISCLOEURE. II IS IUIENTIO:! ALLY LETT BLA i .

HCGS Action:

In13 PAPAG~LAI'II CONIAIUS 2.70](d)

IliFOR'jATION /UD IS NOT FoR FUBLIC DISCLUUUEE. II IS IUIENIIO'! ALLY LII ELAU d. IE Information Notice No. 83-36: Impact of Security Practices on Safe Operations, dated June 9, 1983 Description of Circumstances:

In February 1983, the NRC completed an evaluation of the impact of NRC security requirements on operational safety at five power reactor facilities. The NRC found that the potential for an adverse safety impact does exist, to varying degrees, at some facilities if plant operators are unable to quickly pass through locked doors for any reaso HCGS Action:

During this Preoperational Security Program Review, the inspectors found that the licensee had implemented measures to minimize the impact of security and other administrative procedures on plant safet THIS PARAGRAPH CoNTAIUS 2.79](d)

INF0PJlATION AND IS NOT F02 I'UBLIC DISCLOSURE. IT IS l INIEUTIONALLyL; ;3a33, -

e. IE Information Notice No. 80-18: Possible Weapons Smuggling Pouch, dated May 5, 1980 Description of Circumstances:

The NRC received information concerning a device used for smuggling of weapons that can preclude detection by security x-ray machine When used, x-ray images produce only a mottled picture with no indications of a solid mass such as that of a weapon or similar contraban '

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HCGS Action:

During this preoperational security program review, the inspectars observed that the security force personnel operating the access control function for the Salem Generating Station were challenging parcels, attache cases and handbags that presented a mottled picture on the x-ray screen. These personnel will also operate the access control function for Hope Creek. The inspectors determined that the licensee's training program and procedures adequately address the concer IE Information Notices Nos. 82-07/83-15 Inadequate / Falsified Ire-Employment Screening Records, dated March 16, 1982 and March 23,1983 Description of Circumstances:

The NRC became aware that pre-employment screening records for security guards provided to an NRC licensee had been falsified by several mean HCGS Action:

TH15 P/,RAGB '.PH CONIA133 c.799(d)

IUF0FJ1ATION AUD IS liOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSLC. IT IS INICITIONALLY LEFI EM IE Information Notice No. 82-46: Defective and Obsolete Combination padlocks, dated November 26, 1982 Description of Circumstances:

The NRC received information regarding problems with combination pad-locks utilized for the protection of sensitive and classified informa-tion manufactured under several model numbers by Sargeant and Greenleaf (S&G) of Nicholasville, KY (and formerly, of Rochester, NY). The current NRC-acceptable unit is S&G Model 8077 . . - . _ . , _ - =. . - . -- . .

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HCGS Action:

THIS FARAG3AFII CO'IIAII:J 2.7D](d)

IIIFORLIATION AND IS NOT FOR PU3LIC DISCLO5U?I. IT IS

INIENTIONALLY LIJI BLAN Written security procedures are in effect to manage, control and audit'the protection of safeguards information.

i IE Information Notice No. 83-27: Operational Response to Events Concerning Deliberate Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment Description of Circumstances:

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A review of operating reactor events indicated that some improper

valve positioning and instrumentation irregularities may have involved

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deliberate acts directed against plant equipment in vital areas.

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HCGS Action:

The licensee considered this information notice by establishing special station procedures that are designed to verify proper system -

operation. In addition, the licensee has approved security contin-gency procedures that provide inst. ructions for security force members to respond to events of this natur ,

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