IR 05000354/1985047

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-354/85-47 on 850925 & 1001-11.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Procedure Review,Verification & Witnessing,Startup Test Program,Plant Tours & Independent Verification
ML20136D391
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 11/12/1985
From: Briggs L, Eselgroth P, Marilyn Evans, Wink L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20136D355 List:
References
50-354-85-47, NUDOCS 8511210295
Download: ML20136D391 (9)


Text

. . _ _ _ _ . .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ __

'

l

,

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-47 .

Docket N License N CPPR-120 Priority --

Category B Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Plaza - 71C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating Station Inspection At: Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted: September 25, and October 1-11, 1985 Inspectors: 44Af sh L! BriggY, LeadleacM Engineer

// date

  1. /#[

nw 5 // 5 R. Ev , Reactor E44#heer date

. JW Y vs & N $

[. WjfV., Reactor ineer date Approved by: h // E &[

P.~Eselg ~ h, Chief, / da'te ,

Test Pr rams Section, DRS '

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on September 25, and October 1-11, 1985 (Report No. 50-354/85-47)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection (112 hours0.0013 days <br />0.0311 hours <br />1.851852e-4 weeks <br />4.2616e-5 months <br />) by three region- 4 based inspectors of preoperational test procedure review and verification, preoperational test witnessing, startup test program, QA/QC interface with preoperational test program, plant tours, and independent verificatio Results: No violations were identified.

!

i l 8511210295 851115 l PDR ADOCK 05000354 l G PDR t i

.

DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted

  • J. Arnold,. Lead Quality Control (QC) Turnover Engineer
  • A. Barnabei, Principal Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer J. Carter, Startup Manager
  • B. Cole, Lead Site QA Engineer P. Craig, Startup Test Engineer (STE), Nuclear Instrumentation
  • R. Donges, QA Engineer H. Druckman, STE, Safety and Turbine Auxiliary Cooling System
  • J. Duffy, Startup Engineer M. Farschon, Power Ascension Manager
  • J. Fisher, QC Supervisor B. Forward, Power Ascension Lead Engineer
  • Goebel, QA Engineer
  • R. Griffith, Principal QA Engineer
  • A. Indigo, Project Startup Coordinator
  • C. Jaffee, Startup Engineer
  • M. Metcalf, Principal QA Engineer
  • G. Moulten, Project QA Engineer
  • J. Nichols, Technical Manager L. Zull, Lead, Startup Test, Design and Analysis Engineer Other NRC Personnel
  • R. Blough, Senior Resident Inspector S. Chaudhary, Lead Reactor Engineer J. Lyash, Resident Inspector
  • Denotes those present at the exit meeting conducted on October 11, 198 The inspector also contacted other personnel of the licensee's operating and QA/QC staf .0 Preoperational Test Procedure (PTP) Review and Verification 2.1 Scope The PTPs listed below were reviewed in preparation for test witnessing, for technical and administrative adequacy and for verification that testing is planned to adequately satisfy regulatory guidance and licensee commitment They were also reviewed to verify licensee review and approval, proper format, test objective, prerequisites, initial conditions, test data requirements and system return to normal.

J i

. . . ,_- - - . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ .-_

.. . - - - - . - -- ~ . - . _ - - . - - . - . . - .

.

..

--

PTP-AE-2, Feedwater System, Revision 1

--

PTP-EG-1, Safety and Turbine Auxiliary Cooling System, Revision 1

--

PTP-GS-1, Containment Atmosphere Control, Revision 0

--

PTP-KP-1, MSIV Sealing System, Revision 1

--

PTP-SE-4, Traversing Incore Probe System, Revision 0

--

PTP-SK-1, Plant Steam Leak Detection, Revision 0 )

!

--

PTP-SN-1, Automatic Depressurization System, Revision t 2.2 Discussion 2. PTP-SE-4 During review of PTP-SE-4, Traversing Incore Probe System (TIPS), the inspector independently compared the test's criteria to the acceptance criteria of G.E. Preoperational Test Specification 22A2271AZ, Rev 2, Section B23 and Chapter 14 of the FSAR. The inspector noted that the test's acceptance criteria of less than 100 inch pounds for TIP driving torque was different from the G.E. criteria (100 10 inch pounds). Also, testing of TIP detector breakdown voltage required by the G.E. Specification did not appear to be conducted in PTP-SE-4. After discussion with the licensee, the TIP driving torque required in PTP-SE-4 was determined to be acceptable because it was a more conservative requirement. Also, the TIP detector breakdown voltage requirement was being deleted from the G.E. Specification (Field Disposition Instruction WTGV).

The licensee had determined that the testing of this vol-tage would be detrimental to the gamma sensing traversing incore probe to be used in the neutron monitoring system i at Hope Cree . PTP-SK-1 During review of PTP-SK-1, Plant Steam Leak Detection, the inspector compared the Appendix G acceptance criteria for the Temperature Switch (TS)/ Differential Temperature Switch (TDS) setpoints with the required setpoints listed in i the Plant Setpoint Register furnished by Bechtel. At the i L completion of the review, the inspector noted that three l of the acceptance criterion in Appendix G differed from i those of the Plant Setpoint Register. This item was  ;

discussed with the licensee. The licensee was aware of  ;

l i i

'

l

'

<

-

i

. - .

-. - . - - , , - . . - , . -._,-..---.-

- _.- , ~ . - - . - - - , - , - - .c..-. i

. . - -. .. . . _ _ _ - . - -_ -___- - - . .

.

..

the setpoint discrepancies and indicated that they will be updated with on the spot changes prior to testing. If testing is completed prior to updating all setpoints, a retest of the particular instrument affected will be conducte The inspector will further review this item during a routine results evaluation inspectio .3 Findings No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Preoperational Test Witnessing 3.1 Scope Testing witnessed by the inspector included the observations of overall crew performance stated in Paragraph 3.0 of Inspection Report 50-354/85-1 .2 Discussion The inspector observed portions of the performance of preoperational '

test procedures (PTP) KJ-2, Emergency Diesel Generator "B", and KJ-4, Emergency Diesel Generator "D". l

--

PTP-KJ-2 The inspector witnessed steps 8.7.2.12 and 8.7.2.13, testing of the Generator Protective Relays. When the licensee attempted to simulate a Shutdown Relay Trip, the Control Room computer input point did not change state. The startup test engineer entered a test exception (No. 35) and discontinued testing in order to troubleshoot the proble '

--

PTP-KJ-4 The inspector witnessed steps 8.15.67 through 8.15.77, Starting Reliability Test No. 7 for Emergency Diesel Generator "D". The Inspector independently verified from the strip chart data that i the design specifications were met within 10 seconds for l l' Generator Voltage (3875 volts), Engine Speed (>514 RPM) and .

j Frequency (59.75 HZ). The inspector also reviewed strip chart !

l data for previous Starting Reliability Tests to verify that l: these design specifications had been met within the required

, 10 seconds.

During all Diesel Generator Test witnessing, the inspector ,

noted that testing was being conducted in accordance with the criteria of Paragraph 3.1 above. The inspector also reviewed the portions of the PTP's that were completed, including all !

l

.

I l

l

.

.

test exceptions and procedure change The procedure changes were minor ones not affecting the procedural intent. The inspector also observed continuous QA coverage during Emergency Diesel Generator "0" Testin .3 Findings No unacceptable conditions were observe .0 Startup Test Program 4.1 Discussion The inspector met with the Power Ascension Manager and members of his staff to discuss the status of the Startup Test Program including organizational structure, procedure preparation and approval, personnel training and the proposed test schedule. In addition, the inspector reviewed Station Administrative Procedure, SA-AP.ZZ-036, " Phase III Startup 7est Program," Revision 0 which establishes the controls to be used during the Startup Test Program, the organization and responeibilities of personnel, the structure of Startup Test procedures including their implementation and the review and approval of test result During the review of the Administrative procedure the inspector noted several differences between the organizational structure and responsibilities as described by the Power Ascension Manager and those contained in the procedure. Subsequent discussions with the Power Ascension Manager indicated that the Power Ascension Organization had recently been reorganized and that a revision was being processed. The Power Ascension Manager agreed to expedite the Revision to the Administrative procedure to reflect the actual organizatio The Power Ascension Organization will be an integrated group including representatives from Public Service Electric and Gas, Gene n 1 Electric, Bechtel and EIGEN Engineering (See Attachment "A").

The Power Ascension Manager is a representative of General Electric and has overall responsibility for the Startup Test Progra As of October 6, 1985, 41 of 124 startup test procedures were approved by the Station Operations and Review Committee (SORC). The Power Ascension Manager indicated that all 124 procedures had been drafted and were in the final review proces The Power Ascension Manager indicated that the overall startup test schedule was 185 days in length and that activities were already in progress to support this schedule. These include training (including simulator experience) of test personnel in procedure

.

.

.

performance, a scram reduction program, specialist walkdowns of selected systems and proposals to reduce or eliminate certain l testin I 4.2 Findings Within the scope of this review no unacceptable conditions were identifie .0- QA/QC Interface with Preoperational Test Program 5.1 Discussion The inspector reviewed recent QA surveillance reports (QASR) regarding different activities of the licensee's startup grou The following QASR's were reviewed:

--

QASR-04731, Surveillance of PTP-BF-1, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (CRDHS) test, completed on October 2, 198 The QA inspector observed a preliminary test of Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) -10U-202-34-47A which consisted of scram testing a single control rod. The test was attempted five times unsuccessfully because a Visicorder trace could not be obtained at the test panel as required. Testing was terminated. The STE (CRDHS) suspected the problem was located in the Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) and contacted the STE (RMCS) for resolution. The QA inspector also checked instrument calibration status. No deficiencies were identifie QASR numbers 04685, 04690, 04768 and 4773 concerned surveillance of "0" Emergency Diesel Generator preoperational testing being conducted under Preoperational Test Procedure (PTP) KJ-4. They were completed on September 24, October 1 and October 5, (2 QASR's) 1985, respectively. The QA inspector witnessed overspeed testing, No. 2 of 23 reliability starts, simulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with off-site power available and Loss of Lube Oil trip testing. Some minor deficiencies were observed during testing and were either corrected at the time in accordance with PTP-KJ-4 or documented as test exceptions by the system test engineer (STE). No deficiencies were identified by the QA inspecto QASR-04663, Surveillance of PTP-BD-1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, completed on September 29, 1985. During this surveillance the QA inspector witnessed the STE obtain operating data for the RCIC pump. Mandatory witness points (4)

were RCIC pump suction and discharge pressure, RCIC turbine speed and RCIC system flow during reactor pressure vessel injection. All data obtained were acceptabl F ,

-

i

.

l j The inspector also met with the Quality Control (QC) Supervisor and discussed QA/QC responsibilities regarding Nuclear Department Work

'

Orders. Various recent work orders were reviewed and discusse One work order (85-09-24-199-6), of particular interest to the inspector, required investigation of the cause of a switchgear trip and inspection of the bus to ensure that no damage had occurred. It appeared that work had been done under this work order without proper QA/QC notification. The licensee stated that this discrepancy was presently being investigated by the QC departmen The licensee later informed the inspector that no work had been done under this work order. The Maintenance department had only investigated the cause of the switchgear trip. This item is now being tracked under Station Deficiency Report HMD-85-08 In addition, the inspector reviewed Station Administrative Procedure SA-AP.ZZ-009(Q) " Control of Station Maintenance," Revision 3, to verify that the above activities were performed as required by procedur .2 Findinos No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Plant Tours 6.1 Discussion The inspector made several tours of various areas of the facility to observe work in progres , housekeeping, cleanliness controls and status of construction and preoperational test activitie In addition, a facility tour was conducted on September 25, 1985 by the inspectors accompanied by the Regional Administrator and the Director, Division of Reactor Safety for site familiarity and to observe testing in progres .2 Findings Within the scope of this inspection, no unacceptable conditions were observe .0 Independent Verification 7.1 Discussion The inspector independently verified that test data obtained for Emergency Diesel Generator "D" met design specifications as dis-

! cussed in paragraph V

.

,

j '

l e

7.2 Findings i

No violations were identifie .0 Exit Interview A management meeting was held at the conclusion of the inspection on October 11, 1985, to discuss the scope and findings as detailed in this report (see Paragraph I for attendees). No written information was provided to the licensee at any time during the inspection. The licensee indicated that no proprietary information was contained within the scope of this inspectio .

.

.

- ATTACHffENT A

,

..

x8 m Ga su 52 8 Su So d2 %2

-

45 Et $ba 4"3 5 5W ua i__

M50

=

a 8- e S- i

$ '5h l i *5 '

G ' '

= 80 mm

,g i 1

,

-

af m I ' 5

' ' ha 1 8 5W

t M

-

2 02

_

$= ~5

~t C* Mu a E$

~

WO

$ $ g

-

= , -

.

5 G Me l= dg w

y __

W5 m

= g-g

. ,,

sm 85 eg m- *w gg -= -

u_ == ag

= 5"

=

g l Ma

= -

~

"w

M5 ~~ d ~

_ *W ER$

gw . etw -

wx = wg

. y

-

CEw

-

N5 8 Wh '

-

s ==c m i

'

2 255 '

5 $$

2_g i

i i dN m

w '

I I

I

< .-  ;

l------

~

a o

%

-

-

I

._ _ ._ __ _._ ___ _ _.