ML20134H526

Summary of 970107 Meeting W/W in Rockville,Md to Discuss W AP600 Fire Protection Analysis

ML20134H526
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	02/06/1997
From:	Diane Jackson NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
NUDOCS 9702110342
Download: ML20134H526 (40)

Text

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• UNITED STATES E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'f WASHINGTON, D.C. 20665 4001

% Q# February 6, 1997 APPLICANT: Westinghouse Electric Corporation FACILITY: AP600

SUBJECT:

SUPMARY ANALYSIS OF MEETING TO DISCUSS WESTINGHOUSE AP600 FIR The subject meeting was held at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (West-inghouse) office in Rockville, Maryland on January 7, 1997, between Ed Cummins, Jim Winters, and Don Hutchings of Westinghouse and Jeff Holmes and Diane Jackson of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the general layout of several plant areas as it related to fire fighting capability and fire protection. Attached are draft markups for proposed changes to the standard safety analysis report sent by l Westinghouse via facsimile to facilitate the resolution of open issues. These facsimiles information.will be followed by a Westinghouse letter to docket the incoming i

The staff discussed several concerns with Westinghouse.

1) The staff is concerned that a cable routing in a fire area that is surrounded on three sides by another fire area is susceptible to a fire in the second fire area.

2) The staff is concerned that fire pumps and the air compressor for breathing air is susceptible to a fire in the turbine fire area. This equipment is currently located behind fire walls in the turbine build-ing. Westinghouse has defined this as a separate fire area than the fire area that contains the turbine.

3)

The staff is concerned that the water supply (75 gpm) for fire fighting i for safe shutdown equipment is insufficient for initial fire fighting.

The fire water for safe shutdown equipment is currently supplied from {

the seismically-qualified passive containment cooling system (PCS) tank.

(0 pen Item Tracking System (0ITS)# 314 and Key Issue 12.a)

By letter NSD-NRC-97-4940, dated January 14, 1997, Westinghouse provided its position that the design will remain the same, PCS water will be used for fire water for safe shutdown equipment. The staff will review

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this letter. Action N

4) The draft standard safety analysis report (SSAR) markup regarding the n definition of the " Zone of Influence" is insufficient to address the staff's concern. \l' (OITS# 309 and Key Issue 12.b) unC fMWA 9702110342 970206 PDR A ADOCK 05200003 pyg d

February 6, 1997

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Attached is the facsimile sent by Westinghouse on January 15, 1997, which provided a draft markup of the SSAR. The staff will review the information. Action N i

, Westinghouse reviewed with the staff certain cable chases, sprinkler system ,

locations and combustible loadings. Listed below are actions associated with l l the meeting. I i

1) The staff will provide a written letter regarding the adequacy of the i location of fire pumps and air compressors in the turbine building. '

Westinghouse will provide an explanation on how they ensure the protec- '

tion of the fire pumps and air compressor. (0ITS# 321) Action N & W l l

2) Westinghouse will provide information regarding where the sprinkler  ;

system is located in relation to cable trays and intended combustible loadings.

l By letter NSD-NRC-97-4951, dated January 23, 1997, Westinghouse provided proprietary drawings indicating the areas of fire suppression, the rating of fire barriers, and fire zone boundaries. The staff will review this information. Action N

3) Westinghouse will provide a sample table of a few fire areas demonstrat-ing the available shutdown capabilities if a fire were to occur in a given fire area. (0ITS# 306c)

Attached are facsimiles sent by Westinghouse on January 17 and 24, 1997, which provided a sample table and SSAR markups related to 0ITS# 306.

The staff will review this information. Action N

4) Westinghouse will provide markups of drawings to show the safety related cable routes in the nuclear island. (0ITS# 312) Action W

5) Westinghouse will add a cross-reference in SSAR Section 9A.3 to the plot plan in SSAR Figure 1.2-1.

Attached is the facsimile sent by Westinghouse on January 15, 1997, which provided' a draft markup of the SSAR. The staff will review the

( information. Action N original signed by:

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s jDiane T. Jackson, Project Manager N -

I t + , Standardization Project Directorate l Division of Reactor Program Management

, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No.52-003

• DISTRIBUTION:

See next page

Attachment:

As stated I

cc w/ attachment:

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• DOCUMENT NAME: A:SPL1 7. MIN Ts seenive a copy of this docuneemt,6 in the ben: 'C' = Copy without ettschenent/ enclosure *E' = Copy w6th attachment / enclosure *N* = No copy 0FFICE PM:PDST:DRPM m , BC:SPLB: DSS 6, D:PDST:DRPM ^ l NAME DTJackson:sg VX TBMarsh M V(no TRQuay' <hl/

DATE 02/6 /97 U 02/d/97~ \

AfW / /W l OFFICIAL RECORD TOPY l

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Westinghouse Electric Corporation Docket No.52-003 cc: Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager Mr. Frank A. Ross Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Office of LWR Safety and Techn' logy Westinghouse Electric Corporation 19901 Germantown Road P.O. Box 355 Germantown, MD 20874 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. Ronald Simard, Director Mr. B. A. McIntyre Advanced Reactor Program Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Nuclear Energy Institute Westinghouse Electric Corporation 1776 Eye Street, N.W. l Energy Systems Business Unit Suite 300 Box 355 Washington, DC 20006-3706 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Ms. Lynn Connor Mr. John C. Butler Doc-Search Associates Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Post Office Box 34 Westinghouse Electric Corporation l Cabin John, MD 20818 Energy Systems Business Unit j

Box 355 Mr. James E. Quinn, Projects Manager i Pittsburgh, PA 15230 LMR and SBWR Programs GE Nuclear Energy Mr. M. D. Beaumont 175 Curtner Avenue, M/C 165 Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division San Jose, CA 95125 Westinghouse Electric Corporation One Montrose Metro Mr. Robert H. Buchholz 11921 Rockville Pike GE Nuclear Energy Suite 350 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 Rockville, MD 20852 San Jose, CA 95125 Mr. Sterling Franks Barton Z. Cowan. Esq.

U.S. Department of Energy Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott NE-50 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor 19901 Germantown Road Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Ed Rodwell, Manager Mr. S. M. Modro PWR Design Certification Nuclear Systems Analysis Technologies Electric Power Research Institute Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company 3412 Hillview Avenue Post Office Box 1625 Palo Alto, CA 94303 Idaho Falls, ID 83415 Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer AP600 Certification NE-50 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, MD 20874 j

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DISTRIBUTION w/ attachments:-

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PDST R/F TKenyon BHuffman' '

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TMarsh, 0-8 DI SWest, 0-8 D1 HWalker, 0-8 D1 DISTRIBUTION w/o attachments: 1 FMiraglia/AThadani, 0-12 G18 RZimmerman, 0-12 G18 BSheron, 0-12 G18 TMartin DMatthews TQuay l

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.i Facsimiles from Westinghouse on Fire Protection January 10, 1997 SSAR page 3.4 No SSAR change proposed for OITS 1996 (1 page)

January 13, 1997 SSAR 9.5.3.2.2 Markup for OITS 319 (1 page)

January 14, 1997 SSAR p. 9.5-4 and -5 Markup for 0ITS 309d (2 pages)

January 15, 1997 SSAR 9A.3 Markup from meeting open item (1 page)

January 17, 1997 SSAR 9A Markups for parts of 306 (18 pages)

January 24, 1997 Example table from meeting open item (3 pages)

January 31, 1997 SSAR p. 9.5-5 and 9A-5 Markups for OITS 309 (3 pages)

SSAR = Standard Safety Analysis Report OITS - Open Item Tracking System Attachment

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The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any prob! ems occur during thle transmission, please call:

WIN: 2s4-5125 (Janice) or Outside: (412p74 5128.

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3. Design of serneres, C ; m - Equipansat, and Systenes i

i l AuxWary BuSding imel 4 (E3evasles 1174")

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• Nemranelegkaty CentreRed Arun i

j Level 4 of the nonradiologically coanolled area includes the main control room, one j divisional Class IE penetration room, one non Class 1E elecincal penetration roorn, two I main secam isolation valve companments, and one mechanical equipment room.

l l De doors to these roorns are not weer eight. Dere are no doors fmm the main meam j l isolados valve companments to the Class 1E electneal areas. De main steam isolamma 1 valve compartments are only accesable florn the nubine builling at elevation 135'-3".

1 %e machanical eqmpment room is only =~aaaihte fkom the turbme buikhng at elevamon 117'4".

l De pu,adial for floodag Class IE elecencal areas on this level is limned to fire i figbang activities. De Class IE elecsrical penseration room and main coenol room are me==ikt* from a bone stanon scar the east stairwell. While the main control roorn i kitchen and restroom are provuled widi potable water, the lines are 1 inch and smaller, and are not evaluated for pipe ruperas.

! Fire fighting in the control room is done snannally using portable exungtushers or a fire base from a bose station in the east corridor. In the event that a hose is brought into the main control room tiuongh the east corndor arme doors, water accumulation is j hauted by flow through the access doors which are open. De threshold of the east corndor access door are at the elevados of the floor slab. Once in this i flow drains. via floor drains. the st.;.wl! mad alavanar ^* in le An eE-i l l 'egrees door and stairwell is locased on the west end of the main comerol room which

! I leads down to the remote shotdown workstanon. De threshold of the emergency egress l

door is flush with the raised ponion of flooring in the main control room, wloch is p/

appmmirnately 14 inches above abe east corridor entrance Waser being discharged in ,

. this area will flow through the porous raised floonag and flow back out the east access j I doors ' ne main controTroom ;

' ins a monnany closed noor dram whach can be rnanuauy 1 opened to drain water to the anihary buildag non-RCA sump at level 1. The drain i paths prevent sigraficant flooding of abe adjacent rooms

' In the event of fire fighting activity in the nonClass IE elecencal penetration rooms, the accurv=4=ana of water is prevented by floor drains and flows through the stairwell and elevator shaft so level 1.

De teachanical equipaset room contains aantainment isolation valves for the chilled weser, compressed air, component cochng water, and passive core cooling (nitrogen)

, systems. Ploodag in the mechnaical equipmeer room due to fire fighting or piping ruptures is directed to the turbine tatilding through the access door at elevation 117'4" or through floor drains to the nubine buikhng. %s maximum flood level for this roorn

Revidea: 6 March as,1**6 T westinghouse 3.4-18 4

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The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmisslor., please cell:

WIN: 284 5125 (Janice) or Outside: (412)3744125.

COMMENTS:

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JAN 13 '97 14: 20 FROM AP600 DESIGN CERT TO NRC PAGE.002

9. Auxiliary Systems l

9.5.3.2.2 Emergency LJghting i

Emergency lighting is designed to provide the requued i!!umination levels in the areas as described below: g.v e c*'g s a 'A

• 4 g. Main control room and remote shutdown area (mergency lighting consist [of 1

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fluorescent lighting fixtures which are continuously energized. "Ihe fixtures are powered from the Class IE 125 V de switchboards through the Class IE 208Y/120 V ac inverters and are isolated through two series fuses. Three hour fire barner separation is provided between redundant emeigency lightning power supplies and cables outside the main control room and the rende shoulown area. The control roorn lighting complies with the human factor requirements by utthzing semi-induset. low-glare lightmg fixtures and l

programmable dimnung features. The control room emergency lighting is integrated 2

with normal lightmg that consists of identical lighting fixtures and dimming features The emergency lighung system is designed so that, to the extent pracheal, altemate emergency lighting fixtures are fed from separate divisions of the Class 1E de and I uninterruptible power supply system. Both connal and emergency lighting fixtures.

controllers, dimmers and the associated cables used in the main control room and remote-shutdown area are non Class IE. 'Ihe ceiling grid network raceways and fixtures utiliz*e * ' ' '

seismic supports. A Nic bl+ c~a*+ * * *'IF'*5'a M % *'*'"'

A & st was weetaMwe som % d f. _ _ __ _ _._ _ _ .. ...

I Followmg the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period after a loss of all ac power sources, the nonnal and

- emergency lighting in the main control room and in the remote shuulown area is powered from two transportable ac generators as described in subsection 3.3.1.1.1.

- Emergency lighting in areas outside the mam control room and remote shutdown area is accomplished by 8-hour, self-contamed, battery pack lighting units. These units are non-Class 1E and provide illumination for safe ingress and egress of personnel following a loss of nortnal lighting and for those areas which could be involved in power recovery

' (for example, onsite standby diesel-generators and their controls). In addition, these units are provided in areas where manual actions are required for operanon of equipment l needed during a fire. '!hese units are normally powered from the non-Class IE 480/277 V ac motor control centers and they automatically switch to their internal de source once normal ac power is lost.

-1 a

I 9.5J.2.3 Panel IN.

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! l Panel lighting is designed to provide lighting in the control room at the safety panels as I described below:

1 1

• Panel lighting consists of lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the control I toom. ~1he panel lights are continuously energized. The fixtures are powered from the 1

Divisions B and C Class IE inverters through Class IE distribution panels.

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The circuits are treated as Class IE. The panel lighting circuits up to the lighting ftxture i are classified as associated and are routed in Seismic Category I raceways.

Revision: 10 December 20,1996 9.5-20 $ W86ttgh0U88

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l The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, j Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please cell:

4 l WIN: 284 6128 (Jenice) er Outside: (412)3744128.

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• Fire bamer separation is not provided within the remote shutdown workstation fire area g/ J j

hacame the remote shutdown workstation is not required for safe shutdown unless a firefd requires evacuation of the main control mom. j p )%tf <

• Fue hamer separationis not provided the primary tainmentfirearea neluding the middle and upper annulus zones of the shield bui ng) because of the to satisfy other design requirernents, such as allowing pressure equalization ' thin the containment following a high energy line . Fire protection features within the  ;

containment fire area provide confidence that one train of safe shutdown equipment will j temam nadamayA following a fi The quantity of combustible materials is minimized

%e use of carmed reactor coo t pump motors has eliminated the need for an oil lubncation system. Redu trains of safe shutdown components are separated j whenever possible by existing walls, or by distance The fire protection system provides appropriate fire det 'on and puppression capabilities.

es s thMel k.e wre.

Outside of the primary containment and the main control room, the arrangement of plant equipment and routmg of cable are such that safe shutdown can be achieved with all components (except those protected by thour fire barriers) in any one fire area rendered j

inoperable by fire.

Openmgs and penetrations through fire bamers are protected in accordance with the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.

De fire protection analysis contains a description of plant fire areas, fire zones, fire bamers, and the protection of fire barrier openings, as well as a description of the separation between redundant safe shutdown components.

Electrical Cable Design Routing, and Sepetition 1 Elecmeal cable (including fiber optic cable) and methods of raceway construction are selected in accordance with BTP CMEB 9.5-1. Metal cable trays are used. Rigid metal condait or metal raceways are used for cable runs not embedded in concrete or buried underground.

Pleaible rnetallic tubing is used in short lengths for equipment connections.

De insulating and jacketing material for elecencal cables are selected to meet the fire and flame test requirernents of IEEE Standard 383(Reference 3).

De design, routing and separation of cable and raceways are further described in Section S.3 Control of Combustible Materials

%e plant is constructed of noncombustible matenals to the extent practicable. he selecnon of c=rmetion matenals and the contro' of combustible materials are in accordance with BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and NFPA 303.

Revision: 8 9.5-5 June 19,1996 T Wesththouse 200*300d DdN 01 1833 NDIS30 009de WOd3 GG:?1 46. r' ! Nof

,, ** COO *390d 1e101 **

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9. Amdleary Syssaans semperanare Where structural failures could adversely affect safe shutdown capebilities, this analysis of the fire resistance of.sw.1 seest imTA.e.1 establishes the need for firepmofing.

Fuefighting personnel access routes and life safety escape routes are provided for each fue area. Fue exit routes are clearly marked.

Buildings outside primary containment generally have two enclosed stauways for ernergency ammess Stairwells servmg as escape routes, access routes for firefighting, or access routes so areas containing equipment p=*aamy for safe shutdown of the plant are equipped with emergency lighting. Such stairwells, and elevssor shafts, which penetrate fire bemer floors, are enclosedm ' towers constructed using gypsum boards having a fue resistance rating of at I

least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Openings are protected with approved automanc or self-closing doors having a ratmg of 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

The main control room is designed to permit rapid detection and locanon of fires in the underfloor and ceiling spaces and allow ready access for manual firefighting.

Plant Arrangsesent The plant is subdivided into fire areas to isolase potennal fires and minimize the risk of the specad of fue and the resultant consequennat damage from corrosive gases, fue suppre agents, smoke, and radioactive contammation.

Some fue areas are subdivided into fire zones to permit more precise identification of the type The and locations of combustible materials, fire detecoon. and suppression syssems.

subdivision into fire zones is based on the configuration of interior walls and floor slabs, and the location of major equipment within each fire area.

,,, aan.cm6.sste s te J Fire bamers e providad in acm-he with Bl? CMEB 9.5-1 and NFPA 803. Three-hour surround fire areas contanung safety-relesed mT+er, cats. The resistance of fire fue I

barriers in nonsafety related areas of the plant may be less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, where jusnfied by the fire protocoon analysis (Appendix 9A).

Three hour fue bemers provide mat *** separation of redundant safe shutdown components, including equipment, electrical cables, instrumentation and controls, except where the need for physical wi;erssca conflicts with other important requirements, specifically:

• Fue barrier separadon is not provided within the main control room fire area brane*

functional requiremems make such separation impractical. The risk of fues in the control room is minimised by the reduction in the quantity of electncal cables. r%manme occupancy provides confidence that fires would be quickly detected and l Should a fire require evacuation of the main control room,the plant can be safely shut located in a l down using independent controls at the remote shutdown worb=taa separase fire area.

I Revissem: 8 Jane 19,1996 9.5-4 TQ s l DBN 01 1833 ND1530 009de WOdd 95:r1 ts, p1 ser COO"3Ded

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l 412 374 4887 l,) JAN 15 '97 16:52 FROM AP500 DESIGN CERT TO NRC PAGE.001 i

W l Westinghouse ums FAX COVER SHEET l

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OATE: Twm,/ / 3-, <997 NAME: Jim QJe3 LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER -

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PHONE: FACSIMILE: PHONE: omee:@-3g_ pcpo Facsimile: win: 284 4887 COMPANY:

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Cover + Peges 1+/ l The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, pfesse esil:

WIN: 2844125 (Janice) er Outside: (412)3744125.

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JAN 15 '97 16:53 FROM AP500 DESIGN CERT PAGE.002 PA. Fire Protection Analysis Anziliary Syssenas

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of emerge.,cy lighting in locations where these actions are performed and along the egress routes thereto.

Emergency Cosamualcations "Ihe safe shutdown evaluations c-:+='4x the need for and availability of emergency  ;

coma *%s within the plant following a rue. I 9A.2.7.2 Safe Shutdown Methodology The safe shutdown process, the systems used, and the functional isqdm 4.ts for 1

shutdown are described in Section 7.4. As noted above, only safety-related equ utilued for safe shutdown. A description of this equipment is pved in the WMhle I

secuons Table 9A-2 lists the safety-related components used for safe shutdown and theirl i '

electrical divisions. Each fue area is reviewed to identify the potenbal scope of fut da 1

and to verify that the capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is preserved The shutdown process uses controls located in the main control room. In the e in the main control room, controls locesed at the remote shutdown workstaban are j,2.- Z I

Fire Protection Analysis Results g ,,, 4 A gge g p/ $ f/p,,

9A.3 The fue protection analysis is conducted for the following primary l

• Nuclear island

• Turbme building

• Annex building i

• Radwaste building

• Diesel generator building '

Table 9A-3 identifies the type and quantity of ccmbustible Fire detectionmatenals and in eac i

primary plant structures and indicates the equivalent fire duration.

I suppression features are also summarued in Table 9A-3.

Openings through fue barriers for pipe, conduit. and cable trays are provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to ventilation are protected by fue dampers having a rating equivalent to that of For 1-bour rated fire barriers, fire dampers are not requued since the duct I

bamer. The protection of door op ainy conforms to the guidelines of BIP I

Structural steel fireproofing is provxiod as desented in subsecuon 9.5.1.2.1.1.

I Revision: 8 9A-g 3 Westingh0058 June 19,1996

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. 9A. Fire Protection Analysis Auxillary Systems I

l l Any damage which the fire is capable of causing is assumed to occur immediately. No credit I

is taken for proper operation of equipment or proper positioning of valves which are not  ;

protected from the effects of a postulated fire.

Zone ofInfluence i A postulated fire does not exceed the boundary of the fire area. For fire areas outside the I

main control room, remote shutdown workstation, and containment fire areas, all equipment l I '

in any one fire area is assumed to be rendered inoperable by the fire and re-entry into the fire I area for repairs and operator actions is assumed to be impossible. However, no credit is taken for complete fire damage in cases in which complete damage is beneficial and partial damage I is not. Chases for electrical cables, piping or ducts that pass through the fire area but are I separated from it by 3-hour fire barriers are outside the zone of influence for that fire area.  ;

1 1 Inside the containment fire area, potential fire damage is evaluated by fire zone. All I equipment in any one fire zone is assumed to be rendered inoperable by the fire unless the i fire protection analysis demonstrates otherwise. Class IE electrical cables that are located in I or pass through the fire zone but are separated from it by a 3-hour fire barrier are outside the I zone of influence for that fire zone.

Independence of Affected Fire Areas i Only systems, components, and circuits free of fire damage are credited for achieving safe I shutdown for a given fire. Systems, components, and circuits outside the zone of influence 1 I are considered free of firt, damage if the effects of the fire do not prevent them from i performing their required safe shutdown functions.

Event Assumptions l l Plant accidents and severe natural phenomena are not assumed to occur concurrently with a postulated fire. Furthermore, a concurrent single active component failure (independent of the fire) is not assumed.

Offsite Power l A loss of offsite power is assumed concurrent with the postulated fire only when the safe I shutdown evaluation indicates the fire could initiate the loss of offsite power.

I Availability of Nonsafety Related Systems i

I Only safety-related components and systems are assumed to be available to perform safe I shutdown functions. (This is more stringent than required by BTP CMEB 9.5-1.) Fire i protection and smoke control systems are assumed to function as design and I mitigate the effects of the fire.

C~po. a..L (ses seu, or y , L. ssla sUhun evM s v 0ll S' h **' ""

(,,a ,,4 ws orp nd s.d..J us ebens.LY-rsMJ *(w&

Revision: 8 T WestlagtX)USe 9A 5 June 19,1996

b' 9A. Fire Pr:tectio3 Analysis Auxiliary Systems gg ss aho udklco<sh '

l If offsite power is available, nonsafety-related stems are assumed to cont ue to operate if I a more conservative evaluation would result. e safe shutdown evaluation : S =2:n the i possibility that the operator may initiate safe shutdown using available nonsafety-related I systems and that, should the fire later cause those systems to fail, safety related systems may I be automatically or manually actuated to continue the safe shutdown process.

Process Monitoring Direct process signals are provided to monitor the shutdown process and to assist in determining proper actions for operation of the shutdown methods.

Manual Operation One of the required manual actions to achieve plant shutdown for a postulated fire event in I a fire area is to scram the reactor.

Manual actions by operations personnel include manipulation of equipment located anywhere outside the fire area, if accessibility and staffing levels permit such actions. Entry into the fire area for repairs or operator actions is assumed to be impossible.

I Although the typical shutdown sequence does not require manual actions by the operator, fire I damage may not be sufficient in many cases to trip the plant. The operator may take I appropriate actions to expedite an orderly shutdown. These actions are performed in the main I control room. If the fire occurs in the main control room, these actions are performed at the I remote shutdown workstation i

High Low Pressure Interfaces I NRC Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference 3) requests the identification and evaluation of the interfaces between the high pressure reactor coolant system and low pressure systems such as the normal residual heat removal system. Typically, these high-low pn:ssure interfaces contain I two redundant and independent remotely-operated valves in series. Rese two valves and their

'ated cable [may be subject to a single fire. This fire may potentially cause the two i valves to open, resulting in a fire-initiated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) through the high-low pressure system interface. Electrically controlled valves which provide such an interface are identified. 'Ibese interface valves are considered to be required for safe shutdown.

co nelndpowsr Spurious Actuation of Equipment Fire-caused damage is assumed to be capable of resulting in the following types of circuit faults: hot shons, open circuits, and shorts to ground. Spurious actuation of components caused by these circuit faults are evaluated. Components are assumed to be energized or de-energized by one or more of the above circuit faults. For example, valves are assumed to fail open or closed; pumps are assumed to fail running or not running; electrical distribution I breakers could fail open or closed. For three-phase ac circuits, the probability of getting a hot short on all three phases in the proper sequence to cause spurious operation of a motor is Revision: 8 June 19,1996 9A-6 3 Westinghottse

1

- -=

• ) .

9A. Fire Protection Analysis Auxiliary Systems fire protection system in fire areas containing those components. His subject is further discussed in Section 3.4.

Drain systems in the radiological controlled area of the nuclear island Annex Building and Radwaste Building drain to fire zones in the nuclear island where there are no safe shutdown components. Fires in these zones due to potential combustible liquid transpon by the drains i do not affect safe shutdown.

I There is no drain path which could drain combustible liquids to the fire areas in the electrical portion of the nuclear island.

1 i

For mechanical equipment fire areas in the nonradioactive auxiliary building, fires caused by potential transpon of combustible liquid through the drain system are included in the fire )

1 hazards analysis.

9A.3.1.1 Containment / Shield Building This building comprises one fire area - 1000 AF 01. This fire area includes the areas inside containment as well as the valve room for the passive containment cooling system (PCS), the middle annulus, the upper annulus, and the operating deck staging area outside containment.

The fire protection and the safe shutdown analysis for the containment identifies the location and the separation of the safe shutdown components located inside the containment. The safe I

shutdown components located inside the containment are primarily esses:M " the ,

passive core cooling system (PXS), the reactor coolant system (RCS), ie steam generator i system (SGS), and containment isolation.

c er 'M # 0 Fe: this evaluation, the containment shield building is divided into the following fire zones.

These zones are based on the location of the safe shutdown components including termination I boxes- ^ "" dh the containment Class lE electrical penetrations and the primary cable routing pathwa that distribute the Class IE power and instmmentation and control cabling to the safe sh down components.

Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A 10 3 W85tlDgh00S8

1 l i

,; 9A. Fire Protection Analysis A3xiliary Systems l

Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A-2 identifies the safe shutdown components located in this fire zone. This l

compartment is physically separated from other fire zones by structural barriers such that a 1 fire does not propagate to or from this fire gone. l

[Ge.la.f ul le \

The quantity of combustib materials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of I cable insulation :.=c.c.;.;_

. S the instrumentation in this zone. Although it is unlikely that all of the components would be damaged, a fire in this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable all of the above instrumentation. Over-temperature AT and over-power AT 1 instrumentation located in other fire zones is sufficient to perform the applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.  !

9A.3.1.1.2 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11204 This fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No. i 11104 Reactor coolant drain tank room 11204 Vertical access area Safe Shutdown Evaluation l i

l 1

Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components contained in this fire zone. This fire zone is physically separated from other fire zones (except 1100 AF 11300B) by structural barriers or labyrinths such that a fire does not p}ropagate to or from this fire zone.

.feeIa tul lo The quantity of combustib materials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of I cable insulation a==!:.*:1 "h the instrumentation in this zone. Although it is unlikely that all of the components would be damaged, a fire in this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable the passive core cooling system containment floodup level and reactor coolant system hot leg instrumentation. The redundant reactor coolant system hot leg instrumentation located in 1100 AF 112% and passive core cooling system floodup level instrumentation located in 1100 AF 11105 are sufficient to perform the applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

9A.3.1.1.3 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11206 This fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

11206 Passive core cooling system valve / accumulator room A Revision: 11

[ W8Stiflgh00Se 9A-13 February 28,1997

awa y  !

9A. Fire Protection AIalysis Auxiliary Systems Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components contained in this fire zone.

His compartment is physically separated from other fire zones by structural barriers such that a fire does not propagate to or from this fire zone.

re.lukd +o The quantity of comb tible materials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of I cable insulation em ed i:5 the valves located in this fire zone. A fire in this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable control of all of the valves and instrumentation in this fire zone. The passive core cooling system safe shutdown components located in fire zones 1100 AF 11207 and 1100 AF i1300B are redundant to those in this fire zone, and are sufficient to perform applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The spent fuel pool cooling system containment isolation valve located outside the containment fire area is redundant to the containment isolation valve inside containment in this fire zone and is sufficient to maintain containment integrity.

Redundant reactor coolant hot leg instmments in f.re zone 1100 AF 11204 provide the operator with information required to take corrective action during reduced inventory operation.

9A.3.1.1.4 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11207 nis fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

I1207 Passive core cooling system valve / accumulator room B Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire zone. This zone is physically separated from other fire zones by structural barriers such that a fire does not propagate to or from this fire zone. In the case of adjacent fire zone 1100 AF 11208, the accumulator vessel prevents a fire that originates in one zone from propagating to and damaging safe shutdown components located in the other fire zone.

n luted tv De quantity of combusti aterials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of I cable insulation mh_  !:h the valves in this fire zone. Althot.gh it is unlikely that more than one valve would be damaged, a fire in this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable control of all of the valves. The passive core cooling system safe shutdown components located in fire zone 1100 AF 112% and 1100 AF ll300A are redundant to those in this fire zone, and are sufficient to perform applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A-14 [ Westingh0US8 i

)

[3 9A. Fire Protection Analysis Auxiliary Systems #

.l . i 9A.3.1.1.5 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11208 Dis fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

1 Room No.

11208 Normal residual heat removal valve room Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this zone. This fire zone is physically separated from other fire zones by structural barriers such that a fire does not propagate to or from this fire zone. Physical separation from fire zone 1100 AF 11207 is provided by the accumulator vessel as described above.

f , cab d +o The quantity of combustible materials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of I

cable insulation ==!rf wi:h the valves in this zone. Although it is unlikely that more than one valve would be damaged, a fire in this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable control of all of the valves. During normal power operation, power to the hot leg suction isolation valves is locked out to protect the high-low pressure interface between the reactor coolant system and the normal residual heat removal such that they will be unaffected by the fire in maintaining the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The normal residual heat removal containment isolation valve, located outside the containment fire area, is redundant to the four containment isolation valves in this zone and is sufficient to maintain containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity.

9A.3.1.1.6 Firt Zone 1100 AF 11209 His fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

11209 Chemical and volume control system room l

Safe Shutdown Evaluation j

Here are no safe shutdown components in this fire zone. No safe shutdown evaluation is required.

9A.3.1.1.7 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11300A i

his fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

I1300 Maintenance floor (southeast quadrant)  !

11400 Maintenance floor mezzanine Revision: 11

[ W85tingh0080 9A-15 February 28,1997

3' 9A. Fire Protection Analysis Auxiliary Systems -

Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A 2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire zone.

De quantity and arrangement of combustible materials in this fire zonc are such that a fire which damges safe shutdown components in this zone does not propagate to the extent that it damages redundant safe shutdown components in adjacent fire zone 1100 AF ll300B.

g l-atJ k De quantity of combusti terials in this Gre zone is very low, consisting primarily of I

cable insulation emit 95 the above components. Although the consequences of a fire are expected to be very limited, a fire in this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable all of the safe shutdown components in this fire zone.

The redundant passive core cooling system, passive containment cooling system and steam generator system safe shutdown components (listed in Table 9A-2), located in fire zone 1100 AF 11300B, are suf0cient to perform applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

The primary sampling system and containment air filtration system containment isolation valves, located outside the containment fire area, are redundant to the containment isolation valves in this fire zone and are sufficient to maintain containment integrity.

The redundant reactor coolant system cold leg flow instrumentation located in fire zones 1100 AF i1300B and 1100 AF 11301 is sufficient to perform applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

9A.3.1.1.8 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11300B This fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

I1300 Maintenance floor (northem part) 11400 Maintenance floor mezzanine (northern part)

Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire zone. This fire zone is physically separated from other fire zones (except i100 AF i1300A and 1100 AF 11500) by structural barriers or labyrinths such that a fire does not propagate to or from this fire zone.

The quantity of combustible materials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of cable insulation in the termination boxes and cable trays. He quantity and arrangement of combustible materials in this fire zone are such that a fire which damages safe shutdown components in this zone does not propagate to the extent that it damages redundant safe shutdown components in fire zones i100 AF i1300A and 1100 AF 11500.

The division A and C electrical penetrations listed in Table 9A-2 are conservatively assumed to be disabled as a result of a fire in this fire zone. De B and D electrical penetrations listed Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A-16 [ W85tingh0US8 I

,{ 9A. Fire Protection Analysis A;xiliary Systems i

l

1. de l in Table 9A-2, and ^ /" cable trays routed from the electrical penetrations to the 3

adjacent fire zone 1100 AF 11500, are protected by a 3-hour fire barrier. These two divisions '

are sufficient to perform applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

Th passive core cooling system passive residual heat removal components and the related reactor coolant system / passive residual heat removal heat exchanger outlet temperature and flow instrumentation (listed in Table 9A-2) are conservatively assumed to be disabled as a result of a fire in this fire zone. The automatic depressurization system, core makeup tank, accumulator, and in-containment refueling water storage tank located outside of this fire zone are sufficient to perform the applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

The passive core cooling system core makeup tank, passive containment cooling system, teactor coolant system pressurizer and steam generator system instrumentation located in this fire zone are conservatively assumed to be disabled as a result of a fire in this fire zone. The redundant passive core cooling system core makeup tank, passive containment cooling system, reactor coolant system pressurizer and steam generator system instrumentation (listed in Table 9A-2) located in fire zone 1100 AF 11300A,1100 AF i1301 and 1100 AF i1500 are i

safficient to perform the applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. l I

The reactor coolant system to chemical and volume control system stop valve: located in this fire zone are conservatively assumed to be disabled as a result of a fire in this fire zone. The chemicel and volume control system containment isolation valves located outside of this fire  !

zone provide backup isolation capability to maintain the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

The redundant reactor coolant system cold leg flow instrumentation located in fire zones 1100 AF i1300A and i100 AF i1301 is sufficient to perform applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

The chemical and volume control system and the liquid radwaste system containment isolation valves located outside the containment fire area are redundant to the containment isolation valves inside containment in this fire zone and are sufficient to perform the applicable functions to maintain containment integrity.

The redundant steam line pressure instruments located in area 1201 AF 05 for steam generator i and in area 1201 AF 06 for steam generator 2 are sufficient to perform the applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

9A.3.1.1.9 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11300C This fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

11300 Maintenance floor (access space between containment shell and west wall of refueling water storage tank)

Revision: 11

[ W95tingh00S8 9A-17 February 28,1997

c n. .

,3 9A. Fire Protection Analysis Auxiliary Systems i

Safe Shutdown Evaluation Here are no safe shutdown components in this fire zone. No safe shutdown evaluation is reqdred.

9A.3.1.1.10 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11301 His fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

11201 Steam generator companment I 11301 Steam generator i lower manway area 11401 Steam generator i tubesheet area 11501 Steam generator 1 operating deck 11601 Steam generator i feedwater nozzle area 11701 Steam generator 1 upper manway area Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire zone. This fire zone is physically separated from other fire zones (except fire zone 1100 AF 11500) by stmetural barriers or labyrinths such that a fire does not propagate to or from this fire zone. This fire zone borders fire zone 1100 AF 11500 at the top of the steam generator companment, which is open to the air space above the operating deck. The quantity and arrangement of combustible materials in this fire zone are such that a fire which damages safe shutdown components in this fire zone does not propagate to the extent that it damages redundant safe shutdown components outside this fire zone.

r e ls. feel k De quantity of combust materials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of 1 l cable insulation asseein sh the components in this fire zone and the reactor coolant l pump motors. Although the consequences of a fire are expected to be very limited, a fire in I this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable all of the safe shutdown components in this fire zone.

De redundant reactor coolant system fourth stage automatic depressurization system valves and hot leg / cold leg instrumentation located in fire zone 1100 AF 11302, and redundant reactor coolant system pressurizer and steam generator system steam generator level instmmentation located in 1100 AF ll300B are sufficient to perform applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

De four divisions of reactor coolant system / reactor coolant pump bearing water temperature instrumentation are assumed to be disabled and would not be available to detect and provide a trip signal on a loss of component cooling water to the pump. If the fire in this fire zone does not disable the pump, the component cooling water flow to the pump will be unaffected by the fire and will continue to provide cooling water to the pump bearings until the pump is tripped by other means.

Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A-18 [ Westiligt10tJS8

' asa

.{ 9A. Fire Protection Analysis A:xillary Systems .

He reactor coolant system reactor coolant pump shaft speed instmments are conservatively assumed to be disabled. He redundant reactor coolant system cold leg flow instrumentation located in fire zones 1100 AF ll300A and 1100 AF 11300B is sufficient to perform applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

He four reactor coolant system reactor head vent valves are assumed to be disabled. If power is lost while in the closed position, the head vent valves will maintain reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity. Refer to subsection 9A.3.7.1.1 for a discussion on spurious actuation of reactor coolant system reactor head vent valves.

9A.3.1.1.11 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11302 His fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

11202 Steam generator compartment 2 11302 Steam generator 2 lower manway area 11402 Steam generator 2 tubesheet area 11502 Steam generator 2 operating deck 11602 Steam generator 2 feedwater nozzle area 11702 Steam generator 2 upper manway area Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire zone. This fire zone is physically separated from other fire zones (except fire zone 1100 AF 11500) by stmetural barriers or labyrinths such that a fire does not propagate to or from this fire zone. This fire zone borders fire zone 1100 AF 11500 at the top of the steam generator compartment, which is open to the air space above the operating deck. The quantity and arrangement of combustible materials in this fire zone are such that a fire which damages safe shutdown components in this fire zone does not propagate to the extent that it damages redundant safe shutdown components outside this fire zone.

,..Ia.*f fe ne quantity of combus materials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of I

cable insulation ass ~tt . hh the above components and the reactor coolant pump motors.

Although the consequences of a fire are expected to be very limited, a fire in this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable all of the safe shutdown components in this fire zone.

The redundant reactor coolant system fourth stage automatic depressurization system valves and hot leg / cold leg instmmentation located in fire zone 1100 AF 11301 are sufficient to perform applicable functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

He four divisions of reactor coolant system / reactor coolant pump bearing water temperature instrumentation are assumed to be disabled and would not be available to detect and provide a trip signal on a loss of component cooling water to the pump. If the fire in this fire zone does not disable the pump, the component cooling water flow to the pump will be unaffected Revision: 11

] Westinghouse 9A 19 February 28,1997

) 9A. Fire Protection Analysis Auxiliary Systems The passive containment cooling system water delivery flow and storage tank level instrumentation are conservatively assumed to be disabied as a result of a fire in this fire zone.

Re applicable function of verification of passive containment cooling system water delivery 1 can be performed by visual observation via access to the passive containment cooling system air diffuser from the passive containment cooling system valve room. I 9A.3.1.1.18 Fire Zone 1270 AF 12701 This fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

12701 Passive containment cor ling system valve room l

S06 Stairwell Safe Shutdown Evaluation I Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire zone. This fire zone is physically separated from other fire zones by structural barriers such that a fire does not propagate to or from this fire zone.

r <.l&at to De quantity of combustibt aterials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of I cable insulation r~e'- M the valves and instruments in this fire zone. Although it is unlikely that all components would be damaged, a fire in this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable all of the valves and instruments.

The valves for each passive containment cooling system water delivery path are arranged with ,

a normally open motor-operated valve and normally closed / fail open air-operated valve in '

series. If the fire causes a loss of power to the valves, the air-operated valves will open and passive containment cooling system flow, which has no adverse impact on achieving and I maintaining safe shutdown, will be initiated. Refer to subsection 9A.3.7.1.2 for a discussion i of potential spurious actuation of a passive containment cooling system water delivery valve as a result of a fire.

The passive containment cooling system water delivery flow and storage tank level instrumentation are conservatively assumed to be disabled as a result of a fire in this fire zone.

He applicable function of verification of passive containment cooling system water delivery can be performed by visual observation via access to the passive containment cooling system air diffuser from the passive containment cooling system valve room or from the upper annulus.

Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A-24 [ Westirigt10U56

9A. Fire Protection Analysis Auxiliary Systems 9A.3.1.1.19 Fire Zone 1250 AF 12555 This fire zone is comprised of the following room (s):

Room No.

12555 Main control room emergency habitability system air storage / operating deck staging area Safe Shutdown Evaluation This fire zone is physically separated from other fire zones by structural barriers such that a fire does not propagate to or from this fire zone.

This fire zone contains no components required for safe shutdown after a fire. The pressurized main control room emergency habitability system air storage bottles are not required for safe shutdown after a fire, but are protected from fire-induced overpressure by pressure relief valves.

9A.3.1.2 Auxiliary Building - Nonradiolqgically Controlled Areas pochrt of He safe shut systems and components located in the nonradiologically controlled area i are a:=ima. A the protection and safety monitoring system and the Class lE de system, and containment isolation.

1 The safe shutdown components =&d . the protection and safety monitoring system are the instrumentation and control cabinets located in the nonradiologically controlled area I on level 3 (elevation 100'-0"). He safe shutdown components -~^-""A "^h the Class IE de system are the Class 1E batteries on level 1 (elevation 66 6") and level 2 (elevation 82'-6") and the de electrical equipment, also on level 2.

m The nonradiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building are designed to provide separation between the mechanical and electrical equipment areas.

The piping compartments in the nonradiologically controlled area are the main steam isolation valve compartments on levels 4 and 5 (elevations 117'-6" and 135'-3", respectively) and the valve / piping penetration companment on level 3 (elevation 100'-0"). The mechanical equipment rooms in the nonradiologically controlled area are the HVAC compartments on levels 4 and 5.

He nonradiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building are also designed to provide separation between the Class IE and the non-Class IE electrical equipment.

De Class IE electrical equipment areas have been designed to prevent the migration of smoke, hot gases, and fire suppressant to the extent that they could adversely affect safe shutdown capabilities, including operator actions. These areas are separated from each other and from other plant areas by 3-hour fire barriers. Smoke from a fire in the turbine building Revision: 11 y Westingh00S8 9A-25 February 28,1997

f 9A. Fire Pr:tection Analysis A:xiliary Systems Fire Detection and Suppression Features

• Fire detectors Hose station (s)

• Portable fire extinguishers Smoke Control Features Fire dampers close automatically in response to a smoke detector signal or high temperature to control the spread of fire and combustion products. Smoke and hot gases are subsequently removed from the fhe area by reopening the fire dampers after a fire. He nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system exhausts smoke and hot gases from the battery room to the atmosphere.

Fire Protection Adequacy Evaluation A fire in this fire area is detected by a fire detector which produces an audible alarm locally and both visual and audible alarms in the main control room and the security central alarm station.

He fire is extinguished manually using hose streams or portable extinguishers.

He fire resistance of the boundaries of this fire area is greater than the equivalent fire duration, as shown in Table 9A-3. Thus, the fire is contained within the fire area with or without active fire suppression. He battery room is also separated from the other fire zones within this fire area by a 1-hour fire banier, which limits the spread of fire within the fire area.

He ventilation system does not contribute to the spread of the fire or products of combustion to other fire areas because fire dampers isolate the fire area.

Fire Protection System Integrity An evaluation of the consequences of inadvertent operation of an automatic suppression system is not required because there are no such systems in this fire area. See Section 3.4 for a discussion of the consequences of a break in a fire protection line in this fire area.

Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire area. De spare batteries may be connected as a backup power source for any one of the four Class IE electrical divisions. De terntinations of the cables to these divisions fi m the spare batteries are not normally energized or connected, so a fire in this area has no in: pact on the unconnected divisions. If the spare batteries are being used as a backup to a Class IE division, then the consequence of a fue in this I area is the same as a fire in the battery room of the au d division g g y, cram.

Neither a fire nor fire suppression activities in this fire area affect the safe shutdown capability of components located in adjacent fire areas.

s Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A-40 [ Westifigh0US8

P' 'un

• i

. I l 9A. Fire Protection A"ralysis Arxiliary Systems Safe Shutdown Evaluation Table 9A 2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire area. De electrical eq in this area is non-Class IE; however, some division A and C cables are routed through this are I In the event of a fire, the division A and C cabling in this area can be damaged. His dam I can

- "A result!^ in loss of control of equipment n#f(rM these cables. Other compo k divisions are not affected.

• ^ A And C rervud 4(

His postulated fire can disable control of the division A containment isolation valves outside containment.

For this event, containment isolation is provided by the redundant containment isolation valves located inside containment outside of this fire area.

Such a fire can also disable control of the division C passive containment cooling system isolation valves. De redundant division B passive containment cooling syrtem isolation valves are not affected. Therefore, the safe shutdown capability of the passive containment cooling system is maintained.

His fire can also disable the division A and C inputs to the reactor trip switchgear. He signals from the remaining two divisions are sufficient to trip the reactor. Furthermore, the reactor can be tripped with the diverse actuation system described in Section 7.7.

Neither a fire nor fire suppression activities in this fire area affect the safe shutdown capab of components located m adjacent fire areas.

9A.3.1.2.7 Mechanical / Piping Areas 9A.3.1.2.7.1 Fire Area 1201 AF 04 se ewu ^ )

His fire area co 's wo nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system equipment rooms I e~:ird visions B and D. Only division D semeem safe shutdown equipmeng ne fire area is subdivided into the following fire zones:

C.s loc 4J unfb Fire 7ene Room No. .tLu for< o r u..

1241 AF 12405 12405 Lower nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system divisions B and D equipment room (117'-6")

1251 AF 12505 12505 Upper nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system divisions B and D equipment room (135'-3")

Dere are no systems in this fire area which normally contain radioactive material.

Fire Detection and Suppression Features Fire detectors Hose station (s)

Portable fire extinguishers Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A-42 [ W85tingh0US0

5 9A. Fire Protection Analysis Auxiliary Systems I l *

• ) ,

1 Smoke Control Features l

Fire dampers close automatically on high temperature to control the spread of fire and l

combustion products. Smoke and hot gases are removed from the fire area by reopening the fue dampers after a fire. He radiologically controlled area ventilation system exhausts smoke and .

hot gases to the atmosphere. I Firt Protection Adequacy Evaluation i A fue in this fire area is detected by fue detectors which produces an audible alarm locally and )

I both visual and audible alarms in the main control room and the security central alarm station. l The fire is extinguished manually using hose streams or portable extinguishers.  !

%e fue resistance of the boundaries of this fue area is greater than the equivalent fue duration, I as shown in Table 9A 3. Dus, the fire is contained within the fue area with or without active fue suppression.

De ventilation system does not contribute to the spread of the fue or products of combustion to other fire areas because fue dampers isolate the fue area. I Fire Protection System Integrity An evaluation of the consequences of inadvertent operation of an automatic suppression system I which drains to this fue area are bounded by the consequences of a break in a fue protection line l I in this fue area. See Section 3.4.

Safe Shutdown Evaluation I Table 9A-2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire area. He electrical equipment I in this area is non-Class 1E; however, some division A and C cables are routed through this area.

I In the event of a fue, the division A and C cabling in this area can be damaged. This damage I cables. Other components I can result in loss of control of equipment *d amy'*.sh p/

usW-d 'M6*6: divisions are not affected.

2A~-d c l

I De spent fuel pool cooling system and normal residual heat removal contamment isolation valves I are conservatively assumed to be disabled as a result of a fire in this fue area. De rMmdant I spent fuel pool cooling system and normal residual heat removal contamment isolation valves I located inside containment are outside of this fire area and are sufficient to perform the applicable I functions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

I Neither a fire nor fue suppression activities in this fue area affect the safe shutdown capability of components located in adjacent fue areas.

l l

Revision: 8 June 19,1996 9A-54 3 Westinghouse

l

.{ 9A. Fire Protection Analysis A:xiliary Systems Fire Protection System Integrity An evaluation of the consequences of inadvertent operation of an automatic suppression system is not required because there are no such systems in this fire area. See Section 3.4 for a discussion of the consequences of a break in a fire protection line in this fire area.

Safe Shutdown Evaluation here are no safe shutdown components in this area. so a fire in this area has no impact on safe shutdown. De electrical equipment in this area is non-Class lE: however, some division A and I

area can be damaged his damage can result in loss of control of equipment =x!-H p5#,g C cables are routed through this area. In the event of a fire, the division A and C cabling in th

.... I/

I these cables. Other components a=!-d ri:P is possible from equipment in other fire,,areas. [& divisions are not affected. Safe shutd h

Neither a fire nor fire suppression activities in this fire area affect the safe shutdown capability of components located in adjacent fire areas.

9A.3.1.3.1.3 Fire Area 1204 AF 01 Ris fue area is subdivided into the following fire zones:

Fire Zone Room No.

=

1214 AF 12354 12354 Mid-annulus access room 1234 AF 12351 12351 Maintenance floor staging area a

1234 AF 12352 12352 Personnel hatch

=

1244 AF 12452 12452 Containment air filtration system penetration room 1244 AF 12454 12454 Containment air filtration system / spent fuel pool cooling system / primary sampling system penetration room 1254 AF 12553 12553 Personnel access area 1254 AF 12554 12e51 Security room R554 Security room

=

1264 AF 12651 12651 Radiologically controlled area ventilation system equipment room Fire Detection and Suppression Features

• Fire detectors Hose station (s)

=

Portable fire extinguishers Smoke Control Features Fire dampers close automatically on high temperature to control the spread of fue and combustion products. If the radiologically controlled area ventilation system is not affected by the fire, smoke and hot gases are removed from the fire area by reopening the fire damper (s)

Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A-56 T Westinghouse e

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• 9A. Fire Protection Analysis A xiliary Syst:ms i

l Fire Protection Adequacy Evaluation A fire in this fire area is detected through the operation of the dry pipe sprinkler system which produces an audible alarm locally and both visual and audible alarms in the main control room and the security central alarm station. The fire is extinguished by the automatic dry pipe l sprinkler system. Water from the sprinklers rapidly fills and cools the small diked area under the tank. If necessary, the fire can also be extinguished manually.

I

'Ihe equivalent fire duration for this fire area exceeds the fire resistance of the fire area boundaries, as shown in Table 9A-3. However, the 3-hour fire resistance of the fire area boundaries provides sufficient time in which to extinguish the fire.

1 The ventilation system does not contribute to the spread of the fire or products of combustion l to other fire areas because fire dampers isolate the area.

l 9A.3.7 Special Topics 9A.3.7.1 Evaluation of Spurious Actuation

'Ihe potential for spurious actuation of equipment as a result of fire damage to electrical circuits is considered for each fire area containing safety-related equipment. As discussed in subsection 9A.2.7.1, one spurious actuation or signal is postulated at a time (except for high-low pressure interfaces). Principal spurious actuation are discussed below. In no case does the spurious actuation of equipment prevent safe shutdown.

9A.3.7.1.1 liigh-Low Pressure Interfaces NRC Generic Letter 81-12 requests the identification and evaluation of high-low pressure interfaces between the reactor coolant system and interfacing systems such as the normal residual heat removal system. Per the Generic letter, these interfaces typically contain two redundant and independent motor-operated valves in pries. On a typical pressurized water reactor plant, these I two valves and their - -

cable'may be subject to a single fire. Potential high-low pressure system interfaces of part' ular interest are discussed below.

, c aml nel pm.-

Reactor Coolant System Valve Actuation NltC Generic Leuer 81-12 specifically addresses the reactor coolant / residual 1: eat removal system interface on pressurized water reactors. For AP600, the reactor coolant system to normal residual

i. eat removal system interface is similar to the typical pressurized water reactor configuration.

However, the normal residual heat removal system is not a safety-related system and is not required for safe shutdown. To preclude the spurious opening of the interface valves as a result of a fire, the power to the valves is locked out during power operations. Thus, spurious actuation of the reactor coolant system to normal residual heat removal system interface valves does not occur and the safe shutdown capability is not affected.

Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A-94 [ Westingt100S8

[3 9A. Fire Protection Analysis Armillary Systems 5 .

Passive Core Cooling System Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve Actuation One normally open valve is provided to isolate the inlet line to the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. Spurious closure of this valve is assumed to occur where a fire affects W 'g i -~'H electrical circuity. Such a fire can occur in fire areas or fire zones through which the applicable electrical cables are routed. Spurious closure of this valve disables the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. Safe shutdown proceeds using the automatic depressurization system as described in subsection 7.4.1.

Passive Containment Cooling System Valve Actuation Two valves in series isolate each of the two discharge flow paths from the passive containment cooling system storage tank. For purposes of system reliability, one valve in each flow path is normally open and the other is normally closed. Electrical divisicn assignments are shown in Table 9A-2.

I Spurious actuation of one of these valves is assumed to occur where a fire affects S -"A ds electrical circuity. Such a fire can occur in an electrical equipment fire area, in the passive containment cooling system valve room, or in fire areas or fire zones through which the applicable electrical cables are routed.

Spurious actuation of one of these valves causes a passive containment cooling system flow path to be disabled or inadvertently opened, depending on which valve is affected. If a normally closed valve spuriously , pens, passive containment cooling system water delivery from that flow path will be initiated which does not adversely affect the capabiN < rhieve and maintain safe shutcown. If one of the normally open valves were spuriousy .losed to prevent passive containment cooling system water delivery through that flow path when called upon during the safe Gutdown process, the redundant passive containment cooling system water delivery flow path would be sufficient to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

Containment Isolation Valve Actuation Spurious actuation of a containment isolation valve is assumed to occur where a fire affects the N I ==. .J electrical circuitry. Each containment penetration has redundant means of containment isolation.

Reactor Trip Switchgear ne reactor trip switchgear receives signals from each of the four Class IE electrical divisions.

ne signals are de-energized to trip. Also, two out of four signals are required to trip. Dere are two redundant sets of trip switchgear in separate fire areas. Dere is no single spurious signal which could prevent the reactor from being tripped.

l l

t Revision: 11 February 28,1997 9A-% T Westinghouse

FAX COVER SHEET 1 Westinghouse W )

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SENDER INFORMATK)N REblPIENT INFORMATION NAME: M Q),e j

OATE: Long 24/H7 LOCATION. ENERGY CENTER .

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outside: (412)374 4887 Ll i A//.C 1.OCATION: -

0 Cover + Pages 1+3 The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, M:ntoeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, plasse call:

WIN: 2s44125 (Janice) or Outside: (412)3744125.

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Control Rods PRHR and PCCS CMT UPS ',! l AIW)0 VariaWes Cove Makeup Teks ADS and CMF / ADS and CMT / )l.

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Control ur Safety Valves PAMS B1 Class IE and DC y Connel Rods (Auto ADS and CMT / CMT UPS  ?

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9 Wese lWestinghouse FAX COVER SHEET RECIPlENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORMATION DATE: _Taguans 3/,697 NAME: L @,g TO: LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER -

Dianas IAc.424 EAST PHONE: FACSIMILE: PHONE:

Office: 4s2-371.f/90 _

COMPANY: Facsimile: win: 264 4887 {

LA.I A/8C outside: (412)374 4887 l LOCATION:

Cover + Pages 1+3 The followin9 Pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please cati:

WIN: 2s44128 (Janice) or Outside: (412)374-6128.

COMMENTS:

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9. Audiary Syssenes a

Fire barner separation is not provided within the remote shutdown workstation fire area l

because the remote shutdown workeamrion is not required for safe shutdown unless a fire '

requires evacuation of the main control r9am. *p J d*' 4,,.

gg gemy iledek e a 4-e a-<=. ea'5 ue barrier separatiorfis not provided within the primary containtnent fire area including the middle and upper annulus zones of the shield building) because of the nee J to satisfy "gr design requirements, such as allowing for pressure equalization within the f

f4 ch of 8. containment following a high energy line break. Fire protection features 1within the d* 5'** '""', pu.s containment fire area provide conSdence that one train of safe shutdown equipment will QL 4 h **" g remain undamaged following a lhe quantity of combustible matenals is minimized h use of canned reactor coo t pump motors has eliminated the need for an oil m ,,AW J.guc$ lubricanon system. Redu trains of safe shutdown components are sepersted whenever possible by criatin annu*-al walls, or by distancegThe fire protection system M*/ O p shf provides a fire djrfection anf suppression capabilities.

, f,abser****- L,. 4 {.x se e.

l Outside of the primary containment and the rnain control room, the arrangement of plant equipment and routing of cable are such that safe shutdown can be achieved with all components (except those protected by 3-bour fire barriers) in any one fire area rendered inoperable by fire.

Openings and penetrations through fire barners are protected in accordance with the guidelines of B17 CMEB 9.51.

The fire protection analysis contains a description of plant fire areas, fire zones, fire barners, and the protection of fire barner openings, as well as a description of the separation between redundant safe shutdown ec,rei c,nents.

Electrical Cable Design, Routing, and Separation i Electrical cable (including fiber optic cable) and rnethods of raceway construction are selected in accordance with BTP CMEB 9.51. Metal cable trays are used. Rigid metal conduit or rnetal raceways are used for cable runs not embedded in concrete or buried underground Flexible metallic tubing is used in short lengths for equipment conneccons

'Ihe insulanng and jacketing matenal for electncal cables are selected to meet the fire and j flame test requirements of IEEE Standard 383(Reference 3).

! 1he design, routing, and separanon of cable and raceways are further desenbed in Section 8.3.

Control of Combustible Materials The plant is constructed of noncombustible materials to the extent practicable. h seleenan of construction matenals and the control of combustible materials are in accordance with BTP 8

CMEB 9.51 and NFPA 803.

Revision: 8 T Westkghouse 9.55 Jane 19,19N o

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• MCO(-1 37Td_ldlA -

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j 9A. Fire Pretendes Analyuls Amantiary Systems '

Any damage whuh the fue is capable of causmg is assumed to occur immediately. No credit is taken for proper operation of equipment or psoper positioning of valves which are not

,' preescoed froen the effects of a posmlated fire.

H NCOWr j, i af ImW

" TtYs B*7* 2 l l A postulated fue does not exceed the boundary of the fire area. For fire areas outside the

{ l main control room, remote shutdown workstation, and containment fue areas, all equipment j i in any one fire area is assumed to be rendered inoperable by the fire and re-entry into the fut j i area for repaus and operator actions is assurned to be impossible. However, no credit is taken

for complete fire damage in cases in which complete damage is beneficial and partial damage I is not. Chases for electrical cables, piping or ducts that pass through the fue area but are

I separated from it by 3-bour fire barriers are outside 6

:_: d 2 --- 6 that fire area.

m j g 7 g 7 _ _ ._ ._ _ _ _ ,_ ___ _ _ _ . ,_ m_ . .

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) I equipment in any one fire zone is assumed to be rendered inoperable by the fire unlet s the l I fire proteccon analysis demonstrates otherwise. Class IE electrical cables that are loca ed in i l or pass through the fire mne but are separated from it by a 3-hour fire barrier are kthe I menN#1rtfluemme4er that fire zone.

e nsaar 4- p #ty 3 Inde;

:'::r of AReeted Fire Areas 5

l j i Only systems, componems, and circuiu free of fue damage are credited for achieving safe j i shutdown for a given fue. Systems, components, and circuits outside the zone of influence 4 I ait considered free of fire damage if the effects of the fue do not prevent them from

} I performing their required safe shutdown functions.

j Event Assumptions ,

2 i

f Plant accidents and severe namral phenomena are not assumed to occur concurrently with a

) posmleted fue. Furthermore, a concurrent single active component failure (independent of the

) fire) is not assumed Oftsise Power i

! 1 A loss of offsite power is assumed concurrent with the posmlated fire only when the safe 4 I shutdown evahaation indsates the fire could initiate the loss of offsite power.

f I AvaBabutty of Nonsafety-Related Systeins 1

I Only safety-related components and systems are assumed to be available to perform safe I shutdown fhactions. (This is more stringent than required by BTP CMEB 9.5-1.) Fire I protection and smoke control systems are assumed to functico as designed to detect and I mitigaen the effects of the fire.

Revision: 8 g6 9A 5 June 19,1996 COO *30ed DWN 01 1833 NDIS30 009de WOW 4 GC:21 d6, .l@ _ NG9 f

..- - -. . . .-~ _ - . - . - - -

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• • ** P0 0 ' 3Dd d 'le101 ==

i INSERT 1 Ftre Barriers As described in =haartian 9.5.1.2.1.1, notwxunbustible fire bamers are provided in accordance with BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and NFPA 903 (Raference 2). The equivalent fire barrier ratings are shown in Figures 9A-1 through 9A-5. Fire barriers or equivalent structural features form the boundanes of fire areas. For most Ere zones in containment, fire barriers separate redundant equiprnent If cables of a safety-rehead division must pass through or a4acent to a Ere area or fire zone of an unrelated division, they are protected by fire barriers l

INSERT 2 Fire Areas Fire areas are three dimensional spaces designed to contain a fire that may exist within them. They are surrounded by fire barriers, structure equivalent to fire bamers, fire barrier penetration l protection, and other devices, such as those within the heating and air conditiorung ducts, that isolate l l a fire to within the fire area.

l INSERT 3 Outside containment, zone of influence is not denned A fire outside containment is assumed to I affect its entire fire area. Inside the containment fire ares, the zone of influence is defined as the entire fire zone containing the fire.

In contamment, fire zones are usually bounded by physical samctures equivalent to a 3-hour fire barner In some cases, other fire protecnon features apply, such a distance or lack of fuel. For

exatnple, fire zone 1100 AF 11300A has no physical barner besween it and fire zone 1100 AF 113009. This is due to the fact that all combustibles are at the extreme ends of these fire zones and are reparated by more than 40 feet. There will be no communication of a fire from one fire zone to the other. Other exainples include fire zones 1100 AF 11301 and 1100 AF 11302 which are open at their tops into fire zone 1100 AF 11500. Fire zone 1100 AF 11500 is the open upper comainment With no fuel sources over fire zones 1100 AF 11301 and 1100 AF 11302, there will be no fire ces . idcsinon between these zones and fire zone 1100 AF 11500.

INSERT 4 Fire Zanes l Fire zones are three dimensional spaces withm fire areas. Fire zones are identified uniquely to l indicate that they have fire protection features or attributes different than other fire zones in a given l

area. For example, this difference may be due to different sprinkler coverage due to different fuel j loadings. In containment, fire sones are identified to establish

• zones of influence".

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