ML20217K795
| ML20217K795 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1997 |
| From: | Kenyon T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| GL-86-10, NUDOCS 9710290213 | |
| Download: ML20217K795 (26) | |
Text
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;r NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'j ;' W ASHINGTON. D.C. 3066H001
# October 17, 1997
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APPLICANT: Westinghouse Electric Corporation FACILITY: AP600
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1997, MEETING 10 DISCUSS FIRE PROTECTION ISSUES ON THE AP600 On September 29, 1997, representatives of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion and Westinghouse met to discuss fire protection issues for the AP600 design. Attachment 1 is a list of attendees. Attachment 2 is a copy of the handouts provided by Westinghouse. The meeting opened with a discussion of the potential for spurious actuation of the de motor-operated valves (H0Vs) as a result of a fire and compliance of the AP600 design with Generic letter 86-10. Westinghouse then presented its position that spurious actuation of the MOVs was a low probability event or that a spurious actuation will not have a significant result. Equipment that could be affected by a fire in the main control room (MCR), remote shutdown workstation, instrumentation and control (110) rooms, and electrical equipment rooms was discussed. Westinghouse agreed to provide additional information concerning operator actions outside the MCR and remote shutdown station to prevent or mitigate spurious operation of equipnient. Westinghouse also agreed to consider design modifications to reduce the probability of spurious actuation of the head vents and automatic depressurization system for a fire in the MCR. In addition, Westinghouse stated it would evaluate whether there was an acceptable way to turn off power to the I&C rooms from.the electrical rooms as part of the response to a fire in this fire area. In addition, compliance with IEEE Standard 383 versus IEEE Standard 1202 cable testing specifications was discussed. The staff stated that Westinghouse should commit to the testing requirements of IEEE Standard 1202, or the requirements of IEEE Standard 3B3 excluding the option to use the " burlap bag test." Westinghouse indicated that they understood the staff's concerns. Then Westinghouse discussed their concerns with possible future misinterpreta- ' tion of the staff's positions regarding fire protection of safe shutdown I 1 capability (see meeting summary dated October 2, 1997). Westinghouse requested the staff to clarify its position to ensure that possible misinter-pretations (some are described in Attachment 2) would not occur. The staff ~ agreed to consider Westinghouse's proposal, to discuss it with its management, Mq )) and provide feedback on the matter. During the next discussion on smoke control, Westinghouse stated that they were in the process of reviewing the AP600 design against NFPA Standards 92A, 204M, and 804. The applicant discussed possible design modifications to address concerns with smoke propagation. Westinghouse )rovided an outline of its smoke control evaluation and examples of its safe slutdown fire hazards ana?ysis for the AP600 design.
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October 17, 1997 The staff requested Westinghouse to make its calculations on the structural capacity of the enclosure for the fire pumps in the turbine building available for review. Westinghouse agreed. Westinghouse indicated that they would provide a markup of the standard safety analysis report and the fire hazards analysis addressing these issues by the end of October 1997, after which a meeting would be set up to discuss tne staff's review of these submittals. The staff indicated that it would provide feedback on Westinghouse's examples of the safe shutdown evaluation in about one week. A draft of this meeting sumary was provided to Westinghouse to allow them the opportunity to coment on the sumary prior to f ssuance, original signed by: Thomas J. Kenyon, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorato-Division of Reactor Program Management Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 52-003 Attachments: As stated s cc w/atts: See next page DISTRIBUTION w/ attachments: Docket file ' PDST R/F- TKenyon PUBLIC BHuffman DTJackson JSebrosky DScaletti JNWilson DISTRIBUTION w/o attachments: SCollins/FMiraglia. 0-12 G18 BSheron, 0-7 D25 RZimerican, (-12 G18 JRoe DMatthews TQuay WDean, 0-5 E23 ACRS (11) JMoore. 0-15 BIS PMadden, 0-8 D1 Econnell. 0-8 D1 JHolmes, 0-8 D1 KWest, 0-8 D1 DOCUMENT NAME: A:FP MTGl. SUM
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v . u...., _- g 0FFICE PM:PDSfildRPM 0;TDST:DRPM NAME TJKenyoW:sg T RQuay --rik? DATL 10/!4/97 10//7/97 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
[ Westinghouse Electric Corporation Docket No. 52-003 cc: Mr 'cholas J. Liparulo, Manager Mr. Frank A. Ross t ..r Safety and Regulatory Analysis U.S. Department of ' Energy, NE-42
- i. lear and Advanc.d Technology Division Office of LWR Saftsty and Technology Wet inghouse Electric Corporation 19:01 Germantown Road P.0 Box 355 Germantown, MD 20874 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. Russ Bel's Mr. B. A. McIntyre Senior Project Manager, Programs Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Nuclear Er.ergy Institute Westinghouse Electric Corporation 1776 I Street, NW Energy Systems Business Unit Suite ?do Box 355 Washirgton, i DC 20006-3706 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Hs. Lynn Connor Ms. Cindy L. Haag Dec-Search s Associates Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Post Office Box 34 :
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Cabin John, MD 20818 Energy Systems Business Unit Box 355 Dr. Craig D. Sawyer, Manager 9 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Advanced Reactor Programs GE Nuclear Energy Mr. M. D. Beaumont 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-754 ' Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division San Jose, CA 95125 Westinghouse Electric Corporation One Montrose Metro Mr. Robert H. Buchholz 11921 Rockville Pike GE Nuclear Energy Suito 350 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 Rockville, MD 20852 San Jose, CA 95125 Mr. Sterling Franks Barton Z. Cowan, Esq. U.S. Department of Energy Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott NE 50 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor 19901 Germantown Road Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Ed Rodwell, Manager Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer PWR Design Certification AP600 Certification Electric Power Research Institute NE-50 3412 Hillview Avenue 19901 Germantown Road Palo Alto, CA 94303 Germantown, MD 20874
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FIRE PROTECTION - AP600 MEETING ATTENDEES SEPTEMBER 29, 1997 HAME ORGANIZATION THOMAS KENYON NRC/NRR/PDST PATRICK MADDEN NRC/NRR/SPLB EDWARD CONNELL NRC/NRR/SPLB DON HUTCHINGS W AP600 ED CUMMINS W AP600 JIM WINTERS W AP600 TOM HAVES W AP600 JEFF HOLMES NRC/NRR/SPLB K.S. WEST NRC/NRR/SPLB TED QUAY NRC/NRR/PDST s Attachment 1
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AP600/ Westinghouse Meeting on AP600 Fire Protection September 29,1997 e E ii 8 n-, . .-
. IIII AOenda Mi AP600 DRAFT (W) AP600 / NRC FIRE PROTECTION
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a September 25,1997 Wording of NRC Positions Winters DC MOVs Hayes IEEE 383 vs. IEEE 1202 Cable Hayes Spurious Actuations (Associated Hayes Circuits) Smoke Conirol Hutchings Examples of SSAR Appendix 9A Winters Descriptions Schedule Winters 213emerpre-92sp 2
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ma - a Recommended Working Changes for AP600 Fire Protection Certification Criteria l 3 l l
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, m.... Mi esse Westinghouse Recommended Alternative (9/29/97) The use of ADS is not acceptable as the planned method of decay heat removal in any fire hazards analysis as a direct consequence of a fire occurring during power operations. for use to achieve safe shutdown fo!!Owing a firo. PRHR or the nomial systems shall be available for use used. l 5
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IIII lDji AP600 NRC (9/11/97) _ . .
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Automatic suppressidn shall be provided in those plant . areas (safety or non-safety) outside containment that result in a demand for plant shutdown. Possible Interpretation Provide automatic suppression for a fire in a rod control switchgear cabinet and not for startup feedwater pumps or RNS pumps i 2I14alf pps TNW7 7
3 1 /- IIII EEOli AP600 Westinghouse Recommended Alternative (9/29/97) Automatic suppressidn shall be provided in those plant areas'(safety or non-safety) outside containment that a fire would result in a demand for decay heat removal that would require the use of passive safety related systems. plant shutdown. Intended Interpretation I Provide automatic suppression for start up and main feedwater and their support systems, but not necessarily for redundant switchgear cabinets or other locations where a fire induced plant trip could occur without challenging the ! normal decay heat removal systems. i t__ _ _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Mi! AP900 NRC (9/11/97) _ . _ Safe shutdown as defined by Westinghouse (420 F - 200 F) is acceptable as the licensing basis for the AP600 with the l enhanced capability of the RNS system to be available following-a fire, and the inclusion of the above listed fire protection provisions. Westinghouse Recommended Alternative.(9/29/97)- NO CHANGE Safe shutdown as defined by Westinghouse (420 F - 200 F) is acceptable as the licensing basis for the AP600 with the enhanced capability of the RNS system to be available following a fire, and the inclusion of the above listed fire protection provisions. m.,
r DC CIRCUITS
+ "For ungrounded DC circuits, if it can te shuwn that only two hot shorts of proper polarity without grounding could 1;suse spurious actuation, no further evaluatiosiis necessary except for any cases involving HM pressure interfaces."- GL 8610, Sec. 5.3.1.
- DC MOV circuits require 2 hot shorts of proper polarity plus one internal short.
- The DC system is ungrounded - one short to ground will have no effect.
- Ihe probability of the internal fault is roughly equivalent to the effect of the ungrounded system.
- Spurious actuation of DC MOVs as a result of power cable faults is not credible.
- Hi/La pressure interfaces are evaluated.
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IEEE 383 vs. IEEE 1202
- EEE 383-1974 is endorsed in Reg. Guide 1.131.
- EEE 1202 is not endorsed by NRC.
- Most current cable catalogs reference EEE 383 testing.
- The 'new' version of EEE 383 which will reference 1202 has not been issued by IEER - and not endorsed by NRC.
IEEE 383 vs. IEEE 1202
- Cable vendors tell us that, if we specify EEE 1202 for nuclear cable, we will be expected to help pay for the additional testing.
- Westinghouse plans to continue to use EEE 383-1974.
- Alternative is "383.qt 1202".
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l' . 1 Spurious Actuations n
- Design changes will be required to meet the new NRC position.
- In the current AP600 design, spurious ADS is safe and analyzed.
- Does not meet new NRC position.
- Some of the following features are n21in the current design but are under consideration.
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Spurious Actuations - a Control Room
- Remote Shutdown Workstation i
- I&C Rooms
- Electrical Equipment Rooms
- Cables
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4 l Spurious Actuations Control Room
- Soft Controls
- Dedicated Switches
- Safety Panels (single-switch)
- Safety Panels (two-switch)
- Head Vents
- DAS (two-switch)
Spurious Actuations MCR Soft Controls
. Most controls in the c )ntrol room are soft.
. Spurious actuations as a result of shorts in soft contrets are not credible.
- Further evaluation of spurious actuations from soft controls is not necessary.
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1 Spurious Actuations MCR Safety Panels - 1 Sveitch a Some controls from the safety panel dedicated switches are one switch actuation. (Reactor trip Safeguards actuation, PRHR actuation, CMT actuation, Containment isolation, Main steamline isolation, Feedwater isolation, VES actuation)
- One-switch spurious actuations will not lead to a breach of RCS pressure boundary, loss of decay heat removal function, or loss of shutdown reactivity control.
- Further evaluation of one switch spurious actuations is not necessary.
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Spurious Actuations MCR Safety Panels - 2 Switch
- Some controls from the safety panel switches require two actuations.
[ ADS stages 1-3, ADS stage 4,IRWST injection, Containment recirculation, IRWST drain to containment, containment cooling <cnay be revised to one-switch >>]
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Spurious Actuations MCR Safety Panels - 2 Switch
- Two-switch actuations require actuations at both panels.
- Two-switch actuations will use ' Form-C' contacts with timed I&C cabinet inputs.
- Disabling safety panel switches on control room 3 evacuation is not necessary.
- * ' Simultaneous' failure of both open and closed contacts on two switches on two panels is not credible.
- Further evaluation of spurious actuations from two-switch, Form-C, dedicated switches is not necessary. -
e ,un .. ,, Spurious Actuations MCR - Head Vents
- Head vents are individual valve controls.
- Spurious head vent requires two valves to open (same panel).
- Spurious head vent can be corrected before unrestorable conditions occur.
- Further evaluation of spurious head vent actuation is not necessary.
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l Spurious Actuations DAS Panel Some functions can also be actuated from the DAS panel. [Reactorfrurbine trip, PRHR actuation, CMT actuation, ADS stage 1, ADS stage 2, ADS stage 3, ADS stage 4, Containment cooling, Containment isolation, Hydrogen igniters, IRWST injection, Containment recirculation, IRWST drain to containment]
- All DAS manual actuations require actuation of two switches and a Master Enable switch (normally open).
S Spurious Actuations DAS Panel
- DAS switches are housed behind protective cover.
- Wiring from DAS switches to actuated device is such that four hot shorts are required for spurious actuation --
individual energize-to-actuate circuits.
- DAS switches will be disabled from outside the control room following evacuation (normally closed switeb).
- With these features, spurious DAS actuations are not credible.
- Further evaluation of spurious DAS actuations is not necessary, scene,1113 wwa p 1
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Spurious Actuations Control Room - Summary
= Soft Controls - spurious actuations not credible
- Dedicated Switches
- Safety Panels (single switch)- Actuations OK
- Safety Panels (two-switch)- Actuations not credible
- Head Vents - Venting not likely but can be corrected before unrestorable conditions occur
- DAS (two-switch)- Actuations not crediole erhMT 1513 WW.ma# IS Spurious Actuations Remote Shutdown Workstation
. Soft Controls
- Dedicated Switches
-Transfer switches
- Reactor trip
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Spurious Actuations RSW Soft Controls
- Most controls at the remote shutoown workstation are soft.
- Spurious actuations as a result of shorts in soft controls are not credible.
- Further evaluation of spurious actuations from soft centrols is not necessary.
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Spurious Actuations - RSW Dedicated Switches
- Spurious transfer switch acte nion can be rrversed by operator action in the I&C rooms.
- Actuation of transfer switch does not result in any component actuation
- Transfer switches defeat soft controls in MCR and DAS controls
- Spurious reactor trip is of no consequence.
- Further evaluatir of spurious actuations from RSW is not necessary.
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l l Spurious Actuations I&C Rooms
- Integrated Protection Cabinets
- Engineered Safety Features Actuation (ESFA) Cabinets
- Protection Logic Cabinets (PLCs)
-- AOVs
- MOVs
-- Squib valves Spurious Actuations Integrated Protection Cabinets
- Sensor inputs are voted 2-out-of-4. A single I&C room fire can not cause 2 voted sensors to ' fail'.
- I&C cabinets communicate using messages over a data highway. Fire-induced spurious messages are not credible.
- IPC cabinet failure in a single division causing spurious actuation is not credible.
- Further evaluation of spurious actuations from Integrated Protection Cabinets is not necessary.
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Spurious Actuations ESFA Cabinets
- I&C cabinets communicate using messages over a data highway. Fire induced spurious messages are not credible.
- Control room dedicated switches were previously discussed.
- Further evaluation of spurious actuations from ESFA Cabinets is not necessary.
-au . . . si Spurious Actuations -
PLCs -- AOVs
- No single safety-related AOV out of position results in an uncontrollable breach of coolant boundary, loss of decay heat removal function, or loss of shutdown reactivity control. (Fluid system design criteria)
- In the unlikely event of two AOVs held out of position by hot shorts, instrument air could be removed to send the valves to their preferred position.
- Further evaluation of spurious AOV actuations is not necessary.
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Spurious Actuations PLCs -- MOVs
- No single MOV spurious actuation results in an uncontrollable breach of coolant boundary or loss of shutdown reactivity control.
- Power will be removed from PRHR inlet MOV to prevent single actuation from resulting in loss of PRHR.
- Power will be removed from normal RHR isolation valves to protect Hi/Lo pressure boundary.
Spurious Actuations PLCs -- MOVs
- If two MOV actuations could result in an uncontrollable breach of coolant boundary, loss of decay heat removal function, or loss of shutdown reactivity control, the signals will come from separate cabinets (e.g., ADS stages 1,2, & 3)- providing protection from small fires.
- A small fire causing two MOV actuations is not credible
- Funher evaluation of spurious MOV actuations resulting from a small fire is not necessary.
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Spurious Actuations PLCs -- Squib Valves
. Spurious squib valve actuation requires two spurious actuations - Arm and Fire.
- The arm and fire signals come from separate cabinets.
If an MOV is in the same line, its signal comes from a third cabinet. This provides protection from small fires that do not consume an entire area.
- A small fire causing both the arm and fire actuations is not e edible.
= Further evaluation of spurious squib valve actuations resulting from a small fire is not necessary.
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Spurious Actuations - I&C Rooms -- Large Fires
, . For a major I&C Room fire the ADS Stage 4 block valve will be closed and power will be removed from I&C cabinets, MCC, & Squib control. [ Requires operator action.)
- AOVs move to safe position.
- MOVs and squib valves can not actuate after power is removed.
- Further evaluation of multiple actuations is not necessary.
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Spurious Actuations I&C Rooms -- Summary
- Spurious actuations from a small I&C Room fire, as discussed above, are either acceptable or not credible.
- Spurious actuations resulting from a major f&C Room fire are limited to AOVs moving to aafe position.
- Further cvaluation of actuations resulting from an I&C Room fire is not necessary.
4 ! Spurious Actuations 1E Electrical Rooms
- Direct effect of equipment room fire is only loss of power.
- Loss-of-power spurious actuations do not result in a breach of coolant boundary, loss of decay heat removal function or loss of shutdown reactivity control.
- Smoke-induced spurious actuations in I&C cabinets will be limited by removing power from I&C cabinets.
[ Requires operator action.]
- Further evaluation of spurious equipment room actuations is not necessary.
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O Spurious Actuations Input Cables
- Soft controls and dedicated switches were previously discussed;
- Automatic actuations require 2-out-of-4 sensor failures.
No actuation results from single sensor failure.
- Each fire area (zone) will be evaluated to show that no uncorrectable breach of coolant boundary, joss of decay heat removal function or loss of shutdown reactivity control is possible for multiple sensor failures.
Spurious Actuations - Cables -- MOV & AOV
- No single AOV out of position results in an uncontrollable breach of coolant boundary, loss of decay _
heat removal function, or loss of shutdown reactivity control. In the unlikely event of two AOVs out of position (4 hot shorts), instrument air could be removed to send the valves to their preferred position.
- Spurious MOV (not Hi/Lo interface) actuations resulting from power cable faults are not evaluated (2 hot shorts of proper polarity plus one internal hot short).
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l Spurious Actuations Cables -- Squib Valves
- Squib valves are actuated with <50 volts and >l amp.
Squib valve cables are routed with instrument cables.
' Squib valve cables will be separated from any cables capable of >l amp.
-- Exception is other squib cables.
- Spurious squib actuation from hot shorts to other squib cables is acceptable. (ADS is first to 6te in normal progression.)
Spurious Actuations . Cables -- Squib Valves
- Spurious actuation of squib valves resulting from hot shorts to cables in other trays is not credible.
- Further evaluation of spurious squib-valve cable-fault actuations is not necessary, ean . n 1
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t . 9'2697 SMOKE CONTROL AP600 HVAC Systems Compliance with NFPA Guidance for Smoke Control
- Westinghouse is in the process of reviewing the AP600 design against the following guidance
- NFPA 804-1995, " Standard for Fire Protection for Advanced Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants." -
- NFPA 92A-1993, " Recommended Practice for Smoke-Control Systems."
- NFPA 204M-1991, " Guide for Smoke and Heat Venting" '
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SMOKE CONTROL Focus of review is: 5 Nuclear Island HVAC Systems Protection of safety-related systems and components Stairtowers throughout the Plant Egress and fire fightingissues Turbine Building Smoke and heat control particularly as related to protection of defense-in-depth systems and compor, ants 1
97697 SMOKE CONTROL E Results: Will be presented in the form of a document Will be made available to the NRC for review Agreed to portions of document may be added to SSAR SMOKE CONTROL [3 Status:
- Nuclear Island HVAC Systems
- Preliminary review completed
- Westinghouse performing internal review of results
- Stairtowers throughout the Plant
- Preliminary reviewin process
- Turbine Building,
- Preliminary re.iew not yet begun B
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9A. Fire Protectica Analysis Armillary Systems Fire Protection System Integrity An evaluation of the consequences of inadvertent operation of an automatic suppression system is not required because there are no such systems in this fire area. He consequences of a breek in a fire protection line during normal plant operation are limited because the containment isolation valve for the fire water supply line to the containment hose stations is normally closed and are bounded by other flooding events inside containment. See Section 3.4 for further discussion of flooding events inside containment. 9A 3.1.1.1 Fire Lone 1100 AF 11105 His fire zone is comprised of the following room (s): Room No. 11105 Reactor vessel cavity 11205 Reactor vessel nozzle area Safe Shutdown Evaluation De quantity and arrangement of the combustible materials in this fire zone, and the characteristics of the barriers that separate this zone from other fire zones are such that a fire which damages safe shutdown components in this zone does not propagate to the extent that it damages redundant safe shutdown components in another fire zone. He quantity of combustible materials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of cable insulation associated with the instrumentation in this zone. Dese cables and instruments are located in the lower part of the fire zone. his fire zone is separated from adjacent fire zones by the thick concrete walls and floor of the reactor yessel cavity, except i at the top of the fire zone, where there are penetrations associated with reactor coolant I system piping and where the annular space around the reactor vessel flange is closed by the , cavity seal ring. Here is a doorway to the reactor coolant drain tank room (fire zone 1 1100 AF 11204) that is closed and a ventilation duct that provides cool air from the l containment recirculation cooking system. I
\_ This area has no automatic suppression.
Smoke and hot gases from a fire accumulate within this fire zone and gradually migrate via reactor coolant system piping penetrations to adjacent fire zones 1100 AF 11204, l 1100 AF 11206,1100 AF i1301, and 1100 AF 11302. The smoke and hot gases are
\ expected to rise due to their buoyancy and be replaced by air comingfrom the containment I recirculation cooling system. ney are coc!cd by mixing with the air and by contact with structural surfaces and thus do not cause propagation of the fire beyond this fire zone. Safe shutdown components listed in Table 9A 2 for the adjacent fire zones are not susceptible to damage by the diluted and cooled smoke and gases from this Sre zone.
Rev siofiI17 3 Westingh00S8 9A 13 Octo r 15,1997 OW
9A. Fire Protection Analysis AuxUlary Systems l Table 9A 2 identifies the safe shutdown components located in this fire zone. They are the l four excoreflux instrumentation channels, onefor each division. Although it is unlikely that all of the components would be damaged. a fire in this fire zone is conservatively assumed to disable all of the above instrumentation. He source, intermediate and power I range excore detectors are not required for automatic safe shutdown initiation or I maintenance during orfo!!owingler a fire in this fire zone. These detectors are used to l monitor and vertfy that the reactor is shut down. %e redundant instrumentation used for < l this monitoring core reactivity indirectlyftmc4 ion are the core exit thermocouples located in l fire zone 100 AF 11500. These thermocouples are mounted within the reactor and l Integrated headpackage and have exposed cable high in the integrated head package infire l zone 100 AF 11500. The thermocouple cables will be unaffected by combustion products l from a fire in the reactor cavity. In addition, reactor subcriticality after shutdown is I maintained by an adequate boron concentration in the reactor coolant. This concentration I is establish by the automatic actions taken upon reactor trip such as, isolation of non. l borated makeup sources and opening of theflow paths to sources of borated water. Boran l concentrations can be checkedperiodically to determine if adequate Lvrls exist.-Reetme w l p=iv::cre ecclin;;;ystendec&p 1:v:1 in;:==:ation4ecc.:cd in ficeeene+100 AF !!2at i es-sufficia: :c pdorm th: appli=b!: function; :c cahiev =dMetain =f: :h;;hwa 1 A fire in this zone can cause no spurious actions which could cause a breach in the reactor l coolant boundary or defeat any decay heat removal capability or cause and increase in l shutdown reactivity of the reactor. Fullplant capability to achieve cold shutdown with I normal systems is intact after a fire in this zone. 9A.3.1.1.2 Fire Zone 1100 AF 11204 nis fire zone is comprised of the following room (s): Room No. . 11104 Reactor coolant drain tank room ll2N Vertical access area Safe Shutdown Evaluation ne quantity and arrangement of the combustible materials in this fire zone, and the characteristics of the barriers that separate this zone from other fire zones are such that a fire which damages safe shutdown components in this zone does not propagate to the extent that it damages redundant safe shutdown components in another fire zone. The quantity of combustible materials in this fire zone is very low, consisting primarily of cable insulation associated with the instrumentation in this zone. %e cable raceways are located against one structural concrete wall of the fire zone and in the reactor coolant drain tank room at the bottom of the fire zone. The floor of this fire zone is solid concret: at the bottom of containment. Thick concrete walls separate this fire zone from adjacent fire zones, except for access passageways to and from the steam generator compartments (fire zones Revision: 17 October 15,1997 9A-14 W Vestinghouse
i . 9A. Fire Protection Analysis Assillary Systens shutdown workstation area. In the unlikely event that the fire damages the transfer switch set, causing transfer of control from the main control room to the remote shutdown workstation, the operator restores control to the main control room by de-energizing the remote shutdown multiplexer cabinets in the instrumentation and control rooms. Safe shutdown is achieved using the safe shutdown components listed in Table 9A.2. Neither a fire nor flic suppression activities in this fire area affect the safe shutdown capability of components located in adjacent fire areas. 9A.3.1.2.5.3 Fire Area 1243 AF 01
'Ihis fire area is comprised of the following room (s):
Boom No. 12423 Reactor trip switchgear i There are no systems in this fire area which normally contain radioactive material. Fire Detection and Suppression Features
- Fire detectors Hose station (s)
- Portable fire extinguishers l The area has direct access to stairway S01 through a single corridor and the non 1E l equipment / penetration room. There is adequate accessfor rapid manual response to afire l in this area.
Smoke Control Features , l Fire dampers in the equipment room HVAC subsystem of the annex / auxiliary building non. I radioactive HVAC system close automatically on high temperature to control the spread of fire I and combusdon products. The subsystem is automatically shut down. The corridorforfire I fighting access is supplied by the nuclear island non radioactive ventilation system. This I system is maintained at a positive pressure relative to the annex / auxiliary building non. I radioactive HVAC system and willpromote airflow toward the efected) ire area. Smoke and hot gases are removed from the fire area using portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Fire Protection Adequacy Evaluation
/. iire in this lire area is detected by a fire detector which produces an audible alarm locally and both visual r.nd audible alarms in the main control room and the security central alann station.
'Ihe fire is extinguished manually using hose streams or portable extinguishers.
Revision: 17 October 15,1997 9A-48 [ Westif)ghouse
s a 9A.- Fire Protection Analysis Auxiliary Systems Combustible materials in this fire area are listed in Table 9A 3, and primarily consist of cable insulation for cables associated with the reactor t:ip switchgear, located in the center of this small fire area. His is a light hazard fire area and the rate of fire growth is expected to be slow. nree-hour fire barriers provide edequate separation from adjacent fire areas and the fire is contained within the fire area. he ventilation system does not contribute to the spread of the fire or products of combustion to other fire areas because fire dampers isolate the fire area. Fire Protection System Integrity An evaluation of the consequences of inadvertent operation of an automatic suppression system is not required because there are no such systems in this fire area. An evaluation of the consequences of a break in a fire protection line is not required because no such lines pass through or terminate in this fire area. Safe "ihutdown Evaluation Table 9A 2 lists the safe shutdown components located in this fire area. His fire area contains cable from each of the fo'r Class lE electrical divisions. This cable provides trip input from each of the four divisions and is separated per industry standards. De safety-related trip inputs are normally energized, so a fire in this area may result in a reactor trip. In the event the fire generates multiple hot shorts, interfering with the reactor trip signal, a reactor trip can be I produced in the redundant trip cabinets located outside of this fire area in fire area 1243 AF l 02, Furthermore, the. reactor can be tripped with the diverse actuation system described in Section 7.7. This fire does not affect other uluipment in the Class lE divisions. Derefore, the safe shutdown components listed in Table 9A 2 are available to achieve and maintain safe sht tdown. Neither a fire nor fire suppression activities m this fire area affect the safe shutdown capability of components located in adjacent fire areas. I A fire in this zone can cause no spurious actions which could cause a breach in the reactor
\ coolant boundary or defeat any decay heat removal capability or cause and increase in l shutdown reactivity of the reactor. Fullplant capability to achieve cold shutdown with l normal systems is intact after afire in this zone.
Revision: 17 3 Westingh00S8 9A 49 October 15,1997
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