ML20216G147
| ML20216G147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1998 |
| From: | Scaletti D NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9803190249 | |
| Download: ML20216G147 (21) | |
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- **, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l E WASHINGTON, D.C. 30eedke001
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- p' March 6, 1998 i
APPLICANT: Westinghouse Electric Company FACILITY: AP600
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF THE FEBRUARY 24,1998, MEETING WITH WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY TO RESOLVE ISSUES RELATED TO THE AP600 FIRE PROTECTION DESIGN On February 19,1998, the staff met with representatives of the Westinghouse Electric Company to resolve the remaining open issues associated with the staff's fire protection review of the AP600 design certification application. The issues discussed at the meeting and their resolutions are as follows:
Onen item 9.5.1-1:
Fire areas containing redundant equipment and circuits necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown using the normal systems specified in Table 9.5.1-4 of the standard safety analysis report (SSAR) have not been provided with automatic suppression in accordance with the specified criteria.
Section 9.5.1.3 of the SSAR states that manual partial opening and closing of one of tho first stage automatic depressurization (ADS) valves to reduce RCS pressure to the allow initiation of the normal residual heat removal system (RNS) will be used in the event the chemical volume and control system (CVS) is not available. The u?e of the first stage ADS results in a controlled venting of the RCS to the in containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) and does not result in an increase in containment pressure or temperature. The use of the first stage ADS as described above is acceptable as an attemative shutdown method provided the normal shutdown equipment and circuits are provided with automatic suppression or are located in separate fire areas.
Resolution:
Westinghouse will add fire suppression to the room containing the CVS charging pumps and the electrical penetration room above it.
Westinghouse will vso revise Table 9.5.1-4 to indicate the extent of fire area separation for the RNS function.
Westinghouse will provido NRC with a description of the fire department connection to the component cooling water system to the extent available. ,
1 Open item 9.5.12:
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The applicant has included the reactor head vents for consideration as a high/ low pressure interface in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter (GL) 81-12. However, only 9803190249 900306 PDR ADOCK 05200003 s 3s*0 sl! O i;;g h ;n.Z ;ww a - a U6 [h,ly F PDR y s
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.. ,. I 3-March 6, 1998 the power circuits inside conti ment have been adequately protected from a hot short to prevent a spurious actuation. The ap, ' ant has not provided a discussion of the protection provided for the power and control circuits L aled outside the containment, which can also result is a spurious actuation of the reactor hsad vents. Therefore, the applicant's resolution of this issue is unacceptable.
Resolution:
. Westinghouse will provide additional explanation of the head vent control paths in the hwad vent high/ low pressure interface section of 9A. This includes power and control circuits, their routing, as well as, outside containment and in the control room.
Open item 9.5.1-3:
The spurious actuation of ADS due to hot shorts of control circuits of motor operated valves from a fire in the remote shutdown workstation, DC equipment rooms, and Class 1E penetration rooms has not been adequately addressed in the SSAR by the applicant. Spurious actuation of ADS results in a venting of the RCS in conflict with the fire protection of safe shutdown capability acceptance criteria specified above for the AP600. Therefore, the applicant's resolution of this issue is unacceptable Resolution:
. Westinghouse will revise SSAR pages 9A-9,9A 54 and others, as appropriate (MCR), to change the soft controls statement to state that fire induced actuations are not credible.
"There are no fire induced failure modes of soft controls that will lead to spurious actuation of ADS."
. For fires in the l&C/ penetration rooms, Westinghouse will revise the SSAR to requ4e operator action to shut off power to the affected division and will change the additional COL item provided by their response to 280.35 to state " minimize probability of" in lieu of " prevent."
l Ooen item 9.5.14:
i The applicant has not fully evaluated the smoke control capability of the normal ventilation system against the criteria specified in NFPA 92A, " Recommended Practice for Smoke Control Systems," concoming stair tower pressurization in the auxiliary building. Specifically the applicant has not specified the minimum design pressure difference across the doors in the stair towers to be maintained in accordance with the guidance specified in NFPA 92A. Therefore, the applicant's resolution of this issue is unacceptable.
Resolution:
. Westinghouse will demonstrate that the leakagd rate for the back draft dampers is equivalent to a UL listed smoke damper. If leak rate is equivalent, then Westinghouse will say so in HVAC portion and 9A of the SSAR. If not, then Westinghouse will provide smoke dampers between zones !n the safety division fire areas in the clean auxiliary building.
s ...
March 6,1998 l
Westinghouse will change the design and the SSAR to provide adequate pressurization (in 1 accordance with NFPA 92A) of the two stair towers in the clean auxiliary building. j Open item 9.ti.1-5:
New Fuel Storage Area. The new fuel storage pit is provided with automatic fire detection, hose stations and portable extingu!shers; automatic suppression has not been provided. Floor drains l are provided to prevent the accumulation of water that could result in an inadverient criticality. j The new fuel storage pit is located in the same fire area (1200 AF 02) as the rail car bay / filter storage area. The rail car bay / filter storage area has not been provided with automatic suppression. The applicant has not included the potential for transient vehicles in the fire protection sumrnary Table 9A-3 of the SSAR. The potential for transient vehicles in the rail car bay coupled win the other combustibles located in this fire area represents a significant i exposure hazard to the new fuel storage area and is, therefore, unacceptable. I Spent Fuel Pool Area: The fuel handling area is provided with automatic fire detection, hose stations and portable extinguishers, automatic suppression has not been provided. The fuel handling area is located in the same fire area (1200 AF 02) as the rail car bay / filter storage area. ,
The rail car bay / fitter storage area has not been provided with automatic suppression.
Materials Containina Radioactivity: Materials that collect and contain radioactivity such as spent I resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA filters are stored in closed metal containers. However, materials containing radioactivity are located in fire area 1200 AF 02, which contains numerous ignition sources and combustibles. Therefore, the radioactive materials located in this fire area are not adequately protected from an exposure fire. Therefore, the fire protection provided for i radioactive materials is unacceptable. l Resolutino; e
Westinghouse will provide suppression in the auxiliary building rail car bay. l Attachment 1 is a copy of the meeting handouts. Attachment 2 identifies the participants at the ,
meeting. Westinghouse has committed to provide the updated information to close the open items by March 6,1998.
original signed by:
Dino C. Scaletti, Senor Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No.52-002 DISTRIBUTION: See next page
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: See next page DOCUMENT NAME: A \2-24-98. SUM To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE PM:PDST:DRPM l D:PDST:DRPM l l l l NAME DCScaletti:sd ((2 TRQuay WA aDATE 03/ ( /98 V/ 03/ 4/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
l Westinghouse Electric Corporation Docket No.52-003 l
1 cc: Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager Mr. Frank A. Ross Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 .
Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Office of LWR Safety and Technoiogy ;
Westinghouse Electile Corporation 19901 Germantown Road P.O. Box 355 Germantown, MD 20874 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. Russ Bell Mr. B. A. McIntyre Senior Project Manager, Programs Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Nuclear Energy institute i Westinghouse Electric Corporation 1776 i Street, NW l Energy Systems Business Unit Suite 300 '
Box 355 Washington, DC 20006-3706 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Ms. Lynn Connor !
Ms. Cindy L. Haag Doo-Search Associates j Advanced Plant Safety & Ucensing Post Office Box 34 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Cabin John, MD 20818 j Energy Systems Business Unit )
Box 355 Dr. Craig D. Sawyer, Manager Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Advanced Reactor Programs GE Nuclear Energy Mr. M. D. Beaumont 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-754 Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division San Jose, CA 95125 Westinghouse Electric Corporation One Montrose Metro Mr. Rober1 H. Buchholz 11921 Reckville Pike GE Nuclear Energy Suite 350 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 Rockville, MD 20852 San Jose, CA 95125 Mr. Sterling Franks Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.
Ll.S. Depsrtment of Energy Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott NE-50 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor 19901 Germantown Road Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Ed Rodwel!, Manager Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer PWR Design Certification AP600 Certification Electric Power Research Institute NE-50 3412 Hillview Avenue 19901 Germantown Road Palo Alto, CA 94303 Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Robert Maiers, P.E.
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Radiation Protection Rachel Carson State Office Building P.O. Box 8469 Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469
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!' DISTRIBUTION w/ attachments:
l Docket File PUBLIC PDST R/F TKenyon BHuffman JSebrosky DScaletti
! JNWilson SMagruder JHWilson MDunsaniwskyj DISTRIBUTION w/o attachments:
SCollins/FMiraglia,0-12 G18 BSheron,0-12 G18 BBoger,0-12 G18 JRoe DMatthews TQuay ACRS (11)
' JMoore,0-15 B18 JLyons,0-8 Di SWest,0-8 D1 LBMarsh,0-8 D1 PMadden,0-8 D1 EConnell,0-8 D1 JHolmes,0-8 D1 '
l l
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. Westinghouso i
AP600 FIRE PROTECTION February 24,1998 i
Spurious ADS Actuation - ,
Issue II The sourious actuation of ADS due to hot shorts of control circuits of motor operated valves from a fire in the remote shutdown workstation. DC eautoment rooms. and Class 1E penetration rooms has not been adequately addressed in the SSAR by the applicant.
Spurious actuation of ADS results in a venting of the RCS in conflict with the fire protection of safe chutdown capability acceptance criteria specified above for the AP600. Therefore the applicants resolution of this issue is unacceptable.
,,3% AP600 Fire Protet, tion 2 Attachment 1
, . Westinghouse l
l Spurious ADS (Remote ,
Shutdown Workstation) l There are no remote shutdown workstation (RSW) hot shorts that can cause spurious ADS.
. RSW controls are ' soft'. Spurious actuation from soft controls is not credible.
. RSW controls are not normally active.
J l
,, ej,,, AP600 Fra Protecta 3 Spurious ADS (Class 1E DC Equipment Rooms)
There are n2 de equipment room hot shorts that can cause spurious ADS.
. The only possible spurious ADS actuation from a dc equipment room fire is smoke-induceu electronics failures in the l&C room of the same division.
. Following detection of a fire in a do equipment room, power is removed from all circuits of that division, removing the possibility of smoke-induced spurious actuations.
- **c>=.m.w AP600 Fre Pretscia 4
l l
Spurious ADS (Class 1E , .
Penetration Rooms)
. ADS MOV control circuits from PMS cabinets to MCOs are two-pole, energize-to-actuate (2 hot shorts of proper polarity required for spurious opening of one MOV).
. ADS MOV control circuits from DAS to MCCs are two-pole, energize-to-actuate.
. ADS MOVs on same flow path are controlled from different MCC stacks.
, , , , , _ , , AP600 Fra Protection 5 Spurious ADS (Class 1E Penetration Rooms) '
I
. Spurious ADS requires opening of 2 MOVs, thus 4 hot shorts of proper polarity.
. Following detection of a fire in a penetration room, power is removed from all circuits or that division, removing the possibility of hot shorts.
. Post-fire time line analysis is a COL responsibility. (RAI 280.35F)
,wcj.. % AP600 Fro Ptotection 6
. Westinghouse i
Head Vent Valves -Issue i The applicant has included the reactor head vents for consideration as a hiahllow oressure interface in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter (GL) 81 12.
However, only the power circuits inside containment have been !
adequately protected from a hot short to prevent a spurious actuation. The applicant has not provided a discussion of the protection orovided for the oower and control circuits located outside the containment, which can also result is a sourious actuation of the reactor head vents. Therefore, the applicants resolution of this issue is unacceptable.
, e3,,, AP600 Fro Protection 7 Head Vent Valves - Cables i
. Inside Containment
-Cables for a valve in each flow path is enclosed in conduit (280.34F)
.=c3% AP600 Fire Protecuon e
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. Westinghouso Head Vent Valves - Cables
. Outside Containment
- Power circuits are four-way (divisional) separated.
- Outside MOR, control circuits are four-way separated.
-Inside MCR, divisional separation is maintained as much as practical.
,,,,% AP600 Fro Protection 9 Head Vent Valves - MCR .
Controls n
Each head vent valve has two three-position (open-neutral-close) dedicated switches, one on each dedicated safety panel.
. Circuits are two-pole, energize-to-actuate.
. ' Neutral' is de-energized (normal position).
- MCR soft controls are active only if both switches are ' neutral.'
- Fire-induced spurious actuation from MCR soft controls is not credible.
. _ , . Aesoo r,. n=en ,o
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!. Westinghouso l
t Head Vent Valves - MCR Controls
. Either-switch in the 'close' position will close l the valve.
. Opening a head vent valve using dedicated switches requires both switches to be in the
'open' position. !
. Spurious actuation from MCR dedicated switches requires 4 simultaneous hot shorts of !
proper polarity per valve (8 hot shorts in two locations required per flow path).
,,3,,,,, AP600 Fra Protection 11 i
l i l
Head Vent Valves - MCR .
Controls
. MCR dedicated switches are disabled by transfer switches at RSW.
. Valves are controlled from RSW following I
transfer.
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,+=cums., AP600 Fre Protection 12
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NRC FSER OPEN ITEM New SSAR Table 9.5.14 Table 9.5.14 Capabilities Used To Achieve Cold Shutdown FOliowing a Fire l Function System Capability Fire Protection
{
RCS Reactivity Control 1
, Short Term ControlRods separation
, Long Term - (1) -(1) l RCS Makeup - (1) - (1)
RCS Pressure Control
, increase - Pressurizer heaters - separation
, Decrease - Auxiliary spray (2) - (2)
Decay Heat Removal - SFWpumps feeding CST water to SG - filo suppression (high temperature) SG PORV discharge to atm. separation Decay Heat Removal - RNSpumps circulating RCS - separation (cold temperature) CCS cooling RNS - fire suppression
- SWS cooling CCS - fire suppression i Process Monitoring - RCS monitoring instruments separation (PMS)
- Non 1E Instrumentation and Control (3) - separation Support Systems - Instrument Air - fire suppression
- Standby DieselGenerators - fire suppression and separation Non 1E AC Power (3) - separation
- Non-1E Room Ventilation Fans (4) - separation W Westinghouse 2E32M i
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, NRC FSER OPEN ITEM RB1
&is rdur elI New SSAR Table 9.5.14 (cont.)
Notes:(1) a fire, one CMT can provide this capability agedby wit (2) CVS auxiliary sprayprovides pressurizerpressure .
reduction If th amagedby a fire , one ADS stage 1 valve usedin a low capacityeration can throttled ve slowly depressurize the RCS without loss of RCSpressure containment.
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(3) The portions of the non 1E ACpower and the non 1Einstrumentation controlsystem required are those needed to operate components; controlcabinet). r local con (4) i control room, non-1E switchgear rooms, instrumentation and controlsystem (see note 3).
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i AP600 FIRE PROTECTION DESIGN MEETING
SUMMARY
FEBRUARY 24,1998 l ATTENDEES LIST l NAME ORGANIZATION BOB VlJUK WESTINGHOUSE i JIM WINTERS WESTINGHOUSE l TOM HAYES WESTINGHOUSE
, DON HUTCHINGS WESTINGHOUSE BRIAN MCINTYRE WESTINGHOUSE DINO SCALETTI NRC/NRR l TED QUAY NRC/NRR JIM LYONS NRC/NRR STEVE WEST NRC/NRR ,
L. B. MARSH NRC/NRR l PAT MADDEN NRC/NRR l ED CONNELL NRC/NRR JEFF HOLMES NRC/NRR I
l l
Attachment 2 l
l