ML20210Q122
| ML20210Q122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1997 |
| From: | Kenyon T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9708280138 | |
| Download: ML20210Q122 (25) | |
Text
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y lt UNITED STATES C' J Jt j
- ! f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WAaHINGToN, D.o. 30eeHopt k * . . . . /j}
i August 22, 1997 APPLICANT: Westinghouse Electric Corporation FACILITY: AP600
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF AUGUST 7, 1997, MEETING TO DISCUSS THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY DESIGN FOR THE AP600 1 I
On August 7,1997, representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Westinghouse met to discuss the proposed containment s) ray design for the AP600 design. Attachment 1 is a list of attendees. Attac1 ment 2 are the slides presented by Westinghouse.
Westinghouse described the containment spray design it proposed to incorporate into the AP600 design in response to the Commission's Staff Requirements Memorandum On SECY-97-044 dated June 30, 1997. In addition, Westinghouse discussed the impact of the containment spray system on aerosols in the :
containment atmosphere following a severe accident, i At the close of the meeting, the following action items were agreed to:
- 1. Westinghouse agreed to document key assumptions used in its su) porting analysis in its evaluation of the containment design. Westinglouse needs to demonstrate that its design is adequate to address the Commission's concerns.
- 2. Westinghouse agreed to reconsider whether selection of a failed-closed valve (V701) is appropriate based on its expected impact on reliability.
- 3. Westinghouse agreed to address the use of the spray system in WCAP-13914,
" Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Management Guidance."
- 4. The staff agreed to reconsider its concern that Westinghouse has not considered the effect of an inadvertent spray actuation on the maximum external pressure analysis due to the features of the proposed design.
- 5. Westinghouse agreed to consider a mechanism for assuring that the loca-tions of the locally-operated valves in the fire / spray system in the as-built design will be accessible during a severe accident.
- 6. Westinghouse agreed to address how the spray would affect the containment isolation mode and hydrogen combustion modeling in the Level 2 probablistic risk assessment for the AP600.
- 7. Westinghouse agreed to evaluate the effectiveness of the passive contain- x ment cooling system during a spray, G
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i August 22, 1997
- 8. The staff stated that it would determine the acceptability of Westinghouse's position that availability controls need not be imposed on the spray system.
Westinghouse indicated that the design of the containment spray rystem would be documented in Revision 16 to the standard safety analysis re) ort. A draft of this meeting summary was provided to Westinghouse to allow tiem the opportu'iity to comment on the summary prior to issuance, original signed by:
Thomas J. Kenyon, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No.52-003 Attachments: As stated cc w/atts: See next page plSTRIBUT10ff:
l Docket File PDST R/F SCollins/fHiraglia, 0-12 G18 PUBLIC RZimmerman, 0-12 G18 SWeiss 10uay TKenyon BHuffman DTJackson JSebrosky WDean, 0-5 E23 ACRS (11) JHoore, 0-15 B18 JNWilson DScaletti REmch, 0-10 D4 JLee, 0-10 D4 JKudrick 0-8 H7 MSnodderly, 0-8 H7 RPalla, 0-8 H7 KCampe, 0-8 E2 DOCUMENT NAME: A:CS.SUH
- i. .~ . ... . w. w. wn.p. w o wo c . co, .*,ma .n.cwne.=w,.. e . cov nh .u.a., nu.mw,.. v . s co, OFFICE PM:PL)Si $ RPM D:PDST;()SPM NAME IJKeiyon':sg IRQuayl[3la. '
DA1E 08/1L[97 08/'JN97 l I
OfflCIAL RECORD COPY
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Westinghouse Electric Corporation Docket No.52-003 cc: Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager Mr. Frank A. Ross Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Office of LWR Safety and Technology Westinghouse Electric Corporation 19901 Germantown Road P.O. Box 355 Germantown, MD 20874 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. Russ Bell Mr. B. A. McIntyre Senior Project Manager, Programs Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Nuclear Energy Institute Westinghouse Electric Corporation 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Energy Systems Business Unit Suite 300 Box 355 Washington, DC 20006-3706 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Hs. Lynn Connor Hs. Cindy L. Haag Doc-Search Associates Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Post Office Box 34 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Cabin John, MD 20818 Energy Systems Business Unit Box 355 Dr. Craig D. Sawyer, Manager Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Advanced Reactor Programs GE Nuclear Energy Mr. H. D. Beaumont 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-754 Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division San Jose, CA 95125 Westinghouse Electric Corporation One Montrose Metro Mr. Robert H. Buchholz 11921 Rockville Pike GE Nuclear Energy Suite 350 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 Rockville, MD 20852 San Jose, CA 95125 Mr. Sterling Franks Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.
U.S. Department of Energy Eckert Seamans Cherin & Hellott NE-50 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor 19901 Germantown Road Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Germantown, MD 20874 Hr. Ed Rodwell, Manager Mr. S. H. Hodro PWR Design Certification Nuclear Systems Analysis Technologies Electric Power Research Institute Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company 3412 Hillview Avenue Post Office Box 1625 Palo Alto, CA 94303 Idaho falls, ID 83415 Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer AP600 Certification NE-50 19901 Germantown Road Germantown. HD 20874 4
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NRC/ WESTINGHOUSE AP600 CONTAINMENT SPRAY MEETING PARTICIPANTS AUGUST 7, 1997 H&ME ORGANIZATION J. WILSON NRR/NRC/PDST C. THOMPSON DOE B. HUFFMAN NRR/NRC/PDST D. SCALETTI NRR/NRC/PDST R. EMCH NRR/NRC/PERB J. LEE NRR/NRC/PERB T. QUAY NRR/NRC/PDST J. KUDRICK NRR/NRC/SCSB M. SN00DERLY NRR/NRC/SCSB R. PALLA NRR/NRC/SCSB M. CORLETTI WESTINGHOUSE B. MCINTYRE WESTINGHOUSE R. V!JVCK WESTINGHOUSE J. GROVER WESTINGHOUSE T. KENYON NRR/NRC/PDST K. CAMPE NRR/NRC/SASG 4
i l
Att:chment 1
..\i l AP600 Containment S rav s l4 Michael M. Corletti a August 7,1997 5 8 a
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Westinghouse 1 i L --
li::: SECY-97-044 -
"iii e NRC Commissioners Approved the NRC Staff Position e AP600 Shall include Containment Spray Severe Accident Management Not Required to be Safety-Related
- Westinghouse 2 1
t: Containment Spray System
~
l i ; l e Functional Requirements Provide a Containment Spray System to . Enhance Severe Accident Management l } ! e Design Goals ! Minimize Changes to Plant 1 Minimize Adverse System Interactions
-Design Basis Events
-Flooding Westinghouse 3
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' 5 AP600 Containment Spray o System Design Two Containment Spray Ring-Headers
-Connected to Fire Protection System Header Inside Containment e Air-operated Isolation Valve e Normally Open ManualIsolation Valve
-44 Nozzles at Elev 235 ft.
-24 Nozzles at Elev 250'
-1033 gpm at 20 psig Containment Pressure
~82% Containment Coverage
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s ::- Containment Spray System ' i e System Operation Remote Operation From the MCR
-Severe Accident Management Guidelines e Core Exit Thermocouples > 1200oF e Emergency Procedures (AFR-C.1) Transitions to SAMG
-Continuous Operation (~3 hrs) e Maintain Containment Water Level (<109 ft.)
Westinghouse 8
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- i t
e System Operation i Manual Alignment of Two Valves '
- Auxiliary Building '
-Layout of Valve Room Modified to Minimize Radiation Exposure l e Estimate of Operator Exposure - 250 mR l e Applicable NUREG-0737 Limits-5000 mR l !
.l Westinghouse 9 i
1 i g :::*: l Containment Spray Interactions "
- e Effect on Design Basis Evaluations ~
j Boron Dilution
-Severe accidents only l -Water in core is voided; loss of core geometry
-Boron dilution not a concern l
Containment pH Concentration
-Small effect on long-term pH e 300,000 gallons spray decreases 30 day pH ~0.14 j
-No significant increase in iodine re-evolution Westinghouse 10
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o Containment Spray Interactions
~
e Effect on Design Basis Evaluations (cont.) ! Inadvertent Containment Spray
-Number of random independent failures not
! credible e Requires misalignment of two manual valves (one lock-closed containment isolation valve) e Remote manual actuation of containment spray isolation valve
-Only used in severe accidents e Clear and unambiguous indication provided to operators
- Additional manual isolation valve provided for
, shutdown Westinghouse 11 1
it ': Containment Spray Interactions " " e Other Considerations Maximum Containment Spray
~300,000 gallons
- Containment water level ~109' elevation e Post-accidentlevelinstruments
-Containment air mixing patterns are maintained Westinghouse 12
~
e & Containment Spray Testing = e Initial Test Program
- Preoperational Testing
-Fire Protection System
-Pump Head / Flow Characteristics
- Air Testing of Spray Nozzles I oITAACS ;
-Inspection for Spray Nozzles i
Westinghouse 13 [
Containment Spray e Future Submittals SSAR - Revision 16
~
ITAACS - Revision 4 WCAP-13914, Revision 1
" Framework for AP600 Severe Accident Management Guidelines" Westinghouse 14
~
g . Impact of Containment Spray on Aerosols In the Containment Atmosphere Following a Severe Accident August 7,1997 l t Jim Grover Containment and Radiological Analysis Westinghouse Electric Corp. au
Pg . ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING SPRAY REMOVAL OF AEROSOLS Severe accident with source term as calculated by NRC using the MELCOR code No credit is taken for passive aerosol removal processes
- (sedimentation, diffusiophoresis, and thermophoresis) while
! sprays are in operation i ! The passive removal processes have a combined value of 0.4 hr-I (NRC value) The rate of mixing between the sprayed and unsprayed regions is twice the unsprayed volume per hour (consistent with SRP) l Duration of sprays is three hours
~
t ( _ _ -
I Effect of Containment Spray on Aerosol lodine
, (Using MELCOR Generated Source Term and NRC Passive Removal Coefficient) m
,8 100 a.
m o 90 ^ - E .
< 80 - - - - -
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g 0 ........ ,.........,.........,.........,.........,.........,.........,......... n. r 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Time (hours)
- u. u. s,r.1 s,r.7 -
Removal Spray at 1.0 kr. at 2.5 hrs.
.............. ......- - . - fy . -
b.N RELEASES OF AEROSOL I-131 ACTIVITY Over the first 24 hours of the accident the release ofI-131 due to containment leakage is:
- 50,600 curies if there is no removal other than decay
- 6000 curies if onfy passive removal processes are credited 1300 curies if sprays are actuated at one hour
- 2400 curies if sprays are actuated at 2.5 hours l
l
gi . CONCLUSIONS l The AP600 containment spray design provides an effective means for reducing airborne particulates resulting from a severe accident i}}