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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20210B7941999-07-15015 July 1999 SER Denying Licensee Request for Changes to Current Ts,Re Deletion of Tendon Surveillance Requirements for Calvert Cliffs ML20196C6981999-06-21021 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Use of ASME Section XI Code Including Summer 1983 Addenda as Interim Code for Third 10-year Insp Interval at Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 Until Review of 1998 Code Completed,Would Be Acceptable ML20204H6471999-03-21021 March 1999 SER Re License Renewal of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20203D4311999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Procedure Established for long-term Corrective Action Plan Related to Containment Vertical Tendons ML20199G4671999-01-20020 January 1999 SER Accepting USI A-46 Implementation for Plant ML20199F4781999-01-0808 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Bg&E Performed Appropriate Evaluations of Operational Configurations of safety-related power-operated Gate Valves to Identify Valves Susceptible to Pressure Locking.Concludes GL 95-07 Actions Were Addressed ML20198S7591999-01-0707 January 1999 SER Accepting Quality Assurance Program Description Change for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20195H1001998-11-16016 November 1998 Safety Evaluation of First Containment Insp Interval Iwe/Iwl Program Alternative ML20154G3931998-10-0505 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Flaw Tolerance Evaluation for Assumed Flaw in Inboard Instrument Weld of Pressurizer Meets Rules of ASME Code ML20237D4981998-08-19019 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for Extension of Second ten-year Inservice Insp Interval ML20236L7521998-07-0606 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Bg&E 980527 Request for Relief from Requirement of Section IWA-5250 of ASME Code for Calvert Cliffs Unit 2.Alternatives Provide Reasonable Assurance of Operational Readiness ML20236F7791998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Request for Temporary Relief from Requirement of Subsection IWA-5250 of ASME Code,Section XI for Plant,Unit 1 ML20217Q7971998-05-0404 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 227 & 201 to Licenses DPR-53 & DPR-69,respectively ML20217P7441998-04-0707 April 1998 SE Accepting Licensee Request for Second 10-yr Insp Interval to Use ASME Section IX Code Case N-416-1, Alternative Pressure Test Requirement for Replacement Items by Welding, Class 1,2 & 3,Div 1 at Plant Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20203E9741998-02-11011 February 1998 SER Accepting IST Program Requests for Relief Submitted for Third 10-yr Intervals for Pumps & Valves for Plant ML20198K3741998-01-0505 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Second 10-yr ISI Interval for Plant,Units 1 & 2 Relief Request from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Requirements to Use Performance Demonstration Initiative Program ML20197G1291997-12-15015 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Revised Withdrawal Schedules for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20134G5291997-02-0707 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Request Relief from ASME Code Requirement for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 1 ML20058G0561993-11-29029 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Installation Requirements of Section Iii,Article 9 of 1968 Edition of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code for Plant ML20057C3831993-09-22022 September 1993 Sser Accepting Licensee 930707 Response to Station Blackout Rule,Per 10CFR50.63 ML20127C0571992-12-23023 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting Clarification of Previous Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program Actions & Withdrawal Schedule Change for Reactor Matl Surveillance Capsule ML20128B9371992-11-20020 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to Suppl 1 to GL 87-02 IR 05000317/19900801990-11-21021 November 1990 SER Determining That Load Profile Used During Surveillance Test Procedure Meets Requirement of Tech Spec 4.8.2.3.2.e, Per Unresolved Item Noted in Insp Repts 50-317/90-80 & 50-318/90-80 ML20059N2251990-10-0101 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Actions Re Potential Design Deficiency,Per LER 89-023 ML20245E8561989-06-22022 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability for All Domestic Operating Reactors ML20247D0361989-03-24024 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 119 to License DPR-69 ML20205P6491988-11-0202 November 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Compliance w/10CFR50.62 ATWS Rule. Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Sys Designs in Conformance W/ Requirements of TMI Action Plan Item II.E.1.2,surveillance Testing,Complies W/Atws Rule ML20238A3141987-08-24024 August 1987 Safety Evaluation of Encl Technical Evaluation Repts EGG-NTA-7243,EGG-NTA-7720 & EGG-NTA-7463 & Licensee Submittals in Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 2.1.1, 2.1.2 & 4.5.2.Responses Acceptable ML20213E8731987-05-11011 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 861002 Request for Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of ASME Code Section XI Re Peripheral CRD Housings ML20205R7061987-03-26026 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Relief from Certain ASME Code Hoop Stress Requirements Until Next Refueling Outage to Repair Flaw in Base Metal of Steam Generator Main Steam Line 12 ML20210P0911987-02-0404 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events.Util Must Submit Reevaluation of Resistance Temp PTS ML20207P0721987-01-0606 January 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Conformance to Reg Guide 1.97 W/Noted Exceptions ML20198G6971986-05-22022 May 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.2 Re post-trip Review Data & Info Capability ML20210P2801986-05-0606 May 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to Items 3.1.3 & 3.2.3, Post-Maint Testing of...Safety-Related Components, of Generic Ltr 83-28 ML20202E0721986-03-31031 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 116 to License DPR-53 ML20141N7691986-03-10010 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Granting Util 850913 & 860113 Requests for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI Re Observation of Lubricant Level or Pressure During Pump Testing ML20136G7371985-11-14014 November 1985 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI Requirement Re Pressure Testing of Class 2 Piping Associated W/Rcs ML20138E2821985-10-10010 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Re Extended Burnup of C-E PWR Fuel. Methodologies Acceptable for Extended Burnup Application ML20137W8811985-09-18018 September 1985 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Radiographic & Visual Insp of Reactor Coolant Pump Casings ML20126L8241985-07-18018 July 1985 Suppl to Safety Evaluation Supporting Response to IE Bulletin 80-11 Re Reevaluation of 22 Masonry Walls,Utilizing Methods Other than Energy Balance Technique ML20133E1101985-07-18018 July 1985 Corrected Suppl to Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 850612 Reevaluation of Masonry Wall Design Using Linear Elastic Methodology.Action Completed on IE Bulletin 80-11 ML20205B2591985-07-10010 July 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Position on Generic Ltr 83-28 Items 4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Re Reactor Trip Sys Reliability ML20127N2351985-05-0909 May 1985 SER Re NUREG/CR-3511, Interim Reliability Evaluation Program:Analysis of Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Nuclear Power Plant. Use of PRA Results Out of PRA Context Clearly Inappropriate ML20132B8731984-03-21021 March 1984 SER on Multi-Plant Action C-14 Re Seismic Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys ML20148A9641978-01-0404 January 1978 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 27 & 12 to Licenses DPR-53 & DPR-69,respectively 1999-07-15
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G6971999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Calvert Cliffs Npp,Units 1 & 2.With ML20216J8731999-09-10010 September 1999 Rev 52 to QA Policy for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant ML20212A4441999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Ccnpp,Units 1 & 2. with ML17326A2011999-08-23023 August 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990724,reactor Tripped Due to Main Transformer Bushing Flashover.Plant Was Brought to SS & Components Were Tested & Performed Satisfactorily.With 990823 Ltr ML20210S6091999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Ccnpp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20210N6001999-07-27027 July 1999 ISI Summary Rept for Calvert Cliffs Unit 2. Page 2 of 3 in Encl 1 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20210B7941999-07-15015 July 1999 SER Denying Licensee Request for Changes to Current Ts,Re Deletion of Tendon Surveillance Requirements for Calvert Cliffs LD-99-039, Part 21 Rept Re Defect of Abb 1200A 4kV Vacuum Breakers. Initially Reported on 990625.Defect Results in Breaker Failing to Remain in Closed Position.Root Cause Evaluation & Corrective Action Plan Being Developed.Licensee Notified1999-06-30030 June 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect of Abb 1200A 4kV Vacuum Breakers. Initially Reported on 990625.Defect Results in Breaker Failing to Remain in Closed Position.Root Cause Evaluation & Corrective Action Plan Being Developed.Licensee Notified ML20209F1721999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Calvert Cliffs Npp.With LD-99-035, Part 21 Rept Re Abb 1200A 4KV Vacuum Breakers Performing Trip Free Operation When Close Signal Received by Breaker. Defect Results in Breaker Failing to Remain in Closed Position.Root Cause & CAP Being Developed1999-06-25025 June 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Abb 1200A 4KV Vacuum Breakers Performing Trip Free Operation When Close Signal Received by Breaker. Defect Results in Breaker Failing to Remain in Closed Position.Root Cause & CAP Being Developed ML20196C6981999-06-21021 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Use of ASME Section XI Code Including Summer 1983 Addenda as Interim Code for Third 10-year Insp Interval at Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 Until Review of 1998 Code Completed,Would Be Acceptable ML20195K2811999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Ccnpp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20206R5871999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Ccnpp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20195B3891999-04-30030 April 1999 0 to CENPD-279, Annual Rept on Abb CE ECCS Performance Evaluation Models ML20205N2951999-04-13013 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990314,fire Detection Sys Was Removed from Svc to Support Mod to Replace SRW Heat Exchangers in Unit 2 SRW Room During Unit 2 Refueling Outage.Contingency Measure 15.3.5.A.1 Will Continue Until Fire Detection Sys Restored ML20210T5211999-04-0101 April 1999 Rev 0 to Ccnpp COLR for Unit 2,Cycle 13 ML20205P5441999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20204H6471999-03-21021 March 1999 SER Re License Renewal of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20207M8321999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant.With ML20203D4311999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Procedure Established for long-term Corrective Action Plan Related to Containment Vertical Tendons ML20199G4671999-01-20020 January 1999 SER Accepting USI A-46 Implementation for Plant ML20206Q3221999-01-11011 January 1999 Special Rept:On 981226,wide Range Noble Gas Effluent RM Was Removed from Operable Status.Caused by Failure of mid-range Checksource to Properly Reseat.Completed Maint & post-maint Testing & RM Was Returned to Operable Status on 990104 ML20207L0451999-01-0808 January 1999 Cost-Benefit Risk Analyses:Radwaste Sys for Light Water Reactors ML20199F4781999-01-0808 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Bg&E Performed Appropriate Evaluations of Operational Configurations of safety-related power-operated Gate Valves to Identify Valves Susceptible to Pressure Locking.Concludes GL 95-07 Actions Were Addressed ML20198S7591999-01-0707 January 1999 SER Accepting Quality Assurance Program Description Change for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20207M2281998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Bg&E. with ML20199E2931998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Calvert Cliffs Npp. with ML20206R9911998-12-0808 December 1998 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments (10CFR50.59(b)(2)). with ML20198B2631998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195H1001998-11-16016 November 1998 Safety Evaluation of First Containment Insp Interval Iwe/Iwl Program Alternative ML20196E2211998-10-31031 October 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 03-NP to CEN-633-NP, SG Tube Repair for Combustion Engineering Designed Plant with 3/4 - .048 Wall Inconel 600 Tubes Using Leak Limiting Alloy 800 Sleeves ML20195E5281998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154Q7191998-10-21021 October 1998 Special Rept:On 980923,unit 1 Wrngm Was Removed from Operable Status.Caused by Failure of Process Flow Transducer.Completed Maint to Remove Process Flow Transducer Input to Wrngm Microprocessor & Completed Formal Evaluation ML20154G3931998-10-0505 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Flaw Tolerance Evaluation for Assumed Flaw in Inboard Instrument Weld of Pressurizer Meets Rules of ASME Code ML20154M5841998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20153C2571998-09-18018 September 1998 Special Rept:On 980830,wide Range Noble Gas Monitor (Wrngm) Channel Was Removed from Operable Status.Caused by Need to Support Performance of Required 18-month Channel Calibr.Will Return Wrngm to Operable Status by 980925 ML20153C1091998-09-18018 September 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Defective Capacity Control Valves.Trentec Personnel Have Been in Contact with Bg&E Personnel Re Condition & Have Requested Potentially Defective Valves ML20151U5441998-09-0404 September 1998 Bg&E ISI Summary Rept for Calvert Cliffs ML20151T5281998-09-0101 September 1998 Special Rept:On 980819,declared Rv Water Level Monitor Channel a Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Three Heated Junction Thermocouples (Sensors) in Lower Five Sensors. Channel a & B Rv Water Level Probes Will Be Replaced ML20151Y1191998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 & 2.With ML20237D4981998-08-19019 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for Extension of Second ten-year Inservice Insp Interval ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML20237B9371998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant ML20237D5941998-07-22022 July 1998 Rev 2 to Ccnpp COLR for Unit 2,Cycle 12 ML20236L7521998-07-0606 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Bg&E 980527 Request for Relief from Requirement of Section IWA-5250 of ASME Code for Calvert Cliffs Unit 2.Alternatives Provide Reasonable Assurance of Operational Readiness ML20236F7791998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Request for Temporary Relief from Requirement of Subsection IWA-5250 of ASME Code,Section XI for Plant,Unit 1 ML20236R0881998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236X3101998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 1 to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant COLR for Unit 2,Cycle 12 ML20249A9571998-06-15015 June 1998 Special Rept:On 980430,fire Detection Sys Was Removed from Svc to Support Mod to Purge Air Sys 27-foot Elevation & 5-foot Elevation East Piping Penetration Rooms.Installed Temporary Alteration & Returned Fire Detection Sys to Svc ML20249A7711998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Ccnpp,Units 1 & 2 1999-09-30
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- E- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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I WASHINGTON, D.C. 3088f4001
%,*****p SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION l
REOUEST FOR RELIEF FROM THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS l
CODE REOUIREMENT l
i
) BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-317 1
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j 1.0 INTR 0uuCTION The Technical Specifications for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. I states that the inservice inspection and testing of the American Society i of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be
! performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel i
Code (ASME Code) and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g),
j except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission i pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i). 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) states that alternatives to the requirements of paragraph (g) may be used, when authorized by the NRC, if (i) the proposed alternatives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety or (ii) compliance with the specified requirements would result in hardship or unusual difficulties without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components (including supports) shall meet the requirements, except the design and access provisions and the preservice examination requirements, set forth in the ASME Code,Section XI, " Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," to the extent practical'within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials of construction of the components. The regulations require that inservice examination of components and system pressure tests conducted during the first ten-year interval and subsequent intervals comply with the requirements in the latest edition and addenda of Section XI of the
. ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) on the date twelve' months prior to the start of the 120-month interval, subject to the
~ 1 imitations and modifications listed therein. The 1983 Edition, Summer 1983 Addenda of Section XI is the applicable edition of the ASME Code for the Calvert Cliffs Unit I second 10-year inservice inspection (ISI) interval. The components (including supports) may meet the requirements set forth in
. subsequent editions and addenda of the ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) subject to the limitations and modifications listed therein and subject to Commission approval.
Enclosure 9702100443 970207 PDR ADOCK0500g7 P
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5), if the licensee determines that conformance with an examination requirement of Section XI of the ASME Code is not practical for its facility, information shall be submitted to the Commission in support of that determination and a request made for relief from the ASME Code requirement. After evaluation of the determination, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(1), the Commission may grant relief and may impose alternative requirements that are determined to be authorized by law; will not endanger life, property, or the common defense and security; and are, otherwise, in the public interest, giving due consideration to the burden upon the licensee that could result if the requirements were imposed.
In December 1996, Baltimore Gas & Electric (BGE), the licensee, found a leak near a piping support attachment weld on the ASME Code Case 2 safety-injection recirculation piping in Unit I component cooling pump room. In a letter dated December 19, 1996, BGE proposed an alternative examination to the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI. The licensee requested temporary relief from !
repairing the leak until the next refueling outage in the spring of 1998. '
2.0 DISCUSSION 2.1 Code Requirement for which Relief is Requested:
The licensee requested relief from the ASME Code (1983 edition),Section XI, paragraph IWA-5250, which requires that repairs or replacement of components be performed in accordance with IWA-4000 or IWA-7000, respectively, when leaks are detected as discussed above.
2.2 Basis for Relief Request: i The licensee is requesting relief based on 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3). The licensee states:
The proposed alternative actions provide an acceptable level of quality and safety. In addition, compliance with this Code requirement would require the shutdown of Unit I to repair the piping. This results in hardship without compensatory quality or safety improvement.
2.3 Licensee's Proposed Alternative:
The licensee proposes to perform weekly visual examinations and trending to ensure that the leakage does not significantly increase. It will also perform quarterly non-destructive examinations of the defect to ensure that the weld and piping near the defect does not degrade.
The licensee stated the following:
The affected pipe was determined to be operable based on the rate of leakage from the weld being immeasurably small, low stress levels at this location, probable flaw characteristics, and the
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location of the leak. The lack of significant leakage provides reasonable assurance that the weld is not substantially degraded.
Further degradation of this pipe segment will not prevent the safety injection pumps and containment spray pumps from accomplishing their design safety functions under post-accident conditions. Additionally, the affected pipe segment is isolated during containment sump recirculation.
The flaw was examined by liquid penetrant and ultrasonic testing and determined to be a pin-hole weld defect. Liquid coming from the leak appears to evaporate faster than a single droplet can form... Our evaluation followed the guidelines and recommendations contained in Generic Letter 90-05, " Guidance for Performing Temporary Non-Code Repair of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Piping." Based on the results of non-destructive examination and engineering analysis, we have determined that the defect is unlikely to grow under any circumstances. Therefore, it is concluded that the pin-hole size defect will have no effect on the ability of the pipe pressure boundary to fulfill its safety function. We intend to further evaluate this defect once the affected pipe segment is removed.
The licensee discussed the safety significance of the leak:
The operability of the safety injection pump minimum flow recirculation piping ensures the high pressure safety injection, .
low pressure safety injection and containment spray pumps have a minimum flow path to remove excessive pump heat. The pin hole in the affected pipe segment is currently leaking at an immeasurably ;
small rate. Thus, flooding, spray, or loss of safety injection pump recirculation flow are not current concerns. Additionally, the pipe segment is restrained above the defect by the pipe anchor and three inches below the defect by the floor grouping. This provides restraint against pipe movement resulting in a stable configuration should degradation of weld or pipe occur.
The piping at the location of the defect remains structurally sound and the calculated stresses at this location are low.
Additionally, we have concluded that there are no mechanisms which indicate the possibility for significant degradation of the weld.
The pipe segment is restrained such that substantial cracking of' 4 the pipe would not result in pipe separation. Therefore, catastrophic failure of this line is not credible.
Even though failure of this line is not credible, the impact of such a failure has been reviewed. If this pipe were to catastrophically fail, the maximum expected flow out of the break is approximately 400 gpm. This flooding rate is well within the currently evaluated rate for this room (2852 gpm). A break at this location would result in some loss of inventory from the
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Refueling Water Tank (capacity 400,000 gallons), however, at this flooding rate, this loss does not appear excessive.
- In conclusion, the Safety Injection System remains capable of performing its design safety functions. Delaying the repair of this minor leak until as late as the next Unit I refueling outage i has no safety significance. "
- The repair of the weld requires that the safety injection pump
- recirculation line be isolated and drained. Therefore, Unit 1 would have to be shut down into Mode 5 while the repair is made.
i Currently, we expect the repair to require removal of the pipe segment and possible relocation of the pipe support.
t j The licensee performed a flaw evaluation using area reinforcement rules from i the original construction Code. It stated that it used these rules because it i determined that the flaw is similar to an unreinforced circular opening; that j inspection results showed no sign of linear or planar type indication; that i i the indication is too small to represent a volumetric defect at this time; I
that the stainless steel is not susceptible to degradation from corrosion at i this location that would cause the opening to enlarge. The evaluation showed l that the defect had no effect on structural integrity.
1 The licensee will perform ultrasonic and liquid penetrant testing quarterly I
and visual examination weekly to ensure no further degradation occurs. The l boric acid buildup will also be measured, cleaned, and trended weekly. In the i event of an increasing trend, the non-destructive examination frequency will j be increased, and the operability of the pipe segment will be re-evaluated.
3.0 EVALUATION The staff's review of the licensee's proposed alternative finds that the evaluation of the flaw ensures that structural integrity will be maintained and the safety injection system will remain capable of performing its design j safety function. The flaw is minor and not expected to grow. The system was i
determined by the licensee to be degraded but operable. Moreover, the licensee's continuing monitoring of the leak by walkdowns and nondestructive i
' examination will ensure that any further degradation will be promptly identified. The licensee's relief request followed the guidance for Class 3 i
piping in Generic Letter 90-05. Although this guidance doas not apply in this ;
I case because the piping is-ASME Code Class 2, the staff based its evaluation on this guidance to ensure that all the relevant points regarding safety are
- adequately addressed in the relief request.
} '4. CONCLUSION F The NRC staff evaluated the information provided by the licensee in support of i its proposed alternative to ASME Code,Section XI requirements. Based on the
- information submitted, the alternative to repairing the leak in ASME Code 4
Class 2 safety injection recirculation piping contained in the licensee's proposal is authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii). Compliance with
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the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWA-5250, to perform Code repairs on the flawed weld would result in hardship without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. The proposed alternative is authorized until the next refueling outage scheduled for spring 1998.
Principal Contributor: M. Banic Date: February 7, 1997 l
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