ML20128A222
| ML20128A222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1993 |
| From: | Doornbos R, Gainty C, Jeffrey Jacobson, James Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128A183 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-92-30, 50-304-92-30, GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9302020164 | |
| Download: ML20128A222 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000295/1992030
Text
.
~
.
- _ .
.
-
.
.
..
.- -
.
.
.
.
,
,
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
REGION III
Reports No. 50-295/92030(DRS); No. 50-304/92030(DRS)-
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304
Licenses No.-DPR-39; No. DPR-48
Licensee:
Commonwealth ~Bdison Company
Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove, IL
60515
Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear-Power Station
Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Zion Sito,-Zion, Illinois
Inspectors:
.
.
k
/-2/p Nd
C. A. Gainty(
Date
I'Zh $$
.w
f'
, F. Bmith
Date
/
N'b/4.2
hwn
RJ L. Do r bos
Date
p
/d*d
Approved By:
J.'M
' acopson,- Chiet
-
Date
,
e
als
Processes Section-
Inspection Summarv
Insnection cpnducted December 14.-1992 through January 4. 1993
,
(Recorts No.'50-295/92030(DRS);-No.-50-304/92030(DRS))
-Atpas Insoected;
Announced safety-inspection-of tho' licensee's-
response to Generic Letter = (GL)
89-10,:-_" Safety-Related Motor-
Operated Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance" _ (2515/109).
Results:
The' licensee has developed a-program which is-generally
consistent with the guidance'of GL'89-10. -The inspection-
disclosed.one violation (Section 2.a.(4)), three unresolved' items
(Sections 2.a. (3) , . and 2.a. (4) ) , and one open item-_(Section
2.b.(6)).
'
The licensee demonstrated strengths in the following area:
O
Use of a spring' pack tester-at each valve refurbishmentJto
improve' accuracy of torque switch settings prior to= VOTES
-tests.
_
- 930202G164 930126 -
ADOCK 05000295-
'G
,
s-+y
1e
+
-
w
i,L-=w-
w
'
l-
1
.
.
-
-
.
,
- Inspection Summary ~
2
-
-
l
The' licensee demonstrated weaknesses in the following area:
o
The methods used to evaluate data from design basis testi'ng-
did not ensure that Movs could perform their safety function
under design basis conditions.
,
b
%
>
.
}
r.
-
-; .
.
- -
- -
- .
,_- , - ..
. .-
- - - -
-.- . - - . - - - - .
. . -
.-
.. .. .-_
-
.
..
.
.
.
.
,
.
TABLE OF' CONTENTS
P.aG9.
1.
Persons Contacted....................................
1
2.
Inspection of the Program Developed in Response to
Generic Letter 89-10...............................
1
a.
Generic Letter 89-10 Program Review..............
1
(1) Scope of.the Generic Letter Program.........
1
(2) Design Basis Reviews........................
2
(3) MOV Switch Settings.........................
2'
(4) Design Basis Differential-Pressure and
Flow Testing..............................
4
(5) Periodic Verification of MOV Capability.....
7
(6) MOV Failures, Corrective Actions and
Trending..............-....................
7
(7)
Schedule....................................
8
(8) Liberty Technologies 10 CFR Part 21 Review..
9-
b.
Associated Programmatic. Reviews..................-
9
(1) Design Controlifor Thermal overload
-
Protection....................
...........
9
(2)=MOV Setpoint Control........................
9-
(3)
Maintenance.................................
10
(4)
Training....................................
11
(5) Operating-Experience and Vendor
Notification..............................
11
(6)
Diagnostics.................................
11
(7)
Walkdown....................................
11
(8).Backseating of Valves.......................
12
,3 .
Licensee
Self-Assessment.............................
12
4.
Open Items...........................................
11 2
5.
Unresolved Items.....................:................
12
- 6.
Exit Meeting............................'.............
12
T
i
..
l
. .
- -
-
r
- ,
.'
.
,
DETAILS
1.
. Persons Contacted
Commonwealth Edison ~ Company (CECO)'
- R. Tuetken, Site Vice President
- - T. Joyce, Station Manager
- R. Branson, Nuclear Engineering Department.
/*L. Cerda, MOV Coordinator
- J. Dempsey, Technical Staff
- K.
Dickerson, Regulatory Assurance
- K. Moser, Technical Staff
/*M. Pigon, Technical Staff
- B. Rybak, NED Mechanical & Structural Design _ Supt.
R. Ungeran, MOV Program Administrator
U.
S.
Nuclear Reculatory Commission (NRC)
- J.
Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on. December 22,
1992.
'
- Denotes those participating in the-telephone conference -
January 4,
1993.
2.
Inspection of the Procram Develooed in Response to-Generig
Letter 89-10
a.
Generic Letter 89-10 Procram-Review
The NRC inspectors reviewed " CECO-Response to Generic Letter 89-10," submitted to.the NRC by letter dated
September 28, 1990.
Additional commitments regarding
the= program were submitted toithe NRC_-by letter. dated
May 11, 1992.
Zion implemented the-CECO corporate
level GL 89-10 program in accordance with Nuclear
Operations Directive NOD-MA.1, " Guidelines.for. Motor
Operated Valve (MOV) Testing, Maintenance'and
Evaluation," Revision--2,-by-Zion Station procedure. ZAP
400-09.
The licensee had developed a program that was-
generally consistent with the GL as discussed in more
detail below.
(1)
Scope of the Generic Letter Procram
The inspectors reviewed system drawings for safety
injection, containment spray,_ steam generator.
feedwater and-auxiliary feedwater, main steam,
containment spray,' component cooling, and residual
heat removal as a sample' check for the
1
-
_ - _
.
.
-
.
.
completenons of the scopo of the Gb 89-10 program.
There woro 328 safety related HOVs includod in the
program at Zion Station.
The licensoo provided
written-justification for the exclusion of 40 MOVs
from the program.
The justification was in
accordanco with the GL guidanco.
The inspectors
-
datormined that the scope of the licensoo's
program was consistent with GL 89-10.
(2)
llenign 11 asis Rovigyg
(a)
Difforential Pressure Reauirementn
The HRC inspectors examined det
basis
.
review dp requirements for a sa. 410 of MOVs
'
and evaluated the proceduros controlling the
performance of the design basis t
'lews.
No
problems were noted.
(b)
Reduced Voltaae capability
The method used for calculating degraded
voltage at the MOV motor terminals was
acceptable.
The second level undervoltage
relay sotpoint at the 4.16 kV safety-related
bus was used as the starting point for
calculating degraded voltage at-the motor
control contor (MCC).
This is a more
conservative method than the
" lowest
expected switchyard voltago" previous.1v used-
as the basis for calculating degraded voltago
at the MCC.
'
calculations of voltago drops in cables
between the MCC and the MOV motors were
confirmed to be accurato ay the inspectors.
The calculations disclosed an abnormally high
(up to 40 volts) drop in some cables.
This
was determined to be acceptablu due to a
relatively high (about 420 volts)-degradod
voltage at the MCC.
The higher MCC voltage
was made available by increasing the value at
which tho'socond level undervoltage relay
tripped.
(3)
MOV Switch Settingg
Sizing MOVs and setting'of MOV switches was
evaluated and was datormined to be an--evolving
process.
A targot thrust window was calculated
for MOVs that had-enough margin'to use tho' Valve
operational Test Equipment System (VOTES).
For
2
-
-
.-
~
e
.
.
,
,
some MOVs, modifications were planned to improve
the available margin.
This initial approach was
acceptable, however, careful evaluation of test
data is important in order to validate the
assumptions that went into the calculations.
Some
of the assumptions ir cludo valvo f actor, stem
coefficient of friction, amount of degradation in
stem friction over the maintenance interval, and
rato of loading.
The results from the dp testing at Zion appeared
to indicato higher stem friction factors, higher
valvo factors, and grontor offects from load
sensitive behavior for some McVs than was
originally assumed.
The licensco had compiled
data from all six Ceco sitos and estimated that an
averago valvo factor was between 0.4 and 0.5 as
compared to the 0.3 value typically assumed in
uizing calculations.
The licensoo had not
addressed rate-ot-loading in its program.
Itowever, an effect from rate-of-loading was
apparent in the tost data.
The NRC incpectors
informed the licensco that it will be expected to
add additional margin to its calculations to
envelop this offect, when applicable.
It is the
intent of GL 89-10 that test data be evaluated for
applicability to the overall MOV program.
Upon completion of its ovaluation of the backlog
of MOV test dcta, Ceco will be expected to
incorporate the results of the assessment of the
test data into its sizing and switch setting
methodology in accordance with GL guidance.
For
examplo, the thrust windows for the tested MOVs-
will need to be corrected where the thrust
requirements were found to be greater than
predicted. .For those MOVs that will not be tested
under dynamic conditions, test results from valves
similar in type and service, must be considered in
the ovaluation of valve capability.
The licensco stated that, in determining the
acceptability of a limited population of MOVs, it
had relied on the results of a study by Kalsi
Engineering on the capability of Limitorque
actuators to withstand thrust greater than the
published ratings.
The study was used cnly as an
interim measure and modification of the MOVs was
planned.
The Kalsi study had been endorsed by
Limitorque for those licensees that have the
report and have addressed the caveats contained in-
the report,
liowever, Ceco did not have a
3
I
<
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
. - _ - . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.,
'
.
,.
i
P
documented ovaluation addressing tha caveats of
the Kalsi report.
Ceco has committed to address
this issue in response to the LaSallo MOV
inspection (50-373/92023; 50-374/92023).
This
will be considered an unrosolved item for Zion,
pending NRR's review of the LaSallo responso and
considering any issues specific to Zion's limited
uso of the study (50-295/92030-01(DRS); 50-
304/92030-01(DRS)).
(4)
Drolgn Basis Difforpntial Pressuro._nnd Plow
T101109
Approximately 17 MOVs had boon dp tested at the
time of tho inspection, all during thu Unit 1-
Spring 1992 outago.
The inspectors woro concerned
that the dp test results had not boon ovaluated to
ensure that the MOVs could perform their safety
functions under design basis conditions.
The only
acceptance critorion utilized for the dp tests was
that the MOV cycled properly under test dp and
flow conditions.
The inspectors explained that
sinco most of the dp tests woro performed at loss
than full dp, an engincoring evaluation of the
test results was requirod-in o* dor to demonstrato
design basis capability of each'Mov.
In responso
to the inspectors' concerns, the licensoa
committed to perform an engineering ovaluation of
the 17 dp tosts in accordanco with Ceco document
"Whito paper 108" within a 10 wook timo framo and
to use the draft " VOTES Test Report Review Guido,"-
'
Revision 1, dated April-21, 1992'for ovaluation of
the Unit 2 dp touting during the current outage.
The failure to ovaluato test results for theil7 dp
tests is considered a violation of'10 CFR 50
~
Appendix B, critorion XI, Tost Control (50-:
295/92030-02(DRS); 50-304/92030-02(DRS)).
The inspectors reviewed the results of soveral dp-
tests and observed that in ono caso, the corporato
offico had calculated the valvo factor for MOV
ICC0685 to bo in-excess of 10.
Since the thrust
calculation for this MOV was based on a valvo
factor ofl0.3, the inspectors woro concerned that
the high valve factor may impact the operability
-
of the MOV.
Further ovaluation by the inspectors
identiflod that the VOTES traco showed ovidence-of
. disc guide drag or some other abnormality that'had
boon'proviously notod:by.'he VOTES technician,lbut'
t
was-not.ovaluated.
In response to tha. inspectors'
concerns, the licenseo evaluated the test results
and tracos and dotorrined that MOV 1CC0685 was
4
,
..
-
%
v-
y
c
--y
e-
-g-
--Vt
w
r
3
w
t-
_ _ . - _ _ _ - _ _ _. - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
_
.
.
,
- - ,
,
,
&
operable, but marginal, and required stem
_
i
lubrication overy 9 months instead of tho original
36 month interval.
The inspectors considered the
-
licensoo's evaluation to bo acceptable.
During both static and design basis testing, the
actual measured motor current for sono MOVs
exceeded the nameplato. locked rotor current and
'
appeared to indicato that the locked rotor current
was higher than originally assumed.
The offect of
degraded voltago for each MOV included in tho
calculation of capability was based on the
,
nameplato locked rotor current, which is normally
a reasonable assumption.
However, where the
measured current, corrected to rated voltago, is
higher than locked rotor' current, than that'
current should be considered in ovaluating the
worst caso condition under degraded voltage.
The
inspectors woro concerned that the licenson had
not taken stops to evalunto now information with
'
respect to the degraded voltago calculations and
capability for each MOV.
In responso to the
concerns, the licenseo identified the affected
population (approximately 50 tests) and committed
to ovaluate the offect of the highor locked rotor
curront on MOV capability within 10 weeks.
The
inspectors considorod the failure to ovaluate the
offect of the higher than expected motor. current ~
to be an unrosolved item, pending the licensoo's
review (50-295/92030-03(DRS); 50-304/92030-
03(DRS)).
The licansco evaluated static VOTES testing using.
the draft " VOTES Test Report Review-Guide."
'In-
most static tests reviewed, certain items marked
"no" in the guide were documented and
1
dispositioned onsito or forwarded to the corporato
offico for resolution.
This'mothod seemed to work
well in general, however, in the case of MOV.
ICC9438, the inspectors were concerned withLthroo
items marked "no" where there was no documented
ovaluation by either site or corporato.
Section
2.6 of the guide indicated that, when_zero' marks
on the VOTES traces woro not within 5% of each
other, NED (corporato) was to be contacted.'
In
Section 3.1, the measured thrust at."C16" (maximum
- thrust) excooded-the calibration rango; however,
for best fit straight lino calibration, Liberty
does not allow extrapolation beyond the
calibration range.
In Section 3.12, the disc
pullout' force was measured to ho 94.6% of C16
instead of 80% as assumed in the-sizing
'
5
F
6
_y
_
,%----.,
__s
,
y
4..p.
3
-.
.
,.,...y
, , , , , . - , . ,
,
.-
-__
-__ __. -._
.
.-
. *
,
i
,
methodology.
In response to the inspectors'
concerns, the licensee committed to review and-
'
evaluate the above items within 10 weeks.
This is
considered an unresolved item pending NRC review
of the licensee's evaluation (50-295/92030-
04(DRS); 50-304/92030-04(DRS)).
In general, the dp test results indicate that
soveral assumptions utilized for MOV capability-
ovaluations were not conservative.
It is
recognized that bounding all factors considered in
the evaluation of MOV. performance may not be
practical or appropriate and may lead to an
unrealistic compounding of conservatisms.
However, it is tho intent of Gb 89-10 that values
'
of individual factors:be evaluated such that, when
combined, provide reasonably conservative bounds
on actuator performance.
Results from the
testing, corrected in accordance with the October
,
1992 10 CFR part 21 report from Liberty
Technologies, are summarized below.
(a)
Stem friction factors varied between 0.0233
and 0.4514 during design basis testing and
did not appear to be bounded by the 0.15 stem
friction factor that was assumed for most GL- 89-10 program MOVs'in a non-degradedL
condition.
~
.
(b)
Flex-wedge gate valve factors varied between
0.1967 and 1.2643 during design basis testing
(not including the reported valve factor of
10.156 for 1CC0685).
Of the five gate valves
tested, two were bounded by the 0.3 valve
,
factor that was assumed for most gate valves.
(c)
Globo valves exhibited valve factors that-
varied between -0.1473 and-0.2538.
Since l.t
i
is not theoretically possible to have a1 globe
valve with a valve factor less than11.0, the
data may indicate inaccuracies in the
'
measurement of dp or'some other parameter.
Generic.difficultica in measuring test
. parameters may affect the data generated forf
;
all-design basis tests.
Further
.
.
investigation-into this issue is appropriate.
,
'
6
L
,
u
F
w
v
rim--
~d3
en-'y
vd
W
m
-
. __
__
. .___
.
.=
.,
.
,
(d)
Load sensitive behavior had not boon
accounted for in the methods for setting
torque switches.
However, load sensitive
behavior wad observed during most of the
design basis tests and varied between -35.0%
and 66.7%.
(5)
Par.iodie Verification of MOV Cap. ability
The Zion MOV program and the corporate program
both indicated that static testing would be used
for periodic verification to assure that proper
,
switch settings are maintained throughout the life
of the plant.
However, the licensee had no
objective evidence to establish a reliable
'
correlation'octween static tests and dynamic tests
performed at full flow and full differential
presca c< Tre licensee must establish such a
correlat ivu pefore static testa can be used for
'
this pureaew
The station's schedule for periodic testing of
MOVs appeared to follow the, guidance of GL 89-10;
however, the station's program document did not.
The station's program is the formal document-
prescribing the activities to be-performed in
response to GL 89-10.
That program is expected to
represent the practice being followed.
However,
the wording in the program did not follow the
guidance of GL 89-10 in some areas.- For example,_
it excused the periodic verification of some
safety related MOVs (identified as category _2)
provided they received-preventive maintenance on
at least a ten year cycle.
The period recommended-
by GL 89-10 for verification of=the capability.of
each MOV in the program was every third refueling
outage or every five years.
Tius program should
reflect this period.
Any deviation-from this
guidance should be justified on the basis of
actual experience and' documented.-
"
(6)
JiOV Failures. Corrective Actions and Trendina
The inspectors reviewed corrective actions taken
for a number of recent deviation: reports, and
other MOV-failures.
In most cases,.the root cause
,
determination and corrective actions were complete.
'
and well_ documented.
However, the inspectors were
concerned about a number of failures-that resulted
'
from binding of auxiliary contacts in the McCs.
l
According to licensee records, there had'been 28
L
failures attributed to sticking auxiliary contacts
-
1
7
i
..
. - - . . -
_ - , ,
,
.-
,
.
.
'.
'
.
.
in MOVs and other components since 1989.
As a
result of the failure of a switch gear ventilation
fan in November 1989, the licensee identified
through consultation with the manufacturer, that
periodic lubrication of the plunger was necessary
to prevent binding.
The licensee revised the PM
proceduro used for MCC maintenance at that time,
but failed to recognize that not all McCs for MOVs
were in the PM program until further MOV failures
occurred in 1992.
In responso to the inspectors'
concerns, the licensee reviewed the population of
MOVs that had not been properly lubricated and
determined that (1) all plant McCs were in the PM
program, (2) all Unit 2 safety related MCCs will
be lubricated by the end of the current outaga,
(3) all Unit 1 safety related MCCs were scheduled
to receive PM during the Fall 1993 outage, and (4)
the Unit 1 MOVs woro determined to be operable
based on the quarterly surveillance testing
program.
The inspectors considered the licenson's
approach to be acceptable.
The trending program had the capability to collect
data on a number of paramotors, including thrust
at torque switch trip, maximum thrust, and other:
parameters that should become useful as more data
is collected.
Failures were also trended both by
_
cause and by component to attempt to identify
potential problem areas.
This was considered to
be a good approach, especially due to' considerable
MOV coordinator involvement.
However, the
trending for indication of when a refurbishment
would be required was based mostly on the results
of grease inspections.
No periodic refurbishments
woro planned.- This could limit tho-effectiveness
of the station personnel to detect degradation-
prior to failure.
Some forms of wear may not be
detectable until the actuators are virtually
In such a caso, periodic visual
inspecticns may provide a measure of added
assurance.
(7)
Sched412
The licensee committed to implementation of all GL.
89-10 actions by the end of the fifth. refueling
outages, beginning with-the 1991' outages.
The-
schedule was beyond the time frame recommended by
the GL and there were no plans to dynamically test
MOVs where'at least 80% of design basis dp and
~
flow could not be achieved.
This position and the
implementation schedule for GL 89-10 will'be
8
..
. . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ - _ _
.
.-
.
,
reviewed by HRR to determino acceptability.
The
18 inseo has determined that 132 MOVs are
prmcticable to test.
At the time of tho
inspection, 17 dp tests had boon completed on Unit
1.
(8)
Liberty Technoloalos 10 CPR Part 21 Review
During a mooting with the NRC staff in April 1992,
CECO committed to ovaluato the data from tests of
5
motor-operated valvos (MOVs) performed at its
facilition in response to GL 09-10.
In accordance
with 10 CFR Part 21, Liborty Technologies notified
the NRC staff and nuclear power. plant 11consoos in
October 1992 of a generic issue rogarding the
accuracy of its VOTES diagnostic equipment.
At
tho time of the inspection at Zion, CECO had
completed a proliminary evaluation of the MOV test
data including an initial effort at addressing the
offect of the increased inaccuracy of the VOTES
equipment.
In an internal memorandum dated
October 29, 1992, CECO stated that its.
consideration of the increased inaccuracy of the
VOTES equipment would be completed within six
months of recolpt and validation of now VOTES
'
software, received in December 1992.
Tho.licensoo
indicated plans to adhere to this schedulo during
the inspection.
b.
Associated Procrammatic Reviews
The NRC inspectors reviewed other licensco programs
associated with MOVs.
(1)
Desian Control for Thermal Overload Protection
[
The NRC inspectors reviewed the methods for design
f
control of thermal overloads (ToL) .- .The method by
,
which most TOLs in the-plant were selected was
acceptable.
The procedure for selection of future
TOLs was reviewed and found to offer some
additional conservatism.
TOLs selected by either
method conform to NRC guidance.
,
(2)
MOV Sotooint Control
The NRC inspectors reviewed-documentation and
"
discussed the MOV sotpoint control program with'
,
cognizant licensoo' personnel.
Zion-has devoted
!
considerable recourcos to this area as a result of
previous inspection-findings.
The MOV sotpoint
control program was considered to be acceptable.
'
9
_ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - -
.
.
+
,
(3)
Maintenance
The nominal proventive maintenance-(PM) frequency
'
was 36 months, which excooded the manufacturer's
(Limitorque) recommended frequency for stem
lubrication of 18 months.
The exact effects of
the extended maintenance frequency are not known;
however, some additional degradation and increased
i
stem factors would be expected.
The licenseo
planned to perform some static as-found diagnostic
testing to justify their position.
Such
justification would be better supported by as-
found design basis testing because of
uncertainties in the relationship betwoon the
performanco of MOVs under static and design basis
conditions.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's
practico in the area of valvo stem packing
adjustments.
Procedure ZAP 400-04 specified to_
'
perform VOTES testing following packing
adjustments if the thrust margin is narrow,
othorwise, a motor curront signature test was
performed after packing adjustmonts. _Since the
MOV coordinator is involved with the work analyst-
in datormining the appropriato post maintenance
testing for all MOV maintenanco, this.should
provido adequate control.- In general,.tho MOV
.
coordinator's close involvement in planned
,
maintenanco, post maintenance testing (PMT), and
static and dp-testing was considered to be a
positive aspect ofl the program.
The refurbishment _of MOV-operators and tho'
,
calibration testing of several Limitorque spring
packs was observed.
No significant irregularities
wero dotected. . ' Calibration testing was:a-regular
portion-of refurbishment and was used to_ confirm-
that-there was no degradation of spring. pack'
mechanical characteristics and to provido
individual (rather than generic) information for
each spring pack.
Having this information
available improved the~ accuracy:with which MOV
thrust or torque was predicted = prior to VOTES
testing.-
Making use of'this method of-improved-
MOV-performance control is considered-a~ strength.
,
10
_ _ _ .
_
__,
-_
._
. . _
.,
-
._
',
.
+
(4)
Training
,
The MOV training program for electrical and
mechanical mairitenance personnel was reviewed and
found to be acceptable in-content, duration,
examination difficulty, and record maintenance.-
(5)
Qngratina Experience and' Vendor Notification
The NRC inspectors reviewed applicable procedures
and discussed the process for handling various
information notices, VOTES Hot Tips, customer
-
Service Bulletins, Limitorque Maintenance' Updates,
and vendor notifications.
Steps had been taken to
ensure that information received was screened,
evaluated and maintained by appropriate
,
organizations and that appropriate actions were
planned.
The Zion program for the processing and
control of operating exp3rience and vendor
notifications was found to be acceptable.
(6)
Dinanostics
The VOTES system was used to test MOVs under both
static and dynamic conditions.
During the VOTES
testing, one parameter that_is measured is-inrush
current data, which'was measured with an
uncalibrated probe.
Since this reasured data is
important in validating locked rotor current
assumptions used in the capability assessments,
i
the inspectors were concorried with the use of an
uncalibrated probe.
Xn response to the
inspectors' concerns, the licensee committed to
obtain and use a calibrated current probe as soon-
as the probe is available and procedure revirions
are completed.
This item is considered an open
item -(50-295/92030-05 (DRS) ; 50-304/92030-05(DRS)).
(7)
ILalh519ED
The inspectors performed a general inspection of
the plant as well as a detailed inspection of-
MOVs.
In generale. housekeeping appeared to bei
good.
There was no obvious inconsistency.in
lubrication of valve stems, even on several valves
on which the bodies and bonnets were heavily
rusted.
1
11
,
,_.
.
- .
, _ . _
_
_.
.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ .
.
(8)
Backseatino of Valvos
)
The licensco routinely backsoats four valvest
1RH8701, 1RH8702, 2RH8701 and 2RH8702.
Although
J
olectrical b3cksoating is generally conaldered to
I
bo harmful to valvoa, thoso MOVs are exceptions.
]
The manufacturer's instruction manual recommendu
,
backsoating those valvos and backsoating thrust
i
critoria are proscribed.
Under thoso conditions,
backscating is acceptablo.
,
3.
Licensco Self Angessment
'
Efforts in this area were acceptable, but limited in scopo.
Self-assosoment carried out in the area of the GL 89-10
program concentrated on MOV sotpoint control.
Thio.lo an
important area and ono in which Zion has experienced.
difficulties in tho.past.
Although the assessnont was
performed with appropriate depth and objectivity, it covered
only a small portion of the program.
For examplo, the
engincoring ovaluation of MOV test data was not examined.
Failure to promptly evaluato data could result in long term-
use of an MOV-that toat data indicated to bo inoperable.
Self-asanoament in thin area might have averted the
violation included in this report.
Additional coverage of-
the remaining portions of the program in expected.
4.
Qggn.Itong
open itoma are matteru that have boon discussod'with the.
licensoo, which will be reviewed further by the-inspector,
and which involvo some action on the part of the NRC,
licensoo, or both.
An open item disclosed during the
inspection is discussed in Sections 2.b.(6)
5.
Unrosolved Items
Unrosolved items are matters-about.which more information in-
required in order to ascortain whether they are acceptable
items, items of noncomplianco, or deviations.
Unrosolved
~
items disclosed.during-this inspection are discuased in.
Sections-2.a.(3) and 2.a.(4) of this report.
6.
Exit Mgotinq
r
The inspectors mot with licensee representativos (denoted in
Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on'
December' 22,-1992.
-In-addition, a follow-up'tolophone:
conference was hold betwoon licensoo~representativos and the
Region III office on January 4,
1993;- The inspectors
summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection andithe
findings.- The inspectors informed the licenson-of'tho1
12
- .
- - -
. -.
-
-
-
,
. ,
,
1
i
~
.-
,
-
1
violation,'three unresolved items, and one open item
,
identified during this inspection.
The inspectors also-
'
discussed the likely informational content of the inspection
report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
i
inspectors during the inspection.
Several documents wore
identified as-proprietary but were not noted in this report.
,
?
e
i
h
13
._
.
. .
_.
. _ . . _ , -