ML20117Q051

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Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 900312 Suppl 1 to LER 89-023 Providing Compensatory Actions for Interim Operation & long-term Corrective Actions.Salp Input Also Encl
ML20117Q051
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  
Issue date: 08/31/1990
From: Mccracken C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Capra R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20116D885 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-96-237 TAC-77301, TAC-77302, NUDOCS 9009110055
Download: ML20117Q051 (2)


Text

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3 August 31, 1990

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  • Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318 MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert A. Capra, Director Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects I/II FROM:

Conrad E. McCracken, Chief Plant Systems Branch i

Division of Systems Technology

SUBJECT:

CALVERT CLIFFS, UNITS 1 AND 2, LER FOLLOWUP RELATED TO l

POTENTIAL LOSS Of SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DUE TO PIPE BREAK l

(TAC NOS. 77301 and 77302) j Plant Name:

Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 and 2 l

Licensee:

Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Review Status:

Consplete In accordance with TACs 77301 and 77302, the Plant Systems Branch has reviewed l

Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's (the licensee) followup actions to a potential design deficiency discussed in Calvert Cliffs LER 89-023 which was icentified on December 20, 1989. This review was performed as a long-term l

followup to the event (Event Followup Report 90-055) as requested by the i

August 1,1990 memorandum to Robert A. Capra from Patrick W. Baranowsky, Acting i

Chief of the Events Assessment Branch, Division of Operational Events Assessment.

l i

! l As described in the licensee's LER 89-023, dated January 19, 1990, and its Supplement No. 1, dated March 12, 1990, a potential problem may exist in the service water system (SWS) at Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 and 2, whereby a pipe

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break in the nonseismic portion of the system could result in the draining and loss of both safety-related SWS trains. The SWS at Calvert Cliffs is actually

-a closed loop cooling water system with surge (head) tanks and a relatively small volume of water.

l The focus of SPLB's review was to deter 1nine the adequacy of the licensee's compensatory actions for interim operation and the long term corrective actions taken by the licensee. As a result of our review, we have concluded i

that the licensee's proposed actions are acceptable. The bases for our conclusionsareincludedintheenclosedevaluation(Enclosure 1).

i However, we strongly disagree with the licensee's characte'rization of the i

event as "non-reportable" because it was outside the plant design basis. The licensee's reference to the staff's 1972 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) was inappropriate the as sole licensing basis for the plant. Because the SER does not discuss a particular scenario, one cannot assume that it is outside the I

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Robert A. Capra l design basis.

It is our position that a seismic event coupled with a loss of offsite power is not outside the original licensing basis for Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 and 2.

The licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report which provides part of the licensing basis for this plant and General Design Criterion 2, support this position.

Our SALP input is provided in Enclosure 2.

We consider our efforts on TAC No. 77301 and 77302 to be complete.

M8N Canrad E. McCracken, Chief Plant Systems Branch Division of Systems Technology

Enclosures:

DISTRIBUTION As stated Docket File Plant file cc w/ enclosures:

GHubbard P. W. Baranowsky JKudrick D. G. McDor,ld RArchitzel C. E. Rossi JLyons A. P. Young AThadani M. L. Reardon WLeFave AGody (SALP only)

CONTACT:

W. LeFaye x23285 i

i

, S.

SPL : T PLB: DST LB: DST WLeFave;di GHubbard CMcCracken g g /90 g /J//90

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[CALVERTTACS 77301/2]