ML20117P954
| ML20117P954 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1989 |
| From: | Mcneil S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20116D885 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-237 NUDOCS 8907110029 | |
| Download: ML20117P954 (4) | |
Text
'
June 30,198f
\\
Docket Nos. 50-317 DISTRIBUTION and 50-318 Docket File PDI-1 R/F RACapra MEMORANDUM FOR: Lowell E. Tripp, Chief SAMcNeil Reactor Projects Section No. 3A CVogan Division of Reactor Projects, RI ADRI (Acting)
FROM:
Scott Alexander McNeil, Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 l
Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON CALVERT CLIFFS NtlCLEAR POWER PLANT FOR COMMISSIONER ROGERS
]
Enclosed is NRR's input provided to support the planned visit of
)
Comissioner Rogers to Calvert Cliffs.
4 Scott Alexander McNeil, Project Menager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation J
Enclosure:
As stated PDIrb PDI-1 SAMcNeil:ah RACapra 06/30/89 06/yo/89
'dff b/f n
shtu e
M.e-1
/ fed.
c
l i
o
- J
~
A.
Significant Licensing. Issues 1.
Plant-Specific Activities' a.
24-month operating cycle - Currently, Unit 1 is in the i
fifteenth month of its first 24-month operating cycle while Unit 2 has completed its first 24-month operating cycle and is i
refueling in preparation for its second 24-month cycle. Though numerous technical specification amendments have been issued to support the 24-month cycle, significant issues remain outstanding regarding surveillance interval extensions, from 18 to 24 months, for containment leakage rate testing, steam generator tube inservice inspections, emergency diesel generator overhauls, snubber inspections, and calibrations of instrumentation and control electronics (e.g., nuclear 7
instrumentation and the reactor protection system).
Consequently, to accomplish a 24-month cycle, the units i
currently shut down approximately mid-cycle to perform the outstanding 18-month surveillance tests.
b.
Dry Vault Spent Fuel Storage Facility - The spent fuel pool at Calvert Cliffs will be capable of storing only one full core offload from either unit following the 1991 Unit 2 refueling outage. Consequently, BG8E intends to file a 10 CFR Part 72 i
license application in the third quarter of 1989 to establish a dry vault spent fuel storage facility onsite. The Topical Report describing the facility's design was submitted in February 1988 and currently is under review by MMSS.
c.
Performance Improvement Plan - As a consequence of the December 1988 NRC Senior Management Meeting, BG8E was requested to develop a plan providing long-term corrective actions for deficiencies existing in the control of plant operations and processes at Calvert Cliffs. The licensee submitted a preliminary plan on April 7,1989 and is scheduled to provide a detailed revision by July 31, 1989. This plan shall be reviewed by a joint NRR/ Region I panel to evaluate its adequacy in identifying plant problems, in determining root causes and in providing effective corrective actions. The panel organizational meeting.is scheduled for July 13, 1989.
2.
Generic Issues a.
Station Blackout - Calvert Cliffs has three emergency diesel generators (EDGs)fortwounits,oneEDGdedicatedtoeachunit and one that can swing to either unit. As a result, the probability of a station blackout is greatly increased. In response to the issuance of the station blackout rule, BG8E has proposed taking several compensatory measures to attain the required 4-hour coping duration. These measures include the addition of at least one diesel generator.
i
b.
Generic Letter 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal," - As a Combustion Engineering facility, Calvert Cliffs is susceptible to the loss of decay heat removal capability during mid-loop operation. BG8E has taken expeditious actions (e.g.,
maintaining a HPSI pump operable during reduced inventory conditions) to mitigate potential losses of decay heat removal. The licensee has not yet determined what hardere modifications are necessitated by this concern.
10 CFR 50.62 ATWS Modifications - The utility's design for c.
compliance with the ATWS rule has been determined to be acceptable by the NRC staff. The physical modifications required have been completed on Unit I and are scheduled to be complete on Unit 2 by the end of the current refueling outage.
B.
Operating Assessment i
As a result of the May 1989 NRC Senior Management Meeting, Calvert Cliffs continued to be categorized as a facility requiring close monitoring by the NRC.
Their initial categorization was a consequence of the declining performance that has been perceived at Calvert Cliffs over the last three j
years. The following significant deficiencies have been noted over the last two SALP periods:
l l
recurrent procedural noncompliances by members of all onsite organizations. Twenty-two different instances were identified in the recently completed SALP period; instances of continued plant operation with degraded or questionable equipment conditions without sufficient root cause identification and/or corrective actions; l
\\
understaffed and inexperienced engineering department which contributed to a backlog of design changes, insufficient planning time for modification work, and instances of poor engineering and safety analyses; poor coordination and communications on interdivisional tasks.
However, the licensee has taken several measures to attempt to correct these deficiencies:
l February 1,1989 - replaced J. A. Tiernan, as Vice President -
Nuclear Energy, with G. C. Creel. Mr. Creel appears to be more actively involved in setting plant safety and production policies.
In addition, he has directly intervened during certain plant events to direct implementation of more conservative courses of action.
i Following the death of an emoloyee in September 1988, an incident to which procedural noncompliance appears to have been a contributing factor, the previous Vice President - Nuclear Energy implemented a very strong and aggressive program demanding full procedural compliance from plant staff and management. This policy is fully supported by Mr. Creel. However, instances of procedural noncompliance, resulting in plant events, still continue to occur, t
BG&E approved a 15% staffing increase in engineering for 1988 to be-followed by an additional 10% increase in 1989.
+
A training program has now been developed for the system engineering staff with the first sessions commencing in Fall 1988. This program does not include qualification on the particular systems assigned to each individual system engineer.
In response to continuing events demonstrating poor control over work processes at Calvert Cliffs, on May 23, 1989, the licensee committed to taking several corrective actions, including establishing control over system status and work activities, prior to restarting either unit. These commitments were confirmed in the May 25, 1989 NRC Confirmatory Action Letter.
\\
1 l