ML20106G823

Proposed Tech Specs,Supplementing LAR-95-007,revising TS LCO 3.9.4 to Allow Both Doors of Personnel Airlock to Remain Open as Long as One Pal Door Capable of Being Closed

ML20106G823
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	03/13/1996
From:	TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20106G821	List: ML20106G823 TXX-9609, Forwards Ts,Supplementing License Amend Request LAR-95-007, Revising TS LCO 3.9.4 to Allow Both Doors of Personnel Airlock to Remain Open as Long as One Pal Door Capable of Being Closed
References
NUDOCS 9603190036
Download: ML20106G823 (3)

Text

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Attachment 2 to TXX 96090 Page 1 of 3 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS LIMITED CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,

b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and Aiminimum of one ? doorJ 1 n ~ the : emergency " ai rl ock 11 s~ cl osed "and T one~ door ,1 n 3the personnelj airlockj isicapable of; being; closed

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c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1) Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or

2) Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment ventilation isolation valve.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above s)ecification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.

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• " ~; ~ Administrativeicontrols shallf ensure;that-

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'1)L ; Appropri ate 1 personnel ? a re" aware Lthat : both personnel ? ai rl ock : doors arecopen,7 f' 2): ~ A ^ spci fi ed 'i ndi vi dual ( s )?i s l desi gnated : and ' ava11 abl e - to ? cl ose Lthe airlock;following.a required evacuation of containment.3and; s f 3)' fAny; obstruction (s)?(e;g ,fcables and hoses)nthat~could: prevent closure 'of an open; airlock be capable;of;beingiqqicklyLremoved:

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 9 4 9603190036 960313 PDR ADOCK 05000445 p PDR

i Attachment 2 to TXX 96090 I Page 2 of 3 I SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.9.4 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be determined to be either in its closed /isolatedrequired condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment ventilation isolation valve within 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by:

a. Verifying that,

1. Containment ventilation isolation occurs on a high radiation test signal from a containment atmosphere gaseous monitoring instrumentation channel and the containment ventilation isolation valve (s) can be closed remotely from the control I room, or

2. the containment ventilation isolation valve (s) are l closed / isolated.

b. Verifying the remaining penetrations of 3.9.4 not covered by a. I above, are in their closed /isolatedrequired condition. l I

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Attachment 2 to TXX 96090 Page 3 of 3 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION l

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: l (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses.

The value of 0.95 or lessthforboron K'e'rconcentration includes a 1% a k/k conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, '

value of 2400 ppm or greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron. The locking closed of the required valves during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths from sources of unborated water.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor suberiticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time l has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission '

products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING FENETRATIONS ,

1 The requirements on containment building penetration closure and 1 OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material withinfrom containment will be restricted from lecksge to the envircamentminimized. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

1 Both containment personnel airlock doors may be open durir.g movement of l irradiated fuel or during core alterations provided one airlock door is I capable of being closed and water level in the. refueling cavity is maintained

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l as required.

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314.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 9-1