ML20154R786
| ML20154R786 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1998 |
| From: | TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154R777 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9810270187 | |
| Download: ML20154R786 (300) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. . - . . . - - - - . - . - . - AFW System ; B 3.7.5 l B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i l B 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System ; BASES BACKGROUND The AFW System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System upon the loss of normal feedwater supply. The notgridr_13eg AFW pumps take suction through aEcoppon2gn:ttonllf_nelandithelturb.inej driven; pump 2takeDectioLthroughIa] separate and independent suction lines from the condensate storage tank (CST) (LC0 3.7.6) , and pump to the steam generator secondary side via separate and independent connections to the main feedwater (MFW) piping outside containment. The steam generators function as a heat sink for core decay heat. The heat load is dissipated by releasing steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators via the main steam safety valves (HSSVs) (LC0 3.7.1) or atmospheric dump relie_t valves (LC0 3.7.4). If the main condenser is available. steam may be released via the steam bypass dump valves and recirculated to the CST. .,
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The AFW System consists of tjo motor driven AFW pumps and w n.3.7.G-1 ' one f steam Each turbine motor driven driven pump pump provide configured cf .T. into h; ..v.,tr capaci d the turbine driven pump provide of th capacity to the steam generators, as assumed he accident analysis. The pumps are equipped with inignent uJhifloW recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. LhelmMfjo.W m lin~e lfoQheln[ogg%drJMQgigg&DioultisallgdsolateEbnlalfloW signalmEheW1MfMMMfo6the?tUrti1 Der;drjfegpimpJoes
!!otDsolatE8g!D3lBlnsMdgtng]Ljap2pigtstion] Each motor driven AFW pump is power an independent 0 3.7.G-1 Class 1E power supply and feeds, steam generators, although each pump has the capa tytobeIgcajJy realigned frer, the control ro0;;; to feed other steam generators.
The steam turbine driven AFW pump receives steam from two main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves. Each of the steam feed lines will supply 100% of the requirements of the turbine driven AFW pump. The AFW System is capable of supplying feedwater to the steam generators during normal unit startup. shutdown, and hot standby conditions. Rchlstj@mif_eedilfnelis proy1ded Nithialcheciqvalve2thatipreVents116s_slofdsteamisupp1 ilto thelturbfM3trj,Vepump1thgulg]pfpingitajlure3ffectjthi secondarYI51delef]the~ste#mIgerierater2focithatrsupply11peZ CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-26 9/25/98 9810270187 981021 PDR ADOCK 05000445 P PDR
AFW System B 3.
7.5 BACKGROUND
The turbine driven AFW pump supplies a common header capable of (continued) feeding all steam generators with Dorsal,]yZopeg? DC powered;Iair MePated control valves actuated to th; appropriat; ;tca;;; gencretor by the Enginc; red Safety Fcaturc Actuation Systa;;; (ESTAS). One pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions. Thus, the requirement for diversity in motive power sources for the AFW System is met. The AFW System is designed to supply sufficient water to the steam generator (s) to remove decay heat with steam generator pressure at the ]owest setpcint setfpressur_e;of the MSSVs plus accumulatioD. Subsequently, the AFW System supplies sufficient water to cool the unit to RHR entry conditions, with steam released through the AB h ARVs. The AFW System actuates automatically on steam generator water level-low low by the ESFAS (LC0 3.3.2). The system also actuates on loss of offsite powerrland onian;ATWS CP 3.7 13 Hitjgatjog1 System 2W:ttiatjonlCj rcuitry_(AMSAC);sj gnalj hcWeyerEA!ISACittart1GthCAFWipumpslis~notirequired;for AFl[systemlopetabflit M heimotorfdriven pumps ~alsolstatt.og safety injectioni and trip of all MFW pumps. Durin0 normal-pl aptioperations71the;AFWZsystem , Lun.d.ersmanual scontrol gi s useditolaaigtain~SGNaterilevel ? 0 3.7.G 1 The AFW System is discussed in the FSAR. Section ). APPLICABLE The AFW System mitigates the consequences of any event with SAFETY ANALYSES loss of normal feedwater. , The design basis of the AFW System is to supply water to the steam generator to remove decay heat and other residual heat by delivering at least the minimum required flow rate to the steam generators at pressures corresponding to the lowest steam generator safety valve set pressure plus 3% 8tcum018tj.00-In addition, the AFW System must supply enough makeup water to replace steam generator secondary inventory lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions. Sufficient AFW flow must also be available to account for flow losses such as pump recirculation and M line breaks. The limiting Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) and transients for the AFW System are as follows:
- a. Feedwater Line Break (FLB-FWEB): and
- b. Loss of MFW.
CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-27 9/25/98
AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES l l between 72 hours and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times l apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met. C.1 and C.2 When Required Action A. ock annot be completed within 'l-3.7.G 1 l the required Completion %, or if two AFW trains are j inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the unit must be placed in a H00E in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least H0DE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 18 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. l In M00: 4 with two APW trains inoperabic, opcration is 0 3.7.5 1 allowcd to continac becausc only cac actor driven pump AIJ train is required in accordance with the Not; that codifics ; the LCO.;IrQODEi4,Te.ither7the:reactoGeoolantjpumps:orsthel.RHR 100PsXatbeJsed3olprpyLdelforced31tculationZThisjfs , addressed;1[LC023;4L63" J CSlloops,LM14] Although not required, the unit may continue to cool down and initiate RHR. D1 If allJh,r.ee;AFW trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the unit is in a seriously degraded condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown, and only limited means for conducting a cooldown with nonsafety related equipment. In such a , condition, the unit should not be perturbed by any action, including a power change, that might result in a trip. The seriousness of this condition requires that action be started immediately to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status. Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note indicating that all required H0DE changes or power reductions are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable because it could force the unit into a less safe condition. fbi In MODE 4, cither thc reactor coolant pumps or the PJ'n loops can be used to provide forccd circulation. This is addrcssed in LC0 0.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 4." 'Jith cac required AIJ train inoperabic, action must be taken to i;;cdiately rc:*. ore the incperabic train to OPE"J"LC status. Thc i;;cdiate Ccapiction Tic; is consistcat with LCO 3.4.6. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3. 7 B 3.7-31 9/25/98
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AFW System B 3.7.5 ( BASES (continued) IhKSR%Olt!dmisurEIMdDodicAt.BilGhatithCliB3hoEOe
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tgperfoructygling SR 3.7.5.3 This SR verifies that AFW can be delivered to the appropriate steam generator in the event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS, by demonstrating that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on 0 3.7.5 8 an actual or simulated actuation gener_at.edibylanlauxiliary [eedwaterlactuatfoCsignal. TheLSteam1GeneratorjBlowdown, Steam;Gener_atotL8]hdownlSampleEand!F_eedwater2 Split 1 Flow BypasslialveO]gselon~anlaGgillary;f_eedwaterlactuation".to cp 3,7,13 ensutela g 11aryiteg WRte C151de]1yered'toltheisteag generator;upperinozz]esland1gretainddlin;the3tcan generator &forridegQeatLremogal3ThelUM;tlo(controlivalvesitrip to; auto 3cpeg)1tgMauM111afy;teedwaterlactuationato,;ensu.relfull flow 51sJe1Eereditgeachlstaan genetstatiflowamth;ghelsteam i admission 3alveCopeg;tolsGjfp]V theltGrbjneldtiveCaugj]iary feedwatetZpump] This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under ade.inistrative controls. The 18 month F"equency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at ! power. The 18 month Frequency is acceptable based on operating experience and the design reliability of the equipment. e This SR is cdified by "ste that states the SR is not rcquired in "00: 4. In "00: 4, th; rcquired A"4 train is already aligacd
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SR 3.7.5.4 This SR verifies that the AFW pumps will start in the event of any I accident or transient that generates an ESFAS by demonstrating that each AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated l I actuation generated:by*aLal]ggiarylfebdWaterlactuation 0 3.7.5 8 l signal in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In H00E 4, the required pump is already opera ing and the ant mtart function is not , required. The . ntn Frequency is based on Lne neeu cv 0 3.7.G-1 perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-33 M2SM8 l l ,
AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES (continued) T,js SR is modified by 4 lj@i3 hat tw ";tc^. ";tc 1 7 3 M 91CMllWt3isJt4Dhama n ev ausiMsititaDies3 g.3,7,g.1 y cotit!1t)!$li2AIMnemmittiggef tTg]i1[NRW1.riti i becausstegiggtsigtgML4MggqugyperfgEthe v j u_&_ O _&m&__ &L_A AL* en J_ _A ___..J_J J_ uAMP J MANr* y riv b5 k ebubsg ba su b b3rs vn aa a uv b i squ s a bu as a Ivwk 7. 4si s avww A sL. .___..__J _ . . _ _ J. .,..J.. ____.AJ _ _J AL_ ...&__&__A t. . A J 7, ba uw i wqu i s w%s ytsessy ad uiswuuJ vywa u b s u ry visu bstw uu bwa bul b s uIru b ivia
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CST B 3.7.6 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) BASES BACKGROUND The CST provides a safety grade source of water to the steam generators for removing decay and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The CST provides a passive flow of water, by gravity, to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (LC0 3.7.5). The steam produced is released to the atmosphere by the main l steam safety valves or the atmospheric dump teljef valves. The AFW pumps operate with continuous miniflow recirculation to the l CST as fequited. l l When the main steam isolation valves are open, the preferred l means of heat removal is to discharge steam to the condenser by the nonsafety grade path of the steam bypass dump valves. The l condensed steam is returned to the CST by the condensate transfer l pump. This has the advantage of conserving condensate while l minimizing releases to the environment. I
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Because the CST is a principal component in removing residual heat from the RCS, it is designed to withstand earthquakes and other natural phenomena, including missiles that might be generated by natural phenomena. The CST is designed to Seismic Category I to ensure availability of the feedwater supply. Feedwater is also available from alternate sources. Msafetyi telatedibjg%INGsupply;1gprovided, bruafluallskitchove,r,Zof 8.TPumpl40ctiositeltygtAt_1on;ServisaatetiSRtema EM]niCth M n M ;Ac 4 't:J G tllE.c T C ithclC.ST cPt3.713 l iG]MGEc31IiGMMfdtF2 A description of the CST is found in the FSAR. Section 0.2.0 (Refs. 1] 3_2815). APPLICABLE The CST provides cooling water to remove decay heatgand to cool SAFETY ANALYSES down the unit following all events in the acciden alysis 0 3.7.G 1 q as discussed in the FSAR, Chapter 15 (Re . 3). j For anticipated operational occurrences and accidents that do not affect the OPERABILITY of the steam generators, the bounding analysis assumption is scacrally 30 ;;;inutcC4,Jourfat MODE 3, steaming through the MSSVs, followed by a cooldown to residual heat removt.1 (RHR) entry conditiens at the design cooldown rate OMT/fidlRWRefsH4:ag[;gERifsI8stu]sptiq~dpisInotlincl_ude teactor,3601antJp! Lap]!!g. l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-N31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-35 925/98
I CST l B 3.7.6 l l BASES l l LC0] MODE 3 f 4 ours, followed by a cooldown to RHR entry conditions (Continued) a 'F iour f g 5 30lRM. This basis is established in o.3,7,a.1 l Re ence 4 5 and exceeds the volume required by the accident analysis. l The OPERABILITY of the CST is determined by maintaining the tank level at or above the minimum required level. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in "00E 4, whcn stc= gcacrator is being l reMe M pon for heat rcacval, the CST is required to be OPERABLE. In MODE fi 5 or 6, the CST is not raquired because the AFW System is not required. l ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the CST level is not within limits, the OPERABILITY of the backup supply should be verified by administrative means within 4 hours and once every 12 hours thereafter, OPERABILITY of the backup feedwater supply must include verification that the Tlow paths from the backup water supply to the AFW pumps are OPERABLE, and that the backup supply has the rcquired volu c of water availabic SSWStis: Operable. InIaddition;Eeach:isotorioperated; valye betweenithelSRand,}ach_0perableMpumpfaust! bey _ERABLE; The CST must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, because the backup supply is']i)i.ti'ccMiensite3radsNaterg may be pcrforming this function in additica to it; normal functicas. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to e verify the OPERABILITt of the backup water supply. Additionally 2i'Legifying3HEbackup3GLteGstippTrewry3 TR-3.7.co2 h03C.sIls31desdalMerliiWEthejbajLup3aterZsUppl? s continuesitiEbOV6113b1HMIThe 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on an OPERABLE backup water supply being available, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period requiring the CST. B.1 and B.2 If the CST cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4, without relicacc on thc stc= gcncrator for heat 0 3.7.6 5 racycl. within $ E6-hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITL .o. 7 B 3.7-37 9/25/98
CCW System B 3.7.7 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System BASES BACKGROUND The CCW System provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, the CCW System also provides this function for various nonessential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CCW System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Service Water System, and thus to the environment. The A typical CCW System is arranged as two independent, full capacity cooling loops [saffgoardsiloops), and has isolatable . nonsafety related components. A"commor[nonisafeguardsilooplis PgvidedifgI!gniessentialicoolingloads;asM111as; spent; fuel, poolicooJjpg] Each gafegugdsjloop f safety rel;ted train includes a full capacity pump, :ur;; t;ri. heat exchanger, piping, valves,
- and instrumentation. Each safety related train is powered._ ~
from a separate bus. An open surge tank in the system provides pump-te+p protective functions to ensure that CP 3.7 13 sufficient net positive suction head is available. IDithe eVegtlanTAng8lngigjjgsMenNalles3iteltepo(1310!indlby anlESEactugjp10s1096EIB;31Esa_f_ety;Inmig:Actuat_1on Eignalm2ctuatiornstgn_a1Hasalescribed jnlthel$gM(.jg)g The pump in each train is automatically started on receipt of a safety injection signal, and thernonj safeguajlggggggg all aca;;;; tial ce +;r.crt: ;re isolated oD : tesMPt3tMEM5tanteR50DdE8ctuat_16n; signal. Additional information on the design and operation of the
*3'7#
system, along with a list of th < = onents served. k presented in the FSAR, Sectio (ner. 11. ine principal safety related function of the System is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Residual Heat Removal (RfR) System. This may be during a normal or post accident cooldown and shutdown. APPLICABLE The design basis of the CCW System is for one CCW train to SAFETY ANALYSES remove the post loss of coolant accident (LOCA) heat load from the containment sump during the recirculation phase, with a maximum CCW temperature of-420315*F (Ref. 2). The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) LOCA and containment OPERABILITY LOCA each model the maximum and minimum performance of the CCW System, respectively. TM norr;i tc g ;tur; r/ tM C0'4 is 00115'T. ;,nd. during unit c^^1d= tc "^X 5 'Tm < 200 f) . ; ;;;;xi;u; CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-39 9/25/98
SSWS B 3.7.8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS-B 3.7.8 S_tatjonServiceWaterSystem(SSWS) BASES BACKGROUND The SSWS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design l Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, and a normal shutdown, the SSWS also provides this function for various safety related and non;;fety related cepenents. o.3.7.8 4 The safety related functionsjare 4s covered by this LCO. The SSWS consists of two separate,100% capacity, safety related, cooling water trains. Each train consists of two 100% capacity pumps, en; caperant ce;1ing watcr (CCW) hcot cxd;ngcr, piping, valving, andjinstrumentatior,, and two cyclenc :cpar; tors. The pumps and valves are remote and manually aligned, cx;cpt to be opetablejin the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The pumps aligned to the critical their1 respective loops are automatically started upon receipt of a safety 0 3.7.8 4 injection signal, ;nd all c:scatial volves or; ligacd to thcir post xcidcat position:. Anlautomaticjyalvelinithe dLschargelof734dCpumpXslinterlockedit[opeD ofalpump;stgr,t!TAq automaticlyalyeMnithelSSWS2coolfng3aterlGgpathlforleacM emergencyMese.12genetatpriectomatica))Eope.ns3nI61dfese] gegerator3startWA11Xottler5 valves;are;manua]fvalves;operat.ed locally] The SSWS also provid;; s.creixy ;dcup to th; ;pcnt_ fur' =' ad CCW Sy;tc; ;3%th,eibac3upjvagrmwiyao 0 3.7 4 1 1 6he!Auxt11arperavsteg. J CressiConMatons 4rCptoMdedlbetWeemtrai_Usla_ndibetsdittnits s@ltMtatEpJttp23sggplylanyIotheGpompis;tesojngigog Itafn31soletiprWeiomrj!!n))y;closedwalvesiiniserieslor.Jo_ne leked Tc1MIMWal%"120Hded!to38ttiffGDCM4MUnitiisojatifon bEone31glatcJosgdwglDRs proyidedgsattsfnGDC 57(Ref.5Q IKtM3]gggpfg3gggggof;StatagrcServicelWateg CP 3.7-13 (LQsSWEejemanMEDManUComancheWek,"jsgekypIcolo tng ceRb1111.1 mig 5MfagabMt.coEMnectMtWeenithew M381(leJERBRMDMERIB3EEMMBBIMRomp3Degally realignet3RMERSalstimRIlt# prov_ideWoolingItoIgssettaltheat Idlldsstomre401ter.9Nhe70PERABIE_ITEdfRth6IMit cJ1ssled8Eg10asntbarsta.tlon156tygWaterJpompJgth MatdoEggasBEssabelwailabiti.tzggsufficientfredundant c311092MEfDBQf&thE91[erAtJnganitEMIE1mitiaryonditiorpf on![ta,tiggggestgelanificientwistTreductioWramndicat.ediby i
?.lgIana]yaremfa'K055mfTStatidnlSey100Wster2Systenteren;E[M i sRie1UiWINatr18$lM52nseteIth#3h5tt?8MEloTftnrsEOPERABILITY oDthe3tation?setMic4KWater&Systenzandrer,ossIcongetibe.tWele the
?!BE401tsj CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-44 9/2588 l mt
- - _ - - . -_ - . ~ . - - - _ - _ - _ . -
SSWS B 3.7.8 : BASES BACKGROUND The:Stationa$ervice X t Meyste lmr_osEconneclt betweenitheltwg (Continued)J ogitsicQlLif835"p_fRg@prTaite;pipin[Brefdss tonnecJtalves smirrjae.31s3streeIofitarista11gnis_etvMwat3rlpumps31 thle twoMNf3HignM theZeroM M M M iloC pa_ths? I additionaE19dur)dagt"coolfrig]:apacity1from one:u_nft11s7available tgitheiltatF5ettfMMatfrl5yst_em3f,;theIother # nit; j Additional information about the design and operation of the SSWS, along with a of the components served, is presented in ! the FSAR, Sectio ;2.'1 ef. 1). The principal safety related function of the S s the emoval of decay heat from the reactor via the CCW System, r n., 7 n.i APPLICABLE The design basis of the SSWS is for one SSWS train, in SAFETY ANALYSES conjunction with the CCW System and a 100% capacity containment cooling system, to remove core decay heat foll aing a design Ref. 2). This basis prevents LOCA as discussed the containment in the sump fluid fromFSAR, increas Sectio @ ing in temperature during the recirculation phase following a LOCA and j provides for a gradual reduction in the temperature of this fluid l as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System by the ECCS 1 pumps. TheSSWSisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionwitha i single failure of any active component, assuming the loss of offsite power. ; The SSWS, in conjunction ith the CCW System, also cools the l unit from resi eat emoval (RHR), as discussed in the FSAR, Section ~40 ef. 3) entry conditions to H0DE 5 CPf3.7 13 l during normal and post accident operations. The time required for this evolution is a function of the time;after shutdq[gffnumber of CCW and RHR System trains that are operating. OneESWStrainissufficienttoremovedecayheat during subsequent operations in H0 DES 5 and 6. This assumes a t maximum SSWS temperature of % 0102*F occurring simultaneously with maximum heat loads on the system. l l The SSWS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Stat = c.t. _ 10CB5013!fd)(2),(11)] Thelr;equirement2onIcto.ss; connections 0 3.7.8 4 i i I i gpppositelunitJpumpgsatisfy1Critetion14;of a 10C_FR50]36_(cE21(11)] j ! l LCO TwoSSWStrainsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoprovidethe required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove ; post accident heat loads, assuming that the worst case single l l active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power. l l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-4S 9/2S/98 l
CREFS B.3.7.10 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Filtration gt g $ptjzg gg System (CREFS) BASES BACKGROUND The CREFS provides a protected environment from which operators can control the unit followina an uncontrolled ,0-3.7.G-1 release of radioactivith..;;;;al, or toxic The CREFS consists of two independent, redundant trains that pressurJz_e] recirculate and filter the control room air. Each train containsitwolfiltfgtioonitsXanieseCgencyptessurization unit:andlag-'emetgencylfHtration ; unit; Each tre+n f,iltration: unit consists of a prefilter or imister, e high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodines), and a fan. Ductwork, valves or dampers, and instrumentation also form part of the system, as well as demisters to remove water droplets from the air stream. A second bank of HEPA filters follows the adsorber section to collect carbon fines and provide backup in case.of failure of the main HEPA filter bank. IgdditionRthelene:rgency Ptessutjzetionluq1tBELta1GLdemisterlag;a he'ater2to; maintain the Mdjtylofjtheli_ngelngIaj rlbeloW900 The CREFS is an emergency system whollyicontained withipithe Con _ trol: Room"AjrlConditienindLSnt_es, parts of which may al;c operate during normal unit operations in the st;nty aci of operation. Upon receipt of the actuating signal (s), normal air supply f_a,ns to the control room 4s gg isolated, and the stream of a ventilation air is pr04ded)ylthelgteygg@ressutizatigflygits eitherj recirculated through the systc; filter trains enjgggg}py (111tatidELmj$i. The pr; filters or demisters andDatets31 Fat _he NAggggligfg]fremove any large particles in the air, and any entrained water droplets present, to prevent excessive loading of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Continuous operation of each trainM pft.5Enf28tidnTunit for at least 10 hours per month, with the heaters on, reduces moisture buildup on the HEPA filters and adsorbers. Both the demister and heater are important to the effectiveness of the charcoal adsorbers. Actuation of the CREFS gfaMgtf3DM1_ogHt.osslofl0ffsite s , P.9@!Cor21gtaFlegtjMgh_IBg18tipgsjgnal places the system in cither of two scporate states (; .ccscacy radiatica ;tatc cr CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-54 9/2588
__ ._ ._ ~ ..__. _ _ _ _ . _ _ .._ _ _ _ . _ _.._.. _ _ CREFS B.3.7.10 BASES (continued) l i APPLICABLE The CREFS components are arranged in redundant, safety related l SAFEU ANALYSES ventilation trains. The location of components and ducting within the control room envelope ensures an adequate supply of filtered air to all areas requiring access. The CREFS provides airborne radiological protection for the control room operators, as demonstrated by the control room accident dose analyses for the most limiting design basis loss of coolant accident, I fission product release presented in the FSAR, Chapte (Ref. 2). CP 3.7 014 TKContp_1Mpost?8Ccide@*sodeT6fEoperation'isithe emetgencRe'circnMtfenWde28Mn1h_eIeeetgency tecitcuAtiwmodeaothIttXDer9enfliltratipOnd, Emergency PressurizationJ nitsra m functioning 3nditheyIoperated n! series lj In;otherArd_szaRIaltgq11FJp3a ses3hroughithe' Emergency E Etessuc1zattorrunityn7eachitrainyilupassithfoughithe cottespogiar3mergencyLEtittation; unit before;itlisireleased intpltheWroTCR@aMhQ_a(etana]ysisihtchiconfitaedith,e CREfSIdeitgnitooKICreditiforJiZo sote than199J1f,11ter3fficie_ngy ofAhe1EleEgif111t(tLorQ!Ditslo_n1ylIIfjtMEmergency Pressurjgl13lO!gitMsBFetit!leltude11XDceItguitement gritetiaKQCIfiltet19tathelsafetyIaglyseOEthezassdefsted - acceptance % indsoK1Lc!DtoWastibyltilelEstgency Ultratioli~unitsEThus2the1@_etates311]Tcontinue3to;be preidedithelprotectionTiderit_111editnithe;11censinf ba_sesMog CPS _ES; The analysis of toxic gas releases demonstrates that the toxicity limits are not exceeded in the control room following a toxic chemical release, as presented in Reference 1. IsolattoDfit_he coMrolitDniG5'M!GfGlBR$EEf9G!Et@lc2chemicalTNJesseteyente , The worst case single active failure of a component of the CREFS, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function. The CREFS satisfies Criterion 3 of the 50 Iclicy Stat;;c.t. 10$fR50,3pigNJfiD] LCO Two independent and redundant CREFS trains are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a , single failure disables the other train. Total system failure I could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem to the control room operator in the event of a large radioactive release. The CREFS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components l ! necessary to limit operator exposure are OPERABLE in both trains. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-56 905A8 q
CREATCS CRACS B 3.7.11 l B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.11 Control Room Ercr;cacy Air Tcgrctura Control AirlConditioning System (GREATGS MQi) BASES BACKGROUND T_helgogtgr60mjfpC,GPSES1s3canonitolboth;unftsland3he 0 3.7.11-1 CMCS11s31shargdXsteftommon;tp;both;uDfts; The CREATCS CR$S provides temperature control for the control room durjgg~notma]KemergencyJoperatjonicad fclicwing i;cic.tica of th; catrol rcon. The CREATCS CRAC!i consists of two indcpcadcat cad redundant trains that provide cooling and heating of recirculated control room air. Each CRACS, train includes 1two; heating and cooling unjts consi;ts of hecting coils. c; cling coils, instrumentation, and controls to provide for control room temperature control. Each cooligg[unitjprovides"50riof the maximum; 1 heat' removal capabil jtLforgjts;tespectiveJrain l The CREATCS CRACS is a subsystem providing air temperature control for the control room. The CREATCS CRACS is an emergency system, parts of which ma'y also operate during normal unit operations. A single train will provide the required temperature control to maintain the control room between LO*F and 85 80*F. EaghiQPS_ES3 nit'hasitwo;CRACS trainsifof31totAMofifoGricmljngiunfts3va11able;to3mRthe commonTcorgM1HggiQ The CREATCS RCRACS operation in maintaining the contr 1 room temperature is discussed in l O'3 7'G'l I the FSAR, Section, ef. 1) and_9 X 1L(ReR2). Iffionel5043afety'fplat#d3gbl ing~unitTirr each; train 11s jgoperablff$h(itg5}Efh3BY3t111. be:operabjaflag a 3.7.11 1 l RBluation20tM2mtRiotBM9;gEWga.th_etmE!S1 temperature; etemstygggstampgggggsIgpable3fj getffgiing!the f Mion fttit2ttt3mmemaR2hatithsgopgrablemnittslaanibs testoCedfatistsingsstalacEthatiWogidIreadire:te150tJnitsT;If tewnitsuggggglgggtnin7hd2metsingetableatheltrain is21DopftstGamingsmegfEmeMEsa l gtyfelatKwiggyoftlig gich;trAgNBggPJeg!Inthatquiteda:cojinnateirMpogr; 100t[ofittEheBA' gg8J[ cap &b11j,tylislstitljZava11ableJE APPLICABLE The design basis of the CREATCS CRACS is to maintain the SAFETY ANALYSES control room temperature for 30 days of continuous occupancy. TheCREATCSGR&QScomponentsarearrangedinredundant, safety related trains. During n_ormaJiand emergency operation, the CREATCS GMC!i maintains the temperature between 10*F and 85 8_0*F. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1131 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-61 9/25/98
Fuel Storage Pool Water Level B 3.7.15 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Peel Aree Water Level BASES BACKGROUND The minimum water level in the a fuel storage peel area meets the assumptions of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident. The specified water level shields and minimizes the general area dose when the storage racks are filled to their maximum capacity. The water also provides shielding during the movement of spent fuel. ThelminimumIWateridepthlfor.Zdesign ;for; fuel;handl ing ;ensureslthat ainominall231eet;ot_Mqterijs' maintained:above~the'; top of,a damagedifue j Zassemb]y;1ay1DgiatopithelfuelistorageJracks3nd that 10;feetloflaterishiel ding'isiaaintainedj above ' fuel;as.sembl ies beinginoyed2l Thelfuelistotagelar,easliDitheluellBui,ldinglinclude;thel.two spent fuetpoglsgreentTEueEMJo 3oziland;spentzuel;goolNo] 2mgaudition2theltueTrstoragezar.easuncluders; portion ' onthe:gfueltog;cantaceach; containment; Building: _ o,3.7.is.3 Ret 3nentispentituejrstMgeltackslareMocatsd;1Kea.ch spentifueDoolianditnithe]upegderlarya3fithelRefueling ca9.itninze_achIcontainmentwataintaining;23jfeetIofyatet;over t_hesels_torageIta M also'ettsur_eislatnominalZdepth3 f p feetlabove t_he: top'bfistin.i.Ws5IitfithetransferXcanalIandi9eticask;pi t du11ngluejl30Venent_] A general description of the fuel storage pool design is given in the FSAR. Section 9.1.2 (Ref. 1). Ihelin3 coplaLnLM[WeHstoraje3Melf $Ide_ssribgdlig1SESection ' 9:1:2 3
@ef21)] A description of the Spent Fuel P ling and Cleanup System is given in the FSAR, Sectio . Tref. 2) .
The assumptions of the fuel handling acciden given in 0 3'7'G 1 I the FSAR. Sectio @(Ref. 3). APPLICABLE The minimum water level in the g fuel storage peel a. tea meets SAFETY ANALYSES the lRiolLdidgtaminstfdhXfictDEpfE100, assumptions of the fuel handling accident described in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 4). The resultant 2 hour thyroid dose per person at the exclusion area boundary is a = 11 fraction of Wel]IWithin the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 5) limits (RefereridelEandj7]. According to Reference 4. there +s sjtould;be dlgomigal 23 ft of water between the top of the damaged fuel bundle and the fuel pool surface during a fuel handling accident. With 23 ft of water. the CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-74 9M5/98
Spent Fuel Assembly Storage B 3.7.17 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS HELMjfuerAssemblGtolagg BASES BACKGROUND In the Max 4 mum High Density Rack fMBR) p!nRI [(Refs.1 and 2)] design, the tWtEshatg at spent fuel storage poohs pools;wej gdsini_stratiMely; divided into two thr6g separate and distinct regions which, foi the purpose of criticality considerations, are considered as separate pools. [Rcgion 1] Eowr;DensityLRacks (LDR, withe 336}556 storage positions 4s at1! designed to accommodate new fuel with a maximum enrichment of E4-653 5.0 wtt U-235, or spent fuel regardless of the discharge fuel burnup. [Regica 2] High:DensityjRacks, with E2fr7031470 storage positions, is designed to accommodate fuel of various initial enrichments which have accumulated minimum burnups within the acceptable domains offone~ootTof1fourfor!two;out?of;four= storage according to FigurefD17Fm we accompanymy u,v. Fuel] assemblies not meeting Ine criteria of Figure E3.7.1713 shall be stored in accordance with paragraph 4.3.1.1 in ll Oa.7M l Section 4.3, Fuel Storage. The water in the spent fuel storage pool normally contains , soluble boron, which results in large subcriticality margins under actual operating conditions. However, the NRC guidelines, based upon the accident condition in which all soluble poison is assumed to have been lost, specify that the limiting k,y of 0.95 be evaluated in the absence of soluble boron. Hence, the design of both regions is based on the use of unborated water, which maintains each region in a suberitical condition during normal operation with the regions fully loaded. The double contingency principle discussed in ANSI N 16.11975 and the April 1978 NRC 1 letter (Ref. 3) allows credit for soluble boron under other abnormal or accident conditions, since only a single accident need be considered at one time. For example, the most severe accident scenario is associated with the movement of fuel from [Rcgica 1 to Rcgion 3} [.DR3brJoneleutTofffourIHDRlsMgg, and accidental misloadir.g of a fuel assembly in [ Region 2] One!outlof ogeJiDR~stor&ge. R This could potentially increase the criticality of [Rcgion 2] [0Ristor89g. To mitigate these postulated criticality related accidents, boron is dissolved in the pool water. SafeoperationoftheHOR(108withnomovementof assemblies may therefore be achieved by controlling the location of each assembly in accordance with the accompanying LCO. Pf4er to ;;;;;;nt of an a;;;;bly, it i; accc;;;ry to perfon: SR 3.7.15.1. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-78 9725/98
Secondary Specific Activity B 3.7.18 l 1 l B 3,7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity BASES BACKGROUND Activity in the secondary coolant results from steam generator tube outleakage from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Under steady state conditions, the activity is primarily iodines with relatively short half lives and, thus, indicates current conditions. During transients, I 131 spikes have been observed l as well as increased releases of some noble gases. Other fission l l product isotopes, as well as activated corrosion products in l lesser amounts, may also be found in the secondary coolant. 1 A limit on secondary coolant specific activity during power I operation minimizes releases to the environment because of normal I operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and accidents. This limit is lower than the activity value that might be expected from a 1 gpm tube leak (LC0 3.4.13, "RCS ., , ational IFAKAGE") of primary coolant at the limit of _ o.3.7,0 1 l l l l'.0 % (LC0 3.4.16, "RCS Specific Activity"). The steam ! ine failure is assumed to result in the release of the noble gas and iodine activity contained in the steam generator inventory, the feedwater, and the reactor coolant LEAKAGE. Most of the iodine isotopes have short half lives, (i.e.,
< 20 hours). I 131, with a half life of 0.04 days, m3.7 001 l I conccatrates faster than it dccays, but does not reach equilibrium bccous; cf blowdown and othcr icsscs, 9 "ith the spccificd activity limit, the resultant 2 hour thyroid dos; to a pcrsca at the exclusion arca boundary (EAS) would be about 0.S0 rce if the main stc= nfaty volvcs (tiSS"s) Open for 2 hours fclicwing a trip fic; full powcr.
Opcrating a unit at the clicuabic limits could result in a 2 hour EAS cxposure of a =all fractica of the 10 0m 100 (Ref.1) l limits, or thc limits cstablishcd as the !RC staff approved liccasing basis. l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-81 9aS/98
S:condary Specific Activity ; 8 3.7.18 BASES (continued) APPLICABLE The accident analysis of the main s am line break (MSLB), i SAFETY ANALYSES as discussed in the FSAR, Chapter (Ref. 2) assumes the o.3.7,0 1 g initial secondary coolant specific activity to have a i radioactive isotope concentration of O_Il0 pC1/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I 131. This assumption is used in the analysis for determining the radiological consequences of the postulated l accident. The accident analysis, based on this and other ' assumptions, shows that the radiological consequences of an MSLB do not exceed a small fraction of the unit EAB limits (Ref.1) for whole body and thyroid dose rates. With the loss of offsite power, the remaining steam l generators are available for core decay heat dissipation by CP-3.7 013 l venting steam to the atmosphere through the MSSVs nd steam generator at;csphcric Ecjjcf dump volvcs (AR"s). The Auxiliary Feedwater System supplies the necessary makeup to the steam l generators. "cnting continues until the reactor cociant tcaper;ture and pressurc have dccreased sufficiently for the Rcsidual ll cat Rc;; val Sy;tc; to c=plete t+a cocidown. In the evaluation of the radiological consequences of this accident, the activity released from the steam generator connected to the failed steam line is assumed to be released directly to the environment. The unaffccted stc;; scncrete is assu;;d to disch;r;c stc;; and any entrained activity through , the MSS"3 and AR"3 during the event. Since no credit is taken in ! l the analysis for activity plateout or retention, the resultant l radiological consequences represent a conservative estimate of l the potential integrated dose due to the postulated steam line . m failure. Secondary specific activity limits satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRS l l'clicy St tc.~nt. }0CF_R592$6Js)12)J11)] l LC0 As indicated in the Applicable Safety Analyses, the specific i activity of the secondary coolant is required to be s O'.110lyCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 to limit the radiological consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) to a small fraction of the required limit (Ref. 1). Monitoring the specific activity of the secondary coolant ensuresthat when secondary spWfic activity limits are exceeded, appropriate actions are taken in a timely manner to place the l unit in an operational MODE that would minimize the radiological consequences of a DBA. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-82 9/2588
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.1-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.1, LCO Statement , ITS 3.7.1, LCO Statement I DOC 01-01-A , I CTS 3.7.1.1 LCO requires the MSSVs operable per Table 3.7-2. The STS 3.7.1 requires the MSSVs Operable as specified in Table 3.7.1-1 and Table 3.7.1-2. The ITS 3.7.1 states the I MSSVs are Operable but deletes the phrase "as specified in Table 3.7.1-1 and Table 3.7.1-2". Comment: DOC 01-01-A states this is consistent with the NUREG-1431. This is not the case. Revise the submittal to retain the STS format which is an administrative reformatting change of the CTS requirement. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-01-A was used to revise the CTS LCO based on NUREG-1431 as modified by TSTF-235. See Comment Number O 3.7.1-4 conceming TSTF-235. To address the administrative reformatting discussion in the comment, the FLOG discussed in the transmittalletter and the " Methodology For Mark-Up of Current TS"in the back of , , the CTS has been marked up to reflect the substance of NUREG-1431, Revision l
- 1. In general, only technical changes have been identified. However, some non-technical l changes have also been included when the changes cannot easily be determined to be non-technical by a reviewer, or if an explanation is required to demonstrate that the change is non . l technical. DOC 1-13-A was created and added to the top of the page for each CTS Section 3.7 Specification. DOC 1-13-A states: "All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording is in accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. During the development certain wording preferences or English language conventions were adopted.
As a result, the Technical Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the TS were made unless they were identified and justified. This justification is used in those instances where, for improved clarity, the CTS was reformatted to conform to the ITS ". ATTACHED PAGES: Enct 2 3/4.7-1,3/4.7-3,3/4.7-5,3/4.7-6,3/4.7-8,3/4.7-9,3/4.7-12,3/4.7-14,3/4.7-15, 3/4.7-16,3/4.7-17,3/4.7-19,3/4.7-23,3/4.7-24,3/4.7-30,3/4.7-31 and 3/4.7-32 Enci 3A 3 Enci 3B 2
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A \ 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE ( O'3'7'l'1 SAFEu VALVES l 1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator l shall be OPERABLE .eith lift ;cttings a ;pccified in Tabic 3.7-2; kW < l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ! I ACTION:3 in.as ta 4 ! 0 Wjth_one;gn motelsteamigeneratorsTWith:oneJLSSV41noperab1_elandithe ModeratoriTemperatute:C_oeffj cientZ(MTC))zero;pCnegatlyie;atall, 104;' power 61evel s ' reduce 1TH_ERMAL~f0WER11evellt03*8JJER] l eb. With four reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in I operation and with ene twojor more main steam line Code safety valves I inoperable orlany:steamfgeneratg,r[with one MSSV,inoperabl_elandith_elMTC positiy.e:atany;powerMeve],operationinMODES1,2,and3mayproceed provided, that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valvels] is gg q restoredtoOPERABLEstatusorfpowerJs.leducedito2esLthaplor.;dqual toWieMa&imum~A11 owed 2@e_rJJistedjlDlTab],eZ3231Jrar&Tlifithi,n,3M72 ; hours the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint( is reduced per Table 3.71: otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. 1 05 m 0 3.7.1 5 l b. The provisions of Spccification 3.0.4 crc not applic;bic. l (Newl WithfoneTor,morelteaCgenerator$~With11es~s3hanitwoINSSVs OPERABLEJ1be;Ln!HOTi: STANDBY 7WithitctheInextT@choofsI82 HOT ((1,7 SHUIDOWN1Within;thelfojJoWing31rhourg SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 105 M Q 3.7.1 5 l 4.7.1.1 No odditional rcquir:: cats other than thc;c rcquired by Specification Wigg$ l N MDMJachlejiujred?MSSVIlifM$etf61ntf(p6c1TabTdN712231CKM n.3,7,1 5 g i eMMthop18erv.icelestJng;P,rograjg.**Jfo]l@jingleistjngHliftE5]!Ltt_tr]gsQh8J1bg l m3 1 04.ts 0 3.7.1 4 i helCondjtjoncentry? time;is?allowedMeagh MSSVJ ' EEEF2kIGJrgtoXpetfo~rmdijnLM00ES e IIar8[2] [,03 5
; RMkgMRegin]!00_E 1]
i 1 02 LS Q 3.7.1 2 CPSES Mark.up of CTS 3/4.7 3N. 7-1 9/2S/98 l
PLANT SYSTEMS {[ 1 13 A I AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 0 3.7.1-1 [, l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 At least three indepcadcat stcc gencrator auxiliary feedwater tIajRg 2 01 LG pu;;;ps and associated ficw paths shall be OPERABLE with: 0 3.7.5 5
- c. Two rctor driven auxiliary fccdwatcr pu;;;ps, cach capabic cf being pcwcred fic;;; separate c;;rscacy busscs, and P'M
- b. One stca; turbinc df4ven auxiliary fccdwatcr pump capabic of being powcrad frc; two OPEPJ2LE stca; supplics.
APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2. and 3. ACTION: .
- a. 92-16 A Q With one auxiliary feedwater tr.airl pu;;;p cr associated ficw path inoperable (fordte.asons'other;than;one; steam; supply l toithelturbine;drjven.;ASCpumplinoperablel, restore the required auxiliary feedwater traig pump cr associated fi w [N5 path to OPERABLE status within 72 hours (AND;wjthin:.10 m jg daysifromJ1scovery;o ff failureitoJee_t;the:LCO) or be in ,
at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT #"d SHUTDOWN within the following 6 Ig hours.
- b. 2 01 LG With two auxiliary feedwater ttalDa Pump CT G33GCiotCd 0 3.7.5 5 ficw path inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 IR hours. 52-zo-Isj
- c. With three auxiliary feedwater t;gna pump or casociated ficw path inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action 2 01 LG to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater ttain pump or 0 3.7.5 5 associated ficw path to OPERABLE status as soon as possible!. NAY
- d. With only one OPERABLE steam supply system capable of .
providing power to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater t2.amd pump. restore the required OPERABLE steam supplies within 7 days QWDylth_ijG10! days.lftom;digolery,[to;meetit])eMOJ or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT :290-LSJ SHUTDOWN within the following 612 hours. ygmc2"nGF*~'7;a;*7:3 liggfE0lEIA!1d,3.lliotherlL@2EQU.I, RED 2ACII0NS;tequir,ing3DEicbtngegate;sgsperldeA 0 tze5-AM RICH 3tlifi4EKIIf81til.18ilEest016tf30~0fEJMBLE31atd.s'l l CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-3 9/2S/98
! PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A l O*3 7 l'1 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK l .. l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with an indicated water level of at least 53%. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3. l ACTION: With the CST inoperable, within 4 hours either: e-e u s
- a. Restore the CST to OPERABLE status or be in at least HOT STANDBY 0 3.7.6 5 l within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 12 6; hours, or
- b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the Station Service Water (SSW) system as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and g restore the CST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least o.3.7.6 5 HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the, followim., 6-12 6; hours.
SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.3.1 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by 3 03 LG l verifying th; indicated watcr lavcl is within its limits when the tank is the 0 3.7.6 3 supply source for th cuxiliary feedwater pumps. . 1 4.7.1.3.2 The SSW system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE byJAadajgts,tr.atheMang at least once per 12 hours whenever the SSW system is being used as an alternate a m Egl supply source to th; cuxiliary fccdwater pumps by verifying the SSW systc; OPPPELE cad c;;h ;ctor operated volvc betw;;n the SSW system and each OPEPX LE euxiliary fccdw ter pu;p is GPERNEE. i l CPSESMark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-5 9nsi98
PLANT SYSTEMS
)
O '3 7'l'1 ' SPECIFIC ACTIVITY I i s j LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall be less than or l equal to 0.1 microcurie / gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. ACTION: 1 With the specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System greater than 0.1 microcurie / gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I 131, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and l- in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall determined to be within the limit by performance of the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.7-2. m CPSESMark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-6 92588
..m
W PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A O'3*7*1'1 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 1
\
i 3.7.1.5 Four MSIVs shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2 and 3 i liODESland '31eKceptwhenzall1SIVs;areiclosedlandldeactJvated; :is.or nil ACTION: MODE 1: With one MSIV inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided 5 02 LS the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 8 72;8f, hours: Q 3*7'2-1 otherwise be in STARTUP within the next 6 hours. l MODES 2* and 3*: With onef.or_'mo_rel.or acre MSIVs inoperable, subsequent operation in M00E.2 . , _ , , or 3 may proceed provided the HSIV is closed within 8 vie 8jihours and Q 3.7*2 1 I verified closed once per 7 days. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. GE'124jn 4 tE03TAIGSIXEiEOPai$101~^42^ 6^Gt3PCTftiEjl"4~ 3 ^T.li97 5 03 ' PEEELPi,syjdiLt.h-EJE,mm^1c^^Qith,ia,m,m m_ ___ m _z._ _ m u _ _.~. L _ a _ ~me. e l ha x.,GEuu_m'f4G'.5sd
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m SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.5 Each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full c'asure time within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.50. U ;rovisions of %gg3 Spccific; tion 4.0.4 are not applicabic for cntry into "00E 3. DLElO EVerifyleachEIVJctuatertojthe" isolation'posi,t.ipEopianlactG4 a Eof ts.es)wA Mau]AtgildgaaXegryllSimonths*j*
- Separate entry times into Action Statement is allowed for each MSIV. ,
MonlEtego.tred3o2be;perfotmedarLMODESIand 32 3 s-07 % CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-8 9aSM8
r , PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A 0 3.7.1 1 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i781-Eyj 3.7.1.6 E;;h ;;in f cda;ter linc shall h;ve F,our'lFIVs;arglassc[ciatedlbypass l glyeshal.]T.be OPERABLE a fccdactc- isslati;n v;1vc fccd ;tcr isslati;n bypass 7,17,tg l valve. ;nd fccda tcr prchc;ter bypass valve. o.3,7,3 6 mumusumumm APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3 egeptaidjenighelteedWagisolati_on;.m_____,_, val.velor p.es.uq a.ssdefa.t % m.~_ m ~ __-,__,
. ,mm. ,__ J. y. pass.valv. ,_.e,_ m . m _ __ m .m.__m.m. mm m. .. is
- .s.,n~ .
C.osed;ar!dide-actjvated l or$1solat_edibyla;closediaanilalJa]ve. ACTION: NOTELSeparate' entry 11slallowed_forfeach valve { 17.aus : H00E 1: 7-08-Es 0 3.7.3 2
- a. With one orimore feedwater isolation valve inoperable, but ;pcn.
operations may continue provided thr f;;d.l;t:r ;a. trol ;nd associ;tcd -- v7 egis 1
. ... . .._, . .__ . _ .___...a-.e
-n~..._ . .-. ._
.... , .u _ m- __ J_2:1_ t,~:
~.a~.m-wu m.;i_1:_;the i noperabl e s7.as.rma feedwater isolation valve is restored to OPERABLE statusEisolated or cl.osed**
within - 72 4 hours. otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. 77-11-ud
- b. With one or more feedwater isolation bypass valves inoperable. operation's 7-es-ES 0 3.7.3 2 may continue provided t;.;~Jc;daptcC;;qt ;l;;nd;;;;;j:ted;byp;;s valvc;
- e. r_r...;_;;.i. l.;b_i.c. ~ fo_r ~ f;-C_.;;t;r.f_i_;;is_ tie 1rr,..;_nd each affected feedwater
. m ._
isolation bypass valve is restored to OPERABLE statusEjsolated or n-at-uj closed ** within 12 Uhours. otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. With one or more feedwater preheater bypass valves inoperable. operations N c. may conti nue provi ded ""~_~m'* 3 v",,,',.w~ .-"_ . '.,~. "~. .' ."m"'.'_s'
^
. . .'y~m--- "..-'u"es 047.32 Ec%.'.-il;birjnC'JW-MLAjLtieggeg each affected feedwater .__
tars 1 preheater bypass valve is restored to OPERABLE statusZjsolated or closed *di within fg ghours. otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 h.7-11-M M hours.
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CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-9 9/2S/98
PLANT SYSTEMS 1-13 A STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES O'3'7'I'l j LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.7 At least four atmospheric relief lines valvcs and associated rcrete
;;;;nual c: Web shall be OPERABLE. 6 01 LG 0 3.7.4 9 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3, ACTION:
. u m u q1
- a. With one less than the required atmospheric relief lines vehes OPERABLE. smuA restore the required atmospheric relief li.nes vehes to OPERABLE status within 7 days *: or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and e-as+s in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 612-6 hours and place the required 0 3 7.4 8 RCS/RHR loops in operation for decay heat removal.
f.614A3d
- b. With two less than the required atmospheric relief lines vehes OPERABLE. ;muy restore at least three atmospheric relief line.s vehee to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and a-as4s in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following;6 6 hours and place the required 0-3.7.4 8 RCS/RHR loops in operation for decay heat removal.
. EG14AN Lne.w) Withithtee or2 pre lesslthanLtheireguited;atmospherMEellefilines10PERABLEJ c5es.uj testoreTat] lea;st;two 'atmospher1c7eliefile ines~ to :0PERABLEgstatus.Lwithin124 hoursforibeJn"at;1eastiHOT; STANDBY.w_ithin the3next261boursland31nM /GISAW$
SW[DOMyjthinithe~,followingJ12 LhourEand_pl aceltheleguired3CS/RHR3 oops E 0PAtationlfot decatheat removal M SVRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS e 4.7.1.7. Each atmospheric relief valve andleachjARV1blocigtalfe and associated g~5, g 4 ~
;;;cnual controls shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
- c. At icost once par 24 hours by verifying that the air accu;;;ulatcr tank p' is at picssurc grcatcr than or cqual to 80 psig.
b- Testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. MLgD!;0ffasjaottapplicable; tersj CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3M.7 3N.7-12 9/25/98
PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM O'3 7 bl LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3 At least two independent cunponent cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE *, restore at least two loops to pseA7j OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3 Each component cooling water loop shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) inithe; flow?pathjservicing safety related is4AM equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position *;t: and f **M
- b. At least once per 18 months *, by verifying that: 52U-AM
- 1) Each automatic valve *$ servicing safety-related-equipment ; s4AO1 actuates to its correct position on its associated enginccred safety feature an;actualiorasimulated actuation signal, and twn j
- 2) Each Component Cooling Water System pump starts automatically on an? actual ~or";s,i_m__u_l a.t_e._d ?a'ctuatiori o safety injection test ,,
ts#W signal. '
- The surveillancc test intcrval is cxtended to 24 months for P2-n4FJ Train A, Unit 2, to rc;;,in in effect until the caviction of the scccad refueling cutogc for Unit 2.
I f,gtegappUcablelequir_ed]ActionslofjlC0,[314Al3Z.RCJStiShetdoWn;got c ggag
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PLANT SYSTEMS f f 1 13 A l 0 3.7.1 1 3/4.7.4 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATING i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I l 3.7.4.1 At least two independent station service water loops per unit and the cross connect between the Station Service Water Systems of each unit shall be 1 l OPERABLE. . l l APPLICABILITY: Units 1 and 2 in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. l ACTION: 1 1
- a. With only one station service water loop in a unit OPERABLE.* restore aMS-Asi l at least two loops per unit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or for )
! the unit (s) with the inoperable station service water loop be in at l least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within ; the following 30 hours,
- b. With one or more of the cross connects inoperable, within 7 days restore the cross connect (s) to OPERABLE status. Otherwise be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.1.1 Each station service water loop shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, y W -A Y l
power operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that , is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its ' correctposition*J: and
- b. At least once per 18 months
- during shutdown, by verifying that each 4:7.A%
station service water pump starts automatically on c Scfety Injcction test 8SJ_c;tualMr7$1mulatedZactDation signal. #HRd 4.7.4.1.2 At least once per 92 days the cross connects shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by cycling the cross connect valves in the flow path or verifying that these valves are locked open. j The survcilicacc test intcrvel is extcaded to 24 rcaths for (2-17-A?sj l Trcin A, Unit 2, to rcacin in effect until the co;pletion of the sccend r,:facling cutc7 for Unit 2. 3 [ggefappUcablelReq0fted' Actions ~of?LC013]Ef]p2RCS.")i0tIShutdoWn3f,of, _ o MG-Ad l . W$1 don 1?helt2peolal%@psli!glKincDerableiby1SSWS1 ggtRC3pppUcAlejAe_ quired:Actismof2f_C0?3/478MAGSourcisM0petat1D91Los gefggtJ X:dieleJIgenst8toMalide3nopelsblelbyLSSq]
!$ UA18.$190Zefd_SWiUFigindjyfdda]Icynplo t egtgd@g@lyI@delgg@ 4 m.Aqq g mongtablej <
l CPSESMark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N.7-15 9/2SM 1 i
PLANT SYSTEMS j f 1 13 A 3 J.14 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ONE UNIT SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.7.4.2 At least two independent station service water loops in the operating unit *, at least one station service water pump in the shutdown unit ** and the cross connects from the OPERABLE station service water pump (s) in the shutdown unit to the station service water loops of the operating unit shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: Unit 1 (Unit 2) in MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4 Unit 2 (Unit 1) in MODES 5. 6 and Defueled l ACIl0N:
- a. With one station service water loop in the operating unit inaperable'. 4 9 02-Aa restore two loops in the operating unit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one or more of the cross connects between the OPERABLE station service water pump (s) in the shutdown unit and the station service water loops in the operating unit inoperable, within 7 days restore the-cross-connect (s) to OPERABLE status. Otherwise place the operating unit in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. If neithur station service water pump in the shutdown unit is OPERABLE, restore at least one pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days or place the operating unit in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.2.1 Each station service water loop in the operating unit shall be g2.n.41 demonstrated OPERABLE per the requirements of Specification 4.7.4.1.1.*** 4.7.4.2.2 At least once per 92 days the cross connect (s) between the OPERABLE station service water pump (s) in the shutdown unit and the station service water loops in the operating unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by cycling the cross connect valves in the flow path or verifying that these valves are locked open.
- A unit in MODE 1. 2, 3 or 4 is designated as the " operating unit".
** A unit in MODE 5, 6 or Defueled is designated as the " shutdown unit".
l ,,,,.~,.s.,,m,w me interval for the 10 acnth requircacnt is cxtended to 24 a2.n-AM acnths for Train A. Unit 2. to rcncia in effect until the co;;pletica of the second refueling cutage Sr Unit 2. f DieCDPplicabTe7RegIjr.pdMetio_ns"iofAC013/,i.4;1;3JBCSjjioLShotdog; mod LM2-Anj l Lesidualih@tlemoy_ajd,oopsZm_adE1 pop _elable by1S_WSJ EnteNBop]icabEReg0.1LeLAcMon slofLLC01324j 8;LT&CiS_ourcesXOperating,ygg eMrggggggener~atorzmadelngpetable;by;SSWlj CPSESMark-up of CTS 3M.7 3N.7-16 9/25/98
A PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK Q 3.7.1 1 i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink (VHS) shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. A minimum water level at or above elevation 770 feet Mean Sea Level. USGS datum,
- b. A station service water intake temperature of less than or equal to 102*F, and
- c. A acximu;;; overagc sediment depth of icss than cr equal to 1.5 feet in Lu.as.a 1 thc scrvice watcr intakc channcl.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: (Units 1 and 2)
- a. With the above requirements fer watcr icvci and intake temperature not satisfied, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. W1thithgabove'requjresenits im5483 for;, waters eye]inotjatisfjedfitestorell eveliWjt)f1C?idaysloribelin3%
1eastlH0ESTANDBYMthin'6;hourslandliD.C0LDlSHUIDOWNyj,thjn thelfol)owing _ 30lho.ur,s]
- b. "ith the avcrage sediacnt depth in the scrvice water intake channci grcater than 1.5 feet, picparc and submit to the Cc;;;aission within 30 days, pursuant to Specificatica 5.0.2, a Spccial lleport that provides h1NU51
; rccord of all survcilienccs perforacd pursuant to Spccification ,,,
4.7.5c and specify what ;casurcs will bc capicyed to remov; sedi;;; cat frca ' the scrvice watcr intakc chanaci. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . 4 4.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the station service water intake temperature and UHS water level to be within their limits,
- b. At least cacc pcr 10 months by visually inspccting the dafrHwid plung.nj verifying no abacimal degradation or crcsica, and
- c. At 1 cast oncc per 12 months by verifying that thc overage sediment depth gutes.gj in the service water intake channci is less than or equal to 1.5 fcct.
CPSES Mark-up ofCTS 3N.7 3N. 7-17 9/25/98
PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM i 0 3.7.1 1 l l CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION / PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM OPERATING i l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1 Two Control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System trains shall be OPERABLE. , APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. ACTION: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4: I With one Control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System train pui inoperable, exceptifotIjnabiljty;to;mauntajn10;1253fnche.s'ofjwatersgauge jnithelesergency2ecitculation;modeloCgperation" restore the inoperable train 1 to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Q[EN) WithiControllRgje PressutejnotEgapablejof@ejngimajgajtledEp32Rnche's;of ;mg . WaterggaugesinJ4helemetgencyltecirculation1 mode;oEoperatjpn?;testort capab111ty3o;aejntajnjpressurelWithin31mit withinl2Ehpursiottbelig1 HOI SIANDB.Yiwfthiqi6Jhours7andlCOLD;SHUIDOWNJJthinithe;foUoWJi O0l,houtsj, ItM Mithltlo;.ControMoom1 Emergency 1111tation/Etessut1RiLioffystesetrA1DE gg inopefableZexc_ep_tiforlgapabiljtyltoimaintainlCRfpres:sugfentM2LC0ft 310J3 1LunedfaleM n MODES 5, 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies:
- a. With one Control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or immediately place the OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System train in the emergency recirculation mode or immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies,
- b. With two Control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System trains inoperable immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
[RElQ Hith3pgtrpliRgsfreitute[notfcapabl_e;o,fibejngian10$ajgLd2112_5].incheCog mug
$ptet3la#geI11gglelqueIgencyltgcirculat19Dimode;gGgggtgliqp] goedialgly p1ge3he"0PJBglRC_on_tt#ERoom'Emiergen_MFilttatigefErg42134tionMmeg c
sta_1gmq1the ggggenentgejrcolatjog3 ode 30disq$N!lG9BElgRBMLONDM J' KentGt10,fligggjateMyeJ3ssemb))esj CPSESMari-up ofCTS 3N.7 3M.7-19 9n588 i
l PLANT SYSTEMS \ 1 13 A T CONTROL ROOH HVAC SYSTEM 0 3.7.1 1 i CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM (CRACS) LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.2 Two CRACS trains shall be OPERABLE l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. ACTION: H00ES 1, 2, 3 and 4:
- a. With one CRACS train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With two CRACS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the required heat removal capability equivalent to a single OPERABLE CRACS train available, restore the inoperable trains to OPERABLE status within 30 days or bc in at least ll0T STANDSY within the acxt S hours ;nd in,00LD ,
~,.~,,,, m ..in the fclicwing 30 hours.anterlL_C0:3J0;3] alo Is.tsa H00ES 5, 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies:
- a. With one CRACS train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 30 days or immediately place the OPERABLE CRACS train in operation or immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
m
- b. With two CRACS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the required heat removal capability equivalent to a single OPERABLE CRACS train available, restore the inoperable trains to OPERABLE status within 30 days or immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies,
- c. With two CRACS trains inoperable and with b. above not applicable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ! 4.7.7.2 At least once per 18 months verify each CRACS train has the capability { to remove the assumed heat load. i l CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N.7 23 9/2588
l PLANT SYSTEMS g 1 13 A
- 3/4.7.8 PRIMARY PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEM ESF FILTRATION UNITS o 3.7.14 f
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 Two independent ESF Filtration Trains shall be OPERABLE. 1 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: f
- a. With one ESF Filtration Train inoperable, restore the inoperable ESF Filtration Train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least H0T
- STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With the inability to reach and maintain a negative pressure in the negative pressure envelope of the Auxiliary, Safeguards, and Fuel Buildings greater than or equal to 0.05 inch water gauge, restore the PRIMARY PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEM to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within
) the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With the inability to reach and maintain a negative pressure in the negative
- pressure envelope of the Auxiliary, Safeguards, and Fuel Buildings greater than or equal to 0.01 inch water gauge, restore the PRIMARY PLANT VENTILATION-
,. SYSTEM'S ability to maintain a negative pressure of greater than or equal to i + 0.01 inch water gauge within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the I next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. ! SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each ESF Filtration Train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE- ! 12 05 LS
- a. At least once per 31 days on ; STACCErsE0 TEST SASIS by o 3.7.12.1 4 initi; ting. fr;; th; ;;ntrol rees, flow thr; ugh th; litPA filt;r; nd ther;;;l ed;;rk r; nd verifying that each ESF Filtration Train operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters g l
- operating
- b. EYIDBCggpingZgqG1r,ediESf;E11trationiUnit2f1].terl4%%1gGirl Rec 0ffthgg3ritig1Lhrhat1]stioglFjlter4TestihEtogtgXVEPR s At 7" 7 '
least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone
- communicating with the system by
j \ CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3M.7 3N. 7-24 9/25/98
- - _ _ _ ~ . . -. .. - - . . - .. .. -. . _- -
f PLANT SYSTEMS 1" [ 1 13 A 3/4.7.11 UPS HVAC SYSTEH QQthout; EAR 965001] 0'3'7*1'I j OPERATING I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.7.11 Two independent UPS HVAC trains shall be OPERABLE. , APPLICABILITY: H00ES 1. 2. 3 and 4. j ACTION: (Units 1 and 2) With only one UPS HVAC train OPERABLE. restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. I 1 I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS - l l 4.7.11.1 Each UPS HVAC train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 1
.:2-17-K 41' .
months *-by:
- a. Verifying that each UPS HVAC train starts automatically on a Sciety -
e aa az.TaJ Injection test actual;or3 simulated _a.ctuation signal.
- b. Vcrifying that cach UI'S !lVAC train starts ;utomatically on a Blackout test signal.
4.7.11.2 Fach UPS HVAC train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by stvrting the non operating UPS HVAC train and verifying that the train operates for at least I hour. n i ( The suricillance test intcival is extended to 24 months-fee-
- I Trcin A. Unit 2. to rc;;in in effect until the ccapictica of the sccond refueling cutogc for Unit 2.
CPSESMark-up of CTS 3M.7 3N.7-30 9/25/98
A PLANT SYSTEMS g 3/4.7.11P UPS HVAC SYSTEM [With;LAR;96iOO_4] 0'3*7'I'I
/
J OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.112 The Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) HVAC System shall be OPERABLE such that each UPS & Distribution ",cc: is supported by cithcr. 1
- c. An OPEPX LE UPS P,cca fan Coil Unit, or '
- b. An OPEPE L: UPS Air Conditioning A/C Train which i; the :::c train as the UPS in the reem-l APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
- a. With one or more UPS & Distribution Room supported only by an OPERABLE UPS A/C Train, which is not the same Train as the UPS in that room, restore the required support for each UPS & Distribution Room to an OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. ._
- b. With one or more UPS & Distribution Room not supported by an OPERABLE UPS Fan Coil Unit or A/C Train, but with a UPS A/C Train circulating air, restore the required support to an OPERABLE status within 72 hours while complying with Technical Specification 3/4.7.10 for the UPS Room or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours,
- c. With one or more UPS & Distribution Room not supported by forced e cooling or circulating air, restore the required support within 1 hour, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1181 Each required UPS A/C train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying it actuates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. 4.7.11B.2 Each required UPS A/C train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by verifying that the train operates for at least I hour. 4.7.1183 Each required UPS Room Fan Coil Unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by v?rifying that the UPS Room Fan Coil Unit operates for at least one hour. CPSESMark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-31 9/2588
A ELANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A 3/4.7.12 SAFETY CHILLED WATER SYSTEM O'3'7'I'1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i ! 3.7.12 At least two indcpendcat safety chilled water trains shall be OPERABLE. i 18 04 LG l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. O'3*7*19'l i ACTION: With only one safety chilled water train OPERABLE, restore at least two trains to j OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.12 The safety chilled water trains shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: l
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power l operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not I locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its corregt position.*f -
q 1M1-A ld
- b. At least once per 18 months
- by demonstrating that each safety chilled water train pump and chiller and cicctricci switchg;;r cree #. *
- cacrgency fan coil units start on a simulated ~orly?.tuallactuation rise-w1 SafctyInjectiontestsignal. .
!!sse-Taj e
The surveillance test interval is catcnded to 24 conths for Witwy Train A, Unit 2. to rcacin in effect until the ceapletica of the seccad refueling cutage for Unit 2.
** Js51ationlofis41etf3thfllgAatersfl0F6t611ndjy[dgaXqomponints?does;;not p'gg Etn@XLthegafetf3hlllR. IJat.erlsystemMacpera_bjej l
l l i l CPSESMark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-32 9/25/98
CHANGE NUMBER EE DESCRIPTION 01 06 M The new ACTION adds an explicit requirement to be in MODE 3 in 6 hours and MODE 4 in 12 hours if any steam generator (SG) loop has less than two MSSVs operable. NUREG 1431 requires that the plant only be placed in a mode where the specification is no longer applicable, which in this case would be MODE 4. The CTS would require the plant to enter TS 3.0.3 because operation with less than two MSSVs OPERABLE per SG is an undefined condition and thus not permitted. Therefore, the new ACTION eliminates the one hour allowed for action via TS 3.0.3 3 This requirement is more restrictive with the loss of the one hour for actions required by TS 3.0.3. 01 07 A The CTS SR is revised to specifically reference the In service Testing (IST) Program developed per TS 4.0.5 and contained in the Administrative section of the ITS. The surveillance directly references Table 3.7 2 for lift points and incorporates the requirement that the MSSV as left lift points to be within it of the nominal setpoint. 01 08 Not used 01 09 ES-M Not used applicabic to CPSES. Scc Convcision Conparisca Tabic oc 3.7 001 l (caciosurc 30). 01-10 LG The note on Table 3.7 2 stating that the set pressures of the MSSVs shall correspond to the ambient conditions of the valve at normal operating temperatures is moved to the Bases of ITS SR 3.7.1.1. This change is acceptable because it removes details from the TS that are not required to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining he basic limiting condition for operation. 01 11 LG The MSSV Mee orifice size is moved from Table 3.7 2 to a licensee controlled document. This is oesign information that is not oc m. 002 l
~
required in the ITS for operating or OPERABILITY concerns. 01-12 LS 32 Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (anelosure 38). N RBL1 6 A117eformstt.ingsfrehumbering, Tan _dfe, ditdMaMe@ggMgis3,4 0 3.7.1 1 f p Mcance,~pithitheTWesti,ghouse1St.anday.dlech_nic]I] Spgggica_tionj%NUREG-M31TE D0Qn0the!detelopinigRgtt_&iq fortting:prei(tence:sMEnglish,RaguggAo_nV_egigs3RgLdop_ted.] as3ctesultXthellechni'c m2specifica;1ogKTss_h60ldlbehr( s te.agtly2eydableragit_he_re[otelundentggab)fibMpleggperatofj tod2t. herHis_etsEDuMnctheTrelo~rmaltjgRegabednMynd tew9tding:ptopes.jgdoltechnica.]ichangejJJe_1thetactual!00 4 Intetptetattggintolthels.;were:made3nilessitkey;greI1dentif_ted h andgjustifiedNhisIjustificationjigsugtOthole,gnitances:@here] foe 51mprojed;clanttfrithelCT51as'refol11idtteditoTecnforsfitoithe I_Tsj CPSES Description ofChanges to CTS 3N.7 3 92SA8
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 2cfu TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUPEER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON C0HANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALUWAY 01-09 Not31sedfhi; 00"" ;gcific da rcvix; ;xi us pc cr r;ngc N/A,VEh- N/A;"0. rcicr to N/A;T.icfr g/ Air. rcfc ES -M ncutr;; 'igh flux trip ;ctpci-t; ccq ircd for ;.c cc x,rc l'.", 07 OC 01 04 LS 3. te- to-ir.cgr; tic "SS"; i c.ccerder.cc uitt the rccm..dction; cf :.t;itted 01 04 LS 3. 01 04 LS 3. l W;ti.V~.x 5"i 04 001 d;ted J;nuary 20.10^4 and spccific justifying ' onely;i; and calculation; pcr forud to can'i ; thc conclusion; cf revi;cd high l the W;tir.she.x NS'i. i fluxa - t. rip ;ct C. . ~n" E. . ' E. m l DC-3.7-( 01 l , NSSVs-01-10 The note on Table 3.7-2 stating that the set pressures shall YES YES YES YES LG correspond to the ambient conditions of the valve at normal operating temperatures is moved to the Bases of ITS SR 3.7.1.1. 01-11 The MSSV h e-orifice size is moved to a licensee-controlled YES: moved to YES: moved to YES: moved to YES: moved to LG documents. FSAR. FSAR. USAR. FSAR. ; i DC- ALL-( 02 01-12 The proposed change would require that the plant be placed in HOT NO. already NO: part of CTS. YES YES i A SHlffDOWN within 12 hours instead of COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 part of CTS. ' hours _ f ' 01,13 2 Alhrgfotsatingutenumbegjg;;pLd;ed[torjahwordjngds2i n JES YES yES * ! YES
$ accot4ancelWithithc3 tstinghouseiStandard Techq1 cal
_ Speci[1 Cations;1MJREG3431{ 2 l Q-3.7.1%l t 02-01 The descriptive material, definition of an AFM train in the LCO YES YES YES YES LG is moved to the Bases. 02-02 The ACTION specifies the requirements for A0T should one of the YES NO: part of CTS. YES YES LS-5 steam supply valves to the TDAFW pump become inoperable. l 02-03 ACTIONS are modified to require restoration of the systems to YES YES YES YES M meet the LCO within 10 days of discovery of failure to meet the , LCO. 02-04 In this DCPP specific revision, the APPLICABILITY and ACTIONS are YES NO NO NO ; M revised to include MODE 4 when the SGs are relied upon for heat l removal. d i f L CPSES Conversion Comparison Table- CTS 3M.7 9/2S88
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET , ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.1-2 APPLICABILITY: CP l REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.1 Action a ITS 3.7.1 Actions Note DOC 01-02-LS1 ITS 3.7.1 adds a new Actions Note that states, " Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV". The markup for CTS 3.7.1.1 states " Separate entry time is allowed for each MSSV." l Comment: Revise the CTS markup to be consistent with the ITS 3.7.1 Actions Note. FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS 3.7.1.1 markup and DOC 1-02-LS have been revised to use , the words " separate Condition entry". i ATTACHED PAGES: Encl 2 3/4.7-1 Enci 3A 1 m
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS b13 A 0'3 7'l'1 t 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE ) l SAFETY VALVES l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 l l l 3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator I shall be OPERABLE with lift settings c; specified in Table 3.7-21 NN ' APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. and 3. i ACTION:* Lneu) 1 a; WithiogeIor; moteisteamigeneratorgwith;one]ES_V21nopetable~andjhe Moderator 2 Temperature ~Coeff1cientI(MTC) zeroCorinegative:at;all l',04j,, POWefgetels reduc;e, THERMAL'f0WER3evel303371ETN eb. With four reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with ene twolor more main steam line Code safety valves inoperable otanylsteam^gener_atorJith;one MSSV;jnopetablee anditheitlTC Posittyvelattany; power 3eyel,, operation in H0 DES 1, 2. and 3 may proceed provided. that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve (s), is N*u j restored to OPERABLE status or:powegisite_duc_editgi_les'sithan;priequal to ithe]!aMaumiAJLowedlopetalistgip2Tablel33,ilDndEthinithem hours the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint( is reduced per Table 3.71: otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. 105 M Q 3.7.1 5
- b. The provision; cf Specificaticr. 3.0.4 crc not applicable.
Q!!!d W.jthlo#3I;moreisteamlgeper,atorY1Withjlepsjt#natwo3SJs QPJ.RABLEEbeyin"liOT!SIA_NDBYIWithitfithe211ex31tjrhoulsTand: HOT [,fj[1,7 MiUTD03N,Mith1D.1h, elf.o_Ilo91nglsirbouty SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 105 m Q 3.7.1 5 4.7.1.1 No ;dditional requirencnts other than thosc rcquircd by Spccification tj$$J83 M B[diggghJgl01feid tlSSVaiftlsetpo,jp33ie1YableWM2ete.5tdagj! 0 3.7.1 5 ERIGLDERLHLeplcEI@t_ing2t6 gram.*,*31ollp,W_1bEtestjQ9I91ft!$ettings_,";sh811dbe 1 04 LS Q 3.7.1 4 [ WYditihentr . EEER125%Bigea toEpetig__J1CMODESjlleydl2] _ s"allowediferJeaci)JtS5y] l'[h' 5 t enumanquit@in~N00E71] \
,1 02 LS ,
l 0 3.7.1 2 CPSES Mark-up ofCTS 3N.7 3N. 7-1 9/25/98
.3
DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3/4.7 This eaclosure contains a brief description / justification for each marked up change to current Technical Specifications. The changes are identified by change numbers contained in encloture 2 (Mark up of the current Technical Specifications). In addition, the referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHCs) are contained in enclosure 4. All technical changes are discussed: administrative changes (i.e., format, presentation, and editorial changes) made to conform to the NUREG 1431 Revision 1 are not discussed. For enclosures 3A. 3B, 4, 6A and 6B, text in brackets "[ ]' indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location. CHANGE NUMBER EiliG DESCRIPTION 01 01 A A reference to Table 3.7-2 is deleted from the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) and moved to the Surveillance Requirement (SR) (refer to change 01 07 A). This change is consistent with NUREG 1431. 01-02 LS 1 A note is added to allow separate entry for eacn , main steam safety valve (MSSV). The w sent specification 0 3.7.1 2 requires that all MSSVs discovered to be inoperable, be returned to OPERABLE within the initial four hours provided for the first inoperable MSSV. For example, if a second inoperable MSSV were discovered three hours into the action statement of the first inoperable MSSV. both MSSVs would have to be returned to OPERABLE within the following one hour or the plant power level would have to be reduced to that specified in Table 3.71. The addition of the note allowing separate entry for each inoperable MSSV provides the full four hours for each inoperable MSSV. 01 03 LS 2 The CTS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires that each MSSV "as-found" setpoint be within ilt of the nominal lift pressure. The MSSVs:are tested in accordance with the Inservice Testing (IST) program. If the MSSV is found outside of the ilt of the nominal lift pressure, the lift setting is adjusted (i.e.. "as left") to within i it. The non conforming as found condition is documented in a Licensee Event Report (LER). The NUREG 1431 tolerance for the as found lift pressure is 13% while retaining the ilt as-left tolerance. The net result of this change is the elimination of the requirement to issue an LER when MSSVs are found to be outside the ilt tolerance but within the i3% tolerance. CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N. 7 1 9/2588
\
l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.1-4 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA ! REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.1 Action a ITS 3.7.1 Action A.1 and A.2 and Table 3.7.1-1 DOC 01-04-LS3 JFD 3.7-01 This change is beyond the scope of a conversion because of the industry travelers referenced in this DOC (WOG-83, Rev 0 and Rev.1) that have not been approved by the NRC. Comment: Withdraw the change or adopt the STS. l FLOG RESPONSE: WOG-83 has been approved by the TSTF and is designated as TSTF- 1 235. This traveler has been submitted to the NRC and is under review. The proposed wording in TSTF-235 was modified from WOG-83 and these modifications have been incorporated into the ITS. Comanche Peak, Wolf Creek, and Callaway continue to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler. Diablo Canyon will no longer pursue this change due to issuance of LAs 125/123 (dated May 28,1998) which revised CTS 3/4.7.1.1, Table 3.7-1, " Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint With Inoperable Steam Line Safety Valves" and the associated Bases. See licensee-initiated number DC 3.7-008 for more details. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 3/4.7-1 and 3/4.7- 2 Enci 3A 2 Enci 3B 1 Encl. 4 22 and 22a Encl.5A Traveler Status page, 3.7-1, 3.7-2 and 3.7.3 Encl. 5B B 3.7-1, 2, 2a, 2b, 3, 4, 5, 5a and 6 1 End.6A 1,1a and 4 Encl.6B 1 and 2 l 1
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A 0 3.7.1 1 3/4.7.1 11JRBINE CYCLE SAFETY VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Tabic 3.7-2; OD APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, and 3. ACTION:3
- news 1 a] With:onelot_ note; steam;genetator G ithione:MSSVlinopetableand;th ModeratorResperature;Coef fici.ent3(NIC) !zero!orinegativeIatlal] '
4' power il evel s ' reduce' THERMAL;P,0WER113yel ,to'18HlgTPJ f
With four reactor coolan loops and associated steam generators in operation and wi two_ r more main steam line Code safety valves ino r orjany3 team; generator 1wnn one nnv inocerabletand'the' nun - sitive"atrany'oowerslevelwrauon in H0 DES 1, 2, and 3 may proceed jrovided, that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve {Q is u' p restored to OPERABLE status orJpoiwer3sleducedat_oless;thagg6 qual toltheJalimum311oged1P_oWerj]jist_ed2nHab]QU; B li th,1 Ltte;7 hours the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoin o at:cd per Table 3.71: otherwise, be in at least HOT STAND within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. 1-05 M 0 3.7.1 5
- b. Thc provisicas of Specification 3.0.4 crc not applicabic.
(Negl W,ltWAq6Zgtimoressteamlgenerators'Wjthjless~Ithanitwo e MSSj[g O EPg7abelinFSTMDBY31thinltheInensjfthoEt3nd' HOI ['7[1,7 S_HUTDOLOl'WithigthyJ1_gll,0Winglsix.Choutsj f SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 105 m 0 3.7.1 5 4.7.1.1 No Odditional requirc; cats othcr then thosc rcquired by Spccification $993 4dh6- Ef&if.Cgsh:tyjgui_riedfMSSV21Tft?fe.t@jntlpeMab]DIEEHENgggdaQCg 0 3.7.1 5 El.tME! bas 3e 1141eltfn92tMta!n . EF_olloWjng';testj ng!ilgtgieltingsZshallshe RLt.t(BEMTd 1 04.Ls 0 3.7.1 4 4 gaignaratelconditionientrylt4me:is;allowe_diforleachJSSJV] i BF.?Dri1FV%niMred 't( Tbe. performedj n;MESD)}C 2] [-[7}.5 QaqsggLequirgilin 1 02 LS Q 3.7.1 2 CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3/4.7-1 9/25/98
>..p
TABLE 3.7 1
^
"*XI"U" ALLOJA"LE POJE" "^NCE
. NEL""0N FLUX !!IOil SE'"0Itc 'JI"l IM0"E""."LE S".'" LINE SAFE" "AL"ES OPERABLETMain' Steam"SafetWValves?VersM w _ m _ m.. . o_.,m
. - u_= = miloWed'Powe
-r-....--.. . .
... ___ .-- 3, g ' .
NUMBER OF -INOPERABLE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWE Ne
,,,vm r. .d iau: LL:0!"T 1 04 LS ETY VALVES PE8 ON
- am i= l"C STEAM GENERATOR OPE"ASLO ("C" CENT f\r n Miv A,Tf"M iuu u a Tt iLitrnu u ir A,I s n/st, iv trn \
sui si M O'3*7'1'4 ( ----- s- m r 1 07 2 65 43 120 3 43 65 2.3" 4 87 100 "lA TABLE 3.7 2 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING (i 13 %)* 0"sIFICE SIZE **" 5 1 I LOOP 1 LOOP 2 LOOP 3 LOOP 4 J,1-1ME;j MS 021, 058, 093. 129 1185 psig M-ta' . i!1-11-tA.l MS 022, 059, 094, 130 1195 psig M-4n' , MS 023, 060, 095, 131 1205 psig M-ta' HS 024, 061, 096, 132 1215 psig M-4n' MS 025, 062, 097, 133 1235 psig W-in' 1 The lift ;ctting picssurc shall corrcspor,d to ::bient conditions of ths vciv; t ac;inal operating temperaturc and pressure. UI M l i CPSES Mark-up ofCTS 3M.7 3N. 7-2 9/2S/98
CHANGE NUMBER EHC DESCRIPTION 01 04 LS 3 The ow continued operation with inoperable MSSVs if the power ran tron flux high trips are reduced. ENUREG 1431 as ggiggd ;cdified b s'gged3SEE245J industry traveler "00 03. "cv. O ard draft "cv.1. provided revised ACTIONS to require that: 1) the reactor power be reduced o compensate for the loss of pressure relief capacity to a maximum allowable power determined in accordance with Westinghouse NSAL 94 001 and NRC Information Notice 94 60, 2) the power range neutron flux high trip setpoi be reduced for inoperable MSSVs if a positive moderator temperature coefficient (HTC) exists at the allowed percent rated thermal power in MODE 1, and 3) the power range neutron flux high trip setpoints be reduced to account for a control rod withdrawal at partial power with more than one MSSV inoperable. Base (og 0 3. m Westinghou_se]uplefat;SafetyiAdvfspfMLetterXNSAL19E001&fot ! pl.agsntcensedito; operate:atipartjallpower;1 eve!.s31th a~posjtlyeMC] f l change _slateinadeltoirequirelalteductionlKthelPoWerJangeJNeutron164c35gl l reactor;trjp3etpoint3nzadditjon tola:rejk!ctiogninIteactoripower3henlaht I l MIcits:positivelg3h_is11smecessaryatq. altattithalprimary;gde.; heat i generation 3hatimayloccurlduringla3CS2helluployentJ31t!CaIpojitiyp,E bgatep;of;t_he3plo ant 1111Ztesult31plalpofferlingtescXgggtps l additionalisteamlettevingicapac{tyff2 Changes 2areltadeitolequjte3 reductionXn;thKPowetlRangeJentro[OnGjgtCteactoMtrjpisetpolp_t11D additjon to'alteduc_tionlinithe reagtor"~po_Wer1WhenithetellsMeithanTonj; jnoperable1SSVioniany;singlels.teamigener) tori.MofZalreiglyityligsergg accidennsugaszan unconttolted1CMapglgthdemp1;ttgela sttia12 peg levelithelesctoripower1Wjll;f qqtea s.e!durjngthe;ttyn_sientient1JJgittag ttiploccurs7on~0vertemperatur_e;[N 361;or2PoWerIRangeiNeutton!El W Righ;5 With;moreltMn~onjGinoperable:ljSSVlonlapylgteamlgeneratoGthelc_cabjapctBlgt f.1991 capacity 3fithe2poperable' MSSYslamuthEturbinejgaylke0iinsjlfRcfSMB some;casesitolpretentleyerpressocizatioD]fAthe Main SteajalsyttgIntig33 teaching 1thgSte[ctorlttjplsetpojntRThGe$fortfogeducingW roc
~
NeutIgCfl0EHighlteactonitrJpIsetpojbtJithodif;felbFEfAgtpoM3d indicate;thatTeducjngithe3etpoir)t%f CDn1RTreq0lrfjMtWDERj3I6 atjC33hgitNet~o rIRCotectionJsyst#LtrfpMh3TS23.,%rJip@ tid (s3iGf11SE protectiop] In addition, the completion time rnr resetting the high flux trips is revised from four hours to 72 hours and the ACTION is revised to specifically require an appropriate power reduction within four hours. Thi s is a relaxation since the CTS require the high neutron flux trip setpoint to be reduced as required within four hours for inoperable MSSVs regardless of i the MTC value. "erding approval of draft "cv.1 of 'J00 03, the changcs proposed in the travalcr M vc been ;odified to retain the current TS rcquirc; cat to rcsct the pcwcr rang neutrca flux high trip setpcints besc on the nu;kr of liSSVs inoperabic to a ;;xi;u; alicwdic powcr deteraired n accordancc with calculations or analysis to account for "cstingheuse NSAL 04 001 and N"C Information Notice 04 60. "cwcycr. the c ;piction tiac of '2 hours proposed by "00-83 has bcca retaincd and is justificd based on th; 15 pr2 ability of an event occurring during this ti;c and the recd to provide sufficient tire to rcset the chanacis in an orderly =nncr without inducini a transient duc to hu;cn error. "ctentica of the CTS requir;; cat for resettingthercactortripsetpcintsisacaptablebecausethisrequir;;p is act; conscrvativ; tkn the ACTIONS specified by eithcr the ISTS cr '" r 03,asrcvised.O CPSES Description of av :: W !!!. i 9/25/98
1 */16 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 APPLICABILITY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DiANGE i DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLARY NUMBER DESCRIPTION YES YES YES YES 01 01 Reference to Table 3.7-2 is deleted free the LCO and moved to the A SR (refer to 01 07-A). YES YES YES 01-02 A note is added to allow separate condition entry for each MSSV YES LS-1 which allows the full four hours for each inoperable MSSV. NO . YES NO 01-03 This CPSES specific revision relaxes the as-found HSSV lift NO: tolerances from +/- it to +/- 3t. LA 108/107 LS-2 1ssutd 10/1/95 to relax setpoint (refer also to 01 @ a i VESNOL . YES YES YES 01-04 Revised ACTIONS for inoperable MSSVs: 1) specificelly requires af l~0-3.7.1-4 l LS-3 power reduction within four hours and 2) requires she reactor ( maintaining CTS ) < power neutron flux high trip set point to be reductd within 72 % y hours. YES YES YES 01-05 The ACTION of the JTS which allowed an exception tt. TS 3.0.4 is YES MA deleted due to the note associated with revised SR 4.7.1.1 which 0-3.7.1-5 ll ' allows a H00E change into MODE 3. one of the HDDES of APPLICABILITY of the LCO. YES YES YES 01-06 The new ACTION adds an explicit requirement to be in MODI 3 in 6 YES M hours and MODE 4 in 12 hours if any SG loop has less thar. 2 MSSVs operable. This is one hour less than allowed by LCO 3.0 3. , YES YES YES 01-07 The CTS SR is revised to specifically reference the IST Frogram. YES A The surveillance directly references Table 3.7 2 for litt points and incorporates the footnote from the table requiring the MSSV as left setpoints to be within +/- It of the nominal setpoint.
, NA NA NA NA 01-08 NOT USED t
J 9/2S/98 i CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - CTS 3M.7
- l. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ - ~__ _ - - - - _. . - - . - . - _ - - . . - - . - . - - - - - _ -
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 3 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 1 The CTS allow continued operation with inoperable MSSVs if the power range neutron flux high reactor trip setpoints are reduced. The amount of reduction in the trip ! setpoint is dependent on the total number of inoperable MSSVs per SG and is intended to compensate for the lost relief capacity (heat removal capability and thus , overpressure protection) should a transient requiring their operation occ Based M.1BistseJugss@MffgehmueL@AL,9t0. 01Efgriplagtslljcensedito 90stgeratspattianpoietJ eielsyj thXpositive] MTC Echanges3r0madello Ngtqge:ayeduction3[the]owerdRange: Neutron" Flux Highireactotitrjp 0 3.7.1 4 atten.1!!t:10additjonito a;teductioniinleactpr2 power wheg;theligC3s Msitives'Hhis;1Enecessary;tonimit.ithe:prjmaryiside3eaggeneratjonjthat BBlecuridu_ ting 1a gsiheatuplelentf91thla; positive] MTEaiheatufoithelcool ant M1Etesult11glaj ponerjincteasfWhich itequiresZadditionallsteamire.]jeyingicapacityl] Ghamesrate;madelto ntquire;a;teduction;1nithelP,0wer RangeiNeutrpnflux31gh; reactor st1plsetpointijnladdition;t.glalteductionlig the;reactorJpowerlwhendth.ere>1sinore ttLE90elinoperable'MSSv_oDiagylsinglels_ team;generatot;rforla r_eactivity2in.settion ggegggtlsughlasiansuncontrolled'RCCA" bank 1Withdrawallitqpla tid 131Merl]milthe gpgergpgeerjM]J110cteaseldulipgitheltragsientluntil t falteactpfltrip!gcursion Mggspetatire2Ni16 Eor.,fowe21gangeiNeutton;F10xiHigil'.13jttil;noreithynigne 2 llLopffablelM_SSV;ogiagDteamjgenerator:the'co_mb1ged steausflorcap_acityIofj,t_he inoMrjibleI!gS_v_sland3he~turbineTmarb_e insuff.fcientlinJoselcasis to 3tev_ent Regptessgizatiotof3he3ainISteamlSystemjpr1otLto 2 reachingithe~regatoMttjp BILt1BButPfg[tte,"6ctiogYprJtedgf.agithe2p@erJRa~nge;Neutrdn31041tligtgredctorfttig ggtgintiis_3odifiedibraNootnotenolindicatRthatIreducin,gititelRtpf,gt31_sZonly CBatglgipr((LODEgygniMEOD2IajldAlthelteactorIprotet; tion' system 33rDs11[CIS S E!siariDr6Vfde~s+suffjcientjprotectfoy in cne prvpuseu specification, tie c a requirement to reauce i m iauge high neutron flux reactor trip setpoint is retained; however, the time to complete resetting the trip setpoints would be
- changed from four to 72 hours.
The CTS require that, if the MSSV cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status within four hours, the power range high neutron flux reactor trip setpoints must be reset in the same 4-hour period. NUREG 1431 requires that the reactor power be reduced in four hours if the MSSV cannot be returned to an OPERABLE status; however, NUREG-1431 i would not require resetting the power range neutron flux high setpoints. The i Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) has orooosed chanaes to NUREG-14_ 3 M cler W00-03 Q revised through drcft Rcv iy1aHSTFl235))that: 1) propose that the completion time for reseu.ing me puwer range neutron flux high trip setpoint oc3'70T [R,{to compensate for a positive MTC or a control rod withdrawal event at partial reactor power to be 72 hours, 2) specifies that power level ' reductions be per the Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Let_ter. NSAL 94-01 and 3) , deletes the Maximum Allowable
- RTP for 5 MSSVs OPERABLEj!bwcVer, per=g cycl of drcft =v, J L w, th; chcngcs propc;cd in the trovcicr hcv w 0 3.7.1 4 I
[modificd to r3tcin thc current TS requirc; cat to rcsct the powcr rcry l CPSES No Significant Ha:ards Considerations - CT.S 3M. 7 22 9/25/98
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-3 (continued)
- flux-high trip satpcints based on the number of M;;"s inoperabk to a mim ==bu w r et = ixe in = =rd = m ith = uunti = = = ,gsis a37" l E L'cstinghousc NSAL 04 00LMhe allowed Completion Time to N I
reduce the Power nonvc neucron Hux trip setpoints is reasonable based on operating l experience to accomplish the required ACTIONS in an orderly manner. The power
; levels specified per NSAL 94 001 are based on a conservative algorithm developed by Westinghouse to bound the required relief capacity.
1 Tha ahnva t hanges are consistent with NUREG-1431 as revised WOG-&3 TSTFe235.7
~ ' ~ ' ' ^
I SAL-9400i'] I This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted l below: i "The Comission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 1 50.91. that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration. if operation of the facility in accordance : with the proposed amendment would not: m l l t I CPSESNo Significant Ha:ards Considerations - CTS 3/.l.7 22a 9/25/98
INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.7 l l TRAVELER STATUS JUSTIFICATlQN COMMENTS NUMBER NUMBER TSTF 36. Rev 2 Incorporated 3.7 42 Only applicable to DCPP l TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant-specific reanalysis to establish I decay time dependence for fuel handling accident. TSTF 70. Rev 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable. NRC"Eapprov_ed m 3.7-00 5 TSTF not I adopted since ! change was net applicable. TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7 05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. 1 1 TSTF-101 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. TSTF 139? Rev.;1 Incorporated 3-7-29 Not NRC. approved TR 3.7 00 i Applicable M Bases change] TSTF-140. Rev 1 Not ; incorporated NA Not NRC approv,ed as of traveler cutoff date. M J173 Incorporated NRC .;appr_oved.: TR 3.7 00 L M3Z4 Incorpor_ated NRC^ approved TR 3.7 00! W0G-64 Incorporated W 0 3.7.2-1 7 l'artially 3.7 01 iletaincd CTS T [T83TSTF23.5 except for the Incorporated 0 3.7.1-4 } l cxtcasica to 72 l hours for trip W90-86IEE28] incorporated 3.7 57 Not; applicable o.3.7 10 M t(DCPR TR 3.7 005 l l l W9G-981STE 289 Incorporated 3.7-56 a.3.7.2. l l
MSSVs 3.7.1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) LC0 3.7.1 The Ejyj! MSSVs perZsteam:generatorjshall be OPERABLE. as specified .;.
,4,
.. g., .
in T;bic 3.7.1-1 :nd T;bic 3.7.1 ?.. -C l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTIONS
.............................N0TE......-..............................
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV. l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME r - l j Onetoramote; steam [\ A .' Reduce 3lERMAlf0WER; tom 4. hours gegeratotsiwith;one k fE873[RE ['jl'g 3- i MSSylinoperable;Eand ; ths.39derato; Iemperatute l - GoefficientAIIC) te W ot3!egat%9elat a1]IpgmGlev.eLs3*;
@ Oneormorgcgired 4 hours stgggggggrators1W1 h1 ReduceThermal2owerto less than or equal to the ["jl 3-4 tWrror9morep!55vs applicable Maximui! E inoperabl - Allowahl.ejt RTP listed in specifiedAin Table '
EQB 3.7.1-11f@thelnopbelrZoj 0,P,EELEJ_liSSVs. gnoralotersteam i mm1ggtgr51Wittfrone AND tifdiBitMgr3Ealid % tt!g E W Ot111YeTat ;;u .aNOIE.j; .c q M 3 1!E 2189 135 l Only2g l Qgm@jIed3nTBDDtapr
,.i. :-n- m ygg i 2 ReduceitheIPowerZRane 7_2;)!oEu l
N
' Neutron 7El Q 3.7.1-4 r, _ ot Hrjplset o lesUthaXorle@a]LtoJ_he l t!aX1 mom 311ogableERIE specWiedlin7ab1mi'13 32fof]thie@0mber3f OP.E. RABLEJMSSVs7El CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-H31 -ITS 3.7 3. 7-1 9/25/98 l
MSSVs 3.7.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
.- Required Action and associated Completion h1
\./
8e in H0DE 3. 6 hours Time not met. IABID E Be in MODE 4. 12 hours 3.7-01
/ N 0 3.7.1 4 One or more stea ge ators wit - ~4 -
___ .u~, , , pyy
,ua t81 inoperable;0PE L E.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
^
SR 3.7.1.1 - -- ---
--NOTE - - ---
Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2. Verify each required MSSV lift setpoint per In accordance Table 3.7.12 in accordance with the Inservice with the l Testing Program. Following testing, lift Inservice , setting shall be within it. Testing Program ! l l CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3. 7-2 9/2S/98
1 MSSVs 3.7.1 Table 3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1) OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus cabic tiagieuslAlicumbyower G "cccent c; ""TED TilE"".AL "0WEg i I I
..,... .c-+e.ena,
. re a man ,
l M i "INI"U"NUMBEROFdERABLE)SSVs W D O GALL M LE Nft 4 - CE."0IE (EE1 PER STEAM GENERATOR AP"LICABLE POWER (* RTP) REOUI"E0 'Q" B-PS + 4 s 8087 -fe? 3 s 6065 65 2 s 4043 -$-43 l l l l l l l l l l l l CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3. 7-3 9/25/98 l
-~
MSSVs B 3.7.1 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) BASES BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the MSSVs is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) by providing a heat sink for the removal of energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and Circulating Water System, is not available. Five MSSVs are located on each main steamline header, outside containment, upstream of the main steam isolation valves, as described in the FSAR. Sccticr.10.3.1 (Ref.1). The __ MS ' cepec. ty c. .mc is 110% of rated stc;;;; flow ct ;;;ust T 0 3.7.1 4 I ave sufficient"caDacity to^1imit secondarv>sydam~nra"ure toMgf the steam generator design pressure 6n orde, go meetMs cccphe requirements of the ASME Code. Section III (Ker. 2). The MSSV design includes staggered _ setpoints, according to Table 3.7.1-2 in the accompanying LCO so that only the needed valves will actuate. Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve chattering that is due to steam pressure insufficient to fully open all valves following a turbine reactor trip. Operationyith3neiorisolegnoperable;HSWs21slallgableM1hg n teactorlpgRefils1 appropriately;teducid 75Thisfactiorcen40renthat if.laXeVent1Weleitg*Mcur7theIopela,b_le.1SSys1@uldicont1We39 e 5 prAVide;g(d_e_q0a_t_eloj(erptiissurelpr_ot_elcoE3 APPLICABLE The design basis for the MSSVs comes from Reference 2 SAFETY ANALYSES and its purpose is to limit the secondary system pressure to s 110% of design pressure whcr. passir.g 1000 cf desigr. stc; ficw. This desigr basis is sufficicr.t to copc with foyany anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or accident considered in the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis. The events that mostisjgnjficantlyichallenge the relieving capacity of the MSSVs, and thus RCS pressure, are those characterized as decreased heat removal events, which are (Continued) CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases - DS 3.7 B 3.7-1 9/25/93
. . . . ~ - . ._-- - - . - . . - - ---- -
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES presented in the FSAR. Section 1_51{ (Ref. 3). Of these, the full power turbine trip without steam dump is typjcally]the limiting A00. This event also terminates normal feedwater flow to the steam generators, r~
^
The safetylana]ysislMst_r_at_ef3hatjfhe] transient response for turbine trip occurritnglfronJfullpgeef without a direct g,3,7,1,4 reactor trip presents no hazard to the integrity of the RCS or the Main Steam System. If a mini;um rcactivity fccdback cP 3.7 15 E j is ass;;cd. the reactor is trippcd on high picssuricer picssure. In this casc. the pressuricar safety valves open, and RCS pressurc rc;ains below 110% of the Gesign valuc. The "SS"s also spcn to limit the sccendary stca; pressure. If mimum rcactivity feedback is assu;cd. the reactor is tripped 9 on overte;perature oT "a?nsti.;1eiRetet;WiiC]cvolilow; t 10;,.: . The d perture fre; aucicate boiling retic incrcoscs throughout the transient. and ncicr drops below its initial valuc. Prcssuricar relicf valves and "SS"3 src activated and prevcat evcipressuricatica in the pri;;ry and sccendary systc;s. The . turbine ~trj p]j s;petfo_rnedlassumj njinolprjaary; system;pr, essure contro);1boticreditingleactorittip;o_nIbi.gtCpteisurizerlpriessure . and; operation;offtheIpressurfzerlsafety3a]ves 0LThislanalysis demonstrateEthatIRCSiintagrity;isim81ntainedibEshowipgithatithe maximum]tCSlpreissurfdoetzgotteXc:eadjl_10tiofithe de_signf. pressure:: Al]Jeases3Da]yzedidemonstrgelthatltheIMSSVsinaigtajnJajn St.eam Systemittegrltylby]limitiggithermaximum7steamipressure;.to e :_le_ss than7110!I6fithe~; steam'geget&tbEde5fggfptessur_e] Ipiadditj_dg2toltbeldet~rea'sedihettltendValievie_ntgreactivity insertiori;etent:simayraisoccha11engelttfelteJievingicapacity a.3,,,1 4 , ontheJSSEllThe~uncontrolleditodiduster i c_onttolassembly (RCCA)IbankNithdrawallRtiptseNeverMEcMtac_terlze~d;bylan ipqreasd3fEtorgpoWersBlid4te]!IggehKption24teIGntiXrfactorr tt.jploccurQ!1erEtitbentherais: GEttDre;E16rcMPoWeERa! igg Neutron ! #DEHighisettpbint'Us"M8theiGESteam;fTUIEtoltheiturbine Wlllgot;1tiere]LsEft@Jtsynit1812tl[Lefe3forathfrevenFThe increasedINettTgratislegtd'AheTseconiseT'.153jderciuse;slaniggrease igIsteamfggs]Drelargi1W2l[sieltyn3pilg11gg qtthelt!SSVsIpriorito teactorltrjpKgss.0mjjr166Tereditifor2DpetationicfitheIatmosphet14 orZcondertse.rlstyamId! Lap]Valie61MZS8RIsafetyiana]ysisIofit_he R_CC61 bank NithdraWallaltIppWerleV W for.TaIrrangeFaffinitial? core , powerj]evelsidemonstratetithatithelM_SSVs2arelcapablelof / pteyentijgfisecondaryIsideToverpas_sud.gationifofithisIA00j
- (Continued)
CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-2 9/25/98
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES -
,7 -
TheRSelEgfely3Da],tgsPdiscusjed3bovelassgelthat2alEof O'3 7'l,4 th M M fof7eathZste8M y nef8torlatp10P M BLEgitithere atelinopershWBS$31spM131sThecessafylto3mitithelptimary CP-3.7-15 systemingRt3g2g:MgLd6 state' operationland]M0ftola = valuent[atatoen!EttsultstrqLxceedigatje3Mbindisteam flotiEuyih.lME6fIthe3turhirli6Mif#avnflab]@JagdIthe? remain.ing OPERABLEIll55VsMbew;11gitation].cn;pth!iarylsystenMt necessarfitolpcMint3lpc9Ddaryisysteie%%uawsizetion' mafibe detersjnedibyltystemitr_aglegt[analyseQIgisomel,gf rf.umstances;1t 1.ssnecessary;to211 alt;thCptimary[sidelheat[generatf onithatican beiachievediduringlan' A00Aylteducing;the3etpoLntiofat_helPower Range 1NeuttgniFluxlRigh:teactoritrip,Tunciton,Eforgx_amplef]if notef thagionejMSSEg;a " single 2 steam; generator 31siinopetable. tag uncontrolled _;RCCAlbangyithdraWalr a tIpowerleventiocgurting:from;a partiaEpWetilevelfmay2esultlipianlincreaseJin; reactor 7 power that exceedsit_helegebined3 team; flow;capa_gjtysofithelturbine:and the;remaigijgLORERABLELMSSVs Wsgforimultiple]inopetable1MSSVs oDithelsgate_as;generatorGitli s;negessaryito~pteventleXceeding this poweribyiloweningith.e]@etiRange"Neutrog;fFluxidigh!setpoint toIaniappropriatelval,ue~.lWher[the; Moderatotulemperature CoefficientlMIC)LisIposit.11enthe reactor;powerJuay11gcrepse abovelthelinitia11value;duting [an, RC51heatup3vegti(eIgEttrbine t ttjpnaThus7dorlanyinumberlofjinoperablelMSSVs;ttIis;gecessary tolteducettheltr;1plsetppigtlifia;posjtiv_eEC;maylexistiat pattiallpontscogditiopsZunless;it;isidemoDsttatediby; analysis that:.a lspecifiedireactotipowerlteductionlalo[_ney preventroverpressutizatiorr ofithe7 steam rsyst he MSSVs are e79 _r:d t h=: tw n ;;ti'!c ::d ::: ;:--i.s failure modes. The active failure modes arc spurious is'antinadvertent opening and failure to reclose once opened. The pa;;iv- failurc ;;& is e Failure to open upon demand jsinotiasso.r.edl(RefG),. The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Stat ;;nt. 10CF.R5013,61Q(21(11)]. LCO The accident analysis requirdfeue that?fiv_ SSVs per stea generatort@i;.0PJRAELEhe provide overg om.m protection for ; dy,sigD,,,, basis transwm.s occurrina at 1027 RTP_. r s.,v w . . . , pu_,consicris ;negrabic. . ifm. it. . .fails _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ , to ogn .- on i;;nd%;T. _m_ o.3.7.14 l f e~_ y, m % r. -~.. . . . . v.
- m. . ~. , m. .
. m.% y. - ~.. e f tolqqEe. e LCO requires that fiy_e MSS Q rlsteay j gegeratori PERABLE in compliance with Reference 4 even Qhough this i not a rc u;r;;;nt ;; and}he DBA analysis.
(Continued) CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-2a 925/98
-. ~
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES n T
.nis is bcccust cpcration with ic33 than the full number of ,
u.e.eu. ____.2._m__.
.. .,y. . s.a.
a.t ua.m__.....3.,._...t.,.s.
. m a
,,..i.e.n.u.o,m .nnm.
rn, ' u' m- e 0-3.7.1 4 meet """C Codc rcquircacnts). Thc3c limitations are I according to Table 3.7.11 in the accompanying LCO an m m .. J AL A M l my 2.. em nm a..m.
.. m.m.
The OPERABILI f the MSSVs is defined as t ity to open (gd@ithin the setpoint tolerances, t relieve steam scuciawr overpressure, and reseat when pres ure has been reduced. The t l [ I t l l { I l I I l t l l m I 1 l l l t i (Continued) i I l i CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-2b 9/25/98 t
.m
. __ . ~- . .- . _ - . - - _ - - .. . -. -- - . - . . . . - - - - MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
,,,c lift settings occording to Table 0.7.1-2 in the , , o.3,7,1 4 g occ ..penying LCO, corrcspcad to =bicnt conditions of the valve et ac;inal operating te .gratura and pressurc.
This LC0 provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences accidante that could result in a challenge to the RCP r< Main
~
Steam;Syst.enMnt -
^
7 --i % APPLICABILITY M00C 1 abovc 40% ",T", the numbcr of "SS"s per stcc: f[genentorrequiredtobc0"E"ASLEmustbcoccordingto C P 0 3.7.1 4 l
--Tobic 3.7.1 1 in y; occompanying LCO. "cicw 40! "J" MODES 1, 2, and 3, kah two five%SSVs oer staam_ aenerator
~
are rannicad tn be OPERABL o pr_ e. v_ e_nt_.'.M_a. .in ' Ste. am _ System
~
{overpressurjzatiog,n In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requirir!g the MSSVs. The steam generators are not normally used for heat-removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized; there is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these MODES. ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV. m ed w With one or more MSSVs inoperable action:mustlbeltjeD qmmos.m m so that the available M5dv rellevmg capacity 0 3.7.1 4 l mgTaferr^ Myerpres_slireipMectio, uirements. 7, thc appTicobic EE"".AL "0"E" ;Gcjff;_d~jn .y _,u iv CP 3.7 15 l E7XJ Operation with less than all f,jj,g MSSVs OPERABLE for each steam generator is permissible. if THERMAL POWER is proportionally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that the energy I transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief canacity in that etaw gennratne for
..A. if onc "SSV is inspcrobic in cac stc= gcncrator, the g'kf d copecity-ef that stc;; generator is reduced by _
CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-3 9/2S/98
. .. . . . _ . . . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ --_____.._m__m_ _ . . _ _ . - . . . . . _ _ m _m_ _.-__.m m_. _ .. _ - _..__m . . _ _ . . _ . _ MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES
- ~
---- mJ-- .1 . Sn& T. rs. & ALJ. - J- AJ._ J 14.s uyy3 vn ubwIJ LV1 iv vsaJEb bu t 4 J s wwww b i VIs sis awI svi
.... .&.. - - - . . . & . .t. &. AL.& ,&___ _..& L.
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CPSES Markup ofNUREG-143i Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-4 9M5/98
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES
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CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-S 9/2588
_ . . --. - -.- - - - _ _ - . _ . _ = _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ . - MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES Coef _ . Ms"cosit1WtheiteactorJpowetgaM1pcrease31!q ult [offRIDGEjb@tthTD988tIstichlth8t tf1FEapacitfl6Tathe remainijg3NR8BIEMSSVs'is3nsuffjcientgelrgoggircaddittog f tolR,equii'etMetM8Xiidifch!sMifjfes?8vFappropriatelgiductiog (nireac_toJr tRLeegig(Lthin!41hbursERe@iNd" Action?B!21spe_cLfies that"JhelPoWerIR EageQten2E10HighfrtattMttipisetpojgtibe teduced;Within;72ihoutis? The; maximum;INERMAt;POWFKcotresponding fo;theiheatjremoval ca'pacitylofithelemaining10PERABLE MSSVs21s! determined )1Can approprj ate!alj oWance]f_or3uclearJInstrumentatign; System; trip channellu ietdigtigs,Z Requi red ?Ac_toniBj2;j simodi fiedibyza30te,Dindicatingithatithe P_onifer' RangelN, eotron'fj ux:High2eactor;trj p3etpoint1redugtion 11 s onlylrequiredlinJ0DE;QIn; MODES 12fand 3;the're.actoriprotection syst_emittipfspecjfjedjn1L001313;1E%eactor;Tripf. System InstrumentationM provid_e ; sufficient: protection) Thela))owedicompletion,iTimes:atelr.easonablebas_ed;onpperat experiencej,t o3cigomp]ishitt! elRequired3ctjonslinlan "or y, manger 31th60tEct)ellengigg Unitisystems? CB. 2^ C?.2 If tha ed3ctionji18telnot[ e Comp]etedjiSSV3 con ,ct b^ CP-3.7-15 l 6 c3tored to OPEPX L status m .... un: assocla - t^mietion f 0 3.7.1-4 5 Time, or if one or u - A r generators have "49friopb~rab% Cim ..... - y SSVs 6 PE L 6 the unit must be placeo in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status. . , the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoint in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. TheASMECode.SectionXI(Ref.4-5-f), requires that safety and relief valve tests be performed in CP 3.7-13 l accordance with ANSI /ASME OM 1-1987 (Ref. 5-{i5). According toReference5-t-5,thefollowingtestsarerequired:
- a. Visual examination:
CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-Sa 9/25/98
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES
- e. Verification of the balancing device integrity on balanced valves.
The ANSI /ASME Standard requires that all valves be tested every 5 years, and a minimum of 20% of the valves be tested every 24 months. The ASME Code specifies the activities and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7.1-2 allows a ! 35 setpoint tolerance for OPERABILITY: however, the valves are reset to it rinrinn the Rurveillance to all drif he]itt3iettingsZaccoting;to; d Table O'3 7 l'4 tL1-2.;cortespond_tolambienticonditionsl;ogthe;valvelat nominallopetatingitempetatdre"and'oressure' This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. The MSSVs may be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist sevice to simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting pressure shall be corrected to ambient conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure. 0 3.7.1-4 l REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 10J3))
- 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Section III.
Article NC 7000, Class 2 Components. CP 3.7 015 l
- 3. FSAR, Seet4en Chapted 15.
n
- 4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
- 5. ANSI /ASME OH .1-1987.
- b. )
(Continued) CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-6 92S88
1 i i l l I d JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG 1431 Section 3.7 1 4 This enclosure contains a brief discussion / justification for each marked up technical change to NUREG 1431 Revision 1, to make them plant specific or to incorporate generic changes result %g from the Industry /NRC generic change i process. The change numbers are referenced directly from the NUREG 1431 mark ups. For enclosures 3A, 3B, 4, 6A and 68, text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing 1 Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location. 4 4 CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER N s a 1 J. -...J..J r._J aeT a S .JJ.J s. L. ,' 3.7 01 a r*T T mws - m.. se .wy s .mu ram
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CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER _.21ons3rC MMdiconsistentMth$5JEgancsojintriof3ht factithatra"MWaginjpoweraleveElsinorgiaqqgggp9Itional h toltheXeduct$iain;majnisteam tsafety3al vieILMSSy)iggfe11DE / capab1Mtond" plants 3bichimeyIpperatelforzstme;partIqEalmel; cycle f Mithypp_sjtiviModetatoraIempe l etute CoefficitentuttTC)3Jinsecon LiestinghouseJtu.qleariSaLety3dyisory;tetteragatsigagrcplants 11 censed 2to opetate3t;panjalfpmenlevelsjgtigspyggggg changes;ar.e,madelto: require:a;yeduction ;in]!helPcWyMrJeutrog Flux-Highlreactorltej p;setpoigtlin;ad_d.itionitq2aIrgductjoniineactpr poweriebenjtheXCli s;positivgHhi siis inecessary;,1031mitithe ptimaryI41delheatigeneratjoDithatimay; occur l dutigg1RCSLheatupieventlj With:aipositive:NTCTaf heatupipfL the:cpol antIW11Eresult11nfa: power j ncreaselwhi ch3 equi resiaddit.tonaljsteam, re1jtevjpgicapaqity;;~iC_hange_s ar.elmadeltolequire;a reduction in;the:Poweg3angefjleutron1)Ruxilligh reactpritr,ip:setpointiinladdition;to)j reduction:;inithelreactorjpower when;there is;moreithanione,jnoperable~MSSVion any31_ngleisteam 1 generatorJMpt, a_reac ti vityLi n_ser. tion;a cci_dentJsucJhs"ag uncontrolled _RC_CA l banifyithdrawallfrom'a'partiallpowerjl_e.vellthe teactorlpoweriwjills. increase duringithe:transieDt l uDtila a lteactofitrjp occursion101e_rtemperatutej[Ni16]iordPpwer:RangelNelltronlElugjitghQ s WjthlmotelthagioneligoperableJSSVloniany3 team'genetetoGthe;qombined ~ st.eamjfloWicapacityloQthelinopetabl.e;HSSVsLanditheJAulrbjpelmay;be insufficient 11n3ome; cases itp; preventIoverptessurjzatjo_n"ofAthelMaja Steam;Systempriorito] reaching lthgireactotittipTsetpoint? 3.7 02 Not Applicame to w5ES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 03 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure , 6B). CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-1431 - ITS 3. 7 la 92588
i CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUPSER p une s_...1_ ne in_.. nr.__.2__J e__ m 2 _ a __2 vm._ . . - __
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~ -- i C_ riso[ Table 3encio~soreI6B}
A 3.7 13 Not Applicable to CP5ES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). 3.7-14 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). 3.7 15 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 16 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 17 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 18 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). 3.7-19 Not Applicable to CPSESs See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7-20 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). CPSES Di(ferencesfrom NUREG-ID1 - ITS 3. 7 4 9/25M8
n -. .. - CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431- SECTION 3.7 Page 1 of 6 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY CANYON PEAK [ % 3.7-01 ycrctim with y i; rcvi;cd; ad acu ".C'IO" ". 2 i; cddcd] to ccccant for inspcrchic "SSV; =d ractting thc pcucr rcng; ncutron 'la VES N0; maintaining _ CTS YES YES YES hig' trip ,ctpcint; wit' i.;;crchic "SSV;. Thc Cc;plction 'i;c to rc;ct the pca: rag; rcutra fla 'igh t-ip ;ctpci-t , i; atcadcd to '2 hour;. [ l0-3.7. l-4 ,l
-} ThefetionstarenrevisedmonsistentMthJSTFf 235;to.accountjor2 the; fact j thatiaireductionLin; powerilevenis;notylirectly: proportional,tcithe /
Eeductiorisin;mainisteamlsafetyly41yeMNSSYhrevetringicapabilityiandjplants Which,may opetatelforAsomejparrqfiatfuelicycle;with;ajpositive, Moderator _,, J m 't- * - hntM MTC)! 3.7-02 The CTS Applicability of Modes 1. 2. and 3 is being retained in ITS 3.7.2 NO: DCPP is NO: CPSES is YES YES MSIVs. and ITS 3.7.3. [MFIVs]. adopting ITS. adopting ITS. L 3.7-03 SR 3.7.3.1 is divided into two surveillances since both the stroke time and YES (per LA NO NO N0 the frequency requirements are different at DCPP for the feedwater 77/76) regulation / bypass valves and the feedwater isolation valve. 3.7-04 Requirements involving reliance on the SG heat removal system for heat NO - DCPP is YES YES YES removal in Mode 4 would be deleted. adopting ITS , 3.7-05 REQUIRED ACTION B.1 and new C.1 are revised to state that restoration of YES YES NO: refer to NO: refer to "all but
- and "all but two" [ARV] lines is required which will effectively 3.7-19. 3.7-19.
exit the respective REQUIRED ACTION. 3.7-06 The CONDITION and REQUIRED ACTION for two or more inoperable [ARV) lines is YES YES NO: not part NO: not part limited to two [ARV] lines and the COMPLETION TIME is revised from 24 to 72 of CTS. of CTS. hours per the current licensing basis. A net, CONDITION C is added. 3.7-07 Revised Conditions A and C to be consistent with CTS. The ITS as written NO: not part of NO: not part YES YES would have allowed the OPERABLE EES train to remain in standby during CTS. of CTS. movement of irradiated fuel. 3.7-08 SR 3.7.5.1 is revised to add a note consistent with the CTS and the plant NO: AFW valves YES YES YES specific design. The verification of flow control valve position is' have a correct deferred until conditions are appropriate. position. J CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - ITS3.7 9M588
n Page 2 cf 6 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431- SECTION 3o7 APPLICABILITY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE DIABLO COMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION CANYON PEAK r NO NO N0 New Conditions E. F. and H and the surveillance requirement associated YES 3.7-09 with the PWST AFW pump supply are relocated from the CTS on AFW supply and included in the DCPP APJ specification for completeness. YES NO NO N0 3.7-10 The specification description, the LCO, the action requirements and the surveillance are revised to incorporate the DCPP plant specific requirement for operable AFV supply sources via the CST and the FWST per the current licensing basis. NO YES NO NO 3.7-11 The REQUIRED ACTIONS for CPSES feedwater isolation and associated bypass valves inoperable are revised consistent with the current licensing basis. 0 -3. 7. 3-2 l l E.'s..
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6 03 rcvi ;cd Cor2ktica " . .d Tobic 3.' i to ;;ce nt for plant; that NO VESN0 NO NO yES[\ 3.7-12 m.m., , . ~ . . . . ~ . . , . . .,..-m.. - m ip fu.;ction hcn "'C i pc;itivc (Scc C" 3.7 01 ;bovc). 'hc erding of the travckr he; b ;n ;r.cdificd for C^SCS to ;xcunt for phnt ;pcific diffcrac- Eor,,Callaway Ltwo I I setpointsiare:gtven,1n1
- Table t3;7mlifor;thelcase;of10PERABLE;MSSVs ; per lQ-3.7. L-4 l i steamigeneratorffRNote11.sgadded,to) Table %7;1-1_and,to;the Required action A11Ltoladdtesssitelplantispeciftelrequitementa __..
YES NO NO NO 3.7-13 Note 1. under ACTION REQUIRED A.1 is deleted. The DCPP emergency diesel generators have self contained cooling systems that do not rely upon an external source of cooling water. NO NO N0 3.7-14 The note for SR 3.7.8.1 is deleted since the DCPP ASW system supplies only YES the CCW heat exchanger and no other individual components. SR 3.7.8.1 is revised to include a DCPP specific requirement to verify the YES NO NO NO 3.7-15 availability of power and air so that the valves can be placed in their correct position as described in the bases. NO NO N0 3.7-16 SR 3.7.8.2 is revised to include only power operated valves since there are YES no automatically operated valves in the DCPP ASW system. The survdillance is revised to require movement of power operated valves to demonstrate the ability to reconfigure the ASW system as' described in the FSAR and the ITS bases. CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - ITS 3.7 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.1-5 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.1 Action b ITS 3.0.4 and ITS SR 3.7.1.1 DOC 01-05-M CTS 3.7.1.1 Action b states that "The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable." A note in ITS SR 3.7.1.1 states the SR is only required in Modes 1 and 2. Comment: This change is in accordance with the STS and it is acceptable. However, the l DOC is incorrectly justified as a "more restrictive change. ITS 3.0.4 has been revised to permit the placement of Notes, as in this case, that permit entry into Modes of operation where the i LCO Operability can be established. This is an administrative change that reformats the CTS j requirements for the purpose of clarification by explicitly stating the reason for Specification ! 3.0.4 not being applicable. Revise the submittal to provide an "A" DOC. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 01-05-M has been revised to be DOC 05-A. The justification of the change has been revised to indicate that the ITS Note is equivalent to the CTS 3.0.4 exception. ATTACHED PAGES: EncI2 3/4.7-1 Enci 3A 2a Enci 38 1 e
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A Q 3.7.1 1 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE SAFETY VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Tabic 3.7 22 MAM APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2. and 3. ACTION:** 9.aa Ls J a With;oneMrlmoretsteam;gegetatotsIwith1one;MSSVJigoperablelandLt_he 4 poderatorIremperatureCoe_f[1cient'(MTC)izero;orinegatiye atIall ;LS ',' poWetaleve] siteducLTHE,R!!ALIP,0WER3 eveL to182LRIPJ , 1 ab. With four reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in l operation and with one two;or more main steam line Code safety valves inoperable or;anylsteamIgeneratgriwlth;one'MS.SV2jnoperab]eR41theiM[C posi,tivelatjany;pgWerflevjl, operation in MODES 1, 2, and 3 may proceed i provided, that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve (sl is 4' 9 i restored to OPERABLE status or;poWerjisleduced;tolessithagiorl@quaJ tolthe;MagimumallowedlowerllistedMTable73.i7jJE&nd;"J1thfg;1tle22 hours the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint( is reduced per Table 3.71; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. 1- l y 3. . - , b. Gc provi;icas of Specification 3.0.4 era not opplicabicf I (NeN1 WitMog!Eg,r_moreIsteamAneratofLs"Wjthle_s_slthanitwd2MSSys
- QP_ERMLEXbe;110!0IiSTMBJJWithinItheinemsj)C hour ~sTBnd;t!0J [3fj[1,7 StUTDOWNNithin thelfg]JoWingIs1,f.houts; 1
i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS of Q 3.7.1 5
- 4.7.1.1 No edditional rcquircnnts othcr than thoso -- ..m by Specification pfdnni j 4 IGREBfGlachWauirfdKSV.3 We b. r2 Table 7377
- 22DCac_cbBlanc6 a.3,7,1 5 EXEEiElGl Mice 2 Testing 1r.ogram . c11mingitesti.gg3111tlettigscsh.allib!
i 1 04 LS i Q 3.7.1 4 { ....................
= ~ -- rvEenditionTentryitime:isialjoWedjforleacJlMSVj g
' 7.1 5 i ~ 1 02 LS l Q 3.7.1 2 CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-1 9/2588
CHANGE NUMBER H2iG DESCRTPTION 01 05 The exception to TS 3.0.4 is no longer needed due to the note associated with the revised surveillance. The exception was allowed to 3.0.4 due to the fact that the applicable MODES must be entered in order to perform the required surveillance (if the MSSVs are tested in place) and to allow Mode changes to be made if the applicable action was met. In the CTS, MODE 1, 2, or 3 could be entered. In NUREG 1431, the surveillance is modified by a 6cra restrictivcyote that specifies that the surveillance neeu v 1; M Su rent prior to reaching MODE 2. The 0 3.7.1 5 E surveillance noteTHsnequivalentgo3rle;&TSfE031exceps a % (Deca _use b .ii aiIows nuut enanwes inw uie nuut or Avytr_^r".!" ^# the LCO. i.e. . MODE 3 for testing purpose _nd hus#the3hange.;isladministrative. e CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N.7 2a 9/2588
~. . . - . . . . , -
18.f16 CONVERSION COMPARIS0N TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 APPLICABILITY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE C0HANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY DIABLO CANYON NUl6ER DESCRIPTION I YES YES YES YES 01-01 Reference to Table 3.7-2 is deleted from the LCO and moved to the A SR (refer to 01-07-A). . YES YES YES A note is added to allow separate condition entry for each MSSV YES 01-02
- LS-1 which allows the full four hours for each inoperable MSSV.
YES NO NO This CPSES specific revision relaxes the as-found MSSV lift NO: 01-03 LA 108/107 LS-2 tolerances from +/- It to +/- 31. issued 10/1/95 to relax v setpoint (refer also to 01 ; LS20). YES YES YES , Revised ACTIONS for inoperable MSSVs: 1) specifically requires a VESNO3 01-04 maintaining CTS 0-3.7.1-4 l' LS-3 power reduction within four hours and 2) requires the reactor power neutron flux high trip set point to be reduced within 72 i hours. YES YES YES The ACTION of the CTS which allowed an exception to TS 3.0.4 is YES 01-05 ] Q-3.7.1-5 t
, deleted due to the note associated with revised SR 4.7.1.1 which ~
allows a H00E change into H00E 3. one of the MODES of APPLICABILITY of the LCO. y ' YES YES YES YES 01-06 The new ACTION adds an explicit requirement to be in H0DE 3 in 6 i H hours and H0DE 4 in 12 hours if any SG loop has less than 2 MSSVs operable. This is one hour less than allowed by LCO 3.0.3. YES YES YES YES 01-07 The CTS SR is revised to specifically reference the IST Program. A The surveillance directly references Table 3.7-2 for lift points and incorporates the footnote from the table requiring the MSSV as left setpoints to be within +/- It of the nominal setpoint. NA NA NA NA ; 01-08 NOT USED a 9DS)98 CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - CTS 3/4.7 i e
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.1-7 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.1 Actions l ITS 3.7.1 Action B DOC 01-06-M l ITS Action B adds a new condition for when "one or more steam generators with less than two l I MSSVs OPERABLE", then MODE 4 is entered to exit LCO Applicability. CTS 3.7.1.1 Actions would require the more severe LCO 3.0.3 shutdown for this degraded condition. Comment: This change is not "more restrictive". In this degraded condition, the loss of one ! hour is immaterial since the one hour is insufficient time to retum all the MSSVs to Operable. i The one hour period is the normal allocation of time to plan for an orderly plant shutdown. It is i less restrictive to place the unit in Mode 4 rather than in Mode 5. The "more" and the "less" I restrictive features of this change are acting as opposites. Therefore, this change should ) include all this discussion and then ve revised as an administrative reformatting of the CTS Table 3.7-1 requirements. FLOG RESPONSE: The applicability for this specification is Modes 1,2 and 3. In the CTS, LCO 3.0.3 shutdown only requires that the licensee "... place the unit in a MODE, in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in.. " Mode 3 in next 6 hours, Mode 4 in the following 6 hours and Mode 5 in the subsequent 24 hours. Thus, for this specification, LCO 3.0.3 is satisfied upon entry into Mode 4. LCO 3.0.3 allows 1 hour to prepare for an orderly shutdown but the new Condition B does not; therefore the change is more restrictive. ATTACHED PAGES: None 1 1
l l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET
\
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.2-1 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.5, All Actions ITS 3.7.2, Action A, C, D, and E I DOC 05-03-LS-12 l JFD 3.7-34 l l These changes are beyond the scope of a conversion because the industry travelers referenced in this DOC (WOG-64 and TSTF 30) have not been approved by the NRC. Comment: Withdraw the changes or adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: WOG-64 has been approved by the TSTF and is designated TSTF-281. , This traveler has been submitted to the NRC and the industry status reports indicate that the l reviewer recommends rejection of this traveler. Therefore, the FLOG has decided to withdraw l the changes proposed by the traveler and adopt the 8 hour Completion Time as identified in ' NUREG-1431. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 3/4.7-8 Encl.3A 6 . Encl. 3B 5 Encl. 4 1,35,36,37 and 38 Encl. 5A Traveler Status page,3.7-5 and 3.7-6 Encl. 5B B 3.7-10, B 3.7-11 and B 3.7-12 Encl.6A 6 Enc. 6B 4 e
PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13.A Q 3.7.1 1 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Four MSIVs shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2 and 3 H00ES12:andXexcept:wheralEMSIVsnateMojedland;(eantated] iWettsj ACTION: H00E 1: With one HSIV inoperable but open. POWER OPERATION may contin ovided 5 ^3 ' 0 the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within , . hours: " 0,3.7.2,1 otherwise be in STARTUP within the next 6 hours. H0 DES 2* and 3*: N With onehooreley MSIVs inoperable. subsequent oneration in MODE 2 _ , , , , , or 3 may proceea prvvided the MSIV is closed within @' pours and 0 3.7.2 1 verified closed once per 7 days. Otherwise. be in HOTTANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
~
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_ _ ~ .,~ .._ _ , m th,c2SE, _. iGic cd Within: _m,_-,,,, m.onm, m,m,E_G;r"it?~qirK-' _ m _ m.- ~ _. 0 3.7.2,1 mmymuwm .._cvanum&m.an uv.L um-->. -2numm.a newmwr._sym
,';OM31%".E91tliiCthC'cIIGi;1flMT4 SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.7.1.5 Each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure time within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.52. The provision; cf pg Sgcificctica 4.0.4 are not applicabic for entry into "00: 3.
M Eggffy36ch MSIVTettuatisitf,th6210'littbnIposi,tibDnlanJJitttglj;pf gegip@ M M ar gyetyi18imgat!1sM]
- Separate entry times into Action Statement is allowed for each MSIV.
M .1SILeg0itedJ o X pet qtmed!;fnlH00ESlIIhnd>2] f (s.pgl CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3M.7-8 925/98
.v
l CHANGE NUMBER R$$ DESCRIPTION 04 02 LS 8 The SR of Table 4.71 to determine Gross Radioactivity is deleted. The change is acceptable because radiciodines and the resulting thyroid dose are limiting; not noble gases and whole-body cose. The primary to secondary leakage limits and dose equivalent I 131 limits ensure the dose analyses in the [ Final Safety Analysis Report] remain valid. 05 01 LS 9 The MODE of APPLICABILITY for the main steam safety valves (MSIVs) is revised to clarify that in MODES 2 and 3 with all MSIVs closed [and de-activated], the safety function of the MSIVs is already met. Thus, operability of the MSIVs in this condition is not required. 05 02 LS-11 Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). 05-03 .. The Complction Time for closing cac incperable MSI" is "l m24 extended to 72 hours and separatc naquired Action; art included for cither one MSI" inoperabic or two or acrc MSI"s l
-ie~e, v in Modes 2 and 3. Thc completion ti;c cf 72 hour; is
+ s *wt j sppropriate becau;c the Main Stca: System i; a cic;cd
> 9 a--- The closed systcm is subjected to Type A tc; ting. is.,
seum+e Category I piping, is missilc protected. and typically has prc.:surizcd ficw through it d_ ring normal cpcration such that ic;; cf integrity would be expected to bc ob;crved through icokage dctcction systems and during walkdowns of the systaa. This is con;istcat with the 72 hour resteret4en-ti;; for cor,tair cat isclation valves on cic;cd systc;;. This changc is consistent ... Z)C 54. "ot,"appljcable3o2SES3See'ConVersioC_ T d nclosure3BU i 05-04 A Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). 05 05 M Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). 1 05 06 Not used. i
; 05-07 LS 23 A footnote is added to the SR to indicate that demonstration of ' MSIV OPEoABILITY is only required to be performed for entry into j (and continued operation in) MODES 1 and 2. The footnote is added in lieu of the current exception to CTS 4.0.4. While the footnote is intended to establish the same exemption, it is in fact less restrictive because the footnote permits an indefinite stay in MODE 3 while the exception to CTS 4.0.4 requires testing within 24 hours of establishing the necessary plant conditions per TS 4.0.3 as described in Generic Letter (GL) 87 09.
CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N.7 6 9/25/98
S */N CONVERSION COMPARIS0N TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 APPLICABILITY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALUNAY NUPBER DESCRIPTION NO. The service YES NO: refer to NO: refer to 03-03 The CPSES specific description of how to verify the operability 03 02-LS-22. water system is 03-02-LS 22. l LG of the service water system when acting as backup to the CST for AFW supply is moved to the Bases. The surveillance will now not accredited require that the operability of the backup system be verified *by AFW supply backup. administrative means." YES YES YES YES 04-01 Isotopic analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 concentration is to M be performed on a 31 day frequency. The conditional performance requirements in the CTS are deleted. YES YES YES YES 04-02 The SR of Table 4.7-1 to determine Gross Radioactivity is LS-8 deleted. YES N0: maintaining NO: maintaining 05-01 The H0DE of APPLICABILITY for MSIVs is revised to clarify that in YES CTS. CTS. LS-9 MODES 2 and 3 with all MSIVs closed [and de-activated]. the safety function of the of the MSIVs is met. YES NO NO NO 05-02 This DCPP specific change revises the A0T/ completion time for an LS-11 inoperable MSIV from 4 hours to 8 hours in H0DE 1 and in MODES 2 and 3. This change also deletes the MODE 1 requirement to place the plant in MODE 3, and then H0DE 4 due to an inoperable MSIV and only requires entry into MODE 2 since the ACTIONS for H00E 2 or 3 operation would then be applicable. Operation in H0 DES 2 and 3 is revised to allow more than one HSIV to be inoperable and > by a note to allow a separate condition entry for each inoperable g MSIV. \ NO - Refer to VES$10nialready YES YES 05-03 etion time for closing one inoperable HSIV is extended 05-02-LS-11 jn.CISI l0-3.7.2 11 LS-12 o 8 R -hours and separate Required ACTIONS are included for either one $P! i.4cc.bk or two-ee more HSIVs inoperable in WES 2 or 3. The LCO is changed from the OPERABILITY of each MSIV to the YES NO: already in YES YES 05-04 CTS A OPERABILITY of four MSIVs. CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - CTS 3N.7 9lI5'98 J j i
1 i 1 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC) CONTENTS t l I. Organization ........................................ 3 l l II. Description of NSHC Evaluations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 III. Generic No Significant Hazards Considerations "A" - Admini strative Changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1
"R" Relocated Technical Specifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 "LG" - Less Restrictive (Moving Information Out of the Technical Specifications) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 "M" - More Restrictive Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 IV. Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations "LS" LS 1................................................ 16 LS 2.............................. ................. 19 LS 3................................................ 22 LS 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e i
LS 6................................................ 25 L$ 7............... ................................ 27 LS 8................................................ 29 LS 9............... ................................ 31 LS 10............... ............................... 33 LS 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . %M i Ano 0 3.7.2 1 LS 13............................................... 39 LS 14............................................... 41 ' LS 15............................................... 43 LS 16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Not Appl i cabl e LS 17............................................... 45 LS 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 19............................................... 47 LS 20..........................................Not Used LS 21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e _ LS 22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 23............................................... 49 LS 24............................................... 51 LS 25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 26............................................... 53 LS 27. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e ' LS 28. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N ot Appl i cabl e LS 29............................................... 55 l LS 30............................................... 57 i LS 31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not u_ sed n' y y- '. . " ^ l oc.3.7001} CPSES No Significant Ha:.ards Considerations - CTS 3N. 7 1 9/25/98
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i 1 t 1 1 IV. SPECIFIC NO SlGNTFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS LtC U/* Ie 19 nsirv ww su I I rg .wvi
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l l l l l i l IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS I i t s ' ueu,r i e m, m, usi w i _ _ _ u .. . _ n Q 3.7.2 1
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.,e ,n __...,u__ c___ su_ ___..___:__ s_ su_ :____.._a Tc ___.s _ .u _ e. . s u _
wuwsaiJ buis _.isv ha sh a w Ju i b i sy i a um wa N wvi s v v s J ewI bv bi sw s istyi v y w u aa s vi sisu t. ____2&_u__ _s._;-_u _, ,n rPn en nn,_s. ._; -____.o__,.. . _a_2,2___s L..._m _.siv asyissaswussw s uusui wa uvi sa s uw s u w a vs i a b ui suu n ud vi sv w6 sg sv . ss g w / , un au uwwva u a s sy s y . u _a _ :_. s u... 2. ___:n_u__ c:_a __ . 2. . . u c _ a J 131 ii s wola b slukui u d wvi ad s uwi u k B ul u 5 I s fu u s iy iJ yuJbii sww. t l l m i I t l l CPSES No SignifIcant Hazards Considerations - CTS 3N. 7 38 9/25/98
INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.7 I TRAVELER SIAIV.S JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS NUMBER NUMBER l TSTF-36. Rev 2 Incorporated 3.7 42 Only applicable to DCPP } TSTF-51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific
- reanalysis to establish l decay time dependence for I
} fuel handling accident. l TSTF 70. Rev 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable. NRCriappro9.ed m.3,7 00p l TSTF not adopted since change was not i applicable. I TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7 05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7-29 NRC approved. , TSTF 139f:Revil Incorpo"ted 3-7 -29 Not NRCiapproved TR 3.7 005 Applicable l Bases change] TSTF 140. Rev 1 Not ! incorporated NA Not NRC approyed as of traveler cutofT date. EsTE173 Incorporated NRCj3pprov_ed4 TR 3.7 00L l l TSTE17f Incorporatsd NRCiappr.oved2 TR 3.7 002 l 7 % y - W9G-64 Incorporated 3-7-34 0 3.7.24 i WOG43 ISTf7235, l'artially 3.7 01 Rete +tmd-GTS Incorporated except for the 0-3.7.1-4 l extensicr to 72 hours for trip reset-WOG-86TSTFJ287 Incorporated 3.7 57 Notlapplicable 0 3.7 10- L4 tolDCPP, TR 3.7 00i WOG-98TSTfFL2.89 Incorporated 3.7 56 03.7.2- l
-~
MSIVs 3.7.2 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i l l l 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) LC0 3.7.2 [oug MSIVs shall be OPERABLE. gag l APPLICABILITY: H0DE 1. l H0 DES 2 and 3 except when all MSIVs are closed and 281 desc_tiyated. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i 1 ours 3 + 34-A. One HSIV inoperable in A.1 Restore HSIV to OPERABLE . Q 3.7.2 1 MODE 1. status. ~ B. Required Action and B.1 Be in HODE 2. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. C. NOT C.1 Close HSIV. 72;8 B-hours 3 + 34-Scper;te Cor.diticr cr,try 0 3.7.2 1 is clicwcd for coch ANQ MSIV-
- C.2 Verify MSIV is closed. Once per 7 days
-Thltu3.:n:n:3 "
390ta.f._(Cppdition.fentry i ig294Tosedifor,;e'ach [ Eilli
' ys'm--75E5EU One ( rcrciprX HSIVs inoperable in H00E 2 or 3.
/ ~
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ic tt [j 0.1 Cicsc MSIV. bW s--7 \ T m e s e M e t e r!! Q 3.7.2 1 UHfi ---- E - J-& dVY Y &% a m2 E&f.' ,,,p 0.2 Verify MSIV is closed. Or,-;i4C i=WMc;;jS._I"4,.
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L. Z / CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3. 7-5 9/25/98
MSIVs 3.7.2 l l l ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l j Required Action and 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated C
-Q 3 7 2'1 Completion Time of M -
Condition - not met. _2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l l SR 3.7.2.1 - . - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - Only required to be performed in H0 DES 1 and 2.
....................................... ..:B-PS M In accordance Verify..th.e_'is_ola.t. ion ~closurc time of each MSIV with the 3.7 56 is s 4-6 5 seconds, cr. cr. actual or simulated .Insgyice 0 3.7.2 3 e v"u.. Testing
?B-PS E1 Pro:gry cr [10] .;cr.ths ,
kRf2.L2)g ;:bi-25lW2MGOTE'2=Mw .--- .:-M O!!LV2equitgC13EMMtfR47KM00ES f1?ind)) g= m - -- --r -- f- -+ m - 12 =~=-2 Yetity"eachTMSIV1ctuat(sitolttiBlisol atj@ 183onthq 3-[.f2 3 polition!oin3n3ctuaW6r31dD18ttdJgetJatj6r) sigg1; i ? l CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3. 7-6 9/25/98
MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES l thDHrAlpigDLafsR$KtMJigtssorOCthe3teWgenerato!! j RLtlGIOR$1DRsutacanP5=-ov %@stECgeessary stgiamersso'tatingsleiflorthroug;the'roptgen
- e. The HSIVs are also utilized during other events such as a feedwater line break ggilLOCgiforIcortta;inmentlisolation).
This acnt is llyttCeM3rj less limiting so far as MSIV OPERABILITY is concerned. The HSIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the N",C ";1 icy State :nt. 10CFR50l36(c))(21111). LC0 This LC0 requires that fo.ur: MSIVs in the steam lines be OPERABLE. l The HSIVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are l l within limits, and they close on an isolation actuation signal. l This LC0 provides assurance that the MSIVs will perform their , l design safety function to mitigate the consequences of I accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable
' to the 10 CFR 100 (Ref.1-4) limits ee-and Jthe NRC staff .
~
CP 3.7 13 approved licensing basis. l l l APPLICABILITY The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3, except when closed and de activated, when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the MSIVs are closed, i they are already performing the safety function. n In MODE 4, normally most of the HSIVs are closed, and the steam l generator energy is low. 1 In MODE 5 or 6 the steam generators do not contain much l energy because their temperature is below the boiling point of water: therefore, the HSIVs are not required for isol.etion of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES. i ACTIONS M With one HSIV inoperable i E 1, action must be taken to restore ' i OPERABLE status within J ours. Some repairs to the MSIV can be l i ! (Continued) l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -JTS 3.7 B J.7-10 9/25/98
MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES made with the unit hot. The . . 8' our Completion Time is reasonable, considering the 1 ability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a 0 3.7.2 1 closure of the MSIVs. s The 8Mour Completion Time ishcr then greated CP 3.7 13 (tnan _.......,. ,...3. that normally allowed for tax,;,,,,ar!d uu2t56; containment 1 solation valves bcc;usc the MSIVs arc valycq m--Dite'lt51Tsare@5'Mthat isolate a closed system penetraung containment. Thcs; va' vc- differ frco other cont &r- ' isolation valvcs in that the 9-^' T "- 11 tj;c,j:jeesenebW4ue mtEff.;11VGti.iNNDI3ICCL;;E;iic;2iicEThese valv;es djfferif, Ice;ethefGDEiS5?and:GDC; 56? contai nment31_solatjonlyal veslin
- .M;MTMe*w'oiovlaes an additional'g7..cano im containment isolation.
IL1 If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within B-72 8 hours, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours and Condition C would be entered. The Comp]etion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to rea^ch MODE 2 and to close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
" 017.21 C.1 and'end-C. 0: rcf.d D:2 w {
Condition C B-G [s modified by a Note indicating that @ Q . G G y
@!V1;singy.t;gseparateConditionentryisalloweaim m u raiv. ,
since um n,un are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the , ' inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis. !
. 6 our Completion Timebr5MdWtierCCll is D I The 0 3.7.2 1 i consis with that allowed in Cnndition Al'Gi~MISV !
T@E;blCi#% elf:~;Tr%!70GnatM]id ) t!L8t!"Iet%C-deniTTICGC~;ClisEG15EE;MIM3110G-l For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE CP 3.7 13 status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed l but]!otidleaitiyst_ed, the inoperable MSIVs must be verified on ; a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure CP 3.7.ED that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 SMEday Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of MSIV status indications CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-11 925/98
.3
MSIVs B 3.7.2 l BASES available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position. E0.1 and " 2 Dr17rkfiD:2 _ 0 3.7.2 1 l l If the M51vs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not l closed within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be l placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve l this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion l Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from HODE 2 conditions in an orderly l manner and without challenging unit systems. 1 \ l l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS i This SR verifies that MSIV; closure time is s E4-6} . 0 3.7.2 3 5 seconds. On an actual or simulated actuation ^ignal. The. hand:swjtchtmay;belused;as2thelactuatjonjsignalitoperform this'surve111ance.]3The MSIV cissure isolatjon]timejis assumed in l the accident and containment analyses. This Surveillance is i normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The "SIVs should act be tested at _s__o_ _____4 _ 4 ___.. . u._ _ _ .s. _ yv . _, __ w sn 4.nsu __u .yui ___i w o u uns snm.s.es inw.su s. was _4."'. c CP 3'7 008 ef a valvc closurc when the unit is gen rating powcr. As the "SIVs are act OfLCtjit;;;s tested at pcucr. they are a excmpt fica th; AS"E Code, Section XI (Raf. 5). requir^;^nts during operation in ."00 1 cr 2. The Frequency is -in accordance with the LnserJJceTTestLng 0 3.7.2 3 RR)1PEggg or 10 months. The [10] month Trcqu ncy for valvc closure time is bescd on the refueling ycle. Operating
- experience has show. that th sc ceeyoncats usually pass the
! Surveillance when perfor;;d at the [10] acnth frcqucacy ;pgifjcid eGf;E~i&64. Thcroforc, the frequcacy is acccptabi- frca e reliability standpoint. l This test is all_oWeOK,bd conducted in MODE 3 with the unit at operating temperature and pressure, as discussed in Rcfarcnc; 5 ixcrcising rcquirc; cats. This SR is modified by a Note that i allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the l SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish (Continued) CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-12 9/2S88
CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER l 3.7 32 CONDITION A is changed to "SSI level less than required" and SR 3.7.9.3 and 3.7.9.4 are deleted because the plant specific design does not use cooling towers. The "SSI level less than required" is a condition comparable to an inoperable cooling tower fan since the surface area (i.e., cooling capacity) decreases with level. 3.7 33 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). v_ -____;-___ ..su . _ . . _ , _ _ nne e, u_ - 2__ - _#r
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b s ium awwwvva bi N ysvuuwiiibJ vs wi n iwwud aul J un i i b b u ulid t wis bd uslu us ITU _ u . . s a _. ._ _ su.._ >____..a__ . ._ : s . . < _ . . -_a - __._ __ ..-2. di su buvvvi id , bl iu J s myi vu s isy us a i b Ju l s bJ ussu s lawi wua s isy usi i b u...21.L v m u s w 2,12 i ab . ,.. Not>-Osed 3.7 35 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). 3.7 36 REQUIRED ACTIONS D and E are revised for two trains inoperable where at least 100% of the required heat removal capacity is available. These changes are consistent with the current licensing basis. These actions are acceptable based on the number of cooling units available and the flexibility and redundancy in the power supplies and the support cooling water. 9/25/98 CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-H31 - ITS 3. 7 6
Page 4 of 6 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431- SECTION 3.7 APPLICABILITY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE DIABLO COMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION CANYON PEAK NO YZS NO N0 3.7-26 CONDITION D is deleted to reflect the CPSES plant specific design of primary FIVs and associated bypass valves and isolation backup via the in series FCVs and associated bypass valves. YES (per LA No No No 3.7-27 A note is added to DCPP Table 3.7.1-2 under LIFT SETTING that specifies that the lift point of the lowest set safety is +3% and -21. 108/107) NO: CTS is 18 YES YES YES 3.7-28 Revise [ARV) frequency from 18 months to "in accordance with Inservice Test months. Program." YES YES YES YES 3.7-29 Revise AFW pump testing to be "In accordance with Inservice Test Program." NO: covered by YES NO: single NO: single 3.7-30 LCO 3.7.8 and ACTIONS are revised to incorporate requirements for two units unit plant. ECG per GL91-13 unit plant. with station service water system cross connections. response. NO: refer to YES NO N0 3.7-31 SR 3.7.8.2 is replaced with the current CPSES specific surveillance of the cross connections between units. The CPSES design has no automatic valves 3.7-15 and 3.7-16. as per this SR in the ITS. NO YES NO N0 3.7-32 CONDITION A for CPSES is changed to "SSI level less than required
- and SR 3.7.9.3 and 3.7.9.4 are deleted.
The requirement to verify a make-up flow rate during the tests YES: per CTS NO: retained YES YES 3.7-33 CTS ,
'lamonstrating the capability to maintain control room differential pressure 5 :: :' ~
- ric pressure would be deleted. requirement.
l0. ;depting 3 VESNA b-34 !n accords.cc with travcicr '.003. a m .~ ~ .m. Efor closir.; enc h;;r f4T frs; VESN6 VESN4 rescrobic $!V i; cate..dsd to 72 hour ;. ;nd ;cp;rste rcgircd action; crc includcd for cithcr cac 5!V i. pcr;ble or t ; or -. c 5:V; i.grebic i- STS NA - Medc; 2 and 3. lk g gsod lQ-3.7. 2-1 N NO NO N0 3.7-35 SR 3.7.10.3 is revised to reflect DCPP specific plant configuration and CTS YES required testing. , NO YES NO NO 3.7-36 REQUIRED ACTIONS D and E are revised for CPSES for two trains inoperable where at least 1004 of the required heat removal capacity is available. NO YES NO N0 3.7-37 Nodifies LC0 3.7.2 CONDITION A and adds np CONDITION B and C to be consistent with the CPSES CTS. CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - ITS 3.7 9/25n8
.- ~. . _ - - - - - . . _- __ -. - -_ _ _ . _ .
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.2-3 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.5 ITS SR 3.7.2.1 and SR 3.7.2.2 DOC 05-08-M l JFD 3.7-56 l i These changes are beyond the scope of a conversion because the industry traveler referenced in this DOC (WOG-98) has not been approved b'! the NRC. i l Comment: Withdraw tN change.s or adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: WOG-98 has been approved by the TSTF ano is designated as TSTF-289. The August 18,1998 industry status reports indicates this traveler has been approved by the NRC. The proposed wording in TSTF-289 was modified from WOG-98 and these modifications have been incorporated into the ITS. The FLOG continues to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl.3A 7
- Encl.5A Traveler Status page,3.7-6 and 3.7-9 -
Encl. 5B B 3.7-12, B 3.7-13, B 3.7-20 and B 3.7-21 Encl.6A 8 i i
?
I l I
l CHANGE . l NUMBER HSHC DESCRIPTION 05 08 M This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs [and feedwater isolation l' valves] to distinguish between the IST and the automatic actuation testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation, if one necurs. f.p satisfy the SRs. This change is consistent wi@289 t003 is proposed change is acceptable because it resun.s m more stringe requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG 14 . Although this is a new surveillance requirement. it may be n.3.7.2 3 l performed in conjunction with existing surveillanca : recu* rt&inereIoreg.the;statementiallowjngitesti_ng_t3o perfformediinJ00EI3;jfalsoleeded;fgrit!Ligge[survelll, ajLce j teguirementj > 06-01 LG Net-applicabic to CI'SES. Scc Conversica Oc;perison Tobic
'enclosurc OS'.This:q.hange;revisesithelCTS:to;deletelthe o.3.7.4 9 l desgriptivelmateti alllfrom;the' CIS _LC01and; motes 1this;matetla]
to;theBasep 06 02 LS 14 This change adds an exception to LCO 3.0.4 for the 7 day ACTION to restore the atmospheric [ relief] valves OPERABILITY. This revision allows the plant to change MODES if one atmospheric [ relief] valve is found inoperable while in MODE 2 or 3. Allowing MODE tran'aition with an inoperable atmospheric [ relief] valve does not significantly increase that risk since the remaining valves are OPEP.ABLE. 06 03 M Consistent with NUREG 1431. the specification is revised to be applicable to the " atmospheric [ relief] lines" rather than only to the atmospheric [ relief] valves [and associated controls). This terminology extends the applicability of the specification to include the atmospheric [ relief] [ block] valve. This is more restrictive than the current specification. 06 04 M A surveillance is added that requires the manual cycling of the atmospheric [ relief] valve [ block] valves [in accordance with the IST program]. This proposed change is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG 1431. 06 05 LS 24 This change adds a new ACTION for three or more inoperable atmospheric [ relief] valves that requires action within 24 hours. The CTS would require entry into TS 3.0.3 for three inoperable atmospheric [ relief] valves. However. NUREG 1431 0 3.7.4 1 recognizes the7 availability] Lithe f 2Steia.mlumplSys,tes]Latig th.eLMSSVsZandthelowprobabilityofanaccidentrequiring the atmospheric [ relief] valves. thus permitting this configuration. CPSES Description ofChanges to CTS 3N.7 7 925/98
INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.7 TRAVELER STATUS JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS NUMBER NUMBER TSTF-36, Rev 2 Incorporated 3.7 42 Only applicable to DCPP TSTF 51 Net Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident. TSTF 70, Rev 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable. NRCYapproved m 3.7 00 5 l 4 TSTF not adopted since change was not applicable. TSTF-100 Incorporated 3.7-05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. TSTF-101 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. TSTF-139,2Re[1 Incorporated 3-7-29 Not NRClapproved m 3.7 005 Applicable l Bases change] TSTF 140 Rev 1 Notfincorporated NA Not NRC approv_ed as of traveler cutoff date. ISTfil?3 Incorporated NRClapproved.j m 3.7 00 L I Incorpor_at_ed NRC[ approved.' TSTFf_17A m 3.7 00 ?I m WOG-64 Incorporated 3-7-34 0 3.7.2-1 E W0G-83 E 235 i'artially 3.7 01 Retaincd C'S Incorporated except for the 0 3.7.1-4 I cxtensica to 72 hours for trip reset-WOG-86ISTfFi2_8Z Incorporated 3.7 57 Not applicable o.3,7 10 t4 l tEDCPP4 TR 3.7 00i l
. e e m -
MSIVs 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E00; Required Action and E00.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated C-0 3.7.2 1 Completion Time of &N.Q Condition C er-B not met. E00.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 - -- - NOTE - - -- - . Only required to be performed in H0 DES 1 and 2. B-PSSc1 In accorda %nce Verifyhe' isolation ^closurdime of each MSIV i s 4:6 5 seconds. On on actual or simulated 0 3.7.2 3 l I ic
" " ' Testing
?B-PSsia Program or [1S] mcaths , 1 S_RJ32122 F31EHJ3T-VEN01EEHH;2-2912IHj ,
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- IA AI *>L~ ~ *? ~ 3 7
Verify 3ach]MIy! actuate.sjlo tjielsolation 18;montjis, 3:3f'23 Position ~oszaractual3r;Jis01atedfiictuation] - - s1grial] CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3. 7-6 9/25/98 l 1
. . - . - ~ . . . . -.--._. __- . _
I "r!Vsand"IR"sEIVs]andAssociatedBypassValves 3.7.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME EC. Required Action and EC.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours [ED2] associated Completion Time not met. 8E EC. '_2 B_e~1_n__N.0. 0. .E.T_4 12_' hours.
~
87 a
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY In accordance with the 3 7-11 i
j SR 3.7.3.1 Verify the 7 - f each HF4V Q 3.7.2 3 FIV. "in" .p.csure; iso.l.ation arid associated"bvoas'sCValv . is Inservi~ce_
-~
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--s 7 5 seconds. ca an actual or stulated Pro.
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. HSlVs B 3.7.2 l 1 BASES i i 1 available in the control room, and other administrative controls, : to ensure that these valves are in the closed position. I UUd U "" 0 3.7.2 1 If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within the associated Completion Ti:ne, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience. to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. , SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that HSIVjclosure time is s E4 4} . 0 3.7.2 3 l 5 seconds. on an actual cr si=ulated actuation signal. The. liand'switchimay;be 3 sed]a qthesactuation'signalito'perfo d j this' surveillance 70The MSIV@csurc is_oJationJimejis assumed in the accident and containment analyses. ims surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The ",SIVs should not bc tested at poucr. Sinc; cycn ; port stroke cxcrcise incrc;scs the risk 3'#' 8 I of ; valvc cic urc when the unit is gencrating powcr. As the "SIVs era not f011C ; O tasted at pow r, they are , cxcmpt from the AS",C Code, Section XI (Rcf. 5). rcquirc:cnts during operation in .,"- E 1 or 2. The Frequency is in accordance with the InseryicGTesting l {IST)'Prb0r"8m: cr 10 ; cath: G e.; .. ..b,, i , sy.s . ~,, . . . 03'7l23 fe; closur- ti;c is b cd on the refueling ycle. Operatin, experience has shown that thcsc cvapcacats usually pass the ! Surveillance when perforacd :t th; [10] month frequcacy
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_.s_ ,. v. _ _ Wu a e a by , bu. sup This test is alloWditolte conducted in MODE 3 with the unit at operating temperature and oressurm .. .. s.,,sm in Reference , Cecrci ;ng rcaum;cnt:J This SR is moalriea oy a note Inat l allows entry into and operation in H0DE 3 prior to performing the l SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish
]
(Continued) I CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-12 9/2S/98 l
}
MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated. SR'307:22 Ittisk2;".=MV N L d cTec. h q][$eIOjgBB33H8Eti@ MAN hRitt$teasTne" isolation 0 3.7.2 3 , W"atian~mnastsauiancen normany;pp@rmed f JeM3BKthcartt:tGED.JREDEg!Ltpgrefueling outa9C4h!!EtenuensylfgLtyjges3MDrieverr181sonths;1The 183onth2temencyltoctestingasIbavedron:the3efneling; cycl.e7j operatwagetienKha_s3how!Ethat~these1 components 3sual]y pas the;Suratinnce3 den:perforneotitturls;nonthIrequencya Thereforwithisyreguenents3cceptabieltros ;aireliabilit sta.ndpoigt? IttisltestitrLal_lowedito3e3onducteditnEDEi3.yitMthe unit:at;opetatingitemperateteIand; pressure:Uhi.s;SR11s modifiedXflote3hatiaUoWs entry;jnto;andfoperatio_n jn CP.3.7 13 MODEXptibrLtp!petforming',,t_helSRfflhisJ,allowsla idel ayiof testinglunt1]LH0 dei 3l,1to~estab11sh7c6nditions consistent wi.thlhoEG!!deCwhichlthe3cteptancbIctiterj onyas lgenerat,ed.: REFERENCES 1. FSAR Section 10.3.
- 2. FSAR. Section 6.2.
- 3. FSAR, Section 15 .5 ChapterJ15.
m
- 4. 10 CFR 100.11.
- 5. AS"E. Scilcr nd Pressure "cssci Codc Section XI. CP-3.7 13 l
I CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-13 9/25A8
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'."P! and """'!s [ EIVs]and Associated Bypass Valves 3 i 4
B 3.7.3 l 1 1 BASES unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. l l l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each Hf4V FIVb HFRV- and associated bypass valves is s 7 5 seconds. en-en 0 3.7.2 3 l
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___._.__..,.m,,. - . _ m . _,,. m m , m__, _m _ ,,. m _ _ , _ _ ,.. m w m c - w. ~ _a~.,..r ,s ~~__~~ u_ m,-- m eanx, _x 11v 2,27.?2 _ _ =w_ t.rim u __ m.an.21~ _ m..- _ _ _ 4 _ ._ m_ _ _ _ - ( Q 5,upyJJyy w I e ogm._eg eH.,r33 iwnyw s_5 %* .vu _. EU e .sei UV-I t. a bgee _m ,-> m . mb5Nfb
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e s-t-r_u on~_ _ s.u-a, a. - uxm cierm,ra,rres.eam.- m rms "- --atar.m r: .waf~.mme m ~ ~ o.. o s m y m mymmr m g.wr-wwemmw-wrmy-mm%cunm=m REFERENCES 1. FSAR.10.4.7 C_h.ngters!6.w77 a . -- 4107and7152
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RG'1122,3.TerjodifTesting'of; Protection ~ System 6ctuatior.] ~~~ ~ ~ 5nctioM7d2/17,,l75)? 4 CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-21 9/2S/98
I CHANGE JUSTIFICATION ; NUMBER 3.7 49 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure , 68). l 3.7 50 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 51 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7-52 Not itsed-Appliciable30?CPSESi'iSee ConversionlComparison.Jable DC ALL 002 (enclosure,68)] 3.7-53 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7-54 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). 3.7-55 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). 3.7 56 This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs [and feedwater isolation valves] to distinguish between the IST and the , DC-ALL 002 automatic actuation testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the surveillance requirements. These changes are consistent wit _JFj289 . L m nougn da 3./.z.2 is a new ' 0 3'7'2 3 SR, it may be perfo enn ion with SR 3.7.2.1. Therefore, the note allowing testing to be performed in MODE 3 is also used for this SR.] 3.7 57 This change establishes appropriate Required Actions and o.3,7,rg.14 Completion Times for ventilation system pressure envelope degradation. These changes are consistent with ISTF,f28Z WOG-i CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-1431 - ITS 3. 7 8 9/25/98 l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.2-4 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.5 Action for Modes 2 and 3 ITS 3.7.2 Actions Note DOC 05-ww-LSw ITS 3.7.2 adds a new Actions Note that states, " Separate Ccadition entry is allowed for each j MSIV". The markup for CTS 3.7.1.5 states " Separate entry time is allowed for each MSIV." l Comment: Revise the CTS markup to be consistent with the ITS 3.7.2 Actions Note. I FLOG RESPONSE: The wording in the CTS " Separate entry times into Action Statement is allowed for each MSIV" was adopted in License Amendment 54/40 as part of the CPSES "line j item" adoption of the NUREG-1431. The wording was chosen and accepted by the NRC as the best CTS equivalent of the ITS Note," Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV". No ! DOC number is necessary because the existing CTS wording is equivalent to the ITS wording. 1 ATTACHED PAGES: , None i a 3 1 1 l l 4 1 i
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.3-2 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: . CTS 3.7.1.6 LCO and Actions ITS 3.7.3 LCO, Applicability, Actions and SRs DOC 07-08-LS26 DOC 07-09-LS10 JFD 3.7-11,3.7-26 DOC 07-10-M DOC 07-17-A These changes are beyond the scope of a conversion. Comment: Provide additionaljustification. FLOG RESPONSE: A discussion was held with the NRR staff on 10/9/98 conceming the proposed ITS for specification 3.7.3 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) (the TU Electric position is described below). The staff opposed the CPSES ITS on the basis that the changes might be generic, might be beyond scope, and that the licensee either had to retain the Current Technical Specifications (CTS) specification in its entirety or adopt the improved Standard Technical Specifications (STS) in its entirety. Based on the NRC's position on this issue, CPSES ITS 3.7.3 has been revised to adopt the CTS requirements The CPSES ITS has an LCO which requires the Feedwater Isolation Valves and Associated Bypass Valves to be operable in the appropriate unit conditions of operation (Specification 3/4.7.1.6). The Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (Feedwater Control Valves or FCVe at CPSES) are not required to be operable by CTS because the FSAR does not assume the i
< single active failure of an FIV or an MSIV and this assumption is not a regulatory requirement.
I The FCVs are not designated as active (i.e. are not full safety grade) but are designed as highly reliable backups to the FIVs. The NRC found this to be generically acceptable for PWRs in NUREG-0138*. This licensing basis is reflected in FSAR Figure 15.0-10 for MSLB which does not apply the single failure requirement to the feedwater or main steam isolation valves and
- FSAR Section 6.2.1 Reference 21. [*USNRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NUREG-0138," Staff Discussion of Fifteen Technical Issues Listed in Attachment to November 3,1976 Memorandum from Director, NRR to NRC Staff", November 1976.]
The STS in specification 3.7.3 requires the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves and Main Feedwater Regulation Valves to be operable. Since the Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (FCVs at CPSES) are not in the CTS LCO, CPSES chose to retain the CTS for the ITS LCO.
.The remainder of STS 3.7.3 was retained and modified to be consistent with the revised LCO.
Since the FCVs are not in the ITS, the conditions, actions and surveil!ances only took credit for the FCVs if they had been properly verified to be capable of performing the required function. As noted above, the capability of these valves to serve as a backup to the FIVs is consistent with the current licensing basis for the FCVs as approved by the NRC. The CPSES CTS was marked up to reflect the ITS and the changes were justified. The CPSES basis for proposing this was to improve safety of the plant. The CTS allows only 4 hours to correct an FIV problem even though the FCV is fully capable of performing the function. Allowing 72 hours to correct an FIV problem given credit for the FCV is consistent with the STS and could prevent an unnecessary plant shutdown transient or prevent a feedwater transient due to a less than adequate time allowed for a repair. The proposed ITS would retain the CTS 4 hours action time should the FCV not be available to perform the function.
These changes are not beyond scope. This is a proper retention of CTS and modification of the STS to do so. I 1 This should not be classified as a generic change. Although other plants may be similar and I I may have similar CTS requirements, the choice to retain the CTS is made by each Licensee individually. Retention of the CTS is not a generic change. The basis for the STS conditions, actions and surveillances, as modified to be consistent with the CTS LCO, har not been invalidated by the CPSES proposed ITS. The FCVs are only credited if they have been properly verified to be capable of performing the required function. All proposed actions, conditions, and surveillances of the CPSES proposed ITS are just as valid as the actions, conditions and surveillance in the STS. If these are not acceptable for CPSES, they should not be considered acceptable for the STS either. At some point a member of the NRR staff said that we cannot take credit for a component in the actions if that component is not in the LCO. Of course that is not true. There are many cases in which the required actions credit the functioning of a component which is not covered by the LCO (e.g., if an isolation valve is inoperable, the required actions allow isolation of the affected penetration flow path by at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured - these valves are not necessarily in the scope of the LCO). Requiring CPSES to add the FCVs to the LCO is counter to the CTS and to safety. If the FCVs are added to the ITS LCO, it is possible that a deficiency in the isolation capability of the FCVs could result in a unit shutdown when such a shutdown is not required by the CTS and would not be necessary per the CPSES licensing basis. Such a shutdown would put the unit ' through a transient that would be less safe than continuing to operate. , ATTACHED PAGES: Enci2 3/4.7-9 and 3/4.7-10 Enci 3A 9 Enci 3B 8 Enci 4 1,33,34,53 and 54 , Enct5A 3.7-7, 3.7-8 and 3.7-9 m Enci 58 B 3.7-16 thru 8 3.7-21 Enct 6A 3 and 5 Enct 6B 2 and 4 l 1 i
PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES O'3'7'l'1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 67-01-AM 3.7.1.6 Each ;;in fccdacter linc :holl have FourjFI_Vs'andl: associated bypqs.s i v_al_vesTsh_a.))Abe u - OPERABLE a feedsatcr isolati;n valvc. fccdacter isolation bypas3 7 17 LG valvc, and fecdsGtcr pichcGtcr bypG;s valve. 0 3.7.3 6 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3 exceptyhen1thelfeedwat.eGisolationwe}ve~or b7-az.u s associated;] adapter;D;';ti.;[bypassival velef;';;da;t:Cp.:;;.at:Cbyp;;;3;l v;;i s closed. and.:.de-a. c. tivate. d o. r.i. iso. .l.. ate. .d by '.a.'c. lose.d. ma. n.ual. ' val.ve. ACTION: NOTE: : Separate ~ entry j s"allowedjorleach : val.ve; 7.o3.t.s :, MODE 1:
+-se-ts 0 3.7.3 2
- a. With one or_nore feedwater isolatinn valve inoperable. but open.
onerations may continue orovidmuf'.; f;;da;;;r ;;,atre; .r.; esa;;ist;' C'=c: v;lva er;:;v;ile.ble'for'fi3.;;59.i;;5iddE 5.d tne ". f Superable feedwater is 7"U1 1.lon valve is restored to UFtMAt$LL statusdsolated]orlClosed** ! within 4 ours. otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. 4711-u d
- b. With one or more feedwater isolation bypass valves inoperable, operatio s N6 may continue provideil;;#aeterh.-. ,.~.~m.ac; mg ; v;;;g .
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= Yerif D alye:151solatedIor;closedacrper;Idays? p.it.u g CPSESMark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-9 9/2588
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES l l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 MODES 2 and 3: Fee-%
- a. 0 3.7.3 2 With onem _or. .,more feedwater isolation m .m m__m_m._ valves inoperable.
_- . - - . _ _ _ _ _ .. a ooerations mday L,_m.m._,.._. . r" vv eww 1 *"*.ata="= *y=muytyhw'nw _=*m r = =*w 2 ._ m . _ ~ a . _ ,. .s a . s.
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-- *- *a-w.**--nw ~'-* %--y me a i s eu.ea feegater iso)ation a ,pgg,g mq valvels) 1s restoreu w UFtHAt3LL sIatusMSolated or closed ** within 4 ours,exceptthatthevalvemaybeopenedasneededforIperiodofupto "I hour for post maintenance testing: otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within 1 7-17-A R the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
Ase-s l
- b. With one or more feedwater isolation bvoass valves inoperable, operations 0 3.7.3 2 rrug dr; ;y~v;ilabl ed nrovidadQ';; ;;tageg,t;;T_;r,d ;;;;;iated byra;; valva::P Ef;r' f;;3.;;t:C';;ist';'~;gtheaiiecreaieedwater n7-11w1 isolation bypass valv > a i ca wi cu w UPERABLE status or islisolated;or -~
closed ** within hours, except the valve may be opened as needed f'or 'TE a period of up to I hour for post maintenance testing: otherwise be in HOT ' 7-17-A M STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following
^
6 hours.
- N With one or more feedwater preheater bypass valves inoperable, operations 0 3.7.3 2 c.
mav nmcaad nrovidadQ';;3.;;;; ,,;;;;;r:1g.r,d ;;;;;isted bv=:: v;1v;Y
- Corf;Y;ilablCf;r feed.;;terfi;;lotter.*T;r.;ijtne affected feedwater i 7-11-M d preneater oypass valve ) is restored to OPERABLE statusT.is._o.l..a.t.e.d._ ,_ or g, as.uj
- closed ** within ours, except the valve may be opened as needed for a period of up to 1 hour for post maintenance testing; otherwise be in H0T V 7-17-AM STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following e 6 hours. -
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CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N.7-10 9/2S/98 4
.- - - ~ . . _ _ _ _ . . . - . - --
1
]
l CHANGE < NUMBER NSE DESCRIPTION I 1 I 07 05 LS 17 The action for inoperable feedwater isolvirm /alves in MODE 1 is revised to include the option to isolate or close the inoperable valve and the restriction of the action to an inoperable "but open" valve is deleted. The action for inoperable feedwater isolation valves in MODES 2 and 3 is revised to include the option to isolate , , the inoperable valve. The actions for inoperable feedwater l isolation bypass valves in H00ES 1, 2 and 3 are revised to include the option to isolate the inoperable valve. 07 06 LS-33 This change revises the ACTION to apply to one "or more" [feedwater isolation valves] inoperable. This is less restrictive than the CTS which applied to only one inoperable valve. The proposed change is acceptable due to the low probability of an event for which the feedwater isolation valves are required to be OPERABLE and the availability of alternate methods of performing the required function. 07 07 A Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). 07-08 NU"EC-1431 allows a 72 hour 00tiPLCION TI"C for facdwater T isolation valvcs based on the r-dundant isciation providcd by- 0 3.7.3 2 the fccdacter control and associated bypass valvcs. The actica complction times are changed frc; four to 72 hours when crcdit for the fccdactcr contrci and associated bypass valvcs ;;y bc takca and is verified within 4 h urs. NotJsed; 07 09 1S -10 A acw actica is added which retains the action requir ;cnts n.3.7.3 2 which wcrc acdified by Change Number 07 08. Th^ Completion Tisc for this ACTION is furthcr revised fica 4 to 8 hours. Not used] e
; 4
^ ' " - - - ^ ' ^ - - - ' ' - ' ' ' - - ^ ^ ' - ' " ' " - - '
07-10 H 0 3.7.3 2 j control valv; bypass is added. Not.;. u. sed? --
, i 07-11 H A new requirement for a 7 day periodic verification of the closure
[or isolation] of inoperable isolation valves is added. This proposed change is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG 1431. 07-12 LS-4 Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). 07 13 Not used 07-14 Not used 07 15 Not used 07-16 LS 34 Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N.7 9 9/2S/98
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 8*I16 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 07-05 The CPSES specific action for inoperable feedwater isolation NO YES NO NO LS-17 valves in MODE 1 is revised to include the option to isolute or close the inoperable valve and the restriction of the action to an inoperable 'but open" valve is deleted. The action for inoperable feedwater isolation valves in MODES 2 and 3 is revised to include the optiun to isolate the inoperable valve. The actions for inoperable feedwater isolation bypass valves in MODES
- 1. 2 and 3 are revised to include the option to isolate the inoperable valve.
07-06 This change revises the ACTION to apply to one *or more" YES YES YES YES LS-33 feedwater valves inoperable. 07-07 The ACTIONS were revised that require achieving MODE 4 within 12 NO: part of NO: part of YES YES A hours when the ACTIONS or COMPLETION TIMES are not met. CTS. CTS. 07.na J TcCPSCS;pccificall;wcdcompictionti;cfor3hinoperbic NONA VESNA NONA NON Q-3.7.3-2 fccdactcr i;olstica vol.c i; rcvi;cd ' rom 4 to 72 hour; whcn A l (ts-26 credit for the fccdactcr control and ;;;cciated b3p;;; valvc; ;;y bc takca and i; vcrificd within 4 hour;. Not. used 07-09
- nca CPSCS ;pc;ific ACTIO" i; added that rct;in; the ACT!0? NONA VESNA NONA NON 0-3.7.3 2 ccqu , _ .,t which w;; modificd by Cri 07 00 LS 20 ond rcvi;c; the 8 Cor.piction T";c 'rc; i to 0 hour;.gNot;used 07-1 A nca CPSCS ;pccific ;urvcillancc for cach fcedactcr control and NONA VESNA NONA NON
;;;cciated b3p;;; ;;1vc i; cddcd. Not used 6 l0-3.7.3-2
/
07-11 Verification of valve [ isolation or] closure once every 7 days is YES YES YES YES M added. 07-12 The ACTIONS associated with inoperable MFIVs would be revised to NO: part of CTS. NO: refer to YES YES LS-4 provide the alternative of closing [or isolating] an inoperable 07-05-LS-17. valve. t 07-13 NOT USED NA NA NA NA J CPSES Conversion Comparison Table- CTS 3N.7 9/25/98
N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC) CONTENTS I. Organization ........................................ 3 II. Description of NSHC Evaluations...................... 4 III. Generic No Significant Hazards Considerations "A" Admini strative Changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 "R" Relocated Technical Speci fications. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 "LG" Less Restrictive (Moving Information Out of the Technical Specifications) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 "M" More Restrictive Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 IV. Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations "LS" LS 1................................................ 16 LS 2................................................ 19 LS 3................................................ 22 LS 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS - 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e ., LS-6................................................ 25 LS7...............................................27 LS 8................................................ 29 LS 9........................................ . .31 LS 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dEt u sed .vg - n.3,7,3 2 LS 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NotcAppl icabl e 0 3.7.2 1 LS 13................................. ............. 39 LS 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 e LS 15............................................... 43 LS 16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS-17............................................... 45 LS 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 - LS - 2 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N ot U s ed LS 21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS-D...............................................49 LS 24................................................o1 LS - 25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabi t LS-26......................................gt1Usedy 0 3.7.3-2 LS-27...................... .. ..........Not Appin.ause LS 28. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS-29............................................... 55 LS-30............................................... 57 A LS 31....................................Not us,e_d n ry 1.Ja -- dim oc-3.7.ool CPSES No Significant Hazards Considerations - CTS 3M. 7 1 9/25/98
. .. . - ~ --.. - .. - . - , , . - - - . .
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS kle t it' fP in nas su 6v Av in t' FM E* n AO f*1f A t I t ATTrut
*7*
AV wi s\ dv ./6 bun 6VniAVII FOR Tf"I'llkt T t' A t /*l t A lit'f* P TlfAT T unAc t" t f"c c n f* cTf, 7 t'T T i f r* l I Lws in A wn6 wi ins vJ6v i 3 In 4 A s il va6 66Jv it6JIi\AwiAy6 I n t"fil I T n r* ur* LfTP I f TT11T kt Tttr Tt"/'t Ikl T t' A t e n r* t' T f" T t' A T T u\b yvAs\6s36naw vv A i 8 s A li ii16 s 6vs sai Aun6 VI 6vAsAuns4 1 1 ru. . ._ _ , a u _ sa_. z-_ _-u_:__ __ :_.._u,_-u c. a. . a . _ :..,au_ . . . , . . . u I I sw v vm y :L b ivsi b i IIN a vi s UJ hvs sssy usi isavyUsuuIL iviu s s i i bbuvvu bL s iJ V iu b vis yuiyw bv u J..,-u SL- c, .. . _ab ._ u . , _ SL- . . . , . . . J- .L-__aa tsnrn vi 6s vA,n u66 tJ Pm uJ,
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s a vm r bv v s ivu s J , w visa ta bussb vv i b s s nvi \6u' ATJA. L s yl a b s ivu t J IJ s wuJuiluv i u uudbu vai l u . _ __ , ...2,u,as.. c au 4_ ,-_2.u_ .a_, - _ a u . ._ _ . ..3.._ m _ _c __ ( L Iw s ivs mu a uvussuuaiiby vi bs N muist s wwuveu bbs bus i b i Vi ussu uJyuaJ vuswwJ hv yus a vs m 1 su. c. 2 . a - _ : _, s u_ c. . _ a u _ -_2 su ca sus su .u-_ __._a.__ c. . _ a a . _ -- be N i uburv u bb a i av i u b ivsi s us su b i vii unsu bssw euwb 64 lu 6 beeb Jbwum ybs sui u bvs J i un Iw b i wii uJ su. __:_--.. --_S :__-_s a- , sa._ u-__:._ ,_ >> ara _ c- 2.-s-- 2. ,. 2-_ a-_ ,. bish ys siisui J hvil bu i s msva s h I Jv i u b I vi s uus abi Als uuu t bsvil, i LUutt u bb s a Ju i u b Ivil J l ysiu s J 1,. s :_ SL- _ 4_ c 2 . u- _ . . _ . - n__..aaa__ sL. m uasa.- , 52_m . 21, -1,.. S L ,.,
- uaav bl iy bs N mu ii a i UUurvu bu t pumpJ. 4 a v v s u a i sy be su u au ii,ivitu s b s cum rv i i i uI vvi bsau
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. . _ - - . . _ - - .c . -- :Ls _.2....,~ ....,...u,m h vasal qubisww J Vs uns www 4 uws :i, yi w y svuJIJ wyuauubsu.
ru ___-a .u__ x_ _a __..,s _ --..u_2.-_- .u__. .u__- u a im ysvyvavu wa sus syv umbJ l aw b abJul6 als ussJ slui uvuus w wi su' Iyb J vs -- wi s u l lyb J bv l _..sa~,_auh1_a_ vua. --..a.:-- L_ a cc . - .. 6 s t a st n vys. : ubso3 ssN I.mvuv i v3 l m a . losa smy ialvm uvmJ mve uis m um uvisusob lo c k s mui . .c __,..-_; --.22__s mu_ __-_-_ 2 .u-___ _ _ , . . __ --_2-__ .L. c _s SL s va usig - _ . . usiu s JLwu uww s uus s b . sun yavyvJuu wa sus syb vis 5 J u buvyli s &w a bi m suwb bi su b
. .a S L - __J c. 2.a _ a ~1 a t m_ ..1... : _ ,. _ L , . . a r 19 ...-41 L1. u f vv s b e i u anu a a s s Lbuvvu bb s a av i u i, i vi e vusvw a a svyL s uwmv Iu w s i,J_ - - . us v Jbaai uvuiiuuiE bv
..._c.__ eu c. . s u _ ,.
yss a us m abJ Ju c.au,. . suousvoJ. r u _ c._ su ___~au__ n_ _a a_..,..- .:_a u._--- _ su i s mi s. s vi s , .N y.vevJsu ws N o us umwJ oub nivviyw u a s uo c.s u w oa u i. nNsLudm ni mm _ _ L L J 12 5 . . . _ - - - . . . . ~ r -- - - 4 A _4 _m.a..1.. m . 1. . u J yavuumisiby VI._ hvi g abgus s twb J vi usi uww t uus s h yawwuvuJsy wvuluubbu. t. 1 F l l CPSES No Significant Ha:ards Considerations - CTS 3N.7 33 9M5/98 i i
IV, SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS ueur i e in fr m ...,n sivirv wv av g vvi a b iliuwu r 0 3.7.3 2 l a n___ mL_ _L ___ ___.s_ SL_ ____ata,as.. ., . _. ._ 24 ,,____s La_; ., 1
- s. . vvwa bow wnunyw wssubs how yvoasviisby vi u s~n vi usiisiunk nsuu vi
.__2;__s s___ . . . ___JA,s ___.....1. . . . 1. . . s . 2, uvu s uws s u s i um un sy uww suus s b yswvsvuJIJ vvuiuubsu.
TL. _______J _L____ J_._ ..s __ __26.s. _L..J 1 .1s__.sa__ _t AL. _1. s aam yi vyvdwu wi sus tyw uvwa i nv b e swwwJ d i bu ww u . yi(JJiwoa u i b5 a o b I via vi bl N y a uls b r__ _ _ . . __ Jacs____s s.__ _c __.2-- _s . 211 L_ 4 5.11.as . .L __., a_ gasv s iwn vi u s e a wi wis k bJ ys vi %3u s yverws s b niai uw t iiJ bu i B Eu / vi viiullyw d aus ! _._.__s.__ __..__ 2__ ____.1 ____.sa_ TL_ ____.. J _L ___ . 211 .4.411 I yu i unim bw a a yvyssniny nvi mu i y _1u._s nk vywi u b a vi s , iim yivyvasu wounyw nisa Jbi ii _ _ _ . . _ _ st. ___s.a____s L_..;. _.a s.2__; TL. . _ AL2_ .L.__. A__ __s enJu, w i. s ~ wun ku n is.m s i k woumuu s ,. . 2 I ._ muinbussmo. s i gue , ba u s , us ius syv uvmd nob ___.s. sL_ _ _ _ _ a L 414 6. . _s - __. ._ Jass____s La_; _t ...a;__s s___ wiwubs bsis yv a d i u s s I bJ vs u s tun vs usies ws u b n s i gu vi uww s uus s b i s um ussy. _ ,
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J n l CPSES No Significant Ha:ards Considerations - CTS 3N.7 34 9/25/98
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1 i I 1 l CPSES No Significant Ha:ards Considerations - CTS 3M. 7 54 9/25/98
MFIV and MTRVs FIVsfand Associated Bypass Valves 3.7.3 i 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Ha b Feedwater Isolation Valves (MrIVs) (F..IVs) and Main rcc iatee -
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___u_ r u en s., vs ys blILu bE6 J __ __, _____,_ 2 u.____, LI I. sr udy.w . u bwss ug y%se d j bypass valves :Lcjy;2Cthcf;;;..;; _....,_u,_
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inoperable. uv='r-mi3' =w.=>-- - u 3.7 11 u_,_,_._ Q 3.7.3 2 I?v1=22.v2! I _ ,,o nam _ a o,-n-,... . - . _ - - , _ . , _ _ - ,,u...__
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. nam co,-,-.,_-,,..m____,._,..__,_
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Di 8I."Md .YY 1.".D *.s .ar w.. Close or isolate r 1 ( 8 4 hours bypass valve. O N 0 3.7.3 2 AND Ch2 Verify bypass valve is Once per 7 days closed or isolated. m
. Two valvcs in the s=c 0.1 Isciat; affccted flow path.- 8 hours
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3.7 11 0 3.7.3 2
)
1 CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3. 7-8 9/25/98
"II"s :nd "fR"3 Elys'jand s Associated Bypass Valves 3.7.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Eg. Required Action and EC.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion ="h (E09 Time not met. 8lEl EC__r2 B._ejigiMO._DE..'4]- 12._' ho. u. ~rs
~
>B1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY In accordance with the 3 7 11 SR 3.7.3.1 Verify the closurc;1so.latioD time of each HRV Inservice 0 3.7.2 3 FIV."JR" andfas_ soc.iat_edibypassyalyesis pes png -
s 7 5 seconds, on an actual or smulated Program T317! 5FA
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ERIZE 2 YetifreecKEI.VlW!Rigiseggieypass2ams acttMeS_",toltheVSo])tioffAfGB1tioriTonzag8cttlal FJA mulatearacm ain g unau 18 inont_hs g5.gg i._m _ _, m _%-2re'.e $3 Elds-' emr.e.xs.m - 3L-2mwam.' rs =~,- s ~+=ww wrw mrm- tv .= l .. , . . . . m,,,,.,_m._..._m,.__, _ 3.7 11 __ _ . _ , __n
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CPSESMark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3. 7-9 9/25/98
1 i
.....mm ...m.. o EIVs]and Associated Bypass Valves} )
B 3.7.3 1 4 BASES ; 1 1 APPLICABLE The design basis of the HFIVs FIVs and MTRVs is established l SAFETY ANALYSES by the analyses for the large SLB. It is also influenced by the accident analysis for the large [J.B-FWL4. Closure of the HF4Vs l FJVs and associated bypass valves, or MrRVs and associated bpass valvcs, may also be relied on to terminate an SLB for core response analysis and excess feedwater event upon the receipt of ; a steam generator water level-high high signal or a fecdwater isciation signal on high stca; gencratcr icvci. ) l Failure of an MF4V FIV. MFRV or the associated bypass valves I to close following an SLB or FLB-FWEB can result in additional I mass and energy being delivered to the steam generators, contributing to cooldown. This failure also results in additional mass and energy releases following an SLB or FLB-FWEB l event. The;FCVsfand:feedwataFann~tripslare: credited,in thelsafe_tyIanalysesIa ighlyfeljabl. backfups?in'theevent 0 3.7.3 2 ofisuchffajlures; " The HF4Vs FIVs and HFRVs and~ associated bypassiyalves satibfy , Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy State: cat. I.0CFR50J36(c)(2)(11).. 1 l 1 LC0 This LC0 ensures that the HF4Vs [IVs. MTRVs , and their associated bypass valves will isolate HFW flow to the steam generators, following an [LB-FWEB or main steam line break. Thesc valves, will also isolate the acnsafety reisted porticas from the safety related portions of the system. The o.3,7,3 3 g l associated,; bypass]yalyeg[orlea_ch,;FIUareithelfee.@ater, islatiombypssinglvearidithezasidciuted fee ~dwater; p@ eater *pbypasrvalve. This LC0 requires that Efour] MFIVs EIVs and associated bypass valves and [four] MTRVs [and associated bypass valvcs] be OPERABLE. The HFIVs [JV,ji and MrRVs and the associated bypass valves are considered OPERABLE when isolation times are within limits and they close on an isolation actuation signal. Failure to meet the LC0 requirements can result in additional mass and energy being released to containment following an SLB or FLB-FWEB inside containment. Becatise,]4f-a feedwater isolation signal on high steam generator level is relied on to terminate an excess feedwater flow event, failure to meet the LC0 may result in the introduction of water into the main steam lines. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-16 9/2588
~
Mf!V: and MIRVS [ EIVs]and Associated Bypass Valves 3 8 3.7.3 BASES APPLICABILITY The Hf34s EIVs and MIRVS and the associated bypass valves must be OPERABLE whenever there is significant mass and energy in the Reactor Coolant System and steam generators. This ensures that, in the event of an HELB, a single failure cannot result in the blowdown of more than one steam generator. In MODES 1, 2. Eand 33, the Hf3Vs FIVs and M"RVs and the associated bypass valves are required to be OPERABLE to limit the amount of available fluid that could be added to containment in the case of a secondary system pipe break inside containment. When the valves are closed and de activated or isolated by a closed manual valve, they are already performing their safety function. In MODES 4, 5, and 6. steam generator energy is low. Therefore, the Hf3Vs EIVs, MIRV;, and the associated bypass valves are normally closed since MFW is not required. ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each valve. A.1 and A.2 With one Hf3V [IV in one or = ara f' ~ ,-+he inoperable, artinn must be taken tn $ 7 Q y; ' ' ' ^ "" " -
,,,' g.3.7.3 2 l bC$.~O5$3,5E$d50)CI.$9Ia^ N O YO1IODI M INIO 1 50 $
I6%ature Ine 5TTeCIeo Valves to UPtKAt$LL status or to close or isolate inoperable affected valves within
~
ours. war sE.197. mon %~.Si U;bif,1tr.; ;7'ec.t:5 O~~-,--m a CVelV^f%OGl?KC'iCEMf,f .oco tnese valves are closed or isolatea, Iney are penur my their required safety function. T 4 our Completion Time takes into account the redundancy affor e by the remaining OPERABLE valves and the low probability of an event occurring during this time iod that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths. Th our Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experle ce. e ,' J
, d ,-,=_ __u,._~_2. m _-m_2__m_x, m -u._'._ m_,a__ 0 3.7.3-2 l l
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,r=2_n sa e =- w.w.ca w r.v.
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; ""l','s and """3- [ EIVs~and Associated Bypass Valees} ..____
! B 3.7.3 i BASES s I i l , Inoperable MFIVs Hyj that are closed or isolated must be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed or isolated. This ) is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety CP 3.7 ED analysis remain valid. The 7 H. 7 day Completion Time is j reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of valve ! status indications available in the control room, and other i administrative controls, to ensure that these valves ara ! cintad or isolatad -4.T. .O_3.._:0..;s5 allows _sL.the~ +1vst as.2peedediforJpostimaintenanceltesting;toldemon'to:be"~ 0 3.7.3opened 2 4 strate , !, o_p.e_rab _ility_; _ l j B.1 and B.2 ! i i With one in cac cr acrc fisw paths inoperabl , actica must bc l
..u _ .. . "_"".3 . _ .u. .,,.. .; m.,... .. nnen n. r . . . . . _ ._ ..
b unwa s bv s wJ bus w barb ul Iwwbsu vutTwJ bv vi ks v tw6w dbubud, vs bv
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wawww vs sJVsuww i a svyvs uw s u uaasubwu vuavvv vuabssaai Li kJ s uvu a. l When these volve erc cic cd or isolated, they arc pcrforming l 4 their required safety function. 1 1 1 ~ru . r,n, u.... e---,. 2 _ v2_. ..u.. 2_.. ..... . .u. -a.._2..... ! Issw ( s h,g s uvus wvlusy s u k a vs i i a susw bunwd i s i kv uwwvul l b bars s wuut sbaus awy
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.L.
i vv yi vuuw i i i by i cf an cvent occurring during this ti;c pcried that would require
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s av i u b ivu a vi bsIb 5 al FT wvItif 5 w b s v3 5 ] 5 5 VTT fu bl 5 d . 333% ( i E ,) 4 Ivu I 5 5 53t% 5J
- rcasonabic, based on opcrating cxpcricace.
, T_ .._ k1. Ur ntf. rets, .L.. __. .,.J .. J, 1.. J _ . . . u. Ai rvyvi uM i w 5 I4 5%W J 4wWWe bi 8u b up w wIVJuu V8 IdvIubuuo Illu J is Wu (
..._sta., ._ _._2.sa. u..a. .u.. .u... ... .,...a ._ :..,. .,
, rua 53 Isu vis u yWI svusw puasw bi su b ba uwy us w wavasu vi savaubsu.
- This i accc';3ary to cn arc that th; os u;ptions in the safety l analy-i'; rc;;in valid. Thc 7 day Cc;piction Ti;c is reasonabic, e i based on caginc ring judg; cat, in vicw of valvc status indications
! availabic in the ccatrol roca. and othcr administrative ccatrols l to casure that the valvc or cic3cd or isciated. 3 e , ._; e n v.A usvu w.L 1 I With one associated bypass valve in one or more flow paths
- innnarahla action must be taken tcM.Myj;; ,T.ut, etf;G,,d .d j
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. mosm me.m. m
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' 'd -m uw e cue as seCIeo valves to UVt; hat 5Lt tu:i. or to Close or D isolate inoperable affected valves withi ours. When
/l 1
these valves are closed or isolated, they a e performing ]< their required safety function. 0 3.7.3 2 E_
~
Th ur Completion Time takes into account the - j pdun ne affnedad hv the rc;;inin;; ^"E"'"LE vol=[ l OPERABLEN81WB "u,,"... "~N,..w.,,,y...
= _ _ . .~.m'"uy~ e low I 4
probability of an event occurr1ng auring tnis time riod that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths. CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS3.7 B 3.7-18 9725/98
_ . - - - - _. . -. . - - . _ . _ . - - - - . - - - .- . ~ . _ . - . . - -.
"FI" and "."""- [ EI.Vsjand Associated Bypass Valves] ,
B 3.7.3 ! BASES l __-.a n _-- _ a,_u, n ,w ___ .. -,_w- a s.yw_r < u _ a-_-: , _u.uw m ,t--. nm .u.m s ,1_~__ y.- ,--,-
- __- ~w.- - _ - _-~.-..- - a=a- 0-3.7.3 2 m .
l
= L & w .- .a = r - + - - e e.v e .u.n v uvo m._, .
90-f our I t.,umpleUon Time is reasonaDie, uawu on operatin rience, mw ce,un._ _ wa_, u -w = = n , s_ _a W s .*. 54 u .4 6 W eWJywyggg_u f. WW.a LE..Wympu D.M w2 U. 45 z 4.. .b,&W,W>-a.u
.. g . .%. secu~_
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Y",.&,.,;.,' ? ' ~ ~ x a- : ? N M ' F I I---WA ^^~~*Q I Inoperable associated bypass valves that are closed or isolated j must be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed or ! isolated. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in j the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is
- reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of valve status indications available in the control room, and other _ _
administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are / o.3,7.3 2 ! closed or isolated- 4CO. 3.a.~0'5'al.l.ows - - ,th. exFIV bypass. .yalves _o.be..opendJsineededIfodpost; maintenance:testingito de.m_on. .s_trate_ lop _ era. _bil i ty_? 1 1 n , u* uJsL s . ._ J _ _ _ _ _ k1_ ..1..__ J_ sL_ _-__ t1 ~ . -sL L_ __ rv i w a s w vv v s i svys s uv s w wuawha eai wi m w u suw a i vvu yu ws s , wa S NL w_ usuJ.. _ _... vu sIV J.. a _s ..._s__. A. ____ s. . . . A __ 6. 2 _ 1 1. . .. J ___r___ sL_ s wuun suus a w wy J wwsn wv vywa u ww uw kvinu b wu i s J ussu yLa a vs sai hsIL re uircd safety function. Although the containo nt con bc
, _ _ , - . _ . , .2m a_ ,2,..__ _, . . . _ . . . , . . _ _ ,_ ____,,_1 ,_ u_ _-__
savsubwu vg s t,i ws aw au ius w ws w yvv vuavwJ isI yus u a I w I 4Ia wa sw w usuw ficw path, th; double failurc con bc on indicatica of a cococa __;_ <2,..__ 2_ u_ . . , . . _ _ _, a,_ ,,_.. - u __2 -- ...a ,_ , suvuw su4 i us w aas ha N vuiyww ws ws e i a i i vvv yu b s s , us su ww auwi s , sJ s__s_J 6L. ____ -- _ 1___ _ AL_ J._1-s2__ --- L a l a s . . r sta_ bswubbu basw wuum ud u svad v. ba m p av i u k s uis wuyuvaaiby vs was s a ficw path. "nder thc c ccaditions, affectsd valvc- in cach ficw _u ..._s L_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ ; . _ nn en . n i r _m.._ __ u_ .,,__._; , , _ . . yu bs g usu J w ww 5 wa kvu wu hv vs ws v7v 66 wbubud, vs wiss ussswbbu s s uvs
- - a. L 2 _ _1 s _; . 2 a a ._ n L_._ vta ._sa__ __S..___ AL. _m.s__ s_
yu ba s swvsubwu .1 s w a s s i s v s svul J. a ss sw uw w E vs s s s wus ssJ wi sh WJ J wbus bv SL_ ___JasJ._ ..L___ s 1_-_s ___ ..1.._ J. -- L si . - s L J_ bi N wvs su a w a via vu s N w ww swwww visu vuavw sas wwws s i I vvy yu wa a id _ sm _4 .m _. sL. ___.__; _ss.. c.._ sa _ TL. n L_.._ e __1 54 _ ywa a vi su s a ry bi sw I squ s a su du : L wJ s us N w a vii e aasw v s svus uvusy a w w i vs a va__ s_ u._.2 ____-sa_ s. .__,_5 e u sam sw _ . .,v. _uuv a .ss _ __ awu s. , vu Lu vil m ywa u e sas , mys. :...___ ____s , i ms , s.v womy i s ke st_ -_sa___ ___..J__; s. _1 _ _ AL. urvu _ urnM _ 6 L _ _. . J _ bs N uw w avisw a squ a i su hv wiVww wssw a si av VI I ss s) y , __ vi w b s iw s vs s J L a _ _1 s _ u. .cs__s_; c1_ . _-a. savsubw wa N uiswwbwu a e vus yu w s s . CE.1 and CE.2 If the fir!'.'(s) EIVs cad "s""" and the associated bypass valve (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or closed, or isolated within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in . a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours iandja n
@fl4"MthiG23)otif!, The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3,7 .B 3,7-19 9MSR8
"JIt ersd ""","s [ FIVs_.Iand Associated Bypass Valves] ,
B 3.7.3 i BASES unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner ; and without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each MFIV FIV3 HFRV7 and associated bypass valves is s 7 5 seconds. en-en 0 3.7.2 3 _s _a __ . , u s. uu.. . . .v., -_ .:.- ..,. The MHV [IV u._,
... ._ ...a2._
u em u m u m.tv.i s wi m . s~ ,on uenu. 1so]ation;cic=rc times are assumed in the accident and containment analyses. This Surveillance is normally l performed upon returning the unit to operation.__following _; .. a CP 3.7 009 -
...,..__ _L_..,2 __. L_
refue1ing outage. v.u___ .~,s. .u..- ei~u.m .~. um es m u. l __L_ _____2__ 2________ mL. _2_L yv _ J illww w __ u. yus
.2___
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vi u .us.m s. . u .~ . s. n 2. s t. A L. m_uus s .._s. ,s..msu ___.s a__ _ _ . . _ _ m s, r.~.. This is l in_s consistent with A.L. .~ ~,r Acu r=_J. s.vm. . e__A us.w i. , v . _. v n t. s.~s. .e s
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(Ref74)-.
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2 0 3.7.2 3 l The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the ' InservicCTesting~ r___..___.. s__...,.._ Program] cr 2_ 1"u _criths _2 __ Th^mu IST __s.._ 1",,;;;;rith _.._,_ ; i i squss my a vi .ui.w w i vaus % ea vudwu vis bs N ewaus insy __ wywiw. ] l _.___-__A n__ mys. : ..sa._n
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i B 3.7-20 9/25/98 CPSESMarkup ofNUREG H31 Bases -ITS3.7
u.e m . . a u. .e.n,, , _ e
. . . . - . ~ . .. 6 FIVs;,and Associated Bypass Valves}
B 3.7.3 BASES SR*3?7?3' s:SR'..VerifhCthat4.a.rXEIV7and?atsdci._ated
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_.,jng.w M ;, m T*""*:W'*2'C1'"M 'M (RWy"~7;*77 n REFERENCES 1. FSAR 4-7dChapters 6E307andjl5] n._s--.__ u. s_ ra_
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ui o u. s S ct h , U .Not3 sed _ 3l NUBEG 01382S_taMDJscossjonAfgifteenHechnica))Is. sues Listed W Attachmentitd Novembeg 3Ja1076' Memorandum.~.from -- - 7 D._i rect._or.ul.mR.,to~ _a NRR :Sta ff.s$Novembe_r 21.9._76 ? - c 4.-l R_GT_22.PPer_ au iodic Testing:of!
- - - ~ Protect _io_n'Sys. t__e_m_"Ac_t.u_.a.t_io._n Functions 32ML72)]
t CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-21 9/25/98
CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER 3.7 11 The REQUIRED ACTIONS for the main feedwater isolation valves T (FIVs) and associated bypass valves inoperable are revised 0 3.7.3 2 consistent' with tha c'irrant licensing basis.J. LaCO' l - _tions/Raquige_Qc.tjg_ns."agtgurvey_v enc _ege..qq1r.esents as_s. _oc_i. a. t_ed W_ith3_Ef_ee_@_st_e_c.t2_2_I.t. to._11v_alWs3ECVsEe_n..d.:F..CV;, - . . _ bypass -
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l I I l t CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-H31 - ITS 3. 7 3 9/2S/98
CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER l 3.7-21 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure l 68). l 3.7 22 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure l 6B). 3.7-23 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 1 3.7-24 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7-25 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 26 JOITION O (for two volvcs in th; s=c flow path inoperabic' is D deleted to icficct changes to ",cquired Actions A and C and plant 0 3.7.3 2 l specific dcsign of pri;;;;ry IIVs ad associated bypass volvcs and isciation backup vi; tSc in series ICVs and associated bypass l volvcs. The applicable 0 hour co;;;piction ti;;;c is ;;;cycd to thc revised n %cas A and C. NotTysed] - 3.7 27 Not Applicable to t,nts. see conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). 3.7-28 Revise [ARV) frequency from 18 months to "in accordance with Inservice Test Program." to be consistent with other valves in the CTS which are included in the Inservice Test Program (IST). The CTS for the [ARV] surveillance frequency is per the IST Program. [This change is also applicable to the [ARV] block valves that are included in the IST program.] 1 3.7-29 Revise AFW pump testing frequency to be "In accordance with Inservice. Test Program." These changes are consistent with TSTF 101, and will eliminate any ambiguity associated with pump testing frequency as a result of ASME changes. 3.7 30 LC0 3.7.8 and SRs are revised to incorporate requirements for two units with station service water system cross connections. These 0-3.7.8 4 l changes are [ consistent with the CTS and are] more restrictive than NUREG-1431. but are consistent with NRC Generic Letter 91-
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l ? CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-1Di - ITS 3. 7 5 9/25/98 l
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431- SECTION 3.7 Page 2 ef 6 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY g CANYON PEAK 3.7-09 New Conditions E., F. and H and the surveillance requirement associated YES NO NO NO with the FWST AFW pump supply are relocated from the CTS on AFW supply and included in the DCPP AFW specification for completeness. 3.7-10 The specification description, the LCO the action requirements and the YES NO NO N0 surveillance are revised to incorporate the DCPP plant specific requirement for operable AFW supply sources via the CST and the FWST per the current licensing basis. 3.7-11 The REQUIRED ACTIONS for CPSES feedwater isolation and associated bypass NO YES NO NO valves inoperable are revised consistent with the current licensing basis, Cr: CC""'LET!~4 T!"L c: ; .~.. an; :; cicdit the .""".'; Ja;wacr contf;3 J 0-3.7. b2 l ( .;1vc; (FCV;;; ad ;;;;;i;ted brr;;; volyc; for ; miction ti;; cf 72 gr;. A ncu CR i; add;d for the FCV; :nd ;;;;cietcd brr;;; v;1vc;. 3.7-12 '.l00 S3 rcvi;cd Condition A ad T;bic 3.71 to ;;a~nt for plat; that NO VESN0 NO N0
- o. cdit th Icar Ex,; lli7 Natron flun trip funct'c- tc.. 50 i; p;;itive ! 0'3*I* t'4 !!
(0cc CN 2.7 01 ;bovc;. ";c widin;; cf the tr;vcicr ha bcm ;;dificd for CPCC0 to acco,nt for pi;nt ;pccific diffcii,,cc; 3.7-13 Note 1. under ACTION REQUIRED A.1 is deleted. The DCPP emergency diesel YES NO NO NO generators have self contained cooling systems that do not rely upon an external source of cooling water. 3.7-14 The note for SR 3.7.8.1 is deleted since the DCPP ASW system supplies only YES NO NO N0 the CCW heat exchanger and no other individual components. 3.7-15 SR 3.7.8.1 is revised to include a DCPP specific requirement to verify the YES NO NO NO availability of power and air so that the valves can be placed in their correct position as described in the bases. 3.7-16 SR 3.7.8.2 is revised to include only power operated valves since there are YES NO NO NO no automatically operated valves in the DCPP ASW system. The surveillance is revised to require movement of power operated valves to demonstrate the ability to reconfigure the ASW system as described in the FSAR and the ITS bases. J CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - ITS3.7 9/2588 e__ _ _ . _ - _ - . _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - - -
-en____ - __ _ _ - - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ - _ _ . _ - . . _ - - _ _ _ _ _
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431- SECTION 3.7 Page 4 sf 6 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMANCHF WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY CANYON PEAK r 3.7 26 00"0!T!0" 0 i; dcictcd to rcficct the C"SCS plant ;pccific dc;ig cf NONA VESNA NONA N0 pri .; y T!V; :nd aneci;ted bypx; v;hc; ;-d i;;htica backup .i; the i- NA l0-3.7 32 scric; ICV: :nd ;nscisted bg;;; val.c;. ".at used 3.7-27 A note is added to DCPP Table 3.7.1-2 under LIFT SETTING that specifies YES (per LA No No No that the lift point of the lowest set safety is +3% and -2%. 108/107) 3.7-28 Ruise [ARV) frequency from 18 months to *in accordance with Inservice Test NO: CTS is 18 YES YES YES Program." months. 3.7-29 Revise AFW pump testing to be "in accordance with Inservice Test Program." YES YES YES YES 3.7-30 LCO 3.7.8 and ACTIONS are revised to incorporate requirements for two units NO: covered by YES NO: single NO: single - with station service water system cross connections. ECG per GL91-13 unit plant. unit plant. , response. e 3.7-31 SR 3.7.8.2 is replaced with the current CPSES specific surveillance of the NO: refer to YES NO N0 cross connections between units. The CPSES design has no automatic valves 3.7-15 and 3.7-as per this SR in the ITS. 16. 3.7-32 CONDITION A for CPSES is changed to "SSI level less than required" and SR NO YES NO NO 3.7.9.3 and 3.7.9.4 are deleted. 3.7-33 The requirement to verify a make-up flow rate during the tests YES: per CTS NO: retained YES YES demonstrating the capability to maintain control room differential pressure CTS above atmospheric pressure would be deleted. requirement. ; 3.7-34 accordu..cc .;it' tra.cicr '.!00 M. thc Cc piction 'ict fc cic;ing ane "O, ;dopting 0 VESNA VESNA VESN4 i mpcr; tic "S:V i; catu..dcd to 72 hour;. ;nd ;cp;rst; r quired cction cre hour A0T frc; inclJcd f;r cithcr on "S!V incpc. ;bic or t'.;; cr nic "S!V; inspc obic "- SE NA _
. Jc; 2 :nd 3. Nottssed 0-3.7. 2-1 3.7-35 SR 3.7.10.3 is revised to reflect DCPP specific plant configuration and CTS YES NO NO N0 required testing. >
3.7-36 REQUIRED ACTIONS D and E are revised for CPSES for two trains inoperable NO YES NO N0 where at least 100% of the required heat removal capacity is available. 3.7-37 Modifies LCO 3.7.2 CONDITION A and adds new CONDITION B and C to be NO YES NO N0 L consistent with the CPSES CTS. CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - ITS3.7 9/25)98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.3-3 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.6[7] ITS SR 3.7.3.1 and SR 3.7.3.2 DOC 05-08-M JFD 3.7-56 These changes are beyond the scope of a conversion because the industry traveler referenced in this DOC (WOG-98) has not been approved by the NRC. Comment: Withdraw the changes or adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: See the response to Comment Number 3.7.2-3. ATTACHED PAGES: See attached pages for response to Comment Number 3.7.2-3. J
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.3-6 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: ITS 3.7.3 LCO Note JFD 3.7-11 The ITS 3.7.3 has an LCO Note that states "The associated bypass valves for each FIV are the feedwater isolation bypass valve and the associated feedwater preheater bypass valve." Comment: This type of system description should be located in the Bases Background discussion or LCO discussion to define the Operability requirements for the components in this LCO. Revise the ITS submittal to move this information to the Bases. FLOG RESPONSE: The added ITS 3.7.3 LCO Note that states "The associated bypass valves for each FIV are the feedwater isolation bypass valve and the associated feedwater preheater bypass valve," will be deleted from the LCO and moved to the Bases discussion of the LCO. ATTACHED PAGES: Enct 2 3/4.7-9 Enci3A 10 ; Enci 3B 9 EnclSA 3.7-7 Enci 5B E. 3.7-16 Enci 6A 3a m l l 4 w
PLANT SYSTEMS 1-13 A 0 3.7.1 1 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION pot-r41 3.7.1.6 Cach ;;;;in fccdacter linc -hall havc BgirjF,JVslandlassocjated; bypass y4_T_ ves."~s._ha_lFbe.
- m OPERABLE a fccdacter isolation valve, fccdaatar isolation bypass 7 17.LG ValVc, and fecdaatcr prchcater b5 ass ValVC. g.3.7.3 6 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3 egceptHLh.enithCfeedwater"1 solation' valve ~or associatedTcC_^.cCf plotjor ypass;Velv6 cce tegg',cetc7;bgassy;;y;y
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ACTION: NOTERSeparatelentrylis3110wedjforleach val.ve; ,7.o3-is MODE 1: Me-s 1 0 3.7.3 2
- a. With one or;nore feedwater isolation valve inoperable, but cpcn, operations may continue provided thcJced.;;tcGcattcij ,d :ssocjated ,
b5;; iYolV^;3E; ;V4't]eblG;Cssi';t^iJ0leti.cg'Andjthe inoperable ;7""3 feedwater isolation valve is restored to OPERABLE status Aisolated orEclose.d** within Y2 4 hours, otherwise be in H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours. 7-11-M 1
- b. With one or more feedwatcc isolation bypass valves inoperable, operationI MB-M 0 3.7.3 2 may continue provided thcif;;d.g.tcCcggt,ci;;r.d ds;;cisted;bpa 3 valVc-
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' 7*u l' isolation bypass valve is restored to OPERA 3LE status 31s.olated or (7-11-M1 closedt within {g Rhours, otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
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- c. With one or more feedwater preheater bypass valves inoperable, operations may continue provided thc;f;;;.;;teric.r.j.tci;;gGs.ccjatgd,.bype.;2;lygs 03,;7.32
. _ - . . . . , m , - ,_ - , _ mm _ m_ , _ s , - 2 each affected feedwater s e e n u --t u tvn a e.- r e n a -a n tvts. w22x 57 * " 1 preheater bypass valve is restored to OPERABLE status,~jsolated or closedy within ?! Chours, otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 Mit M 3 hours.
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CHANGE NUMBER HSE DESCRIPTION 07 17 A The allowance to open a valve closed per an action in this specification is enveloped by ITS SR 3.0.5. Rgg (G Ibe31dentifit:atj onTcGtheIsifecf f,jfbypasival,yes2Msociated a27,3.p With'ifeedwater?i solatfofvalves2in'J.C0rdndith_e2$p.1Jg'abSjttyJjis desgrjptive rsaterjal!an,dlisimovedito3J)ejBasesiconsiste_ntMaith the3evel?offdetalEptolided TnTNUREGi14311 08 01 LG Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). 08 02 A A note is added to the ACTION that references a potential interaction with ITS 3.4.6 dealing with operability of the RHR system in MODE 4. The Note requires that the applicable TS be entered for the RHR train made inoperable by the inoperable [ component cooling water (CCW)] System. The ACTIONS of the referenced TS (RCS Loops-MODE 4) require more immediate action than are required by the [CCW] ACTIONS. 08-03 LG Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). 08 04 A A note is added to the [CCW] surveillance that clarifies that'-the system is not made inoperable by the isolation of individual components. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431, Rev. 1, and provides clarification only. 08 05 A The surveillance is modified to clarify that valves that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in their correct position are not required to be tested. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431. Rev.1, and provides clarification only. Lhe N03.7.72 glatification ' allow 5'automdtic'Lyalvegj@ishiarglin3theit secuted positidnlunde.rladministfatjysigdhttols',Y;,tolbelegelppted ll Q 3.7.5 9 from;the7surVelllanceE1TMsyfa~utomati3j;YaResia,telse;gur.ed;@ theJLaccidentIpolitio'n?nnd?areMtejiU lteditolaguatelto , peEf_otm t ithe16s~afetylfgc310,nJJftopier3Ld_sitlogipg sof1VAVesits admimsttatitelyichtrtollsdlbr.nUJelelttfoMIo.fdsm1cK0fsitanti I arid 2ppked NalveIpiogramsMTh4Te[T0rdW8E, e nsureRalvles3It maintains _diinlthejEp@Xe p6sitid~7byXega.ifirigindenerjdsat n Yetificat16Eqf21aletEteTetedrotrottiemmpojaqtgegolpagm e , I documlen. tatf6foflh.elpo.s'itfo)Cbf_Hy?Kdld 6q0fM!!elltjinIaIs. U GM1[(dc] ptogram,28nd perJodiciteViNslol,gujpeent nd~rsallEtegal@[tgDg lockMEEiemptinglagt@LticMaMs2thgRteNC0teEjndtheJg tequjredipo]Ltion';isiple gitye,.dlasJtheliiten.lofitheJ[DgLrg1gg2 t andi theref_oleZtheladdit16nlofsthCphragmotela;c_qqtate]yItgflects this"j nt ent rand ~1 sT gon side r'editolbe'adminLstratjyg 08 06 TR 1 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of the initiating signals is moved to the Bases. CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N.7 10 9/25/98
s,fu CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 TECiflICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY DIABLO CANYON C0HANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALUudAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION NA NA NA NA 07-14 NOT USED NA NA NA NA 07-15 NOT USED 07-16 CTS are revised to add a note to allow separate condition entry NO: Refer to NO: Refer to YES YES for each inoperable MFIV. change 07-03-LS- change 07-03-LS-LS-34
- 15. 15.
NO YES NO NO 0/-17 The CPSES specific allowance to open a valve closed per an action A ~ 1Qhis specification is enveloped by ITS SR 3.0.5. ^ N0 p) ( YES 07118 Thejdentjficatinokthei SES;specifjc2 P bypass 1 valves _ associated NO 0-3.7.3-6 3 LG withjfeedwat4TJsolationzvalves;jniLC0;andgtheJpplicability;js V descrinHw ; ,1aliand$1moyed;tp;the;Basess The requirement to perform ACOTs and Channel Calibrations would NO: not in CTS. NO: not in CTS. YES: moved to YES: moved to 08-01 USAR. FSAR. LG be moved to licensee controlled documents. A note is added to ACTION that references potential interaction YES YES YES YES 08-02 A with ITS 3.4.6 for RHR MODE 4 operability. 08-03 The requirement to perform the 18 month surveillance "during NO: not in CTS. NO: not in CTS. YES YES LG shutdown" would be moved to the Bases. A Note is added that clarifies [CCW] operability. YES YES YES YES 08-04 A YES YES YES YES 08-05 Surveillance is modified to exclude valves that are locked. A sealed or otherwise secured in their correct position. YES YES YES YES 08-06 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation and TR-1 moves signal specifics to the Bases. A new surveillance specific to DCPP is added that requires YES NO NO NO 08-07 M verifying that each CCW pump starts automatically on an actual or l DC-ALL-0( 1 l simulated signal actuation at least once per 18 24, months. , Surveillance is modified to only be applicable to flow path YES YES YES YES 08-08 A valves. a CPSES Conversion Comparison Table- CTS 3M.7 9/2588
HRVs and MIRVS FIVs]and Associated Bypass Valves ) 3.7.3 1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Hefn Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIV3) LFJVs] and Main Icci;ater g~3g ^ Rc;;ulatica Valvcs (MIRVS)ZandMssociated.JypepsjValves LC0 3.7.3 Four MIIVs. [four] MIRVS. [ FI.V..$ andrassocjate. d:byp.a..ss: valves. 6
- - - - -. a'3.711 A"
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.............................N0TE - - -- --
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each valve. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
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[IV. 8 4 hours MQ FPS R A.M2 Verify HRV EIV is closed or isolated. Once per 7 days CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-H31 -ITS 3.7 3. 7-7 925/98
l l l l MOVs and MmVsi EIVsjand Associated Bypass Valves} l ) B 3.7.3 4 l l BASES t
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l 1 1 l i APPLICABLE The design basis of the MFIVs Elys and MmVs is established l l SAFETY ANALYSES by the analyses for the large SLB. It is also influenced by the l accident analysis for the large FLB-FWEB. Closure of the HFIVs l FIVs and associated bypass valves, or Mm"s and associated bypess valves, may also be relied on to terminate an SLB for core l response analysis and excess feedwater event upon the receipt of ) a steam generator water level-high high signal cr a faadwater i isolatica signal on high stco; scacrator Icycl. Failure of an MFIV EII, MFRV, or the associated bypass valves ! l to close following an SLB or FLB-FWEB can result in additional l l mass and energy being delivered to the steam generators, l contributing to cooldown. This failure also results.in additional mass and energy releases following an SLB or FLB-FWEB l ! event. The:FCVsiand;feedwaterj pump;tripsrarefereditedif n thelsafetflanalysesras ? high_lyirel iable' backiupslinithelevent 0 3.7.3 2 l ! ofisuch : failures? ! i ! 1 l The HFIVs FIVs and HFRVs and; associated bypassfvalyes satikfy 1 Criterion 3ofthcNRCPolicyStat;;;nt.10CFR5_0;36(cM2)Qt)]. l l LCO This LC0 ensures that the HFIVs FIVs. MmVs , and their l associated bypass valves will isolate HFW flow to the steam generators, Thesc volvcs, will following anacasafety also isciate the F_LB-FWEB related or main steam n .r ^- "a the C' - related portion.; cf thu '-- Ihe 0 3.7.3 6 I'
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re heatg)M(sMg i ThisLC0requiresthatEfour3-HFIVsFJV!andassociatedbypass valves and [four] M m"s [and associated bypass voiva33 be l OPERABLE. TheHFIVsFJygandMmVs and the associated bypass j valves are considered OPERABLE when isolation times are within limits and they close on an isolation actuation signal. 1 Failure to meet the LC0 requirements can result in additional mass and energy being released to containment following an SLB or ELS-FWEBinsidecontainment. BecauseJf-a feedwater isolation signal on high steam generator level is relied on to terminate an excess feedwater flow event, failure to meet the LC0 may result in the introduction of water into the main steam lines. t l l l CPSES Mari.up ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3. 7 B 3.7-16 9/2588 l, - ~ . , - -
CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER 3.7-11 The REQUIRED ACTIONS for the main feedwater isolation valves (FIVs) and associated bypass valves inoperable are revised 0 3.7.3 2 consistent with the current licensing basis. MELCD,1 conditionsdtmMtsuntamuiscVetna&Ettattemmts afechtet
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J t J. ,. 0 3.7.3-6 l L... ..1.,__ u enere s._ ...L etu Mv.JsJ hauwbu ujyuJJ vunwww uw wi www s wa wwws s a av. l I e d 1 9/2588 CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-H31 - ITS 3. 7 3 4
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.4-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.6[7] Actions a and b ITS 3.7.4 Actions B and C DOC 06-05-LS24 JFDs 3.7-05 and 3.7-06 CTS 3.7.1.6[7] Actions have been modified and new requirements are added for when three or more ADVs are inoperable. ITS 3.7.3 Actions B and C contain these new requirements. Comment: Per the Bases LCO discussion, two ADVs are required for unit cool down. Therefore, TSTF-100 is not applicable. Hence, ITS Actions B and C can be accepted if the Required Action wording is changed to match the CTS markup. Required Action B.1 should ' state " Restore at least one ADV (ARV]line to OPERABLE status." Required Action C.1 should state " Restore at least two ADV [ARV) lines to OPERABLE status." [ Note for CPSES: The CTS Action b appears to be incorrect or overly conservative requiring 3 Operable while in a multiple condition entry with Action a.] The DOC 06-05-LS24 does not contain the technical justification that this is acceptable which is the acknowledgement of the diverse backup methods of the Steam Bypass System and the MSSVs. Also, the corresponding JFD's 3.7-05 and 3.7-06 do not contain any technical justification for these changes. Revise the submittal accordingly.
^
FLOG RESPONSE: ITS Required Action B.1 has been revised to read: Restore atleast one ARV line to OPERABLE status. ITS Required Action C.1 has been revised to read: Restore at least two ARV lines to OPERABLE status. The Bases for ITS Actions B.1 and C.1 have been revised to read: ... restore at least one ARV line to OPERABLE status and ... restore at least two ARV lines to OPERABLE status, respectively. s In additions, DOC 06-05 LS-24, JFD 3.7-05, and JFD 3.7-06 have been revised. For CPSES, CTS Action b may be somewhat confusing but it is not overly conservative. With 2 e out of 4 ARVs inoperable, the phrase "... restore at least three atmospheric relief valves to OPERABLE status..." is equivalent to saying restore one of the inoperable valves. The word ,
" restore" seems to imply that three ARVs that were inoperable need to be restored. However, in the CTS, it refers to the total number of ARVs operable, regardless of whether they were previously l
inoperable or were always operable. We believe that the as-marked ITS Actions are consistent with the corresponding CTS Actions. The ITS Bases have been revised to clarify the restoration of inoperable valves. Also (for Diablo Canyon) the Bases for TS 3.7.4, Background (first paragraph) was revised as follows: " Steam Bypass System" and " Steam Dump System" were replaced with "40% steam dump valves." t ATTACHED PAGES: Encl 3A 7 EnctSA 3.7-10 Enci5B B 3.7-24 Enci 6A 2
CHANGE NUMBER MSBC DESCRIPTION 05 08 M This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs [and feeJwater isolation valves) to distinguish between the IST and the automatic actuation testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. This change is consistent with TSTFJ289 WOG48. This proposed change is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG 1431. Although this is a new surveillance requirement. it may be a.3.7.2 3 performed in conjunction with existing surveillance requirements. Th.ereforeZ thelstatementlaU owingitest1Dg X be petfqrmedjn;M00E3ff.sfalsoineededffor;thisj_netsuryeillance requir_ement] 06 01 LG Not applicabic to Ci'SES. Scc Conversica Cc;;;parison Tabis (anciosurc 3S'.This; change; revises the' CTS ~to~ delete the 0 3.7.4 9 desgr,j ptive. materj alHromithe1CTSiLC01nd ,moyesithj si materj al toitt)e' Bas _es 06 02 LS 14 This change adds an exception to LCO 3.0.4 for the 7 day ACTIOM to restore the atmospheric [ relief] valves OPERABILITY. This revision allows the plant to change MODES if one atmospheric [ relief] valve is found inoperable while in MODE 2 or 3. Allowing MODE transition with an inoperable atmospheric [ relief] valve does not significantly increase that risk since the remaining valves are l OPERABLE. s 06 03 M Consistent with NUREG-1431. the specification is revised to be applicable to the " atmospheric [ relief] lines" rather than only to the atmospheric [ relief] valves [and associated controls]. This terminology extends the applicability of the specification to include the atmospheric [ relief] [ block] valve. This is more e l restrictive than the current specification. 06 04 M A surveillance is added that requires the manual cycling of the atmospheric [ relief] valve [ block] valves [in accordance with the IST program]. This proposed change is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG 1431. 06 05 LS 24 This change adds a new ACTION for three or more inoperable atmospheric [ relief] valves that requires action within 24 hours. The CTS would require entry into TS 3.0.3 for three inoperable atmmnheir frpliefl valves. However. NUREG 1431 0 3.7.4 1 recognizpf theavailabilitrofithe [ Steam'DQap3ystygg (theJb5Vs,Tand phenow probability or on acue,; rceiri% the atmospheric [ relief] valves, thus permitting this configuration. CPSES Description of Chwges to CTS 3N. 7 7 9/25/98
ABVs EfA 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 SteautGeneratog Atmospheric Bump Re]je_f Valves 90Vs-) (A._RVA E l i LC0 3.7.4 Three [oug ABVRy lines shall be OPERABLE. l ggq ; APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3 li00: 4 whca :tc=. generator is cclied upca for heat rcacval. p3yaqq ACTIONS 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required ABV ARV A.1 - NOTE --- - line inoperable. LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.
" PS Mi
^
Restore required ABV 7 days ARV line to OPERABLE status.
$ URS$4 B. Two ee-mere required ABV B.1 RestoreQ13;it a_t3 east 24 Z2 hours My lines inoperable. one ABV @ nne w ~
3.7 05 OPERABLE status. o.3.7.4 1 li4MJi i 3 Dir g s moreatguir.ed c;I Bestprs 6at:atg7 242tgsrA 37f',,1 ARVMWr:1popetable] a No'ARVilian,IogMMLE _sta_tu_s] CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3.7 10 9/25/98
ABV AM B 3.7.4 BASES inoperable if operator actica tiac to cpcn the bicck valv; is supported in the cccidcat on; lysis agitZga_nngtXggefitejl Cgnotelfgtpfi t!]eJcontro_lIn!o!!. Failure to meet the LCO can result in the inability to cool the unit to RHR entry conditions following an event in which the condenser is unavailable for use with the Steam Dump Bypees System. An ABV ARV, is considered OPERABLE when it is capable of providing controlled relief of the main steam flow and capable of fully opening and closing on demand usjng;associatedirienot_einanuallcontrol,. APPLICABILITY In H0 DES 1, 2, and 3 and in MODE 4. when a tc;c gcacrator i; being relicd upon for hcat receval. the ABVs ARVs are required to be OPERABLE. In H0DE 4; 5 or 6, an SGTR is not a credible event, f ACTIONS Al . With one required ABV-ARV line inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion i Time allows for the redundant capability afforded by the remaining OPERABLE ABV ARV lines, a nonsafety grade backup in the Steam Dump Bypass System, and HSSVs. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.4 does not apply. IL1 -- q3.7.41 l With two or core ABV ARV linx inoperable, action must be takentorestored"butatBeasthneABVARVlineto OPERABLE status. [rhis;w111<resulha6 yeau.gnreeMrthg
/
s ; Since the block valve can ve closed to isolate an AKV, s repairs may be possible with the unit at power. The L2 E4-hour Completion Time is reasonable to repair inoperable ABV 6RV lines, based on the availability of the Steam Quan Bypass System and HSSVs, and the low probability of an event occurring during this period that would require the ABV W lines. Cil 4 Wjthithr, t eeTorJmorCARV1festin ra ctiore0stibg takenito'le3t_ogfj:lrbui; at31e VXhneitd 0 3.7.4 1 E OPERABf FMthtus*lhis w1 uaresul - _ maw,ggguetsuy W _in:c_elthe: block 3 valve;can De m cios_eag s oasolale;aD ARlgsom6TepairimayDissj ble31th;th_ellLnitI8tIp3ser?MIM e
- 29ourJCompletion3Timelisfr;easo j able]
CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-24 9/25/98
CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER 3.7 04 Requirements involving reliance on the steam generator heat j removal system for heat removal in MODE 4 would be deleted 0 3.7.5 1 consistent with current licensing basis. The SG heat removal system is designed to cool the plant to MODE 4 entry conditions at which time the RHR system may be placed in service. Howevetfithere mustibeDIgriod1f'.timelduj@g]EDE1Horltt]elSG;heatiremoyal o system coblin{Cty!be:trant1tioneditbithelRlRitystenj Thc "J:", systcr;. which is rcquired to bc 0"C"ABLE. is capabic of adcquate hcot rc;r,cval. Although the SG heat removal system may be used for additional cooling below 3500F, the SG heat removal system operability is not an assumption of any safety analysis and is not consistent with the current !icensing basis. The MODE applicability for the SG heat removal system in the CTS is MODES 1. 2. and 3. The SG heat removal system would be used during a normal startup or shutdown and thus , would be capable of providing the heat removal function during the transition to and from RHR in MODE 4 even if not required to be OPERABLE by this TS. 5]S]l7j5!LC0;NOTEEM0DE;4; App]ic~ ability,ECondLtioq;EEthe;SR 3;7.5;3 e NOTEZandithelSRi3115L4lNDTE12lar,ldeletedAs.edloniCTSjappli.cabi.11ty in~ only' M_ ODES'li3JiConditionslBXCandl D"arp~ rrevi sed ;to, del eteE M0 DES 13 sincelthjgis;tedundantitolthelteyisedjepp1_icabilityfj s
~
3.7 05 R v ALl10N B.1 is revised to state and new C.1 states espectively that restoration of "aH-but at3]ee_sXone" and "aH but atileas_t two" atmospheric [ relief] valves [(ARVs)] is 0 3.7.4 1
}
required which will effectively exit the respective REQUIRED ACTIONS. This is consistent with the BASES of NUREG-1431?,_whicl1 recognizes;thea9ailabiljty3f;thle SleamlDumplSystemJiand!the MSSVs,!. e anid;ttle31ow"pLotfab111tyManJatcfdent reqUlring]thelatmosphsric teJ1eDIValves] The specific change proposed by Industry Traveler TSTF 100 is to add the "all but htRist one" phrase to REQUIRED ACTION B for plants that only require three [ARVs] to be OPERABLE. The addition of the "all but et~dels_t two" phrase to new ACTION C.1 is to account for the reauiraman N our [ARVs] w. nt*D ADI I" 3.7-06 The CONDITION and REQUIRED ACTION for two or more inoperable [ARV) lines is revised to limit the applicability to only two 0 3.7.4 1 inoperable [ARV) lines and the COMPLETION TIME is revised from 24 to 72 hours per the current licensing basis. A new CONDITION I C for three or more [ARV] lines inoperable for plants that require , four [ARV] lines is proposed. The original CONDITION C is retained and relabeled CONDITION D. These chanaes are consistent with the intant of NUREG 143fwfuSErecogruzesitheTaVHilabjJity'of1the;[S_ tea _ _umplSystem] fand5thellSSVszarldithotorprobabil_itsfran; f accident te9D.iCjagittte2atmosphelicIte11eBR11Yesjl 9/25/98 CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-1431 - ITS 3. 7 2
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.4-5 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA ; l REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.6[7] ITS SR 3.7.4.1 ) JFD 3.7-28 CTS 4.7.1.6[7] states the surveillance is in accordance with Specification 4.0.5. ITS SR 3.7.4.1 requires one complete cycle of the ASD[ARV]in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The STS requires a frequency of"18 months" instead of"per the IST Program." This change is beyond the scope of a conversion. Comment: Withdraw the change or adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS reference " pursuant to Specification 4.0.5" refers to the Insewice Testing Program. The Inservice Testing Program specifies the testing requirements and the testing frequency for pumps and valves included in the Insewice Testing Program. There is no specification corresponding to CTS 4.0.5 in the STS. The Inservice Testing Program is now controlled under ITS 5.5.8. Thus adopting the Inservice Testing Program frequency in the ITS is equivalent to the CTS Specification 4.0.5 frequency. ATTACHED PAGES: . None c l l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.4 6 APPLICABILITY: CP,CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.7 ITS SR 3.7.4.2 DOC 06-04-M JFD 3.7-28 CTS 4.7.1.7 states the surveillance is in accordance with Specification 4.0.5. ITS SR 3.7.4.2 adds a new SR requirement to verify one complete cycle of the ASD[ARV) manual isolation valve in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The STS requires a frequency of 18 months instead of per the IST Program. Comment: Withdraw the change or adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: Callaway and Comanche Peak have included the ASD (ARV) manual isolation valves in their respective Inservice Test Programs. By including the valves in the inservice Test Program and requiring a new surveillance in the Specification, the requirements are more stringent than before. The STS requires a frequency of 18 months for the new surveillance, however this is provided in brackets. Under TS conversion procedures, bracketed material may be replaced with adequate justification. The ASD (ARV) manualisolation valves provide a support functida for the ASD (ARV) valves. Because it is acceptable for the surveillance frequency for the ASD (ARV) valves to be provided in accordance with the Inservice Test Progam, then it is clso acceptable for the ASD (ARV) manual isolation valves. ATTACHED PAGES: None
]
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.4-7 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.6(7), [ item a] Bases ITS 3.7.4, LCO discussion DOC 06-06-LG For CPSES, the CTS 4.7.1.7, item a surveillance on the air accumulator tank pressure is not retained in the ITS but it is moved to a licensee controlled document. For Callaway and WCGS, there is no CTS requirement but the Bases LCO discussion states the Operability requirements for the nitrogen accumulator tank pressure. Comment: For DCPP. this equivalent CTS surveillance is retained in the ITS. For all others. it is required to explain why this similar surveillance is not being retained or added to the ITS. Revise the submittal to add this new SR performed every 24 hours to ITS 3.7.4. FLOG RESPONSE: NUREG-1431 evolved over many years of industry and NRC review and comment. Part of the process included the removal from the TS, descriptive details and in some cases whole specifications and surveillances that were not required to be in the TS. As a result, TS requirements on many of the support systems for equipment required to be in the TS were moved out of the TS. The accumulators are such a support system for the relief valves. The designs and safety functions of the relief valve accumulator tank for the FLOG plants are j typical of that found in the industry. The accumulator provides a backup means for operation of . the valves in the event of a loss of instrument air. The CPSES requirement to perform a 24 hour ) surveillance on the accumulator tank pressure, while important, does not meet the criteria in 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii) for information required to be in the TS. Neither is there a similar requirement in NUREG-1431. As result ODSES included a discussion of the basis of the accumulator pressure in the Bases and ;n 'ed the requirement for performing the surveillance to the TRM. Callaway and WCGS, which do not have this surveillance requirement in the CTS, likewise did not include it in the ITS. While not required to do so, Diablo Canyon's Operations department chose to carry their CTS requirement into the ITS. m ATTACHED PAGES: None
1 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.4-8 APPLICABILITY: CP l l REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.7, Applicabitty, Action a and b l iTS 3.7.4, Applicability, Required Action C.2, and Completion Time ! DOC 02-20-LS35 JFD 3.7-04 l If one or two ADV's are not restored to Operable, CTS 3.7.1.7 Actions requires Mode 3 entry in l 6 hours and entry into Mode 4 in an additional 6 hours. ITS 3.7.4 permits an additional 12 I hours for entry into Mode 4. l Comment: CPSES has not adopted the STS Applicability extending into Mode 4 until the I " steam generator is no longer relied upon for heat removal." CTS 3.7.1.7 Action a and b both I require the RCS/RHR loops to be placed in operation which directly implies the STS l Applicability is a CTS requirement (perhaps due to the transition temperature being below the Mode 4 limits). The STS permitted total 18 hour Completion Time, for entry into Mode 4, is only for when the Applicability of the LCO has been extended to cover the extra time spent in Mode I 4, while the steam generator is relied upon for heat removal. Therefore, CPSES should adopt ! the revised STS Applicability or retain the current licensing basis of 12 hours total time. JFD 3.7-04 does not discuss the technical basis for receiving the extra 6 hours of Completion Time. The DOC referenced is not applicable and not specific enough for this CTS change. Prqvide a new DOC and revise the submittal. FLOG RESPONSE: (Also responses to Comment Numbers Q 3.7.5-1 and O 3.7.6-5) CPSES I did not adopt the STS applicability for ITS 3.7.4 for the following reasons. l l
- 1. CTS 3.7.1.7 does not require ARVs operable prior to MODE 3. For a normal or l Technical Specification forced shutdown, ARVs are not the primary method of cooling down the RCS. Two motor driven AFW pumps and the main condenser provide the normal heat sink for the RCS loops / steam generators in MODE 3 :
and 4 cooldown until RHR loops are operation.
- 2. CTS 3.7.1.7 actions place the unit in MODE 4 under the applicable requirements for CTS 3.4.1.3 which does not require operable ARVs. CTS 3.7.1.3 (and ITS 3.4.6) require 2 cooling loops from six possible choices (4 RCS loops or 2 RHR loops) in Mode 4.
Actions a and b in CTS 3.7.1.7 lead directly to CTS 3.4.1.7. One motor driven AFW pump provides the required support for two RCS loops. Extending CTS 3.7.1.7/ITS 3.7.4 into MODE 4 when the steam generator is required for heat removal would require 4 l ARVs operable when none are currently required and when only 2 would be required when compared to CTS 3.4.1.3 and ITS 3.7.5 for AFW.
- 3. ARV Operability requirements for the STS LCO are based on SGTR mitigation and are more restrictive than they should be in MODE 4.
The increase in allowed outage time from 6 to 12 hours (DOC 2-20-LS) has been withdrawn for CTS 3.7.1.7 and 3.7.1.3. The increased outage time has been retained for CTS 3.7.1.2 ( See response to Comment Number Q 3.7.5-1)
i ATTACHED PAGES: Enci2 3/4.7-12 Enci 4 63 l Enci5A 3.7-11 Enci5B B3.7-25 l l l I l I 1 1 J
PLANT SYSTEMS i 143 A l STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES O'3 7 l'1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l l 3.7.1.7 At least four atmospheric relief 1_ipes velvcs and associated rcacte l canuci controls shall be OPERABLE. 6 01 LG Q 3.7.4 9 i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2 and 3. ACTION: isentel
- a. With one less than the required atmospheric relief lines vehes OPERABLE. imud restore the required atmospheric relief lines ve h es to OPERABLE status within 7 days *,: or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and e-es-s in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following @ hours and place the required _
Q 3.7.4 8 RCS/RHR loops in operation for decay heat removai.
#MA t$
- b. With two less than the required atmospheric relief 1_ines vehes OPERABLE. 'g restore at least three atmospheric relief lines vehes to OPERABLE status within 72 nours or be in at least HOT TANDBY within the next 6 hours and e ee-s in HOT SHUTDOWN within the followin_ hours and place the required ,0-3.7.4 8 2
RCS/RHR loops in operation for decay heat removal. M10 Al?Q
@_1 With:three;orJore. less;than;theirequired atmospheric;reliefalines~.0P.ERABLE! tmu t testotQtil ea st) twoJ;atmosphetf p; r,elief),l i nes ;tol 0PERA_BLE"stattit]vithin:24 houfCorlbe;1n;at least;H0TlSTANDBY1w3hin,;the;nextikJoutstandMnjiq[
i T N Aid SHUIDOWNiivi_thinithe following323oursland;plage_thelteguirejd RCSLRtBloops 10 petition ifordecay:heatf remova1I4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS m 4.7.1.7. Each atmospheric relief valve and eachAV block? valve and associated pg
;;;caual control; shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
- c. At icast once per 24 hours by verifying that the air acca;;;uictor tank ,
is at prcssurc grcatcr than er cqual to 30 psig. b- Testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. 23fai33.M311 Dot 3pplicable'4 !NIA1 l l CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-12 9/25/98
IV. SPECIFIC N0 SIGN 1FlCANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-35 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev.1, the required completion time to shut the plant down would be revised from achieving H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours to achieving HOT STANDSr within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours. An additional 6 hours would be allowed t P c"^ unT qunTnnw <r- the 3"v w v feedwater (AFW) system. t m Ecndcasatc Storagc Tank, and the [ctacsphcric relief valvc] lincs if they if_a 0 3.7.4-8 1_noperable;AFW pump;could~not be' restored within:the~ required completion tim 0 3.7.5 1 orN f two:AFW pum p were inoperable. Once HOT 5HulUUwN Wa5 aCnleVeo, we plant would be in a MOUE where the residual heat removal (RHR) system would be OPERABLE in addition to the OPERABLE AFW train (s) used to perform the cooldown to HOT SHUTDOWN conditions. Since the inoperable AFW train (s) may affect the normal cooldown rate, the ITS allows an additional six hours to achieve MODE 4. The added time provides additional margin to perform an orderly transfer from the SG method of heat removal to the RHR system to regain the heat removal function without challenging unit systems. The AFW system is designed to cool the plant to MODE 4 entry conditions at which time the RHR system may be placed in service. The RHR system, which is required to be OPERABLE, is capable of adequate heat removal. Although AFW may be used for additional cooldown below 350 F, AFW operability in MODE 4 is not an assumption of any safety analysis and is not consistent with the current licensing basis. The MODE applicability for AFW in the current TS is MODES 1, 2, and 3. In general, the AFW system would be available to remove heat during a normal startup or shutdown and thus would be capable of providing the heat removal function even if not technically OPERABLE. This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves - no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Comission may make a final determination pursuant to the procedures in 50.91 that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed
*:nder 50.21 (b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards i consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed \
amendment would not: l l
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2 Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident frorn any accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards: 1 CPS'EE Vo Significant Hazards Ccnsiderations - CTS 3N.7 63 9/25/98
I 1 A WS ABV! 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued) i l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME j l I G Q. Required Action and GQ.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours ) associated [EDd ~ Completion Time not MQ E0.2 Be in MODE 4 without 16~12 lhours 3,7 04 relioncc upon stc;; Q 3.7.4 8 generator for heat removal. l e SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUEN,CY aPS M SR 3.7.4.1 Verify one complete cycle of each ABV ARV. [10] acnths I @ c,qotdance Wit!Ghg ,, [3.. @_.ljl Iaseryict testing 2dstaq ER,7317,i412 Verify one complete cycle of each ABV ARM block [10] acnths valve. (psg IIEaccofdaILce L. . Witbithf NTM_ ~ Wervic_t i!R1IFProgtag 1 l CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3.7-11 9/25/98 i
ABVARY B 3.7.4 BASES tolrepairlinoperabJe;ARV311nesia;basedionthetevailability;ofLth,e S. team LoutsplSntemienLHSSVsgand s,theno(C otobabilitgof;2nfgent ocauttifigId0ffng th32peir_ft2dithat3ou1EteguLr'lthefEyJJinig e C-071?and GM2 If the ABV ARV lines cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4, without reliancc upon stcc; gcacrator for Scot -0 3.7.4.s rc;cval, withiQ2, ours. tne allowed completion limes are reasonable, b3Wd on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS To perform a controlled cooldown of the RCS. the ABVs ARVs must be able to be opened either remotely cr locally and throttled through their full range. This SR ensures that the ABVs ARV,s are tested through a full control cycle at least once per fuel cycle. Performance of irservice testing or use of an ABV ARV during a unit cooldown may satisfy this requirement. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the Inservice lTestingfrogram;10 ; cath Frequency. The Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. SR"3. 7.'4 :2 The function of the block valve is to isolate a failed open ARV. Cycling the block valve both closed and open demonstrates its capability to perform this function. Performance of inservice testing or use of the block valve during unit cooldown may satisfy this requirement at3eastZoncejperjLue_licygle. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the IJLsefyfcETe~stirl(Pfp)r_as IS month Frequency. The Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. REFERENCES 1. FSAR. Se_qtjons13;fB35A;",9.3 ~and 10.3. 21 F,SAR K hapt.erl15] CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3. 7 .B 3.7-25 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.4-9 APPLICABILITY: CP l l REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.7 LCO Statement ITS 3.7.4 LCO Statement, BASES-LCO DOC 06-zz-LG CTS 3.7.1.7 states that the ARV and " associated remote manual controls" shall be OPERABLE." This CTS requirement has been moved to the ITS 3.7.4 Bases LCO discussion. Comment: This CTS change is not specifically discussed in DOC 06-03-M. This is the movement of CTS requirement which is a less restrictive generic movement or "LG" change. DOC 06-01-LG is a similar justification which was not used for CPSES. Revise the submittal to provide a DOC and revise the CTS markup for this missing "LG" change. FLOG RESPONSE: CPSES has adopted DOC 06-01-LG to move the LCO 3.7.1.7 statement conceming the ARV " associated remote manual controls" to the Bases. ATTACHED PAGES: Enc! 2 3/4.7-12 Enci 3A 7 Enci 3B 6 - EnctSB B 3.7-22 e
l PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A O'3 7 1 1 STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RElfEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l
#6e5(4 3.7.1.7 At least four atmospheric relief ljnes velves and associated reacts l
- nu 1 centrois shall be OPERABLE. 6 01 LG ;
Q 3.7.4 9 l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2 and 3. , ACTION: il6eg4
- a. With one less than the required atmospheric relief li_nes vehes OPERABLE. ges.tsi restore the required atmospheric relief ljnes vehes to OPERABLE status within 7 days *; or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and a-se-s l in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 6 hours and place the required 0 3.7.4 8 RCS/RHR loops in operation for decay heat removal.
- 614AMd
- b. With two less than the required atmospheric relief lines vehes OPERABLE. gu y restore at least three atmospheric relief lines vehes to OPERABLE status l
within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and a-29-s in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following16 6 hours and place the required 03.7.48l RCS/RHR loops in operation for decay heat removal.
.; (61s:AM (neel Withithree or'more less;than;thelrequirediatmosphe,rjc;re]jef;1jnes"0PEMBLE]
r t se.ts 1
- testoteJatjea'stitwo'atmospherj.gfrelief ljnes~ toLOPERABLElst_atunithjtn;24 )
houtslot e;iniat:least b HOTiSTANDBY 2 within,the nextl6;h.ours'and'jnJ10I
; 5to.c4 SMD015;withip;the;fol]oWjng 1.25 hours"and p1 age;thejrequir,ediRCS/M] Loops ig"oper_ationiforldecayiheat; removal >4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS e
4.7.1.7. EachatmosphericreliefvalveanEeach1ARtbl,gckJalveandassociated n g manual contrcis shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
- a. At icast once per 24 hours by vcrifying that the air accumulator tank gg
~ ~ ' --
is at pressure grectcr than or equal to 80 psig. b- Testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
*Jdg3:0;4MsJotLappljcable? tse. tag l
CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N.7-12 9/25/98
CHANGE NUMBER L2iG DESCRIPTION 05 08 H This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs [and feedwater isolation valves] to distinguish between the IST and the automatic actuation testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. This changeisconsistentwithTSTE289W9G-90. This proposed change l is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG-1431. Although this is a new surveillance requirement, it may be o.3.7.2 3 performed in conjunction with existing surveillance requirements. Therefore&thejstatementfallowinglestjngito;bg performed _iniM00.E 3:.isEalso?needed?forithis new suryell1ance , requigrp ^ % x 06 01 LG opplicabl^ to CI'SES. Scc Conversion Comparison Table [mcaciosure 33).This; change revises 1theiCTSitoldeletelthe o.3,7,4 9 1 des.criptive~ mat.erial
---- from the~ CTS LC0;an.dsmoves~.thi.s'.paterial, y,
LS-14 This change adds an exception to LCO 3.0.4 for the 7 day ACTION to l 06 02 restore the atmospheric [ relief] valves OPERABILITY. This revision allows the plant to change MODES if one atmospheric [ relief], valve is found inoperable while in MODE 2 or 3. Allowing MODE trantition with an inoperable atmospheric [ relief] valve does not significantly increase that risk since the remaining valves are OPERABLE. 06 03 M Consistent with NUREG-1431, the specification is revised to be applicable to the " atmospheric [ relief] lines" rather than only to the atmospheric [ relief] valves [and associated controls]. This terminology extends the applicability of the specification to , include the atmospheric [ relief] [ block] valve. This is more restrictive than the current specification. 06 04 H A surveillance is added that requires the manual cycling of the atmospheric [ relief] valve [ block] valves [in accordance with the IST program]. This proposed change is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG 1431. 06-05 LS-24 This change adds a new ACTION for three or more inoperable atmospheric [ relief] valves that requires action within 24 hours. The CTS would require entry into TS 3.0.3 for three inoperable atmospheric [ relief] valves. However, NUREG 1431 _ recognizes th_e'atailability of the;[St.eam Dump Sys_ tem]:land 0 3.7.4 1 3 thejiSSVsiand the low probability of an accident requiring the atmospheric [ relief] valves, thus permitting this configuration. CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N. 7 7 9/25/98
CONVERSION COMPARIS0N TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 ' *II' TECitiICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUDGER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 05-05 A new requirement for a 7 day periodic verification of the YES NO: already in YES YES M closure [or isolation] of inoperable isolation valves is added. CTS 05 06 NOT USED NA NA NA NA 05-07 A footnote is added to the SR (in lieu of the current exception YES YES NO: part of NO: part of LS.23 to TS 4.0.4) to indicate that demonstration of isolation valve CTS. CTS. operability is only required to be performed for entry into (and continued operation in) MODES 1 and 2. 05-08 This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs and feedwater YES YES YES YES M isolation valves to distinguish between the IST and the automatic actuation testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation. if one occurs. to satisfy the SRs. 0 -01 s LCO to move the descriptive YES bES N0;; pot 11n,CTSI d 0-3.7.4-9 bl w - W NO: part of 06-02 Adds an exception to LCO 3.0.4 for the 7 day action statement to YES YES NO: part of LS-14 restore the [ARV) Operability. CTS. CTS. 06-03 Revises the specification to be applicable to the [ARV) lines, NO. CTS YES YES YES M rather than only to the [ARV]. This includes the [ block] includes the valves. block valves. 06-04 Surveillance is added that requires the manual cycling of the YES YES YES YES M [ block] valves every 18 months. 06-05 Adds a new ACTION for three or more inoperable [ARV] that YES YES NO: similar NO: similar LS-24 requires action within 24 hours. requirement in requirement in CTS. CTS. 06-06 Moves the requirements for the surveillances to the Bases and the ' .YES: testing YES: testing NO: not in CTS. NO: not in CTS. LG testing specifics to licensee controlled documents. specifics moved specifics moved to FSAR. to TRM. a CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - CTS 3N.7 9/25)98
ABVs ARVs j B 3.7.4 l B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.4 S_t_eja.1 Generator 2 Atmospheric Bump Relfef Valves (ABVs) {ARVs). l BASES l BACKGROUND The ABVs MVJ provide a method for cooling the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions should the preferred heat sink via the Steam Dump Bypass System to the condenser not be i available, as discussed in the FSAR. Section 10.3](Ref.1). This I is done in conjunction with the Auxiliary Feedwater System ! providing cooling water from the condensate storage tank (CST). The ARBS ARVj may also be required to meet the design cooldown i rat.e during a normal cooldown when steam pressure drops too low for maintenance of a vacuum in the condenser to permit use of the Steam Dump Bypass System. One ABV ARV line for each of the four steam generators providad Each ABV ARV line consists of one ADV ARVll ts 0 3.7.4 9 Qsociatedlemote,manualjcontro'ignd an associated bloc Vaivs. The ABVs ARVs are provided with upstream block valves to permit their being tested at power and to provide an alternate means of isolation. The ABVs ARVs are equipped with pneumatic controllers to permit control of the cooldown rate. The ABVs ARyg are usually provided with e pressurized air accumulators gas supply of bottled nitrogen that, on a loss of pressure in the normal instrument air supply, automatically supply nitrogen air to operate the ABVs ARVs. With30;psig pre.ssure; the nitrogen atriaggumulatorslt!avelsufficientic.apacity , supply is sized tc provide the sufficient prcssurized gas to operate the ABVs g yg for the time required for Stean_Generatpr Tubejupt_ufEmittgatioD RC;;t0T CGolont SJ3tC; ;G0ldGWG to R"E 4 entry conditions. In addition, handwheels are provided for local manual operation sjoeldittg~acctmulator: pres _surelfalllto thelpointM!etC!t3aDMlongericpntrolithe ABVs ARVs. l A description of the ABVe-ARVs is found in Reference 1. The ABVs ARVs are OPERABLE with only a DC power source available, hoWeyed therautomatic'controisifortthe:ARVs'donotsper_forslaisafety fungtion] CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-22 9/25/98 I i
-l
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.5-1 APPLICABILITY: CP l l REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.2, Applicability l lTS 3.7.5, Applicability or Actions A, B, & C ! DOC 02-20-LS35 ) ~ DOC 06-10-A I JFD 3.7-04 CTS 3.7.1.2 Applicability is Mode 1,2 and 3. ITS 3.7.5 Applicability is Mode 1,2 and 3. l Comment:' Issue #1 - CPSES has not adopted the STS Applicability extending into Mode 4 l until the " steam generator is no longer relied upon for heat removal"; however, CTS 3.7.1.7 Actions a and b requires the RCS/RHR loops be placed in operation for Mode 4 entry. ITS 3.7.5 Applicability should be the same as the STS because (as stated in DOC 06-10-A) ITS 3.4.6 permits any combination of RCS/RHR loops in Mode 4. These CTS requirements for l RCS/RHR loop operation directly imply the STS Applicability is due to the RCS/RHR transition j temperature being at or below the Mode 4 350 F temperature limits. Explain these differences ; or adopt the STS. Issue #2 - Correspondingly due to issue #1, the ITS markup is incorrect, as 1
- presented, because MODES 1,2, and 3 should be deleted from the Condition statements of Actions B, C, and D. Provide a revised JFD or adopt the STS text. Issue #3 - This STS permits a total 18 hour Completion Time, for entry into Mode 4, when the Applicability of the i LCO has been extended to cover the extra time spent in Mode 4, while the steam generator is l relied upon for heat removal. Therefore, CPSES should adopt the STS Applicability or retain the current licensing basis of 12 hours total time. JFD 3.7-04 does not discuss the technical basis for receiving the extra 6 hours of Completion Time. Provide a new DOC because the DOC referenced is not applicable and not specific enough for this CTS change. Issue #4 - JFD i B-PS or 3.7-04 does not specifically explain the deletion of the STS 3.7.5 LCO Note. Revise this JFD or provide a new DOC to adopt the STS text. Issue #5 - JFD 3.7-04 does not specifically explain the deletion of ITS Action E. Revise this JFD or provide a new DOC to adopt the STS text. Issue #6 - JFD 3.7-04 does not specifically explain the deletion of the note "
to ITS SR 3.7.5.3 and the ITS SR 3.7.5.4, Note #2. Revise this JFD or provide a new DOC to adopt the STS text. Revise the submittal for these six related issues. 1 FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1 -(Also responses to Comment Numbers Q 3.7.4-8 and Q 3.7.6-
- 5) CPSES did not adopt the STS MODE 4 applicability for ITS 3.7.5 for the following reasons:
- 1. CTS 3.7.1.2 does not require AFW operable prior to MODE 3. For a normal or Technical Specification forced shutdown, AFW is the primary method of cooling down the RCS. !
The two motor driven AFW pumps provide cooling water and the main condenser is the )
; normal heat sink for the RCS loops / steam generators in MODE 3 and 4 cooldown until a RHR loops are operation.
- 2. CTS 3.7.1.2 actions place the unit in MODE 4 under the applicable requirements for CTS 3.4.1.3 which does not require operable AFW pumps. CTS 3.4.1.3 (and ITS 3.4.6) .
require 2 cooling loops from six possible choices (4 RCS loops or 2 RHR loops) in Mode 4. Actions a and b in CTS 3.7.1.7 lead directly to 3.4.1.3. One motor driven AFW pump provides the required support for two RCS loops. Extending CTS 3.7.1.2/ITS 3.7.5 into MODE 4 when the steam generator is required for heat removal would require 1 i motor driven AFW pump operable when none are currently required.
,c .- , m r - - , - - -+ , , - - ., - -
c
Issue #2- The ITS markup has been revised to delete the reference to MODES 1-3 in the conditions since this is redundant to the revised applicability. Issue #3- (Also see the response to O 3.7.4-8.) The technical basis for receiving the extra 6 hours of Completion time is provided in DOC 02-20-LS-35 and NSHC LS-35. The STS permitted total 18 hour Completion Time, for entry into Mode 4, is applicable to CPSES consistent with the STS BASES. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4 with two AFW trains inoperable, operation is allowed to continue because only one motor driven pump AFW train is required to satisfy ITS 3.4.6. Although not required, the unit may continue to cool down and initiate RHR. The extra 6 hours is not dependent on the Applicability of the LCO being extended to cover the extra tlme spent in Mode 4, while the steam generator is relied upon for heat removal. The additional time is applicable in MODE 3 to allow a more orderly and controlled cooldown to reach MODE 4. The required action in ITS 3.7.5 Action C.2 is to be in MODE 4 only and 18 hours is an appropriate completion time given that only one AFW pump may be available for the cooldown. Issue #4- As discusssed above, the CTS do not require an operable AFW train or a motor driven pump in MODE 4. The B-PS notation indicates the bracketed plant specific note is not applicable to CPSES CTS. l Issue #5- JFD 3.7-4 is revised to explain the deletion of STS action E.
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Issue #6- JFD 3.7-4 is revised to explain the deletion of note in ITS SR 3.7.5.3 and 3.7.5.4. l 1 ATTACHED PAGES: Enci4 63 Enc! SB B 3.7-31 Enci 6A 2 m
IV . SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS 1 NSHC LS 35 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE led RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev.1. the required completion time to shut the plant down would be revised from achieving HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and H0T SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours to achieving HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours. An additional 6 hours would be allowed to whipvo unT mrrnnWN for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systep 6densate Storagc Tank, and the [atmosphcric rclicf valvc] lines if they if an 0 3.7.4 8 1!!operabjelAFW1 pump'could notlbelrestored within'the reauired~ completion ~ time ,
,0 3.7.5 1 0 3.7.0 5 rTif;t90'AFW punywere inoperdoie. Unce HOT SHUTDOWN was achieved, the plant would be in a Muui where the residual heat removal (RHR) system would be OPERABLE in addition to the OPERABLE AFW train (s) used to perform the cooldown to HOT SHUTDOWN conditions. Since the inoperable AFW train (s) may affect the normal cooldown rata, the ITS allows an additional six hours to achieve MODE 4. The added time provides additional margin to perform an orderly transfer from the SG method of heat removal to the RHR system to regain the heat removal function without challenging unit systems.
The AFW system is designed to cool the plant to MODE 4 entry conditions at whic,h time the RHR system may be placed in service. The RHR system, which is required to be OPERABLE is capable of adequate heat removal. Although AFW may be used for additional cooldown below 350*F. AFW operability in MODE 4 is not an assumption of any safety analysis and is not consistent with the current licensing basis. The MODE applicability for AFW in the current TS is H0 DES 1, 2 and 3. In general, the AFW system would be available to remove heat during a normal startup or shutdown and thus would ba capable of providing the heat removal function even if not technically OPERABLE. This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves-: no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Corrmission may make a final determination. pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendrnent to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21 (b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration.1f operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendnent would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2 Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident frorn any r
accident previously evaluated; or 1
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
l l The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards: CPSES No Sigm'ficant Ha:ards Considerations - CTS 3N. 7 63 9/25/98
AFW System B 3,7.5 BASES between 72 hours and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met. C.1 and C.2 When Required Action A.1 or B.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, or if two AFW trains are inoperable in MODE 1. 2, or 3. the unit must be placed in a H00E in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least H0DE 3 within 6 hours, and in HODE 4 within 18 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In M00: 4 with two APJ trains incperabic, operation is 0 3.7.5 1 clicwcd to continuc because only onc actor driven pu;;;p APJ - train is required in accordance with th Note that ;;;cdifies theLCO.]n_H00E3,teitherithe,reactoEcoolantipumps'otthe RHRJoops;can ;beJsed_to; provide ; for:cedjci rcul ationMTJ11s;i sj nddressed tin'LCO '3:4' 6?"RCS ' Loops C H00E14;fmhvusi .m rxquired,
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the unit may continue to cool down ana in11:1 ate RHR. L1 If allithree;AFW trains are inoperable in H00E 1, 2, or 3, the unit is in a seriously degraded condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown, and only limited means for conducting a cooldown with nonsafety related equipment. In such a condition, the unit should not be perturbed by any action, e including a power change, that might result in a trip. The ! seriousness of this condition requires that action be started ' immediately to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status. I Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note indicating that all required H00E changes or power reductions are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable because it could force the unit into a less safe condition. ihi ! I In M00C 4. cither the reactor coolant pumps or the PJlR loops can j be used to provide forccd circulation. This is addrcssed in l LC0 3.4.6. "RCS Lccps -MODE 4. " 'Jith onc required A"4 trafft l inopcrobic, action must be taken to i=cdiately restcra the incpcrobic train to OPERABLE status. Thc incdiste Cc;;;piction Tin; is ccasistcat with LCO 2.4.6. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-31 9/2SA8
l CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER 3.7 04 Requirements involving reliance on the steam generator heat removal system for heat removal in MODE 4 would be deleted 0 3.7.5 1 consistent with current licensing basis. The SG heat removal system is designed to cool the plant to MODE 4 entry conditions [ at wh4r' tin th^ """ tudam may be placed in spruir#E.;iRthereB _stA3Dee MtiodKt12M_131 MODE 33Reithe756:hettitenotal systemWlisi10EttRKit.1oneditolthe308ystem] Rc "a systc:.
'M is -requird " " ^""""_2_;. i; capabla of adcquata heat c;r.,9)
Although the SG heat removal system may ue uxd L eddiWool wonng below 350'F. the SG heat removal system operability is not an assumption of any safety analysis and is not consistent with the current licensing basis. The MODE applicability for the SG heat l removal system in the CTS is MODES 1. 2. and 3. The SG heat removal system would be used during a normal startup or shutdown and thus I would be capable of providing the heat removal function during the transition to and from RHR in MODE 4 even if not required to be c OPERABLE hv +'t T';. SIS 3J7;51LCO:JQTEj~d110DEJEAppHeability;;ConditionJ;ithelSR13;Z, NOTEZangtheiSR13lTK4; NOTE 127dre': deleted based;pn; CTS? applicability i in:only1 MODES 13ECygditions1BTCEand;D3r_e: revised 1to' delete. MODES M Hn#thisitsJrglundagtltolthelrevised appli_cability.] : I 3.7 05 REQUIRED ACTION B.1 is revised to state and new C.1 states respectively that restoration of "all but at_ileast;one" and "eM 0 3.7.4 1 l l but at3 east two" atmospheric [ relief] valves [(ARVs)] is required which will effectively exit the respective REQUIRED ACTIONS. This is consistent with the BASES of NUREG 1431EWhich ; tecognjsgsl)M3Vai)RDitfiqEth0[Stgash;Sy}tes]3nJd hel!!SSVsJ e 4gd1helow Z etpttebfMtf6flaOfcgdentle#fitingitheletmosp!Le'r3 l telieDRahfg The specific change proposed by Industry Traveler , TSTF 100 is to add the "all but a R ledst one" phrase to REQUIRED l ACTION B for plants that only require three [ARVs] to be OPERABLE. l The addition of the "all but lLtl}dist two" phrase to new REQUIRED l ACTION C.1 is to account for the requirement to have four [ARVs] l OPERABLE. ! 3.7 06 The CONDITION and REQUIRED ACTION for two or more inoperable [ARV] lines is revised to limit the applicability to only two 0 3.7.4 1 l inoperable [ARV] lines and the COMPLETION TIME is revised from 24 to 72 hours per the current licensing basis. A new CONDITION
- C for three or more [ARV] lines inoperable for plants that require four [ARV] lines is proposed. The original CONDITION C is retained .
. and relabeled CONDITION D. These changes are consistent with the I intent of NUREG 1431Mhich7e c ognizesittl eXallabiUty~p.hthe25 team l Dump ~ Sys}em]Wnd5the]ESVga3ditheMo6Cprgtjability3flanzascident l teuitimthEEa_tso_sphericWelleD @alves ? , 1 CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-H31 - ITS 3. 7 2 9aSB8 l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.5-5 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.2 LCO and Actions ITS 3.7.5 LCO, Actions and Bases DOC 02-01-LG i ~ CTS 3.7.1.2 requires "At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:" ITS 3.7.5 requires "Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE." Comment: The CTS markup should show the LCO statement as follows " three auxiliary feedwater trains shall be OPERABLE " Also,in all Actions and Surveillance Requirements
" pumps" should be " trains" and "the associated flow paths" are moved to the Bases. Revise the CTS markup and the submittal.
^ FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS markup has been revised to show the LCO statement as " three
- auxiliary feedwater trains shall be OPERABLE ." Also, in all Actions and Surveillance Requirements " pumps" have been revised to be " trains" and "the associated flow paths" are moved to the Bases. The above changes were done under existing DOC 02-01-LG.
ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 2 3/4.7-3 and 3/4.7-4 m I l
PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM O'3 7'.l'1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 M three idE:ndcat stc= gencr$1, auxiliary feedwate Ialqq ' ' 2 01 LG 0 3.7.5 5 ( g;ps and associated Gow pa 3 snall be OPERABLE w Mh:
- c. Two motor driven auxiliary fcedwater pumps. cach capable j ef bcing powcrcd frc; scporate cacrgcacy bu :::. and f. M._ M
- b. Onc stc= turbinc driven auxiliary fccdwater pu;;;p capabic of being pcucred frc: two 0"E"A"LE stc= supplics.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3. ACTION:
- a. With one auxiliary feedwater drain cu cr as cciated fl D O Operable (for,-reasons,otherithan oneisteam;supp]y ' ' s 2
l to'the; turbine drivenTAFW pump inoperable). restore the - 5 required auxiliary feedwater Erain pu;;;p or associated fy UFERABLE status within /z hours (Anv2w,1tm 3;10 16d l aysifrom~ discovery:of ~ failure ~toimeetithe:LCO or be in
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"38A
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atle'as't50f5TA~NDBEwithinthene$tThouis'a~n)dinHOT SHUTDOWN within the following 612 hours,
- b. With two auxiliary feedwatgains pump cr a;;cciatcM ' .f7$.5 Cow p$ moperovie, oe in at iea n HUI STANDBY within 6 l hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 12 hours. 42.Mtsj l
- c. With three uxiliary feedwater @ps pump or 03;ccich ,
61cw cat, inoperable, immediate3 initiate corrective action 2 01 LG 0 3.7.5 5 to restore at least one auxiliarv feedwater6Jn pump c;f"'a g --m o m. -- to OPERABLE status as soon as possible*, OM
- d. With only one OPERABLE steam supply system capable of providing power to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater 1W4 pump, restore the required OPERABLE steam supplies within 7 days (,ANDyithin~10: day _sTfromTdissolefyltoye_etR_hy&CO) or be l
in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in H0T F2 2q.rmA SHUTDOWN within the following 6 12 hours. [ WR.T:7:"Yn MDi3!Ld311[otheriLCO,_REERED ACTIONS're_quitingLH00,E311ange_slAr.e10spegdej ;;2-$.Ma N3falpfislest_oreditoi0fERABLE*fsJjitus.] s l l CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-3 9/25A8
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS f. 4.7.1.2 Each auxiliary feedwatepin pu;;;p cr associatcd fic a pegshall be demonstrated OPERABLE: N 2 01 LG 0 3.7.5 5
- a. At least occe per 31 days by:
- 1) Verifying that each non-autcactic manuaRpM9peregglZ%gd automatic valve {eJceptitMfflow'contro]1VaWes); in the flow 2 07-Mg path andlin both~steamis0pply;]ines2toltheIturbine[drieg 0 3.7.5-6 pump; that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position; is in its correct position; and
- 2) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater flow control end -
isciatica valve in the flow path is in the fully open 2 07 m position whenever the Auxiliary Feedwater System is in 0 3.7.5 6 standby for auxiliary feedwater automatic initiation or when """"" above 10% RATED THERMAL POWER,
- b. At least once per 02 day; on a STACCEP.E9-TF5T SASIS In_accordanceyitt; 42.esla j thelfrequ.ency'in the; Inservice TestfProgram by:
- 1) Verifying that each motor-driven pump dcvcicp3 ; diffcccatial pressure of grcater than or cqual to 1372 psid at a fic/a of WNM grcater than cr cqual to 430 gp; deve]opedjea.d i atithelflowltest pointds;greaterithan orlequal tolth.e: required 31ev,e]ppedihead:
- 2) Verifying that the steam turbine driven pump # dcvcicp3 a differential prcssurc of greatcr than or equal to 1450 psid at-e 41* 1 test flwcf greater than or equal to 350 gpc deyelopedjeadiat is.15.usj theff]oDesrpoint:1s1 greater:thanor'equalf.to;their_eguited dtvelopecfjead when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than 532 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3:
- c. At least once per 18 months by 8 05 A
- 1) Vedfying that each automatic valve in the flow path that2Ls a no_tmockedaseatedgotatthgWise3ecute_d1Epolitfo3l actuates to its correct position upon receipt of an Auxiliary Ps.b.W recdaatcr Actuation test actuar;ot31mulatedlactu8ioD signal, and
- 2) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump ( starts as designed automatically upon receipt of an Auxiliary fccdaatcr Actuation _M E
test actuaTrotgsjmulated? actuation signal *. The provisions of 92.is.g Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump for entry into MODE 3. The ;urvcillance tc;t interval is extended to 24 month; for tc; ting th; start of the Unit 2. Train A "stor Driven Auxiliary recdaatcr Pump upon receipt of 41WN! cn Auxiliary fccdactcr Actuation test signal, to rccain in cffect until the cwictica of the scccad refueling cutage for Unit 2. 21pibe;perfpfgedjfotilhLturbine!d ivenJF_WJpompjpylt11224'hourraiggg t M Ate 3migeie,tatot; 41W CPSES Wark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-4 9/25M8
l l l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.5-6 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.2, Action a[b].1 and 2 ITS SR 3.7.5.1 DOC 2-07-M JFD 3.7-08 l CTS 4.7.1.2, Action a[b].1 verifies each non-automatic valve and Action a[b].2 verifies each l automatic valve is in its correct position. ITS SR 3.7.5.1 collectively verifies each manual, power-operated and automatic valve is in its correct position with a new note excepting certain valves. Comment: Issue #1 - Contrary to DOC 02-07-M, these CTS requirements have always applied to automatic valves. Therefore, this is not a more restrictive change but an administrative reformatting change to combine separate surveillances into one ITS SR. Provide a DOC with the appropriate justification for this CTS administrative change. Issue #2 - The Note to this ITS is taken from the CTS but it is superfluous because the CTS l and ITS requirements both are to verify each valve is in its correct position, regardless if the I unit is in Mode 1,2, or 3. If the unit is still in Mode 2 or 3, the AFW flow control is in its correct position if it is closed. In Mode 1, the valve should be open. These are procedural details of how and when this SR is performed. This ITS Note should be deleted and these details moved to and explained in depth in the SR Bases. For WCGS only, the CTS markup does not explain l the conversion basis for 4.7.1.2.1 b.2. Provide a DOC with the appropriate justification for this l CTS change. Revise the submittal for these two issues. FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1: DOC 2-07-M has been revised to DOC 2-07-A. The ITS surveillance results from the combination of two CTS surveillances. Combining the two CTS l surveillances into one CTS surveillance does not impact technical content, but involves a l l reformatting administrative change. Enclosures 3A and 3B have been revised to show the l DOC 2-07-A. DOC 2-07-A incorporates the following: e "Two CTS surveillance requirements, CTS [4.7.1.2a1) and 4.7.1.2a2)], are combined into one ITS SR 3.7.5.1 surveillance requirement. Combining the two surveillances does not impact the technical content. The proposed change is acceptable because it involves an administrative change that reformats surveillance requirements without changing technical content." issue #2: The ITS Note to SR 3.7.5.1 is appropriately located and should not be removed to
- the Bases. The Note is supported by current licensing bases basis and provides clarification for operability of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps with the discharge valves throttled to maintain steam generator levels du-ing plant heatup or cooldown. The AFW system is a dual use system. Under current licensing bases basis, the AFW trains are considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for steam generator level control, when the AFW flow control l
valves are not in the full open position (not the correct position) and when the unit thermal power is less than or equal to 10%RTP. The correct position for these valves for accident conditions is the full open position. By retaining the Note for clarification, current flexibility remains and unnecessary Action entry is prevented. Maintaining the CTS SR as an ITS SR Note is consistent with proposed traveler TSTF-245. l l
' The ci 2.1 ment indicating that the WCGS CTS markup does not explain the conversion basis for 4.7.1.2.1b.2) is not clear. As noted above, CTS SRs 4.7.1.2.1b.1) and b.2) are combined into one ITS surveillance requirement, SR 3.7.5.1. There were no changes made to CTS SR 4.7.1.2b.1) and DOC 2-07-A explains the combining of the CTS SRs. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci2 3/4.7-4 Enci 3A 4 Enci3B 3 i I l n
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
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4.7.1.2 Each auxiliary feedwater tralD pump or associated flow path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: 2 01 1.G Q 3.7.5 5
- a. At least once per 31 days by:
- 1) Verifying that each aca catcactic mandajEpo._weQglengtg3lLtLd automatig valve [eXcip_tJt@3fl@lcontrolGvalitejQ in the flow 20 path andjpIboth7steamisuppJfili_nesitoltheltu~rbingidrjgp26 0-3. . 6 pump; that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in l position] is in its correct position: and
- 2) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater flow control end isciation valve in the flow path is in the fully open 20 position whenever the Auxiliary Feedwater System is in O'3 standby for auxiliary feedwater automatic initiation or when above 10% RATED THERMAL POWER.
- b. At least once per 02 days on a STAOCE!!EO TEST CASIS In;accotdanc_eylti) :24sas1 thefrequency3njhe1InserviceTestiProgramby:
- 1) Verifying that each motor driven pump dcvcicps a diffcrcatial prcssure of greater than or cqual to 1372 psid at ; flow-ef 45W3 grcatcr than or equal to 430 gpm deyelopediheadiatetheifloWitest P01ntii sj greaterlthanforlegualj to,the] required 31evel opedihead :
- 2) Verifying that the steam turbine driven pump # devclops a diffcrcatial pressurc of grectcr than or aquel to 1450 psid at a 4N4 test flow of grcatcr than or equal to 050 gp; deyelopedj])gdiat 12.as.wd thelfloWJesgpoint11sigreater~than'orJegualitoltheir_egujted developed;)ead when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than 532 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3:
At least once per 18 months by:
- c. 8O54
- 1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path that11_s I notilocksd;Yse~ a l.edZdrIothspis:eisecDredligpositfgp]
actuates to its correct position upon receipt of an Auxiliary D%FIRd Fccdacter Actuation test aj;tualIofsjipj]latedTRtu8tioD signal, and
- 2) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump ( starts as designed automatically upon receipt of an Auxiliary feedacter Actuation E ted actdal[of timulate Factuation signal *. The provisions of g Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable to the turbine driven -
auxiliary feedwater pump for entry into MODE 3. The survciliancc test interval is cxtended to 24 rcaths for tcsting the start of the Unit 2 Train A "ctor Driven Auxiliary fccdaatcr Pump upon rcccipt of OM an Auxili;ry Tccdaatcr Actuation test signal, to r;;;in in cffect until the
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caplatica of the scccad rcfucling cutagc for Unit 2. 2 cniGitM*Chg_etformed for thelt01bj.neIdr.ivegAfy;p_0mpIuntiM2ij)o0$Dfff,t
-- war 93!!3tiels,t.elmZgenerator; 16 CPSESMark-up ofCTS 3N.7 3N. 7-4 9/2588
1 l CHANGE l NUMBER EitlC DESCRIPTION 1 02 03 H The ACTIONS are modified to require restoration of the systems to meet the LC0 within 10 days of discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This new requirement is intended to prevent multiple overlapping ACTION entries such that the intended A0T is exceeded. This proposed change is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG 1431. 02 04 M Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). 02 05 A Although previously implied, the addition of the footnote for three inoperable AFW trains assures that LC0 3.0.3 will not be entered and that no other ACTION statement for other inoperable components will be applied that might force the unit into an unsafe condition. 02-06 LG Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). ^ N 02 07 The survcillance to vcrify valvc align cats is revised to 0 3.7.5 6 \ includc outcactic valves. This propcscd changc is acceptable becausc it rcsults in = crc stringent TS requirc; cats that ars ~ both approprictc and consistent with NUREC 1431. Two; CTS surve.111ancelrequitements ECISX42;12alCandi4;Zg.,2a2)] Eare combinedjinto;one3TSLSRi3?7 ; 5J11surjef11 ance ~fegui r.e. ment 3 Combhingitheltwo?surve111&ncesldoesinotjjmpact;theitechnical content.2Thelptopoisedigh.angeldgac_ceptab],,lbecauselitZdnvolyes e 'an Ntdmi d nj,s_ttativeZchangelthatMeformatOurveill anc_eir, equi r _ wit _ heng1]igitechnicaTJcb6 tent] 02 08 LS-6 The surveillance interval for the AFW pump performance is changed ,, from once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS (STB) to "in accordance with the IST Program." This proposed change will eliminate any potential ambiguity associated with AFW pump testing as a result of ASHE changes and results in consistent presentation of pump testing throughout the TS. 02 09 A Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). 02 10 LS 21 Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison TtG e (enclosure 3B). 02-11 A Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). 02 12 'IR-1 The respective valve and pump SRs are revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The i identification of initiating signals is moved to the Bases. t CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N. 7 4 9/25/98 i
CONVERSION COMPARIS0N TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 3rII' i i TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUleER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 02 05 The addition of the note for three inoperable .VW trains assures YES YE5 YES YES A that TS 3.0.3 will not be entered and that no other action statement for other inoperable components will be applied that , might force the unit into an unsafe condition. 02-06 The change would move details regarding AFW motor operated NO: descriptive N0: descriptive YES YES LG discharge valves and ESW supply valve descriptions to the Bases. material not material not part of CTS. part of CTS. , crificaticr. of valvc cli,.~..t; i; rcvi;cd to inkd \ YES YES YES YES ll Q-3.7.5- i ll M6 e tatic vehea.ETwo;GE2surve11]pnceitequirementshCTS (s [4fL152alha!xu(12L1;gaQ]iaEe egeb1neddntoioge2 surveillancekequjiyeept3 s ITS1 SR m 3i7 5.1'
~
02-08 The surveillance interval for the AFW pump pe ance is changed YES YES YES YES LS-6 from 31 days on a STB to in accordance with the IST Program. 02 09 This DCPP specific surveillance is revised to combine the water YES NO NO NO A and steam flow paths. , 02 10 The time to achieve HOT SHUTDOWN if actions are not completed is YES: also refer NO: refer to 02- NO: refer to NO: refer to LS-21 changed from 6 to 12 hour. This time is reasonable to reach the to 02-04-M. 20 LS-35. 02-20-LS-35. 02-20-LS-35. required conditions under the circumstances since the SG heat removal system is the system performing the cooldown to H0DE 4. 02-11 In this DCPP specific revision, the testing requirements for YES NO NO NO A pumps and valves are separated into two SRs. 02-12 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation and YES YES YES YES TR-1 moves signal specifics to the Bases. 02-13 In this DCPP specific revision. the verification that the fire YES NO NO NO A water storage tank is capable of realignment as an AFW water > source is moved to the AFW ITS. 02-14 The note for testing of the steam turbine-driven AFW pump is YES YES YES NO: part of M revised to explicitly define when testing must be performed. CTS. CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - CTS 3N.7s 9/2588 ,
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.5-7 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.2 Bases ITS 3.7.5, LCO discussion DOC 06-06-LG For Callaway and WCGS, there is no CTS requirement but the Bases ITS 3.7.5 LCO discussion states the Operability requirements for the TDAFW pump control valve and the ARV[ASD]'s nitrogen accumulator tank pressure. For CPSES, CTS 4.7.1.7 item a, is a surveillance on the accumulator tank air pressure for the ARVs. Comment: This comment is related to item #8 of ITS 3.7.4. There is no CTS DOC or ITS JFD provided to explain these Operability requirements listed in the Bases for ITS 3.7.5. An explanation is required to explain why there is no surveillance for the TDAFW pump control valve or ARV[ASD) nitrogen accumulator tank pressure. Revise the submittal to add this new SR performed every 24 hours to either ITS 3.7.4 or ITS 3.7.5, as is similarly done at DCPP. FLOG RESPONSE: See response to Comment Number Q3.7.4-7. The same discussion provided for the ARVs/ASDs accumulators applies to the TDAFW pump control valve accumulators. ATTACHED PAGES: Ncne 1 1 l l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATIO_N NO: O 3.7.5-8 APPLICABILITY: DC,CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.2.1.c ITS SRs 3.7.5.3 and 3.7.5.4 DOC 02-12-TR1 CTS 4.7.1.2.1.c nrifies at laast once per 18 months that each AFW pump starts and each automatic valve actuates as designed upon receipt of a AFW actuation test signal. This SR was divided into two ITS SRs,3.7.5.3 and 3.7.5.4, except an actual signal may be substituted 1 for the simulated signal. : Comment: Issue #1 - The DOC states that the specific identity of the simulated signal, is no longer retained in the SR but it is to be moved to the Bases. A review of the ITS Bases ! discussion for these SRs shows they do not identify these testing details. Revise the Bases in l accordance with the DOC. Issue #2 - For DCPP. the CTS Markup has been revised from a i Frequency of 18 months to at each refueling interval. ITS SRs state the Frequency is 24 l months. The ITS Bases state the Frequency is 24 months which is not consistent with the CTS markup. These changes have been proposed without any DOC or JFD. There is no technical justification provided for these CTS changes. Adopt the STS text or withdraw these CTS I changes. FLOG RESPONSE: The Bases for TS 3.7.5.3 has been revised to read:"This SR verifies that AFW can be delivered to the appropriate steam generator in the event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS, by demonstrating that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on an actual or simulated actuation generated by an auxiliary feedwater actuation signal. . ." The Bases for TS 3.7.5.4 has been revised to read: "This SR verifies that the AFW pumps will start in the event of an accident or transient that generates an ESFAS by demonstrating that each AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation generated by an auxiliary feedwater actuation signal. ..." ' For DCPP - An errata to LAR 97-09 was submitted to the NRC January 8,1998 in DCL-98-003. Errata changes on pages affected by NRC comment numbers are indicated with "DC-ALL-002." Errata changes that dealt with issuance of LAs 119/117 and 118/116 (issued 7/13/97) that addressed CTS surveillance interval increases due to 24-month fuel cycles are indicated with "DC-ALL-001." LAs 118/116, referenced above, defined the CTS frequency notation in Table 1.1. Per LAs 118/116 and LAR 97-09 errata, the notation "R24, REFUELING INTERVAL"is defined as,"At least once per 24 months." Thus, the CTS mark-up stating "each REFUELING INTERVAL"is consistent with the ITS mark-up of"24 months." ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 5B B 3.7-33
AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES (continued) ThKSKit!BallaieOYJrJLitsi!Rtdica_tjgt3banthewahoslog gterredJgt.fremabletesta:endttiograrelegabJished2F;Lhls deletramwomredImmmere11s3lnsuffic_tttt13 team _ pressure to;ner3Xt!Leling SR 3.7.5.3 This SR verifies that AFW can be delivered to the appropriate steam generator in the event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS, by demonstrating that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct nneitinn on '0 3.7.5 8 an actual nr eh" lated actuationdliFnerated b_Y'an"auxilia& [eedwater"ac+ nam =" signal . The: Steam 1 Generator .Bjowdown; Steam;Genetatot;Blowdownlamp]eZand, E!!edwatet;Spl,itlFlow Bypass;ValvesicloselonlaEanxiliary2feedwatetiactuationjto CP 3.7 13 ensure;auxiliattfeedwaterlis;delivereditolthelsteam generator; upper 3iozzlejs3nd 1sZretainedlinitheisteam generator;forldecafhe]atXenoval EThe1AFEflo[contro11valvesitrip tolautol(gten)1on3nl10R111afy;feedwate_rlactuationitolensure: full flow;irdeliverMLtoleachtste_am;generetgifj o(path g]The 'stean! t admission 1aly@p6CtolsupMLthe3Grbineidrigen"80x11 Jar % f_eedwaterlpomp) This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 18 month Frequency is acceptable based on operating experience and the design reliability of the equipment. m This S", i; ;;;cdif. icd by ; Notc that tstc; the SR i; not required in M00: 4. In M00: 4, the rcquired APJ train i; circady aligned and opcrating. SR 3.7.5.4 This SR verifies that the AFW pumps will start in the event of any accident or transient that generates an E5FAS by demonstrating that each AFW pumo starts automatically on an ae+=1 ne simulated actimtion p ratedib.Yl8K aux 111ary7feedgaternactuat @ 0-3.7.5-8 l signal in rwu 1, Z. anu a. In mod 5 4, the required pump is already operating and the autostart function is not required. The1j8monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedto 0 3.7.G 1 perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. B 3.7-33 9/25/98 CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3. 7
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDIT!ONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.5-9 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.2.1.c[1] ITS SR 3.7.5.3 DOC 02-xx-LSx CTS 4.7.1.2.1 item c[1] verifies all automatic valves actuate to their correct [ full open] position. ITS SR 3.7.5.3 venfies only those valves "that are not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position .." Comment: This CTS change was made to the ITS markup but there was no DOC provided to justify this less restrictive technical CTS change for verifying a reduced number of valves. Provide the missing DOC and revise the submittal. FLOG RESPONSE: CTS 4.7.1.2.1 item c(1) was revised to verify only those valves "that are not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position" actuate to their correct position on receipt i of an actuation test signal. DOC 08-05-A was added to address this change which we be'hve to be administrative rather than less restrictive. The NRC accepted a similar change at Vogtle as an administrative change, as discussed in Section 3.1.3.7 item (13) of the Vogtle SER. DOC 08-05-A (as revised in response to Comment Number Q3.7.7-2) states: "The clarification allows automatic valves, which are in their secured position under administrative controls, to be exempted from the surveillance. These automatH valves are secured in their accident position and are not required to actuate to perform their safety function. Pruper positioning of valves is administratively controlled by equipment out of service programs and locked valve programs. These programs ensure valves are maintained in their proper position by requiring independent verification of safety-related or other important equipment, documentation of the position of locked equipment in a surveillance program, and periodic reviews of equipment normally required to be locked. Exempting automatic valves that are secured in their required position is perceived as the intent of the CTS wording, and therefore, the addition of the phrase more accurately reflects this intent and is considered to be administrative." 1 ATTACHED PAGES: Enci2 3/4.7-4 Enci 3A 10 ) 1
_ = _ - . -. - . 1 l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4.7.1.2 Each auxiliary feedwater train pump cr associated flow path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: 2 01 LG 0 3.7.5 5
- a. At least once per 31 days by:
- 1) Verifying that each non automat 4e manuallpowefiopentgQRD(l automatig valve [exceptithe2 flow 3qqtr.ollyal.yeQ in the flow 207M4 path andjnibothIsteamis_upp]y31nesato3he turbjneldrjy_eRn 0 3.7.5 6 pump.? that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in positionj is in its correct position; and
- 2) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater flow control and 4sciation valve in the flow path is in the fully open 2 07 m position whenever the Auxiliary Feedwater System is in 0 3.7.5 6 standby for auxiliary feedwater automatic initiation or when above 10% RATED THERMAL POWER.
- b. At least once per 02 days cr. a STACCERED TEST SASIS Intaccordance;with dios-Is i the frequency)inLthejnserviceJest Program by:
- 1) Verifying that each motor driven pump develops a d&fferential pressure of greater than cr caual to 1372 psid at a ficw of c215.w 2 greater than or cqual to 430 gpm developed headiatitheiflow3est point:is;gr. eater than,or,egual;t_o the required dev. eloped, head:
m
- 2) Verifying that the steca turbine driven pump # devcicps a diffcrcntial pressure of greatcr than or cqual to 14SO psid at a +>1 m A test flow af grcatcr than or equal to 050 spa deyel,oped' head 3t ;21.s.roj the;flowltest[pointjis greater:than oriegualltolthe_teq0jted dey.elopedjead when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than 532 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3:
At least once per 18 months by:
- c. 8 05 A
- 1) Verifyina that each automatic valve in the flow pat thatl
/fot il ocked Tseal ed .- or 'othqanse2 secured lin:.posi . .n!
actuates to its correct posu.wu upon receipt or an ssx;,iary $2-12-N'~
~
recdwatcr Actuation test act0al]otisimulated"actuatiog signal. and
- 2) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pumpf starts as designed automatically upon receipt of an Auxiliary Icedwater Actuatica M17-d testactual;or: simulated;actuationsignal*. The provisions of p12.N Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump for entry into MODE 3.
l The survcillancc test intcrval is extended to 24 months for testing the start l Of the Unit 2. Train A "ator Driven Auxiliary Icedwatcr Pump upon rcccipt cf $2174 l en Auxiliary Icedwatcr Actuatica test signal, to rcmain in cffect until the
;0apiction of th; scccad rcfucling Outage for Unit 2.
f3EDQRQWfeni10XRerforgfor;the3ut neldrjvenRi{. bi pump;untill24JouX,Aftgg M$1M$De!ste~amlgenjtator.] T214.M13 CPSESMark-up ofCTS 3N.7 3N. 7- t 9/2S/98
1 l CHANGE NUMBER H$liC DESCRIPTION . l 1 07 17 A The allowance to open a valve closed per an action in this l specification is enveloped by ITS SR 3.0.5. Hig [4 IbeT1dentificatfoq;ofithelspecjfficibypass?.Valyes235sg,gjgted 0 3.7.3 6 I Withleedweterlfsolationivalves:;inlLC07endithe e hpp]1dat)RitKig i descIj ptive'matetf_alland 1simoveditolthelBa,ses~copsistgf Mth I the3eveliof;detaj]Iptov_idedjin JUREG '143,1] 08 01 LG Not applicable to CPSES See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). 08 02 A A note is added to the ACTION that references a potential interaction with ITS 3.4.6 dealing with operability of the RHR system in MODE 4. The Note requires that the applicable TS be entered for the RHR train made inoperable by the inoperable [ component cooling water (CCW)] System. The ACTIONS of the referenced TS (RCS Loops MODE 4) require more immediate action than are required by the [CCW] ACTIONS. 08 03 LG Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). l 08 04 A A note is added to the [CCW] surveillance that clarifies that-the system is not made inoperable by the isolation of individual components. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431, Rev. 1, and provides clarification only. 08 05 A The surveillance is modified to clarify that valves that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in their correct position are not required to be tested. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431, Rev.1, and provides clarification on ng lp03.7.72
'_1-;ih.auunsun.auwmatic cvayes.3which;areMR_10 seguted positfo~n'underiadmfnistratjvelc.onttol,sgloltx!i*e_ ted H03.7.59 l fromit_he;surveillan_ce'.LThesslautpmatjg3elvegatelieg ~ Jg l thefrlaccidentipositi6nten~diale?notIre_ quired!to;a,ctj ateJgg l Petfptm',thejr l safetKfynctionMProperMsitionijg:bfsvakesi f
admf,njstratively,[contfolled:brequfpmentid0tioff,sef4c_tElRpgram and3o.ckedjvajfeIprogtam_sRTJhefelpro~9taimszensurewaive maintaindd lin!theirJpr,6perMsitidhTby,leq0itingMhdyp]Mghnt yerffjcationToffsefetysrelated;o;rigther2Lapo_rtan_tigigUjpjgg a o documentatjbf,gf;the~p~ sitj691bfRo~ckeM0fgqtMn'RMjl]JiLicg)l Progtam,lagd; periodic ^;teviegszoffe;quipment?no_rma))y:reaufted)to"#d locked.MExiemptingTautomatiPVal vssithat fare ~secursdj#f a Eequjted posjtiofCJsjperceived'asithe"intentiqf,1thei mtdjng] andithereforeXtheladditio_q20HtJhejphtasXmor 7_latelRefleciji _ Slintent'andjisigonsidetedito be' rativej 08 06 TR 1 The SR is revisea to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of the initiating signals is moved to the Bases. CPSES Description ofChanges to CTS 3N.7 10 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.5-10 APPLICABILITY: DC,CP a REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.2 and CTS 3.7.1.3 Action a STS SR 3.7.5.5 DOC 02-yy-A JFD B-PS For DCPP. CTS 3.7.1.3 Action a, requires the Condensate Storage Tank flowpath open to the AFW pump suction. STS SR 3.7.5.5 verifies the required CST flowpaths to each steam generator are properly aligned. For CPSES. there is no CST flow path verified and hence there is no DOC, JFD, or Bases discussion provided. Comment: For DCPP. ITS SR 3.7.5.5 was not adopted when there appear to be CTS l requirements to ensure AFW flowpaths are properly aligned. The ITS 3.7.5 Bases LCO l discussion in the first sentence of the third paragraph states the need to " assure" the CTS ' outlet valve is open. If this verification does not occur in ITS SR 3.7.5.1, retain the STS SR i 3.7.5.5. If this verification does occur in ITS SR 3.7.5.1, modify ITS SR 3.7.5.1 and the Bases l to include this specific component verification. The partial plant specific justification / reason provided as the third paragraph of ITS Bases SR 3.7.5.6 should be moved back to SR 3.7.5.5 or adopt the STS text. For CPSES. provide a DOC or JFD, as appropriate to justify how the 1 4 CTS is affected by adopting the STS SR 3.7.5.5 text. Revise the submittal for these issues. l FLOG RESPONSE: For DCPP - STS SR 3.7.5.5 is not required for those units that use FW for normal startup and shutdown. DCPP uses AFW for startups and shutdowns. The CST flowpath to the AFW pump suction is verified to be properly aligned by completing or verifying the current sealed valve checklist, Operating Procedure OP K-10D, Sealed Valve Checklist for Auxiliary Feedwater System,"in accordance with the " Mode 4 to 3 Transition Checklist" included in OP L-0," Mode Transition Checklists." STS SR 3.7.5.1 verifies that each AFW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each water flow path, and in both steam supply flow paths to the steam turbine driven pump, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise , secured in position, is in the correct position. Since the position of the valves in the CST flow-path to the AFW pump suction are controlled by the sealed valve checklist, they are not part of the STS SR 3.7.5.1 verification. The following has been added to the Bases for STS SR 3.7.5.1 to describe how valves in the CST flowpath to the AFW pump suction are controlled: "The valves in the flowpath from the CST to the AFW pump suction are verified to be in the correct position prior to use of the AFW system for normal startup, and are subsequently controlled by a sealed valve checklist. Use of AFW for normal startups and shutdowns, and performance of the quarterly pump surveillance tests confirm that the CST flowpath to the AFW pump suction is properly aligned." The third paragraph of ITS Bases SR 3.7.5.6 should remain unchanged. For CPSES - The justification for not incorporating ITS SR 3.7.5.5 is provided by the marginal notation in the ITS markup of "B-PS". The "B-PS" notation per the FLOG mark-up methodology means " Bracketed - Plant Specific" (i.e., the plant is adopting the current TS requirements). ITS SR 3.7.5.5 is bracketed in the STS and per the STS conversion methodology would not be required to be adopted unless a comparable requirement already exists in the CTS. A comparable SR does not exist in the CPSES CTS.
- ATTACHED PAGES
None
i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: 0 3.7.6-2 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.3 Action a ITS 3.7.6 Action A i DOC 03-yy-LSy CTS 3.7.1.3 Action a explicitly - 'i' 'ST restored Operable in 4 hours or verify an Operable ESW [SSWS] as a t ack . v. ipply in 7 days. These Actions and Completion Times have been reversed in the ITo ? . dions. 3d; however, the CTS Actions have been Comment: ITS 3.7.6 is acceptaiF extensively reformatted and char.; , .he CTS markup indicating and providing a technical justification for these C r acu requirements. CPSES has provided no CTS markup of this Action to indicate ch 4 and WCGS is the nearest to identifying ct,w.ps but is without an explanation. Provide Med DOC, JFD, or CTS markup with the appropriate explanations and justifications. FLOG RESPONSE: Except for the extension in completion time (DOC 2-20-LS) the unmodified CTS 3.7.1.3 ACTIONS a and b are technically equivalent to ITS Conditions A and B (as modified by JFD 3.7-04). Based on the FLOG methodology, which does not require that t technically equivalent statements be revised solely for the purpose of conforming the CTS to l the ITS format, CPSES chose not to modify the CTS. WCGS and Callaway elected to reformat the CTS to more closely approximate the ITS format but failed to identify that those changes were purely administrative. Based on the response to Comment Number O 3.7.1-1, DOC 01-13-A was added to each specification to address the fact that changes would not be made such as reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording to conform the CTS the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431.. This DOC also is used for those case where sonie non-technical changes were made to conform the CTS to the ITS. ATTACHED PAGES: e None
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.6-3 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.3.1 and 4.7.1.3.2 ITS 3.7.6 Required Action A.1 DOC 03-03-LG CTS 4.7.1.3.1 and 4.7.1.3.2 each cantain details for when and how to verify the Operability of the CST level and the backup SSWS. These details are moved to the ITS Bases. l Comment: It is acceptable that the verification for the 4.7.1.3.2 details is moved to the ITS I Bases discussion of Background. However, the CTS markup of 4.7.1.3.1 does not show the ; text moved to the Bases and does not indicate the DOC for this CTS change. Revise the CTS l markup. Also, DOC 03-03-LG is incorrect because the verification by " administrative means" is ! added to the Recuired Action A.1 and not the surveillance as the CTS markup shows and is I described in the DOC. Revise the CTS markup and DOC to correctly explain and justify this CTS change. FLOG RESPONSE: CTS 4.7.1.3.1 has been marked up to show that the details of that surveillance have been moved to the Bases per DOC 03-03-LG. ITS Bases for SR 3.7.6.1 indicates that CST level is verified every 12 hours whenever the plant is in MODE 1,2 or 3 without any stipulations as to what the CST is supplying. This encompasses the requirements of operability that were moved from CTS SRs 4.7.1.3.1. ., The format of the ITS for this specification is different than the CTS. However, there is no I technical difference between the CTS surveillance to " demonstrate OPERABLE by administrative means at least once per 12 hours whenever the SSW system is being used as an altemate supply source" and the iTS Required Action " verify by administrative means OPERABILITY of backup water supply" with a completion time of "once per 12 hours". Per the Flog markup methodology only technical differences are identified. Administrative change DOC 1-13-A was added to this specification per Comment 3.7.1-1 to indicate that format changes are not identified in the CTS mark-uo. -: ATTACHED PAGES: Enct2 3/4.7-5 See attached pages for Comment 3.7.1-1
l -- ! PLANT SYSTEMS ! 1 13 A 0 3.7.1 1 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with an indicated water level of at least 53%. APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2 and 3. ACTION: With the CST inoperable, within 4 hours either: a-se-Es
- a. Restore the CST to OPERABLE status or be in at least HOT STANDBY n.3.7.6 5 within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 12 6.; hours, or
- b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the Station Service Water (SSW) system as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and m restore the CST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least a.3.7.6 5 HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the, following 642 6] hours.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.3.1 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERARI F at least once per 12 ho 3 03 LG ici;Ty; si we i sicatcd water level i; within its limits when the tank is the 0 3.7.6 3 supply ;ourcc for the auxilicry fccdwater pumps- _ 4.7.1.3.2 The SSW system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE b.yladminj,s_tratjve3meeg at least once per 12 hours whenever the SSW system is being used as an alternate ka m W J supply source to the cuxiliary fccdwatcr pumps by vcrifyin;; the SS" system OPEPXLE sad cach actor operatcd valvc betucca thc SS'J systc; and cach OPEPXLE cuxiliary feedwatcr pump is OPEPX LE. l l CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N. 7-5 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.6-5 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.3, Applicability, Action a and b ITS 3.7.6, Applicability, Required Action B.2, and Completion Time DOC 02-20-LS35 JFD 3.7-04 If the CST level is not within limits and is not restored Operable, CTS 3.7.1.3 Actions requires Mode 3 entry in 6 hours and entry into Mode 4 in an additional 6 hours. ITS 3.7.6 permits an additional 12 hours for entry to Mode 4.
]
Comment: Issue #1 - CPSES has not adopted the STS Applicability extending into Mode 4 until the " steam generator is no longer relied upon for heat removal" As previously noted, CTS j 3.7.1.7 Action a and b both require the RCS/RHR loops to be placed in operation which directly I implies the STS Applicability is a CTS requirement (perhaps due to the transition temperature being below the Mode 4 limits). Adopt the STS Applicability. Issue #2 - This STS permitted total 18 hour Completion Time, for entry into Mode 4, is only for when the Applicability of the ; LCO has been extended to cover the extra time spent in Mode 4, while the steam generator is I relied upon for heat removal. Therefore, CPSES should adopt the revised STS Applicability or I retain the current licensing basis of 12 hours total time. JFD 3.7-04 does not discuss the l technical basis for receiving the extra 6 hours of Completion Time. DOC 02-20-LS35 is not applicable and not specific enough for this CTS change. Provide a revised JFD and DOC as I appropriate for this CTS change. , FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1-(Also see the responses to Comment Numbers Q 3.7.4-8 and l O 3.7.5-1.) CPSES did not adopt the STS applicability for ITS 3.7.6 for the following reasons: 4
- 1. CTS 3.7.1.3 does not require CST operable prior to MODE 3. For a normal or Technical Specification forced shutdown, the CST is the primary source of cooling water for the RCS. The AFW system and the main condenser is the normal heat sink for the RCS loops / steam generators in MODE 3 and 4 cooldown until RHR loops are operation. I
- 2. CTS 3.7.1.3 actions place the unit in MODE 4 under the applicable requirements for CTS 3.4.1.3 which does not require an operable CST. CTS 3.7.1.3 actions a and b result in a MODE that requires 2 cooling loops from six possible choices (4 RCS loops or 2 RHR loops). One motor driven AFW pump provides the required support for two RCS loops. Extending CTS 3.7.1.3/ITS 3.7.6 into MODE 4 when the steam generator is required for heat removal would require the CST operable when it is not currently required.
- 3. CST Operability requirements for the STS LCO in MODE 4 are based on FWLB mitigation and are more restrictive than they should be in MODE 4.
Issue #2 - The increase in allowed outage time from 6 to 12 hours (DOC 2-20-LS) has been withdrawn for CTS 3.7.1.7 and 3.7.1.3. The increased outage time has been retained for CTS 3.7.1.2 ( See response to Comment Number O 3.7.5-1) ATTACHED PAGES: Enct 2 3/4.7-5 Enci 4 63 EnclSA 3.7-16 Enci5B B 3.7-37
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PLANT SYSTEMS 1 13 A CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK O'3'7 l'1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with an indicated water level of at least 53%. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3. ACTION: With the CST inoperable, within 4 hours either: 2-es-ts
- a. Restore the CST to OPERABLE status or be in at least HOT STANDBY a.3.7.6 5 w hin the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 I 12 ours. or j
- b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the Station Service Water (SSW) system as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and g restore the CST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least 0 3.7.6 5 HOT STANDBY wi in the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the, following hours.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.7.1.3.1 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by 3 03 LG verifying the indicated water level is within its limits whcn the tank is the 0 3.7.6 3 Oupply source for the auxiliary fccdwater pumps. 4.7.1.3.2 The SSW system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by;,admjD.istrativeJaeang at least once per 12 hours whenever the SSW system is being used as an alternate usercq supply source to the auxiliary feedwatcr pumps by verifying the SS" system 0"EPXL cad each motor opcrated valvc betwccn the SS" system and cach OPE"XLC cuxiliar) fccdw:tcr pump is OPCIX LE. l l I i CPSESMark-up ofCTS 3N.7 3N. 7-5 9/2S/98
IV. SPECIFIC N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS I NSHC LS 35 l 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION I FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WIllIIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev.1. the required completion time to shut the plant down would be revised from achieving HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours to achieving HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours. An additional 6 hours would be allowed to achioua unT cuijTnnuu fnr tha m iliary feedwater (AFW) syste , mondcasata Storage Tank. and the [atrcpheric relicf volvc] lincs if they if 0 3.7.4-8 130per_able1AFWl pump could.notibe:res.tored within the1 required completion time 0-3.7.5 1
*N *
(dd b oor7ffatwolAFW pumpsjwere inoperapie. unw MUI bHUlUUWN Was aCnleved. o hvut where the residual heat removal (RHR) system would be OPERABLE in addition to the OPERABLE AFW train (s) used to perform the cooldown to HOT SHUTDOWN conditions. Since the inoperable AFW train (s) may affect the normal cooldown rate, the ITS allows an additional six hours to achieve MODE 4. The added time provides additional margin to perform an orderly transfer from the SG method of heat removal to the RHR system to regain the heat removal function without challenging unit systems. The AFW system is designed to cool the plant to MODE 4 entry conditions at whic,h time the RHR system may be placed in service. The RHR system, which is required to be OPERABLE, is capable of adequate heat removal. Although AFW may be used for additional cooldown below 350"F, AFW operability in MODE 4 is not an assumption of any safety analysis and is not consistent with the current licensing basis. The MODE applicability for AFW in the current TS is MODES 1, 2, and 3. In general, the AFW system would be available to remove heat during a normal startup or shutdown and thus would be capable of providing the heat removal function even if not technically OPERABLE. This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves e no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Cormnssion may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91. that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21 (b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration.1f operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
\ 2 Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident frorn any accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. "
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards: CPSES No Significant Hazards Considerations - CTS 3N.7 63 9/25/98
CST 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) LC0 3.7.6 The CST level shall be 2 110.000 gal. 53%. M APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3. M000 4 when ;tes; scacrator is rclied upon for heat rc;r,sval. gg ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CST level not within A.1 Verify by administrative 4 hours limit. means OPERABILITY of backup water supply. MQ Once per 12 hours . 6NQ thereafter - A.2 Restore CST level to within limit. 7 days B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion m Time not met. MQ 3.7 04 l B.2 Be in MODE 4, without 12 3 &Lhours 0 3.7.6 5 rcliance on ;tca; scr,crator
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for hcat rc;r.cv;1. kBt CST 3.7.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 Verify the CST levol is 2 110.000 gal. 53%. 12 hours EB-PS%# CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3.7-16 9/2588
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CST B 3.7.6 BASES LC03 MODE 3 for 4 hours, followed by a cooldown to RHR entry conditions (Continued) at 50*F/ hour forl5 Mud. This basis is established in Reference 4 5 and exceeds the volume required by the accident analysis. The OPERABILITY of the CST is determined by maintaining the tank level at or above the minimum required level. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in ",00E 4, when stc;m gcacrator is bcing rclied upon for hcat removci, the CST is required to be OPERABLE. In MODE 4 5 or 6 the CST is not required because the AFW System is not required. ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the CST level is not within limits, the OPERABILITY of the backup supply should be verified by administrative means within 4 hours and once every 12 hours thereafter. OPERABILITY of the backup feedwater supply must include verification that the. flow paths from the backup water supply to the AFW pumps are OPERABLE, and that the backup supply has the required valuac of water Ovoilable SSWSlis.10perable. In'additjonzeackjactorJoperatpd; d Valve between3he:SS_WS;andleach,0perable"AFX. pump;must1beJ0PERABLE] The CST must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, because the backup supply 1sinot gondensat_elgradelyateM e may bc performing this function in additicr. to its normal functions. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to verify the OPERABILITY of the backup water supply. m Additiona))fEvetifyingithe; bag.kup wate.t(supply;eyAty32 TR.3.7 002 hourslCadequateltolensur_e3h_elbacktjplate!'isupply continuerto'beTavailableEThe 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on an OPERABLE backup water supply being available, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period requiring the CST. B.1 and B.2 If the CST cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4, withou' -^liance on the :tcom gcncrator for heat 0 3.7.6 5 removal, within _J2 hours. The allowed Completion Times > re reasonable, on operating expenem.e. w reacn the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-3 7 925/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.7-2 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.3.[1].b ITS SR 3.7.7.2 DOC 08-05-A l CTS 4.7.3.[1].b requires that each automatic valve is verified to actuate to its correct position. I Corresponding ITS SR 3.7.7.2 limits this verification by excepting those valves that are " locked, I sealed or otherwise secured in position." Comment: This CTS change is acceptable; however, this results in fewer valves that need this verification which is a "less restrictive" change. In addition, for CPSES, the (***) footnote in the l CTS markup has omitted the beginning phrase "in the flow path." Revise the submittal to i provide the appropriate justification for the proposed change. l l FLOG RESPONSE: The FLOG believes that the proposed change is an administrative change. The NRC accepted a similar change at Vogtle as an administrative change, as discussed in Section 3.1.3.7 item (13) of the Vogtle SER. l DOC 08-05-A is revised to include: "The clarification allows automatic valves, which are in their secured position under administrative controls, to be exempted from the surveillance. These automatic valves are secured in their accident position and are not required to actuate to perform their safety function. Proper positioning of valves is administratively controlled by equipment out of service programs and locked valve programs. These programs ensurevalves are maintained in their proper position by requiring independent verification of safety-related or other important equipment, documentation of the position of locked equipment in a surveillance program, and periodic reviews of equipment normally required to be locked. Exempting automatic valves that are secured in their required position is perceived as the intent of the CTS wording, and therefore, the addition of the phrase more accurately reflects this intent and is considered to be administrative." In response to the CPSES specific comment, CPSES has included a revised CTS page to add ,,, the words "in the flow path" to the (***) footnote. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl 2 3/4.7-14 Encl.3A 10 1
PLANT SYSTEMS l 1 13 A i Q 3.7.1-1 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 l 3.7.3 At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE *, restore at least two loops to (s.es.AB OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3 Each component cooling water loop shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) initheiflow path; servicing safety related 3s.08 AM equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position!$; and ' #.#M
- b. At least once per 18 monthst, by verifying that: 12-D-AW
- 1) Each automatic valv[eng safety related-equipment Es45fA%
actuates to its correct position on its associated enginccred r safety featurc an3ctuallrlsimulated actuation signal, and RsMmj
- 2) Each Component Cooling Water System pump starts automatically on an'actdaEofisjmuljated;actuatior) e a safety injcction test MMI signal. 1
- The survcilience test intcrval is extended to 24 months for 12-p-M$
Train A, Unit 2, to rc;ain in effcct until thc completion of the scccad refacling cutage for Unit 2. g gatgg18pplj cablelRe_qdired!ActiorisTofiLCO T4'/113&CENot1Shutd.ownafol Es.ts-AM ' RRildGaT@at* rjtmova))]@ps3aje31_ngefabTelbgCOg g B01stgen3f3CEf_loEto3nd1ViddalIcolibonents;d66sIgot[rendectheLCg[gys,teg p,s:q[(yg Wpbler!)
\'N M DCth6Mlowpath.ithat;iDot11 ocked Iseal ed 7 o r Fotherwi se'secu red.11.0 E- 3h72 CPSESMark-up of CTS 3N.7 JN. 7-14 9/25/98
1 i CHANGE NUMBER HSE DESCRIPTION 1 07 17 A The allowance to open a valve closed per an action in this 1 specification is enveloped by ITS SR 3.0.5. I MBE t.G Theitdentification;o_fith3e pecific;pypasslya]vesgassgefates o.3,7,3 3 wjth;feedwaterli sol atjon3al vesTinlLC_OlanditheLApp]ic_ab,111ttis i desetjpt11e mater.iarandais imoved,tolthe; Bases;gonsigten}Mth thelleveliofide,tajl proVfdedjigLN,UREGE1331] I 08 01 LG Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table i (enclosure 3B). 1 08 02 A A note is added to the ACTION that references a potential interaction with ITS 3.4.6 dealing with operability of the RHR l system in MODE 4. The Note requires that the applicable TS be entered for the RHR train made inoperable by the inoperable [ component cooling water (CCW)] System. The ACTIONS of the referenced TS (RCS Loops-MODE 4) require more immediate action than are required by the [CCW] ACTIONS. , 08 03 LG Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). 08 04 A A note is added to the [CCW] surveillance that clarifies that-the system is not made inoperable by the isolation of individual components. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1, ' and provides clarification only. 08 05 A The surveillance is modified to clarify that valves that are I locked, sealed or otherwise secured in their correct position are ) not required to be tested. This change is in accorda with ' NUREG 1431. Rev.1. and provides clarification on1 he 0-2 7.7-2 cl _ ajgnjallows automatic;valyesyygucn. ore 2 n31_hejr i secuir;ed,positiotCunder admiriistrativeicontrplsTftg~pglexleepled H 0 3.7.5 9 R fromlthess0tiel] lance 2TheisMa_0to_maticivalyes1re,Lsgc0tqd2i[D ' theirlacciderttipositioralid we7not;tenditegatola_ctu_a.teto perform;theitisafety],functionMPropegpgsitioning!of3a]Vggis
!Ldmini strativeJficoat r. ol]epregufpmenticutlofitervtelptograms gnd3peked7 Valve!ptograms7TThesLelprpgrgesJgtsure*Nalygjsgtg gaintaineid]Ethelgplopiefp6fition;by31gGjtfgg1ndepeDde.jg verificatfocoffsafetyrrelated orsfotherlimpottantlegdjpj! pal doculientati.onidfiths))f6fitionJ6fil_ocKedlegefpment2jgisDr_VeiUanJg o j progtamilanggeniodic"rdVleirsToffeq0j p_ men.tJgotma))y3'egfired3 olig ;
locKedrdExymptinglaijt'o maticTaly~e'sithatTafels:ecytedlin d th6Jn l te9010edipositiggifsj percei v,ed,;a sithelinten,tlofitjle2CTEWotding; andithereforegthe"additiofofsthe,Tphras;b']norefaicgurate]y;;rgflec_t
., J entrandgis3onsideredito'.beTadministrativej 08 06 TR 1 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of the initiating signals is moved to the Bases.
CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N. 7 10 9f25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.7-4 APPLICABILITY: DC,CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.3.[1].b ITS SRs 3.7.7.2 and 3.7.7.3 DOC 08-06-TR1 CTS 4.7.3.[1].b verifies at least once per 18 months that each CCW automatic valve [and pump] actuates as designed upon receipt of its [ associated ESF], Safety injection or [ Phase "B" Isolation) test signal. ITS SR 3.7.7.2 and ITS SR 3.7.7.3 [new for DCPP] verify the automatic CCW valves and the CCW pumps actuate on an " actual signal or a simulated signal." Comment: The DOC states the specific identity of the simulated signal is no longer retained in the SR but is moved to the Bases. A review of the ITS SRs 3.7.7.2 and 3.7.7.3 Bases discussion shows these signals are not identified there. Revise the Bases accordingly per the : DOC. 1 FLOG RESPONSE: The Bases for SR 3.7.7.2 and SR 3.7.7.3 have been updated to include ESF actuation signals. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B 3.7-42 1 l l
CCW System B 3.7.7 BASES 1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS
- This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the CCW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CCW System.
4 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and . automatic valves in the CCW flow path provides assurance that the l proper flow paths exist for CCW operation. This SR does not apply l to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR also I does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned. I such as check valves. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation: rather, it involves verification I that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions. ., SR 3.7.7.2 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of e.agf} automati_g3he-CCW valves on itsiassogjated.. eft-actual or j 0 3.7.74 simulated $ actuation signal. ine LLw aystem 1s a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. This Surveillance is .not : i required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage l and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
! SR 3.7.7.3 i i This SR verifies proper automatic coeration_ of the CCW pumps _ _ j
~7' on an actual or simulatedgty;Infeg. tion)ictuation signal. )
The CCW System is a normally upa auns system that cannot be l fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. The 181 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this . Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3. 7 B 3.7-42 9M588 w
4 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.8-1 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS LCOs 3/4.7.4.1 and 3/4.7.4.2, Applicability, Actions, SRs ITS 3.7.8 LCO Applicability, Actions, SRs DOC 09-ww-A CTS 3/4.7.4.1 and 3/4.7.4.2 are complete LCOs which are combined, changed and converted 2 into ITS 3.7.8. Comment: Issue #1 - There are no DOCS provided by CPSES in the CTS markup to describe and justify how these two CTS LCOs are converted into the ITS 3.7.8. Issue #2 - There are no explanations to define how these shared unit systems CTS requirements are retained in the I ITS Issue #3 - There are no explanations for how the CTS 3/4.7.4.2 Applicability in Modes 5,6 and Refueling requirements are satisfied in the ITS. Issue #4 - There are no explanations of how the CTS Actions are adapted to the ITS format. Revise this entire LCO submittal. FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1- Two CTS LCOs are converted into the ITS 3.7.8, however, there are no technical changes associated with this conversion. They are changes in format only. DOC 1-13-A was added to indicate that no specific justifications are provided for non-technical changes such as format changes (See response and attached pages for Comment l Number O 3.7.1-1). . Issue #2- The SSWS is not a shared system. Each unit has a redundant SSWS independent of the other unit in full conformance with GDC-5. Each unit will comply with ITS 3.7.8 separately. Issue #3- See response to issue #1 above. Issue #4- See response to Issue #1 above ATTACHED PAGES: , None l
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.8-2 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.4.1 and 3.7.4.2 Applicabilities and Bases J ITS 3.7.8 Applicability and Bases JFD 3.7-30 CTS 3/4.7.4.1 Applicability is Modes 1,2,3 and 4. CTS 3/4.7.4.2 Applicability is Mode 5,6, and Defueled. ITS 3.7.8 Applicability is Mode 1,2,3 and 4. Comment The submittal has contradictory Applicability requirements. The Bases have not been modified to explain the changes and/or the requirements. It appears the ITS Applicability should be "Both units in Modes 1,2,3, and 4"; (next line) "When one unit is in Modes 1,2,3, and 4 and the opposite is in Mode 5,6 or Defueled". Revise the submittal. FLOG RESPONSE: It is not necessary to deviate from the STS applicability. Either unit in MODES 1-4 with ITS 3.7.8 as proposed is equivalent to the CTS 3/4.7.4.1 and 3/4.7.4.2. ATTACHED PAGES: None 9
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.8-3 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.4.1 and 3.7.4.2 Actions and Bases ! ITS 3.7.8 Actions and Bases JFD 3.7-30 CTS 3/4.7.4.1 and 3/4.7.4.2 are complete and different LCOs with separate Actions which are now combined, change .1 and converted into ITS 3.7.8 Actions. Comment: Issue #1 - The Bases Background and LCO discussions contain descriptions which appear to permit SSWS operating configurations that were never intended. There is nothing to prevent two inoperable SSWS trains in one unit being cross-tied to two Operable SSWS trains in the opposite unit. Therefore, a preventive condition should be logically connected by an QB to ITS Condition C stating "Two trains are inoperable in one unit and two trains are Operable in the opposite unit with the associated cross-connects Operable". Issue #2 - ITS Action B should be placed ahead of ITS Action A due to the length of the Completion Times and ITS 3.7.8 Action B should be split into two separate Actions. Issue #3 - By this ITS being a shared unit LCO (with no further prevents), " Separate condition entry"is implied. Therefore, a SSWS train could be assumed to be inoperable in each unit plus either the associated cross-connects or the required pump, or both, could be inoperable. Should this Condition still permit 72 hours or warrant a shorter Completion Time of 24 hours or be directed to an immediate LCO 3.0.3. CPSES should explain the technical basis for risking continued operation in this configur'ation. i Issue #4 - The Bases LCO discussion has two final paragraphs which are two new degraded I operating conditions with required actions for continued operation. These Bases appear to contradict other statements in the Bases and they may not meet the Standard Review Piri requirements. These " Bases Conditions" must be formally included into the LCO following a technical review or otherwise resolved. CPSES should explain the technical basis for risking continued operation in these configurations. Note: Issues #1 and #3 can also be limited by putting in an Actions note which ' specifically states "The Conditions and Required Actions apply simultaneously to both~ units." l FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1- The ITS 3.7.8 BASES background paragraph 4 states: " Train isolation by two normally closed valves in series or one locked closed valve is provided to satisfy GDC-44. Unit isolation by one locked closed valve is provided to satisfy GDC-5." If an . operable SSW train in MODES 1-4 were cross-tied to either an operable or an inoperable train or unit, it would become inoperable and Condition A would be entered. Flushing of the lines between trains of the same unit is performed during shutdown. Flushing of the lines between two trains of both units is performed under Condition A. Issue #2- The order of Conditions A and B have been switched. The action for Condition A (old Condition B) has been split into two Actions (A.1 and A.2) both with a completion time of 7
- days.
Issue #3- The technical justification for the 72 hour completion time was included in TXX-92410 (Ref. 6 in ITS 3.7.8 BASES). It is the CTS completion time.
l issue #4- The CPSES LCO for SSWS is unique because it includes a Loss of Service Water Event (LOSSW). There are no SRP requirements for such an event. The STS and the SRP are limited to Design Basis Accidents and safe shutdown events assuming a single active failure. The additions to the BASES are required to explain the unique operability requirements of the opposite unit and cross connect valves for a beyond the design basis event. l ATTACHED PAGES: EnciSA 3.7-19 ) Enci5B B 3.7-46 and B 3.7-47 I l
l SSWS 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Station' Service Water System (SSWS)
- -~- -
gpg 39 LC0 3.7.8 Two SSWS trains andWJi$iffmpytheEopplositetunitj,Wjt.1111ts associatedTcfDNFeckiggijshall be OPERABLE. E7'M APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME _ .2 Bequjred;SSW: Pump;onJhe @;1 Re_stotela;SSWfump;on 7jdays % ! opposit.e; unit!or3jts the', opposite;unitlto ' l associated 3 cross; OPERABLE
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7 status 3.7-30 con lnedhljnoperatiie. egl] 0'3 7 8'3 A.2. 4ts-{testor.e.Zassociated Udays crossiconnects;to OPERABLE 7 status ~.' AB One SSWS train .1 -NOTES --- inoperable. 1. Enter applicable PS *i Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.8.1.
"AC Sources-Operating." for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by SSWS.
- 2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.6.
"RCS Loops-H00E 4." for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by SSWS.
Restore SSWS train to 72 hours OPERABLE status. (continued) CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3.7-19 9/25/98
SSWS B 3.7.8 BASES LCO An$SWStrainisconsideredOPERABLEduringMODES1,2,3,and4 (Continued) when:
- a. The pump is OPERABLE: and
- b. The associated piping, valves, hcot excher.gr, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
A;SSW Pump;p0theIoppositelWitlis20P_ERABLElas[back-up;in;,the eventroflglosSW?init;isicapableLoffproyiding: required; flow rates;EemergencyIdieselsgenerator3ower: source 11sInot1 required because))osslof;of,fsite; power 21sinotlassumedipoincident withia LOSSWeyent] Aicro_ssigonnect'lalvells'0LERABJ.Eliflitican;beigycled orlis 1ockedippenfjp.A.lvalvelthaticannot;bejdemonstrat_ed 0PERABLE~by cygling:isiconsJderedinoperable;untillthelval velisisurveilled i_1n theJockedJpeg p_osition1Howeyergat11 east;ggeictossiconnect valve;bepfeerginjtsljsiteqQJIreditolbEmaintainedicloseOtn t , accordan~ c erthIsocisrun16snequjtedlforzflushinglocidae:to totalRoss.IofLStation Ser.vice1Waterpumpsifot;either.lunit.: APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the SSWS is a normally operating system that is required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the SSWS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. m InMODES5and6,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheSSWSare determined by the systems it supports. ACTIONS AB 1 ndW2 cr.d S.2 7 V ' IflholSSjl3xLuplgIKtheIMtflinitIDClitsTassycjatedJrossj 1 CP 3.7 13 l connects 333mstablvat.glatera3JIGltabilitnisidegrsded j sincelalb_acklupWithereventMf!4? tots 3tf15tation;Servicg ( l Water;Sys,teGl;gSSWSEtyejg[may3lotibeIcapable of.{perfgtning o.3.7.s.3 tMfugon"DThe?7fdaGgplettonitime11 sibas_ediortthellow p probabt11ty3Ealt0SSWsJsg1;!githisitimelperiod] If one SSWS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-46 9/25/98
SSWS B 3.7.8 BASES remainingOPERABLEESWStrainisadequatetoperformthe heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is I0'3*78'3 reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE SSWS train could result in loss of SSWS function. Required Action A.1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.8.1 "AC Sources-0perating," should be entered if an inoperable SSWS train results in an inoperable emergency diesel generator. The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.6 "RCS Loops-HODE 4." should be entered if an inoperable SSWS train results in an inoperable decay heat removal train. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components. The 72 hour Completion Time is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period. C.Pand C:2 If the SSWS train orlan_SSW_ P_ ump;onithe; opposite unitjand;1ts associated; cross; connect _s cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. ,
= j SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the SSWS components or systems may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the ESWS.
Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the SSWS flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for SSWS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed, or secured. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation: rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-47 9/2S/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.8-4 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.4.1.1.a and CTS 4.7.4.2.1 ITS SR 3.7.8.2 and ITS Bases Background DOC 09-yy-LSy JFD 3.7-31 CTS 4.7.4.1.1.a and CTS 4.7.4.2.1 verify that each " manual, power operated or automatic" valve is in its correct position. ITS SR 3.7.8.2 requires the verification in accordance with Section XI but only of the cross connect valves. Comment: Issue #1 - The Bases Background discussion, second paragraph, third sentence states that there are remotely aligned valves in the SSWS which seems to agree with the CTS 4.7.4.1.1.a. The Bases, the CTS and the ITS are in contradiction. The STS SR 3.7.8.2 which verifies the automatic valves of CTS 4.7.4.1.1.a every 18 months has not been adopted. Also, there are no CTS DOCS for these CTS changes. Provide sufficient information and explanations to resolve these discrepancies. Issue #2 - The ITS SR 3.7.8.2 has not adopted the phrase "in the flow path" which is a part of CTS 4.7.4.1.1.a requirements. Revise the ITS SR to retain this CTS requirement. Issue #3 - The JFD 3.7-31 states this change is more restrictive than the STS and is consistent with NRC Generic Letter 91-13 but there is no technical discussion provided to make this same determination. Revise the submittal to remove' these contradictions and provide the missing technical justification for these changes. - FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1- The JFD 3.7-31 and the ITS 3.7.8 BASES have been revised to j clarify the SSWS automatic valves with respect to STS SR 3.7.8.2. The CTS does not include a surveillance of automatic valves on a Safety injection test signal as is required for the pumps 1 because there are no such valves in the system. The pump discharge valve is automatic and is l interlocked to open on a pump start. STS SR 3.7.8.2 is not applicable to CPSES because verification of the automatic pump discharge valve is covered by ITS SR 3.7.8.3. The valves in ; the SSWS cooling water flow path for the emergency diesel generators are interlocked to open , I automatically on an EDG start. CTS do not require direct surveillance of this interlock. Issue #2- ITS 3.7.8.2 uses the term " required" in lieu of the CTS 4.7.4.1.2 "in the flow path" which are equivalent in meaning. " Required" is the STS terminology. I lssue #3- JFD 3.7-30 has been revised to provide additionalinformation. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl 5B B 3.7-44 and B 3.7-45 Enci 6A 5 and 5a
SSWS B 3.7.8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3,7.8 Station Service Water System (SSWS) BASES BACKGROUND The SSWS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, and a normal shutdown, the SSWS also provides this function for various safety related ,E nonx cw rcis ac cagn=sp o.3.7.8 4 ) The safety related functio (are gcovered by this LCO. The SSWS consists of two separate.100% capacity, safety related, cooling water trains. Each train consists of two 100% capacity pumps, cac agacnt cecling water (CC'd' hcat exchanger, piping, valving, andjinstrumentation, and two cycicnc separators. The pumps and valves are remote and manually aligned, ex;cpt to'be operablejin the unlikely event of = 'm nf coolant accid t (LOChi.' The pumps aligned to # - --' their; respective - loops are automatically started upon receipt or a 4,V 0 3.7.8 4 injection signal, and all csscatial ='= = 21':- " '- > their =' ---iint xxiti--- dautomaticlvalyelin3he _schangelof;ea'cKpumplislinterlockedLto~open;ojn alpump; start t 3An automaticlyalye11pithelSSEcooling',gater20awJeth20Ceach emergency 3fje_se1Jgenetatgrlautomatically;opegslonlaidiesel geDeratgristartRAllTother valves ~areTsanual Valves"o3erated ocally? e pW5 also provides acrgen y c:kcup to t ;c ;pm fuc. gi :nd CC'J System :nd is.,the]ackupWater!supplylto 0 3.7.G 1 the]Augillary1Eeedwate&Sysles. Crossiconnectionslare;provided; bet _weegtrajns7andibetween; t units sitc!11thatAnyIpumpIcanisupply;anytotgripumpls2eguiteditlow) . l i Itatnlisolationyltiolgo_rmally a elosedwalgs3gteries;orione l loclediclAsMDitelifprJNLdeditoTs~attifLGDCREUnit11 sol atM on bylonellockedic]osed NalveMsJptgyldgJtgIs__atisfy1GDCiSq(RefA5) ; IgitheIeventDfiEt_otAMLditiof4StationMerVicbDlaten CP 3.7 13 l (LOSSW)IeLentlinTone;)]nitiBtIComancjlp2hk3baggGpolirig naabflity11cavanabteivfs'aIctess33nacttbetswEtMitig units"3ReleJgcetNSlajW476)EAnwrtMMBi.EIpGuip3[EmotiUa_119 tealigneend iflottaljaggito;ptoyjde.3g11gg3o31sentf allh. eat i 1.9.edsito!cpeIotlbgth]gL11s.Ys,"tequjfe_dETLe10PERABIEllTLbfithe3Injt ctossiconnect;alongmttcalSlatdon]Iylce RaterIpump'_inithe shutdown:.unitzensates7the3Vailabjli_tyloffsufficientIred.undant c.ool10glapacityJforathelopeta11gg;unitETheJQuiting'ConditjenZof o OpefalioglTiensure74Ttfortifica'ntitisiCreductioDsiindicatedlby thelanalysWEofia10JEplgtattog1ServicelWa_te%@ygt__egleyeat;.%T_he _$GtRW11183!ellequifeM[s]RK$utilthelthe.tt3330, tig?te~raLORERIBlEJJY ofithelStat,toniSetVic_elWatKSystem!)))icros~sleyg_nabctibetieenithe tio;ontts] CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-44 9/25/98
SSWS B 3.7.8 i BASES 1 l BACKGROUND The; Stat _jgLSgtgLctiM%?stgsicrassidjggectibgt)gnCtheltwo (Continued)] talts cgggigQtQglggggjggpjpjpgIBns3rossiconnectla]jes ; Mnist. he313@ggOfith0St4tiotESerfjcelWatgpumps' of i the2Nggitsspyaltempglegrossm+rtigge_thsj adet!tiageErgdundag3colincapacityltrom ogonitzis available tolthelStatjerC56tvjceC]faterlSystenlojf ttie!otheCunit.1 l Additional information about the design and operation of the ; SSWS, along with a list of the components served, is presented in : the FSAR, Section 9.;2j1 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related l function of the SSWS is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the CCW System. n., 7 n.i l APPLICABLE The design basis of the SSWS is for one SSWS train, in SAFETY ANALYSES conjunction with the CCW System and a 100% capacity containment cooling system, to remove core decay heat following a design basis LOCA as discussed in the FSAR, Section 6;2 (Ref. 2). This prevents the containment sump fluid from increasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following a LOCA and provides for a gradual reduction in the temperature of this. fluid^ as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System by the ECCS pumps. The SSWS is designed to perform its function with a single failure of any active component, assuming the loss of offsite power. The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCW System, also cools the unit from residual heat removal (RHR), as discussed in the FSAR,SectionSj4J,(Ref.3)entryconditionstoMODE5 CP.:).7 13 during normal and post accident operations. The time required for this evolution is a function of the tjmeI8f_tes s_hytdownJajngnumber of CCW and RHR System trains that are operating. OneESWStrainissufficienttoremovedecayheat during subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes a maximum SSWS temperature of % 102*F occurring simultaneously with maximum heat loads on the system. The SSWS satisfies Criterion 3 of the "!iC Policy Statr- " - 10CFR50?36(cI(21riiY' JIhefrequjresen,jaloricross;gonnej;ti_ons 0 3.L8 4 l _Ew itrunitJpLajpsisatis_f;Criterloglot es f 10CFR50236MM2M11U LC0 Two SSWS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming that the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power. B 3.7-45 9/25/98 CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -115 3.7
CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER 3.7 21 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 22 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 23 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 24 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7-25 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). 3.7 26 CONDITION O (for two valves in the s= ficw path incperabic) is deleted to reficct changes to Required Actions A and C and plant 0 3.7.3 2 specific dcsign of primary FIVs and associated bypass valyr: r.d isolation backup via the in scries TCVs and associated bypass valves. The applicabic 8 hcar capiction tiac is acved to the revised Actions A and C. Not;bsed] 3.7 27 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure
^
6B). 3.7 28 Revise [ARV] frequency from 18 months to "in accordance with Inservice Test Program." to be consistent with other valves in the CTS which are included in the Inservice Test Program (IST). The CTS for the [ARV] surveillance frequency is per the IST Program. [This change is also applicable to the [ARV] block valves that are included in the IST program.] 3.7 29 Revise AFW pump testing frequency to be "In accordance with Inservice. : Test Program." These changes are consistent with TSTF-101. and will eliminata any ambiguity associated with pump testing frequency as a result of ASME changes. 3.7-30 LC0 3.7.8 and SRs are revised to incorporate requirements for two units with station service water system cross connections. These 0 3.7.8 4 l changes are [ consistent with the CTS and are] more restrictive than NUREG 1431. but are consistent with NRC Generic Letter 91-3rC6teNsystems"Which "are'3,0_ tedundartt3nd3M]Egl3ll3Eitgamm!!stt"MhJ sithe 3aisE fot GPSES 3M SLS? ERB]!Mg!!$lpt[eEgite@nXpf 10Cfg5m16ku2EIDItItte.21!WlEC.is3focerosrconnect1onsr andjri opposite; unit?pwisatfsfy;cettedor4rof10CER50136LcH281])Mhese i NdditionJ1Lr,equitements]i!ete'8ddeditoIG_PSESlUn_itJ12echlSpecs;byIITS 3,7 1 teference16,'4TXX_:Ed(10'*ilhe E 8ASESTAPPLICABLE
. l SAJE H M Y _._
t!aceecrms!Laitsratifam CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-1431 - ITS 3. 7 S 9/25A8
l CHANGE JUSTIFICATION j NUMBER ; 3.7-31 SR 3.7.8,2 is replaced with the current plant specific surveillance of the cross connections of station service water system between units. ! The plant specific design for the station service water svstem ! does not contain any automatic valvesgi1chiactuate'on an Eh I 0 3.7.8 4 Min the safety related flow path, AnereTore an 3.7.8.2 of , NUREG 1431 is not applicable. ! l I l I n CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-1431 - ITS 3. 7 Sa 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.8-5 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.4.1.1.b ITS SRs 3.7.8.2 and 3.7.8.3 DOC 09-05-TR1 CTS 4.7.4.1.1.b verifies at least once per 18 months that each SSWS pump actuates as designed upon receipt of a Safety injection test signal. ITS SR 3.7.8.2 and ITS SR 3.7.8.3 verify the automatic SSWS valves and the SSWS pumps actuate on an actual signal or a simulated signal. Comment: The DOC states the specific identity of the simulated signal is no longer retained in the SR but is moved to the Bases. A review of the ITS SRs 3.7.8.2 and 3.7.8.3 Bases discussion shows this is not identified there. Revise the Bases accordingly per the DOC. FLOG RESPONSE: The iTS SR 3.7.8.3 Bases have been revised to included the specific actuation signal for SSWS pump start. CPSES has no corresponding SSWS specification requiring verification of automatic valve actuation on an actual or simulated signal. SR 3.7.8.2 (the STS surveillance for verification of automatic valve actuation) was modified to incorporate a plant specific surveillance requirement to cycle the SSWS required cross-connect valves every 92 days.
. j ATTACHED PAGES:
i Enct5B B 3.7-48 m
SSWS' B 3.7.8 BASES The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions. SR 3.7.8.2 This SR vcrifies proper autc;; tic operation of thc SWS valves on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The SUS is a nomally operating systc; that cenact bc fully actuated as part of acr;;;al testing. This Survcillance is not required for valves that are locked, scaled, or otherwisc secured in the required positica , under administrativ; controls. The [10] ; cath Frcqucacy is based ca thc need to perform this Surycillance under the conditicas that apply during a unit cutage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Survcillancc were perforacd with the reactor at powcr. OpcraHng cxperience has shown that thesc ccaponcat-s ttsually pass the Surveillance when performed at th; [18] month Frequcncy. Thereforc, the Frcqucacy is acceptabic frca a reliability standpoint. This'SR_verifie_s; proper position;or_sanual. m operation ofithe~ cross connect: valves 1between units.1;The1921 day frequencyli.sbasedlon;t_helrelquencyliKASMEXIj(Ref.27)7of i testing'ofjCategorylA~andiByalves;andjisJcon.sistent with Genede , Letter;9193f(RefE4)2 l SR 3.7.8.3 This SR verifies proper automatic coeration of the SSWS pumps on an actual or simulated (afetyilnje_ctionJactuation 03.7.85 l signal. The SSWS is a normally operating system that cannot , m be fully actuated as part of normal testing during normal operation. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the j Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating i experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. j CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-48 9/2588
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.9-3 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.5 LCO, Actions, and SRs Licensee Controlled Documents 1 DOC 13-03-R CTS 3.7.5 item c, Action b,4.7.5.b and 4.7.5.c have not been retained in ITS 3.7.9 but have been relocated to Licensee Controlled Documents. Comment: There is no technical basis provided to justify the relocation of these CTS requirements. The generic "R" NSHC is inadequate. Also, this not an "R" change since the R category is used only for the complete LCO relocations. Revise the submittal to provide this information. FLOG RESPONSE: The portion of the existing specification that was relocated could easily have been an independent specification in the CTS. CPSES considers this change to be a legitimate "R" because the requirements relocated contain all the elements of a specification; an LCO requirement, an Action statement and surveillance requirements to determine operability. DOC 13-03-R has been revised to provide additionaljustification for the change. Also screening sheets have been provided to verify that the relocated specification does not meet any of the 4 criteria in 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii) governing components, systems and structures that must be included in the TS. - ATTACHED PAGES: EncI 3A 15 : 1 page 27 and 28 ! l i i l l 1 l
. l 1 l . CHANGE NUMBER HSBC DESCRIPTION 1 13 01 LG Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table ' (enclosure 3B). ! 1 13 02 LG Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). l 13 03 R The LC0 for sedmentation depth and the Surveillance Requirements for SSI Dam inspections and for sedimentation depths are relocated to a licensee controlled documge __ 4 B ~~CilywwhMElElG9iswmmiyt._vaanvuqu)lsta_te atjthe:purpgtejisitO]jaltithe~averagbliediment;depthTonithe , possibilitylthatMcessiv_elsedjnent;builduplip;the'servfgeyateq f l intake:channellcoQld3cqurXAsinotedjinlthe'CESESlESARiduring;the postulatedl100jyearidrpughticondi,tions3ndlafter:40? years 3f sedimentation sthe:Ultjmate:HeatJ Sink;(the: Safe: Shutdown Impoundment liSSJ)Ilside.termined : to^ havel28Eacrifeetfof;watera Ihe3axjuus30M0pptionlof2SSI;Raterlduting; thel 39fday; post , accident" shutdown!c_ooldoWn!perjod3mountsitoJ2;a.greifeet] resulting]inla! decrease;in surface ~elejation of_318;ftMa))owing I adequatemargjn:foIlpost:30rday; operation ~withoutiexceedingithe s_ervice waterIpumplsubmergenc~e:requireme_nt_sE Th1CproposeC[SjtelisionTr.elgtates[regoirementsp3hicKdq'nefseet
- thelTS~ctiteda;1n210C850236[q)J2) (li)2toldogumen,tsMth estab11 shedicont rolj progransnThis2tegulationJaddress_esitMjcope andipurposCofiTS2EIg!doingsgZitlset_s;fotthla!o spec 1[iciset;of objectj ve;ctitetinJfor!detirmining;whighltegulatoryireguj t rjementj andipperatingTiestrictionsIsho01dibelin_c]udedlipithe7TSBRelocatjoD ofatheseiteguitementsia11oRsitheIIS;to;beltesenv_ed;pnlylptitho'se conditionsI6rmimit8tfois;gpVn33esctorJ)LetationJhighlafg Decessary1toTobviateithelpJo s_ibjilityioflan7 abnormal situation:or eventIgtving'llseitolah21mmediatelthreatito;thelpeb]icl@lthiand t 1 safety;th,ereby;fgc0}fugithje sicypelofith,e2TS$nlevaloalten?ofathe
{ applicab1]ity;ofItheseZeriterinitolthis2specjfjicajlon3fptpyjdgd 1XiattachmentI21] To ehsureIanNpgpMatGeie1IoffcghtfolntheseitequjrementsN111 l I?e:819c.ateditE11BkTcume_Qtgtlatlatels]gjectltolthelptggtsion_ s sip { t ! 101C3J501593TrotheOlicEhT6bTd6c_0mehtsIV4LighlhaveTiimilat tegulatoIy*c6ntrol sWeMTitheTQua11trAssurance'Pl ariNasldes.ptibed l jfallelESARithich%ftlqbntth1Tedib)110CFR50 ;548Mor3)161ptogt3M thaffareIcohttolled:VtaIthu?Administratjyy3ontrol s'stttio_nle,f3hg imptcyed]SMThe31dejLt,1f1citionTofithelspecifigaligenleg contto]ledidgom_eqtMontainingithisiregojtement11s;ptoyd_ed3g Ericlosure23BlofitLieltunVetYibnisubmitt_aly CpaplianceNith:theZtelocatedTrequitements311]lnstlbeJffectediby tiffptppos_edlchenJeltolthle currentKethnica11Specificatio!1sEUhs tegdited;periodicZsurveillance's g1112continueitEbe p~erformeditg
~
eDs0Ieithat111mitsloKhafinintelsIdrelaintsine_d,,2IheF6 fore; relocation;o_fitheseyegoirementsm));have polimpactlpnasyst_em 9Petab11itylocith,elmeintenengelofigontt61]edipetanstelsXithjD f 4 limits? i i CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3/.l.7 IS 9/2SM8 l 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SCREENING FORM (1) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.Sc ULTIMATE HEAT SINK SEDIMENT DEPTH Applicable MODES: MODES 1,2,3, and 4. (2) EVALUATION OF POLICY STATEMENT CRITERIA is the Technical Specification applicable to: YES NO _ 1 (1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. _ 1 (2) A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ 1 (3) A structure, system, or component (SSC) that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
- _ 1 (4) An SSC which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessInent (PSA) has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
If the answer to any one of the above questions is "YES", then the Technical Specification (TS) shall be retained in the TS. If the answer to all four of the above questions is "NO", the TS may be relocated to a controlled document. (3) DISCUSSION The Bases for this limiting condition for operation (LCO) state that the purpose is to limit the average sediment depth on the possibility that excessive sediment buildup in the service water intake channel could occur. As noted in the CPSES FSAR, during the postulated 100-year drought conditions and after 40 years of sedimentation, the Ultimate Heat Sink (the Safe Shutdown impoundment, SSI)is determined to have 284-acre feet of water. The maximum consumption of SSI water during the 39-day post accident shutdown cooldown period amounts to 92 acre-feet, resulting in a decrease in surface elevation of 3.8 ft., allowing adequate margin for post-30-day operation without exceeding the service water pump submergence requirements. The TS requirements for the sediment depth of the ultimate heat sink are not applicable to installed instrumentation used to detect a significant abnormal degradation of the RCPB; therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 1. The sediment depth of the ultimate heat sink TS is associated with a design feature or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a DBA or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. However, the sediment depth of the ultimate heat sink requirements are not explicitly considered in the accident analysis. The availability of the ultimate heat sink is assumed based on an evaluation of the 40 year buildup of sediment and the performance of Attachment 21 27
_ . . _ _ . . . ~ . _ . . - _ . - - - - . - . . _ - - , _ _ _ . . - - .~ periodic inspections. The sedim:nt d pth of ths ultimits brit sink operability is not required to be monitored and controlled during plant operation. Thus, this TS does not satisfy criterion 2. The ultimate heat sink is a feature which is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a cha"enge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. However, the sediment depth of the ultimate heat sink is not explicitly considered in DBA or transient analyses but is a design feature which is assured by an inspection program. Therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 3. The sediment depth of the ultimate heat sink had not been shown to be significant to public health and safety by either operating experience or PRA. Therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 4. ) (4) CONCLUSION , This Technical Specification is retained. 1 The Technical Specification may be relocated to a licensee controlled document. l l I m Attachment 21 28
i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.9-4 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.5 ITS 3.7.9 DOC 13-xx-A CTS 3/4.7.5 is written as a common LCO to both units shown as " ACTION: (Units 1 and 2"). The LCO or the Bases for ITS 3.7.9 does not explicitly state the UHS is a shared system. Comment: This is a shared system LCO for both units which must be identified in the ITS LCO and not placed in the BASES. The Applicability should be "Any unit in Mode 1,2,3, and 4" and the Actions should have a note inserted which states " Actions apply simultaneously for both units." FLOG RESPONSE: it is not necessary to deviate from the STS applicability. Either unit in MODE 1-4 will take the unit specific action if the intake water temperature exceeds its limit or the level is not restored within the completion time. i ATTACHED PAGES: None , J
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-9 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA i REQUEST: CTS 4.7.5.1.c.3; [4.7.6.c.1 and 3]; (4.7.7.1.b.2&3] ITS SR 3.7.10.4 DOC 10-17-A DOC [10-15-LG) DOC (10-24-A] JFD 3.7-33 l l CTS 4.7.5.1.c.3 [4.7.6.c.1 and 3] [4.7.7.1.b.3] verifies a system flow rate (s) of 2100 (for DCPP. 2000/2200/750 for WCGS. and 2000/500 for Callaway cfm 110% at least once per 18 months. This CTS requirement is not retained in ITS 3.7.10.4. Cornment: Issue #1 - ITS SR 3.7.10.4 should state the required flow rate for each train i because for the HEPA filter to be effective, the train flow must be within the specified flow rate range of 10% and still meet the room pressurization requirement. Issue #2 - For DCPP, ITS SR 3.7.10.3 has a JFD 3.7-33 that is referenced; however, it is not understood what purpose this JFD has to do with this SR. For all, explain why the makeup flow requirement was not adopted in more detail and/or revise this JFD accordingly. FLOG RESPONSE: (issue #1) The ventilation flow requirements of CTS 4.7.5.1.c.3 (4.7.6.c.1 and 3)(4.7.7.1.b.3) were moved to ITS 5.5.11a and b. See the response to NRC comrsent Q 5.5-8 for a complete explanation of where the specific CTS ventilation system requirements were nioved. ITS SR 3.7.10.4 corresponds to CPSES CTS 4.7.7.1.1(DCPP 4.7.5.1.e.3, WCGS and Callaway 4.7.6e.3). While the CPSES surveillance included a specific maximum makeup flowrate as part of the surveillance, the other licensees did not. The purpose of this surveillance is to verify the positive pressure of the control room with limited intake of outside air. Thus the testing should limit the makeup flowrate. For CPSES the maximum makeup flowrate is in the CTS and thus is included in the ITS. For the others, the makeup flowrate is not in the CTS and is controlled by the testing procedures. (Issue #2) (for DCPP)- The reference to JFD 3.7-33 has been deleted for ITS SR 3.7.10.3. It is applicable to ITS SR 3.7.10.4 only. For the explanation regarding why the makeup flow requirement was not adopted, see response to issue #1. ATTACHED PAGES: None i l l
l 4 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET f ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-11 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.7.1.] l ITS SR 3.7.10.4 1 DOC 10-11-LS19 CTS 4.7.7.1.] requires demonstration that each CREFS train can maintain a positive pressure at least once per 18 months. The CTS markup shows this test is conducted once each 36 months t on a " staggered test basis". ITS SR 3.7.10.4 requires performance of this test once every 18
- months on a " Staggered Test Basis."
Comment: The proposed ITS SR 3.7.10.4 is acceptable; however, the CTS markup is not l , consistent with the DOC, CTS or ITS requirement. Revise the CTS markup. l FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS markup frequency of the staggered test basis (STB) does not i appear to be the same as the iTS frequency STB because the definition of staggered test basis ! i is different between the CTS and the ITS. However, the actual testing frequency has not l changed. The following description was provided in Section 1.0 (attachment 4) for converting the definition of STB to the NUREG-1431 version per DOC 1-23-A: I "The current TS definition for Staggered Test Basis would be revised to be consistent with NUREG-1431, but the test intervals for surveillance requirements throughout the l improved TS that are to be performed on a staggered test basis will be revised to be consistent with the new definition so that there will be no net change in current TS implementation of staggered test intervals For example, under the current TS, if a parameter is monitored by three channels of instrumentation, and the test interval is quarterly, one channel would be tested each month during any given quarter by dividing the test interval into three equal subintervals. Under the new definition, the test interval for that same instrumentation in the improved TS would be specified as monthly so that the net effect is the same. One channel would be tested each month during any given , quarter." ATTACHED PAGES: None
I I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-14 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA l REQUEST: CTS 3.7.6 Action b, Modes 1,2,3 & 4; Action c, Modes 5 & 6 . ITS 3.7.10 Action B, C, D, E, and F DOC 10-20-LS39 JFD 3.7-57 These changes are beyond the scope of a conversion because the industry traveler referenced in this DOC (WOG-86) has not been approved by the NRC. In addition, for CPSES, the Action D condition statement appears to be contradictory because ; with two inoperable trains, it is not clear how any pressurization occurs. i Comment: Withdraw the changes or adopt the STS. 1 FLOG RESPONSE: WOG-86 has been approved by the TSTF and is designated as TSTF-287. This traveler has been submitted to the NRC and is under review. The proposed wording in TSTF-287 was modified from WOG-86, and these modifications have been incorporated into the ITS. This results in changes only to the Bases for the Required Actions for ITS 3.7.10. The , FLOG continues to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler. , l l This TSTF is not applicable to DCPP but is applicable to CPSES. For CPSES, Condition D refers to two CREFS trains inoperable due to inocerable CR houndarv. The CR boundary inoperablity is usually the result of boundary degradation such that with either CREFS trains running the system is unable to maintain a pressurization of
> .125 inches water gauge at 800 cfm. Action D merely requires repair of the degraded ,
pressure boundary. m ATTACHED PAGES: l Enci 3A 17 Enci 4 69 EnctSA Traveler Status page,3.7-23,3.7-24 and 3.7-24a Enci5B B 3.7-57, B 3.7-58, B 3.7-58a and B 3.7-59 Encl 6A 8 Also see the WC and CA response to Comment Number 3.7.13.2-2.
CHANGE NUMBER EillC DESCRIPTION 10 18 LS 36 The action shutdown requirement is revised from MODE 3 in the next 6 hours and MODE 5 in the following 30 hours to enter LC0 3.0.3. This effectively adds up to one hour to the completion time. 10 19 A Clarifies that, for CPSES, the " pressurization" mode is called the
" emergency recirculation" mode.
10 20 LS 39 This change establishes appropriate Required Actions and Completion Times for ventilation system pressure envelope degradation. The proposed change would allow 24 hours to restore the capability to maintain the proper pressure by allowing for routine repairs before requiring the unit to perform an orderly shutdown. This change recognizes that the ventilation trains associated with the pressure envelope would still be OPERABLE and providing the appropriate flows even if the required pressur ' ' cannnt 0 3.7. M be met. These changes are consistent wit Fj287WOG-66 10 21 LS 38 Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). 10 22 M Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). . 10 23 LS-13 The "within 31 days after removal" requirement for completion of laboratory analyses is deleted. This requirement is not contained in the ISTS nor is it contained in the RG 1.52 or the applicable ANSI standards. Failure to complete an analysis within 31 days has insignificant safety consequences because the results would be available within approximately the same time period and it is very unlikely that the charcoal would be degraded to the extent that there would be a complete loss of a safety function. , 10 24 A The 30"C temperature specified for laboratory testing of filter carbon samples is added to be consistent with NUREG 1431. [The requirement to test per ASTHD 3803 1979 at t 70% relative humidity is added per current TS.] This proposed change is acceptable because it adds a requirement already required to be performed when testing in accordance with the standard already specified in the TS: no change to the technical requirements would result. 11 01 M Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). 11 02 LS 28 Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N. 7 17 9/2S88
IV. SPECIFIC N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-39 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE l REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l l l This change provides specific required actions for failed surveillances designed to l detect ventilation system pressure envelope degradation. These surveillances require a I positive or negative pressure limit be satisfied in the area with the associated i required ventilation train operating. While other surveillances in the same ' specification test the operability of the ventilation train, these surveillances ensure the pressure envelope leak tightness is adequate to meet the design assumptions. However, there are no corresponding Conditions, Required Actions, or Completion Times associated with these surveillances. Under the CTS, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered [ ]. The proposed change would allow 24 hours to restore the capability to maintain the proper pressure by allowing for routine repairs before requiring the unit to perform an orderly shutdown. These changes have been modeled after the Shield Building specification (3.6.19) for a Dual or Ice Condenser containment and orovidas consistency with the NUREG. This change is consistent with 287 WOG-86 This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Cmmission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21 (b) or 50.22 or for a testing faci 1ity involves no significant hazards consideration. if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or n
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident frorn any accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. "
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change does not result in any hardware changes or changes to operating methodologies. This change recognizes that the ventilation trains associated with the pressure envelope would still be OPERABLE and providing the appropriate flows even if the required pressures limits cannot be met. The change also recognizes the low probability of a Design Basis accident during the allowed Completion Time. CPSES No Significant Ha:ards Considerations - CTS 3N.7 69 9/25/98
I INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.7 TRAVELER STATUS JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS I NUMBER NUMBER TSTF 36. Rev 2 Incorporated 3.7 42 Only applicable to DCPP TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific l reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident. TSTF-70, Rev 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable. NRC2apptoied m.3,7 0a ; TSTF not ' adopted since change was not applicable. TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7 05 and 3.7-19 NRC approved. TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7-29 NRC approved. TSTF 139,fRevf1 Incorporated 3-7-29 Not NRClapproved m .3.7 00s AppljcableT-1 Bases ch_angej TSTF 140, Rev 1 Notsincorporated NA Not NRC approved as of traveler cutoff date. l E -1Z3 Incorpogted NRC3pproved,} TR 3.7 00 L LSIES7J Incorpost!Ld NRC* approved 2 TR 3.7 00 ?l WOG-64 Incerporated 3-7-34 0 3.7.2-1 W9G-83ISTE235 Partially 3.7 01 Retaincd CTS Incorporated except for the 0 3.7.1-4 cxtension to 72 hours for trip
~ reset-
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CREFS 3.7.10 i 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Filtration /PresTsot[zatiod System (CREFS) p LCO 3.7.10 Two CREFS trains shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 3(; aBM During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies Curing C0"E ALTE"ATI0'4S ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREFS train A.1 Restore CREFS train to inoperable. OPERABLE status. 7 days BBj IglCREFS; Trains B9.1 Restogcontrollroom 24)ours 1poperable;dueite boundetfloiDPERABLE . 3.7 57 jnoperab]e:CR; boundary; statosL;MMlity;to 0 3.7.10 14 MMtniETR iMEdd tb G Gir n " n !Jithin ttatti
. Required Action and 1 Be in H00E 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A hri6HD not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, 3.7 57 0 3 a.10 14 or 4. .2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3.7 23 9/25/98
CREFS 3.7.10 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME JB i C4T Required Action and q associated Completion h1 NOTC Piccc in toxic gas Time of Condition A not protection r,cdc if met 1,Xtt0 dei 57od6,or autor.ctic transfer to 18-PS wi during movement of toxic gas protection irradiated fuel r,cd- is inopcrobic assemblies, or durir.g 3.7,57 C0"s: ATE"ATIONS. Place OPERABLE CREFS Q-3.7 10 14 - train in emergency Immediately recirculation mode. 03 PS . I h2,1 S.uspen[ CORE Immediately .
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inoperable f r2?;;0n; ALTElidTIONS., 0.tAnibsR9i41%i^R'EJ . J iR' MODE;;5Jbr;6;' or 26NQ r during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. cr during E06.2 Suspend movement of Immediately CORE ALTCl'aTIONS for irradiated fuel ., teesons3ther.;than assemblies. Co. n. d.i. ti.on:B.; [EES. Two CREFS trains FE4j.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Immediately i inoperable in 3.7.s7
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l CREF3 : B.3.7.10 BASES (continued) 'A APPLICABILITY In H0 DES 1, 2, 3, 4, [E6] and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies nd during COR ALTERAT-IGE CREFS must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA. ITENCO E ;IiEl th CREIS i; i;suired t; COPC With the relcas; fre;;; the rupturc of an cutside waste gas tank. CP 3.713 l 1 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and CORC ALTERATIONS. the CREFS must be OPERABLE to cope with the release j from a fuel handling accident. ' ACTIONS eu.1 I When one CREFS train is inoperable, action must be taken to l restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the i remaining OPERABLE CREFS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREFS train could result in loss of CREFS function. The 7 day Completjon 4 l Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during l this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability. BB21 ~ Ifithe;Co_ntroligoon2te.ssute11s'iriopletablelsifchlthat;the D 0 3.7.10 u g CREES 2 ttainsLeaEnotiestabljsEotinajatainl@eltequited j preis_suteLne! ; Gin'g3fML;;;;jr"ON;;.1;^gf.M;;11 m 'i I Cs4Rl3 G 2 21 3rd 4 G 0t;P M W MCttlWOstisti @ ltakeito te:s;tocGCOn32.3G,GEU Gt.GAW,EBJAB.EKon_trMtoom i boedarX30thig2Etgit01EIhC2Alte20gp]Rt@Aime11s
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Qoom;bounda annot be restored to OPERABLE status wmun ine requu eu Cump etion Time, the unit must be placed in a H00E that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least H00E 3 within 6 hours, and in H00E 5 within ; 36 hours. The { CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-57 9/2588
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CREFS B.3.7.10 BASES (continued) I allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power . conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. l lb2.1.and
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2 ' Q 3.7.10 14 Injj00Eiflpfi6] of during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, cr durir,- C0^" ALTE"ATI0'E if the inoperable CREFS train l cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion l Time, action must be taken to immediately place the OPERABLE CREFS train in the emergency mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure would be readily detecte An alternative to Required Actionh1 is to immediately suspend activities that could result in a Telease of radioactivity that , might require isolation of the control room. This places the I unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position, j _..J__J A LJ r* 1 J. __JJfJ.J L., . ht _ a _ J .,. J J - . h J _ _ &_ _1.__ & qu i 4 su nw b Vi s v.A sJ Ivvvu i s a su uy u nvbw a 4 su I wu b iIly bV yIuwu b _o_s__ J AL. A.J_ . ___&_aJ __J. Jt ...s_ .&J_ t .__f__ & JJ J b%355 ssE bsu% bvAIb yWJ fu V bb b b8VII IITVub I I M W b VIIEW b 3 b b5 WIIJd b I b
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CREFS 8.3.7.10 BASES (continued) 0 3.7.10 14 I_M;5]erMAj during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. ord durir.g C0"sE ALTE"ATIONS. with two CREFS trains inowrableJGFrpg3sa n g3 nan;1_nogetableicontro];goom,ooundar EeRLConditjgtIBEFlW1.EM11noperableJbotanda.ty3pt;testored 1 thCCompletion: Tim O Moised3 E coax!1tioT B au iun must ce taken
- immealately to suspena acuvlues wai, d result in a release of radioactivity that might enter the control room. This places the unit in a condition that m
CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 3.7-58a 9/2588
CREFS B.3.7.10 BASES (continued) minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position. If sn+h corr < traine are inoperable in MODE 1. 2, 3, or 4. Q-3*7'10 14 oCUIeaj!ogsIothefitheDW inopetaDiejungvuoom, counaarg" (jXe?,~gnditifon: M ...c u tra may nuo ve capau b M l ing th ~ ended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, each train once every month provides an adequate check of this system. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. Systemsfiltration units withl_heatersinust"beloperatedjior;i 10lcontinuous!hogrs with thelheater.slenetgized.EiSystqs Fjltratjonjunits wjthdDt hea.tersmeed;ogly beZoperat_ed; form 15 minutes,to; demonstrate,the fungtioniofitheisy_ stem. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy availability. SR 3.7.10.2 This SR verifies that the required CREFS testing is performed in accordance with the:Yentilation;EilterJTesting;P,rogram'JVET_P). The CREFS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The Vl@ includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the E . The;VETPIf_11tritjorf2e3tMgMjIementslofdSectj ons];5Slagbj anric. areatot;tegu1PBdZfdsrCEmergency: Pressurization' Unit teen;beln ttesttag3 s ut wg x perjediciteltn ergrala months 3ftZaffterE0MQflopetatM32O(teclany CP 3.7-014 l structural: main _tenacelch7jthe l lEPMfj]ter;oricharcoal adsotbeXhAus,ings71o_rJJ3,E[ollowing pai_ntjpgMHteZot ghemigal;'rLeles_sEfor!thercorfesponding C_REF51traig;tolbe OPERABLQ CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-59 9/25/98
1 I l CHANGE JUSTIFICATION NUMBER 3.7 49 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68). i 1 3.7 50 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure i 68). 3.7 51 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 68), j 3.7 52 Not used. epp)jcableit0CPSESKSeelConve_rsion: Comparison-Tabl.e DC ALL 002 (enclosuref6BJJ l l 3.7-53 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). j 3.7 54 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). l 3.7 55 Not Applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 6B). 3.7-56 This change creates a new SR for the HSIVs [and feedwater isolation valves] to distinguish between the IST and the DC ALL-002 automatic actuation testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the surveillance requirements. These changes are consistent with TSTE'289 WOG-98. [Although SR 3.7.2.2 is a new 0 3.7.2-3 SR, it may be performed in conjuction with SR 3.7.2.1. Therefore, the note allowing testing to be performed in MODE 3 is also used for this SR.] 3.7 57 This change establishes appropriate Required Actions and 1 ,0 3.7.n 14 Completion Times for ventilation system pressure envdinna dation. These changes are consistent with f28ZWO[G-CPSES Differencesfrom NUREG-1431 - ITS 3. 7 8 925/98
i l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-19 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.6; [ CTS 3/4.7.7) ITS 3.7.10 Action D.1 [C.1] JFD 3.7-bb JFD B-PS STS 3.7.10 has a note to Required Action C.1 which states " Place in toxic gas protection mode if automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is inoperable." ITS 3.7.10 has not adopted this STS requirement. Comment: There is no JFD for not retaining this STS requirement. The categorization of"B-PS" does not provide the detailed explanation to enable a reviewer to reach the same determination. Provide a detailed JFD for not adopting the STS text or provide an attemate note. FLOG RESPONSE: The categorization of "B-PS" per the FLOG mark-up methodology means
" Bracketed - Plant Specific" The ITS Required Action C.1 Note is bracketed in the STS and j per the STS conversion methodology would not be required to be adopted unless a comparable requirement already existed in the CTS. Callaway, CPSES and WCGS do not have such a requirement in their CTS. ,
1 ATTACHED PAGES: l l None m I l l r-
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.11-1 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.7.2 Actions for two trains inoperable ITS 3.7.11 Action D and E JFD 3.7-36 i When two CRACS trains are inoperable, CTS 3.7.7.2 Actions permit verification of 100% heat removal capability of a single Operable train to exist for continued operation instead of the shutdown or suspension of fuel movement activities. ITS 3.7.11 Action D and E retain these CTS requirements. Comments: This JFD correctly adds the current licensing basis. However, the Bases for the ITS Actions do not provide adequate explanation of how or what assortment of equipment is made available to ensure this capability exists for the control room. The replacement train must consist of safety-related components with assured sources of cooling water and vital bus power. Provide a description of why the Completion Times are appropriate especially when the SR to determine heat removal capability consists of testing and calculations. How long does it take to make this determination? Why isn't the suspension of fuel movement activities or entry into a lower mode more acceptable than the risk of continued operation while waiting for this SR to be completed? Is this a shared system for the Control Room (s)? FLOG RESPONSE: The ITS BASES Bc':kground has been revised to reflect the two 5d% safety related cooling units per train and the cooling capability required for operability. Testing and calculations are not required when Actions 3.7.11 D and E are entered. The operability of one 50% cooling unit per train must be verified by administrative means immediately (i.e., pursued without delay and in a controlled manner). Neither suspension of fuel movement activities nor the entry into a lower mode of operation would be safer than maintaining stable plant conditions although these are alternate required actions if 100% of the required heat removal capability is known not to be available. Once immediate actions have been completed an evaluation which may include testing and calculations may be performed to exit the , condition. If one 50% safety related cooling unit in each train is inoperable, the trains may still' be operable if an evaluation of the conditions (e.g. weather, UHS temperature, etc.) show that one 50% unit is capable of performing the function for thirty days or that the inoperable unit (s) can be restored prior to conditions that would require two 50% units. If two units are required per train and one i noperable, the train is inoperable; however, if one 50% safety related cooling unit in eact train is operable with required cooling water and power,100% of the heat removal capability is still available. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 5B B 3.7-61 i
CREATCS CRACS B 3.7.11 I B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l B 3.7.11 Control Room E;crgcr.cy Air Tc;graturc Control Mc@nditioning System I (GREATGS CRACS) j BASES l A BACKGROUND _he~controftocalfotLCESESHsicommon'tolboth3 nits;agd;the o 3,7,11 1 g CRACS.1slaIshargJystem"commonitolboth;unjts; The GREATGS GMCS proviaes temperature controi wr sc wm. A i room durjpgingirmaHandlesergencylopetatjon;and fcilowing 4 solation of the control rcc;. l l The GREATGS QRACS consists of two indcgndent and redundant trains that provide cooling and heating of recirculated control room air. Each CR6CS train jncludesitwoihe.ating and cooling units consists of hcoting coils, cccling coils, instrumentation, and controls to provide for control room temperature control. Each; cooling 3nitJptov. ides 150 Eof _the; maximum Lheat lemoyal capability 1forlitsirespectiveltain~l The CREATCS CRACS is a i subsystem providing air temperature control for the control room. 1 The CREATCS MCS, is an emergency system, parts of which may also operate during normal unit operations. A single train will provide the required temperature control to maintain the control room between 10. F and 85 80"F. Each_CP_SESJnit3asitwo;CRACS
- trainsiforjaitgtaliofifour,Jpoolinglunitslava11able20 poolithe cgemonicontrol M The CREATCS CRAC} operation in maintaining the control room temperature is discussed in 4
0 3.7.G-1 the FSAR, Sectiong 6;f (Ref.1) andl92.E@efi2). m Jonel50Jlsnietrielatonoo11ng3nltiin~each:trafplia s Lnop~etabletheittainsmaD311Ebeloperableliflag a 3.7.11 1 , etaluatioJ3Eghg23)gdjjgps2(elgEWathet!"UHSitemperature; , e MtsiolgttLaE4lgg51*AltXEtagble'bfigerfp. ming 33e functiefenhtttigsInrithatlt_hgigperablelurlit(sEcan'be restoredjyr.1ont02cnditiotisitjat;goujdlequiteltioJot; uni _ts2If t twlunitsargregiad ~pstrafnra. nd!onelis31gp_etable;1the;tr_ain 1s"LnoperminEttssyestratine150rgafttrrel:ated2oolinglunitlin eachittgglf3ppet91e"1MtMreq0irediccolin[q81erlandip~ owerf
~
100!io_fdt,Ms;3poM' Rap)bjlitgis stil1LayajlableI5j
. APPLICABLE The design basis of the CRCATCS CRACS, is to maintain the SAFETY ANALYSES control room temperature for 30 days of continuous occupancy.
} The GREATGS CRAC.S components are arranged in redundant, safety related trains. Duringnorma]Landemergencyoperation,the CREATCSCRACSmaintainsthetemperaturebetween10*Fand8580*F. CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-61 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.12.1-1 APPLICABILITY: CP l REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.8, Applicability ITS 3.7.12, Applicability DOC 12-xx-LSx CTS 3/4.7.8 has an Applicability of Modes 1,2,3 and 4 which is retained in ITS 3.7.12. Comment: CTS 3.7.8 Actions b and c, and the ITS 3.7.12 Bases Background discussion , first paragraph, first sentence, states "PPVS serves all areas housing ESF equipment as well as the radwaste areas and the fuel handling and storage areas." The fuel handling and storage areas must consider a fuel handling accident and operations which are independent of the reactor modes. The CTS requirement apparently does not consider these situations. Likewise, CPSES has not adopted STS 3.7.13 for the comparable fuel [ handling] building air cleanup systems. CPSES rnust assure the PPVS Operability during " Modes 5 and 6" and "During the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies" based upon the stated function of PPVS. Provide a new DOC, revised CTS markup and the appropriate technical justifications for these CTS changes. FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS do not apply in MODES 5 and 6 or during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies because the current licensing basis does not require the PPVS for I mitigation of fuel handling accidents. See CPSES FSAR Section 15.7.4 and Section 15.&B of l NUREG-0797 Supplement 2 and 22. Therefore, STS 3.7.13 is not applicable to the CPSES current licensing basis. The ITS 3.7.8 BASES Applicability has been revised to reflect the current licensing basis. A1TACHED PAGES: Enci5B B 3.7-67 m I
l ECCSPREACSiPPVS B 3.7.12 BASES l l E4ther typc of failure may result in ; icwcr cfficiency of remeval for any gascous and particulate activity rcicased to the ECCS pump rooms fclicwing a LOCA. The ECCS PREACS PPJS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Stattacnt.10Cl350J36(cL(2[(jjl; t LC0 Two independent and redundant trains of the ECCS PREACS PPVS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming that a single failure disables the other train coincident with loss of offsite power. Total system failure could result in the atmospheric release from the ECCS pump room ESEequipment:1.eakage exceeding 10 CPR 100 regulatory limits in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA). ECCS PREACS PPVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual componentsnecessarytomaintaintheCCCSpumprcemESE filtration are OPERABLE in both trains. A PPyST[rajn'isiconsidered 0P,ERABLEMen)t*s"jndjVjdual; components",ne.ces_s aryJ toimai ntai nEthe ESF7filtrationjare;opetabl.e spcKthajtithe~teguired;negatlye:pteisUteca[be: maintained;inithe
] Auxjlta rgnd_SafegGa rdLbuildjngsTO Note G fione"ofjthe:two1ESF filtration;unitsl.inXtrainicanyaint_aKthe2equired_negatiye Pressurezalqnel11Doul djatis fyLthe3perabilj,tfle_quireme_nt G s
AnECCSPREACStrainAJPyS;ESFFiltratioinUnjtisconsidered 2 OPERABLE when its associated: e
- a. Fan is OPERABLE:
- b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and
- c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE and air circulation fl@ can be maintained.
APPLICABILITY InMODES1,2,3,and4,theECCSPREACSPPJSisrequiredtobe OPERABLE consistent with the OPERABILITY requirements of the ECCS. l In MODE 5 or 6. the ECCS PREACS PPVJ is not required to be OPERABLE since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE. - x I EEof6;grIduti.ng3ojjgent7ofaftradiate~difuel l assemb1 R c th G PJSli}]no_tlteq0itedito'ble3 @ fable 3jace f (tli s]LotItequired ;forimi tigation~ofifuelihandling; n accidents] Beff3] CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3. 7 B 3. 7-67 9/2S/98
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.12.1-2 APPLICABILITY: CP l \ l REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.8, LCO ITS 3.7.12, LCO DOC 12-yy-LSy i CTS 3/4.7.8 and ITS 3.7.12 LCOs outwardly appear to govem each PPVS system as l comprised of two trains separated from each unit. The ITS 3.7.12 Bases Background ! discussion (third paragraph, last sentence) and the Bases discussion for the ITS Action disclose the shared system operational use. i Comment: The CTS and ITS must be modified to account for the on-going shared system l functioning of this LCO. Though not reflected in the CTS, each of the four ESF filter trains are l required Operable to meet the various design assumptions and configurations permitted for ensuring the PPVS has the required negative pressure maintained in the envelop comprised of three buildings. Revise the ITS to add the Action Note that states " Actions apply simultaneously for both units." l l FLOG RESPONSE: It is not necessary to deviate from the STS applicability. Either unit in MODES 1-4 with ITS 3.7.12 as proposed is equivalent to the CTS 3/4.7.8. ATTACHED PAGES: - None 1 m l l l l l l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.12.1-3 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.8 i ITS 3.7.12 Actions A, B, C DOC 12-xx-A The ITS 3.7.12 Actions A, B, and C reproduce respectively the CTS 3.7.8 Action a, b, and c. Comment: Issue #1 - The formatting and arrangement of the ITS Actions does not follow STS guidelines. Action C should be first, followed by Action A and B. Issue #2 - Accordingly, the current ITS Action A Condition does not need to restate the exception but merely only state ". for any reason except Condition (s).. " issue #3 - Bases Discussion for A.1 contains a second paragraph which appears to be directly related to Action B rather than Action A. This is because Action A inoperability is for reasons other than loss of negative pressure requirements. Move this paragraph to Action B where it belongs. Issue #4 - Condition B as justified in the Bases (see relocated paragraph of A.1) assumes that there is a minimum flow rate which is never verified as being in existence. Required Action B.1 should become B.2 and the new B.1.1 should state " Verify supply / exhaust flow rate differential is > 15,000 cfm" with a Completion Time of 4 hours MQ Once per 12 hours thereafter". Also, the justification for the 7 day Completion Time is marginal. It is compared to the 72 hours allowed for ECCS when that Condition has at least one redundant Operable train to mitigate any accident. There can be up to four ESF filtration trains inoperable which is a Loss of Function that is permitted longe'r-than any other STS comparable requirement. What does the SE for this CTS amendment state? Provide a more in-depth justification for this Action. Issue #5 - Condition C as justified in the Bases (see first paragraph, second sentence) assumes that there is a minimum negative pressure maintained which is never verified as being in existence. Required Action C.1 should become C.2 and the new C.1.1 should state "' 3rify a negative pressure of 0.01 water gauge is maintained" with a Completion Time of 4 hours MQ Once per 12 hours thereafter". Revise the CTS markup and provide the necessary aFDs as appropriate for these changes to the submittal. FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1- Conditions have been reordered by reversing A and C which is consistent with the STS format. Issue #2- Condition A (now Condition C) has been revised as suggested. Issue #3- The subject paragraph explains why Action A.1 (now C.1) does not apply upon failure to maintain negative pressure. The paragraph has not been moved. Issue #4- Each ESF filtration unit will be demonstrated operable in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP, ITS 5.5.11).15,000 cfm is the nominal flow rate for performing the testing. The LCOs for CTS 3/4.7.8 and ITS 3.7.12 do not directly depend on the flow rate of each ESF filtration unit. Two units are provided per train. If one unit in each train meets the VFTP requirements and can maintain a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.05 inch water gauge, the LCO is satisfied. If both units in each train are required to maintain a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.05 inch water gauge, the LCO is still satisfied. Condition B is based on CTS and is sufficient as proposed.
Issue #5- Neither the CLB nor the CTS require the continuous maintenance of a specific negative pressure. The ability to reach and maintain a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.05 inches water gauge is required to be periodically demonstrated (CTS 4.7.8d.4)/ITS 3.7.12.4). The negative pressure boundary is administratively controlled between surveillances to ensure the capability to reach and maintain the specified negative pressure in the event of a LOCA. For example, the negative pressure boundary includes exterior doors which must be opened for personnel and equipment ingress and egress during normal operation and outages. The capability to restore the negative pressure boundary (e.g. closing doors, replacing hatches, and other suitable methods of closing negative pressure boundary penetrations is adequate to restore negative pressure prior to significant ESF leakage after a LOCA.). For example, the design of the ECCS ensures that reactor coolant from a LOCA cannot be recirculated outside containment for at least 10 minutes after a LOCA. In addition, even though the accident analysis makes a conservative assumption that fuel failure occurs instantaneously for the purposes of offsite dose analysis, the revised (NUREG-1465) source terms show that significant fuel failure could not occur for more than two hours after a worst case LOCA. Penetrations which are not open under administrative control would not be expected to significantly degrade over a 30 day period. If the negative pressure boundary surveillance failed to show the specified pressure (s), either 30 days or 7 days would be the maximum time before the next surveillance would be required to exit the applicable action statements. If the negative pressure failed to meet the 0.01 requirement, a re-test would be required within 7 days. If a re-test on the 7th day met the 0.01 requirement but not the 0.05 requirement, a re-test wouM be required within 23 days (30-7) to completely exit the conditions. Therefore, it is not necessary to prescribe additional intermediate surveillances. ATTACHED PAGES: , I EnciSA 3.7-28 Enci 5B B 3.7-68 and B 3.7-69 m i f
l P_PJS Z ESFLEiltration;l[tains;ECCS PREACS] EMFEFECT2?SI2CEIM271720EIE71CFE5520Eg3. 7.12 ;PSM 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Emcrgency Corc Occling Systc; (ECCS) Pump Roca Exhaust Air Cicanup System (PREACS) PrimarylPlantiVentilation' System 3fEVSJEESE EPSl$j Ei]tration:Trajing LC0 3.7.12 Two ECCS PREACS EVS trains shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Cil s l A3 With'onelorJmor.e,PPVS All Restore 1PPVS1 trains to 30. days QSA trains; unable;to OPERABLE; status.' saintaiga,negatiye ptessgre: envelope;in,the 0 3.7.12.13 l MillaryESafeguards2 ' 1 And;@T1Buildirigs20;05 - 10thlatet; gauge; p3,7 37g BJ Mith;oge3rf.. mote 2PVS Bjl RestotelabilitylgfEXS Olays traiggenableito trains;to; maintain:.q maintain;a. negative negatiye;pressur_e7 envelope F Pte(sgp2enve] ope;in3hg ofl0 0U1ncMater; gauge '3'7-37d# l 1 LMLillaCyESafeguardsa pressure '
#KME. Buildings'20;.01 lucMlgterigauge]
l
& C M
CJI Restore EyS ECCS PREACS 7 days Q]jOneEHjECCSPREACS train inoperable for3'any '~ train to OPERABLE status. 0 3.7.12.13 l cd881K 3 % I;1LWE @ m u _.. A_=_,_=_-,__m E gatii^ I
-. l (3.7-37%
rwsema.use vmm Luns at.a m _ _ m - c s_ _ra _ A + N m LA Ma%J*.wMW.15 e rr P.5 M.ds s-nm s m _2_-mn-ne b WM,u.E,m.ffAWAMMdMNNU* U ./ am a_ _ _ c. _ a~ n n s -s m w y.n s a Co!Lditions~A10t1B] l l l CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3.7-28 9/25/98
ECCSPREACS:PPJS B 3.7.12 BASES A Q3.7.12.13k WithionelglgtgiEglD}1ztglegittal!Lslopable:to:pajgtajpla e2g!tthe negatinInt, essure 3!segg/M',JWu11aryasafeguirdszand_ bu11 dings 250105jtachJdte Sectiott~sost;beltakenito2re. store Euel OPERA 8tEIstatus y Lth1W730]Lg! E 00P J1ithis'tineithe:ESE E11ttat1Etrafss:austlasinentme:.ounch3st.ecgauge;;This negativehsurelrt Tfst1]Desureithat7ortf11teredia1Cdoesinot l escape:the ptessureIenvelopea The;30 ~ day; Completion; Time;fslapproprjatelbecause7an;adequat.e negative pressure ehvelopeltCstiU maintained; Bil WithionerorlpotelESE:E1]ttetion;traj nslunable ' to)aj ntain da negative: pressure; envelope]pithe:Auxjl1ary3afeguardsRand Fue1 Bui]dingsj0101;inchiWatengauge;, Taction must be ,takenito~ restore OPERABLE statusNithjn]7 2 days; The17; day;Completiorgjmeiislapproprjatelbecau.seithe,tisk ~ contribut_ ton 3sJess;thanith8tiforitMEC_CS]G2[ hour; Completion Timemand;this; system:isinot;a::directZsuppott' system;fot;the ECCS .3hsI72 day;CompletLonlIlselisibasedXthe21gptobabil ity ofiaiDB6Acuttingidutjng3hfsitfee:peffod;and.JfteldesignJof2the buildingsarte]udedJdthin;thEnegatjle: pressure enVe]ppeJIIhe buj1dingsa r_e; gsjsnermachj ihat2t_hea p sith3 ources:pt pdlentiallECEleakageatelbje ggta_de;pritriternaEtolthe structure]!gtheselbuildingBthusJpro9fdingIaibofferizoneito , e gerg g leakagez a A._1g 3 , 0 3.7.12.1 3 1 With onc ECCS PREACS PPVS train inoperable, {pjiaEree_ son 9xcept;fallgeltofgja gt!1[gQLegat1Vi!Gptess0telenvelope21gith_e ) 8GX1]fafy2LSefgguayisE8MdIFDer;8011dingsI@l05.JLnc_h3aterJgauge] I action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this time, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the ECCS PREACS PPj@ function. l Duelt0the:layputIpflheESflequjpgentiinter.ior;toZthe1Auxi]iary J and Jaf_egoafdibulildiggslarLditheIdes.fgrE6fithEPPlSisupp]fiand l exhaust 3f_a110te3toTsaintain7tfleItequiredl!i69ativelp.tessure._does i I Doticonstj_toXta 16ss"OfMheisaletyltun ctiorgandiaction3A31Would agtiapp]y3E6s31onglas"airWloCis;&chievablgerssentially;alllE , l 1dakagelpooldibelfiltered3hdiexhairstedibylthe2VJ t l l l l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-68 9/25/98 _w
_ _ . _ - - _ _ _ _ _ -___=_. ECCS PREACSIPPVS B 3.7.12 BASES l i T day Completion Time is appropriate because the risk 0 3'7.12.1 3 ) contribution is less than that for the ECCS (72 hour Completion Time), and this system is not a direct support ' I system for the ECCS. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the ) low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ; ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability. ; Concurrent failure of two ECCS PREACS RPVS trains would result in the loss of functional capability: therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must b ' entered immediately. B.1 and B.2 D~T?and'D:2 1 1 If the ECCS PREACS PPVS train or negativ_e; s pressure 1 envelope cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.1 REQUIREMENTS i Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they I function properly. As the environment and normal operating , conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once a ' month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture that may have accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. Systems _, witttl , heaters 11u0jst2be.10ppr,atedfKcontf ndous' hoursMth:theJ3aters eDe[gj zadyithm cWith_ rough 3_heJEM1]tets3nEcharcoatadsorbers 4 Operat.1oGGEbe]nat3t@iftithgConttoRRopmZSystas ,;ithout Scoters nad cn'.y bc ; prated for i IS minutes to dacastrat; the functica of the system.] The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of equipment and the two train redundancy available. SR 3.7.12.2 This SR verifies that the required ECCS PREACS PPVS testing is performedinaccordancewiththeVentjlationIFilteGesting;PIogtam
~
()!UPl. The ECCS PREACS filter tests are in accordance with Reference 4. The VEij includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorbers efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the V_FJfj. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-69 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.12.1-4 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.8.a ITS SR 3.7.12.1 DOC 12-05-LS32 i CTS 4.7.8.a verifies at least once per 31 days on a Staggered Test Basis that each PPVS train operates and each heater / components operate for its specified length of time. ITS SR 3.7.12.1 ! requires these similar verifications every 31 days but not on a Staggered Test Basis. 1 Comment: Issue #1 - This ITS proposed change is acceptable; however there is no technical justification provided in this DOC. Also, the contents of the NSHC contain a justification only for l Vogtle which is not applicable. Provide a technical justification that is applicable to CPSES. ; issue #2 - The CTS markup shows this DOC is an "A" change which is incorrect. Revise the CTS markup. FLOG RESPONSE: (Issue #1) The technical justification for this change is found in NSHC LS-32. This NSHC, while it does reference the NRC's SER for Vogtle's TS conversion, is totally applicable to CPSES. The reference to Vogtle in the NSHC was included only to indicate the i NRC's acceptance of this change on another docket. l (Issue #2) The CTS markup has been revised to indicate 12-05-LS. - ATTACHED PAGES: Enct2 3/4.7-24 I i l
l PLANT SYSTEMS 1-13 A 0 3.7.1 1 3/4.7.8 PRIMARY PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEM - ESF FILTRATION UNITS l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 Two independent ESF Filtration Trains shall be OPERABLE. l l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. l ACTION: 1
- a. With one ESF Filtration Train inoperable, restore the inoperable ESF Filtration Train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT l STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With the inability to reach and maintain a negative pressure in the negative l pressure envelope of the Auxiliary, Safeguards, and Fuel Buildings greater ,
than or equal to 0.05 inch water gauge, restore the PRIMARY PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEM to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With the inability to reach and maintain a negative pressure in the negative pressure envelope of the Auxiliary, Safeguards, and Fuel Buildings greater than or equal to 0.01 inch water gauge, restore the PRIMARY PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEM'S ability to maintain a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.01 inch water gauge within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each ESF Filtration Train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: - 12 05 t:6
- a. At least once per 31 days on ; STACCEl1ED TEST SASIS by 0 3. 7. ,. .
4nitiating, frca the control roca, ficw through the "EI'A filters and cherccal adscrber; and verifying that each ESF Filtration gg~j Train operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating;
- b. BQErfofming2fqujfedlEjiFIFiltrJtfoEUnitig1_tMtAtfrigliD
,d 8tcordanj;LOttjgthe'fVint116t%#7E11ter:gistinglPlegramgVfTP)] At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
l l CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N.7-N 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.12.1-5 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.8.d.1 ITS 3.7.12.4? DOC 12-ww-LSw JFD 3.7-38 CTS 4.7.8 d.1 requires that the ESF filter train pressure drop be verified at a flow rate of 15,000 cfm 10%. This CTS requirement is not retained in ITS SR 3.7.12.4. I Comment: JFD 3.7-38 states that the " CTS permits testing at whatever flow rate is necessary to achieve the required negative pressure". The JFD contradicts CTS 4.7.8.d.1 which can be rectified by adopting the STS requirement for flowrate in ITS SR 3.7.12.4. These requirements are important to preserve the integrity of the HEPA filter and ensure that the air flow is at the correct flow rate and has filter capability while in ITS Action B, as proposed. Provide the new CTS DOC, a revise CTS markup and a new or revised JFD as appropriate for these CTS changes. FLOG RESPONSE: The details of the plant ventilation systems were moved to either the
" Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)* as described in ITS 5.5.11 or the corresponding ITS Section 3.7 SRs and/or the Bases. See the response to NRC comment O 5.5-8 which explains where the specific CTS ventilation system requirements were moved. The CTS 4.7.8.d.}
requirement that the ESF filter train pressure drop be verified at a flow rate of 15,000 cfm 10% is now included in ITS 5.5.11d. The CTS counterpart for ITS SR 3.7.12.4 is CTS 4.7.8.d.4. There is no specific flow requirement in CTS 4.7.8.d.4. JFD 3.7-38 deleted the flow requirement from ITS SR 3.7.4.12 per CTS. ATTACHED PAGES: None , l l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.12.1-6 APPLICABILITY: CP l REQUEST: No CTS 3/4.7.8 requirement l ITS SR 3.7.12.6 DOC 12-07-M l JFD 3.7-39 The CTS 3/4.7.8 has been modified by ITS SR 3.7.12.6 which adds a new requirement to
" verify that each non-ESF fan stops on an actual or simulated ESF fan actuation signal".
Comment: This CTS change as proposed is acceptable; however the accompanying Bases lack the detail required of the STS format. There is no justification for the selected Frequency. Also, the discussion provided in JFD 3.7-39 should be included in the Bases to clearly explain the purpose of this SR. Revise the ITS SR 3.7.12.6 Bases, as necessary, to meet the STS content standards for this new requirement. FLOG RESPONSE: The ITS BASES SR 3.7.12.6 has been revised as suggested. ATTACHED PAGES: EnclSB B 3.7-70 E
ECCS PREACSJPyS B 3.7.12 BASES SR 3.7.12.3 cm3.7.oos This SR verifies that each ECCS PREACS PRV,3 train starts and operates on an actual or simulated Safety 3njectjorj actuation signal. The13monthFrequencyisconsistentwiththat specified in Reference 4. SR 3.7.12.4 This SR verifies the integrity of the ECCS pump roca caciosure negativejpressure envelope. The ability of the CCCS pump room Auxiljary;and;Safegu.ardsfbdilldingsjto maintain a negative pressure, with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the EE{S PREACS PPVS. During the Epost accident} mode of operation, the ECCS PREACS PEVS is designed to maintain a slight negative pressure in the ECCS pump roca Auxil,1ary;# Fuel"and; Safeguards bujldings, with respect to adjacent areas, to prevent unfiltered LEAKAGE. The ECCS PREACS is designed to maintain ; ;[ 0.12S] inch s water gauge relativc to atmospheric pressur^ at a ficw rate of [3000] cfm from the ECCS pump room. Th_eIa.pgeptance:qgjterjalof G0,0511gchesyaterigaugeltel atjpelto;atmospherj cipressure e;was sel ectedlasla;teasonakl_eimeasure;ofitheJintegrj ty;of;the~ netjatj ve pressure boundary] The Frequency of 18; months is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG 0800, Section 6.5.1 (Ref. 6). ! This test is conducted with the tests for filter penetration: thus, an 18 month Frequency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with that specified in Reference 4. l SR 3.7.12.5 , i l N.otiused'.! SR T.7F1276 N LhjJ~SB;1Milfradito3esjff'ithQhutdogrCofjjthe.;nogiESF, h 0 3.7 12.1 % fags 3o!pf6VerLtibypassMfiths;ESFjfjltfition3ni_tsMe o plantidesigf3 foe ~s"hotgrfcT0de7bWasCdampdfs7hoWeVerj byp3s~sTof4the7fiTturcuititEWi] T"otetIr%ffsth6Afon'-E.S3 fans 3te glUTr0nriinph6rCthgESEMangstattriThDP:eforeZtojprevent bypYssEt_hfD6FESF2f8Ms3ifstibgstdpgredKBThe'SRrd#nionstrates thatitheTricEESf;if_an31sjt;oDOfnJactueT?bGsim0TatidTESFactuati signal T{sHf etrirlfectforfis1Qnaly b , ..m tr,c LLLL PREACS cypass de.mpcr Verificatlun vune3rjp~pigrafieach!noniESFJfag;og an;SIlsjign] is necessary to ensure that the system functions j properly. The OPERABIu!T" of the ECCS PREACS byn= damor- 4: / t-
~
M " r- be sacrif4M in RcfarenccJQf,te,quelqqyloG18 r month _siisTcorisfstent31th SR'3;7J12;33 CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-70 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.15-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.9.10(11], Applicability ITS 3.7.15 Applicability and Licensee Controlled Documents l DOC (3.9) 11-01-LG j l CTS 3.9.10[11] is Applicable whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the [ spent) fuel pool. ITS 3.7.15 is Applicable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [ spent] fuel pool, l Comment: The CTS change appears to be acceptable as proposed in the ITS 3.7.15 markup; I however, there is no explanation pertaining to what is actually relocated to the Licensee Controlled Documents. This appears to be a "LS" category change rather than an "LG" ! change. Revise the DOC, or provide a new DOC and revise the CTS markup, as necessary, for the appropriate change category and technical justification required for this CTS change. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 11-01-LG was revised during the Section 3.9 review in response to l Comment Number O 3.9-21. ATTACHED PAGES: None , e i 4 1 l l i
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.15-3 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.9.10, Applicability ITS 3.7.15 Applicability; Licensee Controlled Documents DOC (3.9) 11-01-LG JFD 3.7-45 CTS 3.9.10 Applicability states "Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the fuel storage racks". ITS 3.7.15 Applicability states "During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage areas". Comment: JFD 3.7-45 indicates that this LCO also applies to fuel storage areas in other locations of the plant which were never apparent in CTS 3/4.9.10. Provide a DOC which describes in more detail how this CTS change applies to all fuel storage areas including the in-containment storage area (s). There is no Bases Background or Applicability discussion which adequately describes the fullintended application of this ITS LCO. Provide these new Bases. Revise the DOC, JFD or provide new justifications, and revise the CTS markup, as necessary, for the appropriate change category and technical justifications required for this CTS change. FLOG RESPONSE: The reference to " fuel storage areas"in the CPSES ITS markup refers to the in-containment fuel storage racks and the two shared spent fuel pools. CPSES CTS 3/4.9.10 has always been applicable to the in-containment fuel storage racks as well as the spent fuel pools. The design is such that requiring water 23 feet over the top of the storage racks also ensures a nominal depth of 23 feet above the top of structures in the transfer canal and wet cask pit during fuel movement. Therefore, no DOC or markup of the CTS is necessary. The ITS Bases has been revised to include a description of the in-containment storage fuel racks. ATTACHED PAGES: EnclSB B 3.7-74 l i l
Fuel Storage Pool Water Level l B 3.7.15 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Peet Ated Water Level BASES l l BACKGROUND The minimum water level in the i fuel storage poet a_rea meets the l assumptions of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel I handling accident. The specified water level shields and minimizes the general area dose when the storage racks are filled to their maximum capacity. The water also provides shielding during the movement of spent fuel. The1 minimum;WaterIdepthlfot; design.;forlfuelihandij ng:ensuresithat , a;npminal;23; feet;ofjaterlis;maintajned'above;the topLoffa damaged; fuel; ass'embly3ayinglatop;thelfuel;; storage racks;and that 10;teetiof;watetishjeldiggiisimainta.i.ned ;above2 fuel; assemblies being moved.] . _ ifueEstorage:areaslinitheJuel~Buildinglinclude;theitwo, spent fuetpool_s1(Spent;FueliPoo]30111 apd; Spent:FuellPool2NoJ 2EIn"additionZthCfuel3togagelarea]QncludeXpoirtion . ^ of;thelRefueljng Cavity;in;each; Containment:Buildi_pg; a 3.7.15 3 Permanent;sp_eqtlfue D torageiracksZar Je ,9cated;1Keach spent'fueEpoo] land]inithe~openderJard8Tofuthe' Refueling CaMin]Laghicontainment?dLlajntainlDf 232 feet;ofjatenovet
- Ae;stotage.irjapkslalsolensuNsjaInogLnaldepthiofi231feetiabove theltop;of;struNreslin;theFAtansfeganalEand; Wet 7caskmit ing;fdjelittoVenen yt generai aescription or tne ruel storage pool aesign a wven in the FSAR, Section 9.1.2 (Ref.1). Thejini contaiDeefttifuellstplagelatjaGisIdesctLbedlitoffSARTSection;911.2 m (Refyl)J A description of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System is given in the FSAR, Section 9;1';3 (Ref. 2).
~~
0 3.7 4 1 l The assumptions of the fuel handling accident are given in the FSAR, Section 1523 (Ref. 3). APPLICABLE The minimum water level in the g fuel storage peel areJ meets l SAFETY ANALYSES the pooJLdejlo'ntamination;factorlof]109 assumptions of the fuel handling accident described in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 4). The resultant 2 hour thyroid dose per person at the exclusion area boundary is a mil fractier, of Wel]iRj. thin the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 5) limits []IefersgP6~andjl]. l l According to Reference 4, there b sjeld_be a]ailinal 23 ft of water between the top of the damaged fuel bundle and the fuel pool surface during a fuel handling accident. With 23 ft of water, the CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-74 9/2588
l ADDil10NAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.16-3 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA 1 i REQUEST: CTS 3.9.12. Action b (for Callaway and WCGS) STS 3.7.16 JFD 3.7-dd STS 3.7.16, Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration, was not adopted. Comment: There is no detailed explanation for why this STS LCO was not adopted. Also, see Comment 3.7.17.1-2 of ITS 3.7.17. FLOG RESPONSE: ITS 3.7.16 is a bracketed specification in the STS and per the STS l conversion methodology would not be required to be adopted unless it already existed in the l CTS (as was the case for DCPP). Callaway, CPSES and WCGS do not have this specification in their CTS. For CPSES, the NRC SER for the high density rack License Amendment (LA 4G/32) concluded that normal plant procedures were sufficient to assure boron concentration in the spent fuel pool. Callaway and WCGS are further evaluating STS 3.7.16, Fuel Storage Pool Boron Conce,ntration and CTS 3.9.12, Action b, in conjunction with CTS license amendment request for re-racking of the Spent Fuel Pool. An additional response to Comment Numbers O 3.7.16-3 and Q 3.7.17.1-l 2 will be provided by November 6,1998. l ATTACHED PAGES: None m l l l l
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.17.1-2 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.9.12, Action a ITS 3.7.17 DOC (3.9) 14-04-LS13 l With the fuel assembly storage requirements not met, CTS 3.9.12 Action a requires the " boron l concentration of the spent fuel pool to be verified > 2000 ppm at least once per 8 hours". This l CTS action is not retained in ITS 3.7.17. Comment: The DOC states this action is consistent with the STS which is incorrect. The STS has an LCO for spent fuel pool boron concentration requirements which has not been adopted. The STS 3.7.16 serves the same purpose as this CTS Action a requirement which is to ensure the double contingency principle is maintain for the fuel storage requirements. These requirements are clearly stated in the STS Bases for both STS 3.7.16 and ITS 3.7.17 which are dependent upon one another. This CTS requirement shall be retained by adopting the STS 3.7.16. (For CPSES, recently approved LAR 94-22, TXX-94325 provides a current licensing basis for spent fuel storage and spent fuel boron concentration. However, CPSES should still adopt STS 3.7.16.) Revise the DOC, or provide a new DOC and revise the CTS markup, as necessary, for the appropriate change category and technical justification required to retain this CTS requirement. (Also, see Comment 3.7.16-3 of ITS 3.7.16) ' FLOG RESPONSE: For CPSES, Callaway and WCGS, see response to Comment 3.7.16-3. ATTACHED PAGES: None m
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.17.1-7 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 5.6.1.1.e and f , ITS 3.7.17 l DOC (5.0) 06-04-A CTS 5.6.1.1.e and f contain the requirements for spent fuel storage racks. The CTS current licensing basis for spent fuel storage was approved in LAR 94-22, TXX-94325. Comment: Issue #1 - The Region 1 and Region 2 designations are not used in the LCO but the high density storage racks are defined as the Applicable basis for this LCO. Figure 3.7.17-1 refers to Region 2 which is inconsistent. Issue #2 - STS 3.7.16 should be added to the ITS. 1 (See the above Comment 3.7.17.1-2 of this LCO.) l FLOG RESPONSE: (Issue #1)The Title for Figure 3.7.17-1 will be revised to read " Fuel l Assembly Burnup Limits in High Density Racks." l (Issue #2) See response to Comment 3.7.16-3. ! ATTACHED PAGES: EnctSA 3.7-35 (Figure 3.7.17-1) l l l i
Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.17 I [hPS$) l i l l l 20 2 ou t of 4 l 2 i I Eto. rage __ ! f N 15 l h kidowed I 0 l l l Ik D 2 M D 2 10 a 2 -
- . / ,
i 4
!g 3
2 out of 4 Stohage Not lowe
/ -
O
/
2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.8 3.3 4 4.2 4.4 4.8 4.3 5 INITIAL U-235 ENRICHMENT (w/o) FIGURE 3.7.17 1 (page 1 of 1) -
]
Q 3.7.17.1-7 I Fuel Assembly Burnup Limits in ,,cgior. 2 j 'igh1Delqtylash! 2 \ J i CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3.7-35 97,3gg
i I 1 l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.18-1 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.1.4 ITS 3.7.18 DOC 04-01-M DOC 04-02-LS8 CTS 3/4.7.1.4 limits the secondary specific activity and it is converted to ITS 3.7.18, Secondary l l Specific Activity. Comment: The CTS markup is not sufficiently completed for CTS 3/4.1.7.4 to show how the l CTS changes are identified per the DOCS prepared for this ITS conversion. Provide a i completed CTS markup for this CTS LCO. FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS markup and the ITS are technically equivalent. See justification provided in response to Comment 3.7.1-1. ATTACHED PAGES: None l l
. _ _. _ _ . _ . ~ . - - ._ _. _ -.
l l l l ADDmONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.19-1 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.12 LCO ITS 3.7.19 Bases DOC 18-::x-LG I CTS 3.7.12 states that "At least two independent safety chilled water trains shall be Operable". ITS 3.7.19 states "Two safety chilled water trains shall be Operable". , Comment: The word " independent" on the CTS markup is not shown moved to the Bases of i the ITS. The Bases ITS 3.7.19 contains descriptive detail of LCO Operability in the Bases l Background discussion, second paragraph. Provide a DOC for this CTS change in a revision to the submittal. FLOG RESPONSE: New DOC 18-04-LG has been created to move the word " independent" to the Bases. ATTACHED PAGES: Enct2 3/4.7-32 Enc! 3A 16 Enci38 16 ., m I l l l 1 I i
PLANT SY3TEMS 1 13 A 0 3.7.1 1 3/4.7.12 SAFETY CHILLED WATER SYSTEli LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ~ 3.7.12 At least tw 6epcade]r afety chilled water trains shall be OPERABLE. 18 04 LG
~ s 0 3.7.19 1 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4.
ACT10t[: With only one safety chilled water train OPERABLE. restore at least two trains to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.12 The safety chilled water trains shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not a locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position is in its correct -
position.** R M 1-A S.4
- b. At least once per 18 months
- by demonstrating that each safety chilled water train pump and chiller and cicctrical switchgcar arca # N cacrgency fan coil units start on a simulated orlactuall actuation y tsem 1 Safety Injection test signal.
118 03-TRJ The ;urveillance test interval is extended to 24 months for E2-17-A31 Train A. Unit 2. to remain in effcct until the completion of the sccond refueling cutogc for Unit 2. lsolgtto[ offs o &fety3hilledNaterlfloWito2ndlyJdulaJicomponentsidoe_sinot LSildE.CthCsafitBh1]IedWateNRstemjgoperabl a e g A,ggy o3 CPSESMark-up of CTS 3N.7 3N.7 32 9/25/98 v - ___s
_ - - - . _ . -- .. .- - _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ - -~ _- .. .. - CHANGE ; NUMBER EiHC DESCRIPTION ) l 18 01 A A clarifying footnote is added concerning isolation of safety chilled water flow to individual components. BileMsol_ation of33819ty[CJh led 3ifatefIrfldF10TiddiVidQsRW$'ai) 0 3.7.19-4 teglqritheseIgngggits31dotietabidMitidtles'HetTat[get"ItJg opefjp111tpfitheinfetDh111 Triter3YstesTThe ! jnogetab111tOOffe~ctedXS3gsponentr3ibuld;beIgov_efnedlbfitheig indli!1dua15Jpec11tcMicis)) NUREG 1431 does not have a j corresponding specification {orJsafetylct)111ejd eate_r. The ' conversion of this specification to the ITS format is modeled after the ITS CCW specification (which is a similar specification). The ITS CCW specification has this note and thus the addition of the ) note maintains consistency between these sireilar specifications. j 18 02 LG The surveillance of the CPSES electrical switchgear area emergency fan coil units is moved to a licensee controlled document. T_he electricallsWitghgeariarea;emergencyffanicoi] 0 3.7.19 3 unitslarelsopportisystem_slassociat_ed wi.thithe1 electrical, di stributionisystem "ElRequ[rements'associatedjlithlsupportisystems; whilelimportant; Ear.e:notirequiredjoibe;gaintainedlin;thelTSlunless they;_meetione og[more;ofithelcrjtegjafof210CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii)? The change is acceptable because it removes detail no longer required )
.-- in the TS to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basis limiting condition for operation.
18 03 TR 1 The safety chilled water system actuation surveillance is revised to allow the use of an actual signal to verify actuation. The wntification of initiating signals is moved to the Bases. _ 18103 LG ConsistentI91thiNUR_EGI1431Etheitisold findependentT1.nlthe1L_C0 is con _sjdereditolbeZdescriptiveT;detaillandJLa's'beenInoved;to thelBas.e'sIoGITS a !3RL19.NIheTchange3Deceptabl_elbs;a0][e3t 0 3.7.19-1 r removes;detaiFJ!ollo'ngerIry0lr,edjinith61TSito3rotect1thq healthiandis_afetDLthelpubitGrhileZelainingitybesis limitingIconditionif,orfoper;ation? . CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N.7 16 9/2588
I CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 16 *I16 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUPEER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 16-01 The CPSES specific Snubbers TS is relocated to a licensee- NO YES: relocated NO NO R controlled document. to the TRM. 17-01 The CPSES specific Area Temperature Monitoring TS is relocated to NO YES: relocated NO NO
- R a licensee-controlled document. to the TRM.
18-01 A clarifying CPSES specific note is added concerning isolation of NO YES NO NO A the Safety Chilled Water flow to individual components to mimic the CCW TS which is similar to this TS. 18-02 The CPSES specific surveillance for the electrical switch gear NO YES: moved to NO NO LG area emergency fan coil units is moved to a licensee-controlled the TRM. document. 18-03 The CPSES specific SR is revisM to allow credit for an actual NO YES NO NO TR-1 actuation and moves siQnal sDeCifics to the Bases. v 18:04 laittlis;CDETrispecificatjorC1tt giwgC41".1pdependent'Ajni i t hei,C0 l t jg NO yES NO N() 0 3.7.19 1 ) 1.G considereditolbe1Mset1p!1ve;detaillandihasi beerEnoyedito;the q Beses1QfilDMMM11 s 19-01 The CPSES specific Main Feedwater Pressure / Temperature limit TS NO YES: relocated NO NO R is relocated to a licensee controlled document. to the TRM. 20-01 Moves what constitutes an operable CPSES specific UPS train to NO YES NO NO LG the Bases. 20-02 The CPSES specific UPS activation surveillance is revised to NO YES NO NO TR-1 allow credit for an actual actuation and moves signal specifics i to the Bases. CPSES Conversion Comparison Table - CTS 3N.7.1 9/25/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.19-2 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.12.a ITS SR 3.7.19.1 and ITS Bases DOC 18-yy-LSy CTS 4.7.12.a verifies that each " manual, power operated or autoinatic" valve is in its correct position. ITS SR 3.7.19.1 requires the same verification. Comment: The Bases Background, third paragraph, third sentence states that there are no automatic valves in this water system. Also, ITS SR Bases states this SR applies to manual valves only. The Bases contradict the CTS and ITS requirements. Revise the submittal to remove these contradictions and provide the missing JFD or DOC technical justifications for these changes. FLOG RESPONSE: While the current CPSES design does not include automatic valves, it is not inconceivable that automatic valves could be added at some future date. Since the valve types in the SR are included within a parenthetical phrase, it is understood that only the valve types that apply need be surveilled. The Bases discussion of the SR provides sufficient detail to indicate which are the applicable valves and we do not consider the Bases discussion and the surveillance to be contradictory, in cases like this, especially when the ITS is the same as the CTS, it has been our general philosophy not to change the ITS (or the CTS). - ATTACHED PAGES: None n i 4
i l i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.19-3 APPLICABILITY: CP l REQUEST: CTS 4.7.12.b j Bases ITS 3.7.4, LCO discussion ' DOC 18-02-LG CTS 4.7.12.b requires demonstration that each electrical switchgear area emergency fan coil units start" on a test signal. This requirement is not retained in the ITS SR 3.7.19.2. Comment: This CTS requirement is proposed to be moved to a Licensee Controlled Document; however, there is no technical basis provided to justify the relocation. The genenc l "LG" NSHC is inadequate. Revise the submittal to provide this information. ) FLOG RESPONSE: The electrical switchgear area emergency fan coil units are support systems associated with the electrical distribution system. Requirements associated with support systems, while important, are not required to be maintained in the TS unless they mee. one or more of the criteria of 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii). DOC 18-02-LG is revised to provide additional justification for moving this requirement out of the TS. Also see response to NRC Comment 3.7.4-7 which provides justification for the relocation of other support system requirements. ATTACHED PAGES: - Enci 3A 16 i l i
CHANGE NUMBER EBC DESCRIPTION 18-01 A A clarifying footnote is added concerning isolation of safety , chilled water flow to individual components. Whilei;isolatforj oEs'afety3hT11edXateUfldRTto31ndividtiel.JLeggontntreay 0 3.7.19-4 l tegr;thosi~compdnentQtLoperable31tIdois?tidtleffeditJg 9perabBitDGthD1te1EcMlT3aterJnt.e@g inopetabi11ty3tfattected3s.3omponentsmould;bg:govergedibyltheig I indiViduaBpecificatJ5fs3 NUREG 1431 does not have a corresponding specification fp_risafety3hilledlateg. The conversion of this specification to the ITS format is modeled after the ITS CCW specification (which is a similar specification). The ITS CCW specification has this note and thus the addition of the note maintains consistency between these similar specifications. 18 02 LG The surveillance of the CPSES electrical switchgear area j I emergency fan cM1 dor"="* Melelegtrjca.la sw unitsarea ltcngear is moved to a licensee emergencygan, coy controlled 0 3.7.19 3 [l units areisuppott[systemsIdsjogjat_ed with thelelegtrical distri,bution3ystem;2Reguirementsias.sociated,with;supportjsystem.s; while;importantKareinotir;e_ qui red _t_o;beimaj ntained j n ;the3Slunless they~ meet'one r oremore'ofuthe[gri teri alo ffl0CFR50.36(c) (2) (ii )' e change is acceptable because u removes aetali no longer req 1 red i in the TS to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basis limiting condition for operation. 18 03 TR 1 The safety chilled water system actuation surveillance is revised to allow the use of an actual signal to verify actuation. The identification of initiating signals is moved to the Bases. i 18104 LG i Consistent ~Wi.tENUREG1143125thCword findeperident"JinJthe300 is consideted.itolbe3fescriptiveidetaillandlhasibeenimoyeditg thelBa s_esM1IT_Sl3Z19ETbb! change ~1s! acceptable 1.becaMe2{t 0 32 7.19 1 I remo.LegdeMElorigeXte_gtLited31n~the!TSEtcEprptictithe h.ea1111 Zand sefeMiofitheTp0bitcNhileTetainingIthelba; sis limitingEconditjonZforropetation] a CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N. 7 16 9a5/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.19-4 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.12.a ITS SR 3.7.19.1, Note DOC 18-01-A CTS 4.7.12.a has been modified by the addition of a note to ITS 3.7.19.1 stating that the " isolation of safety chilled water flow to individual components does not render the safety chilled water system inoperable". Comment: The DOC does not describe and provide a technical justification regarding why this note is appropriate here. Also, the ITS SR 3.7.19,1 Bases do not discuss the inclusion or justification for this note. Revise the submittal. FLOG RESPONSE: The Bases for the safety chilled water system has been revised to include a discussion of the note to ITS 3.7.19.1 stating that the " isolation of safety chilled water flow to individual components does not render the safety chilled water system inoperable". DOC 18-01-A has been revised to include additional justification for the inclusion of the note in the CTS markup. ATTACHED PAGES:
~.
Enct 3A 16 Enc!SB B 3.7-86 n
. . - . _ - . .- - - . __ . - _ _ ~ - - _ _ . - -
CHANGE NUMBER EiliG DESCRIPTION 18 01 A A clarifying footnote is added concerning isolation of safety chilled water flow to individual componenteIHkd63sgLagog A
' 356yghDJglfRteMil.oifitd31DdiVi(hfairc6mpnegM 0-3.7.19 4 h ren_detitho!Ggpggggtglin@erJbigEtt?#oerrtot3stfect'3he opetebil jtfp72heMDhilTMteR$3st~ebMs inoperabilitBf3ffectediTSIcomponents31ouldibe;gover_netby;1hejc indiVfdualiisped4ficathk9 NUREG 1431 does not have a corresponaing specificatioihin~rTsafety; chilled wa _. The conversion of this specification to tne ild format is modeled after the ITS CCW specification (which is a similar specification). The ITS CCW specification has this note and thus the addition of the note maintains consistency between these similar specifications.
18-02 LG The surveillance of the CPSES electrical switchgear area emergency fan coil units is moved to a licensee controlled document. Lhe;electrlgal;switchgear1arealemergency; fan ~coi.1 0 3.7.19 3 units;are;supportisystems ? associated 1with "the; ele;gtrical di strjibutionlsystem.ERequi rement s3ssoci atedyith;supportisy, stems,7 whi]elimportantMarelnot requiredito;beimajntainedMnjtheJSlunless they;meetionefor;mo,re;ofithe cr,itetiajofjl0CFR50.36.(c)(2)(11): The change is acceptable because it removes detail no longer required in the TS to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basis limiting condition for operation. 18 03 TR 1 The safety chilled water system actuation surveillance is revised to allow the use of an actual signal to verify actuation. The identification of initiating signals is moved to the Bases. 18,{03 LG ConsistentMi_t_hlNUREGilf31Xttgordfligdepsndent 2jnltheJLCO is[ consider _edjto'beMe,scrJtiveIdetail3nd'hasibele sovedlq thelBases!gfflTS~327A921TheCitangelslacgeptab1_elbgau]_eli,t T 0 3.7.19 1 l removes 7deta1LWtiohgerYsacifedMtselSito;ptotstIth-g healthlandTshfetD,fithDDblicNhfleTretalD.fDg'tKba'sf,s , 1 imiting ~ cog _d1tiogfggoperatiof0 f CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N.7 16 9n588
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ITimzrw 6;- , Mm % . 4m m u d e F* W M Tyu m. s v M TMgqR *] nisult3natols3fatheB5afetfChilledMaterLWstisf4q;tg!pJgghg mtedron3heWMm;"&aggggggg[g M9mEMtaEIMMtstriftgg!812he2cgp14abtTitRDtMMUI gprdashB3RDBM3!!D l t l 5 B W rand BT2 l I IffitheT54fet)rgtjlled;WateXSystealtsgiglcannotibeliG6eeiltd OP.ERLRittat0Qit.hirtthe alsgciatedicomplet9%T.11sepitje3 nit : most;be]pleted2[rfa]l0_D_EljlEWhichJheILC,0]!oes]Iotlapp]MTy ) ichjevQhfs;$t@isEthOr[it;must;biplac_edlinlatHea'stINME3 f l Within16lhoiursjM!d:MODETWithjn?61hoursNThe3)) owed 1Completfon i T_1.mesiar:el.teaso_nable7dbased~on e pperating;experfenceEtoi"reachlthe ! requi red 3 nit;c1xiditionsarom;fulX powericonditionssinlan;orderJy l mannerfandfWithout' challenging;u'n.it s stems? nm v~cammm=:nzm w w mrnr: :m.w;m mum wmm l SLRVEILLANCE SR 33:771931 0 3.7.1 REQUIREMENTS -
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.19-5 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 4.7.12.b ITS SRs 3.7.19.2 DOC 18-03-TR1 CTS 4.7.12.b verifies at least once per 18 monihs that each safety chilled water train pumo chiller starts as designed upon receipt of a Safety injection test signal. ITS SR 3.7.19.2 verifies the safety chilled water train oumo and chiller starts on an actual signal or a simulated signal. Comment: The DOC states that the specific identity of the simulated signal, is no longer retained in the SR but is to be moved to the Bases. A review of the ITS SR 3.7.19.2 Bases l discussion shows this is not identified there. Revise the Bases accordingly per the DOC. FLOG RESPONSE: ITS SR 3.7.19.2 Bases been revised to include the Safety injection signal in the discussion actuation signals. ATTACHED PAGES: EncISB B 3.7-86 i 4 l
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t aniorder]y magner agOithoutichallengigg;unitisystem_s] i um w g v nrwemn--em ww w ,n g m -ygnvm w wm m m SLJRyEILLANCE JSR73:7:1911 0 3.7.19 4 REQUIREMENTS Thj s, SRiifmodi fied; byfaJqt_elindigating[thatitheMsolation otsafetBh1ReGate.gifloWitolindijidua.EcomponentsYeayynder these compondnt.slinopstabjelbutidoes~not2a[fect:the10FfRAB_I ITJlof safetyr chilled: Water sys,. tem; i V.eLifying;thelgotrect:ajjgnme.nt:fon manua1Xvalves3etyicing1 safety telated]gufpment]proiidesZasgutance;thatithelptoperlflofpa.ths e31stiforiSafety;Ch111ed Water 1Syst_egloper_ation mThisWAo_eC.nqt app 1nolV.!L116Kithatletel16ckedHsbaTedH6flothiMisXs~esuted33 position 2since2hents1Vellffedit@e3nithelcottectiositjog ptiojitolteine1LocleG3fealgEotisdcWedWThis1SudoesTnotZdtqujre anyttestlancalvewanjpolationgratheglitJinvol ves 3Verificat1@ t thitithMHIVilypsZgdphble!qfLbejng[m[sNJsftioDidlite31githeIcof_ reg,t positfo!QRhlsiSRZdonsIno_typplyitojLVal,yes]that[can_@tibe 10advertshtlyWs~alignd_dZsgeh1433h[cKWa19e_s] Thel 31!dfVltendengyIiEbygleadsinpftJggIjudgementZis consi stentNithitheJptoteduPB11;centrel sDyelping; Val velopera,tlog] t altdZe~g]sT@tCf6ttetR811elpyJitjons] SR'3.7?19?2 i ThisiSRW6rJfieslptopetIop6fationloflthe25'afetrCM11ed Wa.t myste$ {an_sf andJpdeps7on Tan 7actualfotisj mul atedgety11gnject1_ , ctj[a.tiog sjgnal;XOperating;expe.cfencelhasJshoenithaw-w me ntfpst[al]y pass'th615titVe111 anceI9he.nIphtfotmediatithell_8JopthLequency;g TherefofeRthe38Imonthif.t@feJcf2s3ggptablelffom!alteJiabiljj;y standpojat] Wreeme nntmv=amwmmmmmmtwemrmrmamv mc7rm CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1D1 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-86 9n5/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.20-1 APPLICABILITY: CP l L l , REQUEST: CTS 3.7.11P LCO, item a and b Bases ITS 3.7.20P, Background DOC 20-01-LG JFD 3.7-48 CTS 3.7.11P LCO, items a and b described the details of what constitutes an Operable UPS. These details are moved to the Bases of ITS 3.7.20P, Background discussion. Comment: The Bases discussion produces verbal description which has been transformed into the sketch included with the ITS 3.7.20P Bases. There are also comments on the Bases which pertain to the completeness of the LCO Operability description. CPSES should verify the attached sketch and respond by correction and/or modification of the Bases. I FLOG RESPONSE: CPSES has reviewed the sketch provided and we have revised it to reflect the actual plant configuration. The Bases LCO Operability description has been revised to provide additional detail. ATTACHED PAGES: Revised sketch ' Enct 5B B 3.7-92 m
A/C A/C TRAIN TRAIN "A" y "B" V
) s s
TRN "A" VV TRN "B" VV TRN "A" VV TRN "B" V V , FCU FCU FCU
> FCU
- l U1 U1 > U2 > U2 V V V V "A" "B" "A" "B" SCWS SCWS SCWS SCWS
& PWR & PWR & & pWR PWR , UPS HVAC. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION '
I m?2M17EE5mWsrTWrimmTGEUJUPS;HVAC j E27JmK35mEI",asa%mmCE:2rmTrmumBl?i20E lifl$EMContJnuedEEEEENSTWmWDFMMEmm =~;33rrg; mmmarmer.xmmumn axw.nnewman 4EELIGAJLLE Iheides.jgr,@asisrofitheiUPSEASystes!1s topigtainithej ligpWANALISES1 R&l.Dtstdhgioiroomit_eepetatt! ries] IMhEUPS1RogersrateidedicatentoltheJESLUnitland TraiXthey supporlagM1Rs:s/ciTrain rcomponentra.telersanged;.igtedundant a i safetyleJRtadatainsmguringIemntgesspatationathe3PSRAC Sygem:ssintainsithaltemperatute3!eloB2210UKsingle3ctjye i fa11ute312rcomponentInf;themVecAqjtKallossrof;offsite l poietGle@]o11tegaJrithelability:oflthelsntenito: perform;its ! de. sign 2Mton MRedundagticontrol slare;pr_owld. edifor10PS; room temperaturg1conttolETheJPSltlVAClis;designedLinfaccorda.nceyith Seismic;CategoryJItequirements;;;The;UES;HVACLiszcapable;of i temovigg3ensiblelandilatentiheat,iloads;fron3he;UPS;inyerter tooms2 which;jnclude;consjderation 'off.equj pment~ heat 11 oad requjtements;tolensurefequjpment;0PERAB.ILITU The10PSJEsatisf_ies(Critetion,,4;of 10CFR50.36_(c).(2)(ii); l gw cm - vvwnwm.nwgmmmmmmv~g.wwe - , l LC0 wo UPS HVACLSy_ stem;ttajns are;requir_edito;be;0PERABLE;to ' i o.3.7.20 1 ptovideithErequireditedundancylto functionsitoiremove'heatifromithe~UPS' rooms'duringra:DBA ensuretthatiti,Dsyste[m
% m UFuntm3ystemJrainjs2ponsidered 0PERABLEyhen x 2 1ts associated; a; UPS.1 Emergency 1[anlojl Unjtjs 0PERABLEEot CP 3.7 013 bi 11 AirLConditioneI[andlan_slare;0PEMBLE2an_d 2), Duqtworkiand ~ dampers tare 20PERABLE;Iandlairjcirculation ga[beJgaint1Lned] .
mmmmmmme:rm~m swwar mn m w. w w w n n .~r m s: 3 R QCABILITX Initt0DEJ32217Jpr;MthelUP,jiliV_ACiSystealis2eguireditolbe OPJMBLEltEensurelthe1UPSl&lD.fstriibutidnTroomitesperatures2411 gotlexcgtiqu]peegtIOp6Pationdl Trequitementsj Ig!!@DEiS RIQt_he10PEMBILIFltaquirementsTofithe10P_S s CP 3.7-013 tBLAQ.SAteretejeterminedibfithle s 'stee~'1t30 ppd,tt_s] nnem-mmwm_. smm,,mm-nnwn- m-mnvm mome. = - ~mwww .=rm eummatwu e -e nam -- -- %46 essww.ewawmie.a ma e4 6CJI,0NS A717anCA'2 Withtone1UPS? HVAC2Syst_emitralD3jleZIEf,CEandRCilrjin,Jof2the same;electrRa11traiquigopeta. blezagtiorm_ostibeitaken immedietn]EtoMe_tifyZtlieJA/ChTraM3fithe3ppgitelelectr,1 cal trainXWerable3ndito2es_tWe2ERABLQg8tys]djthin,20fdaysjj Duringit}f_sipetic_d2the7emaininsTOPERABLEittHfrEisid_dequatelto petfore;theJE/HVAQJSysles;f_uqqtiorfMThe130 day 1C_ompletion?[j_me i CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-92 9/25/98 l l m
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET j l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.20-2 APPLICABILITY: CP ! REQUEST: CTS 3.7.11P Applicability and Action ITS 3.7.20P Applicability and Action Note DOC 20-xx-LSx CTS 3.7.11 Applicability and Action is for Mode 1,2,3, and 4 and the Actians are for " Units 1 l and 2". CTS 3.7.11P Applicability is for Modes 1,2,3 and 4. ITS 3.7.20P Applicability is for Mode 1,2,3, and 4. Comment: This apparent shared unit operation showed by the CTS Action is not retained in the ITS. The ITS Applicability should be similar to ITS 3.7.10 and ITS 3.7.11 for room air conditioning and temperature control. It should be either "At all times"; or " Modes 1,2,3,4,5, and 6"; or "When any unit is in Mode 1,2,3 or 4" The equipment in the UPS Rooms will i dictate the appropriate mode of Applicability. Also, the Actions should be preceded by a Note l stating " Actions shall apply simultaneously to both Units." FLOG RESPONSE: The mode applicability for the control room ventilation tech specs 3.7.10 I and 3.7.11 is not based on it being a shared system. Note that the BASES for ITS 3.7.10 notes l the basis for MODE 5 and 6 applicability is a waste gas decay tank rupture. The same modes would apply for non-shared control rooms. The mode applicability in the ITS 3.7.10,3.7.11 and 3.7.20P apply to each unit independently. ITS 3.7.20 without LAR 96-004 reflects a UPS'HVAC I l System comprised of a two train shared A/C system serving unit specific UPS rooms. The I recently completed modification to improve the UPS reliability (which was the basis of the pending LAR 96-004 which generated the "P" version of CTS 3.7.11) added one unit / train specific fan coil unit (FCU) to each of the UPS rooms. The shared UPS Train A and B A/C units, which also supply cooling to these rooms, were retained. Both the systems (FCUs and A/C units) can be used independent of each other to st.pply cooling to UPS rooms. The shared portion of the UPS HVAC System is adequately described in the Bases definition of what is an operable UPS HVAC train. Since the UPS HVAC System is comprised of both unit , specific cooling and shared unit cooling, Actions do not necessarily apply simultaneously to both units. For example, if both A/C trains and 1 FCU were inoperable, one unit would have two operable UPS HVAC trains and the other unit would be in Conditions A and B. It is not necessary to deviate from the STS applicability. The definition of what constitutes an operable UPS HVAC train will dictate the applicable units that may be affected. The ITS applicability properly reflects the CTS. ATTACHED PAGES: None 1
i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET APPLICABILITY: CP ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.20-3 REQUEST: CTS 3.7.11P Action a ITS 3.7.20P Actiun A DOC 20-ww-A CTS 3.7.11P Action a states "With one or more UPS & Distribution Room supported only by an Operable UPS A/C train" that is further qualified as "which is not the same train as the UPS in that room". This additional phrase is not retained in the ITS 3.7.20P Action A. Comment: Issue #1 - The deletion of the phrase "which is not the same as the UPS in that room"is not technically justified with a DOC. Explain the CTS requirement and provide this justification in a new DOC. Issue #2 - The Condition statement of Action A needs to be limite to apply if any unit is in the Mode of Applicability to differentiate it from the conditions for Action C. FLOG RESPONSE: (Issue #1) Refer to updated sketch provided in response to Comment Number O 3.7.20-1. The CTS and ITS LCOs are technically equivalent. The phrase "which is not the same as the UPS in that room"is moved to the Bases per DOC 20-01-LG and is implicit in the Bases definition of an operable train of UPS HVAC :
"An UPS HVAC System train is considered OPERABLE when its associated:
- a. UPS Fan Coil Unitis OPERABLE, or
- b. Air Conditioner and fans are OPERABLE, and 1)
Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation 2) can be maintained." For example, by the above definition, for a train "A" UPS room to be without an operable cooling system, the train "A" FCU and the train "A" A/C unit would have to be inoperable. In this scenario, the only train of air conditioning that could still be operating is the opposite train and therefore the statement "which is not the same train as the UPS in that room" is n necessary. (Issue 2)- It is not necessary to deviate from the STS applicability. The definition of what constitutes an operable UPS HVAC train will dictate the applicable units that may be affected. l ATTACHED PAGES: None + w
1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.20-4 APPLICABILITY: CP l REQUEST: CTS 3.7.11P Action b ITS 3.7.20P Action B and Bases DOC 20-yy-LSy CTS 3.7.11P Action b is for one or more rooms not supported by an Operable UPS fan coil or A/C train but with a UPS A/C train circulating air only. ITS 3.7.20P Action B is entered when two UPS System HVAC trains are inoperable. Comment: Issue #1 - The addition of the new Required Actions B.1 and B.2 is not justified i with a DOC. Provide these justifications in new DOCS. Also, the Action B condition logical l connector phrase must be removed because there is no difference between Required Actions A.1 and B.1 which are determined concurrently. Issue #2 - The maximum temperature for these rooms must be under normal operating conditions which is 104 F and should be explicitly stated here. The Bases state the maximum temperature is placed in the TRM which is unacceptable. The maximum room operating temperature cannot be permitted to exist at the obnormal operating temperature limit of 113 F while in this degraded mode because this could result in the temperature safety limits being exceeded. Issue #3 - The Condition statement of Action B needs to be limited to apply if any unit is in the Mode of Applicability to differentiate it from the conditions for Action C. Issue #4 - The Required Action B.3 Completion Time of 72 hours is not adequately justified in the Bases because the Basis provided is the same aHor the . 30 day Completion Time. l FLOG RESPONSE: (Issue #1)- Although the format is different, ITS Required Actions B.1 I and B.2 are technically equivalent to Action B of CTS 3.7.11P. DOC 1-13-A addresses changes to format. No additional DOC is necessary. Issue #2- CTS 3/4.7.11 does not include maximum normal operating temperature limits. It only l requires the additional requirement to comply with CTS 3/4.7.10 during the 72 hours action. , l This ensures that continued operability of the affected equipment is evaluated while the supporting HVAC system is degraded. Relocation of the 3/4.7.10 specification to a licensee controlled document is consistant with STS and justified in 17-01-R. Issue #3- It is not necessary to deviate from the STS standard applicability. Either unit in MODES 1-4 with ITS 3.7.20P as proposed is equivalent to the CTS 3/4.7.11P. Issue #4- The justification is not the same for the 30 day and 72 hour completion times. The 30 day completion time is applicable when the function of one Fan Coil Unit (FCU )and its associated A/C train is being maintained by a 100% capacity A/C train of the opposite electrical l train. The 72 hour completion time is applicable when the function of one FCU and its l associated A/C train is being maintained by an A/C fans circulating air from other FCUs. l ATTACHED PAGES: l l None l l
h l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.20-5 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.11P Action a, b and c ITS 3.7.20P Action C DOC 20-zz-LSz If the CTS 3.7.11 actions cannot be achieved, then the unit is placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours and in Mode 5 in 36 hours. CTS 3.7.11P Action c and ITS 3.7.20 Action C.1 permit an extra one hcur to " Restore the required support" before entering an orderly shutdown. Comment: The proposed ITS is not technically justified by a DOC, a JFD or by a technical justification in the Bases. Remove this requirement from the new CTS 3.7.11P and ITS. Also, the Condition C statement should be " Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in Modes 1,2,3 or 4." See Comments 3.7.20-3 and 3.7.20-4 above. FLOG RESPONSE: CTS 4.7.11P is CTS 4.7.11as modified by CPSES LAR 96-04. The "P" version is expected to be approved by the NRC prior to the approval of the ITS conversion. As such the wording of the specification (including the additional one hour for restoration) will be in our CTS. Since there is no STS counterpart to this specification, JFD 3.7-48 was used to add this CPSES specific specification to the ITS. Since there are no changes proposed for the CTS no DOCS are necessary. Condition C has been split into Condition C and D to match the CTS. ATTACHED PAGES: EnctSA 3.7-39 and 3.7-40 Enci5B B 3.7-93 m l l l
UPSEACiSyst2 i EMaT2H25575Ei5E322"CIOrHEiriEEEPES?!?SSE ECH32TEJ3i7129 ! EIIEfpj!!ESISIEMS l EZL2eP_BREHVAciSysten:[M1?LLAR,j@iOOf]
@0232I20f MTS~HKS$$en3Jrains3hallIbe10P,ERABLE] k3MM eiggggtm MODEE1Z2?23am8 eLCIIONS CONDJTION REJlDJBEDIACTION COMP,1;ETI_0NJIME A; One;UPS2HVAC; System A;l Verify;the:affected;UPSl& Immediately trainanoperable; Distribution Roos,is supporte(bylan,0PERABLE UPS:A(c3 Train.:
M A.'2 Restoreitheiinoperabl.eiUPS 30.' days l ljVAClttajnjto;0PERABLE statu_sj Bi TwoLUPS_;HVAC System B.1 Vetifylairl,^ circulation:is Immedi.ately trai.ns' inoperable maintained l,by;atileastrone UPS R C!Itainj E E Bequjted: Action A;1;and assocfated Compl,etion B.'2 Verifylthe3jtJtemperature 12diours Time:not;me.t2 in;theIRfectedRSi& Distrib_U MtRoon(sEdoes AND notiexceeditheimaximuW ' tempetatjfre;11mitifocithe Once~per212;houts COM(s)] theteaftet M BI3 RettR60JWJ)fVAC'SystM 72[ hour) ttafrctc0MMBLElsDlug C] Beguired_ Action;B;1;and C'Q ReRor$2helrequjred 1",houn associated,Completiotj g,Ul@tt 0 3.7.20 5
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.20-6 APPLICABILITY: CP l REQUEST: CTS 4.7.11P.1 ITS SRs 3.7.20P.3 DOC 20-02-TR1 l CTS 4.7.11P.1 verifies at least once per 18 months that each UPS A/C train actuates as designed upon receipt of a Safety injection signal. ITS SR 3.7.20P.3 verifies the same UPS A/C train actuates on an actual signal or a simulated signal. l l l Comment: Issue #1 - The DOC states that the specific identity of the simulated signal, is no
. longer retained in the SR but is to be moved to the Bases. A review of the ITS Bases l
l discussion for these SRs show they do not contain these testing details. Revise the Bases in accordance with the DOC. Issue #2 - The DOC 20-02-TR1 is not shown on the CTS markup. Issue #3 - How are the UPS & Distribution Room Fan coil units actuated and how is this verified? Since CTS 4.7.12.b is retained as ITS SR 3.7.19.2, then there should be a similar SR for the UPS & Distribution Room Fan coil units actuating each 18 months. Provide the appropriate technical explanation and justification. 1 l FLOG RESPONSE: (Issue #1)ITS Bases SR 3.7.20.2 and SR 3.7.20P.3 has been revised to identify the specific actuation signal. , (Issue # 2) DOC 20-02-TR-1 was included in the markup of CTS 4.7.11 but not on CTS l 4.7.11P. That is because CTS 4.7.11P is a modified version of 4.7.11 (per LAR 96-04) which l did not include a specific actuation signal in the CTS and therefore a DOC is not required to l ' move that information to the Bases. This version is expected to be approved by the NRC prior to the approval of the ITS conversion. As noted in response to issue #1 above, the Bases will include information as to specific actuation signal. (Issue # 3) The control circuit design of the UPS Room Fan Coil Units (FCUs) does not include, ' an " auto" start or " standby" feature. When all FCUs are operating, the existing UPS A/C Trains are normally maintained in standby. Each UPS Room Fan Coil Unit is controlled from a local control panel integral to the unit. There la no remote instrumentation or control room status indication; so, verification of status is local. The control panel contains a maintained two position hand switch (run/off). Each unit is directly wired to its associated safeguards bus and therefore, load shed if the bus is de-energized upon a Blackout signal ("BOS") or a Safety injection ("S") signal. The units automatically restart upon re-energizing of the associated safeguards bus. The following paragraph will be inserted into the BASES 3.7.20P BACKGROUND:
"The control circuit design of the FCUs does not include an " auto" start or " standby" feature. Each UPS Room Fan Coil Unit is controlled from a local control panel integral to the unit. The control panel contains a maintained two position hand switch (run/off).
Each unit is directly wired to its associated safeguards bus and therefore, load shed if the bus is de-energized upon a Blackout signal ("BOS") or a Safety injection ("S") signal. The units automatically restart upon re-energizing of the associated safeguards bus. A FCU must be operating to be operable." CTS 4.7.12.b is the applicable surveillance for the chilled water supply to the UPS & Distribution
.- -. , , . ,y. ,, , .-- , . _ . - _,
M
- Room FCUs; however, CTS 3.7.12 does not contain a surveillance applicable to the FCUs it supplies with the exception of the electrical switchgear area FCUs which are started by BOS and S signals. The pump room FCUs are interlocked to start with their respective pump and are surveilled as support equipment. The UPS & Distribution Room FCUs do not auto-start.
Therefore, no auto-start survellance is required. ~ ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B 3.7-90, B 3.7-91 and B 3.7-93a
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l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7 R DOCS APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: CTS Section 3.7 LCOs normally relocated in accordance with the Split Report: For all plants:
]
1: 14-01-R CTS 3/4.7.2, SG Pressure / Temperature Limits 15-01-R CTS 3/4.7.6, Flood Protection 16-01-R CTS 3/4.7.9, Snubbers 17-01-R CTS 3/4.7.10, Area Temperature Monitoring 19-01-R CTS 3/4.'7.13, Main Feedwater Pressure / Temperature Limits . l The above CTS LCOs are proposed to be relocated to Licensee Controlled Documents. Comment: For CPSES - There is no technical justification provided for the relocation of these ' i CTS LCOs. Revise the DOCS to provide the missing technicaljustification. For the others - l Where are the normal CTS LCOs which are apparently not part of the respective current licensing basis for these plants? If these CTS LCOs still exist, provide the same technical justifications as required for CPSES. FLOG Response: u For CPSES, DOCS 14-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.2, SG Pressure / Temperature Limits, 15-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.6, Flood Protection, l 16-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.9, Snubbers, l 17-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.10, Area Temperature Monitoring, and 19-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.13, Main Feedwater Pressure / Temperature Limits, have been revised to provide additional justification for the changes. Also screening sheets have been provided to verify that the relocated specification does not meet any of the 4 criteria i in 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii) governing components, systems and structures that must be included in ~ the TS. The location of the relocated specifications is provided in Enclosure 3B. For the other plants, the equivalent specifications (where applicable) were moved out of the CTS into Licensee Controlled Documents in previous license amendments. ! ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 3A 15b,15c,15d,15e, and 16c Attachment 21 25,26,29 thru 36 s I
CHANGE NUMBER HSiG DESCRIPTION 14 01 R The Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitation TS is 0-3.7 R DOCS relocated to a licensee controlled document. Egggggigd tempatateliSGM11R1lgBGED10sEenItNQite!ERBMiltqts (SsEsorpanagnusmanct0EinnurEnEEttlansasIEIB2t3tw I secondacy21MDNomino1MarfMikCE!!R2DsEin6BN210lLRita f gnithgISGJE3o; ens 0MtthatEthe"pg[$shfgEkdMeQ[ttpgggrq gitlKth_e3LadsuggRableXrictut 3Cngthnes*3tW#RisWK2Uhdf l 24TJElettODalanogagg!ggeneratocLToFMATanDEs l suffittentitoWreVeg3gittle"fracttfrij ]hiffprop6serJEteyisiqn I telo_ cates 7requirementgphichrdy notimeet3thg3Srcriterf aI1g 1_0gfB50136fcM2)f11MdocumentslwithAstabMs! Led 3:pntrgl progtemsE]higeguJallogddresseilthE$_ cope"Ynd;porposelo.fE] InzddinggJtIs'etiLfbrthlaispdcific3ntRfiobfestly#~cdtedaTfpr determinfngJ#hicih regeratory2equitemen.tslandropetating testtjetjpns ls_ho0XbgliAcludedLinithe2ISABelocatfggiofithes.e requ.irementcallowssthegto be; reserved;only:forithoselconditiona CUnitis enrVponIrgetorIo@fatioLwlh chletelh6 cess &ty;to r obviateitheJDossibilityIofiarabnormallsituation orTevent"giving tiselto;anMumidiateitlh eatlto~theIpubliclhealthlandisafetfithereby focusing ~the'scoperofithe3SHn'evdl uationlof th_e;applic_abflith ' these7criterialtolthisispeciffcationli sjprpvidedlin]nttachmeDtl2.1j Tolensurran3ppropr;f ateWev'el Toflontro13these3ggoirementsN111 beltelocateditp:1)_IdocDeentsithat;are((thbjest]to3hs!prpyjsloXnot 101CfB;501592_2]CDther331c_enseeldocumentsNhich haveIsimilet regdlatorficontrolsXggMtle;QualityIAs'suranceZElinZasidesctibed indthe~FSARMhichKcontro11edWJ0CFR50:54a)2crI3Etojprggrams an thatitteIclontro1T6Cyla3h6?AdministratifiLConttplCtJctiohlofftM improved ;TSNIhCfden,tific_ation'ofitheIs@ti.fic311c'enset contro11e'did6cument?cdntaihingitbisXgge_f rement Kprpvidedln , Enclosure'383Gthe3cchver51orsub_sitta]2 ggsp11an' c Gith4he~r.alecotetirequirements wj]J3fotwaffecteii;h.f thisJptopdiEcheh@ltg2tu!3 Brent 2IgEgg812SMcifEidE@JM tesUfred Ver1@ic~ittfrVA11TancE3W11rfc6ntinuel1t036IpetioNe636 yniorejth8ta!MaittMnDiirnMitersTit5eIsBfDtMped WBRMTeti! reloc'atioQtithe]ie3tgofitementsNillPh8V62hidsfut2BREtystgg bp'efib111tyKth6%1bliNATict ofTCMttellud l par 8hetert31rithid limit.sl This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 since this i specification is not included in the ISTS. CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3/4.7 ISb 9/25/98
.- . - . _ - - . . ._ - - - - -. =--.- . - - - - - - .
l l CHANGE NUMBER NSBC DESCRIPTION l 15 01 R The Flood Protection TS is relocated to a licensee l controlled document.1helpases?fot9:hig1[ftft1RUMoght1M I Q 3.7 R DOCS fot3peraggE3lERMett!g3lGhgpftacEh ' TllgnitObst faci 13tranaamarmtfantpTmtatsuthoteKcof f i floorcomuntg3Ble3mJy3tig!!blG!ERiblttt1M3batIendangers safetyrtemeregangtgra_m3gterJ!n!ncignithe140@jne building 3gctagsgsggg3sMr3*ytt8KBtomTMLDireB Reselmolt3tllEthgGR}yI1T3Milq!LUfsJghtgefBfleetJe[a!CSe.a tevel31h1D! lmb 00nds2toEtM31gation!tighichJeter:cculd enterithemealzandlmssiacildlyptdangeting;the2 safety chillediMMitemZiThelsktyeillanceleguiremagslAte: designed tolepleme!Lt3!!Islinq1totsgofiswicent!tesetpirishouldiit , teachlan3hoted))ylhigQevefabove:77EfeetRghe1Lfatting 1 Conditior1Ifojri0peratiogifsEdesignsditolimplemegf1md; prot.ection; bylensuring no~opWilowlpath3.faithelCircGlatingyater; System existsgptforato;_reaghingithe:postulatediflood.g eyer. Thjs!propo_ sed)TS3evisiprilelocatesiteguitementtsQr!Lich;doinot meet the35j eritetta}jrC10CFR50.;36{c)f 2)111 Rtoldocumentslwjth established icontrol:1progransOThisltegQlationjaddtessesj the Acope ! and;phrpo_selol2SJ J!Cdoingisd;1ttyetslfptthlaispecifig; set ~of l objectiveictiterialfolr determining;@fchlregu.latory; requirements ; and3peratingInsteretionsishouKbeItac1dded73!!jthe35ERelocation ofCthese~tMotC-.slallogs1theLTEtolbe;teserledign]y;fgt::those corldftions70rGiftitations3tpog2e~attorigpsretfofidtic.h;are necessary;to3bviatelt_heyossibiljty;ofjarigb! tor!!altsituation'or eventI91M1!gse3@CimmediatelthteatitolthOubitcihealttCand safetygthe;rebyLfo#singitheIscDpelqfithe?TSTfAOv8laation;oljhe app 11cability20fitheseictiteriatto7thislypec1[tcationnis provjded 19:attactis!dR02A' - Io;AnsuteZas;jhppgiptjpte3 eve 1 Tof 2onttglgthegtguftenentsiwill beltejgcatedgg2I3ltomsgs;thatNorG@jectit#1ttWFJgrgvisions;pf 101CK50]E;38)IgtD_elriegrygeldgpunentpkhichipeyelijajlar; I tegojatoryncestB31(ejp35the qoglfty?At3Dtance71anza_s3e_sctibed l Jh3helSEM$.3L6!!ttglldjUby30CEB50954020rR}itXprogram!
- thataterejetampttle3heydninistrativeic6ntroirsstigniofEthe 1mpr3!!ed H5Mdehttfic8tibHrtfAgh6]BpecificNitefisee '
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; E!Lcl@uteRB.1513bEconRt[jgDubilittal3 Complianc8Niith3 tite 2e169atedIrfgditements"yill!riotibeleffectKby tA(sIpigposed3hanneitoltheicurler;t1TechnicallSpecifications75The teqdited;per1Ddic30rveil14:ntes3ili1T~c6ntinneitolbeInc2 formed2 to Murgth!?]})mitsipnlparametets.lare' maintained 7GTherefqte]
telogatioOf3heWelr_equjgementsiwJllibajggolfspaj;tfgohlsyytes opetabjlityInt;ghelmaintenance3rlegntfo11edipa_tametersytthin limits] This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 since this specification is not included in the ISTS. CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3M.7 ISc 9/25/98 n
CHANGE N(#EER HSlE DESCRfPTION ; l 1 l l 16 01 R The Snubbers TS is relocated to a licensee controlled 0 3.7 R DOCS document. E!als_nubbers3Xtaguired tEbigefAbleIggnsGre j thalitheistructutalitateg'rltgprthe2CS3ETES3g3g safety? related tsystest"Ermaintained3dtirl#3DdJfo))ggggXLe1Eic oriqtherJeVentiinftiatillsyMitip9ondsTNh61estr;41ggg58?ig3f the]Lnubbegs; ensures'Ithatithe101tiatinrevent5fa11urfeIdag[got Ptopegateitq;otheDattsMfitfigitafleDy.sjteggritatisfj$get2 l gys,tingsgubbers"alsrallocograalthin3RG3E9te!!!9059fRJefag and.^ ngzzlesltoleljeltfateZexcesif VEitt!stg&Egjgss_e5Idhring]jhtatup orEcooldowngSnubberJsurfeillance31s'icdgductedj,b@rittle tequir,ementslofitheIspubberisdtjef]1agOtogtami Th,1sIproposed JSitevisionlelocateslequjr_ementsEwhichldolnottmeet the:TS criterja3 nil 0CfR50136(c)(2)fiiT3to; documents 31th e_stabli sh_edicontrol;ptogtans.iThis;rggulationladdres_sesithelscope andlpurposeiofEST.?In~doing:sopft 3etsiforthia'specifigisetipf objectlye;crftettaZfgt;determinj ng ;ish_f cl1Lr_egulatorfitequirements andloperating;resttictionsishould .ibelincl uded;inithelTSMejogation ofitheselequitementsla))Ms;theMSito~beleserved pnlylforithose ; conditionsataimitations3pon;reactorlopetation1whichzare necessary;tolobyfatelthfpgssibility;ofj[anzabnotsalliituation~ot evenggivi191LseltoTenlimmedia_te' threat 7tolthe_;publicihe81_tfgand safety 1the^rebylfocusingLtheIscopelofitheElAnleVa10ationTof the applicabiljt "ofithese'criterfaltoTthis~specifichtfonlisyntojided infattachmeJLt:21; Tolensure;agapprppriate71eVel fofJcontro1 EtheseTrequj_reme_qtslwj]J belteJocatedito11)Idoc0me_nts3haltlarjgs_0bjectitp3theIptoyfstonsIof 101Cf,RiS015922KotherBicenseeTdocuments!Which3aleisin1Lat tegulatotffcontrolsMeIggthe3hialitVIAstDeancelPld]QisRsgttbgd , ' inithe;fSARmvhichitsTcoptto,11@lbyBOCER50154alfe@)3teograult thatleteX6ntrolled1Vialt@lAchintittatfireIcontr61 Ggt _1M26Cthe LaprJo ed;ixmine2dentificatioEoGttiellottifiGiQthseJ CODttgliedid_otiumerttIcontaininEtbjgttceitete~ntilsTot ovidgLdlig Enc 16Bbre73Bitf3theTconferisiorYstbmittalM ConglianceNithith_elelocaled Hauffineltr$711 LRho1983ffglLteOR this!ptopolgEchMgeltolthj3Frie3n %g@nig115piqigetjfDREIhd teguited p'eriodicTsurvet1.lan_cstjlTaontinuco3ejgetfoesertg ensute;that2];1mitsI6 Mar 8Metdir7t'd3851ntalr_iedEIMtefofM s telocatiofofftheseirequirements'WJ]Eh3VeInolimpac_tlon3sy}teu f operabi]itEcrathQaintensggelbfgoMfo1Tgfpartamet@Xtithig
]jmits73This ci,ange is consistent with NUREG 1431 since this i specification is not included in the ISTS.
CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N. 7 ISd 905/98 L
l CHANGE NUPEER EE DESCRIPTION 1 l 17 01 R The Area Temperature Monitoring TS is relocated to a licensee l controlled document. Ihj}MpicifficatiblCplaC45?MettInti 0 3.7 R DOCS theltemperbtdri2'6fithplali4~$'bf3herpTiHtEishich%cggf.jn 6 safetYirelAted'etgliRdhiitiG$TretIUired303rtsimBthat 1 thellLimpirJtdtg@ffthtfeqllipiinntTdoesNotTHXcentRits2tatf@nnental tiualificatloctempgtalaramur3nnormanopeta.tionaggiosgtead l excig1$igfMghitempir)terisTenyIdegrjideltheliqufpmentiag1Ecadeld loss of;1ts operabjlity; This ptopqsedlTS:tevislogelocates"tequitemeritsgWhj~chXn_otim.,eet the3Sicrite_rfa~dpl10CFR50136(gl(2)(111?ItgjocumentsNjth established control pr_ograms3This~ regulation 3ddre.ssesittjelscope and;purposEofRSHInIdoingIso11tise. ts;forthXtpscjfjgset;of ! objective ~criterialforldetermining' Which"regul atory[tequjgements l and;operatingLtesttictjp!! sis _ho.u][belincludedjinitheHSTJelocation I of3heseitegujtenegtCalloWsltheHSj.tolbeltesetvedioD]ylforithog ) conditionsIoti]Jaitationslupq:teactor.Iopetatipn]shichla~rg j necessaryltolobVlateithelpossibility3 flan;abnormallsituationlor; l eventigivj ngitiselto!an!1mmediateithreatitoithe7public[ health!and l safety;thereby"{ocusing ;theIsc~opelo fithe1TS:TAnlevaluatiogiofithe appljcabilityloffthesercriterialto thisTspegjfjcatigg;is;provided inTattachmsntJ21] I To;ensutela_n;approptiateJev_eJZof2controlEtheselrequirenientsyL1J l be.;telocateditoll); documents 3thatfareispbjectltojh,e;prolijionsLof l 101CFR:5019ZL2110thers liciriseelclocurents3shichThave7 sis 11ag tegulatory3:ontrol s3elg 31the_;Qualj,ty2AssuranceJP,,lanZafdescrj,bdNl in'thifSARE9J1[gh31]i~'contfd].lediby110CER50I54.812bt:3]Ito2ptggta_mj thatlatelcontr,_o]ledWiasthe? Administrative l Controls;sectiorrdf.;the jmptoled1TETheli_dentificationI6f!th61specifjcllicellsfj , conttolled docimientgohtaln_1githisitquirementgis~proyfdedlig En_ glos;ure?3BTofIthelconferjigg;s~ubmittal?3 e Compliance 5iithEthdyelcic4 tid &dahiresElits1911Ehot"belaffRtedM thisTpropd~sedichange2tEttWTctIrfentHechnicalESpecificat,1ohEMThe t@GXedioeNdicis~0tRDJBHCHtN111Eggigir10eXQelperfir3Eed3A ensur6IthatM1mit$3EDarmlettrQrje3iintained 3iNherefo@] relocationlo_ fitness 1requis m113hiVEneTimp4M}yste.s ppetabjjity70tZthe?mainterialiCREdffcnntrb11_ed;p1a 8eetets3rji_;hjn
]jmitis]l This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 since this specification is not included in the ISTS.
CPSES Description of Changes to CTS 3N. 7 15e 9/25/98
l l CHANGE NUMBER EE DESCRIPTION 19 01 R The Main Feed Water Pressure / Temperature Limit TS is relocated to a licensee controlled document. @} Q 3,7 R DOCS prettGreltpth_f61niMRegic3etettals?fn theIcontgitalejl prejagtg2txiundeMBmcrot theifeedwater11solattoot4LV8fAtt impaEfresissKdtested2Kacep_rdance3tithw2300 Zag lllt2100;gf ( thelLSME!B&PXioER$319@HRegtion@1gl&ctioMK3 supplementsvigpsm!Lstjgo!Lngtactyt!!EglytislatElematetion
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l titlDateMGhlh!GnOfitMlee!statemgoJ1tlgDestr@At!t l utfl14edlt93kkostralgithheeptabjjfty]"qfithe"tief0fnalU potegsedItemisolation;;valyesTinnteo_o.f.impactResjstance testing 11naccqWancoith:t_heZMElB&PLC6deXD111sfon;IESection i UQ5ubsepjt on1NC:2300NRegiacementieedwaterHsolatioQalveslot { thej)t;ptessere'tetiiningicomponents.7so;crasithelvalvEbonnetzwill belupact;testedjjn'accordance:with:the"ASME ;B&PLCodeTjDivisiony SectionJILisubsection:NC] , 1 ThisIptoposedlSitpyision2elocates ~r_equiremens;,~@hjchidolnotimeet I the]S 'criterfa))n110C_FR5013fJc M2)111]Atoldocuments;with estabJjshedicogitolintygrams7Jhjsregulationladdtessesjahelscopq and;p_urppjie~bf1Ts2gIgIdoing39231s.ets?forthraIspe~ g jitc;setiot objegtiveictjledgliondete.tatnj ngkhichTregulatoryitequjtgeggtg andjeperating7testric11opsisho01d:bgncluded;1nithe173Selocation l ofith_eseltiguintegttslelloWsithe2530,1belre.servedionlylto_rithose gonditionsatsisitations;uporteactoe;eperation~Bicgarg necessaryitEoib tatelthe:pos'sibility;onan;abnormalaittation'or eyegtZgivingWseitoZanimmediatelthregtpith!Epublir2galtMagd l h safety;thereb_yzo_cu11Dgithe3 cope gf,,,the:TSI[EeVa10ation*ofitlie l applic_abilitF3fltMs~eltfjteffitto?thisIslk[cffjsetig]DXptovjdeld 10.~1tiachmentag m Iozensure2nTalgtgpitatelleieKofccentrbMtheseltjegdttggnts91M beXploce.tgtiMB3do.cLele tsiflatlargoNectitd~tEpfMioitsigi 10]E59HEggEnthg311ce188ggdocDeegs3hichThaYe $ja1Mt tegu]AtpylogtoWC6!aMt_hiCQuality'M$DPance2 Tan 3lg;jk[$$Ilbyd l ifttfeTESARggigtEisTcentrolled 'by110CER501548TM6t?SHijomrograns thaRGojlt!!!!1lRCife'th6TKdministfitfVe3ConttD1$3rgumEprthg impr medisampmdentificationtocthustgetfreN1sens!!!I
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c6n_ttpJ 16dMiCB84tRMtiMinEthjsTreqDirV!18EntN#3ftjalteGd EriciosDrGB_MERGIMaitvettferr!submi_ttg".3 l Compl3anceNithItgggg}ocated2eadir~ementsNilhWotlbe.3Ngtediby thiY4rogios~edl:haMgGD~theICDrr_ent!TethnfiellSpe~ciiftlitions?IIh6 ggq0iredJento1193Deve111ancesy11 FcopitinuotoIbCDetfqte!g!Itd
, ensUfelthatUisit[ofparenietir.s;~ar_e;meintainedFThdfefoj30
( telecationTof3hettTreg0irement$N1111haVe?ndI1mpa~ctTotCSYstem i oper]bflity?d5AheTiliafhtehhnc~eTofXcont_to1 TedTpelametel@th10 \ 1fmitsE This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 since this specification is not included in the ISTS. ( CPSES Descr!ption of Changes to CTS 3N.7 16a 9/25/98
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SCREENING FORM i (1) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION Applicable MODES: At all times. l (2) EVALUATION OF POLICY STATEMENT CRITERIA l Is the Technical Specification applicable to:- YES NO _ 1 (1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. l l _ 1 (2) A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ 1 (3) A structure, system, or component (SSC) that is part of the primary J success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ 1 (4) An SSC which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has shown to be significant to public health and safety. 1 If the answer to any one of the above questions is "YES", then the Technical Specification (TS) shall be retained in the TS. If the answer to all four of the above questions is "NO", the TS may be relocated to a controlled document. (3) DISCUSSION Pressure and temperature (P/T) limits are placed on the steam generators (SG) to prevent a non-ductile failure of either the RCPB or the secondary side pressure i boundr y. The specification places limits on the SG P/T to ensure that the pressure induced stresses are within the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The P/T limits are based on a steam generator RTuoro f 60 F and are sufficient to l prevent brittle fracture. The SG P/T limits are not applicable to installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the RCPB. Therefore, the SG P/T limits do not satisfy criterion 1. The P/T limits are not applicable to a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of DBA or transient analysis that either assumes the l failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. While the TS imposes an operating restriction, it is not employed to prevent unanalyzed accidents and transients. Under the conditions when this TS could be required, an unanalyzed event of any significance from a safety function standpoint (decay heat removal, accident mitigation, and reactor shutdown)is unlikely to result. Therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 2. Attachment 21 25
Ths P/T limits ars associat:d with an SSC that is part of ths primary succ ss path which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transiint that eith:r assum:s ths failura of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. For example, the SG must maintain its structural integrity following a MSLB or SBLOCA to maintain RCS circulation and cooling capability. However, the TS limitations apply only to shutdown conditions when RCS temperature is unusually low (less than 70 F). Under these conditions, the SG is not required to function to mitigate any DBAs or transients. l Therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 3. The steam generator temperature and pressure limitations have not been shown to be significant to public health and safety by either operating experience or PRA. This technical specification is intended to prevent brittle fracture of a SG when at low pressures and temperatures, something which is not likely during plant operation, which is the analyzed condition for the IPE study. This condition, then, is not modeled in the IPE. Therefore, the TS does not satisfy criterion 4. (4) CONCLUSION This Technical Specification is retained.
.X. The Technical Specification may be relocated to a licensee controlled document.
i m 1 26
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SCREENING FORM (1) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION l l Applicable MODES: At all times. (2) EVALUATION OF POLICY STATEMENT CRITERIA is the Technical Specification applicable to: YES NO _ 1 (1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. l _ 1 (2) A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an l initial condition of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. 1 _ 1 (3) A structure, system, or component (SSC) that is part of the primary i success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or ! transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to l the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ 1 (4) An SSC which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessinent (PSA) has shown to be significant to public health and safety. If the answer to any one of the above questions is "YES", then the Technical Specification (TS) shall be retained in the TS. If the answer to all four of the above questions is "NO", the TS may be relocated to a controlled document. (3) DISCUSSION The Bases for this limiting condition for operation (LCO) state that the purpose is to ensure that facility protective actions will be taken in the event of flood conditions. The l only credible flood condition that endangers safety related equipment is from water entry into the turbine building via the circulating water system from Squaw Creek Resentoir and then only if the level is above 778 feet Mean Sea Level. This corresponds to the elevation at which water could enter the electrical and control building endangering the safety chilled water system. The surveillance requirements l are designed to implement level monitoring of Squaw Creek Reservoir should it reach an abnormally high level above 776 feet. The Limiting Condition for Operation is designed to implement flood protection, by ensuring no open flow path via the Circulating Water System exists, prior to reaching the postulated flood level. The TS requirements for flooding are not applicable to installed instrumentation used to detect a significant abnormal degradation of the RCPB; therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 1. The flooding TS is not associated with a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a DBA or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Thus, this TS does not satisfy criterion 2. Attachment 21 29
I Flood protection is not an SSC that is p rt of the primtry succ;ss path cnd which functions or tctuit s to mitigate a DBA or transient that eithtr assumes ths failura of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Therefore, the flooding requirements do not satisfy criterion 3. The .% xx! protection has not been shown to be significant to ptiblic health and saiety by either aperating experience or PRA. Thus, this TS does not satisfy criterion 4. (4) CONCLUSION __. This Technical Specification is retained.
.X. The Technical Specification may be relocated to a licensde controlled i document. l l
l l
. 1
. 1 9
)
1 1 30 e
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SCREENING FORM (1) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.9 SNUBBERS l Applicable MODES: MODES 1,2,3, and 4. MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on l systems required OPERABLE in those MODES. i I (2) EVALUATION OF POLICY STATEMENT CRITERIA is the Technical Specification applicable to: YES NO _ 1 (1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the centrol room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. i l _ 1 (2) A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an I initial condition of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ 1 (3) A structure, system, or component (SSC) that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ 1 (4) An SSC which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has shown to be significant to public health and safety, i If the answer to any one of the above questions is "YES", then the Technical Specification (TS) shall be retained in the TS. l l If the answer to all four of the above questions is "NO", the TS may be relocated to a controlled document. DISCUSSION (3) l l The snubbers are required to be operable to ensure that the structural integrity of the i RCS and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. The restraining action of the snubbers ensures l that the initiating event failure does not propagate to other parts of the failed system or l to other safety systems. Snubbers also allow normal thermal expansion of piping and l nozzles to eliminate excessive thermal stresses during heatup or cooldown. Snubber ! surveillance is conducted under the requirements of the snubber surveillance program. The TS requirements for snubbers are not applicable to installed instrumentation used to detect a significant abnormal degradation of the RCPB; therefore, this TS does not satisfy l criterion 1. l The snubber TS is associated with a design feature or operating rastriction that is an i initial condition of a DBA or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. However, the snubber j requirements are not explicitly considered in the accident analysis. The availability of the snubbers is assumed based on the performance of a program of periodic augmented inspection and testing. Snubber operability is not required to be monitored and controlled during plant operation. Some snubbers (inaccessible) can only be inspected during plant Attachment 21 3I w
l outagIs. Thus, this TS does not satisfy crit rion 2. Those snubbers that are required to function during DBAs or transients to prevent the initiating event from propagating to other systems or components that are part of the ! primary success path may be considered components that are part of the primary ! success path and which function or actuate to mitigate a DBA or transient that either l assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier, j However, snubbers are not explicitly considered in DBA or transient analyses but are a l structural / design feature whose operability is assured aby an inspection program. l Therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 3. l l The snubbers have not been shown to be significant to public health and safety by either l operating experience or PRA. Thus, thir TS does not satisfy criterion 4. ,
)
(4) CONCLUSION This Technical Specification is retained. 1 1 The Technical Specification may be relocated to a licensee controlled document. l I l l l I l n l Attachment 21 32 n a- - e w
t TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SCREENING FORM j i (1) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.10 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING Applicable MODES: Whenever the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPERABLE. l (2) EVALUATION OF POLICY STATEMENT CRITERIA is the Technical Specification applicable to: YES NO _ 1 (1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. 1 _ 1 (2) A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient analysis i that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ 1 (3) A structure, system, or component (SSC) that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or t'ransient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challeng.e to the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ 1 (4) An SSC which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has shown to be significant to public health and safety. If the answer to any one of the above questions is "YES", then the Technical Specification (TS) shall be retained in the TS. If the answer to all four of the above questions is "NO", the TS may be relocated to a controlled documer.t. e (3) DISCUSSION This specification places a limit on the temperature of the areas of the plant which contain safety-related equipment. This is required to ensure that the temperature of the equipment does not exceed its environmental qualification temperature during normal operation. Exposure to excessively high temperatures may degrade the equipment and cause a loss of its operability. The TS reque : m ,ts for area temperature monitoring are not applicable to installed instrumentation od to detect a significant abnormal degradation of the RCPB; therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 1. l The area temperature monitoring TS is associated with the variable of room temperature ! which is not a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial , condition of a DBA or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Thus, this TS does not satisfy criterion 2. The TS for area temperature monitoring does apply to the operability of SSCs that are l Attachment 21 33 x
_. . - . . _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ __. . _ . - ~ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ ._ 1 part of the primary success path which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. However, the TS is only indirectly applicable to the operability of these systems and components. Therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 3. Area temperature monitoring has not been shown to be significant to public health and j safety by either operating experience or PRA. The area temperature monitors have not ; l been included in the CPSES IPE. Therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 4. 1 (4) - CONCLUSION j 1 l This Technical Specification is retained. l ._
.X. The Technical Specification may be relocated to a licensee controlled i document. 1 1
I i n l 1 i Attachment 21 34
-e
I TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SCREENING FORM l (1) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.13 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE l EEESEURE/ TEMPERATURE LIMIT l Applicable MODES: MODES 1,2,3 and during pressure testing of the steam generator or main feedwaterline. (2) EVALUATION OF POLICY STATEMENT CRITERIA Is the Technical Specification applicable to: YES NO _ 1 (1) installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. _ 1 (2) A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an ) initial condition of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient analysis l that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ X (3) A structure, system, or component (SSC) that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challengeto the integrity of a fission product barrier. _ 1 (4) An SSC which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has shown to be significant to public health and safety. If the answer to any one of the above questions is "YES", then the Technical Specification (TS) shall be retained in the TS. If the answer to all four of the above questions is "NO", the TS may be relocated to a controlled e document. (3) DISCUSSION All pressure-retaining ferritic materials in the Containment pressure boundary except l the feedwater isolation valves are impact-resistance tested in accordance with NC l 2300 and NB 2300 of the ASME B&PV Code, Section lit, mentioned in Section 5.2.4. l Supplemental impact testing and fracture analysis, in conjunction with extemal heating of the feedwater isolation valves, are utilized to demonstrate the acceptability of the originally purchased feedwater isolation valws in lieu of impact resistance testing in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Divis ce 1, Section lit, Subsection NC-2300. Replacement feedwater isolation valves or their pressure retaining components, such as the valve bonnet, will be impact tested in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Division 1, Section lil, Subsection NC. ! The fracture toughness requirements are satisfied with a metal temperature of 908 F for l the main feedwater isolation valve body and neck, therefore, these portions will be maintained at or above this temperature piior to pressurization of these valves above 675
- psig. Minimum temperature limitations are imposed on the valve body and neck of main feedwater isolation valves HV 2134, HV-2135, HV-2136 and HV-2137. These valves do Attachment 21 35 3
not need to be v:rifi:d at or sbova 90 F wh:n in MODES 4,5, or 6 (exc pt during special pressure testing) since Tavg < 350 F which corresponds to a pressure at the valves of 140-150 psig or less. The maximum pressurization during cold conditions (valve temperature < 90 F) should be limited to no more than 20% of the valve hydrostatic test pressure (3375 psig X 20% = 675 psig). ( The TS requirements for the main feedwater isolation valve pressure / temperature limit are not applicable to installed instrumentation used to detect a significant abnormal degradation of the RCPB; therefore, this TS does not satisfy criterion 1. l l The main feedwater isolation valve pressure / temperature limit TS is not associated with a process variable design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a DBA or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a l challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Thus, this requirement does not meet criterion 2. The TS for the main feedwater isolation valve pressure / temperature limit is not an ESC that is part of the primary success patn and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Therefore, the requirements do not satisfy criterion 3. The main feedwater isolation valve pressure and temperature limits have not been shown to be significant to public health and safety by either operating experience or PRA. Therefore, the requirements do not satisfy criterion 4. (4) CONCLUSION 2 This Technical Specification is retained.
- 2. The Technical Specification may be relocated to a licensee controlled document.
e i
)
1 1 I i l Attachment 21 36 TL
. -- = _ ~ _ . .. .. . . . . . . . .
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR 3.7-001 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA l REQUEST: Incorporate TSTF-173, Rev. O to revise ITS 3.7.18 Bases, Background, to delete the statement regarding 1-131 equilibrium. The August 18,1998 industry TSTF status reports indicates the status of TSTF-173, Rev. O as NRC approved. I f ATTACHED PAGES: Enct SA Traveler Status Page Enci 553 B 3.7-81 l i a 1 t I
l lNDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.7 l TRAVELER STATUS JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS l NUMBER NUMBER l 1 TSTF-36. Rev 2 Incorporated 3.7 42 Only applicable to DCPP l l TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant-specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for , fuel handling accident. l TSTF 70. Rev 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable. NRCZapproved m 3.7 00 5 TSTF not i adopted since I change was not i applicable. l TSTF-100 Incorporated 3.7-05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. , 1 TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. TSTF 139.7Rev';1 Incorporated 3-7-29 Not NRCfapproved TR 3.7 005 Applicable 5 Bases , changej l TSTF-140. Rev 1 Not ;; incorporated NA Not NRC approved as of traveler cutoff date. f X ' IEFJp3 Incorporated NRC;approvedJ m 3.7 00L , J EEZ1Z4 Incorporated NRClapproved; m.3,7 0a 3 WOG-64 Incorporated 3-7-34 0 3.7.2-1 WOG-63 ISTfi235 Peet+eHy 3.7 01 Rete 4ncd CTS Incorporated except for the 0 3.7.1-4 extcasion to 72 hours for trip reset-- W9G-861ST,E282 Incorporated 3.7 57 Notf;applicabJe 0 3.7 10- L4 r to,KPE TR 3.7 00 i W9G-98ISTFE289 Incorporated 3.7 56 0 3.7.2-
~
Sscondary Specific Activity B 3.7.18 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.18 Secondary Speci;ic Activity BASES BACKGROUND Activity in the secondary coolant results from steam generator tube outleakage from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Under steady state conditions, the activity is primarily iodines with relatively short half lives and, thus, indicates current conditions. During transients I 131 spikes have been observed as well as increased releases of some noble gases. Other fission product isotopes, as well as activated corrosion products in lesser amounts, may also be found in the secondary coolant. A limit on secondary coolant specific activity during power operation minimizes releases to the environment because of normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and accidents. This limit is lower than the activity value that might be expected from a 1 gpm tube leak (LC0 3.4.13. "RCS . Operational LEAKAGE") of primary coolant at the limit of 0 3.7.G 1 l l 1;0, yC1/gm (LC0 3.4.16. "RCS Specific Activity"). The steam line failure is assumed to result in the release of the noble gas and iodine activity contained in the steam generator inventory, the feedwater, and the reactor coolant LEAKAGE. Most of the iodine isotopes have short half lives. (i.e.. h w a > ;-1;;, wn,-, g ga g ]jfc cf 3,0; cays' TR 3.7-0
%nccatratesfasterthanitdecays,butdoc;notreach m li (equilibrium becau;c of bicwdown and other los= . ' d With the spccified activity li;;;it the rcsultant 2 hour thyroid dc;c to a par;ca at the exclusion arca boundary (EAS) would be about 0.S0 re; if the main stca; ;;fety valves ("SS'Is) open for 2 hours fcilowing a trip frca full pcwcr Opcrating a unit at the allowabic limits could icsult in a 2 hear EAB-egasure of a ::all fraction of the 10 CFR 100 (Rcf.1) limits. Or thc limit; c;tablished as the NRC staff approvcd liccasing b;;is.
4 4 . CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-81 9/2588
l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR 3.7-002 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: Incorporate TSTF-174, Rev.0 to revise ITS 3.7.6 Bases for Actions A.1 and A.2 to add a discussion of the Completion Time of "Once per 12 hours thereafter" for verifying by administrative means the operability of backup water supply. The August 18,1998 industry TSTF status reports indicates the status of TSTF-174, Rev. O as NRC approved. ATTACHED PAGES: l Enci5A Traveler Status page Enci5B B 3.7-37 l
l l l INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.7 l l TRAVELER STATUS JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS NUMBER NUMBER i TSTF 36. Rev 2 Incorporated 3.7 42 Only applicable to DCPP i TSTF-51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for l fuel handling accident. 1 TSTF 70. Rev 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable. NRQ3pproved TR-3.7 005 TSTF not adopted since change was not applicable. TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7-05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7-29 NRC approved. TSTF 139.3 Rey;1 Incorporated 3-7-29 Not NRCT. approved TR 3.7 00 5 ApplicableXBases -=== l change';) i TSTF 140. Rev 1 Not iincorporated NA Not NRC approved as of traveler cutoff date. TS_TFil23 Incorporated NRCfapproved.. TR 3.7 00 L
,/ .-
m Eff1M Incorporated NR.C3pproved4 TR 3.7 002 R l 2 WOG-64 Incorporated W 0 3.7.2-1 1 l WOG-83 E f 235 Particily 3.7 01 Rctcined CTS Incorporated exccpt for the 0 3.7.1-4 extensica to 72 hours for trip l reset-- WO6r86pEj282 Incorporated 3.7-57 Notlappli. ccable 0 3.7 10- L4 to;DCP,2 TR 3.7 00i WOG-98T_STE289 Incorporated 3.7-56 a.3.7.2 l
CST B 3.7.6 BASES LC0] MODE 3 for 4 hours, followed by a cooldown to RHR entry conditions (Continued) at50*F/hourforiS~ hod.rs. This basis is established in Reference 4 5 and exceeds the volume required by the accident analysis. The OPERABILITY of the CST is determined by maintaining the tank level at or above the minimum required level. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in tiOCE 4. When stca; gcacrator i; being relicd upon for heat reacval, the CST is required to be OPERABLE. In MODE 4l: 5 or 6. the CST is not required because the AFW System is not required. ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the CST level is not within limits, the OPERABILITY of the backup supply should be verified by administrative means within 4 hours and once every 12 hours thereafter. OPERABILITY of the backup feedwater supply must include verification that the., flow paths from the backup water supply to the AFW pumps are OPERABLE, and that the backup supply has the required volume of water availabic SSWSX0perable. .Inladdition,ileaghlmotorloperatedyalyve between3he3S_WS7and each'OperablejAFW pump;must'be#ERABLE; The CST must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, because the backup supply islottondensate;gradeJ a.tets may bc performing this function in addition to its normal functicasr The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to verify the OPERABILITY of the har kun Water supply. - _ditlocallygverifying'tfg;backupyitter.lsupn1LeveryL12 m.3.7.oo2 hourri s2Fdequite3Ons_Gr~eithe~b(ckup;qatenLs0pply tindett$beiaVa11ablMhe 7 day L.,umpien.ivn ilme is reasonable, Dased on an OPERABLE backup water supply being available, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period requiring the CST. B.1 and B.2 If the CST cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a H00E in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the l unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and l in MODE 4, without rcliance on the tca: generator for heat 0 3.7.6 5 l removal, within 16~12; hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from ! full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-37 9/25/98
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR 3.7-005 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: Revise Traveler Status page to reflect NRC approval and latest revision number of the following travelers:
- TSTF-139 Revision 1 - NRC Approved
- TSTF-70, Revision 1 - NRC Approved
- WOG 86 became TSTF-287 There are no changes involved to any CTS mark-ups, ITS mark-ups, DOCS, or JFDs.
I ATTACHED PAGES: l EnciSA Traveler Status page l Enci5B B 3.7-74a : 1 1 l 1 l l l l
INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.7 1 1 TRAVELER STATUS JUSTIFICATION COMMENTS I ] NUMBER NUMBER l TSTF 36, Rev 2 Incorporated 3.7-42 Only applicable to DCPP TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for ; fuel handling accident. TSTF 70, Rev 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable. @fapprovedh .g.3,7.co ; idir not adopted since change was not J applicable.
- TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7-05 and 3.7-19 NRC approved.
TSTF-101 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. l TSTF-139 ) Incorporated 3 + 29 Not hCapp. u 3.7 00 5 Appljcable/gBases1( ' l yae1 } l TSTF-140, Rev 1 Not jincorporated NA Not NRC approv,ed as of traveler cutoff date. T_STf373 Incorporated NRClapprovedy' g.3,7 00 t ISTF373 Incorporated NRCJ'apptoted] g.3.7 00 ! W9G-64 Incorporated 3-7-34 0 3.7.2-1 WOG-63TEF1235 Partially 3.7-01 llctained O'S Incorporated exccpt for the 0 3.7.1-4 extension to 72 hour; for trip reset-W96-86ISTf287 Incorporated 3.7 57 Notlapplicable o.3,7.io. t4 t6:DCPJ
% m 3.7 00 E WOG-98l bit 1289 Incorporated 3.7 56 0 3.7.2-
Fuel Storage Pool Water Level B 3.7.15 i I l BASES (continued) According to Reference 4, there 4s @ouldits alnomi_nal 23 ft of water between the top of the damaged fuel bundle and the fuel pool surface during a fuel handling accident. With 23 ft of water, the assumptions of Reference 4 can be used directly. In practice, this LC0 preserves this assumption for the bulk of the fuel in the storage racks. In the case of a single bundle dropped and lying horizontally on top of the spent fuel racks, however, there may be < 23 ft of water above the top of the fuel bundle and the surface, indicated by the width of the bundle. To offset this small nonconservatism, the analysis assumes that all fuel rods fail, although analysis shows that only the first few rows fail from a hypothetical maximum drop. The fuel stora e pool water level satisfies C"tcrion Criteria 12 nd 3 f TR 3.7 005 the N"C "clicy Stato: cat.10CFR50;36(c)(2)(ii)? n CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-74a 9/2588
l l ADDmONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.7-ED APPLICABILITY: CP l REQUEST: Various changes that do not impact the technical content of the submittal or other l l FLOG members. Changes are noted with CP 3.7-ED in the margin and noted below: ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B 3.7-11 STS '7" days was inadvertantly changed to "31" days and is now restored to "7" days. B 3.7-29 Deleted extraneous reference to "LCO". l- -: t r i 4 4
MSIVs l B 3.7.2 BASES made with the unit hot. The B-22 8] hour Completion Time is ! reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a 0 3.7.2 1 closure of the HSIVs. The 8-H 8; hour Completion Time is ;;rcatcr than greater cP 3.7 13 than eeNjthat normally allowed for GDC155Iand E 56; containment isolation valves becaus; the ZIVs arc va+ves beclesf ah JeIVsIarelGDC35Ila,1jes that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. Thcsc valvcs differ fica othcr containnat isciatica valves in that the closed systc;;; Pjg;tj clisg;;sgaeb]c;duc toithe rcictitc;s'obiljty;cf;thc~cic:cd sys;c 2.;hjch;Theseivalves di ffetifrasiotherlGDCiS53n[GDC1563ontainmentiisolatj onival veslin that;the closed 3ystem:provides an additional pcssive ::;eans for containment isolation. Eml If the HSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within B-72 8 hours, the unit must be placed in a H0DE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours and Condition C would be entered. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to rea'ch MODE 2 and to close the HSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. 0 3.7.2 1 C.1 and'end-C.270.1 1nd 0:2 Condition C B-G is modified by a Note indicating that.jhenit'.;gic 3c(;
.S 'e 3 E iE;-s 4l.c separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.
Since the HSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3. t.he e inoperable HSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the HSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis. The bib Q hour Completion Time RE"4TJi.;02;ticri;11s o.3.7.2 1 consistent with that allowed in Condition A.'-'JgCdj;;]I;" 1r p r,n.lC,I _ _m _ . CtqQC,.arcR.o!Eils.M,_bic;~;~21.3 m- ~ =, .,__- ,__ m m.m m m o _ w _ .a , _. , _ _ ~ o -, Wih.'? * ' Nd.YMMdY. h.[YOdED#1W.n,MI'.Yh*3Jdd dM D W.2ef.dty 3 Q Q u,p y,3ygt,g,tia,,gg. For inoperable HSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE CP 3.7 13 status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed but;potIdeacti?At_ed, the inoperable HSIVs must be verified on i a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure CP 3.7.ED ! that th ptions in the safety analysis remain valid, t The 7 y Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of MSIV status indications c l l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1131 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-11 905/98
AFW System B 3.7.5 i BASES i pressure boundary. Ihree independent AFW pumps in thregk CP 3.7 ED l diverse trains are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the l availability of decay'he'etJtenove%RHR-capability for all events accompanied by a loss of offsite power and a single l failure. This is accomplished by powering two of the pumps from l independent emergency buses. The third AFM pump is powered by a
- different means, a steam driven turbine supplied with steam from l a source that is not isolated by closure of the HSIVs. j 1
l l The AFW System is configured into threg trains. The AFW System l 1s considered OPERABLE when the components and flow paths l required to provide redundant AFW flow to the steam generators j are OPERABLE. This requires that the two motor driven AFW pumps be OPERABLE in two diverse paths, each supplying AFW to separate steam generators. The turbine driven AFW pump is required to be l OPERABLE with redundant steam supplies from each of two main i steam lines upstream of the HSIVs. and shall be capable of supplying AFW to any of the steam generators. The piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls in the required flow paths l' also are required to be OPERABLE. The LEO is codified by a "ctc indicating that onc APJ train. l l which includes a cator driven pucp is rcquirtd to bc OPEPAL in "00: 4. This is bcccusc of the reduced hcot recoval requir cents and short period of tice in "00: 4 during which the APJ is ! required :nd the insufficient stc;c availabic in ".00: 4 to powcr the turbinc driven APW pucp. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3 the AFW System is required to be OPERABLE. , in the event that it is called upon to function when the MFW is ! lost. In addition, the AFW System is required to supply enough l makeup water to replace the steam generator secondary inventory; lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions. l In MODE 4, the AFW System may be used for heat removal via the steamgenerators.SeeithelBASESJfor?31MJ t ! In MODE 5 or 6 the steam generators are not normally used for heat removal, and the AFW System is not required. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7 29 9/25/98 i
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ] ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.7-004 - APPLICABILITY: CP l REQUEST: CN 10-10-TR for CTS Section 3/4.7 indicated that the specific actuation signals would be moved to the ITS Bases. The Bases description of these signais was inadvertently omitted in the submittal and is being added to the SR 3.7.10.3 Bases description. AWACHED PAGES: Enci5B B 3.7-59a
CREFS BASES (continued) SR 3.7.10.3 This SR verifies that each CREFS train starts and operates on an actual nr ch" lated fetyllgject1ongoJslofigifsfte} CP 3.7 004 ( ggwerFor73nt&KeX . 418tionDediouun signai. ine n equency of;m.pon ms is opcuuled 'in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). Enc!)?actdetibQigrlia %stibe",Ventf,iedJ.(oler]apping lettLn!CfC8ccMtableD SR 3.7.10.4 This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of the potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially m CPSES Markup ofNUREG-N31 Bases -ITS 3.7 ft t.7-59a 9nS/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.7-005 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CN 12-04-TR for CTS Section 3/4.7 indicated that the specific actuation signal would be moved to the iTS Bases. The Bases description of this signal was inadvertently omitted in the submittal and is being added to the SR 3.7.12.3 Bases description. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B 3.7-70 l t s k
ECCS PREACSffjLS B 3.7.12 i BASES . I i SR 3.7.12.3 CP-3.7 005 This SR verifies that each ECCS PREACS ystrainstartsan operates on an actual or simulat afety3rjjgion ! actuation signal. The 18 month Frequenw wusistent with that l specified in Reference 4. 1 SR 3.7.12.4 This SR verifies the integrity of the ECCS pump rcc; cacic urc negativejpressure; envelope. The ability of the CCCS pump roca Auxiliaryla K Safeguards 7buildingssto maintain a negative pressure, with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the ECCS PREACS PfVS. During the Epost accident-} mode of operation, the ECCS PREACS PPyS is designed to maintain a slight negative pressureintheECCSpu;preemAuxili,ary;;fue];aKSafeguards bui] dings, with respect to adjacent areas, to prevent unfiltered LEAKAGE. The ECCS PREACS is desigacd to maintain a _;[ 0.12S] inchc; water gauge relative to atacspheric pic;surc at fl;w reta i of [2000) cfm frc; the ECCS pump roca. The?acceptange;..grjterialof 110.~ 0571nchesNate rJga0pe~rel ati ve3o rat _mosphericipressurayfg selected ~as?,a reasonabl,Emea}urgof'theli.ntegrjtylofithinegatiye ptessutelboundaryj The Frequency of 182 months is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800. Section 6.5.1 (Ref. 6). This test is conducted with the tests for filter penetration: thus,an1@monthFrequencyonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISis consistent with tht.c specified in Reference 4. SR 3.7.12.5 : Mtiuse_dj l SR0337112f6 l l E!1slSR3g2gquiredito3st'ifylh_eJsMLkgniofAthe2ionlESj 0 3.7 12.1 6 ! fagsitolpMVentibypiss3fitheTESELEntfetion.lgrfitEThi! ! plii.10!ss'terirdoeChot31nt1Ude2ypaissMasp_ersnhoW6Ver] ! bypasstof2he711tif~UtiitrJt111@ctuf31fftheirionlESFIfaris7te st111LrunJingyhenithe'ESFMantistar_tf*dherefoteAto'Ste.yent bypa~ssTstie3oniESf; fan 3Talistjbe'ato@edgflh0SRMs.tra.teji j that1heln, ogESfifanMtoCogia.nactualMLsipulatediESflactuatj o.g ' signal 3sgitylisjic.tjslltigg8]FJ Opcr; ting thc ECCS PREACS bypes- d;;pcr Ver,1ficationtofJtheltr&pjngloffelchinon:ESFJi[anIorj 631S11$1g9e1 is necessary to ensure that the system functions , properly. The OPERASIEI"' cf th ECCS PREACS bype;; d;;pcr is ( vcrified if it con bc spctified in Rcfcrcnce 4. Ofr,egtieMyllfila i mo_g@sfj,sIcpjlsistggtMLth1S331D1213.J CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-70 9/2588 J
i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.7-008 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC 1 REQUEST: The Bases discussion of SR 3.7.2.1 is revised to delete statement that not full ' stroke testing the MSIVs at power is an exception to ASME Section XI. The 1989 edition permits partial stroke testing if practicable in lieu of full stroke testing without ; requiring an exemption. l ATTACHED PAGES: l Enci 5B B 3.7-12 l 1 1
. 1 m
MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position. E0.1 and C T F m f:D?2 0 3.7.2 1 If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that MSIV] closure time is s E4-6} - 0-3.7.2 3 5 seconds. en-en actual or simulated actuation signal. Th( handiswit_chlmaEbpsed'as;theiactuat1onlsign_alltolperpts t this3utve111anceiEThe MSIV closure isolation] time]is assumed in the accident and containment analyses. This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The "SI"s should not bc tastcd at % ' pcwcr. sinc cien a part -trckc cxcrcisc increcscs the risk 3.7 008 of a volvc closurc 2,an the unit is scacrating __..__ moc "SI"3 etc not tiimri;;; testec ac powcr. they era , exc;pt fic; th; AS"C Codc, Section XI (Rcf. 5), rcquirc; cats during spcretion in "00C 1 cr 2. 7 The Frequency is in accordance with the Inse rMcf;TeTsting 0 3.7.2 3 l JIST)?PNRpjg or 10 rcaths. The [10] acnth "rcqucacy for valvc closure ti;c is based on the refueling cycle. Operating expericac; h; ;how , th t these componcats usu lly pass the Surveillencc den parfarecd at the [10] =cnth frequcacy M,_M,_fMy m, , m . m ,, v_ ._ m_ ,__,,______m..s e , m_.. m .~,
- u. ,.y. ..
.,a.
w af m, .._ __,s.u.a __s.__2_ u avi 55 IbJ e bus,w p ia,.b. This test is ~allqW(djtolbg conducted in MODE 3 with the unit at operating temperature and pressurc, as discussed in Rcfcrence 5 excrcising requirc..ints. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish (Continued) CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-12 9/25/98 J
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.7-009 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC I 1 REQUEST: The Bases discussions for SR 3.7.3.1 and SR 3.7.3.2 are revised to delete the i l statement that these valves should not be tested at power. The 1989 edition permits partial stroke testing if practicable in lieu of full stroke testing. ! ATTACHED PAGES: Enci 5B B 3.7-20 and B 3.7-21 l l l l l I l-l 1 l f
. _ _ __ - . .-~ . _ . _ __ _ . . _ ._ . - .- ~ - . . _ . _ _
""I" and """"3 [ EIVsjand Associated Bypass Values]
B 3.7.3 BASES l l unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner
- and without challenging unit systems.
l l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each HRV FIVik HFRV; and associated bypass valves is s 7 5 seconds. en-en 0 3.7.2 3
.u..., u..u,__ u__..; u rn,u.
uwI.uua _ _ _e 2u _. v, .m .i, uu _m; umuu,,wo . i i. _ a v_ _m. , The HRV FIV. on. 1solatiofcic=r-timesareassumedintheaccidentand containment analyses. This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation...._, following a -cP 3.7 009 i m.___...,..__ _ u _.. n _n u_ .. - 1 refue1_ing outaqe m iim m. .u..we eu~u m .~ ww m. mu w i. xwu yv _a___ eomb i __ so u _.a yui u _a_
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s.c o wi.~. . mu.. i.I a _, vys. l u e l vi . i,5 3~vs. us um w. R.G =1=. 223, (RefM) 0 3.7.2-3 The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the I.ns_ervicel,estingRogram] cr e___.._.. __ . . . , . . . _ , _ _ . . . 1" =nths The 2_ L __; __ a_ IST __,.. 10 ,a__ math . . . , _ i a squws swy a va yuavb w a vaus w ia vuwsu via i,a tw a w a us i a a ay wJwaw. _L_.- A L a. s____ __s_ .._..11.. . _ , . n__ .a.4__ _~__J_..__ L._ _- __ V yus u w sury unywi I El lws t su d da uvvvi s wa ru b bi N aw svirtyvi ew s i k a uguu IJ yuda a_ e.... J11.___ ..L__ ___,____a a a. L . Yet in _st P.... bisw wun whi i 3 un sws vu Ni u ywi a vi rivww uw ka m avi av isevi s bli iI Equwi s'J - e",
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o _ ss-~u_xu.r_ _u__an u-w2 m.u i i CPSESMarkup ofNUREG.N31 Bases -ITS3.7 B 3.7-20 9/25A8
l "II"3 and " Tit": [ FIVs'.and Associated Bypass Values} l
\
B 3.7.3 ' BASES l SR T 7'3?B2 Thfs' SR'verifi,gsithat7each2FIV7endJsseiated b.9 pas _s~valye.ican closes 3EaggetuaTIstEs_igatediactuatiow1.stenalshis Su.r_veXOgce2s.inotsaUrgerfoDeediuponil eturning7the;onit tolopeettion fonogthowefelfngroutas.. .~,c : soy
~-=-
CP 3.7 009 r.z.-_ mretn...y-mm=_e22&,_.am*m.;i-:-ral-mwem. w2,E = _x-l . r_w. _-wnc. w -w, a.~m w a ~c.xs c.xn-i n..a
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i T_he_ _ _o f_requ_encyaf t._hfs's.u_rve._11.1.a._nce~isre._v_e_ryn'18: m ~ n.o. _nths5The i I 7 187.aon.th2requenc.y!for'W'x" ~cha' tes.t. c ihf1s;. base.d..".on.'the 0 3.7.2 3 i
~
tefueling' cycle 75.pperating~expetjence hasishownithat;these components 1 usual]y; pass 3he1Suryeill anceMen1 performed :at l \ the:18~~mo.nt.h'Frequ_encyMaT .he.refo.re',$t.h. i.s.".. Frequency'is.'. acceptable . . . i fr_om;a' teliabiltyist.andpoint]-- - I d c. e,n,
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-_ .-,.,..-,n_.-.,=_,__,,_,,,,,,.,,__.~~_2.,.,._,.
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_ _ ,... _ ~_m. ,m_ __m_-m._,__- . t.- esuuma.,i,_.~=,., c.n_ ~. -nse.mn >~m--" - _ _-= _ ,"w.c._hese.,,.. w u- s,w~ o ~ ~w - compe1.-..-m..~. u .m- -, ~ m ~,.-...-.~ . ,,, _ _=_u .~ma~22
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\ t - -~ummennxu M**D"f**?M*r?r*T9'T?R***h wm.m m +1wn . nmm wd"ET73Wg'"'7/+g 7 p- T.1W?**j?&**T"."3 L i REFERENCES 1. FSAR M-4 + km.&p.te.w.rr_67f Ch - 7"J107andi151$ Ameek ask l I cue n_,,._ __;
- n. ._ s_ _ a. . . ., u.
u.m_..
, r_2- ^ -
CP 3.7 009
- 2. n.n , vu i s, vuu e u oesi ovuu.
I Sectica XI."otWs'e.d. - - . - - - 3.2 !LUl(EEO138MMfMs@_sslo.nlo_fliften2echnicaEIs. sues Listed 71n?AttachmEntitd3oyeattegM0]61emor,andumJrom Ditector7MRltENRR Steff.;EljovembeG9767 U BG;227i71eriodjcHestingIofjEtotgtioESystem 3ctuatioD Eunctions$2/17/72)] . CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-21 9/2588 l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.7-012 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: CTS 3.7.5, LCO "a" was inaccurately transferred to ITS SR 3.7.9.2. The ITS SR l and the Bases are revised to reflect the CTS. Since SR 3.7.9.2 is bracketed in the STS, a JFD is not required to incorporate the plant specific wording. ATTACHED PAGES: EnctSA 3.7-22 EnctSB B 3.7-51 and B 3.7-53 l ? l l l 1 n
1 l UHS 3.7.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
?P,,S10
'6 .
Sg;31Z;9R Verify water level of BHS SS{ is a 562 770 ft 2_4 hours 38.pse 3 mean sea level. cB 'i SRJ3.7:9,2 Verify h a c station ~servic h at_er ntake 24 hours Ps temperature of U;ly 5 is..s W 102*F.' CP 3.7 012
>B-PS' 'i l
l l SPs 3.7.0.3 Operate cach cccling tcwcr fan for 31 days l r4e, B-PS c us; ... u. .m. . . u . SPs 3.7.0.4 Verify cach cooling tower fan starts [10] months 8-PS;+ 9 automatically on an actual or simulated eetuation ;ignal. 1 m l 1 i i I i I i ; CPSES Mark-up ofNUREG-1431 -ITS 3.7 3.7-22 9/25/98 \ l i
-w
.- . - _ _ _ _- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ .-- _- .-- - - __--- _-
! UHS l B 3.7.9 ! BASES 1 l (e.g.. ,Jgle failure considcrations), and multipic ;;kcup water l sourcca may be rcquired. Additional information on the design and operation of the system along with a list of coa +cacats served. SSI~can be CP 3.713 l found in Reference 1. APPLICABLE The UHS SSI is the sink for heat removed from the reactor core SAFETY ANALYSES Following all accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in which the unit is cooled down and placed on residual heat removal (RHR) operation. Icr units that use U!!S as the normal heat sink for condenser cccling via the Circulating L'ater System, unit operatica at full powcr is its =cximum hc;t icad. Its maximum post accident heat load occurs approximately 20 minutes after a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Near this time, the unit switches from injection to recirculation and the containment cooling systems and RHR are required to remove the core decay heat. ., The operating limits are based on conservative heat transfer analyses for the worst case LOCA. Reference 1 provides the details of the assumptions used in the analysis, which include worst expected meteorological conditions, conservative uncertainties when calculating decay heat, and worst case single eettve failure (e.g., single failure of a man;;de structure the; main;cmlin[resetvoir dam). Ihelherjaalihydrau11cranalystslassJmesianlini_tia11 elevation ~of 7KfeeEmeanisMMenhtchldrops3Q6926"lgof,ncidentiwithithe y Design;Baf f ElentJ The UHS SSI is designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.27 (Ref. 2) which requirn i 30 day supply of coolingwaterintheURS55]. The 9HS SSI satisfies Criterion 3 of the TC Policy Stat;;;nt. 10s@502361gl(2)_(11)] LC0 The UHS S_SI is required to be OPERABLE and is considered OPERABLE if it contains a sufficient volume of water at or below the maximum temperature that would allow the SSWS to operate for at least i 30 days following the design basis LOCA without the loss of net positive suction head (NPSH), and without exceeding the maximum 1 design temperature of the equin=^* wrved by the SSWS. To meet this condition, the U"d! StationtEervice!WliDh CP 3.7 012 Qtemhtiale)thw level euiu not fall mureThouldnotexceed below ZIO 562-ft sesn3eaJ190.10245Idche eye} during normal unit operation. CFSES Markup ofNUREG.H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-51 9/2S/98
UHS l B 3.7.9 I BASES i l SURVEILLANCE SRT3293 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that adequate long term (30 day) cooling can be l maintained. The specified level also ensures that sufficient NPSH is available to operate the SSWS pumps. The F hour Frequency is based on operating experience related v trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES. This SR i verifies that the UHS SSJ water level is := 562 7701ft."meanfsea l level. SR 5327 9:2 This SR verifies that the SSWS is available to cool the CCW l System to at leest its maximum design temperature with the maximum accident or normal design heat loads for 30 days following a Design Basis Accident. The 24 hour Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES. This SR verifies that the over;;c watar tannerature of the Ui!S a . CP 3.7 012
---aticn. ..e.rviceS. WateriSystem51ntak.e.
- - - - is s9010.2.*F.
m en ,,n , an a.v JaJ l Opcrating exh ce;1ing towcr fan for [15] a;inutes casurcs that all fans ;re 0"E"XLC and that ;11 associated controls arc functioning prepccly. It als; casurcs that fan or stor failure, or excessive vibration, can bc detccted for corrective = tion. The ',1 day frequacy is bescd on operating cxpcricacc, the known reliability of the fan units, the redund;ncy ;voi'abic, and the low probability of significant degradation of the U:!S ;;; ling m towcr fans occurring bctuxa surveillanccs. en anr v.r . s.n ,a This 5", verifies that coch c;; ling toucr fan starts =d epcrates on = -=tual er si;;;ulated actuation signal. The [18] e nth frequcacy is censistent with the typical refueling cycic. Opcrating cxp:ricacc h;3 shown th;t thesc ce;;pennts usu;11y pass the Survcilience when pcrform d at the [10] a nth ficquacy. Thcr forc, the ircquacy is aceptable fic;a : reliability - _,__w_, mv.... I l REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Sections [2L374Eand 9.2.5.
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.27.
l B 3.7-53 SMSA8 CPSESMarkup ofNUREG.1431 Bases -ITS 3.7
l I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.7-013 APPLICABILITY: CP i i The BASES changes provided in this item are changes which incorporate current l REQUEST: CPSES licensing or design basis information, clarify the STS BASES or provide l additionalinformation to more precisely describe the BASES and, as such, cannot l be considered changes that could create an unreviewed safety question. ATTACHED PAGES: l EnciSB B 3.7-Sa Reference correction (3 locations) B 3.7-8 Reference addition B 3.7-9 Clarification B 3.7-10 Reference and text correction ) B 3.7-11 (1) clarification to distinguish between GDC A 56 and 57 valve (2) Clarification for " closed" consistent with the ITS spec B 3.7-13 (1) Expanded dc?cription of surveillance ' (2) Deleted unused reference B 3.7-23 Updates / clarifies licensing basis of the ARVs and block valves B 3.7-27 Adds description of AFW system start on AMSAC B 3.7-33 Adds description of valves which actuate on AFW signal ,. B 3.7-35 Corrects CST operability description B 3.7-39 Expands discussion of ESF actuation signal B 3.7-40 Clarifies basis of time to cooldown B 3.7-44 Reference correction B 3.7-45 Clarifies basis of time to cooldown B 3.7-46 Completed incomplete sentence B 3.7-51 Corrects discussion of what is included in Ref.1 B 3.7-57 Provides licensing basis of CREFS in Modes 5 and 6 B 3.7-76 Corrects reference to the SR that verifies fuel storage pool level ' B 3.7-82 Corrects the licensing basis of me MSLB radiological evaluation ~ B 3.7-84 Adds UPS rooms as being supplied by Safety Chilled Water System B 3.7-89 Clarifies Mode 5 and 6 requirements of UPS HVAC B 3.7-91 Revises " Fan Coil Unit (FCU)" to be " Emergency Fan Coil Unit (EFCU)' B 3.7-92 (1) Revises " Fan Coil Unit (FCU)" to be " Emergency Fan Coil Unit (EFCU)' (2) Clarifies Mode 5 and 6 requirements of UPS HVAC B 3.7-93 Revises " Fan Coil Unit (FCU)" to be " Emergency Fan Coil Unit (EFCU)" l l
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES l CoefficientMattamEr.htmessom_esR3sIBMcNDeXTA _ ..._... _ y.g 6 ._1E RAGulEBRW 31!GIM MfM ingeacstcpownpangrawsrsasetilstraractawarspectfies thetitne2NEPAMEMBEWl5lEREH1NOWLMBR5Lrgentfjgt:bg l ts!WeeBbtaWAmts l The!aagia!in3lERNM0JERregtesjtogdigiC#2ttg,h eat;rjaoyal capacitsprAhe33!sajnimRERALEjMSLVEKdgtettinedjrithlan l appropriatetengmeeg3!glent1Ingnjientatptsystem;ttip channellunt:ettsintlesa Requi red 3torL BZf s; modified,bylajiotedindicatingithat;the Po@eERaggellettroLElgtyghireactorjtrjplsetpointireductionlis onlylequired'.:inMREInLM2iandg31thelteactoriprotectiog systen ittjesl_s p1cittedliniLco;341.Tgeactior3Trj pyy_ step IIlstrumentatjorggp@deisaffj_cj,egtip_rotection] Thela11oH!Htcompletton1Tiamafelteatonable3ased;on;opstating ! expetteseltocascompitshit_heiggjeAq1es3Ean;otdenly_ mannerMith$tEchaRengingTMitXs9ste_ns] CB.1 and CB.2 If the Reg 01tedlActjonsIar,elnoticomp]e,t_edjiSS"3 Cannot k ll CP 3.715 restcr;d to OPEPXL status within the associated Completion Time, or if one or more steam generators have E411Dopsrable I la:s than t-c tiSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, 1
- the unit must be placed in at least H00E 3 within 6 hours, and in l MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Tir.es are l reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required l unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoint in accordance with the Ins ce Testing Program. The ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. requires that safety and relief valve tests rforme .'-CP 3.7 13 accordance with S /ASME OH 1 1987 (Ref. According ' to Reference the following tests are requir
- a. Visual examination: -
l l CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-Sa 9/2SM8 l
- - . .-- , . . -. . _ . _ .- __. _ _ _ _ ~ . - - . .
MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES
,__L 2 L .AL. ._JmL ._.,...J. f Lu- e, n ..._L. __- . & J J_
Iswksu uJ be m www s ubi s k wisu s ge a d vi hi m w6u w ysis ka yi w awi s bwu ass AL. ecan e LJ.- r1e 1 e- in.t 61 bs m som, m.m s vil ~.....,t sim i . , , . The design 0.fA 3th eysecondary gLtem precludes the gicJgreJJeg blowdown of more than one steam generator, assuming a single active component failure (e.g., the failure of one MSIV to close on demand). JggadditiogntheLMSIVs aj Cc_ , _flt_he.;_ste_a.nJgge__ratoCt_u.be " CP 3'7 13 IN88 _ .~
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hvv i uvvvi n . vi i b u s u ivda vi Vt awibs yvvvw i- - , bsss I ..---.. wJyviudw vi mabiyu6eusy J. 2.1. . J ed 424.. L . 4 - 1. f . J 1. . - - . --- JJ-- J J ,. 1. . J. JJahuma ia uvsuJwu. w a yi s i e s wuia b w Issy a w a u a r us %J hvisaswws wu isN uus f . J 1. . . .t .- MeTU &- .1... T u i q ui s vs was s sw a y bv wavgw. IntheJafetgghsREreveraGiffeiteht1LBley.egCarelcompared fga'lpst2ditftNhtMDKceptageVisits%A7doublended ed1]IotiESLB% Q.s MA u E ts3 be R TAtt1 W cH a ltgres~piect tEtorEM.ggsey 5 L 3 WlRQttgCgD11MtigeNLB!stside sentainmentitrai m anoffaltososeTeensequesegfKspectrum oIDoHeth&MsticitgggpttreanNfsthe7H5IVsiinitEsteWtonnels frK8.t3!RencedR1ROGrp31MLtirgitrf.egestitKt!!y111ngLntal 99.a11ffcatLoC1Xthe75teap3Lunne15 Halt!!oug!Calb.teaQnjthisisf! ort MtioGfEP11tetaEQerHlogptopbflimand1s.ipostylatedyot (Continued) CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1131 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-8 9/25/98
n MSIVs l B 3.7.2 BASES i l eWirtuget&70gla@gLcitjgOgirgg,s_qQ!gTVNA9arge:SLBZet?hjghej l poMIDMRSIRDIRRE1mr111tD1tspecniWit0!IDempt3tmoetature ! Gstd39h3muneRMMt1121WC10ffnRGBhDDRGERfTRedWaterlinq . btgKaggstREDIGRpoist#CnpWLTJLc11defut!Lhf3LSRs
'gBl!ttalot1Ls3o a3mmatonitteajit atEt fajlurtr --{MW $1ditrediforal]3He,s.11sitt!g CP 3.7 13 7111ur1 & aAn uv X closJe N The MSIVs servc caly : 3:fety function and remain open during power operation 4pdlthpjgsafety;fynctjon.11is2to,3:16selonidemand. These valves erfagsumedity operate under the following situations:
- a. An HELB (SLBlor JLBJ inside containment. In order to maximize the mass and energy release into containment, the analysis assumes that the MSIV in the affected steam generator fails to close. For this eedded scenario, steam is discharged into containment from all steam generators until the remaining MSIVs close. After MSIV closure, steam is discharged into containment only from the affected steam generator and from the residual steam in the main steam header downstream of the closed MSIVs in the unaffected loops. Closure of the MSIVs isolates the break from the -
unaffected steam generators.
- b. A break outside of containment and upstream from the MSIVs is not a contain= cat prcssurication concern.
The uncontrolicd bicwdown of acre then onc stc;; scncrator must be prcycated to limit the potential for uncontrailed RCS cccidown :nd positiv; rcactivity addition. Cicsure of the MS4V3 isolates the brc;k and limits the blowdown to a singic stc; gencretor. p6stul_ated;dde7td;the7XeWexclusion~ design: of3tER1PlGit'EUEEILAlt_ hog 9hleib'r etR9fn'ithislarea]1sEnoj
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- c. A break downstream of the MSIVs will be isoleted by the closurc of the "SIVs is2!jgia3bntHirAent3fyssgizatio!)
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- d. Following a steam generator tube rupture, closure of the MSIVs isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generators to minimize radiological releases. AIq EdditiotGto3tnimizjagiradiol_ogica]JeleasesZthJsleniables (Continued)
CPSES Markup ofNUREG.H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3. 7-9 935/98
MSIVs B 3.7.2 l BASES I 1 I th!DN eD.gifeMigalrCtheIg@g1Gjg3fithe'3 t team!,ger)entog i ftLthBhMRt!K@I@EW1hGEiDuttpADtGIMLes!8t2 Itepiturggeistsiomelflocismet:31Leit9PMel3 l e. The MSIVs are also utilized during other events such as a i feedwater line break and30Cf(Lotcontainment'tisolatjo_n]. This cvcc,t is Theselevents*artj less limiting so far as MSIV OPERABILITY is concerned. The HSIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Stat acr.t. 1.0C M 01361c K2 Kij]. l LC0 This LC0 requires that four MSIVs in the steam lines be OPERABLE. The MSIVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits, and they close on an isolation actuation signal. This LCO provides assurance that the HSIVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could res in offsite exxsures comparable I CP 3.7 13 to the 10 CFR 100 (Ref 4--4) limits ($F-arO}e NRC staff # . approved licensing basis. J s l APPLICABILITY The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 1. and in H00ES 2 and 3, except l when closed and de activated, when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the HSIVs are closed, they are already performing the safety function. In H00E 4, normally most of the HSIVs are closed, and the steani generator energy is low. In H00E 5 or 6, the steam generators do not contain much l energy because their temperature is below the boiling point of water; therefore, the HSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES. I ACTIONS AJ With one HSIV inoperable in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore l OPERABLE status within 83218jhours. Some repairs to the MSIV can be l l (Continued) l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-10 9M588 m
MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES I made with the unit hot. The 8-22 8; hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a 0 3.7.2 1 i closure of the MSIVs. i l S A - 1 The than -8@Ed;Ihour ;;. Completion Time is greater tbn greaterM;t.jtha _CP 3.713,
- ontainment isolation valves because the C V; cr )
e veFves becetiseith,'IMSIyjagvalves that 1solate a closed system I l penetrating containment. L vu.vc; differ fre; other contain;cnt I isciation valvcs in that the cicscd system Rjftj;;;;11 J;;;;rgb];J;g i to;tM;[;'stiV ^2 "'itV~0th;~Cip;;X:;ysta;;;171;'.iTheseIvalves l dif_ferJftan;M~ 55'and GDcyontainmentNsol.ation;yalves3,0 l that'the;closedisystemiproviaesan dditional passiyc ;;;eans for containment isolation, f IL1 If the HSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within B-72 8 ! hours, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours and Condition C would be entered. TheComp(etion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the HSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. 0 3.7.2 1 C.1 and W.2' ^0'T nnd'O.T. .
- Condition 0 B-G is modified by a Note indicating that;hifr.Myriretc l MUEG c.3r~r eichig; separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.
Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the c inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. j When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the l assumptions in the safety analysis. l l The 8dg g hour Completion Time gijicgji;Ge_tierJA;is 0 3.7.2 1 concistent with that allowed in Condition A.E_.',_;G.;EX
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l For inoperable HSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE CP 3.7 13 I status within the specified Completion Time, hot = d ;;;d (tFut,not;deactjVatedgtne inopm oLic "3JtVs must be verified on a perloalc oas1s to be closed. This is necessary to ensure CP 3.7.ED that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 31Mday Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment. in view of MSIV status indications I l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-lul Bases - D53.7 .B 3.711 9aS/98
( l MSIVs 9 3.7.2 BASES conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated. l l SR*8.7 3 3 I ! This::eggegam;mantities7that7eaetraSatan eleswe C10881MJ15Rl8t,4g[mm n1teamr71meLea==wum 0 3.7.2 3 aclpg1gassagagEmegig!!ge23mingBgicametl l Mt1BRMBramatMRtesttM21m4iO[Ett9!alia l outage 2lggggggME!!SHitettigKeRRE181 months'I.The 1simont!ggangrfarltesitnabasedEthelrefuelingscycl.e; operatgqigtlgcelas3he!1thatsthese;componegts3suallylpa i the'SurietMagce1@enlperfotmediatitK18;monthTrequency;] Therefore3thisytequency;tsacceptable'from a~ reliability
- standpoigt]
est;islaueweditobeiconducted;in_MODEi3;withJhe unitiat2cpgatigItemperature:and:.pressutemThis SR;is modi fied;byx.Ngte;,thatiallowsientry ;into;and;operationij n CP 3.7 13 MODK 3;pttgritolperforming11]e;SRCiThislaBowsXdelayiof testinglintiUMODE23;itoles_tablish; conditions 3cnsistent I With_ithosLWgichit_he3cceptanceTygitettonNasigenera REFERENCES 1. FSAR. Section 10.3.
- 2. FSAR, Section 6.2.
- 3. FSAR, Secticr, 15.1.S ChapterJ15.
- 4. 10 CFR 100.11.
,. AS",[. ",0ilcr and "ressurc '!cssel C0du, Sectier, XI. CP 3.7 13 i
I l l i a f l l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 ,B 3.7-13 9/25/98
ABV MV B 3.7.4 BASES APPLICABLE The design basis of the EVs Ng QallElyjniaDu'reMetcapacih SAFETY ANALYSES is established by the cacahi14+y +^ & rna unit to RHR g entry condition (JMitfjG33tgggggggguj l
._j9)M M M ,lT@ M ("MlM CP 3.7 13 l bylthe399RWBiBNHf982EIERMJJBfmagyEtneinssV i assumer if the * *1 stat"aMai- 7z i :i;n . m or 75 50*F l per hour is applicab' e for&natura17c$g;ulagortwmuminiusing two steam generators, each with one sty e, rin racc is e i quot; to cccl The unit cZan beZccoJ @ to RHR entry conditions with only one steam generator and one MVABV. utilizing the cooling water supply available in the CST.
In the accie nt sa[ety analysis presented in References 1 andj2. the ABVs ARVs are assumed to be used by the operator to cool down l the unit to RHR entry conditions for events cccidents accompanied by a loss of offsite power. Prior to operator actions to cool down the unit, the ADVs and main steam safety valves (HSSVs) are assumed to operate automatically to relieve steam and maintain l the steam generator pressure below the design value. For the l recovery from a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event, the operator is also required to perform a limited cooldown to l establish adequate subcooling as a necessary step to terminate the primary to secondary break flow into the ruptured steam ^ generator. The time required to terminate the primary to secondary break flow for an SGTR is more critical than the time required to cool down to RHR conditions for this event and also for other accidents. Thus, the SGTR is the limiting event for the ABVs MVg. Ecurj The numbcr of ABVs a vs arg required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the SGTR accident analysis requirements based;&pcads upon the number of unit loops and og consideration of eny single failure assumptions regardin9 CP 4.7 13 the failure of one or;twoy BV MVs to open on demand. l The ABVs ARVa are equinned with block valves in the event an ABV MV I 13 t ails to close during ar.MGRjeVe'nt usje Qricus The ABVs E V! gildiblocM y& Nesjsatisfy Criterion 3 of the NPsc Policy l Stat;; cat.10CB50:36_(cM2)Jjj)] LC0 Eour Thrcc ADV gy lines are required to be OPERABLE. One ABV ARV line is required from each of four steam generators to ensure that at least one ABV gy line is available to conduct a timely; unit cooldown following an SGTR. in which one steam generator becomel l unavailable, accompanied by a singlet ailureC29 A S ectingib g 6thet second ADV ARV J @ines on en-unaffected ' CP 3.7 13 steamveneratoris). Ine olock valves must be OPERABLE to [ isolate a failed open ABV gy line. A closed block valve l docs not renderg 4t-ee its ABV MV line l CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7 23 9/25/98
AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES BACKGROUND The turbine driven AFW pump supplies a common header capable of (continued) feeding all steam generators with ngyayy3pegg DC powered l lag pp)3tej control valves ;ctuated to th; approprict; ;tc= gencretor by the Saginnr;d Safety Tcaturc Act=ticr. Sy;te;;; (SSIAS). One pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions. Thus, the requirement for diversity in motive power sources for the AFW System is met. The AFW System is designed to supply sufficient water to the steam generator (s) to remove decay heat with steam generator pressure at the laide_st utpoint set;pressurelof the MSSVs plus accumulation. Subsequently, the AFW System supplies sufficient water to cool the unit to RHR entry conditions, with steam released through the NWs ARVs. The AFW System actuates automatically on steam generator
^ T water level-low low by the ESFAS (LC0 33 '" N evstam I also actuates on loss of ^*"a ooweGionlan3]WS h I
. iMgatio LSysteeJctuationXttcuitry2(AMSACMsignal?
bcWevedLAtEQtatOfithe'AFW ~ pumps;is'notirequiredi for J AFW r systeemmeratHl.ity Fngptouwm puw.;atso; start .on safety injec; ions: and trip of all MFW pumps. Dur_ing; normal. Plant,operatLons;itheJ' !Esystem3underlmanua12contro1liis 0 3.7.G 1 usedit.o;majatalESGJater]eyelj The AFW System is discussed in the FSAR. Scction 103 2 (Ref. 1). APPLICABLE The AFW System mitigates the consequences of any event with SAFETY M!f. LYSES loss of normal feedwater. m The design basis of the AFW System is to supply water to the steam generator to remove decay heat and other residual heat by delivering at least the minimum required flow rate to the steam generators at pressures corresponding to the lowest steam generator safety valve set pressure plus 3% (ccomplatig In addition, the AFW System must supply enough makeup water to replace steam generator secondary inventory lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions. Sufficient AFW flow must also be available to account for flow losses such as pump recirculation andMFWlinebreaks. The limiting Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) and transients for the AFW System are as follows:
- a. Feedwater Line Break (ELE}-FWEB): and
- b. Loss of MFW.
CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7 27 9/25/98
AFW System B 3.7.5
-BASES (continued) ildfi e H ' *-s M M M~ N IEtjiuM M4!nalBBIEM858mMIRMel1NWits ,
8!strml1Cinieggie!1t3Ewp.essoct l tKMGGERbMR2 SR 3.7.5.3 This SR verifies that AFW can be delivered to the appropriate steam generator in the event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS, by demonstrating that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on 0 3.7.5 8 an actual or simulated actua, tion generattd;by'araux111ary feedwateraictuae mm-121.nemmemm.m 3, "hi-,~MJ wisampleand1F.ge@ater2 Split 110i! Bypass 3Ges31990)nJ!rilaux111arylfee&athactuation;to g ( ensurelaWiarfjgelhggerftis]dellyeredjoith:Esteen
! gegetator;0pperJo@es3gd2lsiretainedjinitMLsteen s
generatoti9rlditcWJ!sEremoyal.7mABcfigs:ontrolmlres3 rip toZautoJmqug111arylfeedWater;attdettpgito ensure;ful.1 f30W2153bi.2tetREKestKstgan:cenetatmflogattgilhelstgam 1 admission 1819er60erto !supplyl.thelturbine.:drivera0xiliar [.ggatet3gJsp a 'This Surveillance is c.;t @ ired for valves that are loueu, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position l under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on ' the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that i apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned l transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 18, month Frequency is acceptable based on operating 9 ' experience and the design reliability of the equipment. This SP, is redified by : ";te th;t states th; SPs is act required in C E 4. In OS 4. thc required AP.! train is circ;dy aligacd and eg rating. SR 3.7.5.4 This SR verifies that the AFW pumps will start in the event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS by demonstrating that each AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation gegetg g )y JDIaug111arfiteedwaterlacteatled t o.3,7,5 3 signal in H00ES 1, 2. and 3. In MODE 4. the required pump is already operating and the autostart function is not required. The E month Frequency is based on the need to 0 3.7.G 1 perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-33 9/2588
CST B 3.7.6 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) BASES BACKGROUND The CST provides a safety grade source of water to the steam generators for removing decay and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The CST provides a passive flow of water, by gravity, to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (LC0 3.7.5). The steam produced is released to the atmosphere by the main steam safety valves or the atmospheric dump r' emet valves. The AFW pumps operate with continuous minifloW recirculation to the CSTaQeq01 req. When the main steam isolation valves are open, the preferred means of heat removal is to discharge steam to the condenser by the nonsafety grade path of the steam hypees dump valves. The condensed steam is returned to the CST by the condensate transfer l pump. This has the advantage of conserving condensate while j minimizing releases to the environa.ent. l u 1 Because the CST is a principal component in removing residual heat from the RCS, it is designed to withstand earthquakes and other natural phenomena, including missiles that might be generated by natural phenomena. The CST is designed to Seismic Category I to ensure availability of the feedwater supply. Feedwater is also available from alternate sources. TheJsafety3 telated3eLiassuppJyArptMMDEMnoalissitchoferlot w~uctionsamthestatterservidrwaterisistes:s _ MG1Er ^J64 ,.e;;c -_---JOggy:1;i;;.cy CF03.7-13 l
== :-..u z:=: 3 A description of the CST is found in the FSAR, Section 0.2.0 (Refg.1] EEj).
1 l APPLICABLE The CST provides cooling water to remove decay heatjand to cool SAFETY ANALYSES down the unit following all events in the accident analysis 0 3.7.G 1 as discussed iri the FSAR, Chapter 6-end 15 (Refs.2-end 3). For anticipated operational occurrences and accidents that do not affect the OPERABILITY of the steam generators, the bounding analysis assumption is ,cacr:11y 30 =inutc37 hours?at H0DE 3, steaming through the MSSVs, followed by a cooldown to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions at the design cooldown rate.MfMifF J LW3)GEgigWM8ndISMThis"assomptiKdoel j entHnclErlet#1A@l(L*30EheAt. j APPLICABLE The li:iting cvcat f;r the ceni n:cta volu : i; the , CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-35 9MSB8 m
CCW System B 3.7.7 1 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System l BASES l BACKGROUND The CCW System provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design l Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, the l CCW System also provides this function for various nonessential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CCW System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts l between potentially radioactive systems and the Service Water l System, and thus to the environment. l The A typical CCW System is arranged as two independent, full capacity cooling loops Isafeguards3 oops) and has isolatable l nonsafety related components. Aicommon~non safeguards]oopfis provided fotnon es.sentiallcooljngiloads;asiwell;asispentifuel pool.coohng; Each safeguar_dsloop safety rc'ated train includes l a full capacity pump, surgc tank. heat exchanger, piping, valves, and instrumentation. Each safety related train is powered-from a separate bus. An open surge tank in the system
^
N provides pu;p trip protective functions to ensure th CP 3.7 13 l suffehnt not oositive suction head is availabla nlthe vent"a'n' accident;1variougsystemlalvess arefepositioned by
~
an:ESf1HetjatioQignalID16KalSafetyynjectionJctuatlon Signallan_dLorrlalContainnehtiSprayTActuatio[ Signal) ras ~ described iCthelFSAR1Refnin/Ine pump in eacn train as automaticai sy startea on receipt of a safety injection signal, and theTnoni safeguards 5160p21s all acacsscntici components arc isolated on recyfptZpBGontailtment*Spr)y2ctuaMo(Sigriel. Additional information on the design and operation of the 0 3'7'G 1 system, along with a list of the components served, is presented in the FSAR. Section R;2;R (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the CCW System is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This may be during a normal or post accident cooldown and shutdown. APPLICABLE The design basis of the CCW System is for one CCW train to SAFETY ANALYSES remove the post loss of coolant accident (LOCA) heat load from the containment sump during the recirculation phase, with a maximum CCW temperature of-120113f F (Ref. 2). The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) LOCA and containment OPERABILITY LOCA each model the maximum and minimum performance of the CCW System, respectively. The acn;;;l tcapcroturc of the CCW is 8011S*F and. during unit c001dc= te "00E 5 (T < 200'F), ; =cximum CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-39 9/2588
CCW System B 3.7.7 BASES l APPLICABLE tagratur; cf 122 I is assu;ci- This prevents the containment SAFETY ANALYSES sump fluid from increasing in temperature during the l (Continued) recirculation phase following a LOCA. and provides a gradual ! l reduction in the temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to l the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by the ECCS pumps. The CCW System is designed to perform its function with a single l failure of any active component, assuming a loss of offsite power. j Theinormalitemperaturelofithe;CCW 1s",lesslthan'108*E2andiduring unitLeoo[downito1 MODE [5;(Tg<";200*F).Kalmaximunit.esperatur.e of l 1221Gfs'saintained] l The CCW System also functions to cool the unit from RHR entry conditions (T.,,<;350 F), to MODE 5 (T.,, < 200*F), during normal and post accident operations. The time required to cool from 350*F to 200*F is a function of th g arten snuto -
@ umber of CCW and RHR trains operaunv., C.CP; 3.7 ;;'.13 yown )'
u a m 1s sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent I operations with T.,, < 2_0_0*F. This assumes a maximum service l water temperature of 95-102*F occurring simultaneously with the maximum RHg heat loads on the system. The CCW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the Ni10 Policy Statc crt. ) 10CFR50j36(c)(2)(11). . LC0 The CCW trains are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls and power supplies and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA, one CCW e l ' train is required to provide the minimum heat removal capability ; assumed in the safety analysis for the systems to which it I supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met, two j l trains of CCW must be OPERABLE. At least one CCW train will operate assuming the worst case single active failure occurs coincidant with a loss of offsite power. ,
- A CCW train is considered OPERABLE when
- a. Thepumpandassociatedpor_ti_onlofithesurgetankare OPERABLE: and
- b. The associated piping, valves, heat exchanger, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
The isolation of CCW from other components or systems not required for safety may render those components or systems CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-40 9/25/98 l t
SSWS B 3.7.8 B 3.7 PLANf SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 StationServiceWaterSystem(SSWS) BASES BACKGROUND The !SWS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and l operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transieat. During normal operation, and a normal shutdown, the $SWS also provides this function for various safety related and acn;afety related caponents. 0-3.7.8 4 The safety related functions 3rd +s covered by this LCO. The SSWS consists of two separate. 100% capacity, safety related, cooling water trains. Each train consists of two 100% capacity pumps, one capcacnt cccling watcr (CCW) hc;t exchanger, piping, valving, andjinstrumentation and two cyclcac separators. The pumps and valves are remote and manually aligned, cx;cpt toibe operablejin the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The pumps aligned to the critical their; respective loops are automatically started upon receipt of a safety 0 3.7.8 4 injection signal and all cssential valvc; era oligned to their post acidcat positicas. Anlautomatic3alyel;1nithe dischargelolf each l pump 3s[11gtetlockglto;opegionfa~lpumpistert30 autgaatfc3talVeXthelSSWSJcoolingyaterfpoRpathiforleacfi egencLdieseEgenerator7 automatically ~ opens;on :a' diesel gegeratotistattMlllytherivalve's?arrmanuaQvalyes; operated locally 4 The SSWS also providas cnisency =keup to the spent fuci pcci and CCW Synta and islt h ib_ackup Jaterlsupply;to 0 3.7.G-1 t_helu1111aKEsedWater2Syttes. Crgssicons@tions3teIp_rovided_betn{gitta10slandJwitween ;unitj sucithatlapy; pump;canjsupp]y3ny;otMCpompisfreguir.ecitow.! It#E11oJAtiggibyltMNeallnclo:sjs@J1visairsetieslorionA luged3LosylalVC1Dfitidedit@pgfGDQjnTJnilijsplantog bele2Legg3]osed181giffptpitag[LWsjtisgjiDCfEUBefEH EtheleMDBC4'itot4ELi$EoLStatietGerkite3(ateg l cP 3.7 13 UAESM2RHK193shilRit95tiCosatRMRe8M5b_4c.kopTCoo11ng j gelb,iJatfas7avaltabytaTaTeressemqpetIbetweemtheitwo j Umtslgefgences1UQpga J16 28Bdas!2p34tpump.atsguajjy tealigngON1f qwlbaBncf , provideTc6611ngito31sentialligat loadsMcKottbotmitgaj2eqMcMNT_ileIQPLERABILIEpEtM3 nit etpssiconnectlalong31thla]StatioE5errvice1(aterlpompli$ithe shutdowitanitiens_ateEtM3ta_11abilitrolgufficisatitedundant l C99119@pgityitgtithglope,tatigD01t?.BRElellimiting3onditionlof operatigtaillreg.ggxsignificatMsureductioofs2Micategy l ttgenalyggplyJLsof2statiorfiettgeluaterlSyttenyeat25IM s] !tre;111: age 2eguitementszensureitheyshvit2ag]AhgiteAQEER$81GH oflthelsta31ornservice: water 2Systemantrerdss30ane@betweegJthe l unitsJ tw.o CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-14 9/2S/98
SSWS B327.8 i BASES BACKGROUNO Tj)t,'51aglgggggphl52$tes:ctes5Tconnect?betweenItheltwd (Continued)j Gn,ttsJeg3MgrBEinpggjegglfpingEc@ss3cnnectlyalves l
=eetB3Rt2RISDR003fBEstatjgCienjgynterJpumprof l theINO239j1323Oggt!!!g3lLh_eXrossLco!!nectIONpa_ths) agitionhteduM!splolo eccapacitgtton'gelun_1titszava11ab1q tolthe: Station SRvicQa_ tee 5ystem3Ethe3therlunit;!
l Additional information about the design and operation of the ; SSWS, along with a list of the components served, is presented in l the FSAR, Section E22 (Ref.1). The principal safety related function of the $SWS is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the CCW System. n.1 7 n.1 APPLICABLE The design basis of the SSWS is for one SSWS train, in SAFETY ANALYSES conjunction with the CCW System and a 100% capacity containment cooling system, to remove core decay heat following a design basis LOCA as discussed in the FSAR, Section 6.2 (Ref. 2). This prevents the containment sump fluid from increasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following a LOCA,and provides for a gradual reduction in the temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System by the ECCS pumps. The SSWS is designed to perform its function with a i I single failure of any active component, assuming the loss of offsite power. The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCW System, also cools the unit from residual heat removal (RHR), as discussed in the FSAR,Section5,J62,(Ref.3)entryconditionstoMODE5 A P 3.7 13 during normal and post accident operations. The time r ;M Mr this evolution is a function of %im~elait[ hhut_qumber or ccw ana RHR System trains tna are opein um. One ISWS train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes a maximum $SWS temperature of % 10?*F occurring simultaneously with maximum heat loads on the system. The SSWS satisfies Criterion 3 of the Ni1C Policy Stat:. nt. 10CB50.36{cEMijM M2eguirteen,tJfoticr,oss connections 0 3.7.8 4 and3ppoff te~'unilptgptlsatisff;Cnttitj ogg,( 10CFR50136(c)12]i11M l l LC0 Two SSWS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove i post accident heat loads, assuming that the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power. CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-45 9/25/98
l l SSWS l B3[7.8 l BASES l LC0 An$SWStrainisconsideredOPERABLEduringH00ES1,2,3,and4 I (Continued) when:
- a. The pump is OPERABLE: and l 1
- b. The associated piping, valves, heat exchar.;cr. and I instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
ESSWlumplo!Lttle oppositeMitdis"0PERABLEIasjbacitiupiinithe event;of;alLJSSWltGft21s; capable:ofiprovidingyequiredif, low rates 1Aniemergensy;diese]3eneratorapower~sourge.;isinot'tequired becaus.elloss;ofioffsiteipoWetsisinotlassumedjoincjdent with;a LOSSW:eyent] A3tpssiconnectivelyfisiOPERABLE;iifjlt3anibelcyclediorlis I locked;opengAlv.alyeithat$annot' beldemonstratediOPERABLElby cyg]ingits;casf@redijInoperablefuntil;theJalyeats;surfe111ed ijn i the31ocited3penzasition;gm!weverattlleastlone;.crossLcon_nect ! yalve;bmTn11_tsasleentred3oXmaintait!ed3]ogin. ' accordanc[yjtthiGDCiS3mlegrequirgliforlfluthjngibt;duelto, totaljl o.ssAfiStetioniServise3aterJpumps;forleitheguni.t; f APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the SSWS is a normally operating system that is required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the $SWS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. m
~
In MODES 5 and 6, the OPERABILITY requirements of the SSWS are determined by the systems it supports. ACTIONS AB.1 andT2 crd B.2
~ _s 3 UE
- O- CP 3.7 13 l LMs3DQ[pgdlble7Ae3KerallfM11&bflitEisI@g@ded 31!!ce28 ttatlEtapl#GttleMettt Jof?althisTof25tation~ Service WateriSysteeMEM);eggtgIyinotane;capaD,1,elofjperforming o.3.7.8 3 l M funct1oo!Hhle 71dagco!ptenoj!iquemmeugnine.dow l pLobabEtt y;glalLOSSWSIdurigg3hisItimelperigG t
El If one SSWS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-46 92588
UHS B 3.7.9 BASES I
- l 1
l (c.g., singic failure considerations). and multiple makcup watcr A titt7 .ref t .;- @ i; tdi 1 Additional information on the design and coeration__of the
~
CP 3.7 13
<Qtem alcn; with a list of componcats served. SSpan De found in nerererice 1.
\
l 4 APPLICABLE The UHS SSI is the sink for heat removed from the reactor core SAFETY ANALYSES following all accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in which the unit is cooled down and placed on residual heat I removal (RHR) operation. For units that usc U"S as the normal heat sink for condcn:cr cooling via the Circulating Water System. unit operation at full poucr is its maximum hcot icad. Its maximum post accident heat load occurs approximately 20 minutes after a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Near this . time. the unit switches from injection to recirculation and the l containment cooling systems and RHR are required to remove the core decay heat.
- The operating limits are based on conservative heat transfer analyses for the worst case LOCA. Reference 1 provides the details of the assumptions used in the analysis, which include worst expected meteorological conditions, conservative uncertainties when l calculating decay heat, and worst case single aet4ve failure (e.g., !
s4ngle failure of a manmade structure the~mef03ooling;tesegojr; dam). ThegthlerealihydrauKelanalysislassume_szagJnitialleleyation:of ; 77EfeejtigaDea3evillWhichidropsito269'16"1 coincident with.ithe ,_ ' l Design;B_asjs" Event] The UHS SSI is designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.27 (Ref. 2), which requires a 30 day supply of coolingwaterintheUHShS,J. The UHS SSI satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statcmcat. 10CB501361G2)Mf)) LC0 The UHS SSI is required to be OPERABLE and is considered OPERABLE if it contains a sufficient volume of water at or below the maximum temperature that would allow the SSWS to operate for at least 30 days following the design basis LOCA without the loss of net positive suction head (NPSH), and without exceeding the maximum design temperature of the equipment served by the SSWS. To meet this condition, the L"lS SSI StationISerylceiWaterj
-~
CP 3.7 012 System intake temperature shouiii not exceed 9010fFjand the level should not fall below ZZO 562-ft gansea31eVel during normal unit operation. CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-N31 Eases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-51 9/2588 L
l CREFS B.3.7.10 BASES (continued) e a APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4. EM and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies end during 00"I ALTE"ATIONS. CREFS must be OPERABLE to control operator emosure during and following a DBA. A M E E f; the C"ETS is requircd to cog. with the , relc :: fre;;; the rupturc of ;r. outsid; w::ta ses tank. ja3d During inovement of irradiated fuel assemblies e.,o au ALTE"ATIONS, the CREFS must be OPERABLE to cope with the release from a fuel handling accident. I ACTIONS LJ When one CREFS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPEPE LE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREFS train could result in loss of CREFS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring dur' lng this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability. IllL1 % I.01helG!RoliRoom7ENK9ltRIls;1noperable sMEthatthq GREESitf(jg3aEMMDljgahlpfma,1gte10thCtegfred 03.7 M 3 PCessqng @=hE ,E;ii;ugtfiffisnEit-AM 4 e eWeEttStaith:iteht#5BiteipWW2ac_tfon7mustlheltakeEto testote m ia m 5RABLEicontrojltoos bondatrytrMo4Enottsmisbe29~hotit?mple11oK113eas te_asoneientd;MCRhm! EBB 89M11gryEfpsAsoccurrin[during f.his"(1200!B14!f."dibf33535kBBD111tGDLPNTDOLtm!Ldela 1._111.e_teNF, ...- ~mRRIED0& ..--- M..R_120eg . . - . . [N BC.1 and f3L2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREFS train oricont,rol tooEbountjaf$cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a H00E that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in H0DE 5 within 36 hours. The CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS3.7 B 3.7-57 9/2588 _ ___ x
Fuel Storage Pool Water Level l B 3.7.15 i l BASES rcAclin;; canal ie rhM~4 @41v in accordance with l SR 3.9.6].1 @ Z Z I !!arJ $li O I D CP.3.7 013 l j l REFERENCES 1. FSAR. Section 9.1.2.
- 2. FSAR. Section 9.1.3. i
- 3. FSAR. Section 15.7.4-
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.25. Rev. O.
1
- 5. 10 CFR 100.11. j i
6j WCAP3518]!l71Radiologica}iconsequeggesj',of a'FueliHandling AgcidentRJune:197.0] 7l NUREGdO800ZSepMon;15.7d; I l l n l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-76 925h8
Secondary Specific Activity B 3.7.18 i ! BASES (continued) ! APPLICABLE The accident analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB), SAFETY ANALYSES asdiscussedintheFSAR, Chapter 15(Ref.2)assumesthe
~
o.3.7,0 1 initial secondary coolant specific activity to have a raoioactive isotope concentration of OJ pCi/gm DOSE
- EQUIVALENT I 131. This assumption is used in the analysis for l determining the radiological consequences of the postulated l
accident. The accident analysis, based on this and other assumptions, shows that the radiological consequences of an MSLB l do not exceed a small fraction of the unit EAB limits (Ref.1) for whole body and thyroid dose rates. With the loss of offsite power, the remaining steam I generators are available for core decay heat dissipation by_ m CP 3.7 013 venting steam to the atmosobere through the MSSys"ac e rr l Ccacr; tor atmosphcric relief du;c valves (art's)/The Auxiliary Feedwater System sunnHac the necessary makeup to the steam f generatcrs.J"Eing continues until the reactor =0,_ gpcreturc and picssur; havc decreased sufficiently for th L Rc idual ll cat Raoval Syste; to :=plete the cocidown.
~
- In the evaluation of the radiological consequences of this accident, the activity released from the steam generator l connected to the failed steam line is assumed to be ralau directly to the environmentMT,cunenected stc= scacratcrsige l m assu;cd to dischargc st; = and any entraincd ;ctivity throuch I
; ueeu_ .'
"""- " '-~ "- -"- ' ' Since no credit is taken in l the analysis for activity plateout or retention, the resultant ,
l radiological consequences represent a conservative estimate of l the potential integrated dose due to the postulated steam line. m failure. Secondary specific activity limits satisfy Criterion 2 of the "RC ,
"c1 icy Stat ==t.10CFR50J6(cll2)Jfj)j LCO As indicated in the Applicable Safety Analyses, the specific activity of the secondary coolant is required to be s 0A01 C1/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I 131 to limit the radiological consequences of a Design Baric Accident (DBA) to a small fraction of the required
- limit (Ret. 1).
l
- Monitoring the specific activity of the secondary coolant
~ i ensuresthat when secondary specific activity limits are exceeded. appropriate actions are taken in a timely manner to place the l unit in an operational MODE that wouH minimize the radiological j consequences of a DBA. CPSES Markup ofNUREG. I431 Bases - US 3.7 B 3.7-82 9/25/98 I
EEUN15NrnETR'@~3MN4ATf5FCGW TRSafgtylthilledyaterisystes E221 TER13 h19 REEPLAltRSYSJ13JS E3BE3_9.3EELSaf_ ele.fh10sIBtqGSLsted E__-_m-____,_,_.,_.-,___.., BACluiR0]NJ) TheXS38tBEghglgOg!tgr;.52sigEinglllesTessentja11thijlgd watprj tEtheg!!ggggg@lutto113lRitJ1EENDl%23DarmaEandlaccident Wt1RBGaHintflimaWNg5B1matmEstingsumpItgoes M*E3ER!aRISMd!3Mtsrlmalagtto!aggsafetrLnjectiorLPump commsagggggagggg:g!!aLDEIRBEREDAonsE981tay.nmen3; Spray Pumpir,ggggBlgl@!gQuotoridrivenWmRjgtyiF_eedstig'.JAFW); Pump . rpassMggCgl!pjipentmoeQIfgq11gx01%,Peup" rooms?in thd Componentigljthoplater3CCWJItumpm4n tnem Joamsb
. ' CP-3.7 013 and2 inIthET]NisDEIeTecttiglI3WitchgeanTwammmu is1desjgne!!itolggyldelchilled:waterAOaintatnjthe3mbient aft;temperatute3tthirttheIdesign3juitsIofjthe3ssential.
equipmentzsecvesyat.he:sntesj Theisafety"fglatedij!!gufpmentianditespectiveJEFCUs"Larefofdhegame safety! trita!asItherissdcf ated3h111(d3ater;treinmTXha~ power: failureTorI0therlsingleitailuteltolone: coo 11ng3ystem2ttajajill riojgptpver.;_theIc2MngIofR6dendantLeiqujpmentMp3helothec; train; IhelSafety1ChjlledXaterjSystem7forseachlunjticonsistsJofatwo separateTandZcomplp_te]y2 redundant?.saf_e_tyltrain_s,EElachittajg consists;ggae:petliaged',cgittifugallchilletzene3entrjfugal, ch11]eQaterrecitgla11on'pumprintir_ con _nectingJpjp1DgZyalyes; controls 3nddnttdeestatioifSiBtere taYerooTghalicitaly_eislin.lthe system;?AllttidMaGlKiltheitecitgins2EhaleIalegg! s kin"thjlig!!Ji.etet turge3eggiptrElsti.gpamened3BitthelmI40910toitw] separatggmassanctmeggscwete3sentation ontheitwo- , treins;1thNtlLM3telen3tlitilLTsufffglient?n_el'pssitivel$Uction hgdlism, Inladditgest29 tmh $tattRUBb111tmautomafic1t_ tart 1 tithe salety.JagigggggggsAAMd@poXSafttyggjectjpnfisIl
$1gnnk'elligIRte!!fdtiliM#ctoRM Th6ESaf!GMkIl2WlHhtter3ysteE18"Emissfc]Ggiggy:19andiremajns DMtatidRfMRIFMGE@ititli[8MRfe 4Rottoegleu.rlt itiuntempi!
assp!;1attnignstangentattdrtusitigicfitEditrEnteatet2deta1Ufn:F_sg sectionjQEMMsgefKencM12lpC2;2e]pistitelyj we n rmw n n n ~ ,,m nm m m w w w w.n m m gel.1 CABLE d IbeidesigrEb6strDf4the'"dSefetyichfllg_ Jater2 System 11s jBgTY t61 support 1EFCUS$hatEmaintdin'airstdeperatutes 8s*requitexflin CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-84 9/25n8
Emf?RT!E2Ha2T!wwmm2:2;mirrs=7ZMEMUPE WAC zgmmmm2ggemmarsrigmugigsgAgy15n;B;3220 gggSwwwgwwwmannwrammmuumm Muunwwa#Tt;M'Tn'**M?DMWvuwap%rw awWn,nepmww-Tem v m**~'iv'""77W%M1 M AESEAC2iintitrafiggitentidle eMERABLEMtenii.ts 4ERMMMU C MtionditionerianffglatenBJEzand M DgtWortand[dampetsgrgDPERABLEHandlairlcfrculation g ig w intained; emmm m mer m v:m mw mm a mmmme-:mm,mm 1 APPLICABILIU IgDDENZ2E3Zot3AtheMWAC;Sntem;js[tequired;to be otERABLEtOnsureithe10PS;E31strjbutjonloom; temperatures y11.1 netiexceN;equjpment_'operationalJ requffements y Ig; MODE 15 orJ6ZtheiOPERABILITY; requirements;ofithe,UPS N WAC;Sy_steklarej det_erminedibyithelsyst_emslit: supports: CP 3.7 013 h 2 ymgywyy.mmm.a ~m~nmyw swnctrervery nwvv:vr vevwwvnmwmsmw ~ v 9 *,>n wm , -c
--m... ,-
_ _ _. _ .._ _ .:. - _ ~ _ - .- _ . _ _ . _ .m ACTIONS &;l Withloge:UPS"WACLSystem3rainlinopetable;1restotelthelinoperable ^ train;tp 0EERABL.EJstatusMtMnIdays2 DutingithisJpetiodCtheitema1ging 0PERABLEltrain;i.siadequate;to l performittte10RSMAC:iSystemXunction;&TheldayiComp1.etion; Time Isabased;on.lthelisipftom[anlevent;occuttingTequiting the inoperabJg g S M AC;Iraig Br and B12 m Igit100E_? FEE 3XotRifitheltequitedjupportitdiseet;,the LC0'or tEmeeggRited3tiofgirKonditlon ATeannotibe~~estab1_ished; the':UnitwstMpIsced;inralHDDE3thagninimileslthe] rig 2Tg achiewntKstatuszttmitMstl#DlagIQt21 fast 10DEJ 91thinI6J.jgBggXagdj]Ql00Eg@ithirG36IhoursMhQlloged camp.le_tintEiElmeEaterreasonableaasedwogegatinglexperlence; LoleaEthe2equLred1MitTconditionsWromifu_1rpowericonditions 1Eag~.ctdermengerland31tW.3hanengigonit7 systems ? m mc w m-~n m,r M r:ua:"mzm m . m ,u n. a. ww n-~mm~ -m Sp1ELLLANCE 5R *'3 m 20?1 ! E33!EEIES < YetifyjegMRS;8LCittainloperategijforySDMt] ensures ' that , i thyyIate70PERABLE3ndithatial]Iassociated30ntrolsla_re factiomgegperly.;
,(co@jgued)2 tew+ n ,s . ernwmusnavwn rrmrwvnmmwnsmmws*enmurmr~ms CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-89 MSn3
hmmT;EH igggavingrmm;EME072ETEMEUPEljVAC m w m gg, m p r= m = ar%ecwegg2"2mmmeEB3Z20R EMUllMEMIREM M4UPS3WACigatenigggrgiggMth f LAR196100S l l E., --
~ _--,,,. . _. =m. _ _ . - =
_ . - = _ - _ . - MCKGROUND lhfiUPEMgiSystKpr0Vides7tamperggrelcentrollforithCsafety , telatedigroisttibutig1tgangdurfngzalfMtmaRand: accident l sondit19Ms IhCUPSMMMystgconsistfog ___ 1 a] AJedicated;UPE. _ _ r n_CoiLUnit[ CUEinleach l safetyirelated;UPSy ,__ _oMRoom. Zand b) Two31ectrically3Ddependentfanditedundant;MC;trainsf eithet ofwhichMpMttIalllfootLsAfetylel atedlUPSl& Distribution 29oss yriEachltrain3onsistsloganfai r; conditiontasynitrouctwya y,Idampersgandlinstrumentation alsolformipartlofstheIsystem? j ThelDPSM$iSystgislaJgtmallyiopetating3ysten,7;EachiEECU norma 11turovidesithe.ltequireditemperatutelconttoRto;maintaig itsIrespective*rgamlbelg194Hdur;1g3;ormal; plant;conditj6nsrj A31ngTy!ECitt41CgiDispro11deltM2gq01ted: temperiature conttolit[malgainitheLUPSl&' Distribution;foomsibetwee[4071and 1041Eduling;normigplagtrcenditionszupon2eceiptiofian actuatingIggnalza:standbyltrain1w. guldsstatta i The3PPEEisysteens?alsc aQuetge_ggylsyAteg th;ELCJJ eld ir.6161tMT_tequited3AmperatinIcgattollto, maintain
$[E itsitespectiveitngOeloW22WE@t118Egnetgencrc_onditioEn -:
A $1nglewCNea1pimawner6gidernelegutte_d;t_emperatore contf9L190!algteMitgFSwasibefoO221 Educing;emergenc plant;miss] Tie:cantro w treutt*desig m y . diasrag7includ_e2ag TaanorwerzagedgmeatE9EEEEh31EEB8!!nlEMIgegcy ,l o.3.7.20 6 l Ea[Co111nitHEggRtollidgtgeDMRontr617pageT int _egrt1NthOttitHLhg30gtoXMDa12DntalgIa 2statajnqRuprobS1*foGamusettchmmvoffmEscrugitas directlygtedIt#20tsItssoclatedisafeguardsibus3ndithetefote: LoadishedMf3thermosus delwercizg3poca.31ackoutisign41 CooSirincialsaferinjejc iq1m33JggenTg J he' units automatft4KMstattIUpostdienergilinglofithezassociat safeguad_sJt!Gjg8DEGulagg)Dpetati it ' i _ ej In:theIeyennan lis;1ggggtableI5nd3theTrespgc.tiveW.91Traig is2a.lsg11ggpere. eli100rf.co11ngic_rggptovidedibyltEopposits ttal,n'sIA./CETrag CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases - ITS 3. 7 8 3.7-91 9/25/98 m
! mmer47/immy;Emm mME2mTamysm'dRUPSJjVAC nmuezyWmreremwnsnams.m"m imfm6i337120P, BNeutJDWed)W%eamen+m rsmgyv~nsmqggg5 qwcsycvmw m mtm n.m mm m ,w. nam mmxrm m m 85540JHLii IMIdeMe@tWBtG8hmii2DK1gystemits1taalataiche] 18DEIYWIAL]SES] UPS78;p h T_heiUPSjitggIsJg3QLegjggggGRpithe3ESWnit:andiItain:t_ hey supportJEEDeUESWpTeqEggsponeetere;arrangdyredundant! safety;tglatedjagEggrjglcanetggLeroperatignathelUPJJiVAC
- System
- 81st@uR%ClempereEteeld!D22;EsgsjngIcactive
! fa11urofialegsgegIgfitheWPS31VKfifithialloss3floffsjte a powerE@eolo1Hl!MMAW3D31 tty;of;thesysteniteertpre jts designitunctfgerg1edundanBentroisLare: ptot.idedifprlU.PS; room tempera _ture;coglfEThe]PSiWEisidesignedgnIaccordance with l SeismicLcategoggI;teguirementsmThe;UPJSIWAC21s; capable;of removjncsgsibleragdl]ategtiheatiloadsifromithe1UPSlinverter Eoomsyichfincludelconsfderatip[ofJequipmentheat; load requi.remenisitolensurelequjpeentiOPERABILITY] The;UPSJIVACisatisfiesiCriterjonlof 10CFJR50l36.(c)(2)(ii). i mm:m:nw nremwmmemmrmmmmwmgm y nm LCO Iwo UPSJIVAClSystenittafgslareffequited;tolbe OPERABLE to ptovfde;theLreguited;tedundancyltoiensurelthatitheisystem g.3.7.20 1 fuDetions3to2Ninovelheatlfromi the'UPS7roomsiduring;alDBAQ UPSAV6C 1 SystenitrainitsJconsideredRE_RABLE3 hen 11ts associated] l l a; UP.S _[gency ar[cojlaUnit;isMERABLEtor, m CP-3.7-013 bs 1). Att3ondittooeflagdjfansj apCOPERABLEliand 21 ouctworr andLdampersiate OPERABLE [fand, aft; circulation gaCMaltintafged] : we=mm- mmmnnmamwwwm mm=x 3 8PP.LICABILITY IDJ100Ejl3233EprI4EtheIUPRWACjSys_t_eglisRjquireditpibe OEERABEfo3ngRiitheJP,ERRistribgglofroom1 temp e~fatures;w1U notieXcjled]QuMdDefetiditalltegGirement,sj In]) ODE;)M62]$hC9fEMBIEITYle,quitj!aeDtslo.fhhe' N CP 3.7 013 WACSNtGeNeminedibEthelsy3_tegCitI,$upp.olts]
/
m en- wnw .- - _. n, . . .. - , , m / x - ~ w ,, n
.___.n.-_. -= _.awm._ ,- -.-~..c --
A_CTIONS Ail"and!AT2 With.lloql[UPS'ligC15.ysfem3tajnX1MdML~andMJtain~gfdthe sameTeljettic4WMeinlILnoperableEa_c_t1pnTaust' beltaken l is!aldtatelsganity3h9~86Htain:crithe~ opposite electetcal tts1011GyetaDJg3Gdit6;DtsjotGPERABMIstaturgithig130 ; day 13 Dutipg;th1CpetMg3theltemejnigg]588BKtt31n:1sledequate;to pefforiftthe1UPyWAC" Systj!!n,W1oqMu30; day;Completionlime l CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS3.7 B 3.7-92 9/25198 1
DauTMgE*dT MAMtMGMLGal!.Efjjiid81WE@M% PEWMMEFE@RW9 MVZEEB31;20P
]?2 MD_.& KUMDi?WMoMigQM3;i2;D2 VWQWQQ ww w-Aw ~ vemanum,wansn wm mw mysegenm zmr ug;; Mmm i
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~51melwyng temetagadEBarnalteMsensensliimoWWUGisaanitMEThe?I2 hotEgg3lggiggrer31ggttricM323R~%Lage!3 pres ~ 71(
coGEIN1GaA9GLK31ERRMrnehapsIdur.jpg stgedW3MM3!gditionsZ5R!G2Jhget1CgapletfonigneJsibasedlon thEttillGBSEM;etent:9clutting:rewit ng1the;tnapetable UPS
!!ECSItais;gigd1thejignair!1M R SiRoom' Ct!s"andiA/Cltain" fans Providing3lg;yequitedj. prot!!ction ;
G1 Wheln oILefor3mpreiUP$ land:01strjbutioniRoom_slatelnot;supportedjby eitheritojr adiscoling?orlcitcuJating':atr Eone:hourjfs lallowed ito testprels_G,.pglLtitg3helafiectedf, coon (sUEThhe onezhouriminimizes theitimeT1[Ltifgutltequited:sepportJthjleia]1owjng; quick; repairs 3r testoratterreffequfpmentJ l
. 1
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I GDre).7 and G) 3 0 3.7.20 5 In J100EJEgM3Xori4rljif;t_heitequited lJupportitoimeetithe LColor?toTMRequfred 'ActionsliniCMitforiXorlB!can;nottbe testotgd21810theWequirCdLComplettoriHime;Rff;G&thelunit antMamRust3ralltopEitMtzmiinsnesithe7tistmTo;achteYe th16statR5RhellnftigaMit!!;placesMatilgestil!l00E;331 I thin Ocursamlan?J10DEiSNithitE36lhDEITheIallegedicomputton Times ~alpesenabMEba:sedicropera_t1gMeelengento; teach the teqotriganEEgndities:!frwfulmweecond.itia!LsLin3prderJy mannetstlingshoutzchauengLnon11tsstensj mnwemmmunsw __,nemeww ~r+6-wwwwwww
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M JXANCg SR43.1 PRONE BWIBEElEi _ Ye ErgidNE$tNFQ01reggopergt[es]fotiD130ntinuouslhout eI!$0LeEShE3heEstelopef3blej SR13:7120$2 Lerify1Mangt&swestraipperatesIfor/All;houriensuresithat they3DJGERSIKZepd !thatlgl))]5 sociatedicontro] fare fWLet1001ElIBNagth! I CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS3.7 B 3. 7-93 9/25M8
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.7-014 APPLICABILITY: CP ! REQUEST: This item provides a new DOC (10-32-LG) and changes to the BASES for 3.7.10. I The item moves a CPSES specific aspect of the Current Technical Specification (CTS) requirements of surveillance 4.7.7.1b and c from the specification to the l BASES. In the CTS, these surveillances do not need to be met by an Emergency Pressurization Unit for the corresponding Control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System (CREFS) train to be operable. ITS SR 3.7.10.2 states that the " . . . required VFTP . . . " testing must be performed and the 3.7.10 basec explains what " required" means. The bases explanation of " required" is revised to incorporate the plant specific item described atsove and a DOC is added , to identify the movement of this information to the ITS Bases. l ATTACHED PAGES: Enci2 3/4.7-20 I l Enci 3A 13a Enci38 13a l Enci5B B 3.7-56, B 3.7-56a and B 3.7-59 I l l
#4/7.7 CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) l 4.7.7.1 Each Control Room Emergency Filtration / Pressurization System train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by operating each Control Room Emergency
, Filtration / Pressurization System train Emer#nty2Rssprizjitibnit!njj; gqg for 310 continuous hours with the heaters operating andtheIEmergency FStratiorUnitXorJD5!Eing3ej.
- b. P _ ornCtequ1MControliRocaiEmergengyliltfatfonZPfessutizatioq g g-
_y stenMte_ sting 1nIaccot@nceJgtheyentRationlgteelesting c Program 1(VETP)2 At least once pr.* 18 months or (1) after any 10-32 LG structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber CP 3.7 014 l housings, or (2) following painting, fire, cr chemical release - j any ventilation zone coasmunicating with the system by : (1) Verifying that the filtration unit satisfies the in place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less { than 0.05% by using the test procedure guidance in Regulatory l Position C.S.a. C.S.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision l 2, March 1978*, and the emergency filtration unit flow rate is 8000 ) cfm 10%, and the emergency pres.urization unit flow rate is 800 cfm 10t: ., (2) Verifying within 31 day; aftcr removal, that a laboratory go.u.gg q
' ~
analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in l accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978*, meets the laboratory testing l criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978*, for a methal iodide penetration of less itSeSFE than 0.2% whettested;1n!accordance'WithiASJM;D3303219Z93tla tespetatufeXsi130hndIgreate,rithajEorleggaljt.q20Etelat12e , hgidity: and (3) Verifying an emergency filtration unit flow rate of 8000 cfm i f10174K41 10% and an emergency pressurization unit flow rate of 800 cfm i 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510 1980. ,
- c. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorberBneration, by verifying, within 31 day; after rcacval, that a laboratory pgj analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance 1 10 32 LG with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision cp.3,7 014 2, March 1978*, meets the laboratory teting criteria of Regulatory Position C 6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2. March 1978*
a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.2%:
- ANSI N510 1980 and ANSI N50919Tshall be used in place ANSI N510 1975 and ANSI N509 1976, respectively.
CPSES Mark-up of CTS 3N.7 .1M. 7-20 9/2S/98
CHANGE NUMBER RSliC DESCRIPTION N39 Ilot3Bd 10 30 A Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table a.3.7.10 2 (enclosure 38). 10 31 M Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table 0 3.7.10 13 (enclosure 38). 10132 LG InitheX1 ERG.rveBlancesi4HZ1b nndYapp]y20;the1Contro] CP 3.7 014 RoonJEmergencyliltratlog/MyutizatiorFSystenitraingrather \ thanitf0f3tiVJduaEyentD atieffj]teGigitsMEachltrainjas two3entilationEffitetunits"IagLemergegcylfiltratlognitland an emeter4Megsutizationlunit;EWn.. performing an;ESOfunctionl theltwolilterzunitslatelope. Eating 3niserjesland;ogly;oneifiltet unitXnnulted;toetformit_he;@luireCfunctj onfEAsXresul t; botEtiltgiortitre notlnedtoIcesplyNithisutve,tll ances;4;7.7;1b andMfer3heittainitolbOPERABEEThelequifalegt!setv_eilj ancelin the 'IIS;1SR:3?T.10;22 states 2ttjatR.;gdtequj red 1CREFS;3 testing 7.! MJboeMormedamgjcatccedanceyitEtheyentnation711ter Test.ing 1%gtan3VEIPlWHheJ_TSIte. quirements' regatding Mich ffiteglunfts?atsIDeededHjayleib6BWindWditoittle'BASESJforjlTS:5.7;10
- in the?ppli.cableFSafety'Anaht.$..;
- - .. L..C.OM. RDW 7710.2..se.ctions?
~
11 01 M Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 3B). 11-02 LS 28 Not applicable to CPSES. See Conversion Comparison Table (enclosure 38). 9 i i i d 13a
_______~ -_- ___ _. .__. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ __ CONVERSION COMPARIS0N TABLE - CURR W TS 3/4.7 13* c/16 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUleER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CRE X CALUNAY 89f@% EIAat188kD 2togsuspend M N0 pg VEE 11 C00El-3fistreefense fuel m assembues*isemptlterntengesplactneiWLQPEN8l.ELCRVS itrain __ initheiteq1relaticelsedeMienitheigtherittainsisIinoperable! l 0-3.7.10-: 3 l f _ IDithe;Cl5E$JRgstemillangesM1717Ab;gndLc;appintgithe 90 7ES YES g
.Q. Cgntf9R8DCIlll$tgEBQDOHLQlW4RtBR/RDBWRitlMil0ASlst8EEtC81M
{Aptttrajg \ hesituodeMggttgegittgeslggjtgjEggigmRgggy)$31tRa(100iunit l CP-3.7-01 t endierusserstesiWirassudastjengattaiLiespleetterp@elanigSE gl runctionsthesmestotenwatamaremmentiesiintsermaetonis ( caenfiltansanteusetsHtatittimm!fstetthettneuttsdifuncticorHA4
\ airesultiritetetsRGSet!testtestsettesiddoscoepitwith -
N me!niu m te;Da@f51YEED _ 11-01 A new spec on for a neat removal is added to ensure that NO: not part of NO: part of CTS. YES YES M the CR equipment functions following a DBA. CTS. 5 CPSES Conversion Comparison Table- CTS 3N.7 9)25)98
.1 t t
1 I CREFS B.3.7.10 BASES (continued) l APPLICABLE The CREFS components are arranged in redundant, safety related SAFETY ANALYSES ventilation trains. The location of components and ducting I' within the control room envelope ensures an adequate supply of filtered air to all areas requiring access. The CREFS provides airborne radiological protection for the control room operators, as demonstrated by the control room accident dose analyses i for the most limiting design basis loss of coolant accident. 0-3.7.G 1 fission product release presented in the FSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2). ' i
~
_CP 3.7 014 I hCConttoDoonlpost;accidentfoodelohoperattaglisithe ; emeteencMMcitculatjon3nde2g.In~tM guirgency I tecirculetjonimooQhothit_helEmergency;Fjltratfo[and. Emergency ) Pressutization;Unitslatelupctjoninglnditheyfoperatelinl series: 1 l In"otherlwordsEalEajr;whicEpassesith_ rough 3hCEmergency Pressuriz_atj.onlUnjtlin[eath:trainMj]lipassLthroughithe cottespoging;EmergencyJiltration'Un1Dgforellt;is; released intolthe3;ontroliRoom;Mhe2afety3nalysis;.whj ch'confj rmed,the CREESidesignitoottredj t;[orinoisote2han[99Ef11 tet ef ficiency ofithle E.m_ergency{ Filtration;Unitsionly17;Iithe; Emergency P_r_essurlzationJUnitsidoEnogneetithQurveillage;requitement I criterfaxorif11tr'ationttheTsafetyIanalyses"andithelassogiat.ed ^ agceptahEsrjterialcontin0Go;MI.m. Rt;bTthelEmergogcy l FjltratfKU_nitsMhus]itgoperatot!@il]Icyntinueltolbe l ptovidedithe2protectjonsidentiffed;inithellicensing: bases;for l CQES] The analysis of toxic gas releases demonstrates that the toxicity limits are not exceeded in the control room following a toxic chemical release, as presented in Reference 1. Isolatjon;offthe cetro]Id@m;isingtlaytosa_tJEfotXtoMcichemicallteleaselevent; e The worst case single active failure of a component of the CREFS, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function. The CREFS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statcnnt. 10CM)J1clL2)J111; . LC0 Two independent and redundant CREFS trains are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure disables the other train. Total system failure could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem to the control room operator in the event of a large radioactive release. The CREFS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to limit operator exposure are OPERABLE in both trains.
- l CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-56 9/25/98 i_
CREFS 8.3.7.10 BASES (continued) A CREFS train is OPERABLE @ttein both?Kitrationj]ur)1ts31.Krilhe t engLrgegates40tAtatfMJunitMEBIE3RLNJiltration]n,Ht (EBI)}ltjfjPR8KEjgA'?filtfitionTtnGt%1COEggLt.Ejwhen the associated:
- a. Fan is OPERABLE:
- b. HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are ca3able of performing their filtration functions,7(1%EF9;must me_et; m Vent 11ationlF1]te 2 CP 3.7 014
- ing ftogras3yrggtequir_ements;1the;EPU;mM$t",meetj yFT requirementsgexceptforifiltration;requir_ements)7cou -
- c. j Heater 1(EPU,;ony},demister(EPLonly},ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.
In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors. m CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 8 3.7-56a 9/2Si98
.- . - - . ~. . . ~_- -. - - - .. - - ._
CREFS B.3.7.10 BASES (continued) minim 1zes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position. FEH.1 If both CREFS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4 f9fiteasdns"o3hpf*h=RarCfilppqtable30rttrglitoom 'boundaty 0 3.7.10 14 l (fy1Cggdi_tionJE the CREFS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condi ion outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, each train once every month provides an adequate check of this system. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. SystemsFDtration units ititXheatgensg[beloperat_ed3fot.$f10icontingous: o hours 81th3helMt3GiggtztRf 5'; uSystems FJ1ttatioOlgit$ Wjtho^ut - - ~ heatersinee(70nJ)rgoperat_edifot; P15)Jnotesito; demonstrate;the , (unctionigfithle systs. The 31 day Frequency is based on the l reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy availability. l SR 3.7.10.2 This SR verifies that the required CREFS testing is performed in : accordance with the;YegDAiogfiltelgTesting1Pfogr_aml(MID. , The CREFS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The R IE includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and the physical prop rties of the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussedindetailintheIFTj. N IVEI EP]1HIMElesi_tgg3eggtestj V@fj. sect _1onIEL5111a rils R$1cIafg3!DJ.[l338tfiggy3lggtgelFtetsgtizatJgnlUnit
, their beitigIt_eRigg]nEglit1lg_TjperfiggpJggitMgm18 marithsloffdifter'NMcgltatioED(2)Lafteflagy CP 3.7 014
$3DLet.ut r t a ]T3MWaDN!CBD73hrtEPA?filte~Jpr3hategal -
odsorb6f20051ngED!2BMd_11cgiggip]Dati.ngsf.itelog
@esicalTNtTeaseMoritheTcoEinest3LCREES'irgin_Ito' be a
CPSESMarkup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-59 9aS/98
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.7-015 APPLICABILITY: CP REQUEST: TSTF-235 modified STS 3.7.1 to incorporate changes recommended by NSAL 94-001 with regard to inoperable MSSVs. The FLOG position on this TSTF was provided in response to Comment Number Q 3.7.1-4. The response indicates that CPSES incorporated TSTF-235. CP 3.7-015 is being added to indicate that in some locationc CPSES revised the Bases from that which was provided with the TSTF to make it plant specific to CPSES. The non-applicable wording from the TSTF was not shown. ATTACHED PAGES: Enci5B B 3.7-2, B 3.7-2a, B 3.7-3, B 3.7-Sa and B 3.7-6 9 l 9
MSSVs l B 3.7.1 ! 1 BASES I
. presented in the FSAR Section 1514 (Ref. 3). Of these, the full power turbine trip without steam dump is typiq6Myjthe limiting A00. This event also terminates normal feedwater flow to the steam generators.
~
The sa . Ag8}384~4emonstratenthaEtheGtransient response for urbine trip Wik6viisittidqu1Qoperj without a direct 0 3.7.1 4 l r actor trip presents no hazard to the integrity of the RCS m2 , r the Main Steam System. If a minimu;;; reactivity fccdback CP 3.7 15 l j is assu;cd the reactor is tripped on high picssuricer l
' prcssure. In chis casc. the pressurizer safety valves open, and RCS prcssurc is; ins bcicw 110% of the dcsign value. The i tiSS"3 also spa to limit the sacadory stc= pressure.
If ;;;;ximu;;; reactivity feedback is assuccd. th reactor is tripped i ca cvertapersture aT gi;Dc;t;;;;;;..;;3;;cge;;Gvgia;a.3 1 4. The dcparture fra nuci a ta boiling ratic incrases througacut the tr=sicat, and acvcr drops below its initial j value. Picssuriccr relief valves and MSS"3 cr; activated and I prevent uverpicssurication in the pri;;ry =d seccadary systas. The;tuttiineltdpIts;perfdreesissumingl@;ptimarynystem.orpssure gorttronEbniergttingregtoritdpW111ghRessddzegtessute andloperatiezofithe3nstorfzerzsaLetyaaltes2Th1Caglysis i demonstratesithat.LRCSligt.!!grityJ1sinidintainediby3hogngithatithe l maximunin.cS:stegorgdgEntmceedg1FlofitheIdestergpressure; AU3agsTg!6}3lidMhateltha.t3heINSSisImaMa1(MainiS_ team l Sy_stemustgiritswaisttiwtheImaximuersteam;prisantelto11ess l t3an11.lorofithe? steam 3entrat0cde_sigognenute; 1 InladdttiomtoittedecremgMat:tenggavetentsateas11ty . insertionmentoayzalsBh811@De3MTfalleMngfcapgtty n,3,,,1.g ; af;thiP,gg1MEggggg3BMGt9fjgitHicgg.trdllessi!M!1y j mcCAEkan! alt!glta!aintaRuisvuggggghgactedjesinyzart i igenateltagggg!ggiggMtenangetatan2 ate;u_ntt12pactot I tdp;pcegggggggtht663rJFoWerlRange l
!W1r.on Dgp1l1lg3!gettgap.MRgmeniggeamWEt#3tgitutbine MR39113RDJ!RalMG88ttBElmt911MligMetith1 Cele 113he incregm31deficausesJgLncrease
,inistessoggggggmeggggggghugggM3Ethe3tliSEEplr t orit l tea ~ctor2triprLelminGngagentarmpgatmof.it_hamo_ spher c
\. er7cbndo6stEstMGIGW3RMBEheESAPIstfety;agyg10C _ ,
\ R,CgEbe90N;tWtaR8T38tNgggBVentTroNgBligeLoflinitialfe !
\ poterJevelfdestonstratesIshA_t"the'HSSVs?ar_elcagbleLof pIetentigisecondary;,sideIm_6ssgjzatfonifgrithf 5"A00 '.
l l
- - (Continued) .
CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases - ITS 3. 7 B 3. 7-2 9/2S/98
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES ! w 1)nrg--- f' rrmwaimm%u.M-wm_JtiatiglRot 0 3.7.1 4 ) f--a ticlMBEMESEDERISK116MsiEEMaiktEtheTRisar9 CP 3.7 15 4
$#$ tem 6 2itEE2ti! Mids 60*"te vaTKaftigres;stisMMtRBDema!Minimjnedateam L
DWicmKtEREEhutttWMGN2RIDMIGEluld3he Jteleining DEERNDB15SRMhtleD1Md331Bt1DtfMIRlls!LrEsygerpower neessstallirmacucowargsystee'ogatasorJ4ation~3ay;be detersJ1temsyls ep1trans_t.en;anja ysgamege31rcumstances3t 1sineceiulrBoltMt.3htgrjaaryMde' heat;wratationithat:can be.; achieved 3uring3nJ0(T bylteducinduhe~satpointI0fithelowen Range:NeutrolEQWitligh3tgjRtonitrip;gngtfoGEor example 711 more;thanj;gegjeSsyIdgalsfgg]eIstvamaeneratorasI1noperablenaa uncont_ coned;RCCrbanprithdrawallatMglelentjeccurring fromla pattianggeMlegiLsayges01t11g3nJgtea_sJe Eteactpripower thateggdQhelcombjned3teasTfiqW3 ppa 31ty3fitheiturbine rand the.1 rem _atals;otE_ReBytMSSVs3hus;3forisultiple3tnopetablelMSSVs onithelsame!$teasigeneratofKis; net.essary;tolpreventiexc.eeding thigpoWeriby11cWetipg3thelPowe.rJRange r _J ie0 tron 11ux-High3etpo.irit td'an agptopir;iate'VaTue'.7When;theIModerator!Tempefature Coeffjglejgt'gt@EjptIposit1VeJnthegeYeter$6tlay11_ncte. ase abple:thsismtittaaTue21mHgg3n1RCS3eatup3htnt;(Q.Xturbine c trfpl?HhumtgragEnumbe rofliggper_a.pleTMSsysiit;1tsmecessary taltedecetheittipIs_etydfat36m;p6gigventiciinayletistla_t pa_rtia]Sgggy[cggd.11190sHE}1sjsit23;@=*stratedibyfala,1ysis i thatlaJfg!ggle(Maletofg8Mer2reductIDtlIa16 feilslsofficientito ! preyents.rEestiutizationidCtheIsteam'sisteel The MSSVs are l assumed to have two 59g active and cac passive failure modes. The active failure modes arc spurious islanlitLadvertent opening and failure to reclose once opened. The passive failurc acdc i.s. , Failure to open upon demand islgtlasjLunedI(RefE31 The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the CC Policy Statca . l 10CFR50;36(c}f21C11M. l l s _ K _/ , LC0 The accident analysis requires feue tb8t3f1VeQ4SSVs per steam l generator pl[gER85LE3to provide overpressure protection for ! design basis transients occurring at 102% RTP. An "SSV M 4 ! bc considcccd inoperabic if it fails to open on dc:end ti;g o.3.7.1 4 l l tiiCpWOOG1;I.KO3MthinitliOffC3E2;;;03 1plicou. The LC0 requires that five MSSVs Q~Mteam e genetator,"abe OPERABLE in compliance with Reference 2, even
- though this i; not a requirc; cat of ajgljthe DBA analysis.
(Continued) CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-2a 9/2 M 8
l l MSSVs 8 3.7.1 BASES 1 l l OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance ! testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Thc lift ;cttings, e cerding to Tabic 0.7.1-2 in the 0 3.7.1 4 , ecc ;penying LCO. coric; pend to ;;bicnt condition of the I valve at ne;inal epcrating tc grature and pressure. l This LC0 provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform l their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences of l accidents that could result in a challenge to the RCPB orjMain steam;gystemantegrity. 1 APPLICABILITY "_T"_,the number of "SS"_: per stca; t In "_00C vs.,s. .__...1, yabove
- a. . s. 40%
.. um. n.orn.ni r
_ . . _ , u_ m. m.s. . m_ m..'"__ j 0 3.7.1 4 Table 3.7.1 1 in the acce;panying LCO. "clow 40% "J" in l MODES 1, 2, and 3, only two f.,1vq MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE to~preventiMajn' Steam; System i overpressurjzation. I In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the l MSSVs. The steam generators are not normally used for heat-removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized: there is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these i
- MODES.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate l Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV. m l O ith one or more MSSVs inoperable, a]$jyKgustLbeltaken redu c powcr so that the available MSSV relieving capacity n,3,7,1,4g l meets $hg "cfccc ,cc 2 gLerpfgjlsgtelp@ticggd requirements. for the :pplicabic ll E^".'L "0WE", ;GRfiGiEI@.J.5 CP.3.7-15 u.r_assa l Operation with less than all glyn MSSVs OPERABLE for each steam ! generator is permissible, if THERMAL POWER is proportionally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generatcr is not greater tha the available relief capacity in that steam generator. For exampic, if enc ""'s is inepcreble in enc stc;; scacrator. '..c relicf cepocity -thot ,tc;; scr.crator is reduccd by CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-3 9/2588 m
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES r
. if141ggl@hamirdMy$2hED34t$Mgtlliler3saMJicrease3sr t#EGit1ERIS5iMIR0pmitlRt3flpRTc8DVcitf"Of5the rJgiataMRIBClimiErmalsmitleglg3herefqremg3ddjtt 163eqqDMfmB30ptWete2nductjon ,
1steagt!LeasynnMrcomorrElpm1!teuIsctioJn 12;seteiffe.s l th!LtithELogectesmaegtrWEIGHilllCf88ctorattipisetpojnt. ;be reduced:Rithirf92Cll60,ts] The7maximug:lHERFLPOWERfcottespondiKto3he; heat; removal, capacitylofit_heRemajnj$f0PERABLE!MSSVstisideterminedjith.'an apptopriate311wanceitorincleagnstrjaentation: system' trip channelluncertaiqttes] Regujr_edleton%231s"modif, led _bylalotenindicating,3 hat;the P,oWet RangeLNeotroplElugfHfgh2eactoritfjpyetpointlreductionlis on]P;feguitedMt100 Ell.TIn30 DES 12:ahditthelteactoiprotection systemitrjps specified:inTLCO'313;1&1eactor;TripJystem InstrumentationKptovide7 sufficient, prot _ectj on; Ma11gged30mpletionTimetIariteasMable: based;on;operatang expetiente3olaccomplis_hltERequfted1Actjonslinlan3tdetly_ manperiWithout3tgilengjpglinit;; systems] CB.1 and CB.2 If the Beguited3ctiop_ slate';notIgomplet_ed "SS"3 cannot be CP-3.7 15 / restored to OPEPELE tatu: within the associated Completion Time, or if one or more steam generators have E4;jnop'e table 03.7.1/ less th;n two ",SSVs OPEPELE, the unit must be placed in a f i MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, 9 the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in ODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are asonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required un conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and w hout challenging unit systems. N / SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each P.SSV lift setpoint in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 4-5-4), l i requires that safety and relief valve tests be performed in CP 3.7-13 l accordance with ANSI /ASME OH 11987 (Ref. 5-fiS). According l to Reference 5-t-j, the following tests are required:
- a. Visual examination:
CPSES Markup ofNUREG-H31 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-Sa 9/2SM8
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES
- e. Verification of the balancing device integrity on balanced valves.
The ANSI /ASME Standard requires that all valves be tested every 5 years, and a minimum of 20% of the valves be tested every 24 months. The ASME Code specifies the activities and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7.1-2 allows a i @t setpoint tolerance for OPERABILITY: however, the valves are reset to it during the Surveillance to allow for drift. The3jftlsettings',Taccording;toJable 0 3.7.1 4 3;;Lli2;cor_responttolambjent;;conditig:otthe3alve.:at floainallopetatipflemperaturfand; pre lssure.; This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and ; operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. The HSSVs may be l either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an l assist device to simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not i tested at hot conditions, the lift setting pressure shall be corrected to ambient conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure.
- 1. FSAR, Section 1.0;311 and';10.3.2. 0 3.7.1 4 REFERENCES ;
- 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Section III, CP 3.7 015 Article NC 7000, Class 2 Components. ,
- 3. FSAR. Section Chapter 15.
m
- 4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
- 5. ANSI /ASME OH 1 1987.
f l (Continued) CPSES Markup ofNUREG-1431 Bases -ITS 3.7 B 3.7-6 9/2588
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