ML20094N620

Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Containment Pal Doors to Remain Open During Movement of Irradiated Fuel & During Core Alterations for Plant

ML20094N620
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	11/21/1995
From:	TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20094N619	List: ML20094N616 ML20094N620
References
NUDOCS 9511280112
Download: ML20094N620 (2)

Text

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. to TXX 95289 Page 1.of 2 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS LIMITED CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

a.

The equipment hatch closed and held in place by a minimum of four

bolts, b.

A ;ini;;; cf en; deer in ;;;h airlock is ci;;cd. and A'ainimus'of, one idoor ii n i the l esergency Jai rl ock li s ' closed iand 'one :doorj i n3he ;;

personnel airlock);is;capableiof,being;glosed,iandj c.

Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1)

Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or 2)

Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment ventilation isolation valve.

APPLICABILITY : During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTIOR:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied. immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be determined to be either in its cic;cd/iseletsdrequired condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment ventilation isolation valve within 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by:

a.

Verifying that, 1.

Containment ventilation isolation occurs on a high radiation test signal from a containment atmosphere gaseous monitoring instrumentation channel and the contain:nent ventilation isolation valve (s) can be closed remotely from the control room, or 2.

the containment ventilation isolation valve (s) are closed / isolated.

b.

Verifying the remaining penetrations of 3.9.4, not covered by a.

above, are in their cles;d/iseleted tequired condition.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 9 4 9511280112 951121,

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~ to TXX 95289 Page 2 of 2-3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 7

BASES-

-l 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:

(1) the reactor will remain.subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a l

uniform boron concentration is maintained for. reactivity control in the water i

-volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The value of 0.95:or less for K e includes a 1% a k/k l

conservative allowance for-uncertainties.

Similarly, the,' boron concentration value of 2400 ppm or greater includes-a conservative uncertainty allowance of 3

50 ppa boron. The locking closed of the required valves during refueling l

operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the 1

-filled portion of the RCS. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated

, ater by closing flow paths from sources of unborated water.

w 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION i

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that-redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the i

reactivity condition of the core.

-l 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ' ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. ~ This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material withinfrom i

containment will be r;;tricted free k;h;; to th enviren;;r.t ;;in'inized. The I

~

OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict ra'cioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based u)on the lack of j

containment pressurization potential while in the RE:UELING MODE.

Both~ containment' personnel" airlock doorsimay?belopen"during movement;ofR 1rradiated fuel tor /during core alterations;provided;one air;1ock door;isa capable of<being; closed and; water 61evellin,the,refuelingicavjtyiis;;maintainedi i

as1 required;;

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS i

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the

)

facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

CONANCHE PEAK UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 9 1