|
---|
Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20148U0111997-06-17017 June 1997 Confirmatory Survey of Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Fsv Nuclear Station Platteville,Co ML20133D7661996-09-16016 September 1996 Confirmatory Survey Plan for Fsv Nuclear Station Decommissioning Project ML20129A4621996-09-11011 September 1996 Rev 0 to Fsv Decommissioning Project Final Survey Requirements for Liquid Effluent Pathway ML20100L3581996-02-22022 February 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Submitting Corrected Version of Plant Decommissioning TS Updated to Reflect All Approved Amends ML20097C2601996-01-17017 January 1996 Confirmatory Survey Activities Plan for Fsv Nuclear Station PSC Platteville,Co ML20101F2091995-09-18018 September 1995 Issue 7 to DPP 5.4.2, Odcm ML20084B8801995-05-25025 May 1995 Rev 1 to Fsv Nuclear Station Decommissioning Project Final Survey Plan for Site Release ML20084B6881995-05-10010 May 1995 Issue 5 to Fire Protection Operability Requirements (Fpor) FPOR-7, Fire Extinguishers ML20082K2461995-04-14014 April 1995 Proposed Decommissioning Tech Specs Administrative Control 5.3.1,reflecting Organizational Changes That Impact Membership of Decommissioning Safety Review Committee ML20082T2151995-04-12012 April 1995 Issue 7 to Fire Protection Operability Requirements (Fpor) FPOR-12, Fire Detectors ML20082B9411995-03-17017 March 1995 Confirmatory Survey Plan for Repower Area,Fort St Vrain, Platteville,Co ML20082C0801995-03-16016 March 1995 Proposed Confirmatory Survey Plan for Repower Area,Fort St Vrain,Platteville,Co ML20082B9821995-03-15015 March 1995 Instrumentation Comparison Plan Between Orise & Fort St Vrain ML20086S2471995-02-0909 February 1995 Decommissioning Plan for Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20077C7171994-11-30030 November 1994 Issue 9 to FPOR-14, Fire Protection Operability Requirements ML20078C0641994-10-12012 October 1994 Revised Fire Protection Operability Requirements,Including Issue 21 to Depp Table of Contents,Issue 2 to FPOR-22 & Issue 3 to FPOR-23 ML20081J7951994-09-15015 September 1994 Issue 5 to DPP 5.4.2, Odcm ML20063M1551994-02-17017 February 1994 Rev 0 to Fsv Nuclear Station Decommissioning Project Final Survey Plan for Site Release ML20057A6151993-08-30030 August 1993 Issue 2 to FPOR-23, Fire Water Makeup Sys ML17291B3261993-05-18018 May 1993 Proposed TS Section 2.2 Re Activated Graphite Blocks,Section 2.4 Re Channel Calibr & SR 3.2.1 Re Verification of Reactor Bldg Pressure & SR 3.2.2 Re Verification of Pressure Drop Across Each HEPA Filter ML20118B2141992-09-25025 September 1992 Proposed Decommissioning Tech Specs Replacing Radiation Safety with Nuclear Safety, Revising Applicability Requirements for Specs Dealing W/Reactor Bldg Confinement Integrity & Clarifying Items Re Unreviewed Safety Questions ML20114D6871992-09-0101 September 1992 Tritium Leach Test on H-327 Graphite ML20096H1961992-05-19019 May 1992 Decommissioning TS Deleting Section 4.2.15 Re LCO 4.2.15 Covering Pcrv Cooling Water Sys Temps ML20095B0951992-04-14014 April 1992 Proposed Tech Specs Re Organization,Review & audit-administrative Controls ML20094L2831992-03-19019 March 1992 Proposed Tech Specs Re Controls & Limits Appropriate for Decommissioning ML20086C5301991-11-15015 November 1991 Proposed Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation 4.2.15 Re Pcrv Cooling Water Sys Temps ML20079M4261991-10-11011 October 1991 Revised Abnormal Operating Procedures,Reflecting Deletion of Issue 9 of EP Class ML20091D7631991-10-11011 October 1991 Proposed,Revised Limiting Condition for Operation 4.2.15 Re Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel Cooling Water Sys Temp ML20082L9311991-08-30030 August 1991 Proposed Tech Specs Re Decommissioning ML20082H8851991-08-16016 August 1991 Issue 2 to Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-I-2, Chemical, Petroleum & Hazardous Waste Spill Response ML20091C4141991-08-0202 August 1991 Issue 58 to Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-L, Loss of Instrument Air Header ML20024H3341991-05-10010 May 1991 Nonproprietary Rev 2 to FSV-P-SCP-100, Fort St Vrain Initial Radiological Site Characterization Program Program Description ML20072V5291991-04-12012 April 1991 Revised Defueling Emergency Response Plan,Including Section 1 Definitions,Section 2 Scope & Applicability,Section 3 Summary of Fsv Derp,Section 4 Emergency Classifications & Section 5 Emergency Organization ML20070V6871991-03-20020 March 1991 Issue 55 to Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-R, Loss of Access to Control Room ML20072S0521991-03-15015 March 1991 Public Version of Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 9 to CMIP-11, Classification of Emergency for McGuire Nuclear Station & Rev 11 to CMIP-12, Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station ML20066J1171991-02-15015 February 1991 Issue 56 to Intro Section of Abnormal Operating Procedure (Aop),Issue 58 of AOP-A,Issue 58 to AOP-B,Issue 56 of AOP D-1 & Issue 2 of RERP-TRANSPORTATION ML20066A3781990-12-21021 December 1990 Proposed Decommissioning Tech Specs Re Reactor Bldg Integrity,Reactor Bldg Ventilation Exhaust Sys,Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation & Pcrv Shielding Water Tritium Concentration ML20059L5891990-09-14014 September 1990 Proposed Tech Specs Changing Design Features Section 6.1 to Permit Removal of CRD & Orifice Assemblies from Core Regions Defueled in Support of Plant Closure Activities ML20058N1071990-08-10010 August 1990 Issue 56 to AOP-I, Discussion of Fire ML20042F3151990-04-26026 April 1990 Proposed Tech Specs Re Defueling ML20006B7921990-01-25025 January 1990 Proposed Tech Specs Re Administrative Title Changes to Section 7.1 ML19332E8901989-12-0404 December 1989 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactivity Control & Control Rod Pair Position Requirements During Shutdown ML19332F3561989-12-0404 December 1989 Proposed Tech Specs Re Limiting Condition for Operations 4.7.3, Fuel Storage Wells & 4.7.5, Instrumentation. ML19332C8151989-11-21021 November 1989 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Items 2.D.(1) & 2.D.(4) Re Max Power Level & Early Shutdown,Respectively ML20064B2111989-11-0909 November 1989 Fort St Vrain Cycle 4 RT-500L Test Rept ML19324B6961989-10-30030 October 1989 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Core & Reactivity Control ML19327B1321989-10-13013 October 1989 Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Deleted Limiting Conditions of Operations 4.1.2 Through 4.1.6,deleted Surveillance Requirements 5.1.1,5.1.2,5.1.3 & 5.1.5 & Newly Added Reactivity Control Section ML19351A3271989-10-13013 October 1989 Proposed Tech Specs 6.1 Re Defueling Phase Document Design Features ML20248G4731989-10-0101 October 1989 Proposed Tech Specs Re End of Operations ML20248G4461989-09-30030 September 1989 Proposed Tech Specs Re Chlorine Detection & Alarm Sys & Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys 1997-06-17
[Table view] Category:TEST/INSPECTION/OPERATING PROCEDURES
MONTHYEARML20148U0111997-06-17017 June 1997 Confirmatory Survey of Group E Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas Fsv Nuclear Station Platteville,Co ML20133D7661996-09-16016 September 1996 Confirmatory Survey Plan for Fsv Nuclear Station Decommissioning Project ML20129A4621996-09-11011 September 1996 Rev 0 to Fsv Decommissioning Project Final Survey Requirements for Liquid Effluent Pathway ML20097C2601996-01-17017 January 1996 Confirmatory Survey Activities Plan for Fsv Nuclear Station PSC Platteville,Co ML20101F2091995-09-18018 September 1995 Issue 7 to DPP 5.4.2, Odcm ML20084B8801995-05-25025 May 1995 Rev 1 to Fsv Nuclear Station Decommissioning Project Final Survey Plan for Site Release ML20084B6881995-05-10010 May 1995 Issue 5 to Fire Protection Operability Requirements (Fpor) FPOR-7, Fire Extinguishers ML20082T2151995-04-12012 April 1995 Issue 7 to Fire Protection Operability Requirements (Fpor) FPOR-12, Fire Detectors ML20082B9411995-03-17017 March 1995 Confirmatory Survey Plan for Repower Area,Fort St Vrain, Platteville,Co ML20082C0801995-03-16016 March 1995 Proposed Confirmatory Survey Plan for Repower Area,Fort St Vrain,Platteville,Co ML20082B9821995-03-15015 March 1995 Instrumentation Comparison Plan Between Orise & Fort St Vrain ML20086S2471995-02-0909 February 1995 Decommissioning Plan for Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20077C7171994-11-30030 November 1994 Issue 9 to FPOR-14, Fire Protection Operability Requirements ML20078C0641994-10-12012 October 1994 Revised Fire Protection Operability Requirements,Including Issue 21 to Depp Table of Contents,Issue 2 to FPOR-22 & Issue 3 to FPOR-23 ML20081J7951994-09-15015 September 1994 Issue 5 to DPP 5.4.2, Odcm ML20063M1551994-02-17017 February 1994 Rev 0 to Fsv Nuclear Station Decommissioning Project Final Survey Plan for Site Release ML20057A6151993-08-30030 August 1993 Issue 2 to FPOR-23, Fire Water Makeup Sys ML20079M4261991-10-11011 October 1991 Revised Abnormal Operating Procedures,Reflecting Deletion of Issue 9 of EP Class ML20082H8851991-08-16016 August 1991 Issue 2 to Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-I-2, Chemical, Petroleum & Hazardous Waste Spill Response ML20091C4141991-08-0202 August 1991 Issue 58 to Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-L, Loss of Instrument Air Header ML20024H3341991-05-10010 May 1991 Nonproprietary Rev 2 to FSV-P-SCP-100, Fort St Vrain Initial Radiological Site Characterization Program Program Description ML20072V5291991-04-12012 April 1991 Revised Defueling Emergency Response Plan,Including Section 1 Definitions,Section 2 Scope & Applicability,Section 3 Summary of Fsv Derp,Section 4 Emergency Classifications & Section 5 Emergency Organization ML20070V6871991-03-20020 March 1991 Issue 55 to Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-R, Loss of Access to Control Room ML20072S0521991-03-15015 March 1991 Public Version of Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 9 to CMIP-11, Classification of Emergency for McGuire Nuclear Station & Rev 11 to CMIP-12, Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station ML20066J1171991-02-15015 February 1991 Issue 56 to Intro Section of Abnormal Operating Procedure (Aop),Issue 58 of AOP-A,Issue 58 to AOP-B,Issue 56 of AOP D-1 & Issue 2 of RERP-TRANSPORTATION ML20058N1071990-08-10010 August 1990 Issue 56 to AOP-I, Discussion of Fire ML20154M4361988-09-0909 September 1988 Rev a to EE-FP-0005, Evaluation of Cable Trays Outside of Congested Cable Area ML20154L8751988-05-26026 May 1988 Simulation Facility Program Plan ML20154L8911988-03-31031 March 1988 Rev 2 to Guidance for Development of Simulation Facility to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.45 ML20148Q4681988-03-31031 March 1988 Rev 2 to Guidance for Development of Simulation Facility to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.45 ML20150E3141988-03-18018 March 1988 Issue 1 to Procedure SR 5.4.1.3.8.abcd-R1, Steam Line Rupture Detection/Isolation Sys (Slrdis) Calibr & Testing for Panel I-93543 ML20150E2901987-12-31031 December 1987 Issue 5 to Procedure SR 5.3.4b1-A Loop I Shutdown Cooling Power Operated Valve Test ML20238E3541987-08-0707 August 1987 Rev a to EE-ISI-002, Condensate Line Erosion Insp Program ML20236N8681987-08-0505 August 1987 Exercise Manual Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Nrc/Fema Graded Exercise 870805 ML20235Y7861987-07-29029 July 1987 Issue 2 to MAP-4, Maint Dept Personnel Experience, Qualification & Training Requirements ML20237J6921987-06-0909 June 1987 Issue 6 to MQCIM-1, Maint QC Insp Program. Annotated Page to Rev 4 to Updated FSAR Encl ML20235Y7731987-05-25025 May 1987 Training Mgt Procedure Index ML20237J7151987-05-0101 May 1987 Issue 12 to Q-18, QA Monitoring & Audit Program ML20215H9731987-04-30030 April 1987 Revised Buckle Users Manual:Creep Collapse of Thin-Walled Circular Cylindrical Shells Subj to Radial Pressure & Thermal Gradients ML20215H6101987-04-10010 April 1987 Program Plan for Integrated Validation of NUREG-0737 Initiatives ML20215H6031987-04-10010 April 1987 SOAP-2,Issue 1 of Guidelines for Preparation of Emergency Procedures ML20215H5951987-04-10010 April 1987 Procedures Generation Package:Public Svc Co of Colorado Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20150E3041987-03-20020 March 1987 Issue 1 to Procedure SR 5.4.1.3.8.abcd-R2, Steam Line Rupture Detection/Isolation Sys (Slrdis) Calibr & Testing for Panel I-93544 ML20237J7231987-02-20020 February 1987 Issue 5 to QAAP-1, Planning & Scheduling Fort St Vrain QA Audits ML20212B3081987-02-15015 February 1987 Issue 7 to Procedure G-9, Controlled Work Procedures ML20210E3001987-02-0303 February 1987 Revised Administration Procedures Consisting of Issue 7 to G-3, Action Request-Preparation & Processing, Issue 21 to G-2, Fort St Vrain Procedure Sys & Issue 6 to G-6, Compliance w/10CFR21 Requirements ML20210A7571987-01-30030 January 1987 Fort St Vrain 1987 Power Ascension Plan ML20237J7421987-01-19019 January 1987 QA Audit QAA-502-87-01, Audit Plan - QA Program for Transport of Radioactive Matls ML20212B2851986-10-24024 October 1986 Issue 10 to Procedure Q-3, Design Control Sys ML20238E3461986-10-0202 October 1986 Rev C to EE-ISI-0001, Extraction Steam Lines & Turbine Vent & Drain Lines Erosion Insp Program 1997-06-17
[Table view] |
Text
-
ATTACHMENT 3 TO P-85040 CONTROL ROD DRIVE AND ORIFICING ASSEMBLY PROPOSED PREVENTIVE / PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM Prepared by: [ (
Jtur Eggebroten Technical Services Engineering Supervisor Approved by:
Frank X Novach h Technical / Administrative Services Manager Public Service Company of Colorado Fort St. Vrain Unit #1
~~ 8502060545 850131 PDR ADOCK 05000267 P PDR
e .
2 l
l
'I. ABSTRACT-A review of source information to identify potential preventive l maintenance activities has been completed, and aspects of that program are being proposed. The detailed implementation of some parts of the program will be dependent -upon the results of currently underway Engineering studies. Evidence sugg'ests that a preventive _ maintenance -schedule based on the scheduled refueling cycle for normal. service rods (i.e., replacement of
. rods in refueling regions with refurbished assemblies), and for the regulating rod, in conjunction with predictive maintenance, ,
.is appropriate. Of.particular importance is the monitoring of shim motor performance, to identify and schedule maintenance other than normally scheduled maintenance.
II. DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL REVIEW .
A review of a variety of source information on Control Rod Drive and Orificing Assemblies (CRD0As) has been performed to identify aspects of maintenance for which preventive maintenance
- consideration would be appropriate. The following sources of information were used:
- 1. Operations a'nd Maintenance Manual (GA-9806, May 1977)
- 2. ~ Completed Plant Trouble Reports from the STAIRS database
- 3. Open Station Service Requests (Plant Trouble Reports)
- 4. Plant Maintenance Personnel
- 5. Plant Maintenance Engineering Personnel
- 6. Proposed Modifications
- 7. Operational. Experience
- 8. D-1201 Drawings (DesignDrawings)
- 9. Surveillance Requirements 10.- Engineering Development Studies From this variety of information, a set of potential preventive maintenance activities has been identified. Each of these is
- being' subsequently considered individually with regard to t
component failure history, service life, predictive maintenance-(PDM) test potential,-and other possibilities, to identify a set of preventive maintenance (PM) activities that.is appropriate.
A q
_ _ _ _ __ - . _ .__ - - ,,w. , , , ., __.
l 3
III. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE (PM) PROGRAM -
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF POTENTIAL PM ACTIVITIES l
A. SHIM MOTO.R/ BRAKE ASSEMBLY Visual Examination 11.
- a. Pinion gear
- b. Motor bearings
- c. Brake pads
- 2. Test - as left
- a. Dynamometer
.b. Torque to rotate - removed from CRD0A
- c. Torque to rotate - installed on CRDOA
- d. Back-EMF (scram generated braking voltage)
. 3. Shim Motor Bearings
- a. Clean / replace as required i
- 4. Electrical
- a. Megger motor (insulation test)
- b. Dynamometer (load capability)
- c. Megger brake windings (insulation test)
- 8. DRIVE TRAIN
- 1. Visual Examination of exterior
- 2. Torque - delivered (rods on) measurement
- a. Torque to rotate - motor installed on CRDOA -
through shim motor rotor shaft (This is the same as. item A.2.c, above)
- b. Back-EMF (scram generated braking voltage)
C. CABLE
, 1. Visual examination
- 2. Surface wipe analysis
- 3. Replace one cable'every.3rd refueling cycle to allow:
i l i
- a. Detailed visual examination l
_b. Meta 11ographic examination
[ c. Pull test 1
I I
4 D. RESERVE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
- 1. Hopper
- a. Visual examination ,
- 2. Material
- a. Sample removal - visual examination b ', Samole analysis - select CRDOAs
- 3. Pressure switch-
- a. Functional test - Surveillance Requirement
- 4. -Valves
- a. None
- 5. RSD System -
d
.a. Functional test (blow rupture disk) -
Surveillance Requirement E. POSITION POTENTI0 METERS - R00 PAIR
- 1. Visual Inspection
- 2. Test
- 3. Replace based on service
- a. Number of shims
- b. Rod travel
- c. Anomalous indication
- d. Other service parameters F. LIMIT SWITCHES (2 each -slack cable, in, out, retract)
- 1. Visual Inspection
- 2. Test
- 3. Replace based on service 4
- a. Time in reactor
- b. Moisture
- c. Anomalous behavior i
[ g t
- 5 G. ORIFICE DRIVE MOTOR ASSEMBLY
- 1. Visual
- 2. Bench Test
- 3. . Clean and lube (dry)
- 4. Replace support nut H. ORIFICE DRIVE LEAD SCREW ,
- 1. Visual - as found
- 2. Clean physical
- 3. Dye Penetrant testing
- 4. Lubricate and exercise I. LOWER SEAL
- 1. Visual
- 2. Clean physical, wipe
- 3. Clean - body housing J. PRIMARY SEAL - 600 ASSEMBLY
- 1. Visual - both surfaces
- 2. Clean - wipe
- 3. Clean - mating surface, penetration and 600 Assembly
- 4. Lifetime evaluation possible replacement K. PRIMARY SEAL - 200 ASSEMBLY
- 1. Visual
- 2. Clean - wipe
- 3. Clean - mating surface- !
i
- 4. Lifetime evaluation possible replacement j l
L. CHECK VALVES - (RSD, CRDOA Purge)
- 1. Visual l
.2. Test 1
o
- 1. As determined by observed elevated / abnormal housing temperatures N. ORIFICE MOTOR PLATE SEALS
- 1. Visual
- 2. Clean - wipe '
O. WINDOW SEALS
- 1. Visual
- 2. Clean - wipe
- 3. Gasket material - evaluate for lifetime P. MCC CAPACITORS
- 1. Test
- 2. Shelf life / service life evaluation Q. ELECTRICAL - POWER
- 1. Megger shim motor (test insulation deterioration)
- 2. Bench test shim motor (load capability) i
- 3. Megger brake windings (test insulation deterioration)
Bench test brake solenoid (load capability) 4.
- 5. Bench test stepping motor (load capability)
R. ELECTRICAL - INDICATION
- 1. In/Out Limit Switch Function - test redundancy when made up
- 2. Slack Cable - test redundancy when made up
- 3. Full retract - N/A - normally not both made up S. BOLTS - EXPOSED TO PRIMARY COOLANT
- 1. Visual on selected bolts
% 5
T. ABSORBER STRINGS
- 1. Visual
- 2. Lifetime evaluation possible replacement
- 3. Shock absorber only replacement IV. PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE (PDM) PROGRAM A. SHIM MOTOR / BRAKE ASSEMBLY AND GEAR TRAIN ,
- 1. Wattage - outward shims - as found/as left t inward shims - as found/as left t
- 2. Back-EMF voltages -
during scram (and/or equivalent) - as found/as left
- 3. Delivered torque at motor - as found/as left
- a. After CRD removed from PCRV during PM
- b. Static - complete rotation, both directions
- 4. Scram times (SR 5.1.la-A)
, a. Gross performance parameter (really monitors motor variation if done with constant capacitances)
- 5. Rod drop rate (SR 5.1.lb-M)
- a. More sensitive than Item 4., but less than Item 2.
- 6. Torque to rotate motor / brake assembly - as found/as left
! a. Removed from -CRDOA (hence reflects motor bearings only)
- b. Static - complete rotation i
J
, ..n- r - , , - ,
ATTACHMENT 4
' ~4*
- TO P-85040 FORT ST. VRAIN STATION CONTROL ROD DRIVE AND ORIFICING ASSEMBLY REFURBISHMENT PROGRAM RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE HANDLING ANALYSIS .
T .
2 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 4
PREPARED BY: bdwc/rA.dcrtse
- Frederick J.'iorst Support Services Manager /
Radiation Protection Manager
.5 l
1
> Ow FORT ST. VRAIN STATION CONTROL ROD DRIVE AND ORIFICING ASSEMBLY REFUR8ISHMENT PROGRAM RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE HANDLING ANALYSIS Introduction The radioactive waste genera ted as a result of the Fort St.
Vrain Control Rod Drive Refurbishment Program will fall into two general types: relatively low activity, high volume waste such as anticontamination clothing, ~
g loves, wipes, cleaning materials, reserve shutdown material, and the like; and relatively high activity, low volume waste including the control rod clevis bolts, cable and fittings, and control rod cables.
a The handling methods for each of the two waste types will differ and are described below.
Low Activity, High Volume Waste For the most part, 'this waste will be handled in accordance with existing plant procedures relative to collection, transport to
! the on-site compacting building, compaction, and staging prior to shipment off-site for disposal. At the current time, Fort St. Vrain does not have an approved low level waste disposal program satisfying 10CFR61 requirements. This was identified in NRC Inspection 83-28 as Open Item 04 and is being tracked as Corrective Action Request (CAR)84-005 by PSC. An approved program will be in place prior to shipment off-site for disposal. Currently the PSC Office of Executive Staff Assistant is evaluating via CAR 84-006 the Fort St. Vrain on-site waste staging facilities (NRC Inspection 83-28, Open Item 05) to determine an acceptable activity content for staging. At no time will the activity placed in the staging area exceed the acceptable quantity as determined in response to CAR 84-006.
Reserve shutdown material will be handled on a case-by-case basis to ensure proper handling and staging techniques are followed.
ATTACHMENT 5 l
.-. TO P.85040 FORT ST. VRAIN STATION CONTROL R00 DRIVE AND ORIFICING ASSEMBLY INTERIM SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PREPARED 8Y: -
o//
Charl'es~H. Fuller Station Manager
-e r
- s um id: 1 .r.. n
Elements of Test for Partially Inserted Rods
- 1. Obtain analog and digital position.
- 2. Verify " Rod Out", " Rod In", and " Slack Cable" lights are not lit.
'3. During the drop, obtain back EMF data.
- 4. Obtain analog and digital position.
- 5. Withdraw the rod to its previous position.
- 6. Obtain analog and digital position.
Elements of Test for Fully Inserted Control Rods
- 1. Obtain analog and digital position.
- 2. Verify " Rod In" light on; verify " Rod Out" and " Slack Cable" lights off.
Elements of the Test for all Control Rods
- 1. Obtain CRD motor temperatures.
- 2. Obtain purge flaw if installation on individual rods can be achieved pr or to startup.
- 3. Verify that to " Slack Cable" lights are lit.
Discussion The obtaining ard comparison of analog and digital position indication confi rms the sati sfactory operation of the associated potentiemeters. The acceptable deviation between the indication will be 10" which is well within the
- deviation assumed in the FSAR for different control rods within a group (2 + 1 foot per Fage 3.6-19, Page 7.2-9, and Section 7.2.2.1). Deviations greater than 10" will be resolved by calibration if possible, or comparison with operable position switch indication. If this is not successful appropriate corrective action will be taken to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications.
4 A rod drop of approximately 10" is performed by deenergizing the control rod brake for a specified time. This portion of the test confirms that the brake assembly is operating properly, and that deenergi:ation (such as during a scram) will in fact result in brake release. .
Quarterly Surveillance Objective - To supplement information obtained on the weekly surveillance; to verify redundancy of selected control rod position limit switches.
Methodology - Check redundancy.
Elements of Test for Fully Withdrawn Rods
- 1. Determine which of the two redundant " Rod Out" limit switches has actuated.
- 2. Bypass this switch to allow further rod withdrawal.
- 3. Withdraw the rod further until the second switch actuates.
- 4. Confirm operation of rod motor deenergization interlock with second switch actuation.
f 5. Return rod to original position and remove bypass.
, Elements of Test for Partially Inserted Rods Not Applicable - Partially inserted rods will not have " Rod In", " Rod Out", or " Slack Cable" lights lit. Weekly 4
surveillance will compare analog and digital indication.
Elements of Test for Fully Inserted Rods i Not Applicable - Technical Specifications prohibit the withdrawal of these control rods out of sequence. Such I withdrawal would be necessary to confirm limit switch redundancy. The weekly surveillance will compare analog and digital indication, and that the control rod " Rod In" light is lit. Fully inserted rods are already performing their design function.
l
- -