ML20215H610
| ML20215H610 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1987 |
| From: | PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215H588 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 PROC-870410-01, NUDOCS 8704200448 | |
| Download: ML20215H610 (32) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ M. c i l l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station PROGRAM PLAN FOR THE INTEGRATED VALIDATION OF NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES I B704200448 870410 PDR ADOCK 05000267 PDR p
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t l TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND PURPOSE .. . . .. ... ...... .. . 1 2.0 OVERVIEW ..... .... ....... .. ... . . .... 2 2.1 FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE ... ... . .. . ... .. . ... 2 2.2 OBJECTIVES .. .... ... . . .. ........... .. 2 2.2.1 Emergency Operating Procedures ............ 2 2.2.2 Control Room Improvement Activities . . .. . 2 2.2.3 Safety Parameter Display System ......... ... 3 2.3 PREREQUISITES ...... ....... ..... . .. ... . . 3 2.3.1 Emergency Operating Procedures . .......... 3 2.3.2 Control Rocm Improvement Activities .... ... 4 2.3.3 SPDS . ... . . . ... . . . ... ... 4 3.0 METHODOLOGY , .... .. . .... . . ... . .. 4 3.1 PLANNING . .. ...... ... .......... . .. 4 3.1.1 Scope . . ... . . . .. .. ... ...... 4 3.1.2 Resources . . ..... . .... . .... . .. . 4 3.1.3 Validation Method ... . ... .. ... . 6 3.1.4 Evaluation Criteria . . . . 6 3.2 PREPARATION .. . .. . ... .. .. 7 3.2.1 Developing Validation Scenarios ... .. 7 ( 3.2.2 Validation Work Sheets . 8 I l 1 3.2.3 Scheduling the Resources . . .... . 8 3.3 CONDUCTING THE WALK-THROUGH TALK-THROUGHS 9 3.3.1 Briefings .... .. .... . . . ... 9 3.3.2 Responsibilities and Assignments . 9 3.3.3 Execution ..... .. . ... .... . . .... 10
o 3.4 ASSESSMENT ......................................... 10 3.4.1 Debriefing ......... .. .................... 11 3.4.2 Evaluation .. ................... .......... 11 4.0 CORRECTION PHASE ................... ......... ........ .. 12 4.1 ACTION AREAS . .... ............. .................. 12 4.2 ADDITIONAL MEASURES ... .................... ...... 12 4.3 IMPLEMENTATION . ......... ......................... 13 4.3.1 Plant Changes .................... .......... 13 4.3.2 Approved Procedure Changes ............. ... 13 4.3.3 Unapproved Procedure Changes ........... ... 13 4.3.4 Training ................................... 13 4.3.5 Administrative Changes ........... .. 13 f 4.3.6 Additicnal Requirements ............. ...... 13 5.0 DOCUMENTATION ........... .. .. .. ... ................. 14 5.1 PURPOSE ...... . ... ... ......... .................. 14 5.2 CONTENT ........ . . . . ........ .................. 14 5.3 PACKAGE STRUCTURE . ... ... .......... .. .... ... 15
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND PURPOSE The Safety Parameter Display System (SPOS), Control Room Design Review (CROR), Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) upgrade are interrelated efforts designed to improve emergency response . capabilities. Regulatory requirements applicable to these activities are based in NUREG-0737 and NRC generic letter 82-33. The importance of integrating these activities was recognized during the initial _ planning phases by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), various industry sponsored groups, and Public Service Co of Colorado (PSCo). An excerpt from the text which describes the NRC's position is as follows: The design of the SPOS, design of instrument displays based on Regulatory Guide 1.97 guidance, CROR , development of function oriented E0Ps , and operating staff training should be integrated with retpe;t to the overall enhancement of operator ability to comprehend plant conditions and cope with emergencies. While NUREG-0737 doesn't contain requirements for a specific Verification and Validation Program, the requirement to verify the effectiveness of each change or addition is inherent in the specific requirements for each initiative. Figure 1 (extracted from PSC's CROR Program Plan) illustrates the interrelationship between the various NUREG-0737 initiatives and includes an " Integrated Verification and Validation" step. The need to verify and validate the changes resulting from each activity has been acknowledged repeatedly throughout the various program plans, and other related documentation. Each activity has completed some verification activities and defined or proposed criteria for an Integrated Validation effort. The purpose of this program plan is to describe the manner in which PSC intends to conduct the integrated validation of NUREG-0737 initiatives. Figure 2 shows the functional relationships between each initiative, the process by which these initiatives are integrated into the " System" and the
" System" to be validated.
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e. 2.0 OVERVIEW 2.1 ' FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE The purpose of the Integrated Validation Program is to evaluate the combined effectiveness of all NUREG-0737 initiatives to: (a) enable the operator to perform under emergency conditions'to accomplish the actions needed' to mitigate the consequences of an emergency (b) as a minimum, ensure that the operator's ability to perform under emergency conditions has not been degraded by the control room changes or additions. 2.2 OBJECTIVES The objective of the Integrated Validation Program is to evaluate the operational integration of the results of the following four (4) NUREG-0737 initiatives: i
- Control Room Design Review a Safety Parameter Display System
- Post-accident Monitoring Instrumentation
- Upgraded E0Ps Operational integration is the functioning of the system components as a unit to achieve the desired results.
The. program defined by this plan is comprdsed of the validation of component picts in an interrelated and integrated canner. These unique objectives are as follows: 2.2.1 Emergency Operating Procedures
- To determine whether the centrols and instruments identified during verification
! are, in fact, the centrols and instruments used by operators to accomplish procedural I objectives. I '
- To determine whether the language and
- content cf the procedures is compatible with the knowledge and training of Fort St. Vrain control room operators.
- To determine whether the procedures can be
- l esecuted in a timely manner by the minimum 1 shift staff and the minimum control room I
staf f required by Fort St. Vrain Technical
- Specifications.
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2.2.2 Control Room Improvement Activities
- To verify that the information required to determine that a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is being challenged, is in-fact available.
- To verify that the controls and instruments required to support operator actions in mitigating the consequences of challenges to CSFs are present.
- To verify that the operating staff is able to perform the operations necessary to mitigate the consequences of challenges to CSFs.
2.2.3 Safety Parameter Display System To verify that the SPDS provides a concise display of critical plant variables to control room operators to aid them in rapidly and reliably determining the safety status of the plant and in assessing whether abnormal conditions warrant corrective action. 2.3 PREREQUISITES The Integrated System Validation Program described by this plan is based on the prior satisfactory completion of all component verification activities. These verification activities shall have included, but are not limited to the following: 2.3.1 Emergency Operating Procedures
- Each procedure is technically correct, i.e.,eit accurately reflects either the existing procedure or the flowchart developed for a particular critical safety function.
- Each procedure is written correctly according to the Writer's Guide.
- The language and level of information presented are compatible with the qualifications, training, and experience of the range of individuals on the operating staff.
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- The information and control requirements embodied in each procedure are available from the displays and controls in the Fort St. Vrain control room.
2.3.2 Control Room Improvement Activities
- Evaluate the technical accuracy of each control room Improvement change and its .
interface in the Fort St.-Vrain control rec =. 2.3.3 SpDS
- Demonstrate SPOS conformance to the functional criteria of the SPOS Program plan.
3.0 METHODOLOGY 3.1 PLANNING The planning phase of the Integrated Validation Program is represented by this document. The activities which comprise this phase are as follows:
- defining the scope of the validation
- determining the required ref.ources a selecting validation method (s)
- determining the use of eva uation criteria 3.1.1 Scope The scope of this " Integrated Validation" includes tne machine (control room changes to date, including the SPDS and Reg Guide 1.97 instrumentation), the procedure, and training components. The training component is manifest through the operator's demonstrated ability to perform the required tasks.
3.1.2 Resources The required resources include:
- personnel
- equipment
- time The validation team shall include an individual from the procedure writing team, the SPDS Development team, the Control Room Improvement Group, a human factors specialist, a training specialist, and two control room operators.
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Of the two operators, at least one shall not have participated in the procedures writing effort. It is preferable that this operator be a full-time, on-the-boards operator. The second operator may be either a licensed operator or non-licensed individual, however, this individual must have received Licensed Operator Training. Note: A less technically experienced operator may orovide the best insight into the operational integration of the system. Although " seasoned" operators may be quite familiar with the system, they may not recognize flaws, deviations, or have the same problems as less experienced operators or non-licensed personnel. 1 i Additional personnel may be included in the i validation team as observers with specific assigned duties (see Attachment A). One member of the Validation team shall be i designated as the team leader. The duty of the l team leader is to coordinate and direct the walk-through talk-through briefings, execution, and assessment phases. Equipment resources include the control room and the control room mock-up. The control room mock-up includes a circulator control and SPDS simulator. The use of the actual control room may be restricted to the walk-through talk-through of l scenarios requiring equipment not present in the mock-up. I Note: The word scenario as used in this document refers to a particular order of postulated
- or actual events, system responses and L associated activities. For the purpose of I this document, a scenario may be
! considered to be either static or dynamic. l Time requirements will be dictated by the number l and complexity of the scenarios developed for j this validation. The remedial action to correct j any discrepancies identified will be noted and ne proposed corrective action factored into the wais-through talk-through activity. While the identification of discrepancies and the
- determination of corrective actions will extend the time requirements, the validation process l will not be unnecessarily delayed to fully implement any corrective measures.
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3.1.3 Validation Method The walk-through talk-through metnod shall be the primary method utilized. The SPOS simulator shall be the primary source of stimulus for operator actions. The circulator simulator section shall be used when applicable. A walk-through talk-through is a validation method whereby control room operators conduct a step-by-sten enactment of their actions during a scenario for an observer / review team without carrying out actual control functions. The walk-through talk-through method requires that applicable scenaries and a suitable format be developed prior to the actual validation activities. Scenario selection and format requirements are described in Sections 3.2.1 & 3.2.2. 3.1.4 Evaluation Criteria The goal of the evaluation is to determine that the procedures, plant and operator interfaces are compatible as a system and that operator actions would, under actual conditions, result in the appropriate and desired plant response. The determination of acceptable system response depends on compatible component interfaces and an acceptable response of these interfaces. Therefore, the system evaluation criteria for this Integrated Validation Program will consist of evaluation of the interfaces between each component part. The interfaces to be evaluated are:
- Procedures / Plant
- Procedures / Operator
- Operator / Plant
- Training / Plant
- Training / Operator
- Training / Procedures 3.2 PREPARATION The Preparation phase consists of the following activities:
*- developing validation scenarios
- developing validation worksheets
- scheduling the rescurces 3.2.1 Developing-Validation Scenarios Written descriptions of selected plant transients and/or equipment failures used to exercise the Emergency Response Capabilities System shall be prepared prior to conducting the walk-through talk-through activity. These written descriptions shall provide background, prerequisite conditions, and the proper sequence of realistic plant symptoms and responses. Each scenario shall guide the system through a designated evaluation path so evaluation criteria can be addressed. Individual scenarios may vary in length, complexity, and style, depending on the postulated transient.
The number of scenarios developed will depend upon the minimum required to exercise all emergency procedures through all optional paths. Background and prerequisite conditions shall be clearly and adequately described to provide the operater with a realistic mental picture of the system status. Scenarios shall be developed for logical progression of events based on the following symptoms:
- High Reactivity
- High Reactor Pressure
- High Primary Coolant Temperature
- Loss of Primary Coolant
- Loss of Secondary Coolant
- Loss of Secondary Coolant Flow
- High Radioactivity in Secondary Coolant
- High Area Radiation Indication A flow chart shall be generated for each selected-scenario. See Figure 3 for an example.
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.3.2.2 Validation Work Sheets Work sheets shall be developed which provide for tne documentation of. all pertinent validation activities. Sample forms are provided as Atta:hment C.
The following documentation shall be completed and retained for each validation scenario:
- Scenario Description
- Flow Chart
- Walk-through Talk-through Step Sequence Record
- Control Room Floor Plan
- Panel Board Elevation Maps
- Record of Debriefing Activities
- Deviation Description and Dispesition Record The scenario description and a Flow Chart for that scenario shall be generated prior to the walk-through talk-through activities.
The General Step and Information/ Control Needs columns of the " walk-through talk-through" Step Sequence Record shall be completed prior to the walk-through talk-through activities. The remaining columns of this form shall be used to record the initiating cues, the actual instruments and controls used by the operator (s), alarms, communications, and any operating aids required in accomplishing each step. Operator traffic and sight links shall be recorded on the control room floor plan. Instrument and control locations shall be recorded on the Panel Board Elevation Maps. Special forms are not required for Debriefing activities; however, these activities shall be summarized in an appropriate level of detail. Deviation Description and Disposition Records may be initiated at any time throughout the preparation, walk-through talk-through, and , Assessment activities. 3.2.3 Scheduling the Resources Scheduling the validation activities will depend on the completion of the control room changes, procedure generation, and training activities. _g_
Scheduling the walk-throuhh talk-through
= activities _will depend on the availability of the mock-up facility, personnel, and access to the control room.
Since the validation activities are contingent on the completion (or partial completion) of several interrelated- activities, a schedule will be developed and calendar dates determined at a later time. . The . Nuclear Engineering Department shall coordinate the personnel and resource scheduling with other departments. . 3.3 CONDUCTING THE WALK-THROUGH TALK-THROUGHS 3.3.1 Briefing The review team leader shall perform the following: 1
- review with the observer / review team the responsibilities of each member (See Attachment A for " Responsibilities of Validation Team Members" P
- clarify all questions concerning the use of procedures and forms
- review the overall objective and techniques of the walk-through with participating operators i e provide the operators with a copy of the
]; procedure to be used
- review the scenarios and any underlying
- assumptions about them a define which physical movements and l- actions require simulation i
a describe how plant symptoms will be simulated or otherwise presented to the operating staff i 3.3.2 Responsibilities and Assignments i Each team member is assigned the responsibilities of observing certain actions / items relative to the validation activities and may be required to , interact with the operating crew. J
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Each team member shall review the responsibilities assigned (see Attachment A) and the debriefing / observation guide (included as Attachment B) to ascertain the scope and nature of his (her) responsibilities. 3.3.3 Execution
- The mock-up facility shall be set up to-simulate the operating environment to the extent possible.
- All observer / review team members shall be stationed such that operator movements and actions are observable. Selected stations should be within normal audible range and shall not obstruct operator movements or actions.
- The operating staff shall assume their normal operating positions and duties.
This may include routine CSF monitoring.
- The team leader shall initiate (via the SPDS simulator) or verbally present the initiating symptom or event.
- The operating staff shall assess the postulated challenging event or symptom of such event and perform all actions that would be required under actual conditions to place the plant in a safe condition and assure public safety. Changes in plant conditions may be described to the operating staff to provide information required for effective assessment.
Team members shall observe operator actions and record all information relative to the assigned responsibility. Deviations and the type of deviation from the procedures shall be noted. See Attachment D for the deviation type. 3.4 ASSESSMENT The purpose of the Assessment phase is to assess the overall effectiveness of the integrated system to effectively respond to challenges to the CSFs. i
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3.4.1 . Debriefing , A debriefing shall be conducted immediately following the completion of each wal k-through. The purpose of such debriefing is to:
- Review all elements of the walk-through talk-through tt3t were not clearly and precisely enacted during the execution phase.
- Question the operator members of the team i to clarify any assessment, evaluation, or action taken during the execution phase.
- Present problems and discrepancies identified during assessment.
- Present explanation (s) of possible causes and potential solutions.
Evaluation 3.4.2 Following the debriefing, a determination of the < overall effectiveness of the integrated system to function in mitigating the consequences of challenges to the CSFs shall be made. The following evaluation criteria for each component must be satisfied in order to make the ' , determination that the integrated system
' functions in an effective way to maintain the plant in a safe configuration.
All deviations identified shall be evaluated to determine the resultant effects of any such deviations. The particular type of deviation shall be considered in assessing the effect on emergency operations. Deviations which are judged to adversely affect or have the potential of adversely affecting emergency activities shall be evaluated for resolution.
- Plant Evaluation Criteria
- Does the " operating" control room provide the informational presentations and control means to enable the operating staff to respond in a timely and correct manner to plcnt conditions that result in challenges to the CSFs?
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L - Does .the " operating" control room provide information presentations and control means to enable the operating staff to monitor and control post accident plant status?
- Procedures Evaluation Criteria
- Do the procedures correctly guide the operating staff to mitigate the consequences of challenges to the CSFs
'without regard- to any particular initiating event?
- SPDS Evaluation Criteria
- Does the SPDS provide sufficient information to enable the operating staff to correctly and expeditiously assess the status of CSFs?
- Operator Performance Evaluation Criteria
- Did the operator correctly assess the plant status, select the correct procedures, and perform the procedure steps in an effective and expeditious manner?
4.0. CORRECTION PHASE 4.1 ACTION AREAS Corrections required as a result of deviations judged to have an unfavorable effect on the system may include one or more of the following:
- Plant (SPDS, Control & Instrument in control room) changes
- E0P System structure or text changes
- Additional or revised training 4.2 ADDITIONAL MEASURES Other optional corrective measures include administrative control, staffing, communications, and operator aids.
4 4.3 CORRECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 4.3.1 Plant Changes Where the resolution of a problem requires changes to the plant, a Design Change Action Request will be initiated in accordance with administrative procedure G-3, Section 4.1 4.3.2 Approved Procedure Changes Where the resolution of a problem requires changes to an approved procedure, a Procedure Change request will be initiated in accordance with Administrative Procedure G-3, Section 4.2. 4.3.3 Unapproved Procedure Changes Procedures which are in the preparation (unapproved) phase will be revised to resolve procedural problems by the Procedures Generation Group. 4.3.4 Training If training is determined to be a suitable method of resolution, a General Services Action Request shall be initiated in accordance with administrative procedure G-3,~Section 4.4.
- 4.3.5 Administrative Changes Where. resolution of a problem requires administrative action (controls, staffing & etc),
inter-departmental memorandum shall be directed , to the station manager. The production of operator aids, if required, shall be requested by a General Services Action Request initiated in accordance with Administrative Procedure G-3, Section 4.4. 4.3.6 Additional Recuirements I The Integrated Systems Validation Team shall i determine if additional verification and i validaticn activities are required as a result of corrective actions. The team shall also determine tne extent of such verification and validation activities. It is anticipated that deviations required to accomplish the intent of a procedure will be made (and recorded) during the walk-throughs. Procedure changes resulting from these deviations are after-the-fact and do not require revalidation. Procedure changes which are determined to have- the potential of altering plant response shall be revalidated. All determinations made by the Integrated Systems Validation Team shall be recorded and included . with the documentation applicable to each scenario. 5.0 DOCUMENTATION Throughout the validation process, documents will be processed to record scenario sequences, task sequences, operator actions, informational needs, and the results of observations. 5.1 PURPOSE The - purpose of documenting all integrated systems i validation activities is as follows:
- To provide an auditable record of each activity, the results of each activity, and any required additional activities.
- To provide a historical record for referral purposes.
5.2 CONTENT All documentation shall be sufficient in content and detail to provide the following:
- A record of the scenarios developed for this validation
- The sequence of events comprising each scenario which shall include a time line l - The actions taken to place the plant in a safe i state
- Operator traffic and sight link patterns I
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- A record of all deviations from the applicable procedures
* -A' record:of each debriefing session
- A record of all Requested Corrective Actions
- A record of- all determinations made by the validation team 5.' 3 PACKAGE STRUCTURE
- Document packages shall be assembled for each scenario developed for the validation process.
A suitable table of contents shall be placed in the front of each documentation package. A title sheet shall be provided which shall identify the package by the scenario and the applicable Emergency Procedures.
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ATTACHMENT A RES90NSIBILITIES OF VALIDATION TEAM'MIRBERS
- 1. The Validation Team leader shall execute the following:
- review scenario (s) e conduct the briefing sessions as defined by section 3.2.1
- direct the walk thru-talk thrus e coordinate the efforts of operators and review team members-
- ask appropriate "what if" questions e record instrument and control numbers used by the operator, along with communications and other pertinent information
- note problems and discrepancies encountered by plant operators e conduct the debriefing and assessment activities 2, Operators shall perform the following:
- walk / talk-thru actions they would take during specific situations covered by the scenario (s)
- describe actions they are taking
- identify information sources used to take actions
= identify controls used to carry out actions, expected system response (s), how response (s) are detected, and action (s) to be taken if response (s) did not occur
- 3. The Procedures Generation activity representative shall perform the following:
- Observe the operator's use of the procedure (s) and determine the following:
Did-the operator select the correct procedure?
- Did the procedure enable the operator to place the plant into the correct mode?
Page 1 of 3
- 4. The ' Control Room Improvement activity representative shall perform the following:
- Observe the operator's use of the Instruments / Controls and determine the following:
plant parameter values are available and presented in a manner to support the operators selection of procedures, performance of procedure steps, and that the level of information presented enabled the operator to accomplish the required control action that the required controls are in-fact present, and that the operator is able to recognize the control and perform the required manipulation within the required time frame that all required Instruments / Controls are grouped and arranged to support the required control action that all labeling is clear, unambiguous and consistent with procedure steps
- 5. The Safety Parameter Display System activity representative shall perform the following:
- Observe the operators use of the safety parameter display system and determine the following:
that the displays provide an accurate real time simulation of plant status that the displays present plant status information in a manner that is clear and is readable by the operating staff from normal operating position that the information presented is understood by the operator and guides the operator to take the ' appropriate actions
- 6. The T raining Representative shall perform the following:
- Observe the operators actions and determine the following:
operators are able to assess correctly parameter values and take corrective action if required operator ( s) correctly perform the actions required to mitigate challenges to the Critical Safety Functions Page 2 of 3 '
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- operators are able to explain the basis for each action and the expected plant response
. 7. .The Human Factors Specialist shall perform the following:
i
- assist in developing validation scenarios ,
. +
- observe and assess system performance 5
- observe and assess the effectiveness and efficiency with which human activities are carried out
!
- observe and assess the human values characteristics of the operating environment.
i
- perform other assigned duties relative to the validation ,
, effort.
- 8. Observer No. I shall perform the following:
f a plot movement pattern of operators, using layout diagrams i
- track operator use of procedures j
- record discrepancies and problems encountered by operators *
- 9. Observer No. 2 shall accomplish the following:
- track sight link patterns of operators -
- record discrepancies and problems encountered by operators j
4
- record Instrument and Control locations l
I h i I l 1 l Page 3 of 3 ; I i i i
ATTACHMENT B DEBRIEFING /0BSERVATION GUIDE This guide lists questions that should be answered in assessing the six interfaces being evaluated as elements of the integrated system validation. I. PROCEDURES / PLANT A. Were the actions specified in the procedure performed in the designated sequence? B. Were alternate success paths found that are not included in the procedure? C. Were the procedure actions performed on the plant at or within the designated time intervals? D. Did the operator obtain the necessary information specified in the procedure from the plant instrumentation provided? E. Did the plant symotoms provide adequate information for the operator to select the applicable procedure? F. Did the operator have to use information or equipment not l specified in the procedures to accomplish the task? G. Could the operator use labeling, abbreviations, symbols, and location information provided in the procedures to find the needed equipment? H. Were the instrument responses (if under actual operational conditions) consistent with the parameter values stated in the procedure? I. Were the operators able to distinguish the Emergency Procedures from other procedures in the control room? J. Were the procedures physically compatible with the work situation (too bulky to hold, binding will not allow them to lay flat on work space, no place to lay the E0Ps down to use)? Page 1 of 4
I
I. PROCEDURE
S /0PERATOR A. Were the procedure instructions compatible with the shift manpower? B. Could the procedure action be performed by the operating shift? C. Did the procedures help coordinate the actions of the operating shift? D. Was the operating shift able to follow the designated action step sequences? E. Did the plant conditions allow the operator to follow the action step correctly? F. Was there sufficient information to perform the specified actions at each step? G. Were all* alternatives explicit at each decision point? H. Were the procedures missing information needed to manage the operating cordition? I. Were the contingency actions sufficient? J. Could the operator use title and numbers to find referenced or branched procedures? K. Was the E0P easy to read? L. Were the emphasized items noticed? M. Were the values on figures and tables read easily and accurately? N. Were caution and note statements complied with?
- 0. Was the organization of the procedures understood?
P. Was the procedure step complied with? Q. Was the step secuence(s) complied with? R. Could the operator find the particular step or set of steps when required?
- 5. Could the operator return to the procedure exit point without omitting steps when reouired?
Page 2 of 4
l . T. Could the operator enter the branched procedure at the correct point? U. Could the operator exit from a given procedure at the correct branch? III. OPERATOR / PLANT l A. Were particular annunciators or instruments that the l operator uses as cues adequate to indicate that a step l within a task should be expected? B. Were annunciators redundant? Does more than one alarm tell him the same information? C. Were controls reachable and displays readable for the l appropriate system panel? l l 0. Were the identification labels of instrumentation and controls sufficiently detailed to permit the operator to locate the panel and the particular control without l resorting to other documentation? l l E. Did indications exist to allow the operator to determine l that a step has been completed or that a condition has l cleared? Does this indication convey the information satisfactorily? l F. If the primary cues, controls, or indicators are not available, is there still some way to complete a given step? G. If it is necessary for the operator to take some action when a parameter reaches a particular value, is the instrument for that parameter accurate and readable to that value? P H. Were all instrument scales and ranges appropriate to the required reading precision? ; IV. TRAINING / PLANT A. Were all plant systems and equipment operated safely and correctly with the available controls and instrumentation?
- 8. Was any system or equipment operated incorrectly due to a ,
lack of understanding of a modification to that system or j equipment? ; C. Was prompt and proper action taken in response to ' annunciators? i Page 3 of 4
4 4
- 0. Was information misinterpreted from controls and instrumentation?
E. Were erroneous conclusions drawn from controls and instrumentation? V. TRAINING /0PERATOR A. Did one operator consistently direct the activities of the other operators? Are responsibilities designated among the operators? B. Did any verbal instruction between operators have to be repeated? C. Were any verbal instructions between operators not carried out? D. For orders that went from the control room to another station, does/did the other station
- 1. acknowledge the order
- 2. report when the order has been carried out E. Did an error occur due to deficiencies in
- 1. manpower planning and staffing
- 2. supervisory control and coordination
- 3. monitoring F. Did an error occur due to
- 1. failure to communicate or report information ,
- 2. operator workload being too high VI. TRAINING / PROCEDURES A. Was sufficient information available to perform the specified action at each step?
B. Were all alternatives explicit at each decision point? e C. Could the operator use labeling, abbreviations, symbols, and location information provided in the procedures to find the needed equipment? D. Were the procedures missing information needed to manage the operating condition? ; E. Were the contingency actions sufficient? F. Could the operator use title and numbers to find referenced I or branched procedures? i G. Did an error occur due to revisions in the procedure? Page 4 of 4
ATTACHMENT C SAMPLE FCRMS a _ __. -c., __ _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ - _ _ , - . _ _ _. _ . . . . - . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - . . - . _ _ .
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- FCRT ST. VRAIN a INTEGRATED VALICATICN WORKSHEET Scenario
Title:
Page of Entry Conditions: Symptors and/or Initiating Events: Scenario
Description:
4 participating Operators: Applicable Procedures: Assessment: (Use additional sneets if required) Were evaluation criteria satisfied? O Yes O No Were there deviations or discrepancies? Oyes O No
!s Corrective or Remedial action recuired? Cyes C No Brie'ly describe required Corrective or Remedial actions:
Rem rts : Reviewer / Observer cate Reviewer / Observer Oate seviewer/Ces e rver Oate 8eviewer/0eseev er Oate
ATTACHMENT D DEVIATION INDICATOR TYPES COMMISSION TYPE l Commission - a deviation that occurs either when the operator should not have performed an action but did, or should have performed an 4 action but performed the wrong one. (
- walks to incorrect area of control room on first try
- looks at incorrect display or looks in incorrect direction on first try l
- touches incorrect control on first try
- sets control to incorrect value on first try l
- performs an action not in the procedure
!
- selects wrong procedures
- selects too many procedures SEQUENCE TYPE a performs an action out of sequence OMISSION TYPE Omission - a deviation that occurs when the operator should have performed an action but did not
- fails to perform an action or step
- allows a limit to be exceeded
- fails to detect key signal
- fails to perform task within allotted time UNCERTAINTY
- has to interpolate from charts, graphs, etc.
- has to reread procedures
- takes excessive time to read procedures
- takes excessive time to complete action
- does not use procedures (when procedures are available)
- is tentative, confused
- cannot find key information in procedures}}