ML20099J451

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App R Evaluation:Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, Rept 1 Shutdown Model
ML20099J451
Person / Time
Site: Fort Saint Vrain Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/12/1984
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TERA CORP.
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References
DC-84-21, NUDOCS 8411290053
Download: ML20099J451 (190)


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APPEFOlX R EVALUATION -

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GEERATING STATION REPORT NO. I SHUTDOWN MODEL Submitted to Public Service of Colorado P. O. Box 840 O Denver, Colorado 80201 November 12, 1984 TENERA h CORPORATION 7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda Maryland 20814 301 654 8960 0 .- - -

DC-84-21 8411290053 841116 PDR ADOCK 05000267 F PDR

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TABLE OF CONTENTS O

l.0 OVERVIEW l.1 Background 1.2 Review Criteria 1.3 Review Methodology 1.4 Reporting I.S Scope of Report No. I 2.0 FIRE PROTECTION SHUTDOWN EVALUATIONS 2.1 Shutdown Model 2.2 Spurious Valve Operation 2.3 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 2.4 Control Rod Evaluations 2.S System Timing Require ments 2.6 HVAC Evaluations 3.0 MINIMUM REQUIRED FIRE PROTECTION SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS 3.1 Forced Circulation Cooldown 3.2 Alternate Cooling Method 4.0 SUBSEQUENT REPORTS APPENDIX A - Letter to NRC, August 17,1984, (Fire Protection Acceptance Criteria)

APPENDIX B - ACM Procedures O DC-84-21 i

l.0 OVERVIEW O i.i Bacug,oend Since the Browns Ferry Fire of 1975, NRC criteria and guidance relative to fire protection have been evolving. These criteria are principally embodied in BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A and in Appendix R to 10CFR Port 50. Additional guidance is contained in various Generic Letters, I&E Notices, and Staff Positions. In

! response to these criteria Public Service of Colorado performed a fire hazards analysis, plant shutdown evaluation and comparison to Regulatory guidance in 1978. Modifications at that time included improved fire suppression capability as well as provision of an Alternate Cooling Method (ACM) to assure shutdown of

, the piant independent of power sources and cabling in the three room complex of Fort St. Vrain. The evaluations performed at that time were principally aimed at responding to Browns Ferry experience as well as NRC criteria in BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A.

The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the degree of compliance with the i criteria of Appendix R, and in determining where additional modifications are O re9uired or exemption reauests shouid be pursued if odeseete protectroa is j deemed available. This report contains results of evaluations that have been l

performed; results of further evaluations will be contained in subsequent reports.

I j l.2 Review Criteria 4

Section lil.G of Appendix R provides criteria on separation and protection of plant shutdown components. Section Ill.L of Appendix R provides performance I criteria for the safe shutdown systems. The criteria of Ill.L are generally aimed l at water reactors (i.e., PWRs and BWRs), and are not completely applicable to a I gas cooled reactor such as Fort St. Vrain. Accordingly, specialized performance criteria have been developed for Fort St. Vrain in order to provide on equivalent l level of shutdown capability to that prescribed under Appendix R. In response to l concerns identified in a letter from the NRC of July 18,1984 (G-84257), Public j Service of Colorado provided fire protection acceptance criteria applicable to i

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Fort St. Vrain for both congested cable areas os well as noncongested cable m creas. These criteria are documented in a letter to the NRC of August 17, 1984 (P-84281). Congested cable arcos were defined as the Control Room,480 Volt Switchgear Room, Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room, and congested cable areas along the J and G walls. A copy of the August 17,1984 letter to the NRC is attached as Appendix A to this report. These criteria essentially call for a forced circulation cooldown capability for a fire in noncongested cobie areas, and shutdown with loss of forced circulation us!ng PCRV liner cooldown for a fire in congested areas. G The review of Fort St. Vrain as described in this report has been consistent with these criterio. Additional criterio used in the evaluation are consistent with those contained in various NRC guidance documents, such as consideration of loss of offsite power, not allowing equipment repairs for equipment that may be required within a short time period following a reactor scram, consideration of spurious volve operation, consistency with shutdown methods relied on for other design basis events, process monitoring instrumentation and consideration of i

support functions necessary to assure continued decay heat removal for a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time period, as well as capability to provide decay heat removal well beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

l.3 Review Methodology The systems philosophy at Fort St. Vrain is somewhat different from that used in water reactors. Fort St. Vrain provides numerous diverse systems that are capable of performing individual shutdown functions, rather than a single system with redundant trains. The Fort St. Vrain systems themselves include significant redundancy of components, in addition to the diverse methods available to accomplish shutdown functions. Because of this design approach for Fort St.

Vrain, it becomes extremely unlikely that a single fire con cause loss of all methods available to accomplish individual shutdown functions. Nonetheless, in order to assure that at least one method remains ovaliable and undamaged following a fire, and to demonstrate the degree of compliance with the separation and protection criteria of Ill.G of Appendix R, further evoluotions have been performed.

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Evaluations have been performed to identify the shutdown functions and system functions necessary in order to satisfy the performance criteria contained in Appendix A to this report. The evaluations also identify for each shutdown function a minimum of two redundant methods to accomplish that function.

From these, two sets of systems were identified as Fire Protection Shutdown Train A and Fire Protection Shutdown Train B. The necessary components for performing shutdown functions were identified. The Intent has been to identify the minimum set of components that are required in order to satisfy the review criteria described in Section 1.2 above.

l.4 Reporting The Fort St. Vrain Appendix R evoluotions have been subdivided into four major parts. Each portion will be documented in a separate report, and submitted in accordance with the following:

o Report No. I - Shutdown Model, November 17,1984.

o Report No. 2 - Electrical Reviews, December 17,1984.

o Report No. 3 - Fire Protection, January 17,1985.

o Report No. 4 - Exemptions / Modifications, February 17,1985.

l.5 Scope of Report No. l This first report describes the shutdown models that have been developed for Fort St. Vrain to demonstrate the capability to achieve safe shutdown under the criteria of Appendix R. The report identifies the minimum systems required, components, support functions, and process monitoring instrumentation. The result is a list of minimum required fire protection shutdown components using forced circulation (for noncongested cable area fires), and for shutdown using a PCRV liner cooldown (for congested cable area fires). This shutdown model provides a lead-in for subsequent evaluations to be addressed in later reports.

Where subsequent evaluations identify additional or alternative components that may be required, the later reports will include page changes to revise and update this first report.

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l The scope of subsequent reports is described in Section 4.0, O

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2.0 FIRE PROTECTION SHUTDOWN EVALUATIONS O This sectioa describes the varievs shetdo wa evaivatiees that were perform ed of Fort St. Vrain to identify the required shutdown systems and components that need to be considered in terms of the separation and protection requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G.

2.1 Shutdown Models Since at the NRC's request, the Public Service of Colorado letter dated August 17, 1984 to the NRC staff (Appendix A to this report) established separate safe shutdown performance requirements for congested cable areas and noncongested cable areas,it was necessary to establish two separate shutdown models for Fort St. Vrain. The intent of these shutdown models is to establish the safety subfunctions necessary to satisfy the performance goals of the August 17 letter, necessary systems to accomplish the safety subfunctions, and necessary components and support functions for systems to satisfy their performance requirements.

O 2.i.i Fo,ced Ci,c,iation Cooidown Summary of Evaluation:

The August 17, 1984 letter (Appendix A to this report) established performance goals for safe reactor shutdown and cooldown for a fire in noncongested cable areas. Including the reactivity control function, main-taining PCRV liner integrity and PCRV structural and pressure contain-ment integrity, reactor heat removal (maintaining forced circulation decay heat removal), process monitoring and supporting functions. These perfor-mance goals were converted into a set of safety functions and subfunctions as outlined in Figure 2.1-l. Systems necessary to support the safety subfunctions of Figure 2.1-1 were identified as reflected in Figures 2.1-2 thru 2.1-7. Collectively these figures summarize the shutdown model that is proposed to be relled on for forced circulation cooldown (i.e., fires in noncongested cable areas).

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~ _ _._. ,. . _. _ , _ . . . ., _. _ , _ _

The general method used in our fire protection shutdown model is water drive of a Helium circulator using either boosted fire water or a conden- j O e' avm e seerras *='er for circe'e'er iv8 rice'reo ema cooiims. >>eem generator cooling from a condensate pump or fire water, process monitor-ing to confirm that safety subfunctions are being accomplished and that systems are performing properly, and various support functions for accom-plishing the above.

Accident Analysis 14.4.2.1 of the FSAR (Revision I) justifies the adequacy of a condensate pump (1272%) for accomplishing water drive of a circulator, in addition to feeding a steam generator for steam generator cooling.

Accident Analysis 14.4.2.2 of the FSAR (Revision l) justifies the adequacy of boosted fire water for accomplishing water drive of a circulator. The FSAR occident analysis 14.4.2.1 also justifies ability of a firewater pump to cool a steam generator in addition to supplying water drive of a circulator. System description SD-21-2 defines required components for functioning of the bearing water system. Accident Analysis 14.4.2.1 of the FSAR (Revision l) stipulates the need to preserve reactor coolant system (RCS) helium inventory.

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The general methodology for performing the systems evaluations was to prepare marked-up flow diagrams for each of the identified systems in Figures 2.1-2 thru 2.1-7 that are relied on for fire protection shutdown, identify the components required in order for systems to sofisfactorily function, including valves that must be repositioned for proper systems performance, and define necessary support functions. Figures 2.1-8 thru 2.1-11 provide simplified flow diagrams of the principal process flows for accomplishing the forced circulation cooldown safety functions. Tables 2.l-l thru 2.l-7 were prepared to summarize the necessary fire protection shutdown components for each of these systems. Included are tables for necessary support functions. In addition other evaluations have been performed to address specific issues related to a shutdown model such as spurious volve operation, process monitoring, control rod evaluations, systems timing requirements, HVAC evaluations and primary system O DC-84-21 2-2 l

pressure boundary consideration. >ther sections of this report summarize the related evaluations that we e performed. The end result of these shutdown evaluations is a listing of minimum required fire protection shutdown components as contained in Section 3.0 of this report.

Primary System Pressure Boundary:

For a forced circulation cooldown of Fort St. Vrain, primary system integrity is important to assure that a fire will not cause loss of sufficient helium inventory such that the core heat removal function would not be satisfactorily accomplished. The accident analysis relied on for Fort St.

Vrain for shutdown under post fire conditions justifies a forced circulation cooldown following a 1-l/2 hour interruption of circulator operation; however, that accident analysis does not assume helium depressurization.

Accordingly, an evaluation was performed to identify potential pathways for loss of helium from the PCRV, and to determine the potential for a fire to cause inadvertent loss of helium through any of these flow paths.

All penetrations through the primary system boundary were identified and tabulated. An evaluation was then made for each primary system penetration and a conclusion stated regarding whether each primary system boundary penetration could be compromised, given a fire, such that on inadvertent depressurization with a loss of He would result.

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The following is a summary of the PCRV penetration evaluations:

O ^. Ton seod eenetrations

a. Refueling / Control-37 Individual penetrations The primary and secondary refueling / control pene-tration enclosures are built onto or in the refueling / control penetration liner. Further, both enclosures are not vulnerable to any fire exposure possibilities because of their coverage by steel and concrete. Therefore, a fire would not jeopardize these metal barrier seals. The check valve in the helium purge line is also built into the penetration and there are no vo:ves that could spuriously operate. The check valve prevents helium backflow.

A fire would not cause a loss of helium from the 37 refueling / control penetrations

b. Helium purification system and the helium pump down line The helium purification system penetration evalua-tion is identical to the evaluation of the 37 refueling / control penetrations.

One pathway that could lead to inadvertent helium p

s depressurization is through the pump down line.

When depressurization of the primary coolant system is required, the helium system pump down line (3"L2325-D32) is used to transfer helium cool-ant inventory to the helium storage system. This line is normally isolated from the primary system by motor actuated valves HV2311-2 and HV2312-2.

These valves are on a header that converges onto a single line with a normally closed motor valve HV2401. The pump down line feeds into the helium transfer compressor. Therefore, in order to violate the primary system integrity with a flow of helium out of the PCRV, two separate and valved isolation points would have to spuriously operate in series and the transfer compressor would have to also l

spuriously operate. This sequence of events is not considered to be a credible event.

Two separate ventilation system lines are taken directly off the pump down line, but are isolated from this line by normally closed manual valves I

V23271 and V23272. Given these closed valves, and the closed valves (HV2311-2, HV2312-2, and O DC-84-21 2-4

HV2401) pri:r to tha ventilation system take off line locotton, it is not considered credible that the primary system integrity would be compromised through this path.

k Based on the above, a fire would not cause a loss of helium from the two helium purification system penetrations, the helium purification pump down line, the ventilation system piping, or the storage system.

c. Access Some os for refueling penetration closures. A fire would not cause a loss of helium from the top head access penetration.

B. Bottom Head Penetrations o.

Steam Generator (NOTE: primary closure is within PCRV liner boundary.)

Since the primary closure is built within the PCRV

, penetration and the secondary closure is a welded plate on the liner, then fire effects would not cause o loss of helium, b.

i Helium Circulator Structure (NOTE: total of four penetrations).

l O Since there ore ne noris of these geneerotion assem-blies that would be spuriously operated or degraded because of fire, no helium leaks would result.

(NOTE: Helium circulator penetrations such as the buffer lines, static seal actuation system "O" Ring, and the circulator broke system were evo,luotad and found not to be o potential primary system leakage path.)

C. Sidewall Penetrations o.

i Instrumentation (NOTE: Total of 18 penetrations and all have primary and secondary closures that consists of welds, steel pipe, flanges and bolts, and are within the concrete of the PCRV.)

Since there are no leak paths through volves on the .

instrument lines or other penetrations, no leakage of helium would result because of a fire.

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b. Safety Volves Since a steel tank encloses safety valves and rupture

]- discs, there are no external valves or combustible gosket materials that could degrade given a fire, and the primary boundary is steel (as is the second-ory boundary), no loss of helium would result given a fire event. Additionally, the safety volves are not remotely operated.

2.1.2 Alternate Cooling Method Public Service hcs provided on alternate cooling method based on a design basis occident addressed in the FSAR (Reference DBA-1, FSAR Appendix D). This alternate cooling method will be relied on for demonstrating capability to achieve shutdown given fires in congested cable areas. The August 17, 1984 letter to the NRC (Appendix A to this report) detailed performance goals for achieving shutdown for a fire in a congested cable creo. These performance goals include the reactivity control function, helium depressurization, PCRV liner cooling, process monitoring, and support functions for the above.

O The Fort St. vrota oiteraate coeiras method (ACM) hos been described ia various previous submittals to the NRC, and has been approved through NRC Safety Evaluation Reports. The following summarize the ACM submittals:

o Letter PSC to NRC; January 19,1976 (P-76006);

Fort St. Vrain, Alternate Cooling Method.

o Letter NRC to PSC; June 2S,1976 (C-76049); ACM and lACM Additional Information Request.

o Amendment No.14, with SER, to Focility Operating License DPR-34 (C-76046).

o Amendment No.18, with SER, to Facility Operating License DPR-34 (G-77076).

o Letter NRC to PSC, June 6,1979 (G-79103); SER and License Amendment No. 21 (ACM opproval).

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l o Amendment No. 22, with SER, to Facility Operating License DPR-34 (G-80139).

O Figure 2.l-12 has been prepared to summarize the ACM shutdown model.

Figure 2.1-13 illustrates the ACM interrelationships for the various plant systems that form a part of the ACM. Table 2.1-8 provides additional information pertaining to miscellaneous supplemental components required in order to support ACM operation. Equipment startup, operation, volve alignments, and performance monitoring are described in several Public Service Company procedures. Appendix B to this report contains portions of selected procedures related to the ACM illustrating the step by step controls available when operating under this system.

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TABLE 2.1-1 (Sheet I of 2)

Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref P&lD's 1. PI 21-4 4. Pt 216 System: Bearing Water to Loop i

2. PI 21-5 S. PI 31-2 Function: Circulator Bearing Lubrication and Cooling, D2.1 3. Pt 21-7 6 Beoring F.P.

Water PI-21-4 Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Cornponent

  • Train Power Manual PI's and Source Coolina HVAC Sensors Operations (Power) Notes Beoring Water A NA Fire NA Surge Tank NA NA Control Monitor 1.

Water Room LI 21135 -

T-2104 PVmp (Start and stop emergency P-4501-S makeup pump P-2106 based on LI-21135).

Brg. Wtr. Pump A AC T-2104 NA NA HS 2131-2 I-02 Stari from I.

P-2101 (See Table control room (Any 2 of 3 in series).

2.1-5)

Brg. Wtr. Pump A AC T-2104 TM See P-2l06 HS 21312 1-02 1. (Any 2 of 3 (See Table Section Control 2.5-5) 2.6 in Series)

Room Heat Exchanger A NA T-2l04 Service NA E-2104 NA NA NA 2. (One of Water (Table 2 Coolers) 2.1-6)

High Pressure A NA He Side NA NA NA NA NA SeparatorIA of Bearing 3.

T-2l06 i

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TABLE 2.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Cose: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref P&lD's 1. Pl 21-4 4. PI 21-6 System: Bearing Water to Loop I 2. Pt 21-5 S. PI 31-2 4

Furstion: Circulator Bearing Lobrication and Cooling, D2.I 3. PI 21-7 6.

Bearing F.P. Actuation Control Water PI-21-4 Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Component

  • Manual PI's and Train Power Source Coolina HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Emergency Brg. A AC T-3102 NA NA HS-21394 Control Control from 1.

, Water Mk-Up Pump (See Table P-2108 Room (1-02) HS-21394 i

2.l-5)

Volve A - -

Manual Local Open volve I.

V-211214 locally.

Condensate A - - - - -

Storage Tek S.

T-3102 Low Pressure A+B NA T-2104 NA NA NA NA NA Separator T-2ill 4.

C-2101 Bearing Water A AC T-2111 See Start pump Control Removal Pump P-2l04 Start from 4.

1 Section based on room (1-02) HS-21109 2.6 Ll-211iS.

Use HS-21109 i

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TABLE 2.12(Sheet I of 2)

Cose: Fire in non-CCA oreo (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. Pt 21-4 4. Pt 21-6 System: Beoring Water to Loop 2

2. Pt 21-S S. PI 31-2 Ftmetion: Circulator Bearing Lthrication & Cooling, D2.2 3. Pl 21-9 6.

i Bearing Wtr. F.P.

PI-21-4 Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Component
  • Train Manual PI's and Power Source Cooling HVAC Sensors Operations (Power) Notes Bearing Water B NA Condensate NA Surge Tonk NA NA Monitor I. (Start and stop T-3IO2 T-2105 Ll-21136 makeup pump P-2105 based on LI-21136).

Brg. Wtr. Pump B AC T-2105 NA See P-2102 HS-2130-1 Control Start from 1. (Any 2 of 3 (See Toble Section 2.1-5) Room (1-02) control room in series).

2.6 Brg. Wtr. Pump B AC T-2l0S NA See P-2107 HS-2130-2 Control Stari from 1. (Any 2 of 3 (See Table Section 2.1-5) 2.6 Room (1-02) control room in series).

Heat Exchanger B NA T-2105 Service NA E-2l05 NA NA NA 2. (One of 2 Water (Table coolers).

2.1 6) i High Pressure B NA He side of NA Separator IC NA NA NA 3.

bearing T-2108 4

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l TABLE 2.1-2 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. PI 21-4 4. Pl 21-6 System: Bearing Water to Loop 2

2. Pl 21-5 5. PI 31-2 Function: Circulator Beoring Lubrication & Cooling, D2.2 3. Pl 21-9 6.

Bearing Wtr. F.P.

j PI-21-4 Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Component

  • Troin Power Source Manual PI's and Coolina HVAC Sensors to g Operations Notes

'; Condensate B NA Condensate NA NA Storage Tank NA NA NA 5.

T-3102 I

Bearing Water B AC T-3102 & Service NA Mokeup Pump HS-21331-C Control Stort pump l.

(See Table T-2lli Water Room from control P-2105 2.1-5)

(Tobre 2.1-6) room; HS-2131-C a

(1-02)

Valve V-211309 B Manual - - - -

Local Close 1.

i volve locally 1

Low Pressure A+B NA T-2105 NA NA NA NA Separator NA 4.

C-2103 T-21Ii Volve B Elect. o NA NA NA NA Open volve Open volve 4. (Need to 4 HV-21252-1 Pneumatic remotely, remotely, or protect capability or locally locally if to open volve, if possible, possible. or open locally).

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O O O TABLE 2.l-3 (Sheet I of 5)

Case: Fire in non-CCA oreo (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. PI 31-2 4. PI 21-6 7. PI 22-2 System Condensate Pumps 2. PI 31-S S. PI 21-7 Functlon: D1.4 and J.3; Drive Pelton Wheel of Circulotor 8. PI 32-1

3. PI 31-l 6. Pl 22-l 9. Pl S."

C-2101 and feed S/G B.-2201.

F.P. . Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Monuol PI's and Component

  • Train Power Source Coolina HVAC Sensors Operations (Power) Notes Pump P3106 A AC Condensole None See NA (Pump IC) Cont. Room Stari From 1.

(See Table Storage (Gland Seal Section HS-3131 Control Room 2.1-5) Tank H2O not 2.6 or required Decoy heat under abnormal i removal conditions, exchanger ref. SD-31, Pg.

E-4202 6 & 7.

Valve HV-3133-1 A MOV Local I.

De-energize and operofe localIy.

l (close volve)

Volve HV-3133-2 A MOV - - - -

Local De-energize 1.

and operate 2

localIy.

(open volve)

Valve V-31131 A,8 Monual -

Local Close Volve 2(D,4); Note l Valve V-3166 A,8 Manual -

Local Close Volve 2 Note i Volve V-31408 A, B Manual Local 2 tkte i Close Valve Volve V-211658 A Manual -

Local Close Valve 4 tbte i Volve V-21867 A Manual - -

Local Close Valve 4 Note i i

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TABLE 2.1-3 (Sheet 2 of 5)

Cose: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. PI 31-2 4. Pl 21-6 7. PI 22-2 System: Condensate Pumps 2. PI 31-5 5. PI 21-7 8. PI 32-1 Ftnction: DI.4 and J.3; Drive Pelton Wheel of Circulator 3. PI 31-1 6. Pt 22-1 9. P152 C-2101 and feed S/G B-2201.

F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and 3 Component

  • Train Power Source Cooling HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations tJotes Valve HV-2109-1 A Normolly - - - - Local Open Valve 5.

Air locally; de-energize Valve SV-2109 A Electro- - - - -

Local Open Valve 5.

' hydraulic locally; de-energize Valve HV-2109-2 A Norrnally - - - -

Local Open Valve 5.

Air locally; de-energize lonk T-2110 A, B - - - - - - -

4.

(Turbine H O

drain tank)2 i

Turbine H2O A AC T-2110 - See -

Control Start From 4.

l Removal Pump (See Table Section Room Handswitch (P-2103) 2.1-5) 2.6 HS-211I

, Valve LV-2il 14 A, B Inst. Air - - -

LC21114 Auto. -

4.

(See Table 2.1-7) s Valve V-21729 A Manual - - - -

Local Operate 4, Note 2 Valve Locally (Close)

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TABLE 2.l.3 (Sheet 3 of 5)

Case: Fire in non-CCA orea (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref P&lD's 1. PI 31-2 4. Pl 21-6 7. PI 22-2 System Condensate Pumps 2. PI 31-5 5. Pt 21-7 Function: DI.4 and J.33 Drive Pelton Wheel of Circulator 8. PI 32 1

3. Pl 31-1 6. PI 22-1 9. PI 52 C-2101 and feed S/G B-2201. "

F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and Component

_ Power Coolina Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Volve V-31904 A, B Marwal NA NA NA Manual Local Close Valve N.O. Gate 1.

i Valve V-31989 A, B Manual NA NA NA ' Manual Local Open Valve N.C. Gate I.

Volve V-31921 A, B Manual NA NA NA Manual Local Open Valve N.C. Gate 1.

Volve V-32109 A Manual NA NA NA Manual Local Open Volve N.C. Gate 1.

Valve V-3102 A Manual NA NA NA - -

Close Valve 1. N.O. Butterfly Valve V-32108 A Manual NA NA NA Manual Local Open Valve N.C. Gate 1.

Volve HV-2237 A Normally NA NA NA NA Local - Remove Power N.C. Globe 6.

AC (MOV) Manual and Open Valve Locally Volve FV-2205 A Normally NA NA NA NA l-49 Control Control through 6.

i electro- Room HS-2205 in hydraulle manual control position Valve V-75595 A Manual - - - -

Local Close Valve 7.

Valve HV-2223 A Normally P-3' 6 NA NA NA I-05 Control Close Volve 7.

electro- Room (if remove power 3

pneumatic can't control or protect H5 locally) control from control room, t

O O O TABLE 2.1-3 (Sheet 4 of 5) i Cose: Fire in non-CCA orea (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's I. Pl 31-2 4. Pl 21-6 7. Pt 22-2 System Condensate Pumps 2. PI 31-5 5. Pl 21-7 Fun tion: DI.4 and J.3; Drive Pelton Wheel of Circulator 8. PI 32-1

3. PI 31-1 6. Pl 22-1 9. Pl 52 C-2101 cod feed S/G B-2201.

1 F.P. Actuation Control l Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual Pl's and Component

  • P ,wer Source , (;olino HVAC Tro_in _ Sensors (Power) Operations Notes 1

i Volve PV-2229 A Normally P-3106 NA NA NA l-49 Control Open Volve 7.

electro- Rcom (if remove power pneumatic can't control or protect H5 locally) control from ,

control room.

l Volve V-22345 A Manual - -

Local Close Volve 7. N.O. Cate Volve V-5288 A Manual NA NA NA NA Local Open Volve 9. N.C. Cote l Volve V-5287 A Manual NA NA NA NA Local Close Volve 9. N.O. Cote Volv. V-5203 A Manual - -

Locol Close Volve 9. N.O. Gate Volve V-32308 A Manual NA NA NA NA Local Close Volve 8.

Volve HV-3220-6 A Electro- NA NA NA NA Local pneumatic Remove instr. 8.

l air and open I locally l Decoy Heat A,B - - - - -

Exchanger E-4202 8.

i j Volve V-32234 A Monual NA NA NA NA Local Close Volve 8.

. Volve LV-3250-2 A Normally NA NA NA NA Local Remove power 8. N.C. Globe AC (MOV) and throtile flow locally 4

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  • Components in flowpath required to function (operate) to ochieve the above system function.

Note la Close these volves to prevent dverting flow to functions not required for F.P. shutdown. i i

Note 2: Close valve to prevent excessive condensate to low pressure separator T-2111.

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O-4 I

TABLE 2.1-4 (Sheet I of 6)

-l Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. PI 45 6. PI 21-6 11. PI 42-1 a

System: Fire Water i 2. PI 31-2 7. PI 31-1 12. PI 32-1

' Function: DI.I and J.I: Bo sted Firewater to drive 3. PI 221 8. PI 22-6 13. PI 41-1 Pelton Wheel and Firewater for Steam 4. PI 21-9 9. Pt 22 7 14. Pt 75-2 Generator Cooling 5. Pt 21-5 f

10.Pt52 F.P.

Actuation Control i Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Component

  • Train Power Manual PI's and

] Source Coolino HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Storting Notes l Diesel Fire B Fuel Oil Main Engine and See Pump P450lS No. Auto. Local Local Start: Battery

! (Engine Cooling gear drive Section required I. Fuel tank F.O. Pumpi twr. basin; oil cooled Start from monitor f ..I can be

! 2.6 HS-4504-3 level and no other make-up from pump replenished i replenish as from .

components) pumps. discharge; necessary, sources on Table drain to 1.5-l.1 basin. site.

Fuel Oil Tank B - - - - - -

T-4503 - -

1.

j Volve V-4525 B Manual - -

Local Open Valve -

1.

Emergency H2O B AC (See - -

See -

Con'rol Stari from Booster Pump Table -

3.

P-2110 Section Room Control Room 2.4-5) 2.6 HS-21536 Valve V-211565 B' Manual - -

Local Close Valve -

3.

Volve V-2il573 B Manual - - - -

Local Open Valve -

3.

, Valve V-211570 B Manual - - - -

Local Open Volve -

3.

Valve HV-2110-1 B Normally - -

Asr Local Open Valve -

4.

Locally; de-energize i

DC-84-21 1

0 O O-TABLE 2.1-4 (Sheet 2 of 6)

Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. Pl 45 6. PI 21-6 l 1. Pi 42-1 System Fire Water

2. PI 31-2 7. Pl 31-1 12. Pl 32-1 Functiom Dl.1 and J.l; Boosted Firewater to drive 3. Pt 22-1 8. Pt 22-6 13. Pl 41-1 Pelton Wheel and Firewater for Steam 4. Pl 21-9 9. Pl 22-7 14. PI 75-2 Generator Cooling S. PI 21-5 10.Pl52 F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual Component e Train Power Source Pl's and Coolina HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Other Notes Valve SV-2il0 B Normally - - - -

Local Open Valve hydraulic 4.

Locally; de-energize Valve HV-2110-2 B Normally - -

Local Open Valve . -

4.

Air Locally; de-energize I

Tank T-2110 A+B - - - - - -

(Turbine H O 6.

Droin T

! Turbine H2O B AC (See T-2110 i

See Operate as Hand Sw. Start from Cland 6.

Removal Pump Table Sectien required (P-2l035) 2. l-5)

Control Rm. Controf Rm. Seal (Filter 2.6 based on and manual Tank T-2110 valves; norm, level. open)

Valve LV-21114 A, B inst. Air - - -

LC-21114 Auto - -

6.

Valve V-31904 A,8 Manual -

l Local Close Valve 2.

N.O. Cate Valve V-31919 A, 8 Manual - -

Local Open Valve 2.

N.C. Cote I Valve V-31921 A,8 Manual - - - -

Local Open Valve . 2.

b'.C. Gote Valve V-31101 A,8 Manual - - - -

Local Open Valve 2.

N.C. Cote Dc4 21 i

s

O O O-i J

TABLE 2.1-4 (Sheet 3 of 6)

Cose: Fire in non-CCA creo (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's I. PI 45 6. PI 21-6 11. PI 42-1 System: Fire Water Fmetion: DI.I and J.I Boosted 2. PI 31-2 7. P131-1 12. PI 32-1 t Firewater to drive 3. Pt 22-1 8. Pl 22-6 13. PI 41-1 Pelton Wheel and Firewater for Steam 4. Pl 21-9 9. Pt 22-7 14. PI 75-2 Cenerator Cooling 5. Pt 21-5 10.PI52 l F.P. Actuation Control l Shutdown Motive Water Equipment ed Location Manual Component

  • Train Power Source PI's and Coolino HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Other Notes Condensate Storage B - - -

Tank T-3101/T-3102 No. Action 14, 2 overflows and req'd. (Over-gravity drain to flow is oligned service water to service wir return sump. return sump.)

Service water - - - - - - -

return sump Required components for sump operation, up to branch line to main cooling tower are covered by the service water evoluotion table.

Volve HV-4221-1 B Motorized - - -

Local

)

Remove power -

13.

and throttle of tower Volve HV-4138-l B Motorized - - - -

Local Remove power -

13.

and close locally DC-84-21

s O O O 9

TABLE 2.1-4 (Sheet 4 of 6) 4' Cose: Fire in non-CCA orea (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref P&lD's I. PI 45 6. PI 21-6 11. PI 42-1 System: Fire Water Function: Dl.1 and J.lg Boosted Firewater to drive 2. PI 31-2 7. PI 31-i 12. P132-1

3. PI 22-1 8. PI 22-6 13. Pl 41-1 Pelton Wheel and Firewater for Steam 4. Pt 21-9 9. PI 22-7 Cenerator Cooling 14.Pt 75-2
5. PI 21-5 10.PI52 F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Component
  • Train Power Manual PI's and Source Coo!!nn HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Other Notes Valve HV-4138-2 B Motorized - - - -

Local Remove power -

13.

and close locally Main Cooling 8 Gravity - - - - -

Tower (Fon Not 13.

E-4103 Required)

Volve HV-31122 B Normally - -

AC Local Remove power -

N. C. Gate and manually 7 open valve Valve HV-2238 B Normally -

NA NA AC Control Rm. Remove power -

N. C. Globe (HS-2204) and open volve 8.

localIy Valve V-75610 B Manual - - - -

Local Close Valve -

9.

Volve HV-2224 B Electro NA NA NA 2-05 Control Close Valve pneumatic -

9.

Room Remove power Valve PV-2230 B Electro -

NA NA pneumatic Open Valve -

9 locally If possible, or protect controls to HS-2230 DC-84-21

- _~ _

o o O-l TABLE 2.1-4 (Sheet 5 of 6)

Cose: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. PI 45 6. PI 21-6 I1. PI 42-1 System: Fire Water

2. PI 31-2 7. Pl 31-1 12. P132-1 Function: Dl.1 and J.l; Boosted Firewater to drive 3. Pt 22-1 8. Pl 22-6
13. Pl 41-1 Felton Wheel and Firewater for Steam 4. PI 21-9 9. Pl 22-7 14. PI 75-2 Generofor Cooling 5. Pl 21-5 10.PI52 F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual Component
  • Train Power Source PI's and Coofino HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Other Notes Volve V-22346 B Manual - -

Local Close Volve -

9.

Valve V-5202 B Manual - -

Local Close Volve -

Volve V-5288 B Manual - NA NA Local Open Volve -

10.

Valve V-5287 8 Manual - - - -

Local Close Volve -

10.

Volve V-32308 B Manual -

NA NA Local Close Volve -

12.

Volve HV-3220-6 B Electro -

NA NA Locol isolate -

12.

pneumatic instr. air and open volve locally Decay Hera A, B NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 12.

Exchanger E-4202 Volve V-32234 8 Manual -

NA NA Local Close Volve -

12.

, Volve LV-3250-2 B Motorized - NA NA Local Remove power -

N.C. Globe and throttle valve Valve V-32108 8 Mar.uol -

NA NA -

Local Open Volve -

2.

N.C. Globe DC-84-21

1 4

d (Sheet 6 of 6)

  • Components in flowpath required to function (operate) to achieve the above system hmetion.

1 i;

1 I

r E

i 5

1 1

l i

i DC-84-21 l

l l

t l

I i

i I

I

O O O 2

TABLE 2.1-5 (Sheet I of 4)

Case: Fire in non-CCA arec (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's I. Pt 42-1 System: Diesel Generators I A,18, IC, & 1D 2. PI 92-2 Function: Essential AC to Various Components F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Component

  • Train Power Manual PI's and Source Coolina HVAC Sensors Operations (Power) Notes Diesel Fuel Oil A+B - - - - -

Storage Tonk - -

1.

T-9201 Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps:

P-920lX A AC (See -

See HS-9299 l-06 Table Section

1. (Hondswitches LS-92206-i+2 Local ossumed positioned for 2.1-5) 2.6 auto start)

P-920lSX B AC (See -

See HS-92100 l-06 4

Table Sectron I. (Hondswitcles LS-92207-l+2 Local ossumed positioned for 2.1-5) 2.6 auto stort)

Day Tonks:

T-9202X A - - - - - -

4 -

1.

T-9203X B - - - - - - -

1.

! Storting Air Receivers:

T-9204X A - - - - - - -

2.

T-9206X B - - - - - - -

2.

l DC-84-21

e Qm C~) -h v

TABLE 2.I-5 (Shoei 2 of 4)

Cose: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's I. PI 42-1 System: Diesel Generators I A, IB, IC, & lD 2. Pl 92-2 Function: Essential AC to Various Components F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and Component

  • Troin Power Source HVAC Coolino Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Air Start Solenoids:

HSV-92245 A 12SVDC - - -

Auto / Normal Remote / Manual 2. (DC Control per (See tktes) Local Control, os E-1207 & E-1208)

(See Notes) Required HSV-92247 A 12SVDC - - -

Auto / Normal Remote / Manual 2. (DC Control per (See Notes) Local Control, os E-1207 & E-1208)

(See Notes) Required HSV-92249 8 12SVDC - - -

Auto / Normal Remote / Manual 2. (DG Control per (See Notes) local Control, os E-1207 & E-1208)

(See Notes) Required HSV-9225i B 12SVDC - - -

Auto / Normal Remote / Manual 2. (DG Control per (See Notes) Local Control, os . E-1207 & E-1208)

(See Notes) Required Air Stori Motors:

M-92865 A Air from - - -

HSV-92245 See Above -

2 (See above) receiver i

j M-92867 A Air from - - -

HSV-92247 See Above -

2 (See above)

! receiver M-92869 8 Air from - - -

HSV-92249 See Above receiver 2 (See above)

M-92871 B Air from - - -

HSV-922SI See Above -

2 (See above) 4 receiver

DC-84-21

m O O,. U-TABLE 2.1-5 (Sheet 3 of 4) -

Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. PI 42-1 System: Diesel Generators I A, IB, IC, & ID 2. PI 92-2 Function: Essential AC to Various Components F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and Component

  • Train Power Source Cooling HVAC Sensors Operations (Power) Notes Diesel Engines:

1 A 0<-9203X) A Diesel - Service See See Notes See Notes Manual I. (See also E-1203 engine Water Section Control, as pgs t70 + 171) 2.6 required (See <bove)

IB M-9204X) A Diesel - Service See See Notes See Notes Manual 1. (See also E-1203 engine Water Section Control, as pgs 170 + 171) 2.6 required (See above)

IC tK-920SX) B Diesel -

Service See See Notes See Notes Manual 1. (See also E-1203

  • a9'ne Water Section Control, as . pgs 170 + 171) 2.6 required (See above)

ID 0<-9206X) B Diesel -

Service See See Notes See Notes Manual 1. (See also E-1203 engine Water Section Control, as pgs 170 + 171) 2.6 required (See above)

Generators:

l A 0<-9201) A Diesel - -

See See Notes See Notes Manual I (See also E-1203 engine Section Control, os pgs 170 + 171) 2.6 required IB 0<-9202) B Diesel - - See See Notes See Notes Manual I (See also E-1203 engine Section Control, os pgs 170 + 171) 2.6 required DC-8A-21

O l

(Sheet 4 of 4) l

  • Components in flowpath required to function (operate) to achieve the above system function.

1 i

4 i

a 1

4 l

l r

DC-84-21 l

7-o O O TABLE 2.l-6 (Sheet I of 12)

Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref P&lD's 1. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. PI 46-2 Systems Service Water Function: Component Cooling

2. Pl 4:-l S. Pl 75-3 8. Pl 46-4
3. Pl 42-2 6. PI 41-3 9. PI 46-10 F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual Pl4and Component
  • Train Power Source Coolina HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Service Water A AC (See Service Wtr. See Remote 1-06 Pumps Start 1.

Table Cooling Twr. Section Manual P-4201 2.1-5) Basin, make. 2.6 HS-4211-1 op from Cire. Wtr.

P-4202-S B AC (See Service Wtr. - See Remote 1-06 Start I.

Taule Cooling Twr. Section Manual 2.1-5) Basin, make. 2.6 HS-421 l-3 up from Cire. Wtr.

Cire. Water A AC (See Storage -

See HS-4102-1 Moke-up Pump 1-09 Stort 6. (Start and Table Ponds Section P4118-P 2. I-5 throttle flow at 2.6 V42131)

Valve V-41302 A - -

Manual Local Open 2.

(from Cire. Water make-up pumps)

Volve V4121 A - -

Manual Local Throttle 2. (To minimize (Cire. Water Make-w to Main potential flow to Cooling Tower) main cooling tower and ensure flow to S.W. pump pit.)

Valve V-41903P A - -

Manual Local Close 2.

Volve V-42131 A - - -

Manual Local (Make-up to S.W.

Open I. Position to pumps) maintoin S.W. pump pit level.

DC-84-21

O O O TABLE 2.1-4 (Sheet 2 of 12)

Cose: Fire in non-CCA areo (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's I. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. PI 46-2 i System: Service Water

2. PI 41-1 5. PI 75-3 8. PI 464 Fmetion: Component Cooling 3. PI 42-2 6. PI 4l-3 9. PI 46-10 -

F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and Component

  • Train Power Source Cooling HVAC Sensors (Powg] Operations . Notes i Volve V42124 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close 1.

(LCV 4218-1 isolation)

Valve V42130 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close 1.

(LCV 4218-3 isolation)

Volve V-4449 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close 1.

, (Domestic water 4

isolotion)

, Strainer F4201 A+B AC (See backwash - -

Manual Local Bockwosh (Dwl element) Table I. (See also SOP 42 via discharge strainer and strainer 2.1-5) Section 3.5) element select selection &

backwosh HS-4226 PDIS4226 Volve HV4257 A+B AC or - - -

Remote 1-06 De-energize and I. (Foils os is) N.O.

(non-essential Manual Manuol stust-off volve) Close Manually HS-4257 Auto close on LOP & TT Valve HV4225 A+B AC or - - -

HS-4225 l-06 De-energize (Decay heat removal 1.

Manual Close/Open exchanger shutoff) manuoly l DC-84-21 i

O O O I

TABLE 2.5-6 (Sheet 3 of 12)

Case: Fire in non-CCA crea (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref P&lD's I. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. PI 46-2 System Service Water 2. P141-1 S. PI 75-3 8. PI 46-4 Function: Component Cooling 3. PI 42-2 6. Pl 4l-3 9. PI 46-10 F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and Component

  • Train Power Source Coolino HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Service Water Return Pumps:

P-4203 A AC (See Service Wtr. - See HS-4201-1 1-06 Start 1. '

Table Return Sumps Section Auto Stort/

2.l 5) in T.B. 2.6 Stop LS-4208-l +2 P-4204S B AC (See Service Wtr. - See HS4201-3 Table 1-06 Start I.

Return Sumps Section LS-4208-1 + 2 2.1-5) in T.B. 2.6 i Valve LCV-4207 A+B Air (See - - -

Auto Auto / -

1. (Fails open)
(for service water Table LC-4207 Local (air) (See also PI 82-10) j return) 2.1-7)

Volve HV-4221-1 A+B AC or - - -

HS-4221 1-06 De-energize @ 1. - Flow to be (for service water Manual handwheel Local return to main MCC Close for balanced to maintain cooling tower) A Throttie flow level in S.W. pump pit.

for B Valve HV-4221-3 A+B AC or - - -

HS-4221 1-06 De-energize @ I. - Flow to be (for service water Manual handwheel Local MCC Open for balanced to maintain return to main cooling tower) A Throttie flow level in S.W. pump pit.

for B Valve V-4286 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close 1.

(S.W. Blowdown to Yard Drain)

DC-84-21

O O O t

TABLE 2.1-4 (Sheet 4 of 12) l Case Fire in non-CCA oreo (Forced Circulation Cooldown) flef P&ID's I. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. PI 46-2 System: Service Water 2. PI 41-1 S. PI 75-3 8. PI 46-4

Function: Component Cooling 3. PI 42-2 6. PI 41-3 9. PI 46-10 4

F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and Component

  • Train Power Source Cooling HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations ' Notes Service Water Remote 1-06 Cooling Tower Fons: Manual C-420lX A AC (See Locol Table HS-4231-1 Start I.

Local Manual 2.1-5) HS-4231-2 Auto Shut- Local off on High Vibration GS-4231 C-4202X B AC (See - - -

HS-4232-1 1-06 Start 1.

Table HS-4232-2 Local 2.1-5) GS-4231 Local Volve TCV 4267 A Air (See - - -

TIC-4267 Local for (DG IA Eng.

3,4 (foils open) (See Table TE-4267 Cooler) also PI 82-10 & E-1203

, 2.l-7) pages 170 + 171)

J or manual (pneumatic controls are local only).

Valve TCV 4268 A Similar to TCV 4267 Volve TCV 4269 B Similar to TCV 4267 Volve TCV 4270 B Similar to TCV 4267 l

DC-84-2 8

- . . . _ . . - _ . - . ~ - - - . -- _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _

o O O TABLE 2.1-6 (Sheet S of 12)

Case: Fire in non-CCA areo (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. PI 46-2 Systems Service Water

2. PI 41-1 S. PI 75-3 8. PI 46-4 Function: Component Cooling 3. PI 42-2 6. PI 41-3 9. PI 46-10 F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual Component
  • Train Power Source Cooling Pl's and HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Standby Generator Engine Coolers:

E-9201X A Diesel Service Service -

See Notes See Notes -

3. (Assume S.W. supplied engine Water Water (for eng. to all DG's)(See above side otso) circulation) 1' E-9202X A Diesel Service Service -

See Notes See Notes -

3. (Assume S.W. supplied engine Water Water (for eng. to oil DC's) (See above side otso) i circulation)

E-9203X B Diesel Service Service -

See Notes See Notes -

3. ( Assume S.W. supplied engine Water Water (for eng. to all DC's)(See oleve side otso) circulation)

E-9204X B Diesel Service Service -

See Notes See Notes -

3. (Assume S.W. supplied engine Water Water (for eng. to all DG's)(See above side otso) circulation)

DC-84-21

~

O O -

44 TABLE 2.1-4 (Sheet 6 of 12)

Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref P&lD's 1. PI 42-1 4. P142-3 7. PI 4'02 System: Service Water

2. Pl 41-1 Function: Componer.t Cooling 5. Pl 75-3 8. Pl 46-4 '
3. PI 42-2 6.' PI 41-3 9. PI 46-10 -

N F.P. Actuation i Control i Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual Component

  • Train Power Source Cooling PI's and HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Standby Generator Air Handling Units:

S-7539 A AC for ' Service Service i

. See Nctes See Notes -

3. (See also E-1203 fans (See Water Water Table pgs 170+171 & Pi 75-5) 2.l-5) (Assume both operating)

(see above)

S-7540 8 AC for Service Service See Notes See Notes -

3. (See also E-1203 fans (See Water Water Table pgs 170+171 & PI 75-5) 2.1-5) ( Assume both operating)

(see above)

Valve V-4214 A+B - - - -

Manual Local (for service air Close 4.

i compressor) C-8202 Valve V-4229 A+9 - -

Manual Local Close 3.

(for EHC Fluid Cooler E-5109X)

Valve V-4236 A+B - - -

Manual Local (for EHC Fluid close 3.

Cooler E-51095X) l l Valve V-42390 A+B - - - -

Manual Local l- (for heater drain Close 4.

I pump P-3201) l DC-84-21 l

l

O O O TABLE 2.1-6 (Sheet 7 of 12)

Case: Fire in non-CCA oreo (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. PI 46-2 System: See vice Wcter

2. PI 41-1 5. Pt 75-3 8. P146-4 Function: Cornponent Cooling 3. PI 42-2 6. PI 41-3 9. PI 46-10 F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual Component
  • Train Power Source PI's and 4

Coolina HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Volve V-4234 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close (for sample ecoling 4.

system and E-3304X air ejector discharge heat exchanger)

Volve V-42817 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close (for aux, boiler 3.

feed pumps)

Volve V-4256 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close (for BFP fube 3.

oil coolers E-3109X and E-31095X)

Valve V-4239 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close (for RFP Lube 3.

oil cooler E-3108X)

Volve V-4264 A+B . - - -

Manual Local Close (for 8FP Lube 3.

oil coolers E-3107X + E-31075X)

Volve V-42374 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close (for condensate 3.

pumps P-3104 and P-3105)

DC-84-21

O O O-TABLE 2.1-6 (Sheet 8 of 12)

Cose: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref P&lD's 1. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. Pl 46-2 System: Sarvice Water 2. PI 41-1 5. PI 75-3 8. Pi 46-4 q Funct;on: Component Cooling 3. PI 42-2 6. PI 41-3 9. PI 46-10 i

! F.P. Actuation Control l Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and

, Component

  • Train Power Source Cooling HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Volve V-4221 A - - - - Manual Local Open 4.

(for inst. Air Compressor C-8201)

Valve TCV-4234 A Air (See - - - TET-4234 Local - 4.

for C-8201) Table 2.1-7)

, Valve V-42394 B - - - - Manual Local Open 4.

(for Instr. Air Compressor C-8203)

Volve TCV-4274 B Air (See - - - TET-4274 Local -

4.

(for C-8203) Table 2.1-7)

Valve V-42397 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close 1.

(for HVAC Sys)

Volve V-75263 A+B - - - - Manual Local Close 5.

(for hot water heating system)

I i

DC-84-21 l

1

O O O TABLE 2.1-6 (Sheet 9 of 12)

Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's 1. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. PI 46-2 Systems Service Water

2. PI 41-1 S. PI 75-3 8. PI 46-4 Function: Componen' Cooling 3. Pl 42-2 6. PI 41-3 9. PI 46-10 F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equiprnent and Location Manual Component
  • Train Power Source Costing Pl's and HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Reactor Plant Cooling Water (Service Water Loop):

Bearing Water Coolers: ~

E-2104 A -

Service - -

i Water 7,8 (N. O. Manual Valves only)

E-2l05 0 -

Service - - -

Water 7, 8 (N. O. Manual Valves only)

Volve V-46614 A+B - - - -

Manual Local (for N 2recondenser Close 7 Chiller & Regen compressor containment tank) .

Volve V-46lS16 A+B - - - -

Manual Local (for backup bearing Close 8.

water coolers E-2101 & E-2106)

Valve V-46297 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Open for A (for Bearing Water 8. (Assure E-2104S cooler E-2104) Close for B valved out normally)

Valve V-46307 A+B - - - -

Manual Local (for bearing water Close for A 7. (Assure E-2l055 cooler E-2105) Open for B normally valved out)

Valve V-461536 A+B - - - - Manual Local (to HPU Oil Coolers) Close 8.

DC-84-21

O O O 1

TABLE 2.1-6 (Sheet 10 of 12)

Cose Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's I. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. PI 46-2 -

Systems Service Water 2. PI 41-1 5. P175-3 8. PI 464 Fts ction: Component Cooling 3. PI 42-2 6. Pl 4l-3 9. PI 46-10 F.P. Actuation Contrul Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and Component

  • Train Power Source Cooling HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Valve V461535 A+B - - - - Manual Loca Close 8.

(to H'u Oil Coolers)

Valve V461619 A+B - - - - Manual Local Close 8.

(to purif. cool.

water sys. HX's)

Valve V-461744 A+B - - - - Manual Local Close 7. l (for seal water coolers)

Valve V-46145 A+B - - - - Manual Local Close 7.

(cooling water Hx E-4601)

Valve V-46147 A+B - - - - Manual Local Close 7.

(Hx E-4603)

Valve V46146 A+B - - - - Manual Local Close 7.

(Hx E-4602)

Valve V46148 A+B - - - - Manual Local Close 7.

(Hx E4604)

Valve V46322 A+B - - - - Manual Local Close 9.

(for water chiller S-2109)

DC-84-21 l

O o o.d '

j TABLE 2.1-6 (Sheet ll of 12)

Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref P&ID's 1. PI 42-1 4. PI 42-3 7. Pl 46-2 System: Service Water

' 2. PI 41-1 5. PI 75-3 8. PI 46-4 Function: Component Cool;ng 3. PI 42-2 6. PI 41-3 9. PI 46-10 F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual Pl's and Component

  • Train Power Source Coolina HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Nctes Volve V-46483 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close 9.

(for water chiller S-21095)

Volve V-46326 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close 9.

(for water chiller

S-2110)

Volve V-46494 A+B - - - -

Manual Locol Close 9.

(for water chiller S-21105)

Valve V-461538 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close (for trap drain 9.

return pump P-7202)

Valve V-46342 A+B - - - -

Manual Local Close (for Helium Recovery 9 Compressor C-2107)

Valve V-46346 A+B - - - -

Monual Local Close (for Helium Recovery 9.

i Compressor C-21075)

, Valve V-461643 A+B - - - -

Manual Loco! Close i

(for Hetium Dryer 9. >

Unit S-2111)

DC-84-21

O O O L

(Sheet 12 of 12) i 1

l Components in flowpath required to function (operate) to achieve the above system function.

1 i

4 j

l 1 '

l

.]

v a

'i i

i I

i 1

4 DC-84-21

.i

(

TABLE 2.1-7(Sheet I of 3)

Case: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's I. PI 82-1 System: Instrument Air Function: Supply Air to Instrument Headers * * (Support to various F.P. Shutdown functions)

F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual Component e Train Power Source Cooling PI's and HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes

~

l Instrument Air Compressors:

C-8201 A AC (See -

Service -

HS-8211-2 1-06 Start 1.

Table 2.1-5) Water TS's & PS's Local -

See Table

, 2.1-6 C-8203 B AC (See Service HS-82il-l I-06 ~ Start 1.

' Table 2.1-5) Water TS's & PS's Local See Table 2.1-6 1

Instrument Air Compressor After-coolers:

E-820lX A - -

Service - - - -

j 1.

Water See Table i

2.1-6 E-8203X B - -

Service - - - -

1.

Water a

See Table 2.1-6 i

DC-84-21

{

o O O TABLE 2.1-7 (Sheet 2 of 3)

Cose: Fire in non-CCA area (Forced Circulation Cooldown) Ref PalD's I. PI 82-1 Systern: Instrument Air Function: Supply Air to Instrument Headers * * (Support to various F.P. Shutdown functions) ,

F.P. Actuation Control Shutdown Motive Water Equipment and Location Manual PI's and Component

  • Train Power Source Coolino HVAC Sensors (Power) Operations Notes Instrument Air Receivers:

T-8201 A - - - - - -

1.

T-8203 8 - - - - - - -

1.

Instrument Air Dryers:

S-8201 A NA - -

See Notes Local . Bypass if 1. (Dryer controls inovrable not required)

S-8202 B NA - - -

See Notes Local Bypass if I. (Dryer controls inoperable not required) l l

DC-84-21

O O <

i s

i

!, i

)

i (Sheet 3 of 3) i Components in flowpath required to function (operate) to achieve the above system function.

  • Note: Downstream of air supply, headers are open to components serviced.

Function of components serviced is analyzed in associated systems' tables. i 1

i i

i 1

i I

1 ,

i.

I t I

! i i

I t ,

i i

I

' t i

i t i

a r

! i l'

! l i ,

i t 4 i I

t DC-84-21 i i

4

l TABLE 2.1-8 MISCELLAEOUS ACM SUPPORT COMPOtENTS*

o Selected plant lighting powered by the ACM o Breathing air compressor o Battery for D/G startup and control functions o Firewater pump house louvers and exhaust fans o Firewater pump for fire fighting o Power to motor operated volves (2) o Diesel fuel oil supply pumps o Circulating water makeup pump to makeup to service water o Service water tower fan O

Major components that are in addition to items listed on Figure 2.1-12 O

DC-84-21 -l-

O O O I

i i

! SAFE SHUTDOWN FOLLOWING A FNE

, N NOP4CCA AREAS i

smw I j B.2a B.1x EL2h J

REACTIVITY DECAY MAT PCRV CONTROL REMOVAL NTEGRITY I , r a 6

' ' PCRV NTEGRITY AS5URED .

BY DECAY MAT REMOVAL '

APO AND suenmuu T T I I ua I I I ma I REACTOR PROCESS CORE EAT RCS COOLANT PROCESS SECOtOARY SHUTDOWN MoraTORING REMOVAL NVENTORY

! mot 4TORING hi If CONTD CONTO CONTO CONTD CONTO CONTO 1 FIG. FIG. FE FIC. FIG. FE

, 2.I-2 2.1-3 2.1-4 2.1-5 2.1 -6 2.1 -7 i

l i

NEYs (1) MAJOR CoasPOtENT/5YSTEM (D FIRE PROTECTION SitJTDOWN TRAN (g) (5) (5) (3 5HUTDOWN FUNCTION t N 5HUTDOWN COenPOPENTS Arc SLPPORT FLNCTION f TABLES l Tiil ITir (s) PERroRMANcE GOAL rROM sine I0I LTR TO NRC NOTE THAT itE SYSTEM MONITORNG i

H5ThuenENTATOON APO SL590RT FUNCTIONS AM ADDRESSED N OTTER TA81.E5 APO FIGURES I

i FIGURE 2.1-1 SHUTDOWN MODEL - NON-CONGESTED CABLE AREAS FORCED CIRCULATION COOLDOWN I.

,. _ _._m _ - _ _ _ _

O REACTOR SHUTDOWN SUBFUNCTION u

n SYSTEM REACTOR FUNCTIONS SCRAM W

u d

CONTROL RODS SYSTEMS AND CONTROL ROD DRIVE A&Bl SYSTEM l A O u SEe SECTiON 2..

MEY:

l (5) (5) gg) mi RIT (4)

(1) MAJOR COMPOPENT/5YSTEM Q) FIRE PROTECTION $HUTDOWN TRAN (3) $HUTDOWN FUNCTION (4) COMPOPENTS APO $UPPORT FUNCTION (5) PERFORMANCE COAL FROM 0/17/94 LTR TO NRC NOTE THAT TH $YSTEM MONITORNC

" " ^"

E SI o'O ETHER A8 $A E FIGURE 2.1-2 SHUTDOWN MODEL - NON-CONGESTED CABLE AREAS l FORCED CIRCULATION COOLDOWN

""^c' " 5""' ""

O y _, -- _ _ _ - - - - . _ - - - . - . - y_ _ . - - - , , . _ , . _ . _ _ ,y--_. _ . -

e , -

B.2.d d PROCESS r MONITORING OF

\ SUBFUNCTION REACTIVITY CONTROL U

h CONFIRM RX SUBCRITICAL 5

SYSTEM FUNCTIONS NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION OR h

O SYSTEMS WIDE RANGE WIDE RANGE N!-l 133-1 NI-I134-I Al lB.I Bl lB.2 U SEE SECTION 2.3 SEE SECTION 2.3 NEYs (l) MAJOR COMPOTNT/5Y$ TEM (5) (5) (2) FIRE PROTECTION SHUTDOWN TRAN (3) 5HUTDOWN FUNCTION (4) DOWN COMPO4NT$ MO $UPPORT FLNCTION g) (5) PERFORMANCE COAL FROM 8/l7/94 T ME A 5 Y ARE ADDRESSED N OTHR TABLES MO FIGURES FIGURE 2.1-3 SHUTDOWN MODEL - NON-CONGESTED CABLE AREAS Q FORCED CIRCULATION COOLDOWN PROCESS MONITORING OF REACTIVITY CONTROL

- vm::'

O I WORCED PRIM ARY COOLANT CIRCULATON OR I I PELIUM PfLlum CimCRATOR CIRCULATOR

$v11.m wtTM Sv1TEu wtTM STEAM DRIVE w ATER DRIVE SySTE u ruNef.0,4 TMS OPTION NOT RE6 v T. D I

w A,,R _ ,E.R- . ATER PELTON w>f EL FORLLE C ON W g TOT OR OR t

n i I I I I I FipE WATER COFOE>4 ATE AcAr. BolLER CO*CEksATE BE A* LNG $E ARING PUMP CIE5EU Pump O FEED PVW Pump #C "

  • m en , m n su ,, m m m ,n m YASLE Eld TASd 2.13 TAsd Ll.1 T Aad 2.12 emf *CENCy Thel TMS tyRg, w ATER Ewt RQNcy w& TE R OpfloN OPTION pggovAg R gE ARING W&TER

= 8005tER PUw = Pump = m AKEUP puu8 = "'"I'CU"'U"*

TABLE 2.44 ON ON TABLE 2.13 YASLE LI.I T ASd 2.l.2 Syl' EMS TUlese WATER EMERCENCy gpyicg gggyggg rem 0 VAL W gj,MIOR " ** "

, A m m TA8d Ll4 TASM Lt.5 T ASLE 2.14 TABLE 3.14

$EevtCE w&TER

  • EmERQ Ncy gmE RCE Ney 4TU4NPump OstWL Det 5E L

" II gig m QPE N AT@ m Gh(RATOR 7And Lld 7ASLE 2.l.5 7Aatt 2.15 O(5E L QPE RA TOR "'

gE ARINC WATER TAatf 2.1.5 tot mJam comptsewtsysite removal PUw (B FUE Im0ftCTitre M/TCm Trace q p (9 M/FDDEN W Os TASLE 2.1 1 fu compoeWF5 are esotut? Ftecture

. 9.- m , .,,,.

De =N a ase 9 9 acre AIEWunKD fe Of4 R tas613 are eacLaul FIGURE 2.1-4 SHUTDOWN MODEL - NON-CONGESTED CABLE AREAS O FORCED CIRCULATION COOLDOWN CORE NAT REMOVAL

O RCS COOLANT SUBFUNCTION INVENTORY U

n SYSTEM RCS FUNCTIONS ISOLATION IT u

h RCS PRESSURE SYSTEMS BOUNDARY A&Bl lE O u See SECTiON 2.i m.

(5) (5) gg3 (2)l IIII to (1) MAJOR COMPOENT/$YSTEM (2) FIRE PROTECTION SHUTDOWN TRAN

0) $HUTDOWN FUNCTION (4) WN COMP 0ENTS APO suPORT FINCTION

($1 PErtFORMANCE COAL FROM 8/l7/94 INSTR W A APO $UPP T ARE ADDRESSED N OTER TABLES APO FIGURES FIGURE 2.1-5 SHUTDOWN MODEL - NON-CONGESTED CABLE AREAS FORCED CIRCULATION COOLDOWN RCS COOLANT INVENTORY O

o O O

EL2A Pfifw115 escraICHINC F Opt [tet I

l COPEaftaa CODE et Ai FEanOv4 gCorg y CMIRat te A r W R**$ NTE WTY G

SysTE as FLNCTKP6 I I CIRC 11 ATOR SK.FE FDwATER 5 PLED 5/C E Xli Pett sumer &

FLOW ItasP W V5 Teas #4 RA TUfE IF0fR- W I

o OR OR OR OH

,,,,,,,, I I I I I I I I C-214e SPEEO C-2803 $PttD Fas.2201-0 F aa-228 2-8 TA22:29 78-22122 5k2109 Ss-2fle EO(P I FLOu4 Ps. ales PI-I 400 EOOP 2 FLOu4 LOOP g ItasPJ LO(P 2 T[asPJ T ITI E U M G E E M G E T4A-6 474 IIA-8875 E' E feU T IIIT MCis0Pe 2.3 Mcisore 2.3 MCisON 2.3 SECISUN I.3 M CTION I.3 MCilONI.3 MCIKN 2.3 MCTION I.)

earn te tg des masanceercreNIATSIts 43 fDE PH03ECIKDeletNUouse Tittee it 94Atmome ttM tKee 4tp H COnftPeNFS AreSL8FoRIFlattsope is n .ee mi um ano enim pat as a so w seers AutsetMED DeOM A Ianstal APGf MADG$

FIGURE 2.1-6 SHUTDOWN MODEL - NON-CONGESTED CABLE AREAS FORCED CIRCULATlON COOLDOWN PROCESS MONITORING FOR Di-ft

O O O SECOtOARY T

StBFLNCTIONS gy it S/G COOLING SYSTEM FUNCTIOt6 7 it OR I I FIRE WATER AUX. BOILER COF M NSATE COFOENSATE FIRE WATER PUMP (DeESEL) FEED PUMP PUMP (IC) PUMP (ID) PUMP (MOTOR)

,o rrri rrr -

m m rw m rw IABLE 2.14 TABLE 2.13 5YSTEMS THIS EMERE NCY THIS TFt5 SERVICE WATER OPTION DIESEL OPTION OPTION

- RETURN PUMP NOT G MRATOR NOT NOT RE D D TABLE 2.14 TABLE 2.1-5 EMERCENCY SERVICE WATER DIESEL (TO OECAY FEAT G MRATOR REMOVAL XCHGR)

TABLE 2.15 TABLE 2.5-6 alEYs (g (9 m asAJOR COssPOPENT/W1 TEM

" (3 FIRE PROTECTION 94ADOWN TRAN (3 $HUTDocuM FINCT10H I M 9SADOquN COerGENTS APO $17 PORT FLNCTION w imaas (9 PERF0HasAHff COAL FROas 9/11/06 1 mar TA sa ter AfE ADDME55 D N OIPf ft IARLEl APO fICASEES FIGURE 2.1-7 SHUTDOWN MODEL - NOMONGESTED CABLE AREAS FORCED CIRCULATION COOLDOWN SECOtOARY NAT REMOVAL

2

= 400 GPM O L4202 DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EXCHANGER T-3101 COPO SERVICE STORAGE WATER TM 6* L3249-D21 580 CPM 296 PSIC CONDENSATE PUMP IC 1 P P 8" L3109-P!6 p,

CIRCULATOR C 2101 E m

=180

\

GPM 1 r B 2201 STEAM GEN.

O , ,

1 r T-2il0 TURBibE WATER DRAIN TAPM 1

f P-2103 TURBIPE WATER REMOVAL C

FIGURE 2.1-8 SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM O CONDENSATE PUMP FOR CIRCULATOR DRIVE

& S/G COOLING - TRAIN A 1

"^^^

DIESEL O p N

FIRE WATER BOOSTER PUMP I

l

_ _$a $

J g s C.2103/

M CIRCULATOR i dab MAIN COOLING ~ 1050 CPM TOWER E4103 8-2202 STEAM 1 P CEN T.2110 TUR8IPE WA TER ORAIN TAPM TURBIPE WATER REMOYAL PUMP M HV42211 TO SERVICE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EXCHANGER r P-21035 WATER COOLING 1 TOWER E-4202 O re% vel.m w\e SERVICE WATER (NO FLOW REQUIRED) i r l

1 r T-3 SERVICE WATER

" 2 RETURN PUMP P42045 "d COND.

$TORACE TAPK$

7- -

^

M d.'. k SERYlCE WATER RETURNSUMP T4201 FIGURE 2.1-9 SIMPLIFIED Flow DIACRAM O Fine wArea Fon ciacut4Toa Daive a s/c cootinc TRAIN B

O O O t

i 8 FIRE PROTECTION l FIRE PROTECTION SHUTDOWN TRAIN A I SHUTDOWN TRAIN B I

1 8

I CIRCULATOR I CIRCULATOR C-2101 C 2103 HCN PRESSURE l MCH PMSSURE SEPARATOR SEPARATOR O T-2806  : C T-2808 C I

I wAfE 3 TO 28 CPM 1 I 3TO28 CPM y DEARING 1 I MARING W WATER pM V T-21ll LOW PRESSURE BEARitC N# SEPARATOR WATER COOLER COPOENSATE COOLER =

PUMPS / I E-2804 DEAERATOR (; 1TO28 &M E-2105

. , , e u , ,

P-2104 T-2104 SURG SURG

T-2805 COFOENSATE d

EMERG NCY TAFE5 BEARING < 6 BEARINC WATER WATER MAKEUP PUMP MAKEtP 5 TO 30 GPM P-2108 PUMP

( y , 1  ; )

P-2 "M P-2105 p,

P-2101 5TO30 CPM P-2807 m a MARM "I 5 BEARitC 4, WATER WATER PUwS pyy$

s O

! l

i

} l I

i a i

! FIGURE 2.1-10 j SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM i

BEARING WATER FOR CIRCULATORS l

i

O O O TO MAN =

HV-4221-1 (FIGURE 2.5 9) / RC. (MOV)

(T m OTTLE I. I I I AS REQUIRED) HV 4221-3 7 7 CIRC. WATra M (MOV) .

FAN C-4202X FAN C-420lX MAKE-UP PUMP a k 4 L

" (THROTTLE '

  • O" AS REQUIRED) 1 '

SERVICE WATER COOLING TOWER E-4201 = v 42138 (MAPAJAL)

' Tm OTTLE P-4202 P-4208 " (AS Rf OUIRED) 5l M L - . P-42025 eUMe5 . . .

a.6 J.6 s.6 o , , , ,

5250 CPM (I PUA@)

DECAY HEAT E- ) REMOVAL EXCHAPCER E-4202 OO Ra'"

HV-4225 (MOV) HV-4257 (MOV) 0+2290 CPM M M= mM M - TO NON-ESSENTIAL 4 4' '4 =

" SERVICE WATER FEADER (TmOTTLE AS REOUIRED) (CLOSED)

LCV E REACTOR PLANT 4207 COOLNG WATER ULONC (AOy) a SYSTEM - SERVICE SERVICE WATER a L WATER LOOP COMPOPENTS LOOP COMPOtENTS 1 F 1 ,

COMP.IDf DESCRIPTION M COMP. ID # DESCRIPTION g E-2l04 BEARING WATER 270 5-7539 DC. AIR HAtOLING LNT OR COOLER (FOR 5-7540 DG AIR HAFOLING UNIT l 340 2500 CPM I E-2105 OPE) E-920lx DG.EPCINE COOLER l

(FOR (1 PUMP) E-9202X DG. ENGitE COOLER I ore E-2108 BEARING WATER 4 E-9203X DC. ENGitE COOLER I DG) d L d L d L E-LP E-9204X DG. ENCitE COOLER P 4203 P4204 P 42045 C-8208 N5T. AIR COMP. 5 E-820lX INST. AIR COMP, AFTER COOLER

- - C-8203 N5T. AIR COMP. 5 E-8203X INST. AIR COMP. AFTER COOLER COtOENSATE STORACE l TAFES T-3108 & T-3107 Lk J.k J Jb OVERFLOW - 1050 CPM - TRAN B SEE FIGURE 2.19 2

SERvlCE WATER

"Ul0F FIGURE 2.1-1I SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

I I

I m,

I REACTmTY CONTROL ,

A APO T

I I I REACTOR PROCESS SHORT TERM 5HUTDOWN MONITORING (2 TO 10 HU)

NOTEI A

APO A

AND T T I I I I 2A M

[ g SYSTEM Mh[OR A

APO AAPO

' \.~ T T F 1 1 I NOTE is SECTION 2.3 JUSTIFE5 NOT MOURNG PROCESS MONITORNG OF MACTivlTY CONTROL. M C#E PCLIUM REACTOR PURFICATION BUILDING RG REACTC

$Y5 TEM EXHAUST SYSTEM i i

! REACTOR REACTOR HLIUM REACTC RANT BUILDNG PURIFICATION BUILDm

= COOLNG = SYSTEM . EXHAUI l

WATER EX W T HLlUM pm SYSTEA SYSTEM PRESSURE OPERATI I I PURFICJ ON W " PI-23162 h

ACM MACTOR mm DIE 5FL m, BUILONG CEt M TOR EXHAU5T FAN DAMPERS LIQUID mm NITROGEN SYSTEM

r. MLIUM

. == STCHACE

, SYSTEM I

/

ALTEM4 ATE COOLtc METH00 (SATrsrY 08-l BASES A

APO I

DECAY KAT PCRV REMOVAL P4TEGRITY PCRV P4TEGRITY ASSURED BY DECAY KAT RENVAL )

APO I

LOrc TERM (30 TO T2 HU)

A APO T

l l LDER PROCESS COOLPC MOP 4 TORTC

_ TI 6 APERTURE T CATID I I I I RADIAT ON C R WA SECOP ARY CfCRV N LE AT SYS TE M y,QTg P4TEGRITY R gE I I I I EX N T LPE R SERVICE LitJER STA N COOLPC COOLING WATER COOLRC RADIATION =

WATER PUMPS SYSTE M SYSTEM WATER ai OPERATION OPERATION TE RATURE g

, I I I I P144335 Pl4214 SERVICE pt4443 Pl421' Tl4429

.py g g. .

22' WATER 4 34 Tl4430 PI4204 Also Available On Aperture Card ACM DIESEL GEPERATOR FIGURE 2.1-12 SHUTDOWN MODEL CONCESTED CABLE AREAS (LOSS OF FORCED CIRCULATION)

SL/ ll ,% 00Sb-0

O O O

~

, , i + 1 l

m KLIUM m LIQUlO l PURIFICATION "

PURIFICATION NITROGEN

; C, SYSTEM SYSTEM 23  ; 25 47 RESERVE ,

SHUTDOWN -

j 12 l

d l' AUX.

SERVICE LOOPS g j WATER t LOOP 3 r i r i

REACTOR '

HELIUM PLANT PCRV STORAGE COOLING SYSTEM

, WATER -

l' 24 SYSTEM LINER M p COOLING LOOPS VENT STACK d L i r 3 g

l REACTOR

! BUILDING 1 r HVAC 4

ACM 73  ; PING-1 DIESEL VENT STACK ll SERVICE GENERATOR -

RADIATION MONITOR

! WATER m i, SYSTEM '

42 FIRE i WATER SYSTEM l 45 j

m SELECTED

PLANT CIRC. WATER LIGHTING

! SYSTEM ,

MAKE WATER BREA 1%

COMPRESSORS l m ACM DG AUXlLIARIES FIGURE 2.1-13 ACM SYSTEM INTERRELATIONSHIPS

2.2 Spurious Valve Operation U,,

Evoluotions of the forced circulation cooldown method were performed to identify potential spurious valves of concern. The evaluation identified valves in the designated flow path that are either normally closed or opened, and whose closure or continued closure could preclude accomplishing shutdown functions.

The evaluation also identified volves in branch lines to the flow path whose spurious opening could result in significant diversion of flow required for fire protection shutdown functions. Potential effects on system operation were determined as a result of spurious changing of valve position. Valves normally closed in the flow path or normally opened in branch lines were identified as part of the shutdown model evaluation to define necessary components for accom-plishing the shutdown function. Table 2.2-1 provides a summary of the spurious valve evaluation for forced circulation cooling. Potential spurious valves of concern with respect to the operation of the ACM will be addressed in Report No.2.

The spurious valves identified in Table 2.2-1 are considered potential spurious valves of concern. Electrical reviews to be addressed in Report No. 2 may result in justification for excluding certain of these volves from requiring protection with respect to fires, in some cases corrective actions may be taken to overcome the spurious operation. The evaluation of these valves will be completed as part of the electrical reviews addressed in Report No. 2, including possible mitigating actions.

O DC-84-21 2-8

TABLE 2.2-1 Spurious Valve Operation Q Forced Cireviction Cooling F.P. Potential System / Shutdown Spurious Potential Function Train Valve Effects Helium A HV-21191-l, thru Opening of either HV-21191-2 Circulator /D -4 and HV21203-1 or -4 with HV-21191-1 or -3 thru -4 (PI-21-1 l) would result in app!! cation of the He circulator static seal on C-2101. Similarly either HV-21203-2 or -4 opening with HV-21203-1 or

-3 closing would apply the circulator brake to C-2101.

8 HV-21192-1 thru Opening of either HV-21192-2

-4 and HV-21204-1 or -4 with closing of thru -4. (PI-21-14) HV-21192-1 or -3 would result in application of the He circulator static seal on C-2103. Similarly opening of HV-21204-2 or -4 with closing of either HV-21204-1 O or -3 would apply the He circulator broke for C-2l03.

Condensate /DI.4 A Valve HV31191 Terminate condensate (Pelton Wheel)-A (MOV) (PI-31-l) water to drive Boosted Fire- circulator C-2101.

water /DI.I (Pelton Wheel)-B A Valves HV2110-1, Could divert condensate SV-2110,and water to multiple HV2110-2. (Exclude) circulators; instead of (Simliarly for driving only circulator C-2101.

HV-2 i l6-1, SV-2116 (Exclude on basis of 3 and HV-2116-2, as spurious operations well as HV-2115-1, required for each set of SV-2i l5 and valves associated with a HV-2115-2) single circulator). -

B Valves HV-2116-1, Could divert condensate SV-2116,and water to multiple HV-2116-2 (Similarly circulators, instead of for valves HV-2ll5-l, driving only circulator C-2103.

SV-2115, and (Exclude on basis of 3 spurious HV-2115-2, as well as operations required for each HV-2109-1, SV-2109 set of valves associated Q

L and HV-2109-2). with a single circulator.)

(Exclude) l DC-84-21 .

l TABLE 2.2-1 Spurious Volve Operation p'd Forced Circulation Cooling l

(Continued)

)

I F.P. Potential System / Shutdown Spurious Potential Function Train Valve Effects A FV-220S Spurious closure could isolate condensate flow to S/G EES

(#2201).

8 FV-2206 Spurious closure could isolate firewater flow to S/G EES 4 (#2202).

A TV-2227-l Spurious closure could isolate thru -6 condensate flow to S/G EES

(#2201).

B TV-2228-1 Spurious closure could isolate thru -6 firewater flow to S/G EES

(#2202).

A, B Valves FV-2239 and Bypass condensate / firewater HV-2291 (MOV), to S/G reheater sect. in O ei-22-3; (Similarly for valves FV-2240 lieu of circulator water drive and S/G EES and HV-2290, (MOV), cooling. (Could isolate PI-22-8) instrument air to AOV's and manually close).

A Valve HV-2238 Bypass condensate to (MOV) (PI-22-6) S/G B-2202 EES sections in lieu of circulator C-2101 water drive. (De-energize MCC feeding MOV).

B Valve HV-2237 Could bypass firewater to (MOV) PI-22-6 S/G B-2101 EES sections in lieu of circulator C-2l03 water drive (De-energize MCC feeding MOV).

A+B Valve PV-21244-1 Could divert flow to (Exclude) He circulators C-2103 and C-2104, but requires three additional spurious valve operations to be a problem. Additionally valve opening could divert O

DC-84-21 .

, , . , , . - . . , . . , - - - - < - , , . . , , - - . . _ - - - - , , ,.,-..,.,m---

l TABLE 2.2-1 Spurisue Valve Operation g Forced Circulation Cooling V (Continued)

F.P. Potential System / Shutdown Sperious Potential Function Train Valve Effeets i

flow to emergency bearing water to helium circulator bearings; however, higher bearing water system pressure would not allow flow in this direction (PI-21-5 thru -10).

Also, volve opening could attempt to divert flow to bearing water surge tanks PI-21-4 and -5); however, higher surge tank pressure would prevent flow in this direction. (Exclude)

A+B Vaive PV-21243-1 Some as for PV-21244-1 (Exclude) (Could divert flow through I" line to He circulators C-2l01 and i.

Q C-2102). (Exclude)

B LCV-4501 Spurious opening could divert firewater flow to the firewater storage tank, and lead to overflow or overpressure of the fire-water tank.

B Various firewater Spurious opening of these deluge valves could result in diverting (Exclude) firewater flow.

(Spurious opening of these could be terminated well before firewater demands for safe shutdown.)

B LCV-4207 (Potential effects addressed (and other service under service water system water valves) elsewhere in this tobie.)

Condensate /J.3 A+B HV-3220-4 Could divert flow to main (S/G Cooling)-A (Exclude) condenser, but would require Firewriter/J.I two other spurious volve (S/G Cooling)-B operations. (HV-3220-3 and LCV-3217-l). Therefore O exciede.

DC-84-21 _ _

I TABLE 2.2-1 Spurious Valve Operation 7 Forced Circulation Cooling (V (Continued)

F.P. Potential System / Shutdown Spurious Potential Function Train Valve Effects A+B HV-3220-1 Could divert condensate to main condenser. (Isolate air supply and close locally).

A+B HV-3250 and Spurious opening of both LCV-3218 could divert condensate flow to the condenser. Opening of LCV-3218 could divert flow to pre-flash tanks.

(Close volve V-32102)

Bearing Water / A Valve HV 21185 Spurious closing of these D2.1 and D2.2 B Valve HV 21186 could terminate bearing water flow to the associated circulator.

A Valve HV 2187-l Spurious operation of these O B Valve HV 2188-l could terminate bearing water flow to the associated circu-lator.

A Valves HV 2187-4,5 Spurious closure of any one 6, & 7 of these volves could B Valves HV 2188-4,5 terminate bearing water let-6, & 7 down from a circulator.

A Valve LV 21303 Spurious closure of either B Valve LV 21304 of these could isolate bearing water letdown from the associated high pressure separator. Note - lines from hp separators are now routed directly to surge tank gas space, thus affording equalization without need for keeping equalization line open.

Valves LV-21303 and 21304 must be kept open.

A Valve PDV-2175 Spurious closure of either B Valve PDV-2176 of these valves could isolate bearing water letdown from O 'ae main drain of the associated circulator.

DC-84-21 ,

r

TABLE 2.2-1 Spurious Valve Operation Forced Circulation Cooling (Continued) t F.P. Potential System / Shutdown Spurious Potential Fur.ction Train Valve Effects A Valve PDV-2179 Spurious closure of 8 Valve PDV-2180 either of these valves I could isolate bearing water drains of the associated circulator.

A Valve LV-2135-! Spuriour closure of B Valve LV-2136-1 these would isolate bearing water makeup to surge tank T-210S.

A Valve LV-2I I IS Spurious closure could isolate removal cf bearing water from separator T-2111.

A Valve LV-2137 These valves could isolate B Valve LV-2138 suction of bearing water pumps.

O A FV 21297 Spurious opening of these B FV 21298 valves could divert bearing water back to pump suction.

B HV 212S2-S Spurious closure could isolate makeup source from the condensate storage tank for bearing water.

A+G LV 21 l 19-1 Spurious opening would (Exclude) open low pressure separator T-21II floor drains. This is acceptable method of removing bearing water drain water.

Service Water / A+B Strainer F-4201 Terminate service water flow Component Cooling element select for fire at Service Water (PI-42-1) Pump House. (Could deenergize and manually operate valves.)

O DC-84-21 TABLE 2.2-1 .

Spurious Valve Operation n

V Forced Circulation Cooling (Continued)

F.P. Potential System / Shutdown Spurious Potential

, Function Train Valve Effects l

A+B Strainer inlet and Spurious closing of either outlet MOV's could terminate service water flow.

A+B LCV-4207 (AOV) Terminate service water PI 1 return flow; however, unlikely since local pneumatic control only.

(Manual bypass available).

A+B HV-4221-2 (MOV) Assuming Cire. Water Pumps PI-42-1 not running, could divert service water flow to Cire. Water System (Could deenergize MCC feeding and manually close).

A+B PCV-4266 (AOV) Admit firewater to DG HX's, O PI-42-2 adding excessive inventory to service water system and diverting fire water flow.

(Could manually isolate).

A+B TSV-4267,68,69, Spurious cperation of the

& 70, and TCV-4267, TSV's is acceptable since 68, 69, & 70. it just bypasses the temperature c::ntrolier (TIC-4267,68,69, & 70) cnd directly opens its associated TCV (which is fail open).

Spurious operation of the TCV's is not a concern since its control is local pneumatic only, local to its associcted diesel generator.

A fire at a diesel would cause that particular diesel to be inoperable.

{

A TCV-4234 (AOV) Terminate service water flow Pl-42-3 to Instrument Air Compressor C-8201. However, unlikely since local pneumatic control O only. (Manual bypass available).

DC-84-21 _ _ _ . - - _ ._ . -

TABLE 2.2-1 Spurious Valve Operution Q

U Forced Circulation Cooling (Continued)

F.P. Potential System / Shutdown Spurious Potential Function Train Valve Effects B TCV-4274 (AOV) Terminate service water flow PI-42-3 to instr. Air Corppr. C-8203.

However, unlikely since local pneumatic control only.

(Manual bypass available).

A+B FSV-8211-3 (SOL) Divert service water flow PI-42-3 thru Instr. Air Compr.

C-820lS if TCV-4235 spuriously opens. (Not credible since 2 diverse spurious actions required -

elec and air; also, if it occurred, small flow diversion involved, per -

SD-42).

A+B TCV-4235 (AOV) Divert service water flow O Pi-42 3 th,u C-820iS if eSv-82ii-3 spuriously opens. (See above).

Reactor Plant A+B HV-21143 (MOV) Admit firewater to Backup Cooling Water and HV-21142-2 (MOV) Bearing Water Coolers, System - Service or HV-21142-1 (MOV) diverting fire water flow, Water Loop / PI-46-4 potentially adding excessive Component Cooling inventory to the service water system. (Could deenergize MOV's and manually close, or manually isolate upstream at V-461633-P).

A+B HV-21142-3 (MOV) Admit Cire. Water to above.

and HV-21142-2 (MOV) (Could manually isolate at PI-46-4 V-462S I.)

A+B HV-21142-2 (MOV) Divert service water return and HV-21142-1 (MOV) flow to Cire. Water return PI-46-4 header. (Could deenergize MOV's and manually close.)

O DC-84-21 l l

TABLE 2.2-1 Spurious Valve Operation Forced Circulation Cooling O (Continued)

F.P. Potential System / Shutdown Spurious Potential Function Train Valve Effects DC's/ Essential A HSV-92231 (SOL) Actuate disconnect device for AC PI-92-2 DG K-9203X. However,

+

Spurious operation is not a concern since a fire cousing the spurious operation would be local to the diesel, cousing the diesel to be inoperable.

A HSV-92232 (SOL) Actuate disconnect device for PI-92-2 DG K-9204X. However, Spurious operation is not a concern since a fire causing the spurious operation would be local to the diesel, causing the diesel to be inoperable.

{\ B HSV-92233 (SOL)

PI-92-2 Actuate disconnect device for DG K-9205X. However, Spurious operation is not -

a concern since a fire cousing the spurious operation would be local to the diesel, causing the diesel to be inoperable.

B HSV-92234 (SOL) Actuate disconnect device for l

PI-92-2 DG K-9206X. However, Spurious operation is not a concern since a fire cousing the spurious operation would be local to the diesel, causing the

. diesel to be inoperable.

A HSV-92245 (SOL) Spuriously crank DG, PI-92-2 depleting air receiver or inhibit cranking. However, this is not a concern since a fire cousing the spurious operation would be local O

DC-84-21 l

1 TABLE 2.2-1 Spurious Valve Operation p' Forced Circulation Cooling v

(Continued) ,

l F.P. Potential System / Shutdown Spurious Potential Function Train Valve Effects to the diesel, causing the diesel to be inoperable.

(Can manually isolate former and manually bypass the latter; also, redundant air start system provided.)

A HSV-92247 (SOL) Spuriously crank DG, PI-92-2 depleting air receiver or inhibit cranking. However, this is not a concern since a fire causing the spurious operation would be local to the diesel, causing the diesel to be inoperable.

(Con manually isolate former and manually bypass the latter; also, redundant air O start exstem provided.)

B HSV-92249 (SOL) Spuriously crank DC, PI-92-2 depleting air receiver or inhibit cranking. However, this is not a concern since a fire causing the spurious operation would be local to the diesel, causing the diesel to be inoperable.

(Can manually isolate former and manually bypass the latter; also, redundant air start system provided.)

B HSV-92251 (SOL) Spuriously crank DG, PI-92-2 depleting air receiver or inhibit cranking. However, this is not a concern since a fire causing the spurious operation would be local to the diesel, causing the diesel to be inoperable.

(Can manually isolate former and manually bypass the

) latter; also, redundant air start system provided.)

DC-84-21 --

A 2.3 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 0- An evaluation was performed to address the minimum required instrumentation in order to accomplish required fire protection shutdown functions. This included two elements of process instrumentation:

o Direct readings of process vorlables necessary to confirm satisfactory performance of safety functions, and o instrurnentation to perform, control and confirm opero-tion of required systems. The process monitoring func-tions for forced circulation cooldown are reflected in Figures 2.1-3 and 2.1-6. The process monitoring functions for the ACM are reflected in Figure 2.1-12.

i The intent of this evaluation was to identify existing process monitoring instrumentation that is provided on electrical safety busses. Table 2.3-1 identifies the process monitoring instrumentation required for forced circulation cooling to assure that safety functions are accomplished. Table 2.3-2 provides the system monitoring instrumentathn for forced circulation cooling in order to confirm satisfactory operation of fire protection shutdown systems.

l O Process monitoring to confirm reactivity control under shutdown using the ACM is not believed to be required. The section 2.4, Control Rod Evaluation, of this report demonstrates that a fire connot credibly prevent control rod insertion.

Additionally, operation of the reserve shutdown system (neutron obsorbing material) can be performed independent of the control room, without requiring

! use of electrical controls. The reserve shutdown system provides additional negative reactivity beyond the control rods to account for fuel and boron redistribution that may occur under DBA-l (loss of forced circulation) condi-tions. FSAR Section 14.10.3.3 notes that with the reserve shutdown system under DBA-1 conditions, a final K-effective is achieved after all effects are included of 0.95, thus assuring core subcriticality at all times following scram of the control rods. Helium depressurization effects have been accounted for in the above evaluation. No fire induced mechanisms are available that could result in boron depletion. Accordingly, when instituting the ACM for shutdown O

DC-84-21 2-9

- _ . .. -- ~ _ . -

independent of congested coble areas, necessary operator actions to assure insertion of the control rods and operation of the reserve shutdown system are O taken to assure reactivity control. Additionally, the NRC Safety Evaluation Report supporting Amendment No. 21 to the license and transmitted by letter of June 6,1979 (G-79103) concludes that the Alternate Cooling Method provides all necessary functions to assure safe plant shutdown and emergency cooling under degraded conditions. This includes, as noted in the SER a " reserve shutdown system to provide backup to the control rods, to assure the reactor remains subcritical." Accordingly, for shutdown using the ACM, process monitoring to confirm reactor subcriticality is not required.

Table 2.3-3 identifies the process and system monitoring instrumentation avail-able to support loss of forced circulation cooldown (i.e., liner cooldown).

l l

1 l

O d

O DC-84-21 2-10

TABLE 2.3-1 PROCESS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FORCED CIRCULATION COOLING Function Inst. No. Range Ref. Power Supply i B.I Nuclear Inst. SD-93-11-1, FC$R Fig.

Wide Range: NI-I133-1 Approximately 7.3-22. Inst. Bus ! A 10-6-103

% Rx Power B.2 Nuclear Inst. SD-93-1 l-l, .

FSAR Fig.

Wide Range: NI-l 134-1 Approximately 7.3-22. Inst. Bus IB 10-6-10-3

% Rx Power F.I Core Heat Removal Circulator i A Speed SI-2109 PI-21-7 Inst. Bus I A F.2 Core Heat Removal O Circulator IC Speed SI-2110 PI-21-9 Inst. Bus lB G.I S/G Feedwater Flow G.I.I Loop iFW FM-2211-1 PI-22-1 Inst. Bus l A G.I.2 Loop 2FW FM-2212-1 PI-22-6 and Inst. Bus IB IB-93-8 G.2 S/G Exit Temp G.2.1 Loop ITemp TI-22121 PI-22-2 Inst. Bus I A G.2.2 Loop iTemp TI-22122 PI-22-7 Inst. Bus IB O

DC-94-21 _ . _

TABLE 2.3-1 g PROCESS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FORCED CIRCULATION COOLING (Continued)

Function Inst. No. Range Ref. Power Supply H.l RCS Integrity SD-93-11-2 Primary Coolant Press. PI-I 108 0-1000 psia Inst. Bus i A Cire. Inlet Coolant Temp TIA-l I71 100-10000F Inst. Bus l A H.2 RCS Integrity SD-93-11 -2 Primary Coolant Pres. PI-l 109 0-1000 psia Inst. Bus IB Cire. Inlet Coolont Temp TIA-I l75 100-10000F Inst. Bus IB O

l O

DC-84-12 l

O O O TABLE 2.3-2 SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FORCED CIRCULATION COOLING System Variable Instrument Purpose / Method Power Supply Bearing Water to Pump Operation NA Confirm pump stort and NA C-2101 (Loop l} (P-2101 and P-2106) operation of P-2101 and P-2l06 through visit to pttnp room.

PI-21247 Local mechanical pressure NA indicator Flow thru Circulator PDIS-21173 Local mechanical pressure NA indicator Surge Tonk Level LI-21135 To maintain inventory in Instr. Bus IC (T-2104) bearing water system and need for starting /

stopping makeup.

Pump Operation NA Confirm pump operation through NA (P-2108) level in Surge Tonk using Ll-21135.

4 Low Pressure Separator LI-21119 Monitor tank level for start- Instr. Bus l A Level T-211 I ing/ stopping bearing water removal pump P-2104.

Pump operation NA Confirm pump operation through (P-2104) L.P. Separator level LI-21119.

Bearing Water to Pump Operation NA Confirm pump stort and opero- NA C-2103 (Loop 2) (P-2102 and P-2107) tion of P-2102 and P-2107 through visit to pump room.

DC-84-21 ,

O O O l

TABLE 2.3-2 SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION i FORCED O' .lJLATION COOLING (Continued)

System Varioble Instrument Purpose / Method Power Supply PI-21248 Local mechanical pressure - NA indicator Flow thru Circulator PDIS-21174 Local mechanical pressure NA indicator Surge Tonk Level Ll-21136 To maintain inventory in Instr. Bus lC (T-2105) bearing water system and need for storting/ stopping makeup.

Low Pressure Li-21115 To monitor tonk level for instr. Bus IB Separator Level aligning suction of P-2l05 T-21II between T-211I and Condensate Tank -

Pump Operatlon NA Confirm pump operation through NA (P-2105) level in Surge Tank using LI-21136.

Instrument Air Compressor Operation NA Confirm compressor operation NA (Troin A) (C-8201) locally.

Receiver Pressure PI-8209 Confirm air supply to header NA (T-8201) with local mechonical gauge. ,

Instrument Air Compressor Operation NA Confirm compressor operation ,NA i

(TrainB) (C-8203) locally.

DC-84-21 O O O TABLE 2.3-2 SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FORCED CIRCULATION COOLING I

(Continued)

System Variable Instrument Purpose / Method Power Supply Receiver Pressure PI-82S3 Confirm air supply to header NA (T-8203) with loco! mechanical gauge.

Condensate for Condensate Pump PI-3134 Local Pressure indicator; NA Circulator Water Operation (P-3106) confirm pump operation.

Drive & S.G. Cooling (Train A)

Turbine Water Removal PI-21302 Local pressure indicator; NA Pump Operation (P-2103) confirm pump operation.

Fire Water for Diesel Fire Water PI-4506 Local pressure indicator; NA Circulator Water Pump Operation (P-450lS) confirm pump operation.

Drive & S.G. Cooling ^

(TrainB)

Emergency Water Booster PI-2lS36-2 Local pressure indicator; NA Pump Operation (P-2110) confirm pump operation.

Turbine Water Removal Pl-21302 Local pressure indicator; NA Pump Operation (P-2103S) confirm pump operation.

CST Level to define NA Visually inspect tank level NA opening time for Valve via access hatch.

HV-4221-1 Service Water S.W. Pump Pit Water NA Confirm level through visual NA (F. P. Train A) Level observation. Throttle valve V-42131 for water makeup.

DC-84-21 . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

O O O ,

TABLE 2.3-2 -

SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FORCED CIRCULATION COOLING f (Continued) l System Variable Instrument Purpose / Method Power Supply Service Water Pump PI-4214 Local mechonical pressure NA Operation (P-4201) indicator.

Flow thru Strainer PDIS-4226 Local mechonical pressure NA (F-4201) and necessity indicator for backwash.

Service Water Return PI-4204 Local mechanical pressure NA Pump Operation (P-4203) indicator.

Service Water Cooling NA Visually observe fan NA l Tower Fan Operation operation.

(C-420lX)

Service Water Service Water Purrip NA Balance flow returned to main NA (F.P. Train B) Pit Water Level cooling tower basin to maintain Service Water Pump Pit Water Level. (i.e., odjust volves HV-4221-1 and HV-4221-3 and observe water level at S.W. Pump Pit; could adjust for minimum overflow offer time period in which HV-4221-1 must be opened).

Service Water Pump PI-4216 Local mechonical pressure NA Operation (P-42025) indicator.

Flow thru Strainer PDIS-4226 Local mechanical pressure NA l (F-4201) and necessity indicator, for backwash.

DC-84-21 1 L_____ _ ._____ _ ___ - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - -

O O O TABLE 2.3-2 SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FORCED CIRCULATION COOLING (Continued) i System Variable instrument Purpose / Method Power Supply Service Water Return PI-4206 Local mechanical pressure NA Pump Operation (P-4204S) indicator.

Service Water Cooling NA Visually observe fan NA 4

Tower Fan Operation operation.

(C-4202X)

Diesel Generator Voltage from Generator Voltmeter Local indicator.

(Train A) Generator l A l A (K-9201)

, (K-9201)

Diesel Generator Voltage from Generator Voltmeter Local indicator.

(TrainB) Generator IB IB (K-9202) (K-9202)

DC-84-21 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

l TABLE 2.3-3 PROCESS AFO SYSTEM MONITORING l l O INSTRUMENTATION - liber COOLDOWN FUNCTION INSTRUMENT POWER SUPPLY He Purification System -

He Pressure - PI-23162 N/A (Observe Locally)

Reactor Building Exhaust System:

Fan AP- PDI-7323-1 N/A (Observe Locally)

PDI-7339-1 N/A (Observe Locally)

Liner Cooling System Operations - PI-46334 N/A (Observe Locally)

PI-46335 N/A (Observe Locally)

PI-4663 N/A (Observe Locally)

PI-4664 N/A (Observe Locally)

O service woter sxstem operatiom:

Service Water Pump Pit Level - N/A N/A (Observe Locally)

Pump Discharge Press - PI-4214 or N/A (Observe Locally)

PI-4216 N/A (Observe Locally)

Flow Through Strainer - PDIS-4226 N/A (Observe Locally)

Service Water Return Pump - PI-4204 or N/A (Observe Locally)

PI-4206 N/A (Observe Locally)

Service Water Cooling Tower Fan - N/A N/A (Observe Locally)

PCRV Temperature (Reactor Plant Cooling Water Temp.)- TI-4629 N/A (Observe Locally)

TI-4630 N/A (Observe Locally)

O DC-84-21 -l-1

2.4 Control Rod Evaluatiors

(~

The Control Rod Drive (CRD) system was evaluated to determine if fire-caused electrical malfunctions could prevent the insertion of sufficient negative re-activity (i.e., a sufficient number of control rods) required to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a shutdown condition. The cable interconnections for the CRD system are shown in Figure 2.4-l. A detailed Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) analysis was conducted for the cables showr, evaluating the effects of potential grounds, open circuits, and hot shorts. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 2.4-l.

The control rods are housed in pairs, each pair in one of 37 control and orificing assemblies, one of which is shown in Figure 2.4-2. Normal control rod pair insertion and withdrawal is effected by energizing the CRD motor in the direction of motion desired and releasing the CRD brake. The motor is part of the CRD mechanism shown in Figure 2.4-3, and the broke is shown in detail in Figure 2,4-4. Normally, the CRD broke is energized from the 24Vdc scram broke power supplies to hold the control rod in the position selected. Also, the CRD motor is normally unpowered, and is only powered from 3-phase 105Voc when in or out motion is requested by the operator.

Scram is accomplished by interrupting the 24Vdc supply to the CRD brakes and to the scram contactor coils at the CRD Motor Control Centers (MCC's). Since the CRD motors are normally not powered, releasing the broke allows the control rod to fcll by gravity into the core. De-energizing the scram contactors at the CRD MCC's ensures that power will not be inadvertently applied to any CRD motor. Based on the above operation, it is essential for the scram function that the CRD broke release and the CRD motors remain unpowered. In addition; it should be noted that the CRD motors act as dynamic brakes in an unpowered state, so that when the CRD brake releases, control rod insertion speed is controlled to limit the control rod deceleration force at end of travel. There-fore, the CRD motor must be allowed to turn freely during scrom.

O DC-84-21 2-1I

~,

4 The electrical FMEA involved a detailed review of the schematic and wiring 7 diagrams associated with the cables shown on Figure 2.4-l. Grounds, open circuits, and hot shorts were postulated to occur in these cable circuits, and the potential effects of these were determined and evaluated. Potential unaccept-able effects were found in the arcos corresponding to the essential actions which must occur to ensure scrom:

, l. Broke coil spurious energization - Since the broke coil is  !

powered by a 24Vdc ungrounded system, it would take two  !

conductor (hot and corresponding neutral) matchups with the broke coil conductors to spuriously energize the broke. Even if this did occur, only one control rod pair would be offected, which has been analyzed as accept-able. Multiple dual conductor matchups would have to occur to affect more than one CRD. Such on event due to a fire is not considered credible.

2. Broke coil damage and subsequent Jomming - The highest voltage that could hot short to the broke conductors is l 480Voc, 3-phase. However, the broke coil assemblies v ere Hi-Pot tested at S00Voc for one minute, and, in addition special retaining rings were added to the broke coil assembly to prevent the magnetic coil from inter-fering with the armature plate and jomming the broke in the event of coil encapsulation failure.
3. Spurious CRD motor energization - Since the CRD motors are 3-phase 10SVoc, it would require a simultaneous 3-phase conductor matchup in the proper phase sequence and a broke release to cause spurious control rod with-drawal. This is considered incredible. In addition, there are no normally energized 3-phase power cables routed
with the CRD motor power cables.

! 4. CRD Motor insulation domoge and subsequent jamming -A high voltage (480Voc or greater) hot short on the motor windings could cause insulation failure and inhibit free motor operation. However, no high voltage cables are routed with the CRD motor cables, and the motor windings are insulated for its service rating.

Based on the Failure Modes and Effects analysis of the CRD cabling, it is concluded that a fire could not inhibit reactor shutdown via the CRD system.

O DC-84-21 2-12

As part of the Alternate Cooling Method, the Reserve Shutdown system is used with the control rod system for Design Basis Accident No.1 (DBA-l) conditions, b to ensure that sufficient negative reactivity is present in the core as DBA-l progresses and core heat up occurs.

The Reserve Shutdown system is normally manually activated from the main control room via handswitches which energize soienoids to operate valves which admit high pressure helium to rupture discs, thus allowing the reserve shutdown material to enter the core. The material is refractory poison spheres containing boron, and is contained in a storage hopper in each refueling penetration (37 total). The Reserve Shutdown system has provisions for local manual operation of the volves which admit the high pressure helium to the rupture discs. This is accomplished by connecting quick-connect fittings from en installed nitrogen cylinder for each of 37 volves, and locally causing the pneumatically operated helium admission valves to open. Since this operation involves strictly manual actions, on electrical FMEA is not required. (Spurious electrical operation is acceptable.) Therefore, a fire in the congested cable area would not inhibit the operation of the Reserve Shutdown system.

O l

l 1

DC-84-21 2-13

O O O t

TABLE 2.4-1 -

t FAILURE MODES ADO EFFECTS - CONTROL ROD SYSTEM Cable

  • Effects To/From Failure Mode Effects Acceptoble Evoluotion 7 Y = Yes N = No I. 5/C - Pos. Ind. Control Room / Ground Indication Y Pot. (2 cobles CRD MCC Indication not required per CRD) error for SCRAM I

Open Indication Y l Indication not required error for SCRAM Hot Short Indication Y Indication not required error or for SCRAM domoge

2. 3/C or 7/C Control Room / Ground:
in/C ut Control CRD MCC - to in or Out Normally deenergized;

' Loss of Control Y only selected CRD

' conductors Power would have cable ener-gized if operator com-

! - 3 outs in 7/C Withdrawal of 3 Y monded in or out CRDs when only motion, and only while i selected operator held in or out command switch.

  • See Figure 2.4-1 i

DC-84-21 g l

O O O TABLE 2.4-1 (continued) i l

Coble* Effects To/From Failure Mode Effects Acceptoble i Evoluotion Y = Yes N = No

2. 3/C or 7/C Control Room / Open Loss of in/out Y in/Out Contre! CRD MCC Loss of control for control in/out motion under i power does not offect scrom copobility.

Grounding of 3 outs in the 7/C cable is considered incredible, but its effect would stop when operator released "OUT" switch.

4

' Hot Short: Ungrounded system;

- External Cable None Y will not prevent SCRAM.

1

- 3 outs in 7/C Withdrowol of Y See Ground above.

4 3 CRDs

, 3. 2/C or 7/C Control Room / Ground: Ungrounded CRD Broke. CRD MCC system; I

- I conductor None Y will not prevent

! SCRAM.

2 or more cond. Loss of control Y CRD's SCRAM.

power DC-84-21 2

O O O TABLE 2.4-1 (continued)

Cable

  • Effects To/From Failure Mode Effects Acceptable Evaluation Y = Yes N = No
3. 2/C or 7/C Control Room / Open Loss of control Y Broke CRD MCC CRD's SCRAM.

power Hot Short:

- Low Voltage 1/C None Y Ungrounded system.

1 1/C with appro Broke remains N Dual matchup of hot priate neutral energized and neutral considered incredible. If it occurred, one control rod pair may not fully insert which has been analyzed as acceptable.

Multiple occurrences considered incredible.

- High Voltage Coil insulation N Broke coil (480 VAC or retainer failure and/or rings provided per greater) coil domoge, with FSAR (updated Rev.1).

result that broke Spring force caoses jams on. broke mechanism to release offer DC coil is deenergized. Also, Factory Test Procedure required 500Voc Hi-Pot DC-84-21 3

O O O TABl E 2.4-1 (continued)

Effects Cable

  • To/From Foilure Mode Effects Acceptoble Evaluation Y = Yes 1 N = No test for one minute,

' applied broke coil terminal to housing.

480Voc is the highest possible hot short voltoge.

4. 7/C - Pos. L/S'S Control Room / Ground Indication error Y Does not offeet and slock switch CRD MCC or loss of SCRAM.

manual control -)

Open Indication error Y Does not offect or loss of SCRAM.

manual control Hot Short Indication error Y Does not offect or loss of SCRAM.

manual control S. 3/C or 7/C Control Room / Ground Indication error Y not Indication Lights CRD MCC Does offeet SCRAM.

Open Indication error Y Does not offeet l SCRAM.

Hot Short Indication error Y Does not offect SCRAM.

DC-84-21 4

4 O O O TABLE 2.4-1 (continued)

Effects Cable

  • To/From Foilure Mode Effects Acceptable Evoluotion Y = Yes N = No t
6. 2/C - SCRAM Control Room / Some os #3 except high voltage could domoge contactor coils Contactors CRD MCC (2 cables per MCC)
7. 24/C - CRD CRD MCC/ Some os #1, #4, and #5. Orifice Pos. Ind. some os #1.

Control CRD

8. 24/C - CRD CRD MCC/

Power: CRD

- CRD Broke Some os #3.

- CRD Motor Ground - 1/C None Y Ungrounded system; will not prevent SCRAM.

- 2 or more cond. Trip CRD Y No effect on SCRAM 1 Breaker capability; loss of mon-ual control only.

Open Loss of I or Y No effect on SCRAM more phases of capability; loss of man-motor power vol control only.

Hot Short:

1

- Low Voltage-l/C None Y Ungrounded system.

DC-84-21 S

R O O O TABLE 2.4-1 (continued)

Effects Cable

  • To/From Failure Mode Effeets Acceptable Evoluotion Y = Yes N = No
8. (continued) CRD MCC/

CRD

- CRD Motor Hot Short:

ohose Motor operates N 3-phase hot short con-sidered incredible, so no inodvertent with-drawal. In addition, the broke would also have to be released at the some time. Also, there are no normally energized 3-phase cab-les routed with these.

High Voltoge insulation N There are no high failure jams voltoge cables routed motor with these cables.

DC-84-21 6

)

O O O I

TABLE 2.4-1 ~

(continued)

Effects  ;

Cable

  • To/From Foilure Mode Effeets Acceptable Evoluotion Y = Yes N = No .

/

9. 2/C - Reserve CRD MCC/l-21 Ground - l/C None Y Does not offeet Shutdown D.P. Local Pcoels SCRAM.

Switch s

(N.C. Contact) f

?

- 2/C Loss of PDS Y Does not offect output SCRAM.

l Open False high DP Y Does not offect olarm at local SCRAM.

panel Hot Short - !/C None Y Does not offect SCRAM (DC annur.ci-otor input).

- 2/C Loss of PDS Y Does not offeet output SCRAM.

10. 7/C - Orifice CRD MCC/ Ground - 1/C None Y Does not offe$t Volve Motor MCR SCRAM.

~

DC-84-21 7

O O O TABLE 2.4-1 (continued)

Effects Cable

  • To/From Failure Mode Effects Acceptoble - Evaluation Y = Yes N = No l 1
10. (continued) CRD MCC/ 2/C or more Prevent Y Does not affect Control Room operation when SCRAM. Control not selected by required for F.P. shut-operator -

down.

Open Prevent Y Does not affect operatior, .en SCRAM. Control not selected by required for F.P. shut-operator down.

Hot Short - 1/C None Y Does not offect SCRAM. i t

2/C or more Prevent Y operation when Does not affect selected by SCRAM. (Control not operator required for F.P. shut-down.)

I DC-84-21 8

m .

o O.

O TABLE 2.4-1 (continued)

Cable

  • Effects To/From Foilure Mode Effects Acceptoble Evoluotion Y = Yes N = No
10. (continued) CRD MCC/ l/C hot with Stepper Y Does Control Room not offect oppropriate motor SCRAM. Also, one step neutral operation movement of stepper motor results in very small flow change.

I l. 5/C - Orifice CRD MCC/ Ground - I/C None Y Pos. Pot. Control Room Does not offect SCRAM.

2/C or more Loss of Y Does not offect Pos. Ind. SCRAM. (Pos. Ind not required).

Open Loss of Y Does not offect Pos. Ind. SCRAM. (Pos. Ind. not required).

Hot Short - l/C None Y Does not offect SCRAM. (DC system)  !

2/C or more Loss of Y Does not offect Pos. Ind. SCRAM. (Pos. Ind. not required).

l i

DC-84-21 9 L_______

O O O TABLE 2.4-1 (continued)

Note: The remaining cables on Figure 2.4-1 involve power inputs, transfers, and test capability, and annunciation. The cables included in this group are os follows:

9/C - I-03 from Bus I for K-61 and K-63 test copobility 2/C - l-70 annunciator for K-58 power monitor 2/C - l-03 from Cl and C2 (control power) 2/C - l-10 from 16 ond 17 (K-SI odd rods scrom) 2/C - I-10 from 12 and 13 (K-50 even rods scrom) 7/C - Bus I for K-61, K-62, K-63, and K-64 test capability 7/C - Bus 2 for K-61, K-62, K-63, and K-64 test capability 3/C - Ll-1, L2-1, L3-1 120 VAC incoming to transfer switch 3/C - 5,6,7120 VAC incoming to transfer swithe 2/C - C3 and C4 (control power) i Failures involving these cables con lead to foss of the CRD control, test, or annunciation function desired under normal operating conditions, but would not offect SCRAM capability since loss of control power is 'a foil-sofe condition. The cable onofysis above covers the potential failure modes that can offect a typical CRD assembly, which is the only way electrical failures would possibly offeet SCRAM capability, by inhibiting control rod insertion via the CRD broke or motor.

l l

DC-84-21 10 l

O O O RX PLANT MCC 3 480V h E-1843 (J) .

ROD POS. POT.'S (2) COFNECTORS AT l ROD OUT L/55 (2) h PCRV REFMLING y E-13S9(E) SL ACK L/S'S (2) PEtCRATION l ROD N L/55 (2)

FV l RV 4 j ROD MAX LS5 (2) 24/C - CONTROL e CLOSURE PLATE I " " ~ ORIFICE POS. POT. (l) r a e a CRD ASSEMBLY INST. 'AM S/C POS. Iro. POT. ma a s ,

S l

CRD BUS M OR; p_

E S/C - POS. IND. POT.

~~

24/C - POWER ASSEMBLY CRD MOTOR d b EACH 8 CRD BRAKE iL CRD4 3/C or 7/C N/OUT CONTROL CRD OmFICE VALVE MOTOR - EI I- 2/C or 7/C - CRD UR AKE 'MCCl RESERE SHUTDOWN OPS RESERVE ORIFICE

! SHUTDOWN VALVI ASSEMBLY ASSEM0LY I 7/C- ROD POS. L/S$ & S,.ACK SW. 1 3/C or 7/C - IND. LTS. CA LES TOI21C & L27:

CRD

~ ~ ~ ~ " " " " *

- 2/C TO I-2lC FOR DPS (TYP.)

2/C CA# 96S9 KSO SCRAM -

7/C TO l-27 FOR ORIFICE MOTOR

- = - - - -

KSI i A ORS

~

2,C CAE 9892 g 1 r

  • - 24VDC BUS l

9/C - 143 FROM BUS I 2/C 70 AtMNCIATOR 2/C - 143 FROM Cl & C2 7/C - BUS I MAIN (CONTROL eOwER) 7/C - BUS 2 0169-2951 J/C - 3/C - Li-8, m, m (H) CONTROL '-'8 F" " ' ' 2 (K51 - 000 RODS SCRAM) 3/C - S 6,7

, ROOM 2/C - Li0 rROM 12 & 13 2/C- C3 8 C4 (KS0 - EVEN RODS SCRAM)

FV RV

, , _ _ _ _ 24/C - CONTROL g CRO gg, , g NJ g

24/C - POWER I

CRD 3r 1P MCC2 g

NST. SCRAM BUS M BRAKE l l 2 P.i 2 I I I l

l n

NOTE: ALSO NTERNAL RX PLANT MCC l A cot #ECTIONS 480V FRONT TO E-18SI (H) REAR N MCC's FIGURE 2.4-1 BLOCK DIAGRAM - CRD SYSTEM CABLES

O O O 4

i CONTROL A00 wtTHORAuW j CONTROL A00 DAlvE RAECHADHORG 1

%~ 2 -sd <- < - - - I . _,l_. l .I . _I _l _ . _

-l'h$Feak< - ess- T w p[ T '1; ~ :z_:~E::1:T_Z T__: 11:11:ZE::

1

< - - < - - - - y  ; i lg l l -

AEFUELateG PEleETRATION AADIATION SHeELD FLowCONTROL OAeFICE TROL AODINGEATE0 1

l l

I.

FIGURE 2.4-2 i

CONTROL AND ORIFICING ASSEMBLY t

! ~

1 I

1

l l

l l __ b E .,_

lt N c (,

l l' ,

F O i 1

Y5 O@ k/

/

R

( Sh I t N /

N

/3

  • t i

/f '"""'

j CLOSURE PLATE

/ '

g (CONTACT UNDERSIDE) j

/

/

"-g sy

' TEMPERATURE SENSCR NO.I j

/ '

CRDM MOTOR / I s

, /

TEMPERATURE / ,

f SENSOR NO.3 /

~

[ , y

' /

h -

/  % g ,,l., ,

/

/

/

/

- I l

/ i B

/

/

/ n== / /

_..M /

/

/ -] I l g

l

/

/

CRDM BRAME WOTOR ASSEMBLY I / '

O /

- .o -

/

/

l /

/ 'm

/ -

/

E I p -i =;4-p'

/

~

n ORIFICE VALVE '

,. ' i

~

MOTOR ASSEMBLY ,

l l l ll i

l ORIFICE VALVE

' [ MOTOR PL ATE

^

f '

TEMPERATURE

/

SENSOR NO.2 l j b-O n c u Re u -a CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM

O O O SPLINE FRICTION 4

DISCS 1RONHAGNET.N BODY h j m

. 4 . .. _' --- -- A .

~~

!T y 74-w 4 -] /N" E"

+ -- -- - -

NETIC

,-x -

fa 4

l-q, ._ f - ---- -- -}__ 9 4

-s ,

.N SPRING RELEASE 4 'D_f..f[]i *-

a .

A PLUNGERS 17.:..

i$- ,

'I r r 2 9

m u__ m ELECTRO HAGNET CENTER SPIDER IllSC FIGURE 2.4-4 CONTROL ROD DRIVE BRAKE

2.5 System Timing Requirements .

FSAR accident analysis 14.4.2 Justifies a lh hour delay in starting a helium circulator following a recetor trip. This accident analysis demonstrates the adequacy of one helium circulator to prov;de adequate cooling to assure that fuel temperature limits are not reached. A turbine water removal pump would have to be started at essentially the some time os the pump used for water drive of the circulator. Similarly steam generator cooling need not be established until circulator operation is reestablished. Corresponding supporting functions of service water, circulator bearing water, diesel generator operation, and instru-ment air compressors need not be initiated until this time period also. Thelh hour time period provides adequate allowance for fire fighting and fire suppres-sion activities, as well as initial volve alignments and volve position checks that may be required.

Operation of the ACM requires that depressurization be started within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following reactor trip and completed by approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> following reactor trip. This initial depressurization is required for short term decay heat removal. To preserve PCRV liner integrity, liner cooling must be initiated within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> following reactor trip and operated continuously thereafter for continued cooldown; capability exists to operate well beyond the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time period. Support systems for depressurization would therefore have to be available within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following reactor trip. Systems that solely support liner cooling need not be available until nearly 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> following reactor trip. These time intervals allow sufficient time for fire suppression activities, valve alignments and volve position checks, and system startup.

O DC-84-21 2-14

2.6 HVAC Evaluation O An HVAC Evoluotion was performed to assess the adequacy and necessity of plant HVAC systems, on a post-fire event basis, to support shutdown equipment or areas. The necessary HVAC system components required for shutdown (post- l fire) are identified in Table 2.6-l. Each selected building / area evaluated is discussed below.

l Reactor Building The Reactor Building HVAC systems were reviewed with respect to cooling in operational support of the Bearing Water Pumps, Turbine Water Removal Pumps, and the Bearing Water Removal Pumps.

Although significant heat is generated in the piping cavity below the PCRV, this is not so when the reacter is shutdown or undergoing cooldown. Air from this crea, however, is exhausted by the reactor plant exhaust fans. Therefore, the piping cavity fans are not required for shutdown post-fire event. Similarly the air handling units for PCRV cooling and the piping cavity are not required for post-fire shutdown.

The reactor building exhaust fans also draw from the instrument room with a fresh air supply. Hence, the instrument room booster fans are not required for post-fire shutdown. Similarly, the fuel storage facility air is exhausted by the reactor building exhaust fans and, therefore, the emergency booste- fan is not required for post-fire shutdown.

Per the FSAR Section 6.2.3.2.3, only the reactor building exhaust fans and filters are required for plant shutdown cooling.

O O

DC-84-21 2-1S

Diesel Generator, Fire Pumps, Service Water Pumps, and Circulating Water j Moke-up Pump Building An analysis was made of the heat gain potential of the compartments housing the Emergency Diesel Generators, Diesel Fire Pump, Service Water Pumps, and the Circulating Make-up Pump Building. The calculated hect gain was based on the loss of HVAC system operability. With the' exception of the Service Water Pump Building all compartments were found to be in need of the HVAC system ventilation capability.

Three Room Complex: Control Room, Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room, and 480V Switchaear Room The 480V Switchgear Room is independently ventilated but interconnected to the Turbine Building Ventilation System. Room ambient is maintained normally by supplying cooling air from the Turbine Building ventilation system. Normally, both 480V Switchgear Room Vent Booster and Exhaust Fans operate contin-uously. On loss of offsite power, and without relying on the Turbine Building A ventilation system, the 480V Switchgear Room may be ventilated through U

operation of either an exhaust fan or vent booster fan.

The Control Room HVAC System serves the control room, reactor engineer's office and the auxiliary electrical equipment room. The Control Room HVAC System can be aligned to 100% outside air by using either a supply or exhaust fan. This assures adequate ventilation for equipment and habitability considerations.

lo DC-84-21 2-l6 i

(

TABLE 2.6-1 0- REQUIRED HVAC COMPOWNTS -

FORCED CIRCULATION COOLDOWN Building / Area Component Component Number Train A Train B Reactor Building Exhaust Fans C-7301 C-7302S Emergency Diesel Vent Fans C-7528X C-7529X Generator Compartments Air Handling S-7539 S-7540 Fire Pump Room (Diesel) Louvers -

DV-75321 Fan -

C-7522 Cire. Water Makeup Exhaust Fan Fan A -

Pump Room Turbine Building:

o Control Room and Supply Fan C-7504X O Aux. Electrical Equipment Room Return Fan C-7505 o Switchgear Room Vent Booster Fan C-7534 Exhaust Fan C-7539 o Miscellanecus dampers Dampers and louvers that could spuriously close O

DC-84-21 -I-I

3.0 MINIMUM REQUIRED FIRE PROTECTION SHUTDOWN COMPOtENTS This section summarizes in table form the mininum components that have been identified through the evaluations described in Section 2.0.

l 1

3.1 Forced Circulation Cooldown

{

Table 3.1 provides a listing of mininum components required for a forced circulation cooldown. This list of components is an initial list based on a systems review and does not yet incorporate results of electrical or fire protection reviews. These reviews will likely identify additional components that require protection, as well as resulting in justification for deleting certain of the components in Table 3.1. Subsequent reports will provide page changes as appropriate for Table 3.1.

3.2 Alternate Cooling Method The ACM is relied on for accomplishing fire protection shutdown for postulated fires in congested cable areas. Since the ACM has been extensively documented and reviewed in previous evaluations, the intent of this review is to summarize and confirm r,ystem components required to function in order for ACM to accomplish its shutdown functions. These are reflected in Table 3.2.

Valve alignments required for ACM are reflected in ACM procedures (reference Appendix B to this report). Potential spurious valves of concern for ACM operation will be addressed in Report No. 2. Additionally further reviews are being performed to identify instrumentation available and independent of congested cable areas for performing the process monitoring described in Figure 2.1-12.

l l

l l

O 3-1

O O O TABLE 3.1 MINIMUM REQUIRED FIRE PROTECTION COMPOENTS -

FORCED CIRCULATION COOLDOWN i

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Trcin B Reactivity Control Components: Reactivity Control Components:

Control Rods Control Rods Circulator: Circulator:

Circulator C-2101 Circulator C-2l03 Steam Generator: Steam Generator:

j' Loop i S/G, EES Loop 2 S/G, EES S/G B-220! S/G B-2202 Emergency Diesel Generatar: Emergency Diesel Generator:

i K-9201,IA K-9202,IB Pumps: Pumps:

Bearing Water P-2l01 Bearing Water P-2102

Beoring Water P-2l06 Bearing Water P-2107 DC-84-21 1 1

O O O TABLE 3.1 (continued)

F.P. Shutdown Troin A F.P. Shutdown Train B Pumps (continued): Pumps (continued):

Emergency Bearing Water Mokeup Pump P-2108 Beoring Water Makeup Pump P-2105 Bearing Water Removal Pump P-2104 Diesel Fire Pump P-450lS Condensate Pump IC (12F2%) P-3106 Emergency Water Booster Pump P-2110 Turbine Water Removal Pump P-2103 Turbine Water Removal Pump P-2103S Service Water Pump P-4201 Service Water Pump P-4202S Cire. Water Makeup Pump P-4118S Service Water Return Pump P-4204S Service Water Return Pump P-4203 instrument Air Compressor C-8203 Instrument Air Compressor C-8201 Diesel Oil Transfer Pump P-920lSX Diesel Oil Transfer Pump P-920lX 4

DC-84-21 2

O O O TABLE 3.1 (continued)

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B Tonks: Tonks:

Bearing Water Surge Tonk T-2104 Bearing Water Surge Tonk T-2104 High Pressure Separator I-A T-2106 High Pressure Separator l-C T-2108 Condensate Storage Tonk T-3102 Condensate Storage Tonk T-3102 Low Pressure Seporator T-2IIl Low Pressure Separator T-2III Turbine Water Drain Tonk T-2110 Fuel Oil Tonk T-4S03 Instrument Air Receiver T-8201 Turbine Water Drain Tonk T-2110 instrument Air Dryer S-8201 Instrument Air Receiver T-8203 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tonk T-9201 Instrument Air Dryer S-8202 Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tonk T-9202X Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tonk T-9201 Storting Air Receiver T-9204X Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tonk T-9203X l

Storting Air Receiver T-9206X l

l DC-84-21 3 l ,

.. .=

O O 0 TABLE 3.1 (continued) -

l 1

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B 1 HVAC Fons/Dompers: HVAC Fons/Dompers:

Service Water Cooling Tower Fan C-4201X Service Water Cooling Tower Fan C-4202X l Reactor Building Exhaust Fan C-7301 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan C-7302S Control Room - Control Room -

Supply Fan C-7504X Return Fan C-7505 Switchgear Room - Switchgeor Room -

Exhaust Fan C-7539 Vent Booster Fan C-7534 Diesel Generator Compartment - Diesel Generator Compartment -

Vent Fan C-7528X Vent Fan C-7529X Air Handling Unit S-7539 Air Handling Unit S-7540 Circulating Water Makeup Pump Room Exhaust Fire Pump (Dit:el) Room -

Fan "A" Vent Fan C-7522 Louvers DV-75321 Heat Exchangers: Heat Exchangers:

Bearing Water E-2l04 Bearing Water E-2105 Decoy Heat Exchanger E-4202 Main Cooling Tower E-4103 Decay Heat Exchanger E-4202 DC-84-21 4

O O O TABLE 3.1 (continued)

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B Emergency Diesel Generator
Emergency Diesel Generator:

Air Handling Unit S-7539 Air Handling Unit S-7540 Engine Coolers E-9201X Engine Coolers E-9203X Engine Coolers E-9202X Engine Coolers E-9204X Instrument Air Comp. After cooler E-8201X Instrument Air Comp. Aftercooler E-8203X Bearing Wcter Cooler E-2104 Bearing Water Cooler E-2105 Auta. Actuation and Control: Auto. Actuation and Control:

2.1-5 Sht.I Auto Control of P-920lX 2. l-5 Sht.I Auto Control of P-920lSX 2.1-5 Sht.2 0.G. Control /Stort 2.1-5 Sht 2 D.G. Control /Stort Volves - Spuric n: Volves - Spurious:

! He Circulotor HV-21 l 91-1 He Circulotor HV-21192-1 1

HV-21191-2 HV-21192-2 HV-21191-3 HV-21192-3

HV-21191-4 HV-21192-4 1
DC-84-21 5

l O O O TABLE 3.I (continued)

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B Volves - Spurioo:: Volves - Spurious:

Condensate and Firewater /Pelton Wheel Boosted Firewoter/Pelton Wheel HV-21203-1 HV-21204-1 HV-21203-2 HV-21204-2 HV-21203-3 HV-21204-3 HV-21203-4 HV-21204-4 i HV-31191 FV-2206 FV-2205 TV-2228-1 TV-2227-l TV-2228-2 TV-2227-2 TV-2228-3 TV-2227-3 TV-2228-4 TV-2227-4 TV-2228-5 TV-2227-5 TV-2228-6 TV-2227-6 FV-2239 FV-2239 PI-22-3 HV-2291 PI-22-3 HV-2291 FV-2240 FV-2240 PI-22-8 HV-2290 PI-22-8 HV-2290 PI-22-6 HV-2237 Pi-22-6 HV-2238 DC-84-21 6

O O O TABLE 3.I

., (continued) 4 F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B i -

Volves - Spurious: Volves Spurious:

l LCV-4501 i LCV-4207 I

Condensate and Firewater for Steam Generator Cooling Firewater for Steam Generator Cooling

, HV-3220-1 HV-3220-1

HV-3250 HV-3250 d

LCV-3218 LCV-3218 l Bearing Water Bearing Water 1 HV-21185 HV-2! l86 HV-2187-1 HV-2188-1 HV-2187-4 HV-2188-4 HV-2187-5 HV-2188-5 HV-2187-6 HV-2188-6

HV-2187-7 HV-2188-7 LV-21303 LV-21304 l' PDV-2175 PDV-2176 PDV-2179 PDV-2180 LV-2135-1 LV-2136-1 LV-21115 LV-2138 LV-2137 FV-21298 FV-21297 HV-21252-5 i

DC-84-21 7

O O O TABLE 3.1 (continued)

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B Volves - Spurious: Volves - Sporious:

Service Water Component Cooling Service Water Component Cooling PI-42-1 Strainer F-4201 PI 1 Stroiner F-4201 PI-42-1 LCV-4207 PI 1 LCV-4207 PI 1 IW-4221-2 PI 1 HV-4221-2 PI-42-2 PCV-4266 PI-42-2 PCV-4266 TSV-4267 TSV-4267 TSV-4268 TSV-4268 TSV-4269 TSV-4269 TSV-4270 TSV-4270 TCV-4267 TCV-4267 l TCV-4268 TCV-4268 TCV-4269 TCV-4269 TCV-4270 TCV-4270 PI-42-3 TCV-4234 PI-42-3 TCV-4274 PI-42-3 FSV-8211-3 PI-42-3 FSV-8211-3 PI-42-3 TCV-4235 PI-42-3 TCV-4235 Reactor Plant Cooling Water System Reactor Plant Cooling Water System Water Loop /Coniponent Cooling Water Loop / Component Cooling PI-46-4 HV-21143 PI-46-4 HV-2I l43 PI-46-4 HV-21142-3 PI-46-4 HV-21142-3 DC-84-21 8

_ _ _. ~. - . _ ._ __ __

O O O TABLE 3.1 (continued) i i

I F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B 1 ,

! Valves Spurious: Volves - Spurious:

Diesel Generator / Essential A.C. Diesel Generator /Essentini A.C.

i PI-92-2 HSV-92231 PI-92-2 HSV-92233 i P!-92-2 HSV-92232 PI-92-2 HSV-92234 i

PI-92-2 HSV-92245 PI-92-2 HSV-92249 PI-92-2 HSV-92247 PI-92-2 HSV-92251 1

i Volves - Control Protected: Volves - Control Protected:

l Table 2.1-3 Sht-3 Valve FV-2205 2.1-2 Sht. 2 Volve HV-21252-1 i

2.I-3 Sht. 3 Volve HV-2223 2.1-4 Sht. 5 Valve PV-2230 l 2.1-3 Sht. 4 Volve PV-2229 2.1-5 Sht. 2 Valve HSV-92249

2.1-5 Sht. 2 Valve HSV-92245 2.1-5 Sht. 2 Volve HSV-92251 2.1-5 Sht. 2 Valve HSV-92247 2.1-3 Sht. 3 Volve

.' 2.1-3 Sht. 2 Volve LV 21114 2.1-6 Sht. 3 Valve LV-211 I4 LCV-4207 i

2.1-6 Sht. 3 Volve LCV 4207 2.l-6 Sht. 4 Volve . TCV 4269

' 2.1-6 Sht. 4 Volve TCV 4267 2.1-6 Sht. 8 Volve TCV 4274 2.1-6 Sht. 4 Volve TCV 4268 2.l-6 Sht. 8 Valve TCV 4234 i

I f

DC-84-21

) 9 1

\

O O O TABLE 3.1 (continued)

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B Volves - Operated Locolly:' Volves - Operated Locolly:*

i Table 2.1-3 Sht-1 Volve HV-3133-1 2.l-4 Sht-l Volve HV-2110-1 2.1-3 Sht-1 Volve HV-3133-2 2.1-4 Sht-2 Volve SV-2110 2.1-3 Sht-2 Valve HV-2109-1 2.1-4 Sht-2 Volve HV-2110-2 2.1-3 Sht-2 Volve SV-2109 2.1-4 Sht-3 Volve HV-4221-1 2.1-3 Sht-2 Volve HV-2109-2 2.1-4 Sht-4 Volve HV-4138-l 2.1-3 Sht-3 Valve HV-2237 2.1-4 Sht-4 Valve HV-4138-2 2.1-3 Sht-3 Valve HV-3220-6 2.1-4 Sht-4 Valve HV-31122 i

2.1-3 Sht-4 Valve LV-3250-2 2.l-4 Sht-4 Valve HV-2238 2.1 's Sht-4 Valve HV-2224 2.1-6 Sht-2 Volve HV-42S7 2.l-4 Sht-S Valve HV-3220-6 2.1-6 Sht-2 Valve HV-422S 2.1-4 Sht-S Volve LV-3250-2 2.1-6 Sht-3 Volve HV-4221-1 2.l-6 Sht-2 Volve HV-42S7 2.1-6 Sht-3 Valve HV-4221-3 2.l-6 Sht-2 Volve HV-422S 2.1-6 Sht-3 Valve LCV-4207 2.1-6 Sht-3 Valve HV-4221-1 j' 2.1-6 Sht-3 Volve hV-4221-3 N7 molly operated remotely (HCVs, MOVs, etc.)

i

! DC-84-2 i 10

- - =. - -- - - . . . . . .- _ . - . - . . - . -. . _ - . . . . _ . - - - - - - _ - - _ - _ - - - - - -

0 O O TABLE 3.1 (continued) i -

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B 2

[ Volves - Manual Only: Volves - Manual Only: i Table V-21754 Table 2.1-2 Sht 2 V-211309 2.1-1 Sht 2 V-211214 2.1-4 Sht i V-4525 j 2.l-3 Sht i V-31131 V-211565

{ V-3166 2.1-4 Sht i V-211573 V-31408 V-211570 i

V-211658 2.1-4 Sht 2 V-31904 i 2.1-3 Sht i V-21867 2.1-4 Sht 2 V-31919 1

2.1-3 Sht 2 V-2i729 2.1-4 Sht 2 V-31921 1 2.1-3 Sht 3 V-31904 2.1-4 Sht 3 V-31101

} , V-31919 2.1-4 Sht 4 V-75610 V-31921 2.1-4 Sht 5 V-22346 l

V-32109 V-5202 v-3102 V-5288 4

2.1-3 Sht 3 V-32108 V-5287 2.I-3 Sht 4 V-22345 V-32308 V-5288 V-32234

! V-5287 2.1-4 Sht 5 V-32108  :

V-5203 2.1-6 Sht 2 V-42124 I V-32308 2.1-6 Sht 2 V-42130

! 2.1-3 Sht 4 V-32234 2.1-6 Sht 2 V-4449 i 2.1-6 Sht i V-41302 2.1-6 Sht 3 V-4286 i V-4121 2.1-6 Sht 6 V-4214 l V-41903 V-4229 2.1-6 Sht i V-42131 V-4236 2.1-6 Sh! 2 V-42124 2.1-6 Sht 6 V-42390

! 2.l-6 Sht 2 V-42136 2.l-6 Sht 7 V-4234 2

2.l.6 Sht 2 V-4449 V-42817

2.1-6 Sh' 3 V-4286 V-4256 2.1-6 Shi 6 V-4214 V-4239 i V-4264 l DC-84-2 6 Il

O O O TABLE 3.1 (continued)

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B Volves - Manual Only (Continuedh Volves - Manual Only (Continuedh Toble 2.1-6 Sht 6 V-4229 Table 2.1-6 Sht 7 V-42374 V-4236 2.l-6 Sht 8 V-42394 2.l-6 Sht 6 V-42390 2.1-6 Sht 8 V-42397 2.1-6 Sht 7 V-4234 2.1-6 Sht 8 V-75263 V-42817 2.1-6 Sht 9 V-46614 V-4256 2.1-6 Sht 9 V-461516 V-4239 V-46297 V-4264 V-46307 2.l-6 Sht 7 V-42374 2.1-6 Sht 9 V-461536 2.1-6 Sht 8 V-4221 2.1-6 Sht 10 V-461535 2.1-6 Sht 8 V-42397 V-461619 2.1-6 Sht 8 V-75263 V-461744 2.1-6 Sht 9 V-46614 V-46145 2.l-6 Sht 9 V-461516 V-46147 2.1-6 Sht 9 V-46927 V-46146 2.1-6 Sht 9 V-46307 V-46148 2.1-6 Sht 9 V-461536 2.l-6 Sht 10 V-46322 i 2.1-6 Sht 10 V-461535 2.1-6 Sht iI V-46483 V-461619 V 46326 V-461744 V-46494 V-46145 V-461538 V-46147 V-46342 V-46146 V-46346 i V-46148 2.1-6 Sht iI V-461643 2.l-6 Sht 10 V-46322 2.I-6 Sht 1I V-46483 V-46326 V-46494 DC-84-21 12

O O O TABLE 3.I (continued)

F.P. Shutdown Train A F.P. Shutdown Train B Volves - Manual Only (Continued):

Table 2.1.-6 Sht 11 V-461538 V-46342 V-46346 2.1-6 Sht il V-461643 instrumentation: Instrumentotion: .

Process 1Aonitoring Process Monitoring NI-I 133-1 NI-l 134-l 51-2109 SI-2110 FM-221 l-l FM-2212-1 TI-22121 TI-22122 PI-l 108 PI-I 109 TIA-i l71 TIA-I l75 System Instrumentation System Instrumentation PI-21247 PI-21248 PDIS-21173 PDIS-21174 LI-21135 LI-21136 Li-21119 Ll-21115 PI-8209 PI-8253 PI-3134 PI-4506 PI-21302 PI-21536-2 l

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o O O TABLE 3.1 (continued)

FP. Shutdown Train A FP. Shutdown Train B 4

System Instrumentation (Continued) System Instrumentation (Continued)

PI-4214 PI-21302 PDIS-4226 PI-4216 P-4204 PDIS-4226 i A, (K9201) Voltmeter PI-4206 IB, (K9202) Voltmeter Diesel Generators & Accessories: Diesel Generators & Accessories:

Air Stort Motors Air Stort Motors M-92865 M-92869

, M-92867 M-92871 l Diesel Engines Diesel Engines

I A (K-9203X) IC (K-9205X) i IB (K-9204X) ID (K-9206X)

Diesel Generators Diesel Generators

I A (K-9201) 1B (K-9202) 4 i

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TABLE 3.2 REQUIRED ACM FIRE PROTECTION SHUTDOWN COMPOtENTS Diesel-Driven Generator (2500 kW)

Plant Lighting Auto-Transfer Switches Electrical Equipment Transfer Switches 4160v to 480v Transformer Stock Effluent Radiation Monitor (PING-1)

Firewater Pump (Motor Driven)

Service Water Pump Service Water Tower Fan Service Water Return Pump PCRV Liner Cooling Water Pumps (2)

Circulating Water Makeup Pump Reactor Plant Exhaust Fan Diesel Oil Transfer Pump Helium Purificotton Cooling Water Pump Selected Plant Lighting Firewater Pump House Vent Fans and Louvers Motor Operated Valves (2)

Reserve Shutdown System Breathing Air Compressors (2)

Stortop Battery for Diese Generator and D.C. Control Liner Cooling Water Temperature indientors TI-4629 and TI-4630 Helium Purification System, Hel Pressure Indicator PI-23162 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan A P -

PDl-7323-1 and PDI-7339-1 Liner Cooling Pump Discharg . essure Pl-46334, PI-46335, PI- o ', and PI-4664.

Service Water Instruments - PI-4214, PI-4216, PDIS-4226, PI-4204 and PI-4206.

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  • DC-84-21 -l-s

4.0 SUBSEQtENT REPORTS O Subsequent reports will address the electrical reviews, fire protection reviews, proposed modifications and exemption requests related to the Appendix R evaluation of Fort St. Vrain. The following summarize the topics to be addressed in each of those reports:

Report No. 2 - Electrical Reviews o Breaker Coordination Study o Hot Shorts Evaluations o Common Enclosure Evaluations 4

o Cable Isolation and Separation o ACM Spurious Valve Operation Report No. 3 - Fire Protection o Equipment / Component Location o Fire Areas o Structural Steel and Debris Damage o Fire Barriers and Penetrations o Electrical Penetration Seals o Component Separation / Protection o Fire Detection Systems o Fire Suppression Systems o Combustible Cases / Fluids o Component / Equipment Accessibility (Felix / Fred to handle manual valves) i o Emergency Lighting o Personnel Requirements

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4 Report No. 4 - Exemptions / Modifications o Fire Hazards Analysis Data Review j o Operating Procedure Data o ACM Procedure Evaluation o Other Procedures 1 o Communications o Exemption Requests o Proposed Modifications

These reports will be submitted consistent wth the schedules described in Section l 1.5.

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APPEbolX A PSC Le s it.H TO NRC DATED AUGUST 17,1984 (P-84281)

SUBJECT:

10CFR50, APPEbolX R FIRE PROTECTION REGULATORY GUIDANCE (Fire Protection Acceptance Criteria) l l

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'v' PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO

' O.80x e40 D E N V C #. COLORADO acaos

  • * * * " " August 17,1984 Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 P-84281 Mr. Eric H. Johnson, Chief Reactor Project Branch 1 Region IV Nuclear Regulatory Comission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 DOCKET NO. 50-267

SUBJECT:

10CFR50, Appendix R Fire Protection Regulatory Guidance

REFERENCES:

1) NRC Letter, Wagner to Lee, dated h June 4, 1984 (G-84176)
2) PSC Letter, Lee to Johnson, dated June 22, 1984 (P-84183)
3) NRC Letter, Johnson to Lee, dated July 18, 1984 (G-84257)

Dear Mr. Johnson:

This letter responds to your July 18, 1984 letter (reference 3) which transmitted NRC concerns /coments on the Fire Protection Regulatory Guidance submitted via reference 2.

Attachment 1 to this letter is the revised schedule for completion of our fire protection review and the modification requested in reference 3. Attachment 2 includes the revised " Fire Protection Safe Reactor Shutdcwn/Cooldown Capability for the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station" which incorporates your concerns /coments. This ,

regulatory guidance will be used for ensuring compliance with Section )

III.G of 10CFR50, Appendix R. In response to your coment 1 of l reference 3, we have deleted the sentence as requested in order to expedite this document and because it did not affect this fire protection review. Deletion of that sentence does not imply that PSC concurs that the sentence is incorrect.

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P-84281 Pag 2 2 Your early review and concurrence with the proposed regulatory guidance in Attachment 2 is requested. If you have any questions or O *ish to discuss the proposed suidaace ia Attachment 2 ,iease contact Mr. M. H. Holmes at (303) 571-8409.

Very truly yours, Od'/ 00

0. R. Lee, Vice President Electric Prdduction ORL/FWT:pa Attachment l

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Attachm:nt 1 to P-84281 Page 1 of 1 FSV

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(O Scheduie for to >endixraev'ew end Submittais  !

and Plant Modifications '

Comitment Date Commitment 1

August 17, 1984 PSC will submit revised schedule and Fire Frotection Regulatory Guidance November 17, 1984 PSC will submit first portion of Fire Protection Review December 17, 1984 PSC will submit second portion of Fire Protection Review January 17, 1985 PSC will submit third portion of Fire Protection Review February 17, 1985 PSC will submit final portion of Fire Protection Review 3 weeks following PSC will submit schedule for any written NRC approval proposed modifications not complete (SER) of entire Review at that time May 17,1985 PSC will complete modification to

'Q automate J and G wall fixed water spray system

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Attachment 2 to P-84281 Page 1 of 7

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~O rire 'rotectio" s>re ae ctor shutdo*"' coo'do*" cea bi'itv c for the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station

-I . Applicability The following regulatory guidance for compliance with the fire protection provisions of Section III.G of 10CFR50, Appendix R are applicable to the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station.

II. Appendix R Fire Protection Acceptance Criteria at Fort St.

Vrain L ' A. Congested Cable Areas

1. Congested cable areas shall be defined as the Control

. Room 480 Volt Switchgear Room, the Auxiliary Electric Room, and the congested cable areas along the J and G walls currently protected with a coating of Flamemastic and spray systems. ,

2. Limiting consequences of a fire in a congested cable area:

For any single fire in a congested cable area means shall be available to shut down and cool down the h reactor in a manner such that the consequences of DBA-U 1, as defined in FSAR Appendix D (Rev. 1), are not exceeded.

3. Perfomance gcals for safe reactor shutdown /cooldown.

functions for a fire in a congested cable area shall' be:

a. The reactivity control function shall be capable

- of achieving and maintaining a subcritical reactivity condition.

b. The pressure control function shall be capable of l

achievingdepressurization(if required) through l the helium purification system.

l l c. The PCRV liner cooling function shall be capable of maintaining the PCRV integrity, and shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.

d. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings (local or remote) of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.

Attachment 2 to P-84281 Page 2 of 7

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() e. The supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc.

necessary to permit operation of the equipment used for safe reactor shutdown /cooldown functions A.3.a through A.3.c above.

B. Non-Congested Cable Areas

1. Limiting consequences of a fire in non-congested cable areas:

For any single fire in a non-congested cable area means shall be available to shut down and cool down the reactor in a manner such that no fuel damage occurs (i.e. maximum fuel particle temperature does not exceed 2900 degrees F). There shall be no simultaneous rupture of both a primary coolant boundary and the associated secondary containment boundary such that no unmonitored radiological releases of primary coolant occur.

2. Perfomance goals for safe reactor shutdown /cooldown functions for a fire in non-congested cable areas shall be:

O a. The reactivity control function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining subcritical reactivity conditions.

b. Maintain the PCRV liner integrity and PCRV structural and pressure containment integrity.
c. The reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining forced circulation decay heat removal.
d. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings (local or remote) of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.

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e. The supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc.

necessary to pennit operation of the equipment used for safe reactor shutdown /cooldown functions B.2.a through B.2.c above.

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l Attachment 2 to P-84281 Page 3 of 7 (O tit- sa cific criteria A. The congested cable areas at the G and J walls shall be protected with automatic sprinkler or spray systems which comply with either NFPA Standard No. 13 or with NFPA Standard No. 15.

B. The safe reactor shutdown /cooldown capability for specific fire locations may be unique for each such area, room or zone, or it may be one unique combination of systems for all such locations. In either case the redundant or alternate safe reactor shutdown /cooldown capability shall be physically and electrically independent of the specific fire location, i

C.

The capability redundant shallor alternate safe reactor shutdown /cooldown

' accomodate post fire conditions where offsite power is available and where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

D. Redundant and alternate equipment and systems perfoming

' safe reactor shutdown /cooldown functions shall, prior to j

considering any postulated fire damage, be capable of being powered either by both an off-site and an on-site power source, or by two independent on-site power sources.

E. Procedures shall be in effect to implement the capability to

' safely shut down and cool down the reactor in the event of any single fire.

F. The number of operating shift personnel, exclusive of fire a

brigade members, required to operate the safe reactor I

shutdown /cooldown equipment and systems shall be onsite at all times the reactor is not shutdown. All other personnel required for any resulting emergency shall respond within

required time limits.

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G. Systems used to ensure the post fire safe reactor shutdown /cooldown capability need not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, or i other design basis accident criteria, except where required i

for other reasons, e.g., because of interface with or impact on existing safety systems, or because of adverse valve i actions due to fire damage.

H. The safe reactor shutdown /cooldown equipment and systems for each location shall be known to be isolated from associated circuits in that location so that hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground in the associated circuits will not lO

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Attachment 2 to P-84281 Page 4 of 7 i

O prevent operation of the safe reactor shutdown /cooldown equipment.

I. Water-filled mechanical components, such as piping and valves, necessary for safe reactor shutdown /cooldown which are within the area, room or zone encompassed by a single postulated fire shall not be considered damaged by the fire.

Water-filled valves and mechanical components with manual operators in the fire area, room, or zone shall be considered to be manually operable within one hour after the start of the fire.

IV. BasisSection III.L of Appendix R to 10CFR50 provides the perfonnance critiria for Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability for light water reactors. Because of the unique design features of Fort St.

Vrain, a gas cooled reactor, all criteria of Section III.L are not applicable and revised acceptance criteria have been developed. The Acceptance Criteria in Part II of this document provide limiting consequences for single fires in congested cable areas and in non-

, congested cable areas for determination of acceptable safe reactor shutdown /cooldown systems and equipment under either Section III.G.2 or Section III.G.3 of 10CFR50 Appendix R. These limiting consequences ensure that public health and safety will not be threatened for any single fire in the FSV Nuclear Generating Station.

FSV has two primary means of achieving and maintaining safe reactor shutdown /cooldown. For either means the control rods and/or i the reserve shutdown system is utilized to shutdown the reactor and maintain a subcritical reactivity condition. The decay heat removal

', function can be performed by 1) forced circulation cooling or by 2)

PCRV liner cooling. There exists multiple redundant and/or alternate j means for achieving and maintaining either of these two cooldown modes. The consequences of both of these cooldown modes have been analyzed, reviewed by the NRC Staff, and found acceptable.

The limiting event involving forced circulation cooldown occurs s when an interruption of forced circulation (10FC) takes place

followed by a firewater cooldown as analyzed in FSAR Section 14.4.2.2. Following the 10FC forced circulation is resumed when
firewater is supplied to either the reheater or the economizer / evaporator /superheater section of one steam generator and boosted firewater is supplied to the water turbine drive of one helium circulator. Fuel temperatures remain below 2900 degrees F as shown in FSAR Figure 14.4-6 and no fuel damage is predicted to occur.

Fuel damage will not occur so long as fuel temperatures do not exceed 2900 degrees F. At fuel temperatures in excess of 2900 degrees F the fuel failure mode has been determined to be fuel kernel O

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Attachment 2 to P-84281 i

Page 5 of 7 i

migration through the fuel coating layers. As stated in the basis j for Technical Specification SL 3.1, the Core Safety Limit has been j_ established to assure that a fuel kernel migrating at the highest rate in the core will penetrate a distance less that the combined ,

thickness of the buffer coating plus inner isotropic coating on the '

particle. It is further noted in the basis for SL 3.1 that the maximum fuel kernel migration expected for the fuel with the most damaging temperature history is less than 20 microns. Thus, out of a

, total inner coating thickness of 70 microns, only 50 microns is i

assumed to be available in establishing the limits in SL 3.1. Actual testing of TRISO coated fuel particles has shown that at 2900 degrees

F fuel kernels will not migrate through the buffer and inner isotropic coatings for several hundred hours. Therefore, 2900
degrees F was chosen as a fuel safety limit (FSAR Section 3.2.3.3).

l j The FSV fuel testing program is described in FSAR Appendix A.I.

l Table A.1.9 shows that five of six samples of TRISO fuel particles had no evidence of fuel kernel migration after 250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br /> at 1600 degrees C (2912 degrees F) while the sixth sample had only 5 microns of fuel kernel migration. These are all well below the 50 micron

) fuel kernel migration at which fuel particle damage is judged to -

occur. FSAR Figure 3.6-8 predicts that it would take approximately j 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> at 2900 degrees F before the fuel kernel would migrate j through the buffer and inner isotropic coating layers. This is  !

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j consistent with the statement in FSAR Section 14.2.2.7 that " Data for the impact of time and temperature on fuel particle integrity indicate that failure could be expected for any fuel reaching 2500 4 degrees C maintained above 2000 degrees C for almost an hour, or at i

1600 degrees C for times up to several hundred hours." The 2900

} degrees F limit to ensure no fuel damage in II. B of the Appendix R

! Fire Protection Acceptance Criteria at Fort St. Vrain is conservative since forced circulation decay heat removal results in a relatively fast cooldown such that fuel temperatures will not remain high for

long periods of time, and only very limited, if any, fuel kernel j migration will occur.

) The limiting event involving PCRV liner cooldown occurs when I forced circulation is lost and cannot be restored. This permanent j loss of forced circulation is referred to as Design Basis Accident l No. I and is analyzed in Appendix D of the FSAR. In this accident

) reactivity is maintained suberitical by insertion of the control l rods, followed by insertion of the reserve shutdown system's boron carbide balls within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. PCRV liner cooling is established utilizing any one of the four PCRV liner cooling water pumps or by utilizing one of the firewater pumps to supply either one of the two PCRV liner cooling loops. The radiological consequences of Design Basis Accident No. 1 are only a small fraction of the guidelines established in 10CFR100. The NRC SER dated June 21, 1969 concludes

! that the doses resulting from Design Basis Accident No. 1 are insignificant and acceptable.

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Attachment 2 i

to P-84281 Page 6 of 7 l The ?ernate Cooling Method (ACM) provides an independent source j of power to specific safe reactor shutdown /cooldown equipment using

' the PCRV liner cooling method. PCRV liner cooling can be achieved and maintained using the ACM power source for a postulated fire in a congested cable area which causes a LOFC accident and/or disables the nomal power supply cables to the equipment items necessary for PCRV liner cooling. In the SER to Amendment No. 21 to FSV's operating license, dated June 6, 1979, the NRC Staff concluded: "this alternative cooling method (ACM) will ensure that conditions and public health and safety consequences, analyzed and presented in Design Basis Accident number 1 in the FSAR, are not exceeded in the case of such disruptive faults or events (these include a major fire) in congested cable areas." The ACM thus provides an acceptable source of power to the equipment necessary to achieve and maintain PCRV liner cooling.

1 The Acceptance Criteria specified in Part II of this document apply to either III.G.2 or III.G.3, whichever the Licensee chooses to comply with for a postulated single fire in a specific area, room or zone of FSV. The Staff has imposed more stringent acceptance i

criteria for fires in non-congested cable areas than for fires in t

congested cables areas. The Acceptance Criteria for both areas are in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criterion 3, which states " Structures, systems and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires..."

Based on the consequences of DBA-1, the staff concludes that for a postulated fire in the three room control complex or in congested cable areas at, the G and J walls, the substitution of acceptance criteria of DBA-1 in place of the criteria in III.L relating to cold shutdown and limits on reactor coolant system process variables is acceptable, provided that the fire protection features in these areas are enhanced over the minimum requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R as required by Specific Criterion A in Part III of this document. ,

The acceptance criteria for a postulated fire in a non-congested cable area are: no fuel damage shall occur, there shall be no simultaneous rupture of both a primary coolant boundary and the associated secondary containment boundary such that no unmonitored

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radiological releases of primary coolant occur. At FSV the primary coolant boundary includes the PCRV liner, the PCAV penetration primary closures, the steam generator tubes inside the PCRV, the PCRV rupture discs, and piping which contains primary coolant. The secondary containment boundar includes the PCRV itself; the PCRV i penetration secondary closures;yfeedwater piping, main steam piping, and reheat steam piping up to the first isolation valves; the PCRV liner cooling water tubes; lines open to a PCRV penetration '

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Attachment 2 to P-84281  !

Page 7 of 7 h ,

interspace; the PCRV safety relief valves dowstream of the rupture discs; and the PCRV safety relief valve tank.

These criteria ensure that the PCRV helium coolant inventory will be maintained and no significant release of primary coolant will occur. The performance goals for a fire in a non-congested cable 4

area specify that forced circulation shall be achieved and maintained

) for the reactor heat removal function. This requirement is based on the fact that the establishment of forced circulation cooling, within a time dependent on reactor power history, is necessary to prevent

fuel damage.

j The criteria in III.L relating to cold shutdown and limits on 4 reactor coolant process variables such that there i s no fuel clad ,

l' damage nor rupture of any primary coolant or containment boundary, '

apply to light water reactors and are not directly applicable to the .

Fort St. Vrain HTGR. The FSV Acceptance Criteria for a fire in non-congested cable areas, which require no fuel damage and no  ;

i simultaneous rupture of both a primary coolant boundary and the associated secondary containment boundary, are considered to be as

! effective as the III.L light water reactor criteria for ensuring the i public health and safety is protected. t The Specific Criteria 8 through H, in Part III of this document, i parallel the criteria for light water reactors contained in III.L.

Q Specific Criterion C requires that the redundant or alternate safe

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reactor shutdown /cooldown capability acconnodate post fire conditions i

j where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. FSV is required i i

by the Technical Specifications to have sufficient diesel fuel on -

site to permit operation of both standby generators under required ,

loading conditions for at least seven days (LCO 4.6.1) and operation >

of the ACM diesel generator for 108 hours0.00125 days <br />0.03 hours <br />1.785714e-4 weeks <br />4.1094e-5 months <br /> with full ACM load (LCO 4.2.17). Specific Criterion I of Part III is based on the Staff's consideration that manually operable mechanical components containing water would not be damaged by a postulated fire. '

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ACM PROCEDURES 1

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLCRADS S0P 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Issue 13 Page 1 of 48 i I

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v FORT ST. VRAIN .;

TITLE: ALTERNATE CCOLING METHOD fiON - CONTROLLED }

COPY a vEmmssuE  :

STATUS WITH 00CUMENT.ENTEA

~~

lSSUANCE Pm0R TO USE AUTHORIZED Fonu n22M BY , / %dd '

PORC [ EFFECTIVE Review PORc 5 5 5 FEB 9- 1984 DATE 2-Ib - Sk TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION I Section Title pace 1.0 SYSTEM PRECAUTICNS AND LIMITATIONS .................... 4 1.1 Techni cal Speci fiation s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2 System Purpose.................................. 4

, 1.3 Sy s tem De sc ri pti o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4 Major Electrical Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Table 1 Equipment Cross reference.............. 8 Figure 1 ACM Power Di stributi on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.0 S Y S T EM S TA RTU P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.1 Prerequisites to 0peration.................'..... 11 2.2 Placing the ACM System in Operation ............ 14 3.0 SYSTEM OPERATICN ...................................... 22 3.1 General Equipment Operation .................... 22 3.2 Purification System Valves HV-2301 and HV-2302.. 22 3.3 Returning ACM Powered Equipment to No rma l Powe r So u rc e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "

3.4 Ventilation of ACM Batteries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 I

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1 l PC AM 373 23 3443 1

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f 4g n.

U TABLE OF CCNTENTS (Continued)

SECTION I Section Title sz ;e 4.0 SYSTEM SHUTOCWN........................................ 31 4.1 Shutdown of ACM Ofesel Generator from Supplying ACM Loads........................ 31 4.2 Shutdown of ACM Diesel Generator from Exercise or Lead Test...................... 31 5.0 ABNCRMAL OPERATIONS - (not applicable as the entire system is considered an abnormal operating system)

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  1. 04M 373 23 3443

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 l FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Page 3 of 48 rN t i

%.J TABLE OF CCNTENTS (Continued)

SECTION II SHIFT SUPERVISCR CHECKLIST OF ACM EQUIPMENT OPERATION Se: tion Title Page Che:klist.................................................... 32 1.0 ACM Generator.......................................... 35 2.0 Firewater Pumphouse Fans and Firewater Pump. . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.0 S e rvi c e Wate r Sy s tem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 4.0 Cir:ulating Water Makeup .............................. 36 5.0 System 46.............................................. 37 6.0 Heli um Puri fica ti on System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 7.0 Reactor Building Exhaust Fans...'....................... 42 8.0 PCRV Depressurt:ation.................................. 42

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9.0 Insertion of Reserve Shutdown Material ................ 44 10.0 Redi stribute System 46 Flow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 11.0 System 46 Surge Tank Pressurization.................... 48 APPENDIX I ACM Valve List v

P0mW 373 D 300

l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 )

0 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENE l'ATING STATION 4

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(V l 1.0 SYSTEM PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 1.1 Technical Soecifications The operator should be familiar with the follcwing Technical Specifications which are pertinent to the operation of System 48-01. Refer to Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specifications.

I 1.1.1 LCO 4.2.17 - Diesel Driven Generator for ACM, Limiting Condition for Operation.

l 1.1.2 LCO 4.2.18 -

Primary Coolant Depressuri:ation, Limiting Condition for Operation.

1.2 System pureose l 1.2.1 System 48-01, the alternate cooling method (ACM),

provides an alternate means of cooling the reactor in the event of the occurrence of disruptive faults or events, such as a ma, lor fire, in congested cable areas. This method is provided to ensure that conditions and public health and safety consequences, analy:ed and presented in the Design

'(v ) Basis Accicant Number 1 (Permanent Loss of Forced Circulation) in the Final Safety Analysis Report, are not exceeded.

1.3 System Descriotion l 1.3.1 The ACM system is designed to provide sufficient electric power to operate the following equipment items: (see ACM one line diagram, Figure 1)

a. Fire Water Pump, P-4501
b. Service Water Pump, P-4201 or P-4202
c. Service Water Tower Fan, C-4201X or C-4202X
d. Service Water Return Pump, P-4203 or C-4204
e. PCRV Liner Cooling System Pumps (2),

P-4601 or P-46015/P-4602 or P-46025

f. Circulating Water Makeup Pump, CWMUP-1A or CWMUP-18

,p g. Reactor Plant Exhaust Fan, C-7301 or V C-7302 PoRM 373 33 3H3

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST, VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION S 4

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h. Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps (2), P-4803 and P-4804
1. Helium Purification Cooling Water Pump, P-4701 or P-4702 l
j. Firewater Pump House Vent Fans (2), C-7521 and C-7522 A. Motor Operated Valves, HV-2301 or HV-2302 1
1. Stack Effluent Gas Radiation Monitor, PING-1 -
m. Fire Pump House Louvers (2)
n. Selected Plant Lighting
o. Breathing Air Compressors (2), C-4501 and C-4502
p. Startup Battery for Diesel Generator and D.C. Control ,

' C5 l 1.3.2 These items represent slightly less than a 700 KW design load. Electric power to meet these design requirements is supplied bi a separate, dedicated, manually started, diesel engine driven generator unit, the ACM Diesel Generator, K-4804, which is independent of both plant normal and emergency electrical power sources and is rated at 2,750 KW.

l 1.3.3 Existing plant equipment has been used to the maximum extent possible. The ACM system has been designed to ensure that it does not compromise the previously established design or operating limits of such equipment.

1.3.4 Under normal plant operating conditions, the ACM l

diesel generator is shutdown and maintained in a standby mode with the ACM 4160 volt bus de-energized, and the ACM 480 volt load center bus fed from the 480 volt Turbine Plant HVAC load center.

NOTE: Under these conditions, the ACM 480V 1040 Center Bus is capable of supplying only ACM Generator Auxiliary Power. 00 NOT allow use of the backup circuits to E Security System and/or the Technical

'O Support Center without putting the ACM V Generator in service FIRST.

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO 50P 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENE 7lATING STATION 6 of 48 id V

i 1.3.5 The ACM 480' volt motor control center is fed from ,

the ACM load center bus and provides power to the ACM diesel generator auxiliaries and the ACM diesel battery charger to maintain the ACM diesel ready for operation.

l 1.3.6 Electric power is available to ACM loads from the energi:ed ACM load center and motor control center busses, but remains isolated by the manual transfer switches which are selected for normal plant electric power sources.

l 1.3.7 System 43-01 is a backup system which is not used for normal operation of the plant. The conditions and sequence under which it is required to be placed in service are specified in the Safe Shutdown and Cooline with Hichly Decracee Concitions procacure.

l 1.3.8 In the event of a loss of all normal and standby 480 volt essential power, the ACM system is p1 2ced in service as a single operation per Section II of this procedure.

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l 1.3.9 In the event of a Loss of Forced Circulation Situation, installation of the HTFA cooling spool pieces shall be started one half hour after the loss and depressurization of the PCRV shall be started at the time determined from the curves of Emergency Procedure G.

l 1.3.10 The startup, shutdown, and operating procedures for each individual part of System 48-01 are provided l in appropriate sections of this procedure.

Section II provides the procedure to be followed in

. the case where the entire system is placed in service at one time.

l 1.3.11 System 48-01 is designed for manual operation and requires operator action to place it in service.

In order to control the implementation of the ACM, the Shift Supervisor shall establish a means of communications with the person or persons performing the required manual operations.

1.4 Major Electrical Equipment 1.4.1 ACM Diesel Generator (K-4804) is a self-contained unit designed to provide 4160 volt AC, 3/, 60 Hz power at up to 2,750 KW.

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PoRM 373 33 3e43

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 7 of 4g I (v) 1.4.2 ACM 4160 Volt Switch Gear (N-4866)

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1.4.2.1 One breaker which feeds 4160/480 volt AC ACM transformer.

1.4.2.2 One breaker which feeds ACM diesel exercise breaker.

1.4.3 ACM Diesel Exercise Breaker (N-4869) connects ACM diesel generator to the reserve auxiliary transformer in order to load test the ACM diesel generator.

1.4.4 ACM 480 volt Lead Center (N-4868) feeds ACM 480 volt MCC and other ACM loads and is back fed from the HVAC LC.

1.4.5 ACM 480 volt Motor Control Center (N-4870).

1.4.6 ACM Diesel 011 Transfer Pumps (P-4803,P-4804) supply makeup fuel oil to the ACM diesel fuel oil day tank from T-3401 or T-8402. They are fed from the ACM 480 volt MCC.

() 1.4.7 ACM diesel battery charger is fed from the ACM 480 volt MCC.

1.4.8 Electrical equipment provided with ACM is listed with normal and ACM power source in Table 1.

1.4.9 A simple one line diagram of the ACM power distribution is shown in Figure 1.

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Page 8 of 48  ;

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l TABLE 1 l EQUIPMENT CROSS REFERENCE l EQUIPMENT l l l TRANSFER l l l NUMBER l NORMAL HS l NORMAL FEED l SWITCH l ACM FEED l l l l I l l lP-4501 l HS-4504-2 1 480V Bus 1 l N-4876 l ACM 480V LC l l l l l l l IP-4201 l HS-4211-1 l ASOV Bus 1 l N-4874 l ACM 480V LC l l l l l 1 l lP-4202 l HS-4211-2 l 480V Bus 2 1 N-4875 l ACM 480V LC l l l l 1 I l lP-4203 l HS-4201-1 l TB MCC 1 l N-48S1 l ACM MCC l l l l l l 1 lP-4204 l HS-4201-2 l TB MCC 2 i N-4882 l ACM MCC l l l l l l l lC-4201x l HS-4231-1 l TB MCC 1 l N-4871 l ACM MCC l l l l l l 1 lC-4202X l HS-4232-1 l TB MCC 3 i N-4872 l ACM MCC l l l l l l l o lP-4601 l HS-4601 l 480V Bus 1 l N-4877 l ACM 480V LC

,d l l l l l l

l lP-46015 l HS-4603 l 480V Bus 2 l N-4878 l ACM 480V LC l l l l l I I lP-4602 l HS-4602 l 480V Bus 3 l N-4879 l ACM 480V LC l l l l l l l lP-46025 l HS-4604 1 480V Bus 2 i N-4880 l ACM 480V LC l l l l 1 I l lP-4701 l HS-4701 i Rx MCC 1A l N-4845 l ACM MCC l l l l l l- l lP-4702 l HS-4702 l Rx MCC 3 l N-4846 l ACM MCC l l l l l l l lChMUP-1A l HS-4102 l 480V Bus 3 l N-4847 l ACM 480V LC l l l l 1 1 l lCWHUP-18 l HS-4103 l 480V Bus 1 l N-4848 l ACM 480V LC l l l l l l 1 lC-7301 l HS-7323 l Rx MCC 1A l N-4843 l ACM 480V LC l 1  ! I l I l lC-7302 l HS-7358 l Rx MCC 2 l N-4844 l ACM 480V LC l l l l- 1 I I lC-7521 l TIC-75104 l TB MCC 1 l N-4855 l ACM MCC l

I I I I I I i

lC-7522 l TIC-75108 l TB MCC 3 l N-4856 l ACM MCC l I I I I I lP-4803 l ----------- l ------------ l ---------- lI 480V MCC l l l l l l l lP-4804 l ----------- 1 ------------ l ---------- l 480V MCC

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lHV-2301 l HS-2301 1 Rx MCC 2 l N-4842 l 480V MCC l l l' I I I l PORM 373 22 3443

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENER ATING STATION IIDI' I Issue 13 Page 9 of 48 i {

TABLE I EQUIPMENT CROSS RE ERENCE l EQUIPMENT l l [ TRANSFER I l lNUMEER l NORMAL HS l NORMAL FEED l SWITCH l ACM FEED l l 1 1 I l i lHV-2302 i HS-2302 l Rx MCC 3 l N-4841 l 480V MCC l l 1 l l l l lC-4501 l HS-4598 l Rx Plant l N-4501 l 480V MCC l lC-4502 l HS-45100 l HVAC MCC l l l l l l l l l 1

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 9#8 Issue 13 Page 10 of 48

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-}, Act Diesel Generator asserve Auxiliary i Transformer EVAC 4160 Y Sue l I From Turbine Plant ITAC 480 Y LC (normal Supply) i Act 480 Y Land Canter Sue l I

1 7 a 5 o ) )

a F4 01 F 201 C-7301 f:

F4601 F4602 Security 7,, ,g er er or er **' hP SuPFort F-4202 C-7302 F-s4013 F46023 Cauer anc hp g ,g et CWH 7-13 Act 480 y mtar Centrol Cancer Frwa 40 ITA Trans.

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C42012 P-4803 P-4701 60 ETA Fire 23 ETA er er

  • Tren t. uster C42022 F4702 Feed Pump Traaf.

t lesse Feed Anactar F4203 P4404 Act D/G C4501 3 ETA er seuse or Traa f. F1.m t F4206 Fower C-4502 Eases.

l Lighting (See (2777)

Act POVt1 StSTinU* TOM ET-2301/

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO S0P 48-01 FOaT ST. VDAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION sue

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\J l 2.0 SYSTEM STARTUP l 2.1 prerecuisites to coeration l 2.1.1 ACM Electrical Distribution Preoperational System Lineup l 2.1.1.1 4160 Volt Breakers l (a) ACM Exercise Breaker (ACM Bus) - Open l (b) ACM Exercise Breaker (HVAC Bus) -

Closed l (c) ACM Feed Breaker (ACM Transformer) -

3 pen l 2.1.1.2 ACM 480 Volt Lead Center l (a) Circulating Water Makeup pumps Breaker

- Open 1 (b) Fire Water Pump Breaker - Open d

U l (c) Service Water Supply Pump Breaker -

Open 1 (d) Reactor Plant Exhaust Fan Breaker -

Open I (e) Loop 1 Reactor Plant Cooling Water Pump Breaker - Open l (f) Loop 2 Reactor Plant Cooling Water Pump Breaker - Open l (g) ACM 480 Volt MCC Breaker - Closed l

(h) HVAC LC Breaker (normal source) -

Closed l (1) Security System Backup Breaker -

Closed' l (j) Technical Support Center Backup Breaker - Open Security backup feed transfer switch open to ACM feed at the Security Building.

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION e 3

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. l l 2.1.1.3 ACM 480 Volt Motor Control Center l (a) 277 Volt Lighting Breaker - Open l (b) ACM Diesel Generator Battery Charger Breaker - Closed l (c) Breathing Air Compressor Breaker -

Open l (d) 25 KVA Transformer Primary Breaker -

Closed l (e) 45 KVA Transformer Primary Breaker -

Closed l (f) 3 KVA Transformer Primary Breaker -

Closed l (g) 3 KVA Transformer Secondary Breaker -

Open l (h) Firewater Pump House Breaker - Open O i (4) Service Water Return Pum, Breaker -

Open l (j) Purification Cooling Water Pump Breaker - Open I (k) 1A ACM Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Pump Breaker - Closed l (1) IB ACM Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Pump Breaker - Closed l (m) Service Water Tower Fan Breaker - Open l (n) Power Distribution Panel - 277 Volt -

All Switches Closed l 2.1.2 ACM Diesel Generator (K-4804) l 2.1.2.1 ACM Diesel Generator to ACM Loads (No Power on ACM 480 Volt LC) l (a) At the ACM diesel Generator activate the READY push button.

l (b) Place the manual selector switch (MS)

'C in the ACM (independent) position.

P0mW 373 22 3643

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SGP 48-01 8 '

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

((27 l (c) Place Engine " Start /Stop" switch to start for about 5 seconds.

NOTE: Engine will start and idle for approximately 90 seconds. Then increase to approximately 900 rpm.

Generator will self excite after approximately 14 seconds and " Bus" voltage will start to build up. ACM Back Feed ACB Breaker will trip.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker.

NOTE: ACM feed breaker must be closed within 60 seconds of generator voltage buildup.

l (e) Bus voltage should be approximately 4160 volts and frequency should be approximately 60.9 hertz.

l 2.1.2.2 ACM Diesel Generator " Exercise" or Lead (RAT Backfeed) h l (a) Verify the 4160 ACM breaker open.

l (b) Verify the 4160 ACM Load Test Breaker Open.

l (c) Verify closed the 4160 ACM HVAC Lead Test Breaker.

l (d) Verify the battery switch (knife switch) in the generator control cabinet is closed.

l (e) Activate READY push button.

l (f) Set MS te IDLE.

l (g) Press START push button on engine control panel. Engine shculd start.

l (h) After engine has run at IDL'I speed (200 rpm) for 2 minutes, set MS to RUN. Engine should increase speed to 900 rpm.

l l (i) Use voltage control switch to match diesel generator voltage with system

((] voltage.

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PORM 373 22 3M3

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION gy f 4g to I (f) Use governor control switch and synchroni:er to synchronize frequency of diesel generator with system frequency.

l (k) Close ACM load test breaker at proper instant per the synchroni:er.

l (1) Use governor control switch to adjust load to desired load.

l 2.1.3 ACM Diesel Fuel Oil System l 2.1.3.1 Valve Lineup l (a) Complete System 48-01 valve lineup per Appendix 1.

l (b) Close or verify closed P-4803 end P-4804 breakers at ACM MCC.

l (c) Set HS-48506 at the ACM MCC to the desired pump.

't ( l (d) Set HS-48500 at the ACM MCC to AUTO.

l (e) Set HS-48501 at the ACM MCC to AUTO.

l 2.2 placing the ACM System in Ooeration If the entire ACM system is to be placed in operation because of a disruptive event in the congested cable area use the procedure of Section II of this SOP.

If the only use of the ACM system is to provide powar to equipment which has lost its normal power source use the l appropriate steps of Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 of this 50P.

If a LOFC incident has occurred in conjunction with some loss of electrical power use Section II of this 50P.

l l 2.2.1 Placing ACM Equipment in Service l 2.2.1.1 Open the feed breaker to the ACM 480 Volt load center from the HVAC LC. Compartment Al at the ACM 480 Volt load center.

l 2.2.1.2 Place the ACM diesel generator on line per i Step 2.1.2 of this 50P.

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION y Cf 4g ggm

.D 1 2.2.1.3 Veri fy the ACM diesel generator fuel oil I pumps are operable per Step 2.1.3 of this 50P.

l 2.2.2 Individual ACM Powered Equipment Items l 2.2.2.1 Placing the fire water pump house fans and fire water pump P-4501 in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Open the normal feed breaker for C-7521 at turbine building MCC 1.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker for C-7522 at turbine building MCC 3.

l (c) At the C-7521 transfer box place the toggle and knife switches in the ACM position.

l (d) At the C-7522 transfer box place the toggle and knife switches in the ACM postion. ,

'h l (e) Verify all breakers in the ACM distribution panel N-4854 are closed.

l (f) At the ACM 480 Volt MCC close the fire pump house feed breaker.

l ('g) Place HS-4504-2 in the pull to lock position.

l (h) Open the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 2.

l (1) Place transfer switch N-4876 in the ACM position.

l (j) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM 480 Volt load center.

I 2.2.2.2 Placing service water supply pump P-4201 in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4211-1 in the pull to lock position. l l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 1.

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FORM 372 22 3843 l

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j PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEArt GENERATING STATION f 4g l

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4874 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM 480 Volt load center.

l 2.2.2.3 Placing service water supply pump P-4202 in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4211-2 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 2.

l (c) Place transfer switch N .4875 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM 480 Volt lead center.

l 2.2.2.4 Placing service water return pump P-4203 in operation on ACM power.

~

,p l (a) Place HS-4201-1 in the pull to lock (J position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 1.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4881 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM MCC.

l (e) Depress the START switch on the ACM MCC.

l 2.2.2.5 Placing service water return pump P-4204 in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4201-2 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 2.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4881 in the ACM position.

'O PORM 372 3843 1

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VR AsN NUCLEAR GENEft ATING STATION s e r~ 1 (K.)

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM MCC.

l (e) Depress the START switch on the ACM MCC.

l 2.2.2.6 Placing service water tower fan C-4201X in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4231-1 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the no rmal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 3.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4871 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM MCC.

l (e) Depress the START switch on the ACM MCC.

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('f l 2.2.2.7 Placing service water tower fan C-4202X in l operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4232-1 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 3.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4872 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM MCC.

l (e) Depress the START switch on the ACM MCC.

I 2.2.2.8 Placing PCRV cooling water pump P-4601 in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4601 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 1.

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l PORM 3M- 22 3M3 l

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 Ssue FORT ST. 'VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f

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.l (c) Place transfer switch N-4877 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM 480 Volt lead center. l l 2.2.2.9 Placing PCRV cooling water pump P-46015 in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4603 in the pull to lock position.

I (b) Open the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 2.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4878 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM 480 Volt load center.

l 2.2.2.10 Placing PCRV cooling water pump P-4602 in operation on ACM power.

(a) Place HS-4602 in the pull to lock

(]} l position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at 430 Volt Bus 3.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4879 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM 480 Volt lead center.

l 2.2.2.11 Placing PCRV cooling water pump P-4602S in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4604 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 2.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4880 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM 480 Volt load center.

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FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f 4g e l 2.2.2.12 Placing purification cooling water pump P-4701 in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4701 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at reactor plant MCC 1A.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4845 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM MCC.

l (e) Depress the START switch on the ACM MCC.

l 2.2.2.13 Placing purification cooling water pump P-4702 in operation on ACM powe?.

1 (a) Place HS-4702 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at hf reactor plant MCC 3.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4846 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM MCC.

l (e) Depress the START switch on the ACM MCC.

l 2.2.2.14 Placing circulating water makeup pump CWMUP-1A in operation on ACM power.

1 (a) Place HS-4102 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 3.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4847 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM 480 Volt load center.

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l l 2.2.2.15 Placing circulating water makeup pume CWMUP-1B in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-4103 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 1.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4848 in the ACM position.

l (d) Close the ACM feed breaker at the ACM 480 Volt load center.

l '

2.2.2.16 Placing reactor plant exhaust fan C-7301 in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-7323 in the pull to lock position.

1 (b) Open the normal feed breaker at reactor plant MCC 1A.

,{\ l (c) Place transfer' switch N-4871 in the ACM position.

l (d) At the ACM exhaust fan damper operating panel close V-73848.

l (e) At the ACM exhaust fan damper operating panel connect the nitrogen

, bottle to the DV-73453 and DV-73456 air supply line.

l (f) Adjust the nitrogen bottle pressure to 50 psig and verify DV-73453 and DV-73456 are open.

l (g) At the ACM MCC close the reactor plant exhaust fans feed breaker.

l 2.2.2.17 Placing reactor plant exhaust fan C-7302 in operation on ACM power.

l (a) Place HS-7358 in the pull to lock position.

l (b) Open the normal feed breaker at reactor plant MCC 2.

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l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ssue f g to I (c) Place transfer switch N-4872 in the ACM position.

l (d) At the ACM exhaust fan damper operating panel close V-73849.

l (e) At the ACM exhaust fan damper operating panel connect the nitrogen bottle to the DV-73454 and DV-73457 air supply line.

l (f) Adjust the nitrogen bottle pressure to 50 psig and verify DV-73454 and DV-73457 are open.

l (g) At the ACM MCC close the reactor plant exhaust fans feed breaker.

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l 3.0 SYSTEM ODERATION l 3.1 General Ecutoment Ooeration l 3.1.1 The majority of the equipment supplied by the ACM l power system are contained within other System l Operating Procedures. Specific operations not l contained within this section are covered in l Section 2.0 or the appropriate 50P.

l 3.2 Purification System valves HV-2301 and HV-2302 CAUTION: The ACM sy ste.n is designed to provide power to only one of the two valves covered by this section of the procedure. Do not attempt to operate both at the same time.

l 3.2.1 Train A Inlet Valve HV-2301 IACM Power l 3.2.1.1 Verify de-energized or de-energize normal power to HV-2301 at Reactor Plant MCC-2.

l 3.2.1.2 Place transfer switch N-4842 in the ACM postion. ,

'O' 1 3.2.1.3 Inside N-4840, place S-48401 and S-48402 in the ACM position.

l 3.2.1.4 Inside N-4840, place the circuit breaker in the "0N" position.

l 3.2.1.5 At the ACM MCC close the HV-2301/2302 feed switch.

l 3.2.1.6 At N-4840 position the valve as desired.

l 3.2.2 Train B Inlet Valve HV-2302 IACM Power l 3.2.2.1 Veri fy de-energized or de-energize normal power to HV-2302 at Reactor Plant MCC 3.

l 3.2.2.2 Place transfer switch N-4841 in the ACM position.

I 3.2.2.3 Inside N-4839 place S-48391 and S-48392 in the ACM position.

l 3.2.2.4 Inside N-4839, place the circuit breaker in the "0N" position.

' l 3.2.2.5 At the ACM MCC, close the HV-2301/2302

_ feed switch.

FORM 372 - 22 3843 l _ _ . _ _ _ . . . . . .. . . . . . _ .__ . . . _ _ . . _ . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . .. ._ . . . . . . . . . . . .

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO

~

SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f 4g g

f( f l 3.2.2.6 At N-4839 position the valve as desired.

l 3.3 Returnino ACM powered Eouiement to Normal Power Source When power has been restored to the normal source for any equipment being operated on ACM power the equipment may be returned to its normal power source in accordance with the l appropriate step of Section 3.3.1 of this 50P.

l 3.3.1 Individual ACM Equipment

[ 3.3.1.1 Returning fire water pump P-4501 to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

l (b) Place transfer switch N-4876 in the normal position.

l (c) Close the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 2.

l (d) If required P-4501 may be started with

] HS-4504-2.

l 3.3.1.2 Returning fire water pump house to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker to the fire water pump house.

l (b) At the C-7522, transfer box place the toggle switch and knife switch in the normal position.

l (c) At the C-7521 transfer box place the toggle switch and knife switch in the normal position.

l (d) Close the C-7522 normal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 3.

l (e) Close the C-7521 normal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 1.

l 3.3.1.3 Returning service water supply pump P-4201 to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

l l POmW 372 22 3843

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION g f 4g a

N.}

l (b) Place transfer switch N-4874 in the normal position.

l (c) Close the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 1.

l (d) If required P-4201 may be started with HS-4211-1.

l 3.3.1.4 Returning service water supply pump P-4202 to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

1 (b) Place transfer switch N-4875 in the normal position.

l (c) Close the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 2.

l (d) If required P-4202 may be started with HS-4211-2.

l 3.3.1.5 Returning service water return pump P-4203 to normal power.

l (a) Depress the STOP switch at the feed breaker on ACM 480 Volt MCC.

l (b) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt MCC.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4881 in the normal position.

I l (d) Close the normal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 1.

l (e) If required P-4203 may be started with HS-4201-1.

l 3.3.1.6 Returning service water return pump P-4204 to normal power.

l (a) Depress the STOP switch at the feed breaker on ACM 480 Volt MCC.

l (b) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt MCC.

'.O PORM 372 32 3643

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO S0P 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f 4g t.\ _/

l (c) Place transfer switch N-48S1 in the normal position.

l (d) Close the normal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 2.

l (e) If required P-4204 may be started with HS-4201-2.

l 3.3.1.7 Returning service water tower fant-4201X to normal power.

l (a) Depress the STOP switch at the feed breaker on ACM 480 Volt MCC.

l (b) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt MCC.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4871 in the normal position.

l (d) Close the normal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 3.

Or

' l (e) If required C-4201X may be started with HS-4231-1.

l 3.3.1.8 Returning service water tower fan C-4202X to normal power.

l (a) Depress the STOP switch at the feed breaker on ACM 480 Volt MCC.

l (b) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt MCC.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4872 in the normal position.

1 (d) Close the normal feed breaker at turbine building MCC 3. '

l (e) If required C-4202X may be started with HS-4232-1.

l 3.3.1.9 Returning PCRV cooling water pump P-4601 to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

'O romu an 22. sus l

l

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 I'

FORT 3T. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f 4g r x.

tQ) l (b), Place transfer switch N-4877 in the nomal position.

l (c) Close the normal feed breaker at 430 Volt Bus 1.

l (d) If required P-4601 may be started with HS-4601.

l 3.3.1.10 Returning PCRV cooling water pump P-4601S to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

l (b) Place transfer switch N-4878 in the nomal position.

l (c) Close the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 2.

l (d) If required P-46015 may be started with HS-4603.

.p4 l 3.3.1.11 Returning PCRV co' cling water pump P-4602 V to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

l (b) Place transfer switch N-4879 in the normal position.

l (c) Close the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 3.

l (d) If required P-4602 may be started with HS-4602.

I 3.3.1.12 Returning PCRV cooling water pump P-46025 to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt lead center.

l l (b) Place transfer switch N-4880 in the normal position.

l (c) Close the nomal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 2.

'O PORM 372 22 3643

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 I

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f 4g i

l' nJ l (d) If required P-46025 may be started

. with HS-4604.

l 3.3.1.13 Returning purification cooling water pump P-4701 to normal power.

l (a) Depress the STOP switch at the feed breaker on ACM 480 Volt MCC.

l (b) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt MCC.

l (c) Place transfer switch N-4845 in the normal position. ,

l (d) Close the normal feed breaker at reactor plant MCC 1A.

l (e) If required P-4701 may be started with HS-4701.

l 3.3.1.14 Returning PCRV cooling water pump P-4702 to normal power.

(a) Depress the SiOP switch at the feed

.]v l breaker on ACM 480 Volt MCC. ,

l (b) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt MCC.

1 (c) Place transfer switch N-4846 in the normal position. -

l (d) Close the normal feed breaker at -

reactor plant MCC 3.

l (e) If required P-4702 may be started with HS-4702.

l 3.3.1.15 Returning circulating water makeup pump CWMUP-1A to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

l (b) Place transfer switch N-4847 in the normal position.

l (c) Close the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 3.

'O l PORM 372 22 3643

PUBLIC SERVICE COhnPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 l FORT ST VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION s e 3 g

((v l (d) If required CWMUp-1A may be started with HS-4102.

l 3.3.1.16 Returning circulating water makeup pump CWMUP-1B to nomal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

l (b) Place transfer switch N-4848 in the normal position.

l (c) Close the normal feed breaker at 480 Volt Bus 1.

l (d) If required CWMUP-1B may be started with HS-4103.

l 3.3.1.17 Returning reactor plant exhaust fan C-7301 to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

(P(

V l (b) Place transfer switch N-4871 in the normal position.

l (c) At the ACM nitrogen bottle close the bottle valve and disconnect the da=per operating nitrogen supply line.

l (d) Open V-48848.

l (e) Close the' normal feed breaker at reactor plant MCC 1A.

l (f) If required C-7301 may be started with HS-7323.

l 3.3.1.18 Returning reactor plant exhaust fan C-7302 to normal power.

l (a) Open the ACM feed breaker at ACM 480 Volt load center.

l l (b) Place transfer switch N-4872 in the normal position.

l (c) At the ACM damper nitrogen bottle close the bottle valve and disconnect i t5e damper operating nitrogen supply h line.

1 1

PORM 272 22 3643 l

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 8

FORT ST VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

, (^4 iV l (d) Open V-48S49. .

l (e) Close the normal feed breaker at reactor plant MCC 2.

l (f) If required C-7302 may be started with HS-7358. /

l 3.3.1.19 Restoration of HV-2301 and HV-2302 to nomal power.

l (a) Restoration of Train A inlet valve HV-2301 to normal power.

l 1. At the ACM MCC open the HV-2301/2302 feed switch.

l 2. At N-4840 place S-48401 and S-48402 in the normal position.

l . 3. At reactor plant MCC 2 open or verify open the feed breaker to HV-2301.

4. Place transfer switch N-4842 in

{v{ l the nomal position.

l 5. At reactor plant MCC 2 close the feed breaker to HV-2301.

l (b) Restoration of Train B inlet valve HV-2302 to normal power.

I 1. At the ACM MCC open the HV-2301/2302 feed switch.

l 2. At N-4839 place S-48391 and 5-48392 in the nomal position.

l 3. At reactor plant MCC 3 open or verify open the feed breaker to

, HV-2302.

l 4. Place transfer switch N-4841 in the nomal position.

l l 5. At reactor plant Y.C 3 close i

HV-2302 feed breaker. '

l PORM 372 22 3643

i

~

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 8

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f 4g 3

im E

3.4 Ventilation of ACM Batteries l 3.4.1 Normal ventilation of the ACM battery off gas is provided by the Turbine Building Evaporator Cooler Building (T.B.E.C.B.) Bahnson Building ventilation.

l 3.4.2 During extended periods of no Bahnson Building ventilation E during periods of placing the ACM batteries on overcharge, the north and south doors must be opened to provide natural ventilation.

'O PORM 372 22 3643

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1 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 37 of gg i

^

b,;J l 4.0 SYSTEM SHUTDOWN l 4.1 Shutdown of ACM Diesel Generator From Sucolyine ACM Loads t l 4.1.1 Verify electrical system lineup is per Section 2.1 except that the ACM circuit breaker should be closed and the HVAC feed to the ACM LC should be open.

l 4.1.2 Open the ACM circuit breaker.

l 4.1.3 Close the HVAC feed to the ACM LC.

l 4.1.4 Place the MS switch in the OFF position. Engine will run for approximately 10 minutes at idle speed for cooldown then shutdown. -

l 4.2 Shutdown of ACM Diesel Generater from Exercise or Load Test l 4.2.1 Using governor control switch reduce unit load to approximately 500 KW.

l 4.2.2 Open the ACM bus exercise br.eaker.

h' l 4.2.3 Place the MS switch in the OFF position. The engine will run for approximately 10 minutes at idle speed then shutdown.

l 4.2.4 Open the RAT to ACM exercise breaker.

l 5.0 ABNORMAL OPERATIONS l NOTE: The operation of the entire ACM system would be considered an abnormal operation, with the exception of testing.

l l Therefore, it is considered that Section 5.0 does not l apply to this System Operating Procedure.

I PORM 372 22. J843

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . , .....-,,m...v.. . , . _ . . . . - _ _ . - - . . . .

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION s e 3 (V

SECTION II >

SHIFT SUPERVISOR CHECK LIST OF ACM EQUIPMENT OPTICNS When the Shift Supervisor determines that the ACM is to be placed in service, he shall identify the selected equipment items on the following check-list by circling the equipment numeer.

When the Shift Supervisor is notified that a particular equipment item is operating he shall initial the appropriate blank provided.

1.0 ACM Generator

. 2.0 Fire Water Pump P-4501 3.0 Service Water System P-4201 or P-4202.

C-4201X or C-4202X

[( P-4203 or P-4204 4.0 Circulating Water Makeup P-1A or P-18 5.0 System 46 P-4601 or P-46015 P-4602 or P-46025 6.0 Helium Purification System

~ Train A HV-2301 and E-2301 and A-2305 P-4701 or P-4702 E-4701 or E-4702 l ,

(o V

l POmM 372 22 3643

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCl. EAR GENERATING STATION ' 3 g g

'.f'\

V Train C 1 HV-2302 and E-2302 and A-2306 P-4701 or P-4702 E-4701 or E-4702 HTFA Cooling A-2301 or A-2302 7.0 Reactor Building Exhaust Fans C-7301 or C-7302 8.0 Depressurization Train A lineup complete.

Train B lineup complete.

Auxiliary stack monitor operable.

t(( Vent to atmosphere lineup complete.

PCRV depressurization complete.

9.0 Insertion of Reserve Shutdown Material Insertion of RSD complete except for regions.

10.0 System 46 shifted to redistribute mode.

11.0 System 46 surge tank pressurization complete. -

POmM 372 22 3643

l

. . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . - i PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 3 4g

~h

!(O

/

237-230$/06 p-2307/08 p-23cl/02 2 2 O.

sm, x O m

xro i - .

A-23w /02 d

  1. - D01/02

\/ kN' A.2 6 I-Y3/04 p- D09/10' I

X-

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YIV-2303/04 iV- D67/ p 22n-1

' O, "

2 64 E p 2312-1 b 23271 V e i X

X ni.;

'Q F-1301/02 IV-23 u-2 y 5 % 2312-2 T-23279

~.

T E

< \

Dv.73456/457

\I Futer

/ DV-73453/454 C-7301/02 7-7301/02 F12MAJtY CDO*ET DEPRZ5532* J TT01t FLOlt PAM l

l i l O

PORM 272 22 3643

.- ... . . . _ ..-- . .................. .. ... . -.. - - - ~ . ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ - .

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 3

  • FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 7 4g d )

ACM SYSTEM STARTUP 1.0 ACM GENERATOR NOTE: Generator will supply ACM lighting, auxiliary stack radiation monitor, and the plant radio at this time. The radio hand set at the ACM MCC will be operable if instrument power bus IA is de-energized or if the ACM switch at the radio selection panel is placed on the "0N" position.

l 1.1 Verify electrical lineup is as specified in Section I of this SOP.

1.2 At the 480 Volt ACM MCC open the feed breaker from the HVAC LC.

l 1.3 Start the ACM diesel generator per Section I of this SOP.

2.0 FIREWATER PUMP HCUSE FANS AND FIREWATER PUMP 2.1 Start fire water pump house fans and fire water pump 1 P-4501 per Section I of this SOP.

(/, 3.0 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM l 3.1 Start the selected service water supply pump per Section I of this 50P.

l 3.2 Start the selected service water return pump per Section I of this SOP.

3.3 If required, start the selected service water tower fan i per Section I of this SOP.

3.4 If required the following components may be isolated from service water to increase flow to E-4701/02, E-4601/03, and E-4602/04 CAUTION: Do not allow the service water return pump to run without sufficient water input to the service water return sump.

l

'O O

l l

pomu 372 22 3s43

..-..- - - _ _ - - . . _ . ~ _ .. . . . .-

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 3 gf gg V(~'u l l

Component Isoldtter. Valve Reactor Plant HVAC V-42397 )

Main Turbine Lube Oil Coolers V-4267, V-4271 EHC Fluid Coolers V-4227, V-4231 Condensate Pumps 1A and IB V-42375, V-42376 BFP Lube Oil Coolers V-4256, V-4260, V-42114, V-4239, V-4264, V-4266 Standby Generator Air Handlers V-42809, V-42810, V-42811, V-42812 Standby Generator Engine Coolers V-423S6, V-42387, V-42388, V-42389 Sample Cooling V- 4234 Heater 5 Drain Pump V-42390 g, Ma'n Generator V-4242, V-4248 G

Generator Bus Duct Cooling V-4254, V-4255 Air Compressors V-4214, V-4216, V-4217, V-4221, V-4218, V-4222, V-42392, V-42394 Rix Compressor Coolers V-861744 Service Water Booster Pumps V-46614 1A and IB Backup Bearing Water Coolers V-461516 Hydraulic 011 Coolers V-461536, V-461535 Bearing Water Coolers V-46255, V-46258, V-46261, V-46264 4.0 CIRCULATING WATER MAKEUP l 4.1 If required for makeup to the fire water pump pit or to the service water tower basin, start the selected l circulating water makeup pump per Section I of this 50P.

4.2 Makeup to the service water tower basin is controlled via i V-41302 and V-42128.

FOmu 373 33 3s43

l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 l FORT ST VRAIN NUCLEA9 GENERATING STATION 3 '

3 f 48 I

5.0 SYSTEM 46 5.1 Start the selected PCRV cooling water pump in Loop 1 per l Section I of this SOP.

5.2 Start the selected PCRV cooling water pump in Loop 2 per l Section I of this SOP.

6.0 HELIUM PURIFICATION SYSTEM 6.1 Start the selected purification cooling water pump per l Section I of this SOP.

6.2 Install the HTFA cooler spool pieces for the HTFA in the purification train selected for coolcown J . d-,-

6.3 Place in service the HTFA cooler as follows:

6.3.1 For Train A HTFA open:

V-23104, V-46606, V-23105, V-46602 6.3.2 For Train B, HTFA open:

"O v-23106. v-46601. v-23107. v-46605 6.4 Lineup the purification train selected for depressurization as follows:

6.4.1 Train A Selected for Depressurization 6.4.1.1 Train A Inlet Valve HV-2301 ACM Power.

a. Verify de-energized or de-energize normal power to HV-2301 at reactor plant MCC 2. Rackout valve breaker if required.
b. Place transfer switch N-4842 in the ACM position (Level 10).
c. Inside N-4840, place S-48401 and S-48402 in the ACM position (Level 10).
d. Inside N-4840, place the circuit breaker in the "0N" position.
e. At the ACM MCC close the HV-2301/2302 feed switch.

4 v

Pomu 373 22 3643

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f gg 3

m I b,

f. At N-4840 open HV-2301 by depressing l the open pushbutton.
g. Notify the Shift Supervisor that I HV-2301 is open. l 6.4.1.2 Lineup for E-2301 and P-4701 and E-4701 I
a. HV-4704-1 Open Level 10
b. HV-4704-2 Open Level 10
c. HV-4705-1 Closed Level 10
d. V-46657 Open Level 2
e. V-46658 Closed Level 2
f. V-46661 Closed Level 2
g. V-46663 Open Level 2
h. V-46348 Closed Level 2 a'" tevel 2 (O '- '-"
j. V-4706 Open Level 1 '
k. V-4704 Open Level 1
1. V-4775 Closed Level 1
m. V-4776 Closed Level 1
n. Notify Shift Supervisor E-2301 cooling water supply is operating.

6.4.1.3 Lineup for E-2301 and P-4702 and E-4702

a. HV-4704-3 Open Level 10
b. HV-4704-4 Open Level 10
c. HV-4705-3 Closed Level 10
d. V-46659 Open Level 2
e. V-46660 Closed Level 2 Level 2
f. V-46662 Closed i l P084M 372 22 3643 l

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO S0P 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 3 of gg

.Cj.

g. V-46665 Open Level 2
h. V-46348 Open Level 2
1. V-4707 Open Level 1
j. V-4703 Closed Level I
k. V-4705 Open Level 1
1. V-4711 Closed Level 1
m. Notify the Shift Supervisor E-2301 ccoling water supply is operating.

6.4.1.4 The combinations P-4701 and E-4702; or P-4702 and E-4701, are available if required at the Shift Supervisor's direction.

l 6.4.1.5 Liquid Nitrogen Lineup for A-2305 i

l a. HV-2505 Open Level 11 l .

(] b. HV-2501 Open Level 11

c. HV-2502-1 Open Level 11
d. HV-2503 Closed Level 11
e. V-25203 Open Level 11
f. HV-2506 Closed Level 11 l g. HV-2507 Open Level 11
h. HV-2534 Closed Level 11 l 1. V-25204 Open Level 11
j. HV-2535 Closed Level 11
k. HV-2510 Open Level 11
1. PV-2521 Fail Level 11 Open
m. V-25205 Open Level 11
n. Notify Shift Supervisor liquid i nitrogen is cooling A-2305.

FORM 372 22 3843

_ . . .._...s..__._....____ . . _

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f gg

(v~f 6.4.2 Train B Selected for Depressurization 6.4.2.1 Train B Inlet Valve HV-2302 IACM Power
a. Verify de-energized or de-energize normal power to HV-2302 at reactor plant MCC 3. Rackout valve breaker if required,
b. Place transfer switch N-4841 in the ACM position (Level 10),
c. Inside N-4839, place S-48391 and S-48392 in the ACM position (Level 10).
d. Inside N-4839, place the circuit breaker in the "0N" position,
e. At the ACM MCC close the HV-2301/2302 feed switch.
f. At N-4839, open HV-2302 by depressing

. the open pushbutton.

I 1

g. Notify the Shift Supervisor that HV-2302 is open.

6.4.1.2 Lineup for E-2302 and P-4701 and E-4701

a. HV-4705-1 Open Level 10
b. HV-4705-3 Closed Level 10
c. HV-4704-1 Closed Level 10
d. HV-4705-2 Open Level 10
e. V-46657 Open Level 2
f. V-46658 Closed Level 2
g. V-46661 Closed Level 2
h. V-46663 Open Level 2
1. V-46348 Open Level 2
j. V-4706 Open Level 1

. k. V-4704 Open Level 1 l PORM 272 22 3642 l

1 --

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SGP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION e 13 A'

1. V-4775 Closed Level 1
m. V-4776 Closed Level 1 6.4.2.3 Lineup for E-2302 and P-4701 and E-4701
a. HV-4705-1 Open Level 10
b. HV-4705-3 Closed Level 10
c. HV-4704-1 Closed Level 10
d. HV-4704-3 Closed Level 10
e. HV- 705-2 Open Level 10
f. V-46657 Open Level 2
g. V-46658 Closed Level 2
h. V-46661 Closed Level 2
1. V-46663 Open Level 2 C( j. V-46348 Open Level 2
k. V-4706 Open Level 1
1. V-4704 Open Level 1
m. V-4775 Closed Level I
n. V-4776 Closed Level 1 6.4.2.4 The combinations P-4701 and E-4702; or P-4702 and E-4701, are available if required at the Shift Supervisor's discretion.

6.4.2.5 Liquid Nitrogen Lineup for A-2306

a. HV-2506 Open Level 11
b. HV-2503 Open Level 11
c. HV-2504-1 Open Level 11
d. V-25203 Open Level 11
e. HV-2507 Open Level 11 l'O I

I i

! P O AM 372 22 3643

i PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SOP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f

O'

f. V-25204 Open Level 11
g. HV-2501 Closed Level 11
h. HV-2510 Open Level 11
1. HV-2505 Closed Level 11
j. PV-2521 Fail Level 11 Open
k. HV-2534 Closed Level 11
1. V-25205 Open Level 11
m. HV-2535 Closed Level 11
n. Notify Shift Supervisor liquid nitrogen is cooling A-2306.

7.0 REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST FANS l 7.1 Start the selected reactor plant exhaust fan per Section I of this SOP. .

8.0 PCRV DEpRESSURIZATION 8.1 Lineup for Train A Selected 8.1.1 V-23204 Closed Level 10 8.1.2 V-23209 Closed Level 10 8.1.3 V-23206 Closed Level 10 8.1.4 V-23202 Closed Level 10 8.1.5 V-23271 Closed Level 7 8.1.6 V-23279 Closed Level 7 8.1.7 HV-2303 Open Level 8 8.1.8 HV-2311-2 Open Level 8 8.1.9 HV-2311-1 Closed Level 8 l 8.1.10 HV-2312-2 Closed Level 8 l

8.l.11 HV-2312-1 Closed Level 8 l

)

l PORM 372 22 3843

7 PU2LIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO S0p 48-01 FORT St. NRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 4 f 4g

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8.1.12 HV-11251 Open Level 6 8.1.13 HV-2401 Closed Level 4 8.1.14 Notify Shift Supervisor lineup is completed for Train A.

8.2 Lineup for Train B Selected 8.2.1 V-23205 Closed Level 10 8.2.2 V-23203 Closed Level 10 8.2.3 V-23207 Closed Level 10 8.2.4 V-23208 Closed Level 10 3.2.5 V-23271 Closed Level i 8.2.6 HV-2304 Open Level 8 8.2.7 HV-2312-2 Open Level 3 8.2.8 HV-2312-1 Closed Level 8

()' 8.2.9 HV-2311-1 Closed Level 8 8.2.10 HV-2311-2 Closed Level 8 8.2.11 HV-31251 Open Level 6 B.2.12 4V-2401 Open Level 1

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S.2.13 Noti fy Shift Supervisor lineup is complete for Train B.

8.3 Auxiliary Stack ~ Monitor Operability Check (Level 11 Turbine Building).

8.3.1 Verify tne PING-1 r, tack monitor is energized.

8.3.2 Verify the PING-1 sample pump is running.

8.3.3 Depress the three check source switches and verify all three detector channels read upscale.

8.3.4 Release the three check source switches and verify all three detector channels are returning to normal.

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\,g e l 8.3.5 Repeat Steps 8.3.1, 8.3.2, 8.3.3, and 8.3.4 above once each hour during depressurization to atmosphere.

I 8.4 Depressurize the primary coolant to atmosphere as follows: 1 8.4.1 Open V-23279.

8.4.2 Log the time V-23279 is opened. Time:

8.4.3 One and a half hours after V-23279 is opened, open V-23271.

8.4.4 Log the time V-23271 is opened. Time:

8.4.5 Open V-23272, V-23273, and V-23275.

8.4.6 When the primary coolant has depressurized for 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> the time logged in Step 8.4.2, close V-23271 and V-23279.

8.4.7 Noti fy Shift Supervisor depressurization is complete.

(' 8.4.8 At the 480 Volt ACM MCC stop the purification cooling water pump.

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8.4.9 If purification cooling water heat exchanger E-4701 was being used close V-46657.

8.4.10 If purification cooling water heat exchanger E-4702 was being used close V-46659.

9.0 INSERTION OF RESERVE SHUTDOWN HATERIAL 9.1 Insert reserve shutdown material as follows:

9.1.1 Insertion of Reserve Shutdown Material at I-21A (Level 10).

9.1.1.1 At I-21A, close V-187C to isolate normal air supply.

9.1.1.2 At I-21A, connect the nitrogen supply hose quick disconnect to the left hand fitting which connects to the normal air supply line.

9.1.1.3 At I-21A, open V-82887 to normal air supply line.

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9.1.1.4 At the nitrogen supply bottle for I-21A, open the bottle valve to pressurize the normal air supply line.

9.1.1.5 Adjust the nitrogen regulator to 60 psig.

9.1.1.6 When nitrogen from the bottle stops j pressurizing the air lines, all reserve shutdown dump valves whose solenoids are energized have been opened. Note which region's valves are open on the back of this page. Disconnect the gaick disconnect.

9.1.1.7 Verify vent valve, V-821440 is closed.

9.1.1.8 Reconnect the quick disconnect to the right hand fitting. This will open all reserve shutdown dump valves whose solenoids were not energized. Note all regions whose dump valves are open on the back of this page.

9.1.1.9 Insertion of reserve shutdown at I-21A p( complete.

V 9.1.2 Insertion of Reserve Shutdown Material at I-219 (Level 10).

9.1.2.1 At I-21B, close V-187A to isolate normal air supply.

9.1.2.2 At I-218, connect the nitrogen supply hose quick disconnect to the left hand fitting which connects to the normal air supply.

9.1.2.3 At I-218, open V-82888 to normal air supply line.

9.1.2.4 At the nitrogen supply bottle for I-218, open the bottle valve to pressurize the normal air supply line.

9.1.2.5 Adjust the nitrogen regulator to 60 psig.

9.1.2.6 When nitrogen from the bottle stops pressurizing the air lines, all reserve shutdown dump valves whose solenoids are energized have been opened. Note which region's valves are open on the back of g this page. Disconnect the quick q .s disconnect.

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V 9.1.2.7 Verify vent valve, V-821441 is closed.

9.1.2.8 Reconnect the quick disconnect to the right hand fitting. This will open all reserve shutdown duma valves whose solenoids were not energized. Note all regions whose dump valves are open on the back of this page.

9.1.2.9 Insertion of reserve shutdown at I-213 completed.

9.1.3 Insertion of Reserve Shutdown Material at I-21C (Level 10).

9.1.3.1 At I-21C, close V-1938 to isolate normal air supply.

9.1.3.2 At I-21C, connect the nitrogen supply hose quick disconnect to the left hand fitting which connects to the normal air supply.

9.1.3.3 At I-21C, open V-82S89 to normal air supply line.

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9.1.3.4 At the nitrogen supply bottle for I-21C, open the bottle valve to pressurize the normal air supply line.

9.1.3.5 Adjust the nitrogen regulator to 60 psig.

9.1.3.6 When nitrogen from the bottle stops pressurizing the air lines, all reserve shutdown dump valves whose solenoids are energized have been opened. Note which region's valves are open on the back of this page. Disconnect the quick disconnect.

9.1.3.7 Verify vent valve, V-821442 is closed.

9.1.3.8 Reconnect the quick disconnect to the right hand fitting. This will open all reserve shutdown dump valves whose solenoids were not energized. Note all regions whose dump valves are open on the

, back of this page.

i 9.1.3.9 Insertion of reserve shutdown at I-21C

, completed.

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9.1.4 Insertion of Reserve Shutdown Material at I-210 (Level 10).

9.1.4.1 At I-210, close V-195E to isolate normal air supply.

9.1.4.2 At I-210, connect the nitrogen supply hose quick disconnect to the left hand fitting which connects to the normal air supply.

9.1.4.3 At I-210, open V-82890 to normal air supply line.

9.1.4.4 At the nitrogen supply bottle for I-210, open the bottle valve to pressurize the normal air supply line.

9.1.4.5 Adjust the nitrogen regulator to 60 psig.

9.1.4.6 When nitrogen from the bottle stops pressurizing the air lines, all reserve shutdown dump valves whose solenoids are energized have been opened. Note which region's valves are open on the back of f-(_ s'

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this page. Disconnect the quick disconnect.

9.1.4.7 Verify vent valve, V-821443 is closed.

9.1.4.8 Reconnect the quick disconnect to the right hand fitting. This will open all reserve shutdown dump valves whose solenoids were not energized. Note all regions whose dump valves are open on the back of this page.

9.1.4.9 Insertion of reserve shutdown at I-21D completed.

9.1.5 Verification of Reserve Shutdown Material Insertion.

Check that all 37 regions' dump valves have been opened and have been noted. Notify Shift Supervisor when all reserve shutdown material has been inserted.

If any regions have not been  ;

dumped, notify the Shift Supervisor of the region numbers.

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO SCP 48-01 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION gg G()'

10.0 REDISTRIBUTE SYSTEM 46 FLOW 10.1 Line up System 46 in the red'.stribute mode as follows:

10.1.1 Set HV-46229 to the red line on the position indicator dial. Level 5 1/2.

10.1.2 Set HV-46228 to the red line on the position indicator dial. Level 5 1/2.

10.1.3 Set HV-46231 to the red line on the position indicator dial. Level 5 1/2.

10.1.4 Set HV-46227 to the red line on the position indicator dial. Level 5.

10.1.5 Set HV-46230 to the red line on the position indicator dial. Level 5 1/2.

10.1.6 Set HV-46232 to the red line on the position indicator dial. Level 5 1/2.

10.1.7 Set HV-46234 to the red line on the position indicator dial. Level 5.

Q 10.1.8 Set HV-46233 to the red line on the position indicator dial. Level 5.

10.1.9 Notify Shift Supervisor System 46 is lined up in the redistribute mode.

11.0 SYSTEM 46 SURGE TANK PRESSURIZATION 11.1 Pressurize the System 46 Loop 1 surge tank to 30 PSIG as follows:

11.1.1 Open or verify open HV-4669. (Valve fails open on

, loss of air.)

11.1.2 Open or verify open the helium supply bottle valve.

11.2 Pressurize the System 46 Loop 2 surge tank to 30 PSIG as follows:

11.2.1 Open or verify open HV-4670. (Valve fails open on loss of air.)

11.2.2 Open or verify open the helium supply bottle valve.

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11.3 Notify the Shift Supervisor that the System 46 surge tanks have been pressurized.

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! APPENDIX I ACM VALVE LIST I VALVE I P&I l P&I l l PRE-OP VALVE l l l NO. I DWG.lC00RDI LOCATION OR SERVICE I POSITION I CHECKED l l l l l I l l .

lV-48502148-1 l C,6 IACM Fuel Oil Pumps l Open l I l l l l Suction - TKB l l l 1 I I I I I I IV-48503148-1 [ 0,6 lACM Fuel Oil Pumps l Open l l 1 I I ISuetion - TKA l i l l l l l l l l l 1 1 I I I I IV-48504148-1 l D,6 IP-4804 Suction Isolation l Open l l l I I I I I I I I I l l l 1 lV-48505148-1 l C,6 IP-4803 Suction Isolation i Open I [

l I l l I I l l l l l l 1 I IV-48506148-1 i F,5 IPSL-48506 Isolation i Open l l l l l l 1 I I

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lV-48507148-1 1 0,5 IPSL-48507 Isolation i Open I I I l l l l l 1 1 1 1 I I I I IV-48508148-1 1 F,4 IPSH-48502 Isolation i Open l l l l l l l l 1 I I I I I [ l lV-48509148-1 1 0,4 IPSH-48503 Isolation i Open l l l l l l l l l l l l 1 1 I I IV-48512148-1 1 F,3 IP-4804 Discharge Isolation i Open l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l IV-48513l48-1 1 0,3 IP-4803 Discharge Isolation l Open l l l l l 1 1 I I I I I I I I I IV-48514148-1 1 0,3 IDischarge Header Drain I Closed l I I I I I I I I

( Checked By Date 1

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