ML20099G213

Form NIS-1 Owners Data Rept for Inservice Insps as Required by Provisions of ASME Code Rules

ML20099G213
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	08/06/1992
From:	UNION ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20099G212	List: ML20099G211 ML20099G213
References
ULNRC-2683, NUDOCS 9208140155
Download: ML20099G213 (14)

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ULNRC 2683

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FORM NLS 1 OWNER $' DATA REPORT FOR LNSERY1CI INSPECTIONS l As rapdred by the Provisions of the A5ME Code Rmes 5 1 Union Electric Co., P.O. Box 149, St. Louis, MO 63166

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(Nesse and Address of owners

2. Maat Callaway Plant. P.O. Box 620. Fulton, MO 65251

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(Name sad Address of Maat 1

J. Maa: Unit 4. Owner Cereticuse of Aumorizanos (it reqwred) N/A

3. Cammeraal Sernce Date 12/19/84 4. Nscor.at Bo6rd Nwnber for Urus N/A

7. Caertpoetate Itapetted Maavfacturer Campment or Maaufwrurer or laemuer Appuresasace Staae ce Nanoan or tastaller Senaj No. PTowtace No. Board No.

See the :allaway Ref uel 5 Inservi ca Inspection Sucunary Repoht, the Owner's N-3 R ? port, the Installer's N 5 Report, and the N-5 Adde nda 5 for -

the sv9tems 1 sted on sheet 2 of 2.

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Note: Sweptemental itiesis s fonn of Ikas, sustcses, or drawings may be used provtded (1) use is 8% in. x !I in..

(2) tatcemecca in seems 1 enrougn 6 on ma r.ata report 4 inc:wded on escs saett, sad (.1) esca sneet J numeered and me aunuper of saerts a recorcent 44 tse top od mis forra.

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.' ULNRC 2683-FOIU4 Nis.1 OWNER $'.. DATA REPORTI FOR INSERVICE INSPECTIONS As gired by the Provisiosu of the ASME Code Rules Union Electric Co.. P.O. Box 149, St. Louis. MO 63166 (Nases and Aderem of Owner)

Callaway Plant, P.O. Box 620, Fulton, MO 65251 '

2. N (Naree and Addsves of Mant)

I 4. Owner Cernficam of Authocura (if requk'd1 N/A

). he Unit g ,. - ---del Semce Deu 12 /19 /84 4. National Board Number for Urus N/A

7. 8" T les laspected SYSTEM N-5 SYSTEM NAME- DESIGNATOR SERIAL NO.

Main Stcam' AB 0177-AB-F Main Feedwater AE 0179-AE-F Auxiliary Feedwater AL 0207-AL-F Reactor Coolant BB 0276-BB-F-Chemical and Volume control BG 0306-BG-F Steam Generator Blowdown BM 0221-BM-F Borated Refueling Water Storage BN 0144-BN-F Fuel Pool Cooling and C1canup EC 0128-EC-F Essential-Service Water EF 0285-EF-F

' Component Cooling Water EG 0256-EG-F Residual Heat Removal EJ 0229-EJ-F High Pressure Coolant-Injection EM 0181-EM-F Containment Spray. EN 0202-EN-F Accumulator Safety Injection EP' 0203-EP-F

' Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine FC 0137-FC-F Misc. Building FVAC- GF 0077-GF-F Fuel Handling Building HVAC GG .0078-GG-F Control Building HVAC GK 0080-GK-F Auxiliary Building HVAC GL 0103-CL-F

-Containment Cooling GN 0141-GN-F Containment Hydrogen Control GS 0131-GS-F Decontamination HD 0063-HD-F Emergency Fuel Oil JE 0129-JE-F Compressed Air KA 0151-KA-F i

Sheet 2 of 2

ULNRC 2633 Re%el 5 ISI Sum. nary August 6,1992 CALLAWAY REFUEL 5 INSERVICE INSPECTION ABSTRACT JNTRODUCTION -

Inservice Inspections (ISI) on ASME Class I, 2, and 3 componen's and piping were performed prior to and during Refuel 5 at the callaway Nuclear Plant. More specifically, this abstract covers ISI performed from November iI,1991, to May 16,1992. Refuel 5 is the first refueling outage in the third forty-month period of the first ten-year interval. The folkiwing topics are addressed in this abstract report:

. 3rganizations respmsible for ISI work during Refuel 5.

. Inspectiim agency responsible for ISI at the Callaway Plant.

. Codes, Regulatory Guides, and NUREG's applicable to the Callaway ISI Program Plan.

. Final reports contained in the Callaway Refuel 5 Inservice Inspection Summary Report.

l ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR ISI iI The Union Electric organizations and outside vendors involved with ISI excminations during Refuel 5

. are listed below.

NUCLEAR ENERGY SERVICES (NES): NES was responsible for devekyment of the

' balance of plant (BOP) Callaway ISI Program Plan. In addition, NES was responsible for

. procedure devekipment, procedure qualification, and performance of manual non-destmetive examinations (NDE) and the Reactor Vessel 40-month visual examination.

CONAM NUCLEAR: Conam Nuclear was tesponsible for procedure developmer*

. procedure qualification, and performance of eddy current examinations on Steam Generators C aud D.

.- UNION ELECTRIC QUALITY COf(TROL (UEQC): UEQC was responsible for identification of compments to be visually examined during Refuel 5, procedure

- development, procedure qualification, and performance of visual examinations (e.g., VT-1, VT 2, VT-3, and VT-4) identified in the Callaway ISI Program Plan. - UEQC was also responsible for rev;ew of all visual examination data and results.

.- UNION ELECTRIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING: Union Electric Systems Engineering was responsible for identification of welds and components to be examined by NES.

identification of steam generator tubes to be examined by CONAM, review of all vendor NDE procedures, field supervision of all vendor ISI activities, review of all NDE final data and results, development and supervision of the AS',1E Section XI Ten-Year liydrostatic Test Program, and for development and supervision of the ASME Section XI

! ;f Repair / Replacement ProFram.

l . UNION ELECTRIC DESIGN CONTROL: Union Electric Design Control was l responsible for disposition and final resolution of pipe and equipment supports not meeting the UEQC visual examination acceptance criteria.

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ULNRC 2683-

, Refuel 5 ISI Sarruncry

__ August 6,1992 INSPECTION AGENCY ne inspection agency res;mnsible for ISl duties as outlined m ASME Section XI was Hartford Steam 5' ,er inspection and lasurance Company (11. S. B.1 & l. Co.).

CODES. REGULATORY GUIDES. AND NUREG'S ASME Section XI,1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda was the goveming code for perfonnance and selectian of IS! examinathms completed during Refuel 5. This code edition and addenda also govemed ~

the performance of augmented examinations required by the Callaway Final Safety Analysis Repirt. As specified in 10 CFR 50.55a, the 1914 Edition, Summer 1975 Addenda was used for component and weld selection for ASMil Chss 2 systems.

Specific regulations and/or NUREG's identified in the Callaway 151 Program Plan are listed below.

• NRC Standard Review Plan, Sections 3.6.1 and 6.6 (NUREG-08001981)

. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.14

. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.26

. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.53 4 - NRC Regulatory Guide 1.147 CALLAWAY REFUEL 5 ISI SUMM ARY REPORT The Callaway Refuel 5 ISI Summary Report is a compihtion of a number of individual reputs.

, These reports are listed below.

.~ _ Nondestructive Eu.minations Perfonned by 5'ES

! . Visual Examinations Perfonned By Union Electric Quality Control l .- Eddy Current Examination - Steam Generators B & C

. Repair, Replacement, and Modification Index -(N-5 Addenda 5)

Each report or summary listed above identifies components and/or welds examined,' date(s) of examination, and the results of the examination in addition, each report presents the procedures,

' equipment and consumable material used, persotmel certifications, and equipment cahbration records, where applicable.

The " Owner's Data Report for Inservice laspections" (Form N!S-1) presents the Section XI required l infonnation by referencing existing documents. These reference documents are the Callaway Refuel 5 ISI Summary Report, the Installers's N-5 Report, and the N-5 Addenda 5. Each of thew documents are retained as a permanent record at the Callaway Nuclear Plant.

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-ULNRC 2683 Refuel 5 ISI Summary August 6.1992 CALLAWAY REtUEL 5 INSERVICE INSPECTION FINAL RESULTS 1EIROD1!CIl0_N This document prewnts an overview of general conditions observed dunng the performance of Intervice Inspections (ISI) at the CaDaway Nuclear Plant during Refuel 5. For clanty, the ISI work has been subdivided into the following categories:

• Forty-month visual (VT-3) examination of the Reactor Vessel performed by Nuclear Energy Services and nondestructive examination (NDE) of the balance of plant systems, also performed by Nuclear Enctgy Services.

. Vis.ual examinations (e.g., V T-1. VT-2, VT-3, and VT-4) on piping, components, and supports performed by Union Electric Quahry Control.

. Steam generator tube eddy current examinations performed by Conam Nuclear.

• ASME Section XI repairs, replacements, and modifications performed by Union Electrie.

REACTOR VESSEL, VISUAL AND NDE ON BALANCE OF PLANT SYSTEMS Nondestmetive examinations (NDE) were performed on 401 Class I and 2 safety related welds and/or components during Refuel 5. A total of 298 ultrasonic (UT),188 liquid penetrant (PT), and 108 magnetic particle (MT) examinathms were completed. In addition, the areas of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) interior made accessible with upper internals removed were visually examined. Over 70% of all NDE (not meluding the ten-year ISI of the Reactor Vessel) required by the Callaway ISI Program Plan for the third forty-month period of the first ten-year interval were completed during Refuel 5. A brief descripth n of the scope of NDE performed on each system and/or component and the results are listed below.

REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL INTERIOR:

A srmll remotely operated submarine (mini-sub) outfitted with a video camera was used to visually examine the accessible areas of the Reactor Vesselinterior. All areas accessible with the core barrel in place and upper intemals removed were visually examined. No sign of degradation, abnormal wear, or loss of integnty was detected as a result of inis visual examination REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL STUDS AND NUTS:

A total of 48 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) stud and nut sets were examined using ultrasonic -

and magnetic particle methods. These examinations complete all RPV stud and nut ISI examinations required for the first ten-year interval. In addition, Preservice Inspection (PSI) was perfomied on 13 spare studs and 12 spare nuts. These examinations were performed to preclude unplanned PSI, if new replacement studs or nuts are needed in the future. No rejectable indications were detected as a result of these examinations.

PRESSURlZER:

"ae Pressurizer h>wer shell longitudmal weld, C spray noale inner radius area, and C spray nonle-to-head wcld were examined by the ultrasonic method. The surge nonle-to-safe end weld and C spray noule-to-safe end weld were examined u3ing ultrasonic and liquid penetrant methods. In Page 1 of 8

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ULNRC 2683 Refuel 5 ISI Summary

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August 6,1992 4

additim, seismi: support lugs A and D were examined using the liquid penetrant inethod. No rejectable indications were detected as a result of these examinatiors.

STEAM GENERATOR B:

The Steam Generator B upper shell-to-top head weld and Main Steam nozzle inner radius area were examinal by the ultrasonie method. In addition, the Main Steam nozzle-t+ top head weld was examined by ultramnic and magnetic particle methods. No rejectable indications were detected as a result of these examinations.

REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEELS:

Ultrasonic examinations were performed from the outer circu rJerence on the flywheels of Reactor Coolant Pumps A, B, C, and D. These examinations focused on the high stress areas at the

- flywheel bore and keyways. No rejectable indications were detected as a result of these examinations.

REACTOR COOLANT:

The Pressurizer safety nozzle C discharge pipmg Pressurizer spray line, Reactor Coolant System loop 1 radwaste drain line, and Reactor Coolant Pumps A. B, and C seal water injection piping were examined by ultrasonic and liquid penetrant methods. A total of 32 ultrasonic and 22 liquid penetrant examinations were performal on these systems. No rejectable indications were detected. ISI was not performed on the Reactor Coolant System kop welds during Refuel 5.

ACCUMULATOR SAFETY INJECrlON:

Accumulator Safety injection (ASI) kops 2, 3, and 4 were examined using ultrasonic and liquid penetrant methods. - A total of 23 ultrasonic and 27 liquidt e :trant examinations were performed.

No rejectable it.dications were detected as a result of these examinations, in addition, three welds on the ASI-to-cold leg loop 4, not selected in the ISI Program Plan, were examined by ultrasonic and liquid penetrant methods. These three welds were selected for augmental ISI, due to potential

thermal stratification induced stresses resulting from seat leakage at the first check valve which isolates the ASI from the kmp 4 cold leg. No evidence of thermal stratification induced cracking or any other service related indication v as detected as a result of this augmented 151.

HIGli PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION:

The High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) pump suction and HPCI Boron Injection Tank (BIT) header piping were examined by ultrasonic and liquid penetrant methods. A total of I1 ultrawnic and 19 liquid penetrant examinations were performed. No rejectable indications were detected as a result of these examinatwns.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL:

Piping on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) train A. RHR train B, RHR to Refueling Water Storage -

Tank, and RHR to Safety injection was examined by ultrasonic and liquid penetrant methods. A total of 24 ultrasonic and 49 liquid penetrant exaininations were performed. No rejectable indicatk ns were detected as a result of these examinations.

The RHR B Heat Exchanger inlet and outlet nozzle-to-shell weld, bonnet flange-tmchannel weld, and channel-to-heul wr'd were examined by the ultrasonic method. Recordable indications were

~ detected in the inlet and outlet nozzles. In-depth investigation and comparison to PSI data revealed these indications to be of a geometric origin and therefore acceptable. Recordable indications were also detected in the flange-t& channel and thannel-to-head welds. Subsequent evaluation determined Page 2 of 8

-JLNRC_2683.

_. Refuel .i 151 Summary ,

. , August 6,1992 these indications to be acceptable to the standards of ASME Section XI. No rejectable indications :

were detected in these welds and no further action is required as a result of these examinations. The RllR support skirt wekt was examinal 1 y the liquid penetrant method. No rejectable indications were

. detected in the skirt weld.

CllEMICAL VOLUME AND CONTROL:

Chemical and Volume Control normal charging, alternate charging, and prerwurizer auxiliary spray lines were esamin xi by ultrasonic and liquid penetrant methods. A total of 12 ultrasonic and 6 liquid penetrant examinations were performed. No rejectable indications were detsted as a result of these examinations, e

CONTAINMENT SPRAY:

Containment Spray train A and B pipinF was examined by ultrasonic and liquid penetrant methods. A total of 19 ultravnic and 19 liquid penetrant examinations w: e performed. No rejectable indications were detected as a result of these examinations. l STEAM GTNERATOR BLOWDOWN:

- Steam Generator B and C blowdown piping was examined by the ultrasonic method. A total of

. I1 ultrasenic examinations were performed. No rejectable indications were detected as a result of these examinations.

MAIN STEAM, MAIN FEEDWATER AND TURBINE DRIVEN AUX 1LIARY FEEDWATER PUMP:

. Main Steam loops 3 and 4. Main Feedwater loops 3 and 4, and the Auxiliary Feedwater turbine pump steam supply piping was examined by ultrasonic, liquid penetrant, and magnetic particle methods. A total of 48 ultrasonie, 36 liquid penetrant, and 10 magnetic part.cle examinations were performed 'oa these systems. In addithm, the loop 1 Main Steam isolation valve body-to-bonnet boltmg was examined by the ultrasmic method. No rejectable indications were detected as a result of these examinations.

VISUAL EXAMINATIObS Of' PIP NG. COMPONENTS. AND SUPPORTS

. SYSTEM LEAKAGE, INSERVICE, AND FUNCrlONAL PRESSURE TESTS:

. ASME Class ! nystem piping and components were visually examined (VT-2) for leakage while

- at normal operating temperature and pressure. No pressure retaining boundary leakage was identified, Approximately 50% of the reymred Period 3 system inservice and/or functional pressure tests on Class 2 and 3 piping and components were complete at the conclusion of Refuel 5. No rejectable pressure boundary leakage was identified as a result of the visual examinations for leakage during these pressure tests. Minor "non-pressure twedary* leakage was d<w:umented, and subsequently either evaluated 'o be acceptable or corrected.

TEN-YEAR ISI ilYDROSTATIC PRESSURE TESTS:

Callaway intends to invoke the new rules as approved by the NRC in Code Case N-498 (reference Regulatory Guide 1.147 Revision 9). These new rules allow a VT-2 examination for leakage during an inservice or functional test in lieu cf the ten-year ISI hydrostatic test. Based on Page 3 of 8

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, Refuel 5151 Summary

, August 6,1992 this, no ten-year ISI hydrostatic tests were performed on Class I or 2 systems during Refuel 5. ' A total of 45 hydmstatic pressure test,were completed on ASME Class 3 piping and components by the end of Refuel 5. Perhx! 3 (third forty-month period in the first ten-year interval) visual examinatims p - for leakage (VT-2) during inservice or functional pressure tests will not be performed on those

' systems hydmstatically tested. Listed below are the Class 3 systems hydrostaticall; .eted during Refuel 5 and the total percentage of each system tested. The paragraphs which follow detail the conditions found during visual examinations for leakage during these hydrostatic tests.

PERCENTAGE SYSTEM DESCRil' TION SYSTEM ID COMPLETE Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup EC 100%.

' Essential Service Water EF 90 %

Component Cooling Water EG 95 %

Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine FC 100 %

Misc. Building ilVAC GF 100 %

0 Fuelllandling Building IIVAC GG 100%

L Control Building IIVAC GL 100 %

Auxiliary Building IIVAC Gl. 100 %

Containment Cooling GN 100 %

Compressed Air KA 100%

Standby Diesel Engine KJ 30 %

Floor and Equipment Drains LF 100 % .

A small pin-hole leak was discovered at a 6" to 8* reducer in the Essential Service Water to the B Motor Odven Auxiliary Feederwater Pump. Root cause was determined to be raw water -

cormsion aggravated by weld pmosity. The weld was repaired in accordance with the Callaway Repair / Replacement Program and subsequently passed a repair / replacement hydrostatic test.

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A small pin-hole leak was discoverixi in a 3* by 4" reducing ellow in the Essential Service Water -

I-return ime from the A Class IE Electrical Equipment A/C unit. Root cause was determined to be raw ,

- water cormsion.- The defective area was repaired in accordance with the Callaway Repair / Replacement Pmgram and subsequently passed a repair / replacement hydmstatic test.

Small pin hole leaks in two tubes were discovered in the A Component Cooling Water rtem cooler. Root cause of the failure was determined to be miembiologically induced corrosion. Both -

tubes were plugged in accordance with the Callaway Repair / Replacement Pmgram.

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. A small tube leak was discovered in the A Centrifugal Charging Pump room cooler,- Root cause of the failure was determined to be pitting under a cupric oxide film (tubes are a copper-nickel alloy) . ,

This single tube was plugged in accordance with the Callaway Repair / Replacement Program.

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- Leaks were discovered in several tubes of the A Containment Cooler. The entire tube bundle was replaced in accordance with the Callaway Repair / Replacement Program.

Other than the 5 cases discussed ahwe, no other rejectable pressure tvundary leakage was identified as a result of the visual examinations for leakage daring these hydrostraic pressure tests.

Minor "non-pressure boundary" leakage wss documented, and subsetpiently either evaluated to be acceptable or corrected.

The leaks discovered during Refuel 5 hydrostatie testing were all a result of raw water induced lL cormsion. To reduce cormskm rates, Callaway has implemented an improved biocide (bromification)

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ULNRC 2683

, Refuel 5 ISI Summary f August 6,1992 water treatment program and a new biopenetrant water treatment program, in addition, a new proFram has been implemented to inspect and clean omni cooler coils once every three years to reduce pitting caused by cupric oxide film. Lastly, Callaway has an ongoing

• Raw Water Cornwion Monitoring Program" to detect corrosion anti take timely corrective action prior to pressure boundary failure which could adversely effect system operation.

PIPE SUPPORTS AND COMPONENT SUPPORTS:

The selection of piping and component supports for vhual examinaten (VT-3 and/or VT-4 ) is in accordance with the Statistical Sampimg Plan delineated in the Callaway ISI Program Plan. Listed behiw is a breakdown of 91 supporta scheduled for examination in the third forty-month period and completed during Refuel 5. The paragraphs which follow detail the conditions found during visual examination of these suppom.

NUMBER OF SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SYSTEM ID EXAMS Main Steam AB 2 Auxiliary Feedwater AL 2 Reactor Coolant BB 26 Chemical and Volume Control BG 16 Steam Generator Blowdown BM 4 Refueling Water Storage BN 1 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup EC I Essential Service Water EF 6 Gunponent Cooling Water EG 8 Residual Heat Removal EJ 2 liigh Pressure Coolant iniection EM 9 Contaimnent Spray EN 7 Accumulator Safety injection EP 3 Control Buikimg IIVAC GK 1 Containment Cooling GN 2 Emergency Fuel Oil JE I Standby Diesel Generator KJ 4 A kme pipe clamp on a strut assembly for the CVCS normal charging ime was identified during visual examination. This rejectable condition was attributed to a potential water transient that occurred on October 1,1900. As required by the Callaway 1S1 Program Plan, the adjacent (upstream and d .vnstream) supports and a random sample of 22 out of a population of 46 suppotts within the potential water transient tuundary were visually examined. All supports examined were found to be satisfactory. The cause of the water transient was assessed and found to be due to the manner in which the lines were filled and vented. To prevent recurrence, the site operating procedure (OTN-BG-00001) for fdling and venting the subject lines was revised. This failure is the result of a known cause and, therefore, is an " application induced failure' rather than a " service-induced" failure.

Based on this and in accordance with the Callaway ISI Program Plan, no further action or additional examinations are required.

A bent threaded rod on a snubber assembly for the C Containment Omler supply line was identined during visual examination. As required by the Callaway ISI Program Plan, the adjacent (upstream) support and a random sample of 25 out of a panulation of 81 supports within the potential uter hammer boundary were visually examined. Out of these 25 additional exammations, a bent paddle on a snubber assembly for the C Containment Cooler return ime was found. As a result of this second unsatisfactory condition, and in accordance with the Callaway ISI Program Plan, the Page 3 of 8

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, Ref uel 5 ISI Summary

. August 6,1992 remaining suppitte within the water hammer tvundary were visually examinni. A dishidgni and @

umLni bushing woubcovered on the A Containment Cooler retum line in this last esaminati<.n sample.

Tis cauw of the water hammer on the Coutainment Cooling System was investigatal and found to Iv a iesult of prewure surgen that occurred during liSFAS testing To minimite thew pressure surgem, liSFAS test procnturen for train A and 11 (ISP SA 2413A ud ISP-SA 241311) will be revised prior to Refuel 6. In addition, a modification to miti Fate or eliminate the detrimental elfnt of the water hammer will tw implementni during Ref uel 6 and prior to the next ESFAS test. These failures are the result of a known cauw and, therefore, are 'spplication induced

• failuren rather than " service induent' failures. He tlace unsatisfactory e.uppor+a were repairni in accordance with the Callaway.

Rrpair/Replaament Program. Ilased on thin and in accordance with the Callaway ISI Program P;an, these sui.,usts will be visually examined again during the next forty month inspection period.

With the exception of the two cases discuwed above, only minor indications were notnl and no other rejectable conditiors were klentified on the pipe and compmen'suppitta visually examined during Refuel 5.

I I!QUIPMiiNT SUPPORTS:

A total of 25 visual esaminations (VT 3's) w petti imed on njuipment supports donng Refuel S. lated in the tablo below are the aguipment supp rta visually cramined, a bnef descriptkm of the support, and the number of examinations on exh supput. He paragraphs which follow detail the conditions found doting visual examientmn of these niuipment supports.

SU PPO.TT NUMiltiR OF FOUIPMENT DliSCRIPTiON EXAMS Steam Generator il lower suppirt legs 2 Upper sunput ring 1

- RilR lleat litchanger A lower supp>rt struts 4 Upper support strut i Support skirt 1 Motor Driven Auxilis.ry Suppn1 pM i .

Feedwater Pump A Turbine Driven Auxiliary Lube oil heat exchanger saddle 1 Feedwater Pump Pump support pad I Reactor Coolant Pump A Suppnt struta 2

' Support leg 1 ,

Reactar Vessel - Suppirt pida 4-Pressuriier Support 'ugs 4 Eswntial Service Water Pump A Upper and lower scismic restraints 2 Two bolts on Pressurizer support lug number 4 and one tutt en lug number 2 were found to be IMse during visual examination. The telting was re-torqual to specification. In accordance with the s

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ULNRC 2683

, Refuel 5 ist Summary

, August 6,1992 l

Callaway ISI Pmgram Plan, and to ensure rewurk activities were sullicitet to prevent recunence, the Prewunter support lugs wdl be ( jually examinni agam in the next forty-month instwtion perial.

lee and broken bolts were diwovered on the Reattor Veuel cold leg support number 1 and number 3. Thew bolts retain the keept r plates in place and their failure does not impact or compromise the function of the cold leg Peactor Vew! supports. The hilts were replaced and re-ton".ned, as neceaary, le accorJance ws6 the Callawmy ISI Program Plan, and to ensure rework activities were sufficient to present recurrence, the Rector Veuel supports will be visually esaminni again in the next forty-month inspection period.

Exceuive corrod a was noted again on the Essential Set eice Water (ESW) Pump A uppst and htwc seisctie restr ints located in the pump bay. This corrosion prob!em was first diwovered during Refuel 4 shd was attributn! to galvanic corrosion between the stainless sttel weld material and the cashm steel ,nnbed plates. To eliminate the palvanic corrosion, a rn shfication was implemented which replaced the cathm steel emhn! plates and anchor imits with stamleo steel during Refuel 5. In .

accordance with the Callaway ISI Program Plan, these modified seismie ret.traints will be examined I again during the next forty month inspecthm perial. l With the etreption of tim three cases divum4 above. o,y minor indicathms were noted and no other rejxtable conditions were itketifini on the nguipmtet supports vwually esamined.

INTEGRAL ATTAcilMENTS:

A total of 26 visual exehtions (VT 3's) were performed on prewure boundary integrai attachments during Refuel 5, a e integral attu hments for the systems and'or equipment visually ,

examinni are listed below. No rejstl.ble sonditions were identifini, NUMBER OF EQUIPMENT / SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EXAMS Component Cooling Water Pipe lugs 7 .

A RilR llent Exchanger Shell support lugs 5 '

A Containment Cooler Supply and return header support luF" 8 Euential Service Water Pipe luFs 6 VALVE BODY AND FLANGFi BOLTING:

The internal surfaces of tne kop I ho' leg safety injution check valve and the Re.sidual llent r Removal pumps to lwp 4 cold leg check valve were visually examinni. A total of 13 valve or flange

& ring visual exa.ninations were performed on the Accumulatar Safety injxtion, liigh Prvasure w.stant injectiori, Chemical and Volume Control, and Reactor Coolant System, h addition, Steam Generator D manway holting was examinni. So reintable conditions wre idenufied as a result of . .

these examinations. '

. EDD1GRRENT TIIIDG Ol' STE AM Gl'NERATOR TUHES )

' Steam generator tube aldy current testing was performed in accor. lance with Callaway Talmicd

. Specification 4.4.5 One hundini percen: of the unplugged tubes in Steam Generators B and C were ,

~

- examined full length using a bobbin coil probe. In addition, the tube U-bends in row I end 2 of Steam Generator C and the hot leg expansion transition in approximately 600 tubes in Steam Generator B were examined using a Rotating Pancake Coil (RPC) pmbe. Eddy current analysis incorporated a special Page 7 of 8 p yms, ya,- -

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' ULNRC 2683

. Ref uel 5 ISI Summary August 6,1992

'turin* mix program, des eloped by Zetec, on all bobbin coil examination results to er. hance the abihty to detat primary Water Stress Corrosion CratLing (pWSCC).

He primary damage mechaniun identified as a res.d! of nidy current examinations was Antb Vibration liar (AVii) wear. No c"idence of PWSCC was detected. A total of I88 tubes with AVit indications were found, of which 113 had at least one indicati m of 20% or greater. Filteen tubes in S/G 13 and twelve tuben in S/O C were pluggni due to AVil wear. A Smgle A AialIndkation (SAI)in one tube and an Undefirmd Defott inc*aton (UDI) in another tube were detected in Steam Generator C. Ikith of these tubes were pluggni. De tube with the UDI was plugged an a precaution only.

REPAIRS _. REPLACEMEN'IE.AND MODif1CAllDNS Approximately 231 ASMF Section XI repairs, replacements, or modifications were completed on ASMll Class I, 2, or 3 components, parts, and appurtenances during the time peri W begi ming with Refuel 4 breaker closure (November 19,1990) and endmg with Refuel 5 breaker closure (Msy 18, 1992).

Every repair or replacement completed m accordance with ASME Code requirements at Callaway has tren reporkd on Callaway's I orm Nih-2 aport, to thicumunt the extent of work peiformed and to provide traceability 4,f new parts and'or materials. The NIS-2 is not raluired by the goveming code, however, this method of reporting is employed to ensure code compliance.

CONCL1!SIDN  !

Approximately 595 nondestnntive examinations,295 visual examinations, and 76 pressure tests were completal on ASME Class 1. 2, and 3 components and welds during Refuel 5 (this total dws not include edJy current examinations on steam Fenerator tulvs). As a result of the ASME Sectmn XI examinations and tests performed and of the conditions obsermi, there is no general safety esmeern for the pressure retaining integrity of the safety related systems at ttm Calltway Nuclear plant.

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