ML20094N221

Applicant Exhibit A-19,consisting of Justification of Continued Operation Developed to Assist in Evaluation of Splices Utilized in Certain Environmentally Qualified Solenoid Valves

ML20094N221
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	02/12/1992
From:	Hairston W ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:
References
CIVP-A-019, CIVP-A-19, NUDOCS 9204060224
Download: ML20094N221 (5)

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'92 MAR 13 P12:00 Alabama Nwer NS-87-0229 Justification for Continued Operation-- .o. 33,3 ;

Energized Solenoid Valves In or5 ter N StMit# -i s.amt Environmental Qualification ScopeKKEigff{h 21, 1987 cm. W. G. Hairston. III to Mr. J. D. _ Woodard Ai Vice President.

Nuclear Genc ation b

Enclosed-is a justification for continued operation (JCO)_ developed by -

Nuclear Support to assist FNP in their evaluation of splices utilized in certain environmentally qualifled (EO) solenoid vaives. Alse-enclosed (and referenced in the Nuclear Support input)-is input from Bechtel regarding:

(1) solenoid valves which are deenergized to perform thir accident mitigation function, and-

'(2)-. - EQ solenoid valve coil pigtail splices (terminati ...) located in the Main' Steam Valve Room.- -

The Bechtel assumptionf regarding-the configuration of tne conduit and junction box are believed to be an accurate reflection of the as built condition; however, FNP 3hould evaluate their agreement with walkoown reniti.

-A copy of this' letter should be placed in the Environmental

. Qualification Central File under ASCO Solenotd Valve.

g, s W..G. Hairston, !!!

WGH III/_ JAR: dst-060 Enclosure cc:- Mr. 0.--N. Morey Mr. J. E. Garlington Mr. D.'H.-Jones-Mr. K. C. GanChi File: A-5001:IEB 79-01B 9204060224 920212 PDR -ADOCK 05000348' G PDR

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,,_.., k gg, 9tgc034 oe.200 40< 4 0 JC0.: For Energized Solenoid Yalves In Environmental Qualification S

1. N1(2)S31SV0444 BA, BB 445 AA, AB Pressurizer PORV The pressurizer PORVs are normally closed and minimize the potenti the pressurizer safety valves in the event of certain accident scenariosThe .

FNP accident analyses do not take credit for operation of the PORVs (refe APCo' letter tolNRC dat' ed 6-23-82) and' primary system overpressure prote is provi,ded.by the safety valves.

The use'$f the Safety Valves precludes -

exceeding the RCS safety limit as defined in the Technical Specifications. In addition, it should.be noted that the Technical Specifications permit continue operation with both PORVs isolated by block valves with their power removed Furthermore, Technical Specifications even require positive isolation of POR _

vent path should tne PORY be inoperaole. Since the safety function can be satisfied by tne safety valves alone, continued operation is justified.

2. Q1(2)M11SV3369 AC, BC, CC 3370 AC, BC, CC Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV)

The main steam isolation valves are normally open during power operation. The safety function of the MSIVs is to close to isolate main steam such that accident analysis assumptions are satisfied. In the event >f an HELB in the main stea,m valve room, the ESF actuation sy:',en, would initiate MSIVAs closure.

discussed by Bechtel letter AP-13169 the environmental conditions seen by th circuits in question are not expected to produce failures which would interr power necessary to close the MSIVs.

It should be noted that MSIV closure occurs relatively early in the transients of concern.

If the worst case fault in tL.

circuit to the solenoid valve is postulated after MSIV closure, the fault would be of no concern beccuse the MSly mechanical design precludes the valve from reopecing in a manner that would unisolate a faulted steam generator while the intact steam gnerators are pressurized.

The safety function of thne valves is therefore achieved with the energization of the valves.

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The specific concern for this JC0 is the environmental qualification of-tne electrical cable splice between the solenoid valve end junction box. Given the raceway system configuration, the subject splices are capable of withstanding the expected Main Steam Valve toom environment and will thus be able to function per original design during a steam line or feedwater break accident. In addition, any such exposure would only be for a short period of time. The basis ,

for utilizing' the above information as a part of this justification is contained in the enclosed Bechtel letter AP-13169 dated July 21, 1987. Since the safety

- funct' ion ;is not jeopardized and is satisfied, continued operation u justified.

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Turbine Driven Auxiliary feedwater

3. Q1(2)N12SV3235 A, B;  :

Pump Main Steas Admission Valvas The turbine driven ' auxiliary feedwater pump main steam admission valves are normally closed except during pump operation wnen the solenoid valves are required to be energized. The safety function of these valves is therefore achieved with the energization of the valves. The specific concern for this JC0 is the environmental aualification of the electrical cable splice between the solenoid valve and junction box. Given the raceway system configuration, tne subject splices are capable of withstaading the expected Main Steam Valve Room environment and will tnus be able to function per original design during a steam line or feedwater breax accident. In addition, any such exposure would only be for a snort period of time. The basis for utilizing the waixdown information as a part of this justification is contained in the enclosed ghtel letter AP-13169 dated July 21, 1987. Since the safety function is not jeopardized and is satisf.ied, continued operation is justified.

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4. Q1(2)M235Y3227 AA, BA, CA. AC BC CC Auxiliary Feedwater Control Valves 3228 AA, L' , CA

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The purpose of these valves is to control auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators during normal nd accident conditions. The safety function is for these valves to open and, supply. water to the; steam generator during accident e .

conditions. t On a loss of air these valves fall to the open position.

The safety function of these valves is therefore achieved with the energitation of the valves.. The specific concern for this JC0 is the environmental qualification of'the e'lectrical cable splice between the solenoid valve and junction box.

Given the raceway system configuration, the subject splices are '

capable of withstanding the expected Main Steam Valve Room environment and will thus be able to fun [ction gier original design during a steam line or feedwater breakaccidest. In' add'iti[n, any such exposure would only be for a stort period of tiine.

The basis for. utilizing the walkdown information as a part of this justification'is contained in the enclosed Bechtel letter AP-13169 dit ed July 21, 1987.

Since the safety function is not jeopardized and is satidied, continued operation'is justified.

5. Q1(2)P175V3184 Compenent Cooling Water (CCW) to RCP

% Thermal Barrier The CCW to RCP Thermal Barrier valve is normally open ano protects the reactor coolant pump seal from high temperature primary System water.

A diverse method of protecting the RCP seals is by utilizing CVC5 seal injection. The safety function of HV 3184 is to cloca for containment isolation upon a Phase 8 Containment Isolation signal. A Phase B signal also isolates instrument air to containment.

By design, normal loss of instrument air due to bleeding will depressurize the instrument air system inside containment.

HV 3184 will close upon loss of instrument air even with its solenoid valve deenergized. Valve clost.re occurs without opccator action.

Therefore, since valve closure of HV 3184 occurs upon receipt of a Phaso B signal, the safety function is satisfied and continued operation is justified.