ML20094H547
| ML20094H547 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1984 |
| From: | Waters D CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20094H487 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8408140036 | |
| Download: ML20094H547 (200) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:'7 d-ggG4 7' 0 August 9, 1984 gtS 4'pEU " 00CKETED USHRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '84 ASD 13 N0:I4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e rnrE or :F BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)-
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN )
MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power ) Plant) ) APPLICANTS' TESTIMONY OF DAVID B. WATERS IN RESPONSE TO EDDLEMAN CONTENTION 116 (FIRE PROTECTION) e Og000C 0 h T l
c n 1 Q.1 Please state your name, address, present occupation 2 and employer. 3 A.1 My name is David B. Waters. My business address is J Carolina Power & Light Company, P. O. Box 165, New Hill, North 4 _ 5 Carolina 27562. My present occupation is Principal Engineer - 6 Operations for the Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L). 7 Q.2 , State your educational background and professional 8 work experience. 9 1A. 2 I have a B.S. in Engineering Physics from Ohio State 10 University, an M.S. in Nuclear Science and Engineering from 11 Carnegie Institute of Technology and professional experience in 12 the areas of nuclear plant reactor core analysis, licensing and 13 regulatory compliance, nuclear plant operating requirements, 14 and fire protection requirements. A copy of my professional 15 experience and qualifications is affixed hereto as 16 Attachment A. 17 Q.3 What is your present position with CP&L? 18 A.3 My present position with CP&L is Principal Engineer - 19 Operations in the Harris Nuclear Project Department. 20 Q.4 In this position have you any responsibilities 21 relating to the Harris Plant fire protection program? 22 A.4 Yes. In this position I am delegated the responsi-23 bility by the Plant General Manager for administration of the , 1 24 plant fire protection program during the operational phase. I 25 This involves the supervision of the plant fire protection 26 1 _ ._ _ _ _. . ._.- . _ . _ . . _ _ . . . . _ _ . . _ . . . _ . - _ , _ . . ~ _ .
1 staff -- who carry out the development and implementation of 2 procedures, performance of periodic tests of installed fire 3 protection equipment, training of fire brigade members, fre-4 quent walkdowns of plant areas to detect fire protection con-5 cerns, and interface with insurance carriers, NRC inspectors, 6 and company auditors during periodic inspections. I have de-7 veloped a working knowledge of nuclear plant fire protection 8 programs, requirements and regulations through my direct in-9 volvement with responses to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 for 10 CP&L's H. B. Robinson and Brunswick Nuclear Plants during the 11 period between May 1976 to March 1979, and during my assignment 12 at the H. B. Robinson Plant as Principal Engineer - Operations 13 from June 1981 to June 1982, with similar responsibilities for 14 fire protection at an operating plant to the ones I presently 15 hold at Harris. 16 Q.5 What is the purpose of your testimony? 17 A.5 The purpose of my testimony is to address those as-18 pects of Eddleman Contention 116 that question fire brigade re-19 sponse to a fire at the Harris Plant and allege that the Harris 20 Plant " fire fighting capability for simultaneous fires is inad-21 equate, or at least unanalyzed." 22 Q.6 What provisions are made for Harris Plant response to 23 a fire? 24 A.6 The Harris Plant response to a fire event is based on 25 the concept of " defense-in-depth." For purposes of fire pro-26 tection, the Harris Plant can be viewed as consisting of ! l
1 self-contained spaces, or fire areas. Each fire area 2 containing safety-related equipment will be bounded on all 3 sides by three hour rated fire barriers. All penetrations 4 through a fire barrier will be sealed by tested assemblies 5 having a commensurate rating as that required of the barrier. 6 As discussed in the Fire Hazards Analysis, fire areas will be 7 equipped with detectors to provide early warning of fires, 8 including smouldering fires, and will be protected by suppres-9 sion systems actuated by thermal detectors. Fire detection and 10 suppression systems are discussed in Applicants' Testimony of 11 Margareta A. Serbanescu. 12 The trained fire brigade utilizes installed manual equip-13 ment such as fire hose stations and fire extinguishers as the 14 primary response to a fire in each fire area. This equipment 15 is backed up by the design features in these areas, to ensure 16 complete extinguishment of even deep-seated fires such as those 17 that could arise from concentrated cable tray fires. Adminis-18 trative controls are utilized to control activities such as 19 welding and burning or transport and storage of combustible ma-20 terials, and thus minimize the opportunity for a fire to be in-21 itiated. Prior to commercial operation, a pre-fire plan will 22 be prepared for each area of the plant which contains 23 safety-related equipment. The pre-fire plan will provide the 24 Shift Foreman in the control room and the fire brigade leader 25 with information about a possible fire in the area including 26 guidance for preventing a fire from spreading to adjacent areas 27 and for notifying off-site fire companies.
t 1 The implementation of the-Harris Plant fire protec-2 tion program provides assurance that fire events that could ad-3 versely affect safety-related equipment have a low probability 4 of occurring, and that in the unlikely event they did occur and 5 were not promptly detected and extinguished, the safe shutdown 6 of the plant would not be jeopardized. 7 Q.7 What assumptions are made regarding fire brigade re-8 sponse time? 9 A.7 A fire brigade response time of approximately 5-15 10 minutes is expected for most fire events within the power 11 block. This response time is dependent on many factors, 12 including fire location, weather conditions, and location of 13 fire brigade members within the plant and may vary somewhat 14 from the above numbers. Fire brigade training stresses the im-15 portance of prompt reaction to a fire condition, proper use of 16 fire-fighting and protective equipment, and actions required 17 promptly to extinguish different types of fires in a variety of 18 plant areas. This training, supplemented by fire drills, will 19 serve to keep the brigade response time to a minimum. 20 Q.8 What is the basis for these assumptions? 21 A.8 They are based upon the experience of the Harris 22 Plant's fire protection staff, which includes power plant, mu-23 nicipal, volunteer, and industrial fire suppression experience 24 totaling over 30 years. 25 09 Please describe the training program for fire brigade 26 members. 4
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l r 1 A.9 The training program for fire brigade members is de-2 scribed in FSAR Section 13.2.3, a copy of which is attached 3 hereto as Attachment B. j 4 Q.10 How often do members of the fire brigade participate 5 in fire drills? 6 A.10 In accordance with Section I.3 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, 7 Appendix R, fire drills will be conducted at least quarterly 8 for each shift brigade. At least one drill per year will be 9 unannounced for each shift brigade and at least one drill per 10 year will be conducted on a "back shift" for each shift bri-11 gade. 12 Once every three years an unannounced drill will be 13 critiqued by qualified individuals independent of Applicants' 14 staff. A copy of the critique report will be available for NRC 15 review. 16 Q.ll What are the requirements for refresher training for 17 the fire brigade members? 18 A.ll In accordance with Section I.1 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, 19 Appendix R, refresher training sessions for fire brigade mem-20 bers will be conducted quarterly. These sessions will be used 21 to review changes to the fire protection program, to supplement 22 the initial training program and to cover any other subjects as 23 necessary. The refresher training program is designed to en-24 sure that each topic for fire brigade instruction is repeated 25 at a frequency of not more than two years. 26 l l I l
I l' Each brigade member, additionally, will participate 2 annually in a practice session-covering fire fighting on typi-3 cal nuclear plant fires. These sessions will involve actual 4 interior structural fire fighting Iaquiring the use of breath-5 ing apparatus and full protective clothing. 6' :Q.12 Is there any regulatory requirement or guidance 7 requiring consideration of postulated simultaneous fires in es-8 tablishing nuclear plant fire fighting capability? 9 A.12 I am aware of no NRC regulations or regulatory guide 10 and no industry code or standard which requires a commercial 1 nuclear generating facility operator to postulate, or defend 1 against, multiple fires. 'Section I of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Ap-13 pendix R, contains a table establishing three levels of fire 14 damage limits for which fire protection must be provided. For 15 each, only a single fire must be considered. 16 Because there is no requirement to consider simulta-17 neous fires, Applicants have not specifically addressed this 18 subject in the FSAR or Safe Shutdown Analysis. 19 Q.13 Have Applicants nevertheless considered how the 0 Harris Plant would respond to two fires occurring simulta-neously? 22 A.13 The design of fire suppression and detection systems 23 as well as fire suppression procedures which will be in place ; 24 I upon commercial operation of the Harris Plant provide adequate 1 25 I capability to react effectively t.o two fires occurring simulta-26 neously. Activation of the fire detection system in an area is l- Lindependent of other fire areas, so two fires occurring simul-2 taneously in different areas would be detected and alarm-lo-
-3 .cally and at the main fire detection information. center. Also, 4 each. suppression system operates independently of the others, 5 thus multiple simultaneous fires would activate multiple sup-l 6 pression systems. Fire brigade training in fire suppression !
7 techniques will allow the capability of applying personnel re-8 sources to control simultaneous fires. 9 Q.14 Is there an adequate supply of water to handle the-10 activation of more than one suppression system? 11 A.14 There is an adequate water supply at the Harris Plant i 12 to control multiple fires. The Harris Plant water supply con-13 sists of two pumps, each with a rated capacity of 2500 gallons i 14 per minute (gpm) and each capable of supplying 100% of the sup-15 pression system needs. The largest suppression system to be 16 installed in the Harris Plant will require only 2000 gpm if all 17 of its approximately 130 sprinkler heads operate. Statistics 18 show, however, that for fires occurring in areas protected by 19 sprinkler systems, 95% of them are controlled by less than 15 20 of the system's sprinkler heads and over 90% are controlled 21 with only one sprinkler head. National Fire Protection Associ-22 l ation, Fire Protection Handbook, (14th Edition, 1976), Figure i 23 14-1(0). 24 Q.15 What inspection requirements will be established to 25 ensure the operation of fire protection and suppression sys-26 tems? l-( I i o
l 1 A.15 Applicants will test detection and suppression sys-2 tems on a periodic basis as dictated by the Harris Plant Tech-3 nical Specifications. Supply valves which are normally re-4 quired to be open are designed to alarm if they are placed in a 5 closed position. Applicants will also perform routine inspec-6 tions monthly to verify proper valve lineups. 7 Q.16 Have Applicants established administrative controls 8 for flammable liquids and combustible materials at the Harris 9 Plant? 10 A.16 The Harris Plant fire protection program includes ad-11 ministrative controls of flammable liquids and combustible ma-12 terials to ensure that there is a low probability that a fire 13 which could affect plant safety will occur. Administrative 14 controls include the prohibiting the storage of flammable lig-15 uids in safety related areas, minimizing the quantities of 16 flammable liquids in safety cans and storing fluids in fire re-17 sistant cabinets. In addition, Applicants will implement an 18 aggressive housekeeping program to minimize the accumulation of 19 combustible paper and trash. Smoking will be prohibited in all 20 safety-related areas except those which will be continually 21 manned. 22 Q.17 Will the fire brigade include sufficient personnel to 23 respond to two simultaneous fires? 24 A.17 Yes. The fire brigade will consist of a minimum of 25 five persons on each shift, as required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, 26 Appendix R, who will have been trained pursuant to the
1 requirements described in FSAR Section 13.2, plus at least one 2 fire protection technical aide who will provide expert advice , 3 and assistance. In my opinion, sufficient personnel would be 4 available to control effectively two simultaneous fires. 5 Q.18 Is there sufficient fire equipment on site to respond 6 to two simultaneous fires? 7 A.18 Yes. Stand pipe and hose systems are installed 8 throughout the Plant to supply hose stations. Each area of the 9 Plant can be reached by effective hose streams from at least 10 two hose stations. Fire extinguishers, self-contained breath-11 ing equipment, protective clothing and emergency lanterns are 12 provided as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.3. In addition, 13 there will be a fire engine housed on site which will be avail-14 able to respond to fires in outlying areas. The engine carries 15 1000 gallons of water, which will allow an immediate response 16 to a fire situation for 5-10 minutes while adjacent hydrants 17 are supplied with hoses and charged by fire brigade members. 18 Q.19 What assumptions are made respecting off-site assis-19 tance to fight a fire? 20 A.19 Off-site fire companies could be called to assist in 21 responding to fires. Applicants have estimated an average re-22 sponse time of 30 minutes for the Apex Volunteer Fire Depart-l 23 ment and the Holly Springs Volunteer Fire Department. These 24 fire company personnel will be given an orientation of the 25 Harris Plant and will be familiar with the Plant's configura-26 tion and capabilities. They will be invited to participate in
7, 1 drills at the Harris Plant. The 30-minute response time will 2 vary depending upon the time of day a request for assistance is 3 made. Response times are anticipated to be somewhat better 4 during evening hours. The response time can be expected to be 5 somewhat longer than 30 minutes during normal business hours. 6 off-site agency assistance will not be as important during 7 those hours, however,' because additional assistance will'be f 8 available on site from day shift operating personnel and fire 9 protection staff. 10 Q.20 In summary, are you confident that Applicants can 11 fight any postulated fire at the Harris Plant including two si-12 multaneous fires? 13 A.20 CP&L's management has fully supported and encouraged 14 the development of an aggressive fire protection program and a 15 properly trained fire protection staff at the Harris Plant. ! 16 The design features, administrative controls and fire protec-17 tion procedures which I have described are, in my judgment, en- ] 18 tirely adequate to provide prompt and effective response to a 19 single fire as required by NRC regulations, and adequate also , 20 to respond effectively to two fires occurring simultaneously. 21 22 23 1 24
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nr.n.niw.i n SENPP FSAR TABLE 13.1.3-16 David Waters Principal Engineer - Operations Education A. B.S. Degree in Engineering Physics - Ohio State thiversity - 1963. B. M.S. Degree in Nuclear Engineering - Carnegie Institute of Technology - 1967. Professional Societies A. American Nuclear Society B. Professional Engineer - North Carolina - 1975 C. Society of Fire Protection Engineers - Experience April,1963, to April,1972, Senior Engineer, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Pittsburgh, PA May,1972, employed as a Senior Engineer in the Nuclear Generation Section of the Bulk Power Supply Department. Located in the General Office. June,1973, employed as a Project Engineer in the Nuclear Generation Section of the Bulk Power Supply Department. Located in the General Office. July,1974, employed as a Principal Engineer in the Nuclear Generation Section l of the Bulk Power Supply Department. Located in the General Office. January, 1977, employed as a Director - Start-up and Technical in the Generation Services Section of the Generation Department. Located in the General Office. September,1978, employed as a Principal Engineer - Nuclear Generation in the Nuclear Generation Section of the Generation Department. Located in the General Office. Nay,1979, employed as a Principal Specialist - Regulatory Compliance in the Generation Services Section of the Generation Department. Located in the General Office. November,1979. employed as a Principal Specialist - Special Projects in l Nuclear Operations Administration Section of the Nuclear Operations ! Department. Located in the Ceneral Office. l 13.1.3-24 Amendment No. 13
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. SHNPP FSAR e
TABLE 13.1.3-16 (Cont'd) David Waters Principal Engineer - Operations Experience (Cont'd) , l
. February,1981, employed as a Principal Specialist - Special Projects in the l Nuc.laar Operationa Administration Section of the Technical Services Department. Located in the General Office.
June 1981 to June 1982 acting as Principal Engineer - Operations at R. B. Robinson Unit No. 2. , i February, 1982, employed as Principal Engineer - Operations, at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, located in New Hill, North Carolina. i l 13.1.3-25 Amendment No. 13
ou w . w x:.x u > s SENFF FSAR . 13.2.3 FIRE BEIGADE TRAINING 13.2.3.1 Fire Brigade Members 13.2.3.1.1 Instruction Instructions in the topics listed below will be administered to each individual prior to assignment as a fire brigade seaber. The instructions will includes a) Identification of the location and types of fire hazards that could produce fires within the plant, including identification of the areas where breaching air will be required. 4 b) Identification of the location of installed and portable fire fighting equipment in each area, and familiarization with the layout of the planc, including access and regress routes to each area. c) Proper use of available equipment, and the correct methods of fighting the following types of fires electrical, cable and cable trays, hydrogen, flammable liquids, vaste/ debris, and record file. d) Indoctrination to the plant fire fighting plan, with coverage of each individual's responsibilities and their changes. e) Proper use of breaching, comunication, lighting, and portable ventilation equipment. f) A detailed review of procedures, with particular emphasis on what equipment met be used in particular areas. g) A review of the latest modifications to the facility, procedures, fire fighting equipment, and fire fighting plan. h) The proper method of fighting fires inside buildings and cunnels. Refresher instructions will be provided to all fire brigade aesbers on a regularly scheduled basis of not less than four sessions a year with sessions to be repeated at a frequency of not more than 2 years. Instrue:1ons will be provided by qualified individuals knowledgeable and experienced in fighting the fires that could occur in the plant with the equipment available at the plant. Special instructions will be provided for fire brigade leaders in directing and coordinating fire fighting activities. 13.2.3.1.2 Practice Sessions Practice sessions will be held for fire brigade seabers to teach them the proper method of fighting various types of fires and to provide them with practice in extinguishing actual fires. These sessions will be conducted at facilities sufficiently remote free the nuclear plant so as not to endanger safety-related equipment, with the sessions provided at regular inter rals not exceeding 1 year. These practice sessions will be conducted requiring fire l 13.2.3-1 Amendment No. 2 l
SIBIFF TSAR i brigade seabers to don protective quipeone, including energency breaching 2 apparatus. 13.2.3.1.3 Drius Drills win be performed in the plant so that the fire brigade will remain proficient in fire fighting techniques. These drills will includes a) The sianlated use of equipment for the various situations and types of fires which could reasonably occur in each safety-related area. b) Conformance, where possible, to the established plant fire fighting plans. c) Operation of fire fighting equipment, where practical, including self-contained breaching apparatus, communication equipment, and portable and installed ventilation equipment. Drills win be performed at regular intervals, not to exceed three months, for each fire brigade to anow seabers of the brigade to train as a team. At least one drill per year for each fire brigade will be namanaunced to determine the fire readiness of the plant fire brigade and plant fire protection systems and equipment. Drills will be planned to establish training objectives and win be critique.d to determine how won the training objectives were met. This critique will, as a sinisua, assess: fire alars effectiveness; response time; selection, placement and use of equipment; the fire brigade chief's direction of the fire fighting effort; and each fire brigade seaber's response to the energency. A drill will be held annuan y at whien offsite fire department participation win be requested. 13.2.3.2 other station holayees 13.2.3.2.1 Instruction for All Non-Fire 3rigade Members once a year an employees win be instructed on the fire protection plan. evacuacion roucas, and procedures for reporting a fire. Security personnel win be inst ucted in entry procedures for offsite fire departments, crowd control for people aziting the stations, and procedures for reporting potential fire hazards observed when touring the f acility. Instruction will also be given to an shif t personnel who win assist the fire brigade in the event of a fire. Temporary employees will be given instructions to f amiliarize them with the plant's evacuation signals, evacuation routes, and procedures for reporting fires. 13.2.3.2.2 Drins A plant evacuation drin win be performed annuany. 13.2.3-2 Amendment No. 2
. s SENFF FSAR 13.2.3.3 Fire Protection Staff Fire protection staff seabers will be introduced to a program of specialized training. Instructions for the staff will include: a) Analysis of building layout and system design with respect to fire protection requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated design basis fires. b) Design and maintenance of fire detection suppression and extinguishing systems. c) Fire protection techniques and procedures. d) Training in manual firefighting techniques and procedures for plant personnel and the fire brigade. . 13.2.3.4 offsite Fire Departments In accordance with commitments f or the use of offsite . fire departments, the training offered these offsite fire fighting personnel will include courses in i basic radiation principles and practices. Additional training will be offered to familiarize them with typical radiation hazards that say be encountered when fighting fires at a nuclear power plant. 13.2.3.5 Construction Personnel Training for construction personnel will include instructions in reporting fires, responding to alaras, and locating evacuation routes. 13.2.3.6 Initial Training
- The initial fire protection training program will be completed prior to receipt of fuel at the site. The Emergency Plan implementing procedures for fire protection will be completed at least three months prior to receipt of fuel. Sufficient fire protection drills will be perf ormed tamediately prior to fuel receipt to provide assurance that the plant staff is adequataly trained to cope with fire-related emergencies.
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- 13. 2.3 -3 A888d"*nt No. 2 l
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Applicants'-Exhibit i Eddleman Contention 116 l Docket No. 50-400 OL Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.and Appendix-9.5A Fire Protection System - 7' I l l l k
/t SENPP FSAR 5
9.5 OTHER AUXILIARY-SYSTEMS 9.5.1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
-The Shearon llarris Nuclear _ Power Plant (SHNPP) fire protection program is based on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidelines, Nuclear Mutual Limited (NHL) Property loss Prevention Standards for Nuclear Generating Stations an'd related industry standards.' With regard to NRC criteria, the SHNPP fire protection program meets the intent of the. guidelines outlined in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, dated August 23, 1976. Information on various aspects of the fire protection program, detailed as required to show l conformance with the guidelines or to demonstrate the equivalency of alternative i appro'a ches was previously described in the SHNPP PSAR Section 9.10. " Fire Protection System" submitted to the NRC as Amendment 54, dated May 1,1977.
The purpose of the_ fire protection program is to ensure the capability to safely shutdown the reactor, maintain'it.in a safe shutdown condition, and to limit the radioactive release to the environment in the event of a fire. The SHNPP fire protection program consists of design features, personnel, equipment, and procedures to provide defense-in-depth protection of public health and safety. The program is implemented through plant system and facility design, fire prevention, fire detection, annunciation, confinement, extinguishment, administrative controls, fire brigade organization, inspection and maintenance, training, quality assurance, and testing. Tables 9.5.1-6 through 9.5.1-8 are the resumes of EBASCO's Pire Protection Engineers responsible for the formulation and implementation of the Fire 5 Protection Prograuw SHNPP has a Senior Specialist - Pire Protection on its staf f who is responsible for the forsulation and implementation of the plant Fire Protection Program. 9.5.1.1 Design Basis 9.5.1.1.1 Fire Areas The fire protection program covers areas containing safety related systems and equipment and other plant areas containing fire hazards that could adversely affect safety-related systems. Considering the fact that separate fire areas for each division of safety related systems reduce the possibility of fire-related damage to redundant safety related equipment, the fire areas were established to separate redundant safety divisions and to isolate safety related systems from fire hazards in non-safety related areas to the extent possible in the previously l
-established plant design. Where feasible, fire barrier separation was used to I limit the spread of fires between components that presented major fire hazards within the same safety division. Where redundant systems could not be separated by fire barriers, as in Containment and the Control Room, other measures were employed in order to prevent a fire-caused loss of function of safety related systems. These measures included limitation of the amount of I combustible: materials, utilization of fire-resistive construction, provision of. fire breaks and/or fire-retardant coatings in cable trays, and installation of fire detection systems and automatic fire extinguishing k'
9.5.1-1 Amendment No. 5 1.
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SHNPP FSAR sys te ms . The fire hazard analysis (Section 9.5.1.3 and Appendix 9.5A) was used to demonstrate the adequacy of the fire prevention measures utilized. The spread of the products of combustion to other fire areas was Itmited by provision of adequate means to ventilate, exhaust, or isolate the fire areas. Provisions were made for personnel access to and escape routes from each fire area.
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Areas in which fire could affect, directly or indirectly, safety related , structures, systems or _ coeponents are listed in Table 9.5.1-1. 9.5.1.1.2 De f ense-in-Depth The defense-in-depth concept was used in SHNPP to achieve the desired degree of fire safety. This concept was applied to the fire protection program to achieve an adequate balance in: a) Prevention of fire initiation through the control, separation and < guarding of sources of ignition; b) Prompt detection of fires or incipient fire conditions in areas containing safety related equipment or in areas of high combustible loading which may expose safety related equipment; c) Effective suppression of fires to limit consequent damage and to reduce exposure to safety related equipment; d) Confinement of fires to their areas of initiation by provision of fire barriers, spatial separation and segregation of combustibles; and e) Separation of redundant safety related equipment to maintain operational capability under postulated fire conditions. 9.5.1.1.3 Program Objectives , The primary objective of the SHNPP fire protection program is to minimize both the probability and the consequences of postulated fires. However, some fires can be expected to occur. Therefore, regardless of fire prevention measures incorporated-in plant design and operation, adequate means for prompt detection and for effective control and suppression of fire have been , provided. 1 For those plant systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown, , with or without offsite power available, particular emphasis was given to the provision of both passive fire prevention and damage limitation design j features and active fire protection equipment and systems having appropriate i capability and adequate capacity. Design concepts used in the fire protection program provide assurance that a fire will not cause the complete loss of function of safety-related systems, even though lindted loss of redundancy within one system may occur. Plant areas are protected as required based on the hazards present in the areas. For hazardous areas, primary fire protection capability is provided by l automatic fire detection and extinguishing systems in conjunction with separational fire barriers. As total reliance is not placed on a single fire 9.5.1-2 Amendment No. 5 j
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SENPP FSAR
?l extinguishing system, appropriate backup fire extinguishing capability is ,
provided throughout the plant to limit the extent of fire damage. ! Ilose stations, portable fire extinguishers, complete personnel protective equipment 'and air breathing equipment are provided for use by properly trained personnel. Personnel access to areas is provided'to permit effective manual use of fire extinguishing equipment on area fires. Area fire hazards analyses and evaluations of postulated fire effects were
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used to determine adequacy of fire protection' in maintaining the capability of the plant to safely shut down the reactor and to minimize radioactive releases to the' environment. All instrumentation necessary for safe shutdown, which for the Shearon Harris Plant is considered to be the Hot Standby (shutdown) Mode, is provided for Operator information at both the main control room and an alternate shutdown or equipment location. The systems that are necessary for the Hot Standby Mode, and the associated instrumentation items can be found in Section 7.4 and
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Table 7.4.1-1. , 9.5.1.1.4 Quality Assurance Fire protection for SHNPP has been incorporated in initial plant design and carried through all phases of construction leading to actual operation. As an t essential part of the fire protection program, a quality assurance (QA) program was developed and is being used to identify and rectify any possible deficiencies in design, construction, and operation of the fire protection sys tems. 9.5.1.t.5 Fire Suppression System Damage The evaluation of the consequences of inadvertent operation of the fire extinguishing systems is addressed in the description of each respective system and in the detailed fire hazards analysis for each fire area. The evaluation of the consequences of a crack in a moderate-energy line in the fire extinguishing system has been performed to demonstrate compliance with the guidelines of NRC Branch Technical Position APCSB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 (refer to Section 3.6). 9.5.1.t.6 Unusually Hazardous Materials . The unuousily hazardous materials which could complicate fire control activitled or present unexpected fire hazards at the SHNPP are listed 15 in Table 9.5.1-2. 9.5 1.2 Systems Description The systems description of the total fire protection for the plant, given in ) this section, encompasses: ) a) active system components generally recognized as fire protection systems, which include fire detection, suppression and control systems and
- equipment, and 9.5.1-3 Amendment No. 15 l 1
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n SENPP FSAR b) passive system components, usually identified as fire prevention, which provide fire prevention, confinement, and damage limitation features in the design of plant structures and systems. Recognized standards and guidelines call for the inclusion of both active and passive fire protection into the overall plant design. This section describes the passive and active fire protection systems of the plant and their utilisation as detailed below: a) Applicable fire protection codes, standards, and guidelines b) Fire prevention (passive systems) c) Fire protection (active systems) d) Fire protection of safety related and special plant areas 15 9.5.I'.2.1 Applicable Fire Protection Codes, Standards and Guidelines The codes, standards and guidelines used for the design and installation of plant fire protection systems are as follows: a) American National Standards Institute ( ANSI) B 31.1 1973 - Power Piping N45.2.9 1974 - Quality Assurance Records, protection from fire hazards h) American Society for Testing Materials ( ASTM) D 1978 Test for Flash and Fire Points by Cleveland open cup. E 1980 Test For Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials. E-119 - 1980 Standard Test Method for Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials. E-136 - 1979 Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750 C. c) Factory Mutual Research (FM) Fire Protection Equipment Approval Guide d) Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Std. 383-1974 Standard for Type Test of Class lE Electric Cables. Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, Std. 634-1978 Standard Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification Test. e) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
- 1) Std. No. 10-1978 - Installation of Portable Fire Extinguishers j
- 2) Std. No. 11-1978 - Foam Extinguishing Systems 9.5.1-4 Amendment No. 15 L
7. SHNPP FSAR
- 5) Std. No. 15 - 1977 - Water Spray Fixed Systems
- 6) Std. No. 20 - 1972 - Centrifugal Fire Pumps 9.5.1-4a Amendment No. 5
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SHNPP FSAR 9.5.1.2.1 e) (continued) , l
- 3) Std. No. 13-1978 - Installation of Sprinkler System
- 4) Std. No. 14-1976 - Standpipe and Hose Systems
- 5) Std. No. 15-1977 - Water Spray Fixed Systems
- 6) Std. No. 20-1972 - Centrifugal Fire Pumps
- 7) Std. No. 24-1977 - Outside Protection
- 8) Std. No. 26-1976 - Supervision of Va,1ves ,
- 9) Std. No. 27-1975 - Private Fire Brigades
- 10) Std. No. 30-1977 - Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
- 11) Std. No. 515-1974 - Cutting and Welding Process
- 12) Std. No. 72A-1975 - Local Protective Signaling Systems
- 13) Std. No. 72D-1975 - Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems
- 14) Std. No. 72E-1978 - Automatic Fire Detectors
- 15) Std. No. 80-1979 - Fire Doors and Windows
- 16) Std. No. 90-1978 - Air Conditioning and Ventilation Systems
- 17) Std. No. 101-1976 - Life Safety Code
- 18) Std. No. 251-1979 - Fire Tests, Building Construction and Materials
- 19) Std. No. 291-1977 - Fire Hydrants, Uniform Markings
- 20) Std. No. 803-1978 - Fire Protection, Nuclear Power Plants
- 21) Std. No. 1201-1977 - Organization of Fire Services
- 22) Std. No. 1202-1976 - Organization of Fire Department
- 23) Std. No. 1963-1979 - Screw Threads and Gaskets for Fire Hose Couplings
- 24) Std. No. 1961-1979 - Fire Hose
- 25) Std. No. 1962-1979 - Fire Hose, Care of f) Nuclear Mutual Limited (NHL) - Property Loss Prevention Standards for Nuclear Generating Stations g) Underwriters' Laboratory, Inc. (UL) Fire Protection Equipment List h) United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
- 1) SRP (Standard Review Plan) Section 9.5.1 Rev. 2 " Fire Protection Prog ram"
- 2) 10CFR50 Appendix A, General Design Criterion 3, " Fire Protection" 1
15 l 9.5.1-5 Amendment No. 15
r , SHNPP PSAR
- 4) Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. O, " Guidelines for ,
Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plante"
- 5) Branch Technical Position APCSB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Pailures in Pluid Systems Outside Containment."
Attached to Standard Review-Plan 3.6-1, 11/24/75. ,
- 6) Branch Technical Position HER 3-1, " Postulated Break and Imakage Locatione in Pluid System Piping Outside Containerst." Attached to Standard Review Plan 3.6-2, 11/24/75.
- 7) Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. O,
" Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plante '
Docketed Prior to July 1,1976"
- 8) Branch Technical Position ASE 9.5-1, Rev. 1, "Guidelinee for Fire f Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" 3l 9) Regulatory Guide 1.39. Rev. 2 " Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
- 10) Regulatory Guide 1.88 Rev. 2. " Collection, Storage, and ,
Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plant quality Assurance Records." "
- 11) Regulatory Guide 1.101, Rev. 1, " Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants."
9.5.1.2.2 Fire Prevention (Paselve Systees) Pire prevention is achieved in the design of the plant through the proviolon of: . a) features which reduce the incidents of fires and limit the extent and ! damage from fires, such as plant arrangement, building and structural design ' (including fire barriers, construction esterial, drainage, and penetration seals), ventilation systems, lighting, and communication systems. b) control features of other plant systees to ministse the effects of fire, and i c) precaution and design features considered for the adequate protection ,, of identified special hasards such as charcoal.
- PLANT IAYOUT AND ARCHITECTURAL PEATURES .
- Separation and Isolation - the involvement of safety-related equipment in ,
l fires which may occur in the plant is sinteised by separation of components of ' safety-related systems from exposing fire hasards. This separation and l protection provide the degree of isolation required to minimise the ef fects of ; the fires postulated in the fire hasard analysis. Examples of separation I
, isolation and protection of equipment containing signific. ant quantittee of combustible materials ares i
9 9.5.1-6 Amendment No. 3
l L1 SW FF FSAR
. l a)' Safety.related systems are isolated from fire hasards through the use of physical barriers, spettal separation, noncombustible fire retardant or ,
fire resistive coverings applied to fire exposed or exposing surfaces. l i provision of automatic fire suppression systems for damage ' limitation consideree in the design of plant structures, or combinations of the above. l b) , Systems required for safe plant shutdown are physically separated from each other in most plant areas to the extent that redundant trains are not exposed to a common fire hasard. In areas where adequate spatial separation could not be provided, protection against damage from a common fire hasard is , achieved by the provision in the plant design of fire retardant coatings, l barriers, fire detection and extinguishing systems, or combination of these - j eeans. . . I c) To verify the effectiveness of separation and isolation of critical ! equipment components, the fire hasards analysis identifies and locates, 1 throughout the plant, safety-related systems and associated fire hasards and j evaluates the ef fects of the postulated fires on the continued operability of , this equipment. Should future plant design changes occur, the fire hasards i analysis will be reviewed and updated as necessary to reflect actual t conditions. d) Fire hasards presented by flammable or combustible liquids and gases are reduced by separation, confinement, and system design features. I The storage and use of flammable and combustible liquids meet the intent and r basic criteria of NFPA 30. " Flammable and Combustible Liquide Oude." Specific i ! standard requirements are satisfied where compatible with other design ' requirements, except as stated in the fire hasards analysis. i Bulk storage of compressed or cryogenic gases is not permitted within structures housing safety-related equipment (refer to Table 9.5.1-2). Bulk ' flammable gases are stored outdoors or in separate detached buildings and do i not expose safety-related equipment, systems or structures. Small amounts of combustible gases in cylinders are provided in non-safety related areas such ( as waste processinr; butiding laboratories. [ The containers are secured at all tisse to structures or vehicle racks. Safe ! ( permitted use of compressed gases is controlled by operational procedures. 2 ( The diesel fuel oil day tanks are separated from other plant fire areas by enclosure within concrete vaults having einimum three-hour f tre rating, located in the Diesel Generator Buildings. As a precautionary feature considered in the plant design for the significant quantity of oil present in ; these fire areas, further depth in the defense against a possible fire and its i consequences is insured through provision of suppression systems. The turbine-generator lubricating oil system is located in the Turbine Butiding. The wall of the Reactor Auxiliary Building adjacent to the Turbine i Butiding is a three-hour fire rated wall from the outside to prevent exposure of any safety-related equipment within the Reactor Auxiliary Building. Furthermore, to prevent a possible fire in the Turbine Building from spreading, for rapid fire control and to reduce damage to the equipment I 9.5.1-7 Amendment No. 2 L.
SUNFF FSAR involved, suppression systems were considered and provided, as part of the plant design. A fire in this area will not impact operability of any safety-related equipment. The re.wtur coolant pump lube oil system is located within the Containment i Aullding nuar the reactor coolant pumps. In this case, fire prevention in the plant design is achieved by providing an automatic fire suppression system as a precaution to provide adequate protection of this hasard in case of fire occurrence (for detailed fire hasard analysis refer to Appendix 9.5A). The use of dry type transformers as required by BTp CNES 9.5-1 Section C.5.a within safety related structures reduces the separation needed for isolation of this equipment. 011 filled transformers are located in the transformer yard. They are separated f rom safety-related structures by more than 50 f t. distance and f rom 15 the Turbine Building by two-hour fire barrier walls (see Figure 1.2.2-2). The 230 kV oil-filled cable runs underground f rom the switchyard tu the startup transformers. Twenty-four aboveground att tanks, 50 gal. each, are spaced 16 ft. apart. The oil used is a special low viscosity oil having aThe , t minimum flash point of 295 F tested in accordance with ASTM Method D-92. tanks are installed on gravel which will absorb' any oil spill. , e) In the cable spreading rooms, cabling for redundant safety divisions A and B are separated by three hour fire barriers. Further depth in the defense ! i anninst fires is achieved by providing autoestic suppression systems for the special ha3Ard presented by heavy Cable Concentrations. In areas outside of the cable spreading rooms where redundant safety related i trays could be esposed to a common fire hasard, protection is provided by spatial separation, presence of fire suppression systeme to control and mintsize the effects of fire, and/or fire retardant coatings or fire resistive barriers, used singly or in combination. i f) For safety related charcoal filter assemblies, a low-flow air hieed cooling system is provided. This consists of air circulated through the charcoal adsorbers removing the decay heat, thus maintaining the charcoal betov combustion temperature. The control room operator w111 be alerted to any charcoat heating by the high-adsorber temperature instrumentation alare.. In the event of fire in the adsorbers, the fire will be contro11ed by closing the isolation dampers to the pressure-tight filter cabinet, thus restricting ! the fire's oxygen supply. Further means of protection of safety related equipment located adjacent to the charcoal filters is provided by automatic fire suppression systems over the charcoal filter housings for limitation of the extent or damage from
- possible fires.
SARRIMMS AND ACCgSS Fire areas *, as designated in Section 9.5.1.1.1 and Itsted in Table 9.5.1-1 are , isolated from other plant areas by floors, walls and ceilings having three ' hour fire resistance ratings. The fire area boundaries and barrier ratings l i A*endment No. 15 . 9.5.1-8
SHNPP FSAR. are shown on Figures 9.5A-1 through 9.5A-40. These fire ratings are established in accordance with Brasch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and are based on standard-fire lests made in accordance with " Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Butiding Construction and Material" ASTM E-119 and NFPA 251 (the applicable fire protection codes, standards and guidelines are listed in FSAR.Section 9.5.1.2.1). Doors - through fire barriers have fire ratings commensurate with that required of the fire barrier and are of certified fire resistive construction, guaranteed by their manufacturer. - These doors are either self-closing or nutomatic closing types or are normally secured closed. Key doors, status.of which is required for security purposes, are supervised, and door position is indicated on the security panel, unauthorized opening being alarmed. -Other doors. which are not supervised are maintained normally secured closed. Self-closing operability of the doors is monitored through administrative procedures. _ Specific information concerning the rating of the barriers and doors is given in the " Fire Protection Hazards Analysis" in Appendix 9.5A. - Fire doors will-be supervised by one or more of the following methods. a) Fire doors should be kept closed and electrically supervised at a continuously manned location; b) Fire doors should be locked closed and inspected weekly to verify that the doors are.in the closed position; Fire deers should be provided with automatic hold-open and release I4 c) mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions; or d) Fire doors should be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position. SHNPP will meet the intent of NUREG-0800 CMEB 9.5-1 C.5.a.5 concerning supervision of fire doors. i l l 9.5.1-8a Amendment No. 14
SHNPP FSAR-I The specification for the-design and installation of penetration seals through fire barriers requires that - the seals be constructed, tested and installed per 5 the applicable fire protection codes, standards and guidelines listed in FSAR l Section 9.5.1.2.1. Penetration sealing systems used for piping penetrations ' through fire barriers provide both necessary piping flexibility and. containment of smoke and flames. These may utilize non-combustible piping - boots, sleeves, and sealants in accepted combinations. Cable and cable-tray-penetrations at fire barriers are sealed to give minimum equivalent protection to those of the fire barrier. Conduits penetrating fire barriers are sealed at both ends with non-combustible material to prevent the passage of smoke and hot gases. All ductwork which per.etrate fire barriers will be sealed by fire dampers j having a resistance rating at least equal to that of the barrier. The fire , ' dampers are UL listed and/or FM approved. 5 When a high-combustible fire load is present, automatic fusible link closing and manual reopening fire dampers are provided in ventilation openings through fire barrier walls which are not provided with ductwork on either side. (For example, in make-up air transfer grill openings in the walls of the diesel fuel oil pump rooms). 9.5.1-9 Amendment No. 5
. . , . - . - . . - - - - . . - - - - --- - -t
ff-
- SHNPP FSAR
-La non-safety related ductwork, automatic fusible link closing and manual
' reopening tire dampers are provided only where required for highfire exposures at fire barriers, or where fire stair tower walls are penetrated.
In most cases, as detailed in the fire hazards analysis, more than one means or access and egress are provided for each fire area, suitably marked and emergency lighted, to permit escape of occupants and entry of fire response per sonnel. Plant elevators and life-safety stairwells are encased in towers having two hour fire racing as required by the NFPA Life Safety Code, and provided with
. Class B self-closing : fire doors rated at 1 1/2 hour. Fire exit routes are clearly marked. Administrative operating procedures will govern operation of elevators during fire emergencies.
Walls and structural materials are non-combustible. Other interior finish materials, including thermal insulation, radiation shielding, and sound proofing are .non-combustible or have a -flame spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 50 or less as defined in ASTM E-84, " Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials." Plastics are used only where required as essential equipment and to the minimum extent possible, as detailed in the fire hazards analysis. A small quantity of vinyl is used for trimming of non-seismic instrumentation cable tray cover cutouts for cable exits from those trays which are solid bottom with cover construction. Standard Products Quickedge Minitrim Part No. 75000341, which is a vinyl was the only material available to meet the installation requireinents, and therefore was selected for this application. It's use is limited to a minimum 6 in. radius to a maximum of 12 in. by 13 in. rectangular cutout. The "Quickedge" vinyl is self-extinguishing passing Federal Specification FSS-302. Hetal deck roofs are not used on safety-related structures. (Unremoved metal torms used for the casting of reinforced concrete floors or walls do not constitute a metal deck roof or partition.) 4 Suspended ceilings and their supports are of non-combustible construction. Concealed spaces will be devoid of combustibles to the extent practicable. Electrical wiring to lighting fixtures and to HVAC systems in these spaces are , enclosed in conduit to minimize the combustible loading. a) Limitation of Fire Effects - Plant design includes features to control ~ ! the products of combustion from a fire and the discharge of water fire
- suppression systems.
- Sauke and heat concentrations in fire areas are reduced by the use of building ventilating systems:
- 1) . Non-recirculating ventilation systems are provided for fire areas j which may contain airborne radioactive materials. l Z) Partially recircula:ing ventilation systems are provided in other l
tire areas which do not contain airborne radioactivity. Where ; l i 9.5.1-10 l -.
.SHNPP FSAR l
l f.
? practicable, fthese 'are designed to Lbe manually realigned to once-through purge . ventilation for the fire area. .
3)' Smoke and heat from fires,which might occur .in areas containing radioactive materials are monitored- for radioactivity using the existing; area monitors.- (For detailed description of the area radiation _ monitoring system refer to ' Sections 11.5 and 12.3.4.)
$ All ventilation systems' designed to exhaust smoke or corrosive gases through ' - _the use of normal ventilation,- have been evaluated .to ensure that inadvertent ~
operation or single failures do 'not violate the controlled areas of the plant p (refer to Section 9.4). %f To the extent _ practicable, power supply and controls for ventilation systems _ are installed outside the area served by the system.
- The: fresh ' air supply' intakes ' serving safety-related equipment or systems are physically separated from exhaust air outlets to. minimize the possiblility of exhausted air being drawn into the supply intakes and contaminating the -
intake air with .the products of combustion '(refer to Section 9.4). Stairwells are designed. to minimize smoke infiltration-during a firn b ' maintaining a positive pressure, by providing 1 1/2 hr. rating fire dampers
. and doors.
Floor drains are installed in' areas containing sprinkler of standpipe and hose
-station. systems. For the description of these drainage systems refer to Section 9.3.3.
Safety related equipment in sprinklered _ areas are mounted on pads, protected
~
i with covers, shields, watertight enclosures, or as detailed in the fire hazards analysis. Concrete floors surrounding the pads are sloped to floor drains at low points. Areas with equipment containing significant amounts of combustible liquids have containment curbing to preclude inadvertent flows to surrounding areas and drainage systems. Fire protection water discharged in areas having the potential for radioactive contamination is drained through dedicated systems, collected, sampled and 1 analyzed. _ if radioactivity levels preclude discharge directly to the environment, the liquids are routed. to the Waste Processing Building for suitable treatment prior to disposal (see Sections 9.3.3 and 11.2). b) ~ Fire Protec_t,1on, of Cables and Circuitry - Safety related cable trays and circuits are isolated or protected from the effects of fire through the use of physical isolation, spatial separation, non-combustible covering, fire prevention through _ provision'of automatic ~ sprinkler systems or any combination
.of these methods,- to ensure the integrity of essential electric circuitry needed during 'the fire for safe shutdown of the plant and for fire control. . Generally all wiring runs outside of cable trays are enclosed in A metallic conduit to reduce the exposure'of the cable to ignition and
- combustible loading, of the area. However, occasionally, when a cable tray
+
9.5.1-11 n
(- SHNPP FSAR passes over a piece of equipment cable feeding this equipment drops out of the tray into the top of the equipment without conduit. Such runs are limited to a maximum of approximately 4 f t. in length. -
'11 [
Several approaches are used to limit the hazard presented by combustible cable insulation. All electrical' raceway cable construction, as a minimum, meet the IEEE-383-74 flame test, except in-a limited number of places, as outlined in the fire hazards analysis. Communication cable does not meet IEEE-383 qualification but runs only in metallic conduit or underground. Additional fire protection for concentration of cibles is provided, as required. Cable insulating materials which do not create hazardous concentrations of corrosive or toxic gas when overheated or when exposed to flames are used to the extent practicable, as detailed in the fire hazards analysis, Section 9.5.1.3 and Appendix 9.5A. Cable tray construction materials are non-combustible and satisfy the requirements of ASTM E-136. For cable tray fill and derating allowance provided, refer to Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2. Cable trays and conduit are used for cables only: miscellaneous storage is not permitted in cable trays, raceways, trenches or culverts; piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases is not permitted in these areas. Interior high voltage - ampere transformers located in safety related structures are of the dry type. Cable, cable tray and conduit penetrations of fire barriers (vertical and horizontal) are sealed (fire stops) to give protection at least equivalent to that required-for the fire barriers. Fire stops at penetrations of cable trays through fire barriers and all floors are designed to meet the requirements of NFPA'803-1978, Section 6-3, " Protection of Openings in Fire
- Walls and Subdivisions."
- Fire breaks and crossover protection for cable trays criteria is based on guidance from NRC and NNL.
Fire breaks are provided along horizontal, vertical'and horizontal / vertical cable tray runs, at intervals dictated by the safety function performed, type of trays, and runs. In determining the fire break spacing, the fire stops provided at penetrations are considered as fire breaks. Fire breaks are designed to prevent the propagation of a fire for a minimum period of thirty minutes, when tested for the largest number of cable routings and maximum cable density. Covered Trays Fire breaks, consisting of fire resistive material assemblies which fill the entire void of the covered cable tray enclosed space for at least 1 ft. of enclosed cable tray length, are provided as follows:
- 1) Cable tray stacks containing either all safety related or safety and non-safety related cable trays:
(a) Horizontal - approximately 20 ft. Amendment No. 11 9.5.1-12
SENPP FSAR (b) Vertical - at midheight if the vertical run is 20 ft. or more, j but less than 30 f t. - at approximately 15 ft. intervals in runs of 30 ft. or more. (c) Borizontal/ Vertical - approximately 20 ft., except that the vertical spacing requirement governs in any continuous vertical 1 run of 20 f t. or more. 1
- 2) Non-safety related cable trays: )
l (a) Borizontal - approximately 50 ft. (b) Vertical - approximately 30 ft. (c) horizontal / Vertical - approximately 50 f t. except that vertical spacing requirement governs in any continuous vertical run of 30 f t. or more. Open Trays horizontal cable tray systems protected by automatic sprinkler, do not require fire breaks. Vertical runs of cable tray do not require fire breaks only when the automatic water system is directed on the cable trays. In SENPP, the sprinkler systems which protect cable trays, are installed at the ceiling level, not especially directed on vertical cable trays and as a consequence fire breaks are provided in all vertical runs, regardless of sprinkler protection. Occasionally, open cable trays have to be covered for physical protection. In these cases fire break criteria for covered trays governs. Fire breaks, consisting of fire retardant coatings applied to exposed cable surfaces for 2 ft. along the run of cable trays are provided as follows:
- 1) Cable tray stacks containing either all safety related or safety and non-safety related cable trays:
(a) Horizontal, not protected by sprinklers, approximately 20 f t. intervals. (b) Vertical, at midheight if the vertical is 20 ft. or more but less than 30 ft.; or at approximately 15 f t. intervals in runs of 30 ft. or more.
*(c) Borizontal/ Vertical - approximately 20 ft., only for runs not protected by sprinklers, except that the vertical spacing requirement governs in any continuous vertical run of 20 f t. or more, for either sprinklered or non-sprinklered runs.
- 2) Non-safety related cable trays:
l (a) Horizoncal, not protected by sprinklers, approximately 30 ft. intervals. I 9.5.1-13
SENPP.FSAR (b) Vertical, protected or non protected by sprinklers, approximately 30 ft. intervals. (c) Horizontal / Vertical - approximately 50 f t. only for horizontal runs not protected by sprinklers, except that the vertical spacing requirement igoverns in any continuous vertical run of 30 f t. or more for either sprinklered or non-sprinklered runs. Protection for open cable trays intersections (Tees) or changes of directions (EL L's) consist of fire retardant coatings applied to exposed cable surfaces
' along each cable tray for a length of 2 f t. prior to the point of entry to the intersection or turn section. To permit verification of cable routing, cables within the intersection or turn are not coated.
. Cable tray crossovers are protected with fire retardant coatings applied to exposed cable surfaces in the lower open cable tray (s) and the underside of the tray above it, extending from the centerline of the crossing tray (s) in each direction to 'a point 1 f t. beyond the outermost edges of the tray (s).
ConduitM;able Tray Crossinas (Less than 5 ft. Vertical Spacing) Conduit crossovers of open cable trays are protected by fire retardant coatings applied to exposed cable surfaces in the tray, extending from the
- centerline of the crossing conduit (s) in each direction to a point I ft.
beyond the outermost edges of the conduit (s). Conduit crossovers of covered cable trays or of other conduit do not require protection. Conduit crossunders of open or covered cable trays do not require protection. , Fire protection for areas containing cables and circuitry is achieved in the 4 design of the plant through a combination of the following (detailed in the fire hazards analysis): l
- 1) For early warning of fire conditions in the cables, ionization type smoke detectors are provided along major cable tray runs 3
throughout the plant.
- 2) For control and minimization of fire effects, either in case of l
i significant cable fire loading within the same safety train, or for l congested runs of cable trays (outside the cable spreading room) where redundant trains may expose each other, or may be exposed to a common l fire,' automatic suppression systems located above the trays at the
- ceiling level and manual backup capabilities were considered and provided, as required. *
- 3) For essential electric circuits integrity assurance needed during safe shutdown of the plant and for fire control the electrical cables are designed to allow wetting without electrical faulting.
Safety related equipment that does not itself require water protection, but l which could be adversely affected by the operation of sprinklers for such i f l 9.5.1-14 l' l l l
l I SHNPP FSAR l 1 cable trays, are physically protected from sprinkler operation or malfunction, 7 as detailed in the Fire Hazards Analysis. Ik the cable spreading rooms, cabling for redundant safety Divisions A and B are separated by three hour fire barriers. For detailed descriptions of fire protection teatures provided for-various areas containing Class IE equipsent and cables refer to:
- 1) Control Room, See Section 9.5.1.2.6.a
- 2) Gable Spreading Rooms, See Section 9.5.1.2.6.c
~)
5 Computer Room - See Section 9.5.1.2.6.d
- 4) Switchgear Rooms - See Section 9.5.1.2.6.e
- 5) kemote Safety Related Panels - See Section 9.5.1.2.6.f b) Battery Rooms - See Section 9.5.1.2.6.g
- 9. 5.1. 2. 3 Fire Protection ( Active Systems)
The Fire Protection System encompasses the following: a) Water supply and distribution system, including the fire pusps, yard and interior distribution piping. b) Automatic suppression systems. c) Fire detection system, covering detection of fire, automatic suppression systems actuation, fire protection equipment supervision and signaling. d) llanual fire response equipment such as portable fire extinguishers, hose stations, breathing equipment, protective clothing, emergency use of plant connunication equipment, access emergency lighting. For each of the active protection systems used in the plant the following are described, as applicable: a) General design requirements. b) System components, operating modes, special features applicable to plant needs, interfaces with other' systems, power supplies and reliability, and seismic design considerations. c) Use o1 system for protection of safety related facilities. d) Reference to drawings or lists to indicate specific usage of the systems in the plant. 9.5.1-15
p SHNPP FSAR 15 Overall design of the plant fire protection system has been guided by several precepts: a) Fire protection system water will not be used for any non-fire-related purposes, except limited use on intermittent bases to provide makeup water for isolated HVAC chillers in RAB and WPS.
. ~ b) The system design features minimise or preclude inadvertent operation that could cause hazardous or unsafe plant conditions.
c) In all plant areas more than one means of fire control is provided to avoid total reliance on any single system, automatic or manual. The fire protection systems provided in the plant have been selected based on the nature of the hazards expected, the anticipated rapidity of spread, and the eventual magnitude of the fire. Plant operating, inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements have also been considered. Water Supply Fire protection water for the plant is taken from the fresh water supply J impounded in the Auxiliary Reservoir with storage capacity greatly exceeding the quantity required for fire protection. Minimum fire protection quantity is based on: Maximum System Demand = 2,000 gym Maximus Hose Stream Demand = 1,000 gpa Two Hour Supply = 360,000 gal. Reserve Supply = 360,000 gal. Total Supply = 720,000 gal. Makeup Re-supply = 720,000 gal. Total Reservoir Requirement = 1,440,000 gal. . Only the above quantity of storage in the reservoir pertains to the Fire Protection System. The reservoir is also used for storage of water used in plant operations that are both safety related and non-safety related. The reservoir has been designed with seismic considerations to assure availability of safety related water supplies. The quality of water in the reservoir is suitable for use in fire protection systems. Although the water does not require clarification or other treatment for removal of suspended solids, traveling screens are provided at the intake structure for the removal of larget impurities which may be present in the water. (For more details, see description of plant water systems, Section 9.2.1.) Although the water supply serves as the plant ultimate heat sink and also as the fire protection water supply, with sufficient capacity for both functions, fire protection system failure will not degrade the ultimate heat sink function (see Section 9.2.5).
. l l
15 9.5.1-16 Amendment No. 15 l l l 1
aur u em Fire 1%seps Fire pumps and controllers are installed in accordance with NFPA 20. Water is supplied from the Auxiliary Reservoir by two 100 percent capacity outdoor type, _ vertical, 2.500 gym. 125 poi fire pumps. Each fire pump is capable of delivering 3,000 gpa at approximately 110 psig. One electric motor driven fire pump _and one diesel engine driven fire pump, suitable for outdoor operation, are installed outdoors at opposite ends of the Emergency Service Water Screening Structure. The electric motor driven pump is UL listed. The diesel engine driven pump is FM approved. Both pump controllers are UL listed and FM approved. There are no specific requirements in NFPA 20 that electric , motors for fire pumps be listed or approved by an independent laboratory and, 5 therefore, they are not listed. Each pump has a separate intake and discharges through independent underground connections into the main fire loop (see Figure 9.5.1-1). Adequate isolation is provided between pump installations to prevent loss of service of more than one pump in event of a single fire occurrence. The largest firewater flow and pressure requirement is 2750 gym, 72 psi at the system interface valve for the area below the turbine building operating floor (2000 gpa for the pre-action sprinkler system and 750 gpa for manual hose streams). This demand can be met by either of the two fire pumps. For safety related areas, a maximum system demand of 900 gpm (0.3 gpa/sq. f t. over_the most remote 3000 sq. f t.) and 1000 gym for hose streams comprise the largest flow requirement. The minimum fire-water supply requirements are detailed above. Each fire pump provides the total fire protection water supply requirement to the fire main loop, thus required fire pump discharge capacity and pressure are available with either pump out of service. The pump discharge connections are separated by approximately 40 ft. to prevent damage to both connections simultaneously. The fire main loop valves and fire pump discharge valves are arranged to permit discharge f rom either connection to the main fire loop. Alarms and indications of fire pump operating conditions, such as pump running, driver availability, and failure to start, are transmitted to the Control Room. The fire pumps are designed for sequential automatic starting on progressive drops in fire main water pressure. The motor driven fire pump starts automatically when the pressure in the fire loop drops to 90 psig. If the pressure continues to drop, at 80 psig, the diesel driven fire pump starts automatically. Both pumps are stopped manually. The water pressure in the distribution system is maintained at approximately 100 psig by the 50 gpa
~
electric motor driven jockey pump, started automatically on drop in pressure and stopped on restoration of pressure af ter a suitable time delay provided to prevent unnecessary operation of the fire pumps. Power for the electric motor driven fire pump is supplied from a 480V power center, which has two feeds, the normal supply coming from a 6.9 kV switchgear and the alternate through a bus tie with another 480 V power center. Both power centers are fed from the same 6.9 kV bus. Fuel supply for the diesel engine driven fire pump, the 550 gal. No. 2 oil tank, is located outdoors, adjacent to the pump area, suitably protected against fire 9.5.1-17 Amendment No. 5
I 4 SENPP FSAR l q and does not expose the fire pumps to fire damage. A 12 in._ dike is provided 3 to contain the oil in case of an oil spill or tank rupture.
- A pump test discharge header is provided of such capacity that the fire pumps may be given initial acceptance flow test and periodic performance tests. The 1 discharge-of flow test water is sent back to the reservoir. Water discharged I from the pressure relief valves on the fire pumps and jockey pump are returned to the reservoir.
Distribution. System , The fire protection water distribution system (Figures 9.5.1-1 through 9.5.1-5) consists of an underground 12 in. mechanical joint, ductile iron, cement or httuminous lined pipe loop around the main plant building complex to supply the-water requirements for fire protection systems and equipment. The underground loop is cross-connected at three places in a north-south direction through: a) Waste Pricessing and Fuel Handling Buildings, 15- h) Reactor Auxiliary Building, c) Turbine Building These cross connections are six and eight inch piping,' ductile iron, cement or bituminous lined pipe for underground runs and carbon steel pipe, suitably supported, for above-ground piping within buildings. Sectional control valves are provided to assure two-directional supply to all areas. All sectional and isolation valves in the fire suppression water supply system (except hydrant valves and inside hose connections) are either post indicator valves (PIVs) for underground piping or outside screw and yoke (OS&Y) valves for interior building piping. The guidelines of NFPA 24 were used in the design and installation of the IS underground yard main fire loop. Fire protection main piping is not interconnected with any plant water systems. Ductile iron, cement or bituminous lined pipe is used for the yard main fire loop to minimize the ef fects of tuberculation. Flushing of the system, as required is through the yard hydrants, hose connections and suppression system drains. Post indicator valves are provided in the distribution system as required for adequate sectionalisation of loops and isolation of branch lines to facilitate system maintenance. Isolation valves are located in branch lines connecting to fire suppression systems in the buildings to avoid closing sectional valves in the main loop. Sectional isolation valves are provided in the yard loop piping to minimize the impairment of fire protection water supply if maintenance on the loop or on yard hydrants becomes necessary. Sectional control valves provided in the pump discharge connections to the loop and in the yard main loop piping are positioned to assure supply of fire water 15 systems for any area from either or both fire pumps. 9.5.1-18 Amendment No. 15
I i SHNPP FSAR Indicators on yard valves or rising stems on internal cross header valves. A water flow alarm is provided on each standpipe riser. Lack of water flow is alarmed for each sprinkler and water spray system. Non-f reeze type fire hydrants, equipped with a minimum of two 2-1/2 in. gated outlets, are installed approximately every 250 f t. along the fire main loop in the yard area around the main plant building complex and are protected from mechanical damage from vehicular traffic. Branch connections from the main loop supply hydrants hose station and systems at outlying structures. Hose houses are installed adjacent to each hydrant and are equipped with the standard complement of 2-1/2 in. fire hose, nozzles, and hose-line equipment in accordance with NFPA 24 requirements. A curb box valve is installed on all hydrant branches. Screw threads and gaskets for fire hose and hose iine equipment are NPT, in accordance with NFPA No. 1963. Each hose house is provided with two each adapters tagged "Raleigh Fire Department Adapter" and "Sanford Fire Department Adapter" which fit local fire department hose threads. Hanual Fire Response l Equipment used for manual fire response is described below. a) Fire extinguishers - Fire extinguishers provided throughout the plant are UL listed and/or FM approved and labelled accordingly. Extinguishers are mounted in readily accessible locations in conformance with NFPA Standard 10. Types of extinguishers selected are based on the nature of the fire postuinted for the area, in accordance with NFPA 10, and on the unique characteristics of the fire suppresssion agent affecting its proper application to the fire. Considerations include quanity required in relation to the size of the anticipated fire, cleanup after use, and thermal shock or corrosive effects of the agent or its fire decomposition products. The following basic types of extinguishers are used: Dry chemical - hand and wheeled - in operational areas or outdoor areas of severe fire potential, Carbon dioxide or Halon - hand - in area of low fire hazards or containing small electrical equipment where cleanup after the fire is a major consideration, such as Control Room, laboratories and switchgear areas, 15 Water - hand - in areas containing ordinary combustibles such as warehouses . and offices. , b) Standpipe and Hose System - Standpipe and hose systems are installed ij throughout the plant inside butidings 'to supply hose stations, suitable for l safe effective use on identified hazards and involved equipment (refer to Figures 9.5.1-2 through 9.5.1-5). Sufficient hose stations are provided in each area no that all portions of the plant can be reached by ef fective hose ! streams from at least two hose stations.
*1 9.5.1-19 Amendment No. 15 ;'
- c. 1
- . . m.- _ . - . , . . _ , , . _ . - . . _ _ , . , - , _ _ _ - _ . - -_. _ , , , _ , . -_,_
(. SHNPP FSAR O The guideitnes of NFPA 14, Class 2, were followed in the design of standpipe
. and ~ hose systems. Individual standpipes are minimum 4 in. diameter for multiple hose connections and 2-1/2 in. diameter for single hose connections.
Homo stations are equipped with 100 ft. of 1-1/2 in. woven Jacket, lined fire home and adjustable spray nozzles, approved for use on energized electrical equipment and cabling, stored on racks or in cabinets. . Standpipe hose connections are provided in all buildings (except the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Building) on all floors at approximately 100 f t. spacing. The standpipe system is designed and sized to provide, to the most remote hose station, the flow rate and pressure required for ef fective hose streams. Operation of a hose station associated with a particular riser is alarmed 15 locally and alarmed and annunciated in the Plant Communications Roam and the Control Room following sensing of water flow in the standpipe river by system flow switches. Sectional shutof f valves provided for standpipes serving hose stations in safety related areas are located outside the safety related areas to permit access during a fire. , Portions of the standpipe and hose systems installed in the Containment, 15- Reactor Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building, as shown on (Figures 9.5.1-2 and 9.5.1-4), are designed to be operable, if needed, for manual fire control in areas required for safe plant shutdown following a ssfe shutdown certhquake (SSE). These portions of the standpipe system were analysed for SSE loading and seismically supported to assure system pressure integrity. The piping and valves for these standpipes are designed to satisfy ANSI 831.1, " Power Piping." Normally, the post-SSE standpipe hose station header is supplied from the fire protection water distribution system through seismically qualified check valves. Following an SSE event, water supply for the post-SSE portion of the standpipe system can be obtained by operator manual actuation of valves to connect the Seismic Category 1 Emergency Service Water System, located in the Reactor Auxiliary Rutiding, to the post-SSE hose standpipe header. This Seismic Cateogry I water source is adequate for supply of two 75 gpm interior hose streams for a period of at least one hour. A booster pump, designed for post SSE operation, and rated 200 gym at 50 f t. (115.5 psi), is provided in 15 the RAM, at Elevation 216 ft. (Figure 9.5A-6). These pumps are located downstream f rom the connection to the Emergency Service Water System. The seismic check valves prevent outflow to other portions of the fire protection water distribution system, which may have failed during the seismic event, and thus avoid loss of hose line protection af ter the earthquake. c) Self-Contained Breathina Equipment - Breathing equipment is provided as required for protection against smoke inhalation of personnel required to be in plant areas to control fires or to continue vital plant operations. Self-contained breathing apparatus, using full face postive pressure masks, approved by National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSil), i i 9.5.1-20 Amendment No. 15 i i t_
i SHNPP FSAR
~
with'a minimum capacity of one half hour, are provided for fire brigade and controt room l personnel. l Two extra air bottles are located .onsite for each self-contained breathing unit, used by fire brigade and control room personnel, with an onsite _six hour supply of reserve att and refilling manifolds for recharging air bottles. The six hour reserve supply is 'provided from storage cylinders, with resupply from
-an approved breathing air compressor. The air compressor is equipped with a carbon monoxide monitor and with an air intake located away from dust, organic' vapor and other contaminant sources.
d) Protective clothing - Protective clothing will be provided to members of the plant fire brigade or other designated personne1'and is located in accessible locations for use of fire response personnel as developed in the Fire Protection Plan. Instruction in the use of protective clothing and assignment to personnel is a part of the overall fire response procedures developed by plant operating groups. e) Emergency Lighting - Redundant AC normal / emergency lighting (powered from safety related motor control centers) is provided in areas where safety related ' functions are performed, in access routes to these areas, and for emergency evacuation. In addition, fixed emergency, DC powered, sealed beam units with individual eight hour battery supplies are provided to light access 4 areas. Each unit consists of two, 12 watt sealed beam floodlamps. These DC units are energized in the event of loss of AC normal / emergency lighting. Emergency DC lighting, fed from the 125 V station battery, provides lighting in the Control Room and the remote shutdown and computer room in the event that either train of the AC normal / emergency lighting is lost. Portable emergency lanterns are provided for personnel use du' ring an emergency. Space batteries and a battery recharging station are provided (see Section 9.5.3). f) Emergency Communications - The fixed emergency communication system utilized voice powered head sets at pre-selected stations (see Section 9.5.2). Fire Suppression Systems The selection of type of fire suppression system, mode of operation, and performance criteria is based on the fire hazards found in an area, the realistic fire postulated and the overall fire control approach utilised for containment of the fire, limitation of damage and adverse effects on plant operating systems, and eventua1' extinguishment. Primary fire suppression systems for the plant discharge water through
-sprinkler heads, water spray nossles, or, with the addition of foam solution, through foam making devices. Each system is designed, procured, installed and '
tested in accordance with applicable NFPA standards. Suppression systems discharging water through open heads are water spray systems for one-step water release, suppression systems discharging water 9.5.1-21 Amendment No. 14
SHNPP FSAR through closed heads are either multicycle or pre-action systems for two-step release. Two-step water release requires not only actuation of the sprinkler flow control valve by automatte detectors or manual fire alarm stations but also fusing of the sprinkler head linkage by heat from the fire before water.can discharge from the sprinkler head. This operational concept is employed to avoid unnecessary water damage resulting from premature discharge or inadvertent operation caused by system misoperation or mechanical damage. The multi-cycle system is a pre-action syJcen modified so that the water flow control valve is shut off automatically when the fire is extinguished and reonened by the automatic fire detection system if the fire redevelops. Water damage is thus minimized and the hazard of a shut manual system valve is avoided. All system piping is normally dry beyond the sprinkler control valve. Supervisory air pressure in closed piping systems is maintained by small system air compressors at the system riser. . Sprinkler systems (Figures 9.5.1-4 and 9.5.1-5) are provided to protect high hazard or vital process, storage and other operational areas are designed in conformance with distribution system hydraulic calculations which determine water flow density.and system pressures available to the protected areas. Sprinkler system discharge densities are hydraulically designed to deliver 0.3 spe/sq. ft. for the most remote areas of 3,000 sq. f t. or less. , a) Pre-Action Sprinkler Systems are automatic sprinkler systems supplied through hydraulically designed piping systems, containing air under a supervisory pressure of 10-15 pst downstream from the pre-action valve. Each system is automatically actuated by a thermal fire detection system installed in the same area as the sprinklers, which responds before fusing of the aprinkler fusible link. Actuation of the Fire Detection System opens the 15 pre-action valve within five seconds and is alarmed locally, in the Unit 1 Communications Room and in the respective Unit Control Room. The guidelines of NFPA 13 are followed in the design, installation, and testing of the pre-action sprinkler systems. Pre-action sprinkler systems, with separate pre-action valves, each provided with automatic and manual actuation, manual reset, local alarm and valve supervision, and with annunciation in the Communications Room and the Control 15 Room. are provided for the plant areas listed in Table 9.5.1-3 (see Figure 9.5.1-5). For pre-action sprinkler systems covering more than one hasard, independent detection-actuation systems, each with specific local alarm and annunciation 15 in both the Unit 1 Communications Room and the Control Room, are provided for each hazard, as detatted in the fire hasards analysis. ,
! h) Multt-Cycle Sprinkler Systems are pre-action sprinkler systems modified l to provide the capability for continued on-and-off cycling,. during control of the fire, by shutting off the water supply automatically at the multi-cycle valve af ter the detection system indicates that the fire has been extinguished. Each multi-cycle sprinkler piping system is hydraulically designed and is filled with air under a supervisory pressure of 10-15 psi, downstream from the multi-cycle valve. In the uvent of damage to the i
9.5.1-22 Amendment No. 15 I
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SHNPP FSAR detection circuit, the sprinkler system is capable of being switched to low pressure air system operation mode, maintaining the protection, alarms, and supervision of this sprinkler system.
- When controlled by the Fire Detection System, the multi-cycle system is capable of automatically cycling "on" whenever any detector senses heat or' "off" after all the detectors in the detection system sense that the temperature has decreased below their actuation point. Water will continue to flow from opened sprinkler heads for a predetermined period of time, adjustable from 30 sec. to 5 min. in the fire detection actuation circuit, after which the valve closes and the flow of water stops. If the temperature again rises to the rating of any thermal detector in the system that controls the multi-cycle system, the multi-cycle valve will reopen and immediately restart the flow of water to extinguish the reignited fire. Lack of water flow through any multi-cycle valve within five seconds from the actuation by the automatic detection system is alarmed locally and in the Control Roon via the Communications Room. 15 The guidelines of NFPA 13 and 15 are followed in the design, installation, and testing of the multi-cycle _ sprinkler systems.
Multi-cycle sprinkler systems with separate multi-cyc1'e valves, each provided with automatic and manual actuation, manual reset, local alarm and valve supervision and with annunciation in the Communications Room and the Control 15 Room are provided for the plant areas listed in Table 9.5.1-4 (see Figurn 9.5.1-5). For multi-cycle sprinkler systems covering more than one hazard, independent detection-actuation systems, each with specific local alarm and annunciation in both the Communications Room and the Control Room, are provided for each 15 hazard. c) Water Spray Systems consist of open water spray heads supplied through hydraulically designed piping systems, with water flow controlled by a deluge valve. The deluge valve is actuated automatically by the operation of a Fire Detection System installed in the same area of coverage as the spray heads. When the detector senses fire, the deluge valve opens and the water flows into the piping system. The guidelines of NFPA 15 were followed in the design, installation, and testing of the water spray systems. Lack of water flow through a deluge valve, within five seconds from the actuation by the automatic detection system is alarmed locally and in the Control Room via 15 the Communications Room. Separate water spray systems with automatic and manual actuation, manual reset, and local alarm and valve with annunciator in both the Communications 15 Room and the Control Room are provided for each of the plant areas listed in Table 9.5.1-5 (see Figure 9.5.1-5). d) Foam Systems manual, semi-fixed type, using fluoro-protein mechanical foam, are provided for the auxiliary boiler fuel oil storage tanks, located in the yard. Esch tank is equipped with one fixed, type 11 discharge outlet and foam maker connected to a fixed piping installation, which terminates at a safe distance from the tank outside the dike, with a capped connection. The necessary foam producing materials and equipment (foam 9.5.1-23 Amendment No. 15
. SRNPP FSAR concentrate line proportioner and hose) are stored in a nearby hose house.
The water supply for the foam system is from the yard distribution system, taken tros the nearby hydrant. For extinguishment of spill and diked area fires, auxiliary foam hose stream protection is provided. This consists of a line proportioner, hose,' and foam nozzie adapter, which is also stored in the hose house with other foam equi pmen t. . The seini-fixed foam systems for the tanks and the foam hose stream equipment are designed in accordance with NFFA No.11. Af ter the foam solution is depleted, water will continue to flow through the foam system to provide cooiing to protected equipment. Fire Detection System The Fire Detection System is designed to detect fires, actuate fire protection equipment, monitor the operating status of fire protection system components, annunciate fire, operation, trouble and actuation signals, actuate local and general fire alarms and identify the location of the fire. The Fire Detection System provides devices, equipment and wiring required to perform the following functions: a) Detect the presence of products of combustion through use of ionization type detectors provided on an area basis. b) Detect the presence of heat from a fire through use of thermal rate cose;wnsation type detectors provided on an area basis. c) setect the presence of flame throtch use of ultra-violet type detectors prosaded on an area basis. d) Detect the drop in supervising air pressure following loss of integrity of ilte protection system piping. e) Detect the flow of water in fire protection piping. t) Detect pressure drops in the fire protection water distribution system. a g) indicate the operation of supervised fire protection control equi pmen t. h) Actuate sprinkler and unter spray system control valves and other accessory equipment required for fire control.
- 1) Indicate actuation, detection, alarm or trouble signals at local panels and at remote main fire detection control panel.
j) Indicate location of signal origination or identification of monitored j equipaent. l 9.3.1-24 L
7 SHNPP FSAR k) Provide internal supervision of all portions of the detection system, Indicate trouble conditions and provide fault diagnostic indications.
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l) Actuate localized alara' systems, employing bells . horns, or lights, to alert-plant personnel of a fire alarm or a system trouble signal generation. Die -Fire Detection System satisfies the following general design requirements: a) All detection and transmission circuits are Class A as defined in NFPA Std. 72D and 72E. The system is designed to assure minimal signal transmission interruption in evant of single circuit or device failure. b)- All fire detection devices and associated equipment are either UL listed and/or FM approved and so labeled.- They are installed in accordance
% with manufacturer's specification and applicable NFPA standards.
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c) The system consists of a main signaling loop used to carry all fire and trouble alarms f rom the local fire detection control panels (LFDCP) to the main fire detection control panel (MFDCP). The alarm signals are transmitted by a solid state digital multiplexing technique. The signal transmission system is completely supervised by automatic butit-in-test-equipment and alarmed on the MFDCP when a trouble condition exists. The system power is nominal 24V DC. Power for operation of fire detection systems and for actuation of fire suppression system is supplied from the balance of plant static untnterruptible power supply. The MFDCP located in the Communications Room supervises the Fire Detection System of the plant including support buildings. Each fire zone is displayed on the MFDCP as a simic of each of the LFDCP's. 15 Included on the MFDCP. are indicating lights for the operational status of the fire pumps, various suppression systems, and the fire detection signal transmission system. The MFDCP initiates a visual and audible alarm in the Control Room. 15 The control room operator, af ter receiving a fire or trouble condition signal at the annunciator, f rom the MFDCP will be able to sound the alarm and to give instruction to all plant personnel needed for control of the emergency through plant communication systems. The fire detection alarm panels are supplied from Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) Bus it, which is supplied from the 60 kVa static UPS system. The UPS system in turn is supplied from non-Class 1E motor control centers (MCC). In the event of loss of offsite power, the station 250 volt DC battery which is capable of supplying the 60 kVa inverter for 4 hours, is connected via the 250 volt Bus DP-1-250 to the 60 kVa static UPS system. Bus DP-1-250 is also connected via battery chargers to the Class 1E emergency diesel generator manual load block. Figure 8.1.3-3 shows this configuration. d) Each local panel displays local alarm, trouble, normal and actuation signals. When a fire condition is sensed by a detector, a white zone light is energized on the detector's respective LFDCP. Whenever there is a fire condition indicated at a LFDCP, an audible alarm, which produces a sound 9.5.1-25 Amendment No. 15
)
L_ _.
SHNPP FSAR distinctive from other alarm systems, is activated locally at the fire zone. If there is any required automatic action to be initiated for fire suppression the LFDCP performs this function. In addition, the fire condition is 15 indicated on the MFDCP located in the Communications Room. Any audible alarm can be silenced by means of a pushbutton. Further, any local audible alarm may be silenced without af fecting the remote alarm on the MFDCP. All fire detection panels are also equipped with " lamp test" pushbuttons. A graphic
.15 display unit is provided for the cable spreading rooms to operate in conjunction with the LFDCP. This unit gives the layout of the fire sone and the exact arrangement and location of fire detection therein. The unit operates on a "first-out" annunciation basis by lighting an indicating lamp representing the initially . activated detector.
l e) A supervisory system is prov'ided for each detection, actuation and I alarm circuit, in accordance with NFPA No. 26. The supervisory system is designed to actuate an audible alare distinct from the fire alarm and an amber ilght at the LFDCP as well as an amber light on the MFDCP on the occurrence of any of the following:
- 1) Loss of electrical integrity in any detection circuit.
- 2) Loss of electrical integrity in any actuation circuit.
- 3) Loss of electrical integrity in any alarm circuit.
- 4) Failure of water to flow within five seconde after any deluge valve release'is activated.
I
- 5) Operation of any isolation or sectionalizing valves in the Fire Protection System, upstream from deluge, pre-action, multi-cycle alarm valves and strainers away from their normal active position.
- 6) Availability of operational power to fire pumps.
- 7) Loss of air pressure in supervised suppression system (pre-action and multi-cycle sprinkler systems).
- 8) Operation of water flow detection devices.
- 9) Changes in distribution system water pressure.
f) In general, main loop cables connecting local panels with annunciator panet are carried in separate non-safety cable trays with connections to 1 devices, panels or loop cross overs carried in conduit. Interconnecting cable to system devices generally are carried in conduit. g) All detectors are readily removable to facilitate periodic testing and maintenance. Detectors are designed in a way that in-place testing can be accomplished by means of a portable testing kit or apparatus. Fire detection systems (heat, smoke, or flame) are provided in all safety-related areas, or in areas that present potential fire exposure to 4 ! 9.5.1-26 Amendment No. 1$
l SHNPP FSAR safety related systems or equipment. Annunciators and alarms are transmitted to the HFl>CP, located in the Communications Room, which in turn, alerts the Control Room. 15 Selection of detectors was done on the basis of suitability for the postulated fire. Where 'edbles are present and smoldering insulation was postulated, lonir.ation type smoke detectors, sensitive to products of conhustion, are provlded. Where charcoal or codbustible liquids are present and high heat
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release was postulated, rate compensated type heat detec, tors are provided. In
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'1 Amendment No. 15 9.5.1-26a I
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1 SENFF FSAR
. areas where flames could be present, ultraviolet fire detectors are provided, !
as marked on Figures 9.M-2 through 9.M-40. ' i Ionisation Detection Systems are provided in arass where it is advisable to detect smoke and products of combustion at an early stage of a fire. Ionisation detectors are provided on an area basis which is less than the p maximas given =in NFPA Standard 72E. Class A circuitry is provided with less of loop separated except at penal connection points. Not less than two , detectors are provided in any stagle area. Detectors are equipped with
. an. integral signal imp to indicate alarm condition. Sensitivity of each .
detector is readily adjustable in the field without disassembly of the 1: detection device. Deteetore are sufficienCly adjustable to compensate for sensitivity loss due to normal background radiation. Except for loss of l- sensitivity, detectors are not adversely affected by short-term high 1 radioactivity exposures. Detectors in the Containment Building are capable of l operation in a high level radiation environment.
- Detector devices are readily replaceable for periodic testing and maintenance.
I Wiring and connections for each detection device have the capability for i
- circuit continuity testing prior to detector devica installation. ;
i
; Detection devices are so located within an area to minimise delayed detection, t I or loss of sensitivity due to air current, or to obstructions, such as
] ductwork, piping, cable trays, conduit runs, ceiling or roof beams, equipment, j- and floor openings. j Circuitry between detection devices and local panels are capable of surtlying t j required operational power and device circuitry operational status , j supervision following any single break in the circuit or failure of any one
; component.
l Thermal Detection Systems are provided in the same areas where automatic ; j sprinaler systems are installed and are used for actuation of sprinklers. ; Thermal detectors are provided on an area spacing basis which is less than the j i maximus specified in NFPA Standard 72E, and are of a rate compensated or rate i ! anticipated / fixed temperature type. Each thermal detector has a miniasm j - temperature setting of 30 F above environmental conditions for the location in , j which they are used. Sensitivity of detectors is not field adjustable. ! 4 l Thermal detectors interfaced with a fire extinguishing system (pre-action or i multi-cycle) automatically reset themselves af ter an alarm-condition
- dissipates. This action resets the multi-cycle system automatically after a l preset time delay. The pre-action sprinkler system is manually reset at the 1 valve. Any electrical circuit associated with the pre-action sprinkler systes !
- j. is reset manually from the LFDCP. less of supervisory current actuates i sprinkler control valves allowing water flow into the sprinkler distribution .
j PiPin 8 f } Detectors require no replacements af ter a fire alarm to restore them to normal I j o pera tion. The nsaber of detectors is determined by the physical layout of : j sprinklered areas with no less than two detectors provided in any area. I i l l j, 9.5.1-27 j
-_ _ . _ _ , . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ , . , _ - _ .-.J
r SWIFF FSAR Thermal detectors have the same plug-in, wiring, operating voltage, and interchangeability feature as ionisation detectors. They are continually
. supervised and doenergized to alare. Detectors are not adversely affected by short ters high radioactivity exposures.
Thermal detectors used' outdoors (transformer bays) or near equipment in large ceiling areas (reactor coolant pumps) have a heat collecting canopy. Ultraviolet Flame Detection Systems are provided in areas where oil is present, for example Diesel Generator Building and fuel oil pump area. Flame detectors operate on a principle using a Geiger 4tueller gas type cathode tube designed to detect flame-radiated rays in the extreme low and of the radiation spectra. They are of split-architecture construction having a NIMA 7, explosion-proof housing. They use a quarts lens, have a built-in checking system for optical integrity, and have the capability to reject high intensity ultraviolet radiation esitted from sources such as lightning by using an internal time delay circuit. Each has a swivel mounting assembly suitable for vertical or horisontal sounting. Each flame detector controller is capable of operating more than tio flame detectors and is mounted in the associated IJDCP for the fire detection sone. hanual Fire Alara Stations are provided throughout plant operating areas, located to be readily accessible for employee use in signaling the existence of an observed fire condition. To the extent feasible, manual fire alare stations are grouped with fire extinguishers and hose stations. In addition to initiating a fire alert, senual fire alarm stations are used to actuate water flow to associated sprinklers or water sprays. Single action manual fire alarm stations are used in conjunction with fire sones with ionization, air duct, or ultraviolet detectors for early unrning alars. All single action stations are non-code signaling system, non-break-glass type, with a key operated test-reset lock in order that they may be tested. The station is designed so that af ter actual energency operation, it cannot be restored to normal except by use of a key. An operated station automatically conditions itself so as to alarm visually, when operated, detectable at a sinism distance of a 100 f t., front or side depending on location. This is accomplished by a pull lever. Stations are suitable for surface sounting and have a usathorproof NEMA 3 housing. Stations are electrically supervised from the IJDCP. Stations are UL listed or FM approved and in compliance with NFPA-72A. Double action manual fire alare stations are used in conjunction with thermal detectors that actuate various automatic fire extinguishing systems. They have features similar to single action stations. However, in order to activate the circuit two distinct operations must be performed. This is accomplished by pushing a tab and pulling a lever. Air Duct Detector _s are provided within HVAC duct systems to indicate presenen of smoke and guide the control room operator to initiate from the Control Room the remote manual control of the systes deepers, as required, for the selection of clean air intake of the operation of smoke removal systems (refer 9.5.1-28
SW FF FSAR to Section 9.4). These detectors provide operating 'information for proper control of. ventilating systems, in compliance with the NFPA.904 recommended-practicen. Indication from air duct detectors are conr.ected to the LFDCP. Mackup' Fire Responso Capabilities Fire protection systems for the plant are based on the concept of defense in depth. Each plant area is provided with more than one means of controlling and extinguishing fires. Fire extinguishers. provided for early use on incipient fires by employees responding to a fire incident, are backed up by standpipe hose stations located throughout the plant for use on fires beyond the capability of extinguishers. lonisation type smoke detection systems are provided for.early warning and alarm of an incipient fire. Ultraviolet detectors and manual fire alarm stations are also provided for detection of fires and alarm. If the fire area contains suf ficient combustibles that a fire may be beyond the control of extinguishers and hose lines or if the area is not readily accensthie for manual fire control efforts, the installed fire suppression systems, such as sprinklers, or water sprays, will operate to limit the fire apread and control 'and suppress the fire. Thermal detection systems are used for actuation of automatic suppression systems. An a backup to fire protection systems and equipment provided in the fire areas, hone lines may be laid from yard hydrants to permit discharge of fire ntreams into areas extensively involved in a fire. Illtimate backup for plant fire control efforts is provided by letters of 2 agreement from nearby volunteer fire departments. Manpower and mobile equipment may be used to supplement plant fire operations and equipment. The offectiveness of outside fire department involvement is directly related to the degree of preplanning and training given to all groups involved. These are detailed in the plant fire emergency response plan (see Section 9.5.1.5). 9.5.l.2.4 Fire Protection of Safety Related and Special Plant Areas Areas containing particularly hazardous materials are considered in the fire hazard analysis and separation, spect'al criteria or protection, ventilation, penetration protection, construction, detection and suppression system and nupplemental fire equipment requirements are developed in the analysis. The design includes as required a) fire detection h) standpipes and hose stations c) portable fire extinguishers d) drainage 9.5.1-29 Amendment No. 2
f-. 1 J SHNFP FSAR i e). fire nuppression systems t) .tsolation h g) . ventitation-h) fire rated barriers 1
!) construction techniques .
I The protection and extinguishing systems provided to protect the Control Room of the SHNPP and other operating areas containing safety related equipment, special equipment and cables are as follows:- a) The Control Room - The control room air lock envelope is separated 15 f rom all other plant areas by three hour fire walls, ceiling slabs, and floors. All cahilng entering the Control Room terminates there. There is no cabling routed through the Control Room f rom one fire area to another. There are no ralmed floors in the Control Room. The underfloor trenches for cables were reduced to the utntmum possible. A cast-in-place concrete trench of approximately 11 ft. long, 2 ft. wide, 8 in. deep is provided under the HVAC 15 control board located in the Control Room. Covers were not provided for the trench, because of its small size and location, internal to the liVAC control ho.ird . Standpipe hose stations are located outside the Control Room The immediate avalinht tity of these hose lines, together with the location of carbon dioxide and pressurized water portable fire extinguishers within tlee Control Room, provide adequate manual fire protection capability for fires originating within a cabinet or console, or exposure fires involving combustibles in the general room areas. Floor drains located in areas adjacent to the Control Room provide drainage of fire suppression water. Noxales approved for uge on energized electrical equipment are provided at hose stations near the Control Room. They satisfy both actual fire fighting needs and electrical safety providing protection against electric shock to the operators and minimizing physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement. tonization type smoke detectors are located throughout the Control Room at g$ ceiling level. All information from plant fire detection is transmitted to the Control Room via the main fire detection control panel (MFDCP) located in the Communications Room, providing alarm and annunication. The Control Room cabinets, panels, and consoles are of,the self ventilating type permitting smoke to quickly migrate to the cetting of the room. Rapid migration of comhnstton by-products and quick response by highly
**n **nt N . 15 9.5.1-30
7' SHNPP FSAR senaltive ionization type detectors mitigates the need for detection within eahinets 4,in.1 consoles. l Self-contained breathing apparatus is available for use by operators until the Installed room ventilation system can evacuate the smoke. The Control Room is designed for a positive pressure seinimum air leakage envelope (see Section 6.4). Smoke detectors are provided at the outside air makeup inlet so that smoke induction into the Control Room can be minietzed by manual switchover to other inlets following smoke alarms transmitted to the Control Room. The normally recirculating (wlth limited makeup air) Control Room Ares Ventilation System
~is designed so that it may be switched manually to operate in a nonrectreulating mode. This is used only for clearing the Control Room'of heavy smoke concentration.
b) Primary and Secondary Containment (Figures 9.5A-2 through 9.5A-5)
- 1) Normal Operation - Fire protection systems and equipment are provided in the containment areas as required for most effective fire control recognizing the different-types of operations in the area, accessiblitty and available personnel usage.,
The following hazards have been identified and protection is installed in each Containment as follows: (a) Cable penetrations, reactor coolant pumps, and external surf aces . of charcoal filter housing are protected by an automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system. Closed sprinkler heads and supervisory air pressure provide adequate safeguards against inadvertent actuation. Valving and electrical equipment associated with the system are located outside the Containment Butiding, inside Reactor Auxiliary Building at Elevation 236 ft. (b) The amount of transient fire loading in the Containment is strictly controtted and limited through ndministrative procedures. Fire protection system operation does not compromise the integrity of l the Containment or the other safety related systems. Total containment requirements are satisfied (i.e. control of contaminated liquid, gaseous and venttistion releases). Heat and smoke detectors, alarming an annunciating in the Control Room via HFDCP tocated in the Communications Room are installed as 15 f.ol lows : (a) Rate compensated type thermal detectors are installed in the reactor coolant pump zones, over the charcoal filter housings and above cable tray runs in the electrical penetration areas for actuation of the multi-cycle sprinkler system. t 9.5.1-31 Amendment No. 15 L.________________________---_______-.-----____.___
(
~
SMNPF FSAR i (h) lontAMtlon type p.moke detOCtHr4 are (Metailed over the ma,jor t vahlo tray rime. . (c) Early warning detection in provided in the Containment on . I a honorat area basis in installation of tonization type detectors in the air recirculation system ahead of the filtern..
. i
- 2) Refueling and Maintenance - During refueling, eatstenance, and operattone in Containment, additional hasarde such as contamination ,
content esterials, deconteetnation supplies, wood planking, temporary r wiring, welding and flame cutting may introduce additional fire hasards. When personnel and transient esterials are present in the , i containment areas, fire hasards and protection of combustible i materiate are controlled by admintetrative procedures. Fire deteetton and suppression systees, to the estent practical, : remain operational during refueling and maintenance. l t one and one-half inch hose connnections, equipped with 100 ft. of hoso , and water spray nossles, approved for use on energised electrical equipment and on combustible liquid fires, are permanently provided in the Containment Sutiding as standby fire estinguishing equipment for l use during refueling and esintenance. Water supplice for the hoes 6 connectioew are shut of f during normal operation by means of shutof f valven located outelde the Containment Rutiding. H erefore, during normal operation the standpipe and hose system piping remain draine<t. { 3 elf-enotained breathing apparatus and portable fire estinguishers are { provided neer the containment butiding entrances. ,
- 3) Cable Spreading Room (Figure 9.54-9) - The primary fire f
suppreselon eyeten in the Cable Spreading Room to an automette pre-action sprinkler system actuated by rate compensated thermal I detectors, located'st the cetting levet. Iontsation type smoke t detecture, are (notalled for early warning of the presence of product 4 l of combustion. local alare and annunciation and in the Control Room t g e, via the CommunicatLone Room to provided. W e tocal stare for each I t Cable Spreading Rone le a graphic display located at the 1.FOCF, which shows the cable spreading room layout and the location of e4ch tontsstion detector. The graphic display is designed to indicate the f location of the detector whteh alarmed ftret, to direct the manual , fire response to the origin of the fire. [ Klectric cables used are of a construction which passes the flame test required by (Mag-33), and which will not fault electrically when l esposed to fire suppression water discharge. : r Hamial hose stations and appropriate portable estinguishere provide hackup ftre protecttoo for the autoestte pre-actton sprinkler nyetea. ; Floor dratnage is designed to handle the de91gn sprinkler sygtem I l 9,5.1-32 Aeondment No. 15 l l 1
p 1 SMHf t* PCM e discharge with einteel ourcharge, overflow to adjacent areas, and discharge to-store drain system (refer to Section 9.3.3). Multiple doors are provided for each Cable Spreading Room, as detalled in the fire hasards analysts, to insure 1: stress to and agrees from tlwne roman for ef fective fire control. Aisle space for eccess within Cablo Spreadtiqg Rooms was provided based on necessity for service and maintenance for each cable tray, therefore sufficient afste space estets to insure effective manual fire fighting within the Cable Spreadtsyt Roses. Inside safety related Cable Spreadig Rooms (RAB, R1evation 286 ft.) the cable trays are stacked from floor to ceilias, having a space of 12 in. emasured free bottom to bottom of each stacked tray. Redundant safety related cable divisions of the plant, in cable - apreadtm races are separated free each other and the rest of the plant by walte, floors, and cetting slabe having a etnimum fire rating of three hours and Class A f tre doore, in accordance with IFpA 251. Smoke ventlest of the cable spreadligt area le accomplished ualm the normal partially rectreutating ventilation system, which is capable of once-through purge operation.
- 4) Computer Room (Figure 9.5A-10) - he computer Room is located adjacent to the Control Room. De Computer Room is separated by three hour fire barrier well and a type "A" fire door free the Control g3 Room. The room is equipped with an automatic, tonisation type detection systee, alaretsyg locally and alaraig and annunciating in the Control Room. Smoke purgirqs capablitty is provided as described in Section 9.4.5.
There is a cable trench, iteited to the Computer Room only, cast in the concrete floor of the room (i.e. , cast in-place concrete raceway with covers), containtm interconneettm cables for the computer. Drainge for water resultim from use of a fire suppression system is provided by ared floor drains. An adequate supply of halon and carbon diontde type portable extinguishers is provided for manual fire control.
- 5) Switetsteer Rooms (Figure 9.5A-9) - The Switeigtear Rooms used in connection with, safety related equipment are separated by 15 three hour fire walls from other plant areas, Tlw races are equipped with tontsation type detectors, whteh alare and annunciate in the Control Room. Standpipe connections for 1-1/2 in.
hoes statione are provided for this area. Drainage of fire protection water is thrngh regular floor draine. portable carbon dioxide entinguishers are provided for manual fire control. Amendment No.15
l SHNPP FSAA ! he number of cables passing through the Switchgear Rooms has been minimised. Esposed cables of a redundant safety train do not pass through the other train's Switchgear Room. j i
- 6) Remote Safety Related panet Figure 9.5A Automatic l 15 ionisation type fire detectors that alaen locally and alarm and annunciate in the Centrol noon are instatted in the safety related l l ponen aceas.- Pertable fire eatinguishere and hoseline connections ;
are available in the areas for annual fire preteetten. Combustible , materials are elesely sentrotted in these areas. L i 15 7) lettery Roses (Figure 9.5A-9) - Sattery Rooms are separated by
- - three hour fire barriers. Battery chargere are se regulated that L l
overcharging, with reeuttant liberation of free hydrogen gases, is j minimised. Reces ere previded vith adequate ventination (ase Seetton , 9.4.5.2.3) to maintain the eeneentration of hydrogen gas released into
'the room air below the specified limits. Air flow switches are l
l ' l provided for the battery rooms with alarm and annunciation in the main control room an depicted in FSAR Figure 7.3.1-21. Sheets ! pf II, 2 of II, 9 of II, and 10 of II. Battery rooms are protected by standpipe , 15 and hose eennectione and portable entinguishers. located in adjacent i arene. ,
- 8) Turbine Lebeteatton and Centret 011 Seorage and Use kese ,
I 15 (Figures 9.54-34 through 9.5A-39) - he turbine generator section of the plant is separated from safety related areas of the plant by three hout rated fire walls, with Class "A" fire doors.
- 9) Diesel Generator koos (Figures 9.5A-21 and 9.5A-22) - he Dieset 33 Cenerator Building to leested appronteately 175 f t. from the main ,
plant structure. The diesel generators and the day tanks are each separated by three hour fire barriers. M ose compartments are ventilated to avoid accumulation of oil fumes. D ese compartments are protected by automatic multicycle sprinkler systems, backed up by yard , hydrants and hosettnes and carbon dioside and dry chemical portshte entinguishers. , Due to spettal separation of this building from the main structure and i to the fire barrier separatione between redundant equipment, which ; precludes safe shutdown capability impairment from a single fire ' incident, interior standpipe hose stations, operable poet SSE, have l not been provided in these arose. ! hernet detectors are used for actuation of the muitteycle sprinkler systems and detection of heat ever the air starting units sone. i tonisation type seeke detectors are insta11ed in the electrical ' room. Ultraviolet detectors are insta11ed in the' diesel engine and enhaust attencer rooms. A11 detection is alarmed locally and in the ! Control Room. Drainage for the removal of fire protection water l and the att it may contain is routed to the building sump and from t there is discharged to the yard oil separator (see section 9.3.3). ' i ne ventilation rystems serving these areas provide for smoke venting. , i i 4 9.5.1-34 Amendment No. 15 . I
'SHNPP.FSAR Each. tank has 3,000 gal. capacity, based on six hours of diesel :
generator' operation without resupply. The tanks are segregated from the diesel generator areas and from each other by three-hour barriers. An automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system is provided to protect the day tanks. The tank and associated oil piping are designed to Seismic Category 1, assuring a high' degree of system integrity, minimizing the j chances of oil spills and, thus, of fires in'the area. Each day tank enclosure is provided with'a non-recirculating ventilation system for normal fume removal. - As described in FSAR Appendix 9.5A.18, the size of the day tank will not impact the safe shutdown of the plant in case of a fire.
- 10) , Diesel Fuel .011 Storage Area (Figure 9.5A-23) - The below grade diesel fuel oil storage tank.and transfer pump building are located '
15 approximately 600 ft. from the Diesel Generator Building and approximately 150 f t. from the principal plant structures. Redundant , transfer pumps are separated by three hour fire barriers. An
~
automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system is provided in pump . 15 areas, actuated, by a rate compensated detector annunciating to the transfer pump area. Drainage to the yard oil separation system is
- provided to accommodate sprinkler discharge (see Section 9.3.3). A non-recirculating ventilation system is provided for normal fume removal and smoke exhaust. Carbon dioxide and dry chemical extinguishers are provided in and adjacent to the transfer pump area.
. Yard hydrants and hoselines are used for backup protection. Ultraviolet detectors are provided in each transfer- pump room for flame detection. They are alarmed and annunciated locally and in the Control Room.
- 11) Safety Related Pumps - Safety related pumps in the nmin plant 4 area are segregated by physical barriers between pumps when significant combustible loading is present in the immediate area of 15 the pumps or if the pumps have an integral oiling system with capacities in excess of five gal. of oil. In addition, smoke or heat 4- detectors are installed and curbs are provided to the extent practical in the areas where integral lube oil systems exceed five gal. of oil.
Where pump oil capacities exceed 50 gal., an' automatic fire 15 extinguishing system is installed. Portable extinguishers and standpipe hose staticas are provided for manual fire protection in all pump areas. Floor drains are designed to accommodate expected water discharge from fire extinguishing systems. Equipment pedestals or curbs and drains are provided. Concrete floors surrounding the pedestals or pads' are sloped to floor drains at low points. Smoke removal is ensured.for specific areas by the use of normal ventilating systems.
- 12) New Fuel Area (Figures 9.5A-14 and 9.5A-15) - New fuel unloading, new fuel storage, and spent fuel pool areas are located in ,
the Fuel Handling Building. This building is cut off from other 15 structures by three-hour fire barriers. Operations in this building are not related to safe shutdown of the reactor, but safety related 15 equipment is pr e.sent in this building. l 9.5.1-35 -Amendment No. 15
SilNPP FSAR Combus'ible t loading is minimal. Hand portable extinguishers and standpipe hose stations are installed.throdghout the building.
-Location of the hose stations in the new fuel storage area and wetting by fire protection water is considered acceptable, because the new fuel storage racks are designed to retain the suberiticality of the storage array even when flooded by unborated water. Due to the absence of combustible materials and the large room volume and excessive ceiling height. automatic fire detectors are not provided in general areas. However, in confined areas where safety related equipment is present, detectors are provided. For example, in
' the HVAC areas (FFB Elevation 261), which contains the Emergency Exhaust System, thermal detectors are provided over the charcoal filters, for actuation of the multi-cycle sprinkler system, and ionization type smoke detectors are provided inside the MCC room..
Manual fire alarm stations are located throughout the Fuel Handling Building near hose stations with local alarm and annunciation in the Control Room.
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- 13) Spent Fuel Pool Area -(Figures 9.5A-14 and 9.5A-15) - Protection for the spent fuel pool area is provided by portable extinguishers and hose stations.- Due to minimal combustible loading in this zone and excessive ceiling height, fire detectors were not provided in general areas. However, in confined areas where safety related equipment is present, such as spent fuel pool cooling pumps and heat exchangers, thermal, rate compensated detectors are provided for the actuation of the multi-cycle sprinkler system installed in the room. Manual fire alarm stations are provided in strategic locations thoughout the Fuel Handling Building, usually near a hose station. They will alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
- 14) Waste Processing Building (Figures 9.5A-6, 9.5A-8, 9.5A-14, 3 9.5A-18, and 9.5A-24 through 9.5A-33) - Waste processing areas in the 15 Waste Processing Building separated by three-hour fire barriers from .
other. plant areas. Administrative of fices, locker rooms, and laundries are separated from other areas in the building. The ventilation system within this' building is independent of any other plant ventilation system.- Portable extinguishers, standpipe connections for 1-1/2 in. hose, and manual fire alarm stations are
-provided throughout the building.
Pre-action sprinkler systems, controlled by automatic thermal detection systems, are provided on Elevation 261 f t. , 276 ft., snd 291 ft. (Figures 9.5A-27, 9.5A-29 and 9.5A-30), thus protecting administrative of fices, various storage areas, hot and cold laundry, and the area over charcoal filter housings. Ionization type smoke detectors are provided over major cable tray runs.
.15) Decontamination Areas - The decontamination areas are located in the Waste- Processing Building at Elevation 211 (Figure 9.5A-24) and in 15 the Reactor Auxiliary Building at Elevations 236 f t. and 261 ft.
.9.5.1-36 Amendment No'. 15 ,
i
y L SIINPP FSAR
- ( Fi gures 9. 5A-7 ~ and 9. 5A-M) . They are not- used for storage of combus t t hie liquidsfor combustible materials.
Decontamination areas in the Reactor Auxiliary Building'is protected 15 hy multi-cycle sprinkler systems actuated by rate compensated thermal detectors alarming. locally and' alarming and annunciating to the Control Room via the Communications Room. Backup protection is 15 provided from standpipe hoselines and portable extinguishers. Decontamination areas in the Waste Processing Building are equipped with automatic smoke detectors and are protected by standpipe hoselines and portable fire extinguishers. Manual fire alarm stations are provided at strategic locations .throughout the building, in the vicinity of hose stations. They alarm locally and annunciate in the Control Room via the Communications Room. l 15
- 16) Safety Related Water Tanks (Figure 9.5A-11) - The refueling water storage tank, reactor makeup water storage tank, and the condensate storage tank are located in the Tank Building. Standpipe-hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided. No safety related tanks .are exposed to the outdoors, with the exception of the reactor makeup water storage tank and the refueling water storage tank which are located in the open within the Tank Building (see Figure 9.5A-ll),
- 17) Cooling Tower (Figure 1.2.2-1) - The hyperbolic Cooling Tower is of non-combustible construction. Its basin is not 15 utilized for decay heat removal or for fire protection water supply.
Yard hydrants the cooling towerand hoselineslocations. at strategic are provided in the immediate vicinity of - l 15
- 18) Miscellaneous Areas (Figure 1.2.2-2) - Miscellaneous areas such as plant administrative offices, shops, warehouses, and auxiliary boilers are located so that a fire or effects of a fire, including smoke, do not adversely affect any safety related. systems or equipment, since most will be located in separate, detached buildings.
Fire protection consisting of sprinklers, standpipe and hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided, as dictated by the fire loadings present in these areas. The record storage facility is enclosed within 2 hour fire rated harriers constructed in accordance with ANS1 N45.2.9 as referenced by Regulatory Guide 1.88. It is located in the Administration Butiding, separate from main plant structures and does not present a fire exposure to any safety related equipment, therefore BTP CMEB 9.5-1 does not apply. Fire protection for the record storage facility is in accordance with NFPA standard 12A and consists of an automatic Halon~ 1301 system, providing a 5 percent to 8 percent concentration within ten seconds from the discharge. A thermal detection system is installed for the automatic release of the agent. An' automatic' ionization detection system is
-installed for early warning of a smoke condition and automatic closure of dampers and fire doors. Fire protection for 9.5.1-37 Amendment No. 15-O
x SHNPP FSAR the Administration Building-consists of a sprinkler system, portable cut t unninhorn, and standpipe hoselines.
-The fuel ott tanks for auxiliary boilers are above ground surrounded by dikes sized to contain the entire tank content of oli and are equipped with a semi-fixed manual foam system.
- 19) Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins (Figure 1.2.2-2)'-
Bulk resins storage is maintained in an area that does not house or expose areas containing safety related systems. Portable extinguishers and standpipe hoselines are provided for these areas. Selected storage areas are ade,quately drained, and curbed as
.necessary.
- 20) Materials Containing Radioactivity (Figure 1.2.2-2) - Materials that collect and contain radioactivity such as spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, etc., will be stored in metal containers located in areas which do not expose safety related systems or equipment.
- 21) llazardous Chemicals (Figure 1.2.2-1) - Bulk hazardous chemical storage is maintained in an area that does not house or expose areas containing safety related systems.
Portable fire extinguishers are provided. Hoselines are provided for those chemicals which will not react with water. 15 l l t i j l l l I 9.5.1-38 Amendment No. 15 I I-
l l SHNPP FSAR i IS THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY DELETED BY AMENDMENT NO. 15 9.5.1-39 L.
SHNPP FSAR 15 9.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation (Fire Hazard Analysis) The fire protection program has been designed to allow the plant to maintain the ability to perform safe shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a fire. The effectiveness of the fire protection program is verified through the fire hazards analysis by evaluation of fire hazards, postulation of realistic potential fires, and assessment of ef fects of these fires in fire areas throughout the plant. The purpose of the fire hazard analysis is to demonstrate that fire protection facilities, suitable for control of the area hazards, have been provided. During the analysis, the following considerations were addressed: a) Spread of fire (direction, speed, intensity) assuming a point of Ignition and other possible effects of the fire. b) potential extent of damage to essential equipment, loss of safety f unction, or of radiological release to the environment. c) Containment of the fire and its consequences within the considered fire area, and/or ef fect on other fire areas. d) Provision of detectors properly located to sense area fire or smoke conditions so that prompt fire control response can be made, e) Effective use of manual fire control equipment and backup systems. f) Adequate smoke removal to permit personnel to enter the fire area, assess the fire condition, and use manual equipment. 9.5.1-40 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR g) Effects ofLdamage, smoke and heat from the postulated fire on required operation of essential equipment in the area.
- h) Protection of redundant systems, equipment or trains, if located in the 'name fire area, to maintain operability. Separation or isolation of redundant equipment.
. The fire hazard analysis was initiated by establishing the fire areas listed in Table 9. 5.1-1. These are delineated in (Figures 9.5A-2 through 9.5A-40). 15
' Boundaries for these areas were based on the nature of occupancy of the plant space,~the amount and distribution of combustible materials within the area, and the location of safety-related systems and equipment.
Plant areas important to the plant's capability for safe shutdown, such as electrical penetration area, cable spreading rooms, diesel generator areas, switchgear and battery rooms, were designated as fire areas. Other plant areas were considered as fire zones within the overall building fire areas. Fire areas are bounded by barriers with construction that provide a minimum three hour fire rating. Fire zones within fire areas may be founded entirely or partially with barriers having three hour fire rating or less or may be defined by the neea limits of fire protection systems or of occupancies of dif ferent nature based upon the results of the fire hazard analysis. For each of the designated fire areas, listed in Table 9.5.1-1, the fire hazard analysis, as detailed in Appendix 9.5.A, covers the following: a) Identification
- b) Occupancy I
c) Boundaries d) Combustible Loading j e) Control of Hazards f) Fire Detection g) Access and Initial Response i h) Fire Suppression Systems
- 1) Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires j) Fire Area Equipment
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The content of each part of the fire hazard analysis is described briefly in l the ' analysis methodology below: a) Identification - The portion of the plant covered in each fire hazard analysis is identified by elevation building, area, zone or room, as 15 applicable. Reference is made to figures on which the configuration of 9.5.1-41 Amendment No. 15
. _ - ~ _ _ __- - _
SHNPP FSAR the ' space is shown. . Approximate dimensions are given primarily to indicate the magnitude of the area relative to the total plant structure. b) Occupancy - !!ajor operational equipment or systems (both safety and non-saiety related) ' Located in the room, zone or _ area are identified to define : the general: nature of occupancy or use of the area. Identified major - requipment is assumed to have a normal complement of associated controls, wiring and cabling, required for its operation. A detailed Listing of major equipment and supporting facilities, as well as timir function, is given in Part 10 of each area fire hazard analysis. c) Soundaries - The construction of walls, floor and. ceiling or roof of each fire area is described. Where applicablej the fire resistance rating of ' barriers is given.
- i. The use of structural steel or equipment support members in the area is indicated and, where required, the type of protection provided to minimize heat damage ef fects.
The type of fire rating is given for closures of access openings provided in boundary fire barriers for movement of personnel and handling of equipment. (Fire-stop protection for -service penetrations of fire barriers is described in Part 5 of each fire hazard analysis). d) Combustible Loading - The severity of fire that may develop and the damage that may result in the most extreme fire occurrence in a fire area is a
' tunction of the amount of combustibles present and the total heat of combustion generated. As combustibles in an area are not point-source source
- concentrated, a more realistic measure of the relative fire hazard or i exposure to . fire damage of an area is determined by spreading this combustihie loading over the floor area of the space or, in the case of a localized concentration of combustibles, over the floor area within the sphere of int tuence of the postulated fire.
The configuration of fire loading varies from area to area. Some areas are devoid, or essentially so, of combustible materials; other areas contain one or more localized fuel concentrations, spatially separated from each other. A localized concentration of combustible material is delineated by finite parameters beyond which the fire loading is sharply reduced. Examples of local fuel concentrations include cable insulation in MCC units or electrical cabinets, charcoal beds in filter housings, oil in equipment reservoirs, waste materials in containers or on skids, and sbailar items. Linear concentrations
- of combustibles are usually associated with cable trays either solely within the fire area or extending through several fire areas by penetration of intervening fire barrier walls.
- To simplify the calculation of area combustible loadings, conservative ;
caloritic valces, based- on National Fire Protection Association Handbook and j siccitic manufacturer's data (for cables), were adopted for classes of
. combustible materiais which were representative of heat values of specific materials grouped within the class. These are:
9.5.1-42 I
%.-e.-
SHNPP FSAR n Ordinary Combustibles 8,000 Btu /lb. Combustible or Flammable 20,000 Btu /lb.(108,000 Liquids ~ Etu/ gal.) Charcoal 10,000 Btu /lb.
- Combustible loading for minor amounts of grease, integral with equipment, not
' exceeding one Ib. each, was not inventoried since it does not create a significant fire hazard.
Using manufacturer's data on cable construction of typical cables used in SHNPP-and the Bcu content of the isolation materials, Btu values were derived for each running foot (RF) of 24 in wide, 40 percent loaded, power, control and instrumentation cable trays. These are: Power 180,000 Btu /RF Control 157,000 Btu /RF Instrumentation 95,000 Btu /RF Thess values are adjusted proportionally for trays of different width or cable tray loading. The combustible loading for all cables routed in conduit, cast concrete trenches, or contained within metallic cabinets or consoles was not inventoried since they do_not create a fire hazard. In addition to the combustibles normally present in an area, transient combustibles which might realistically be introduced into areas as a part of planned operation are considered, as detailed in fire hazard analysis for each fire area or zone. In most cases, the introduction of transient combustible materials into areas where such material may expose safety related equipment will coincide with scheduled station maintenance. Combustible materials that may be introduced in quantities sufficient to require special attention include:
- 1) Construction materials - (i.e., scaffolding, shoring, forms, etc.)
- 2) Resins in, bulk quantities and associated packaging materials
- 3) . Charcoal
- 4) Combustible liquids (lubricating oils and paints)
- 5) Grease
- 6) Plastic bags and protective sheeting 9.5.1-43
i SiiNPP FSAR
- 7) Packaging materials and containers (plastics, wood, paper, etc.
- 8) Flammable liquids and gases (solvents and volatile fuels)
- 9) Rags
- 10) Anti-contamination clothing The quantity, movement, use and handling of all such materials as well as the provision of supplemental fire protection measures will be administratively
. controlled in the plant through written procedures. For this reason, the fire loss exposure resulting from the addition of transient combustibles in an area during these periods of increased plant surveillance, strict procedural control, and augmented area ==nning has been considered as being no greater chan that from the inventories of nontransient combustibles normally present in each area, except for major plant outages.
Af ter inventory of all combustible materials in a fire area within the proper class, total Btu and Stu per sq. f t. values are calculated and then summed to indicate the total combuctible fire loading for the overall_ fire area. I t The derived combustible fire loading of an area is then used to compare the l area fire hazard relative to those of other fire areas, to judge the adequacy of the area boundary fire barriers, and to verify the proper selection of adequate fire control and suppression systems and equipment. J As a generally accepted fire protection practice, each fire loading increment of 80,000 Btu /sq. f t. indicates the need for an additional one hour of fire rating for the barriers. The relative fire hazard of an area may be considered as low if the combustible fire loading is below 80,000 Beu/sq. ft., moderate if below 160,000 Beu/sq. f t. and high if above 160,000 Btu /sq. ft. i e) Control of Hazards - Supplemental building features are provided to maintain' the integrity of area boundaries and to separate and control hazards within the area. These include fire barrier service penetration fire-stops and seals, confinement and disposal of flammable or combustible liquids, isolation of equipment and cabling, renoval of smoke, and control of radioactive releases. t f) Fire Detection - Areas provided with fire detection systems are identified by the type of detectors used and the design basis for their l selection is stated. The location of the local panel serving the detectors is l given and the functions of the local panel for signal annunciation, local alarm and fire protection system actuation are indicated. For each detection system, the transmittal to the main fire detection control panel of signals ! for annun;iation and for alarm is indicated. g) Access and Initial Response - The means of access to the area from adjacent corridors, stair towers, adjoining buildings or yard areas is described. The type of portable fire extinguishers and hose stations provided for use by personnel responding to the area is given. 9.5.1-44 : L i
. - , - . , , ,, . , . - , - . - - . . _ . . . - - . . , . _ . ~ , , ~ y, - ~,..- -- m- - - -
l l SENPP FSAR h) Fire Suppression Systems - The fire suppression systems provided in
- the area are described, indicating type, coverage, actuation ~ and supervision.
Protection of planc equipment against damage from the operation of the fire protection -system and disposal of sprinkler discharge water is covered.
- 1) Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires - The effect of the most severe postulated realistic fire in the area on the capability of the plant to achieve safe reactor shutdom and to minimize radioactive releases to the environment is analyzed. .
In the analysis, the type and quantity of combustibles is identified and the means of limiting the combustibles involved in the fire and of limiting the damage are described. . The most. significant combustible load is selected for the postulated fire and the means of detection of the fire is indicated. Ability of employees to gain prompt access ,to the affected area for initial manual response to the fire is described. If provided, the operation of backup fire ' suppression systems is described. The extent of the fire damage to the area and equipment is estimated using manual fire response facilities and, additionally, with automatic fire extinguishing systems where installed. The impact of the fire on the capability of the plant for safe shutdom and for control of radioactive releases is then assessed. j) Fire Area Equipment - Mechanical and electrical equipment both safety anc non-safety related show on the plant general arrangement drawings for each fire area is listed. The structure, system or equipment named is identified by neber and safety class: its safety function is indicated, and the separation provided between redundant units is described. The effects of failures in fire protection systems and equipment on the overall fire protection of the plant and on safety related equipment in the plant, and design features to mintsize these effects on the plants habitability and its capability for safe shutdom are discussed in the description of these systems (Section 9.5.1.2) and in the individual fire hazard analysis as pertinent. 9.5.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements a) Construction and initial accep,tance period operational integrity of the Fire Protection System is assured by:
- 1) Inspection of fire protection systen components and equipment according to design specifications and procurement doceentation;
- 2) Installation of the Fire Protection System according to accepted industry practica;
- 3) Inspection of the installed Fire Protection System against l design-specified standards or criteria; t
I 9.5.1-45 l
- - - - - -_---- . - - . . . _ - _ __ _ D
SENPP FSAR
- 4) Testing of the Fire Protection Systems against design performance criteria. These systems are subjected to preoperational -
and startup tests as described in Section 14.2.2. As an integral part of the fire protection system design, features were included to facilitate inspection and testing of Fire Protection Systems. For example, the fire pumps are provided with testhose manifolds; the automatic r sprinkler, veter spray, or deluge system control valves are fitted with ...
. flow-cost connections and pressure gages; and detector relays and panels, and fire-pump controllers are equipped with test circuit connections. After __.
installation, acceptance tests are performed in accordance with NFPA standards and Section 14.2.12. (See also description of Fire Protection Quality Assurance Program, Section 9.5.1.5). b) Continuing Plant Operation Period - Operational integrity of the . various components of the Fire Protection System provided as part of the plant design will continue to be assured through the implementation by the plant of detailed procedures for periodic inspection and testing. These procedures will be based on the guidance given in applicable NFPA standards and regulatory guidelines. Findings of these inspections and tests as well as the progress of indicated corrective actions, if required, will be documented. Periodic tests are required, as described in the Technical Specifications (Section 16.2). These detailed procedures will be developed as an integral part of the plant operating procedures. (See Section 9.5.1.5.c). 9.5.1.5 PsisoEdil"61arif fe'ulEd "aEd Wunsig a) Fire Protection Engineering and Plant Personnel Fire Training Fire Protection Engineer Qualifications - In order es provide a unified and effective Fire Protection System, qualified fire protection engineers and/or consultants are providing the necessary expertise, during conceptualization. design, construction, testing and startup periods. In the course of this work, they:
- 1) Analyze fire hazards and potential loss exposures in all plant c--
areas;
- 2) Establish fire protection system requirements to minimize and control loss exposares;
- 3) Promulgate fire protection criteria to be satisfied in all phases of plant design and development of operational procedures;
- 4) Assist and consult in the design of various components of the Fire Protection System and in the sele'etion and development of fire protection equipeant; l
9.5.1-46 Amendment No. 2
.. .-. .m . . _-.,,-m -, , . --,,,-..-w,- _ . , , , , . , - __,,---..-_..m_..~.--.
- . ._. . . =-. .
51DiFF FSAR
- 5) Develop overall and specific fire protection programs, including:
(a)- Inspection, testing, and maintenance of installed and portable Fire Protection Systems and equipment, (b) Fire-hazard inspections of operating arear, (c) Operation of fire-control organizations, and (d) Fire training of plant and fire brigade personnel;
- 6) Assist and consult.in the inspection and testing of completed components of the Fire Protection System; and
- 7) Assist and consult in the training of personnel and in the institution of effective plant fire prevention and protection programs. >
The extent o'f training, experience, and education of the personnel utilized for the above work is equivalent to that required to qualify for the' grade of Member in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers which includes applicable experience in consultation covering:
- 1) Fire-safe design and construction of new plants and facilities ,- ,
- 2) Identification of structural requirements for fire safety,
- 3) Segregation and reduction of hazards creating loss potentials, and t
- 4) Specification of fire protection and control equipment. This experience is of a quality and to a technical depth that, applied in the design and commissioning of a nuclear power plant, is adequate to:
(a) Achieve basic safety from fire, explosion, flood, windstorm, and other perils, (b) Nimimize loss probability, , (c) Assure conformance with regulatory requirements of Federal, State, and tocal authorities,
~
~(d) Assure compliance with nationally recognized fire protection scandards and codes, and (e) Satisfy insurance carrier requirements. ,
l b) Plant Personnel Fire Training - Training in the recognitica, I reduction, and control of fire hazards and in the confinement, control, and I extinguishment of postulated and actual fires will be provided to all plant operational people, and, in greater detail, to those who are nenbers of the plant fire brigade. Specialized trz.ining will also be provided to those personnel who are responsible for the inspection, testing, and naintenance of installed and portable fire protection equipment in the plant and the recording of these activities. (Training is described in greater detail in the Fire Protection Procedure, Section 9.5.1.5.e). 2 9.5.1-47 Amendment No. 2 4,.- . - , - , , , _ _ _ , , _ - - . . ,,_,r.,, _ . . . ~ , , _ . . ..,y.m_.._,_,,..- . - _ . . _ ~ . , . . _ - , . , _ , , , _ . , . . , . , , _ . . . _ - - . , . . , . - . . . , ,
i SENPP FSAR ' c) Administrative Procedures - Administrative procedures required for - asintaining the performance of the plant Fire Protection Systems and ! personnel are described in the Fire Emergency Response Plan, Section 9.5 1 5.e. Procedures under the Fire Emergency Response ' Plan assign responsibilities by organization titles for routine testing and inspections of the fire detection and protection systems, and will prescribe frequency and detailed procedures j for-testing. l The plant procedures contain instructions to maintain fire protection capabilities during periods when the Fire Protection Systems or other fire defenses are impaired and to control hazardous operations during normal or maintenance periods. The latter include: 1). " Hot work
- permit procedures during velding, cutting or other ignition source type operations, or 1
- 2) Procedures for the control of combustible material use and storage in plant areas.
Applicable industry standards on fire protection, such as those promulgated by the NFPA, are utilized in developing and implementing administrative procedures applicable to - the fire protection program, system and personnel. These include: NFPA 1201 - Organization for Fire Services 1 NFPA 1202 - Organization for Fire Departments 4 NFPA 27 - Private Fire Brigades NFPA 803- Fire Protection For Nuclear Power Plants d) Ouality Assurnace Program - A quality assurance program has been developed for fire protection. (The Design Construction OA Program is described in the PSAR and was approved by the l4tC Staff. The coerational Quality Assurance Program is described in Section 17.2). However, for components of the Fire Protection System designed, specified, orocured,
- 1- manufactured, fabricated, or installed prior to the institution of the Fire Protection Quality Assurance program (February 18, 1977), the program uns followed to the extent practicable. The Engineering and Construction fire protection quality assurance program was approved by the NRC during the construction permit review. j
.j The fire protection OA program, which is under the annagement control of th OA organization, has assured the socisfaction of OA guidelines durine Amendment No. 1 9.5.1-48 ;
, ?
1
.SHNPPlFSAR
. the design, procursment . installation and acceptance testing of fire
' protection equipment - and systems ' provided for the plant and will assure their
. continued inspection,. testing, maintenance and administrative control af ter
' the plant becomes operational. !
As part of their management control, the QA organization has:
- 1) Developed a fire protection QA program, incorporating suitable requirements necessary - for the provision of an effective Fire Protection System,
- 2) VerifiedL the acceptability of the fire ' protection QA program to the. management responsible for fire protection, and
'3) Verified, through review, audit and surveillance, the
, effectiveness of the QA program for fire protection. e) Fire Protection Procedure - The organization, training and equipping of all personnel who- might be involved in adequate responses to fire
~
' emergencies at the plant; including operating personnel, security forces, fire brigade members, visitors and local ~ outside fire department members, are described in detail in the Fire Protection Procedure (FPP). Salient features of the FPP are described below. Procedures providing for a fire brigade, the minimum equipment to be provided them, and necessary drilling of the brigades 5 as per iAW BTP CNEB Section C.3 will be developed.
The purpose'of the FPP.is to assure effective responses to fire emergencies can be made. To accomplish this, the FPP covers: j 1) The periodic maintenance and testing of fire protection j equipment and systems to ensure operational capability at all times, 1
- 2) The continuing fire response training, by instruction and drills of members of the fire bfigade,
- 3) The fundamental fire prevention and fire response education of
- all members of each shif t crew and of support plant personnel, J
- 4) The training, through joint drills with the fire brigade and plant operators, of the local fire department to develop i both familiarity with their role in a plant-fire response and awareness of special precautions they may have to take within plant areas, and
- 5) The coordination of the efforts of the security forces during a fire emergency response, i
Some of the specific areas covered by the FPP include:
- 1) Specialized training is provided to those personnel who are responsible for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of installed and portable fire protection equipment in the plant and for the ,
recording of these activities. 1 l {- 9.5.1-49 Amendment No. 5
SHNPP FSAR The training includes.use of design features to facilitate inspection and testing of Fire Protection Systems. For example, the fire pumps will be tested using test-hose manifolds; thd automatic sprinkler, water-spray, or. deluge system control valves will be tested using flow-test connections and pressure gauges; and fire-pump
. controllers and detector relays and panels will'be tested using test-circuit connections. . Training details the tests to be performed in accordance with NFPA standards or other design-specified criteria.
2 )' The guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.101 (see Section 1.8) is utilized as applicable in the organizing, training, and equipping of plant fire brigades. Applicable fire protection industry standards such as NFPA and other pertinent industry reference materials are used in developing the fire brigade training program. Courses in fire protection and fire suppression sponsored by the fire ; protection industry are utilized as applicable. l Training of the plant fire brigade will be coordinated with local fire departments so that responsibilities and duties are delineated in advance of a fire emergency. Details covering the combined operations are included in the plant fire brigade training program and implemented into the training of the local fire department staf f.
- 3) To ensure fire protection coverage at all times, members of each shif t crew are trained in the recognition, reduction, and control of fire-hazards, and in the confinement, control, and extinguishment of postulated and actual fires. This training is provided to all plant operational people and, in greater detail, to those who are members of the plant fire brigade. The goals of the basic training program are to provide:
(a) Operation as a team, ( b) Knowledge of individual duties, (c) Familiarity with plant layout and with fire protection equipment location and operation, 4 (d) Periodic drills under conditions of smoke, poor lighting, and congestion in the plant areas and on the fire grounds, (e) Planning and critiques of drills, (f) Joint drills with local fire departments, and (g) The means of evaluating effectiveness of communications among all plant personnel during simulated fire emergencies.
- 4) The plant has been designed to be self-sufficient with respect to l
fire control activities; however, it will rely on public response only l for supplemental and/or backup capability. Effective liason has been established with the Raleigh public professional fire department, the Sanford solunteer fire department, and with other volunteer fire
' departments within response distance to the plant.
9.5.1-50
l 1 SHNPP FSAR Availability to the plant of manpower and equipment from these departments during a fire emergency will be assessed. Need for familiarity visits to the plant and for joint training in fire control
'and extinguishing procedures will be identified. A program for effective use of nearby public fire department will be developed and implemented. .The local fire department will be trained in operational precautions when fighting fire on nuclear power plant sites. They will also be made aware of the need for radioactive protection of personnel and of the special hazards associated with a nuclear power plant.-
Procedures will be developed to maintain the primary system pressure 5 during hot shutdown in the event the pressurizer heaters are . rendered inoperable by fire damage, or bringing the plant to cold shutdown in a safe, controlled manner. f p l ( 9.5.1-51 Amendment No. 5
- . , _ - .. - ., _ . . _ _ _ _ . - - . _ _ _ - _ _. _ . _ ~
TABLE 9.5.1-1 FIRE AREAS Reference Fire Fire Areas Hazards Analysis, Designation Fire Area Description Reference FSAR Figure (s) Appendix No. 1-A-ACP Reactor Auxiliary Building, Auxiliary 9.5A-9 and 9.5A-13 9.5A.2 Control Panel 1-A-BAL Reactor Auxiliary Building, Balance 9.5A-6 through 9.5A-9, 9.5A-11 9.5A.3 through 9.5A-13, and 9.5A 1-A-BATA Reactor Auxiliary Building, Battery Room 1 A 9.5A-9 and 9.5A-13 9.5A 4 Reactor Auxilairy Building, Battery Room IB 9.5A-9 and.9.5A-13 9.5A.4
? l-A-BATB .
y l-A-CSRA Reactor Auxiliary Building, Cable Spreading 9.5A-9, 9.5A-12 and 9.5A-13 9.5A.5 7' X; Room 1A 1-A-CSRB Reactor Auxiliary Building, Cable Spreading 9.5A-9 and 9.5A-13 9.5A.6 g3 Room 1B 1-A-EPA Reactor Auxiliary Building, Electrical 9.5A-8 and 9.5A-12 9.5A.7 Penetration IA 1-B-EPB Reactor Auxiliary Building, Electrical 9.5A-8 and 9.5A-12 9.5A.7 Penetration IB l-A-SWGRA Reactor Auxiliary Building, Switchgear 9.5A-9, 9.5A-12 and 9.5A-13 9.5A.8 k Room 1A ii. 9.5A-9, 9.5A-12 and 9.5A-13 9.5A.9 y 1-A-SWGRB Reactor Auxiliary Building, Switchgear g Room IB 12-A-BAL Reactor Auxiliary Building, Balance 9.5A-9, 9.5A-10 and 9.5A-13 9.5A.10 f G
m. TABLE 9.5.1-1 (Continued) Reference Fire Fire Areas Hazards Analysis, Designation Fire Area Description Reference FSAR Figure (s) Appendix No. 12-A-CR Reactor Auxiliary Building, Control 9.5A-10, 9.5A-12 and 9.5A-13 9.5A.11 Room 12-A-CRC Reactor Auxiliary Building, 9.5A-10, 9.5A-12 and 9.5A-13 9.5A.12 Control Room Complex 12-A-HV & IR Reactor Auxiliary Building, 9.5A-10 and 9.5A-13 9.5A.13 HV and Instrument Repair 1-C Containment Building 9.5A-2 through 9.5A-5 9.5A.1 P l-D-DGA Diesel Generator Building, 9.5A-21 and 9.5A-22 9.5A.17 { Diese1 Generator lA Balance h 1-D-DGB Diesel Generator Building, 9.5A-21 and 9.5A-22 9.5A.17 15 Diesel Generator IB Balance 1-D-DTA Diesel Generator Building, 9.5A-21 and 9.5A-22 9.5A.18 Diesel Generator Day Tank 1A 1-D-DTB Diesel Generator Building, 9.5A-21 and 9.5A-22 9.5A.18 Diesel Generator Day Tank IB 1-G Turbine Building 9.5A-34 through 9.5A-39 9.5A.23 g- 12-I-ESWPA Intake Structure, 9.5A-40 9.5A.21 g Emergency Service Water Pump n. N 12-I-ESWPB Intake Structure, 9.5A-40 9.5A.21 E Emergency Service Water Pump
TABLE 9.5.1-1 (Continued) Reference Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix No. Fire Areas . Reference FSAR Figure (s)-
; Designation Fire Area Description 9.5A-23 '9.5A.19 1-0-PA Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area, Diesel 011
- Pump Room 1A 9.'5A-23 9.5A.19 1 1-0-PB Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area, Diesel Oil Pump Room IB l
! 9.5A-23 9.5A.20 t 12-0-TA Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1 15 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area, Diesel Fuel 9.5A-23 9.5A.20-12-0-TB Oil Storage' Tank 1 15 9.5A-14 through 9.5A-20 9.5A.14.
l ,, 5-F-BAL Fuel Handling Building Balance i a, 9.5A-15 and 9.5A-18 9.5A.15'
*- 5-F-CHF Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust l
9.5A-14 and 9.5A-18 9.5A.16 l 5-F-FPP Fuel Handling Building Fuel Pool Heat , Exchangers 9.5A-6. 9.5A-8, 9.5A-14, '9.5A.22 5-W-BAL Waste Processing Building 9.5A-18, and 9.5A-24 through 9.5A-33 e
- e it a,
- j. c
' _r
TABLE 9.5.1-2 UNUSUALLY HAZARDOUS MATERI ALS 1 FLA>04ABLE LIQUIDS Hazardous ApproxImeto Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Gasoline 30,000 gal. Yard Storage Ambient to min./10 times / day Buried Tanks Paint 100 gal. Paint and Moblie Ambient intermittent Equipment Shop, Yard Storage Paint i and Oil Storage ., Building u !
- Paint Thinner 25 gal. Yard Storage Paint Ambient Intermittent and Oil Storage 4
u Building en 30 Propane 2 bottles Waste Processing Ambient Constant (in bottles) Building (Elevation 276) 15 Labs, Chemica'l
. Storage
- 2 Strong Oxidizing Agents J Hazardous Approx 1metc Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use g Oxygen 1050 gal. Yard Storage 250 psig Continuous
@ (cryogenic) (Elevation 261) c.
9 , Oxygen 0.7 W::sta Processing 70 psig & Continuous I @
" Building (Elevation 211) 150 F max.
l j g Waste Gas i
- RecombIners
~
u 1
r 7 TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued) 2 Strono oxidizino Agents (Continued) Hazardous _ Approximate Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Oxygen 2 bottles Waste Processing Ambient Constant n (In bottles) Building (Elevation 276) l 15 Labs, Chemical Storage Oxygen 800 Maintenance Yard 2000 psig Intermittent (in bottles) Storage (For Ambient Cutting and Welding) Chlorine 30 tons Yard Storage Ambient 20 min., 3 times / day (IIqulflod) Elevation 261 m -y-u Chlorine 25,000 lb./ day Chlorinators Ambient 20 min. 3 times / day .g.
- (liquiflod) Chlorination m Building E 15 Chlorine 25,000 lb./ day Circulation Amblent 20 min., 3 times / day
. and Service Water Intake Strucure of Cooling Tower Potassium 50 lb. WPB Amblent- Constant Chromate and Chemical Dichromate
- Storage Potassium 3 lb. WPB Ambient Constant D Permanganate Chemical g
g Storage S
.if
TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued)
- 2. Strong Oxidizing Agents (Continued)
Hazardous Approximate Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Sodium 2 lb. WPB Ambient Constant Peroxide Chemical Storage Potassium 5 lb. WPB Ambient Constant Chlorate and Chemical Perchlorate Storage Sodium 2 lb. WPB Ambient Constant Brohunte Chemical . 1 p Storage g P' m y Sodium 5 lb. WPB Ambient Constant m 3 Dithionite Chemical y Storage 88 , 3. Compressed Gases (1) Flammable Hazardous Approximate Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Condition of Use Duration of Use Hydrogen 3,500 gal. Yard Storage 200 psig. Intermittent (cryogenic) hydrogen (CP&L) Waste Processing Ambient Constant (frou yard) Building (Elevation 276) Hot and Low ) Activity labs i Hydrogen 4,000 cu. ft. Turbine Building 75 psig Static 1 (Elevation 314) Turbine Generator
TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued) 3 Compressed Gases (Continued) (1) Flammable (Continued) Hazardous Approximate Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Hydrogen 500 cu. ft. Turbine building " 75 psig 475 cu. ft./ day (Elevation 314) Turbine Generator Hydrogen 400 cu. ft. RAB (Elevation 261) 120 psig Constant Chemical Volume Control System Volume Control Tank
}D Hydrogen 400 gal. Containment 4 psig, Constant tg yn Building (Elevation 170 F mg
- 236 & 270) Reactor '
Ms dm Coolant Drain as Tank $3 23 (2) Nonflammebte Hazardous Approximate Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Condition of Use Duration of Use Carbon Dioxide 10,000 lb. Yard Storage 300 psi, intermittent (Cryogenic) 0F Carbon Dioxide 4,000 cu. ft. Turbine Building 45 psig intermittent g (Elevation 314) l 15 n Turbine Generator E.
- f. Carbon Dioxide 6,000 cu. ft. Turbine Buliding 95 cfm One hr./ purge
$ (Elevation 314) l 15 g: Turbine Generator
. (Air Purge)
U
TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued)
- 3. Compressed Gases (Continued)
(2) Nontlammable (Continued Hazardous Approximate Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Carbon Dioxide 8,000 cu. ft. Turbine Building 130 cfm One hr./ purge . (Elevation 314) l15 Turbine Generator (Hydrogen Purge) Nitrogen 22,000 lbs. Yard Storage 175 psi intermittent (Cryogenic) Nitrogen 150 gal. Fuel Handling
- 350 psig Permanent e
Buildirn (Elevation 236) Nitrogen Accumu- $ lators (2) 7 m Nitrogen 100 gal. RAB 350 psig Permanent l15 3 (Elevation 261) $. Nitrogen Accumulator Nitrogen 1,600 cu. ft. Containment 750 psig intermittent (Compressed ges) ButIdIng l15 (Elevetion 261) 51 S Accumulator Tanks Nitrogen 1,500 cu. ft. Containment 100 psig Intermittent Buliding 'l15 k (Elevation 236) RCS O Pressure Rollef I Tank a n Nitrogen 400 cu. ft. FHB (Elevation 236) 3 cfm 5 min.-5 times / day
,o Filter Beckwash 350 psig Nitrogen u Accumulator
T ABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued) 3 Congressed Gases (Continued) (2) Nonfiammable (Continued) Hazardous Approwimate Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Condition of Use Duration of Use Nitrogen 400 cu. ft. FHB (Elevation 236) 3 cfm 5 min.-5 times / day Filter Beckwash 350 psig Nitrogen Accumulator Nitrogen 8,000 gal. RAB 100 psig intermittent U (Elevation 216) Containment Spray Addittwe Tank m
%D x
* '4 Nitrogen 400 cu. ft. RAB 3 cfm intermittent l15 @
;., (Elevation 261) 100 psig y
& CvCS volume O Control Tank 4 Corrosive Materials (1) Acids Hezardous ApprowImeto Expected Time Meterial Amount Plant Location Condition of Use Duration of Use Sulfuric Acid 48,000 gal. Yard Storage Ambient intermittent (66 Be) y Sulfuric Acid 2,000 gal. Terbine Building Ambient intermittent
@ (66 Be) (Elevation 240)
- c. '
B Sulfuric Acid 200 get. WP9 (Elevation 236) 93 $ Permanent Acid Additive Concentration g Tank, Solid Ambient Waste Area ea U _ ___ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ J
4 TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued)
- 4. Corrosive Haterials (Continued)
(1) Acids (Continued Hazardous Approximate Expected Time haterial Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Ferrcialoric' 2 Pints max. WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient Constant acid 70% and Storage Rooms Nitric Acid 30 Pints max. WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient constant 90% and Storage Rooms Nitric Acid 60 Pints max. WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient Constant 08% and Storage Rooms y Sulfuric Acid 30 Pints max. WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient Constant g y 100% and Storage Rooms $_ Y Ambient
*g Phosphoric Acid 30 Pints max. WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Constant '
u U$I and Storage Rooms N Hydrochloric 60 Pints max. WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient Constant Acid 37% and Storage Rooms Hydrotluoric 2 Pints max. WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient Constant Acid 45% and Storage Rooms Clacial Acetic 30 Pints max. WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient Constant Acid 100% and Storage Rooms Acetic 30 Pints max. WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient Constant Anhydride and Storage Rooms hypophosphorous 1 Pint WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient Constant Acio and Storage Rooms hydroiodic 2 Pints WPB (Elevation 276) Labs Ambient Constant Acid and Storage Rooms -
TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued ) 4 Corrosive waterials (Continues) (1) Acids (Continued) Hazardous Approximate Expectos Time Meterial Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Electrolyte 420 gal. RAB, Elevation 286 Ambient Permanent ( Sul f uric Bettery Room Acid) 1A-58, in Betteries Electrolyte 420 gel. RA8, Elevation 286 Ambient Permanent
. ( Sul f uric Bettery Room Acid) 18-58, in Betterles yo Electrolyte 420 get. RA8, Elevation 286 Ambient Permanent en w (Sulfuric Bettery Room $
,. Acid) Neutral, in . yl jn Betteries %,
ma to Electrolyte 1,200 get. Turbine Building Ambient Personent (Sul f uric Elevation 26l Acid) Electrical Room, In Betterles Electrolyte 36 gal. Inteke Structure, Ambient Permanent ( Sul f uric in Bettery Acid) l* Electrolyte 120 gel. . Switchyerd Ambient Personent ( Sul f uric l 15 j
.f* Acid)
D tv We U A_._._____ _ _ - _ . _ _
TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued)
- 4. Corrosive Materials (Coritinued)
(2) Caustics Hazardous Approximate Expected Time. , Material Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use sodium 25,000 gal. Yard Storage 70 F Intermittent Hydroxide (50% solution) Sodium 2,000 gal. Turbine Building 70 F Intermittent Hydroxide (El 240) (50% solution) Caustic 200 gal. WPB (Elevation 291) 40.% Permanent. ,~ e Caustic Additive Concentration h Tank Ambient , e E caustic 200 gal. WPB (Elevation 236) 40 % Permanent 5 i Caustic Additive Concentration $ Tank, Solid Waste Ambient Area Sodium 10 lb. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant
- Pellets & Labs and Storage liydroxide Rooms
. 50% Solution Potassium 10 lb. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Hydroxide Laboratories (Pellets) and Storage Rooms Littiium 5 lb. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Hydroxide Laboratories and Storage Rooms t
l TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued)
- 5. Explosives or liighly Flammable hacerials hazardous Approximate Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Acetylene 200 Yard Storage 400 lb., Ambient Intermittent Temperature Ethyl 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Alcohol Chemical Storage and/or i Storage Areas
- hethyl 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant i . Alcohol Chemical Storag:: and/or g p Storage Areas P m y Isopropyl 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant y e Alcohol Chemical Storage and/or ca Storage Areas $ butyl 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Alcohol Chemical Storage and/or Storage Areas
- Acetone 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient- Constant Chemical Storage and/or
' Storage Areas e Methyl 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant l 1sobutyl Chemical Storage and/or Ketone Storage Areas Cyclohexanone 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Chemical Storage and/or Storage Areas l i t i i l i 1
r
, TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued)
- 5. Explosives or Highly Flammable Materials Hazarduus Approximate Expected Time Material Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Methyl 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Cons' tant -
Ethyl Chemical Storage and/or ketone Storage Areas Diethyl 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient constant Ether Chemical Storage and/or Storage Areas D1 propyl 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient ' Constant
, Ether Chemical Storage and/or g y' Storage Areas
.4 4,
g o I I f g Pentane 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant M Chemical Storage and/or $ Storage Areas i hexane 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant
; Chemical Storage and/or Storage Areas i
Cyclohexane 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Chemical Storage and/or Storage Areas i i Material 011 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Chemical Storage and/or Storage Areas Kerosine 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) - Ambient Constant Purified Chemical Storage and/or Storage Areas t 9 1
l TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued)
- 5. Explosives or Highly Flammable Haterials Hazardous Approximate Expected Time haterial Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use i
j Parafine 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Chemical Storage and/or Storage Areas Chlorinated 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Solvents Chemical Storage and/or Storage Areas Methylene 5 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant
? Chloride Chemical Storage and/or '
g 1 ? Storage Areas Q l e h Ethyl 1 gal. WPC (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant E' Alcohol Laboratories % Methyl 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Alcohol Laboratories i j lsopropyl 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant-Alcohol Laboratories Butyl 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Alcohol Laboratories 4 Acetone I gal. WPB (Elevation 276)
- Ambient Constant 4
Laboratories $ Methyl 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant i Isobutyl Laboratories Ketone I i
TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued)
$. Explosives or Highly Flammable Materials Hazardous Approximate Expected Time haterial Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Cyclohexanone 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Laboratories Methyl Ethyl 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Ketone Laboratories i
Diethyl 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Ether Laboratories
? Dipropyl 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant "g ? Ether Laboratories a 4
y 5
$ Pentane 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant M Laboratories %
i' Hexane 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Laboratories Cyclohexane 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Laboratories Material 011 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant 4, Laboratories 4 Kerosine 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient constant Purified Laboratories ] Parafine I gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient. Constant i Laboratories
TABLE 9.5.1-2 (Continued) ,
$. Explosives or liighly Flammable Materials Hazardous Approximate Expected Time haterial Amount Plant Location Conditions of Use Duration of Use Chlorinated I gal. WPB (Elewtion 276) Ambient Constant Solvents Laboratories Methylene 1 gal. WPB (Elevation 276) Ambient Constant Chloride Laboratories ! e r 5 w
1 1 P i
SHNPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.1-3 PRE-ACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
- l. Cable Spreading Rooms -
RAB, Elevation 286 and Charcoal Filter Room - RAB, Elevation 286.
- 2. HVAC (Charcoal Filter)
Room 0ver Air Cleanup Unit-RAB, Column Lines 41 through 45, I through L Elevation 305. 15
- 3. Cable Vault (Elevation 250), Area Below the Turbine Operating Floor with Extension Over Oil Lines at Bearings of the Turbine Generator, Between Columns 9 and 27, Turbine Building.
- 4. Il&V Room (Elevation' 240), Area Below the Turbine Operating Floor with Extension Over 011 Lines at Bearings of the Turbine Generator Between Columns 27 and 43.
Turbine Building. 9.5.1-69 Amendment No. 15 k.
l SHNPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.1-3 (Continued) PRE-ACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEMS 15
- 5. Ilot Laundry, Cold Laundry, Clean Storage Area, Health Physics Records and Storage, Ilealth Physics Office and Storage - WPB, Elevation 261.
- 6. Health Physics Storage, Chemical Records and Stor-age - WPB, Elevation 276.
- 7. HVAC Charcoal Filter Rooms -
WPB, Elevation 291. 9.5.1-70 Amendment No. 15
)
SHNPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.1-4 Minirl CYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS .
- l. Containment Building, Covering Reactor Coolant Pumps (Elevation 221),
Charcoal Filter Housings (Elevation 221) and Cable Tray Runs (Elevation 261).
- 2. Containment Spray and Residual Heat Removal Pumps IA-SA, RAB, Elevation 190.
- 3. Containment Spray and Restdnal Heat Removal Pumps IB-SB, RAB, Klevation.190.
15
- 4. Cable Trays in Corridors, -
Component Cooling Water IIcat Exchangers, Component Cooling Water and Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Pumps, RAB, Elevation 236.
- 5. Electrical Penetrations (Area SA and SB), Char-coat Filter Rooms, Cables in Corridors, Miscellaneous H&V Equipment, RAB, Klevation 261.
1 e Amendment No. 15 9.5.1-71
i i S!!NPP FSAR
-TABLF, 9.5.1-4 (Continued) i
' MULTI CYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
.6. Diesel Generator IA and Day Tank IA Rooms, Diesel Generator Building, Elevation 261.
- 7. Diesel Generator IB and Day Tank IB Rooms, Diesel Generator Building, Klevation 261.
15
- 8. Diesel Oil Pump Room 1A, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area, Elevation 242.25.
- 9. Diesel Ott-Pump Room IB, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area, Elevation 242.25.
- 10. Einergency Exhaust Fllter Room, Fuel Handling Building Elevation 261.
- 11. Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps and lleat Exchangers Room, Fuel Handling Building, Klevation 235.
l 9.5.1-72 Amendment No. 15 L-
SHNPP FSAR I TABLE 9.5.1-5 l WATER SPRAY SYSTEMS
- 1. : Ilyilrogen Seal Oil Unit Curbed Area, Turbine Hullding, Elevation 261.
- 2. . Turbine Reservoir and Lube Ott Curbed Area, Turbine Butiding, Elevation 261.
- 3. Condensate Booster Pumps Curbed Area, Turbine Build-Ing, Elevation 261.
- 4. Steam Generator Feed Pumps Curbed Area, Turbine Hullding, Elevation 261. 15 5._ Condensate Pumps and Sump Area, Turbine Building, Elevation 261.
- 6. Main Transformer IA.
- 7. Main Transformer 18.
- 8. Main Transformer IC.
9 Start Up Transformer IA.
- 10. Start Up Transformer 18.
9.5.1-73 Amendment No. 15 1
l c l i SHNPP'FSAR l t
' TABLE 9.5.1-5 (Continued)
WATER SPRAY SYSTEMS I1. linit . Auxiliary Trans-former IA.
- 12. .llnit Auxiliary Trans-- 15 former 15.
f i i 9.5.1-74 Amendment No. 15 i
m a SHNPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.1-6 JORN ALBORA Associate Fire Protection Engineer Building Services Engineering . EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
Graduate Fire Protection Engineer in charge of engineering of fire protection systems' in power plants and industrial applications. Responsibilities include plant layout, preparation of specifications, interdisciplinary interface, and design and accoptance testing of fire protection systems. REPRESENTATIVE EXPERIENCE Client Project Size Fuel Position Carolina Power 'Shearon Harris 900 MWe Nuclear Support
& Light Company Nuclear Power each Plant Units 1&2 Arkansas Power Coal to Medium Support 5
& Light Company BTU Gas UNG Synfuels The River Plant Support Company Texaco, Coal to Methanol Inc.
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY Ebasco Services Incorporated, New York, NY; 1981 - Present
- Associate Fire Protection Engineer Lockwood Greene Engineering Incorporated, New York, NY; 1981
- Fire Protection Engineer General Services Administration, Atlanta, Georgia; 1979
- Fire Prevention Engineer Brown & Root, Incorporated, Houston, Texas; 1978
- Safety and Fire Protection Engineer EDUCATION University of Maryland, BS Fire Protection Engineering - 1980 i
REGISTKATIONS Engineer in Training (EIT), Maryland 1 l 9,3,3,73 Amendment No. 5 I L
SHNPP FSAR ) TABLE 9.5.1-7 JAMES R. McVEY Principal Engineer EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
Graduate Mechanical Engineer with 26 years experience including engineering and design of equipment for naval plants; engineering design and application of safety relief devices for nuclear and fossil fueled plants; fire protection engineering for nuclear and fossil plants and synthetic fuel plants. Responsibilities include technical and administrative management of fire protection systems for the projects listed below. REPRESENTATIVE EXPERIENCE Client Project Size Fuel Position Houston Lighting Limestone Electric 750 MW each Lignite Lead
& Power Company Electric Generat- Engineer ing Station 5 Units 1 & 2 Carolina Power Shearon Harris 900 MWe Nuclear Lead & Light Company Nuclear Power each Engineer Plant Units 1 & 2 Taiwan Power Chin Shan Nuclear 604 MWe Nuclear Lead Company Plant, Units 1 & 2 each Engineer Naolls Atomic Maolls Facilities Nuclear Lead Power Labora- Modification Engineer tory Program Clark Oil & Feasibility Study Lead Refining Corp of Producing Engineer Gasoline from Coal Arkansas Power Coal to Medium Lead & Light Company BTU Gas Engineer HNG Synfuels The River Plant Lead Company Texaco, Coal to Methanol Engineer Inc.
9.5.1-76 Amendment No. 5
i SHNPP FSAR I EMPLOYMENT HISTORY Ebasco' Services Incorporated, New York, NY; 1979 - Present
- Principal Fire Protection Engineer Frank B. Hall & Company of New York Inc., New York, New York; 1973-1979
- Vice President, 1974-1979
- Asst Vice President, 1973-1974 Marsh & McLennen, Inc, New York, New York; 1967-1973
- Senior Nuclear Consultant General Dynamics, Electric Boat Division, Croton, Connecticut; 1965-1967
- Senior Project Engineer Desser Industries Industrial Valves and Instrument Division, Alexandria, Louisiana; 1960-1965
- Resident & Application Engineer Westinghouse, Bettis Atomic Laboratory, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; 1955-1960
- Engineer EDUCATION Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, BSME - 1954 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS ASME - Member NY Academy of Sciences, Member 9.5.1-77 Amendment No. 5
7. SHNPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.1-8 l MARGARETA A. SERBANESCU Principal Engineer EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
Craduate Mechanical Engineer with 17 years experience in engineering and design of fire protection, plumbing and water pollution control systems. Nine years of experience on nuclear and fossil-fuelled electric generating stations with responsibility for coordination of fire protection and life safety considerations, development of company fire protection standards, preparation of licensing documents, active charge of fire protection system engineering and design from conception through procurement and installation, technical and administrative supervision of engineering and design teams, meeting with Clients and authorities having jurisdiction. Present responsibilities include technical and administrative management of , personnel working on the projects listed below. In addition, responsible for i management of personnel engaged in various technical overhead activities such as ' preparation of proposals and development of engineering standards and standard !* specifications. REPRESENTATIVE EXPERIENCE 5 Cilent Project Size Fuel Position Louisana Power & Waterford SES 1165 MW Nuclear Supervisor Light Company Unit No. 3 Combustion Engineer-ing Pressurized Water Reactor Unit Washington Public WPPSS Unit Nos. 1300 MW Nuclear Supervisor Power Supply 3 & 5 Combus- each System tion Engineer-ing Pressurized i Water Reactor : i Taiwan Power Chin Shan Unit 600 MW Nuclear Supervisor ! Company Nos.1 & 2 GE each Lead Boiling Water Reactor Units Carolina Power Shearon Harris 900 MW Nuclear Supervisor
& Light Company Nuclear Power each Lead Plant Units 1,2,3 Support and 4 Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor Units towa Public Service C Neal Unit No. 4 576 MW Coal Support 9.5.1-78 Amendment No. 5 a
SHNPP FSAR MARGARETA A. SER.BANESCU
, REPRESENTATIVE EXPERIENCE (Cont'd)
Client Project. Size Fuel Position
. Houston Lighting & Allens Creek 1200 MW Nuclear _ Supervisor Power Company Nuclear Genera-ting Station.
Unit No. 1 General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Unit Limestone Elec- 750 MW Lignite Supervisor tric Generating each Station Units 1 & 2 Orange and Lovett Station 200 MW Coal Supervisor Rockland Coal Conversion Utilities Inc. Unit Nos. 4 & 5 Florida Power St. Lucie Pbwer NW Nuclear Supervisor 5 and Ilght. Plant Unit No. 1 IAad Company Combustion Engineering Pressurized Water Reactor Unit St. Lucie Power 890 MW Nuclear Supervisor Plant Unit No. 2 Lead Combustion Engi-neering Pressur-ized Water Reactor Comision Federal laguna Verde 675 MW Nuclear Support de Electricidad Power Plant each de Mexico General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Knolls Atomic Knolls Facilities Nuclear Supervisor Power Laboratory Modification Program Clark Oil and Feasibility Study Synthetic Supervisor Refining Corp of Producing Casoline from Coal l l 9.5.1-79 Amendment No. 5
SHNPP FSAR MARGARETA A. SERBANESQI REPRESENTATIVE EXPERIENCE (Cont'd) Client Project Size Fuel Position Arkansas Power Coal to Medita Synthetic Supervisor and Light Co. BTU Gas HNG Synfuels The River Plant Company, Texas Inc. G al to Methanol Synthetic Supervisor Virginia Electric Surry Units 3 & 4 950 MW Nuclear Imad and Power Company Babcock & Wilcox each Support Pressurized Water Reactor Units Power Authority Astoric Unit 830 MW 011 Support of the State of No. 6 New York Green County 1300 MW Nuclear Support Nuclear Power Plant Babcock & 5 Wilcox Pressurized Water Reactor Unit Electra de Santillian Nuclear 1100 MW Nuclear lead Viesgo, SA Power Plant Spain People's Repub- Shiheng Power 300 MW Q)al Supervisor lic of Oiina Plant Huai-Han Power 600 MW Coal Supervisor Plant Ebasco Services Nuclear Standard- 1200 MW Nuclear' Supervisor ization Prograns GE Boiling Water Support Reactor Unit, Combustion Engineer-ing Pressurized Water Reactor Unit, Westinghouse Pressur-ized Water Reactor Unit Ebasco Services Goal Pired 400 MW Coal Supervisor Inc. Reference Plant 600 MW Coal 800 MW Coal l l i l 9.5.1-80 Amendment No. 5 j
\
-q SHNPP FSAR MARGARETA A. SERBANESCU EMPLOYMENT HISTORY Ebasco' Services Incorporated, New York, New York: 1978 - Present
- Supervising Engineer,1980 - Present
- Senior Engineer, - 1978 - 1980 Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, New York, New York: 1973 - 1978
- Engineer in Power Hydrotechnic Corporation, New York, New York; 1969 - 1973
- Mechanical Design Engineer Spotnails, Incorporated, New York, New York; 1966 - 1969
- Mechanical Draf tsman - Designer Interzoo, Caserta, Italy; 1965 - 1966
- Design Engineer EDUCATION Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest, Master of Mechanical Engineering - 1965 Trane Educational Division, Trane Air Conditioning Clinic - completed course 1977 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
- National Fire Protection Association - Member l
9.5.1-81 Amendment No. 5 1
r- 7
-SHNPP FSAR 9.5.2 CtMMllNICATION SYSTEMS-
-9.5.2.1 Design Bases A comprehensive communications system is provided to assure reliable intraplant. communication, offstte commercial telephone service, and offsite emergency communication capabilities.
9.5.2.2 System Description The communicatton facilitles are as follows:
~
a) .Intraplant voice communication is provided by a Private Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX) telephone system which also interconnects with the central of fice of the Southern Bell Telephone System. b) Intraplant voice paging is provided by a system of centralized audio power _ampitflers and speakers located throughout the site. c) Site alarm signals are carried by the paging system. d) A sound powered headset intercom system provides communication for operational and maintenance purposes. e) Two radio communication systems are provided, one for security communication and the other for operation and maintenance. f) Plant working stations located throughout the plant site are provided with all or a portion of these communication f acilities so that personnel can communicate with other working stations, the Control Room and the auxiliary control room. g3 g) The control room and auxiliary control room are provided with PABX dial telephone, PA paging, radio, and sound powered headset communication facilities. b) Telecommunications support is provided to the plant security system by the telephone and paging systems. I) 120V AC power for the communication systems is supplied from a non-Class IE uninterruptible power supply (UPS) system through power distribution panels. During normal plant operation, power to the UPS system is supplied by 480V non-safety related MCC's. Upon loss of normal AC power the UPS system s recotves its power from the non-safety related 125V de system. j) Two-way voice communication, vital to safe shutdown and emergency response in the event of a fire, is provided by the plant operations and maintenance radio system in accordance with Appendix A of BTP 9.5-1. This system is independent of the plant security radio system and will not Interfore with the communication capablitties of the plant security force. 1 The communication systems are shown on Figures 9.5.2-1 through 9.5.2-5. 1 i 9.5.2-1 Amendment No. 15 l l J
SHNPP FSAR 9.5.2.2.1 Intraplant Communication a) Two PABX telephone switching units will be provided. Both units will he owned and maintained by Carolina Power & Light Company. The primary unit
. will he connected to att telephones. The backup unit will be connected to selected essentlat telephones. A tie cable and automatic transfer switch will ,
interconnect the two units. In this way, the essential telephones are connected to two switching units. The primary unit can support 2,250 slanttaneous conversations (non-blocking) on a pushbutton basis between stations strategically located throughout the plant site. The backup unit can support 900 simultaneous conversations (non-blocking). Initially, only 900
-Itnen are being installed to the primary unit and 600 lines to the backup i
unit.- Certain instruments have direct access to the Bell Telephone System. Other instruments are " restricted" to intraplant telephone calls only. The PAMX is modular and utilizes plug-in type components. the telephone operator can check through his/her console the status of the system. Any malfunction can he easily detected and usually corrected by replacing the affected module. If a line is severed or shorted, it will be antomatically isolated by the switching equipment until it is repaired and the rest of the system will continue to function normally. In case of power falinre, the switches will send an alarm signal to the Control Room. Desk, wall and weatherproof-type telephone instruments'are installed as required and connected to the central switching unit with shteided cable. J. ILich PABX telephone station has access to all other telephones in the plant and will have access to the loudspeaker-paging network. j The central switching equipment is located in the Administration Butiding. The swltching units are separated by a firewall and have automatic fire detection and protection systems. The backup PABX telephones and their supporting eqntpoent are provided with AC power from the auxiliary diesel engine generator for non-nuclear applications on loss of normal power. I h) The alte paging system consists of three separato equipment racks 4 capable of functioning independently. Each rack has pre-amplifiers, power ampitfiers, an override module, site alarm signal module, power supply module, test panel, supervisory detection module and annunicator panet. The output of the power amplifiers feed independent 70 voit audio /stgnal 4 transmission Itnes to which loudspeakers of various types are parattel connected, via line matching transformers. To enhance system reliability, the 7 trannoinston lines are run in pairs so that loudspeakers located in any given I area can he alternately connected. To improve operational efficiency the site paging system is divided into four zones plus an all zone mode. The zones are as follows: Zone Area Covered l$ A Reactor, Reactor Auxiliary, Turbine and Diesel Cenerator Buildings
. C Fuel Handling and Waste
' Processing Rutiding j r 9.5.2-2 Amendment No. 15
-SHNPP FSAR D Perimeter / Outlying Buildings F. Administration Rutiding Zones A and C cach have a dedicated paging equipment rack. 7.ones D and E have a common e.pitpoent rack.
The pre-coinpressor amplifiers, power aanplifiers, and active tone generators (deserthed in Paragraph c below) are monitored by a supervisory signal. Faiture of any of these components is detected and annunciated locally at the rack and.in the Control Room. 15 14f lore of a pre-compressor ampitfier will mute half or one quarter of the tonilspeakers in a paging zone. Malfunction of a power amplifier will affect one quarter or one eighth of the loudspeakers in a zone. In no case will an area or hullding lose total coverage. Kach paging equipment rack is provided with a spare preampitfier and power amplifier (to replace any of the active units) which is normally connected to the suhaystem with plug-in devices, and a standby tone generator (described in Paragraph c holow) that will automatically he connected in each equipment rack in case of primary equipment failure. If a transmission Itne is severed, loudspeakers connected downstream of the break wt11 he muted. If a transmission line is shorted the channel is muted. Voice pagtng nignals are initiated from plant PABX telephones through the PABX telephone switching nnit and interface equipment, and by " Communication Stationn" located in the Control and Auxiliary Control Rooms. The paging 15
/.ones are accessed from the telephones by dialing the appropriate code n umbe r. The "Communtcation Stations" provide direct input to the paging system hypassing the PABX telephone system and have priority over the PABX telephone inittated sit tnal. A selector switch is provided at each of these ,
" Communication Stations" to select none priority access or all zone priority l access control.
c) Each paging equipment rack has a site alarre signal module provided with two solid stato tone generators. The tone generators are arranged such that one generator is active and the other is standby. If the active generator fatis, the standby generator will be automatically connected and an annunciation signal sent to the Control Room. They are remotely controlled by ' pushhntton stations on the Control Room and auxiliary control panet. The tone 15 generator signals are fed to the paging arnpitfiers and broadcasted through the loudspeakur system covering the entiro sitn.
L an t ovacuation ut;tnals are In accordance with 10CFR$0, Appendix F. Fire alarm signals ment appropriate NFPA Standards.
9.5.2-3 Amendment No. 15 - _ _ - _ _ - _D
t SHNPP FSAR d) The sound-powered headset communication system consists of remote jack st:stions, master panels, sound powered headsets and wiring. It provides communication between the' Control Room and auxiliary control panel and technicians adjusting remote instrumentation and performing other routine maintenance. The system la available for use by all plant personnel. It is segmented so that the Waste Processing Rutiding and the remainder of the plattt i , have independent five channel systems. 'the refueling operation has one dedicated channet in this system. The systems are accessed via jack stations located at control panels, relay cabinets, instrument racks, switchgear, MCC's, motors, pumps and important equipment. Channels terminate in the 15 Control Room where plug-in patches, to allow temporary circuit Interconnections, can he made at the master panel should the need arise. Each channet/ circuit consists of a two-conductor shielded line interconnecting the remote stations. A five jack assembly is provided at each remote station, into which the portable headset equipment can he plugged. This arrangement allows for handsf ree operation and requires no ampitfiers. This system also serves as back-up to the normal communications system (PABX). If a zone cable is severed producing an open circuit, the jack stations connected downstream will he lost, if the wires are shorted sound powered 15 communication in the independent five channel system will be partially or totally lost. The sound powered system is a simple system that does not require a power supply. Component fatture is a minimum. e) An interior antenna system for inside buttding radLo signal coverage L1 provided. This antenna system will be used by the security radio system anel the plant operations and maintenance radio system. Should any transmission or control Lines he faulted, depending on the faults location and naturn, a portton of the system will still be operative. All radio stations and auxiliary equipment are located in air-conditioned, limited access areas. f) Working stations which may require attention during transtant events are shown in Table 9.5.2-1. Communication facilities are provided between theso working stations and the main control and aux 111ary control rooms to mitigatn the consequences of transient, accident and fire conditions. All arnas meet the Occupational Safety & Health Administration noise reqntrements which are 115 db(a) for emergency and transient conditions and 90 dh(a) for normal conditions. Communication between personnel performing cold shutdown can he estabitshed by the use of the installed PBX system, the installed sound powered telephone ' system or the walkte-tatkte routinely used by operations personnel. Adequate manpower will be available to complete all necessary action in the time reqntred to bring the plant to a stable cold shutdown condition following a l postulated firn in any single f tro area. I I 9.5.2-4 Amendment No. 15
7 SHNPP FSAR The following criteria are used to maintain reliable, distinct ' and clear communication between the Control Room and auxiliary control room and the 15
- rnferenced working stations'having the indicated background and/or maximum noise levels
a) Areas with noise levels above 100 Decibels, db(a)
- 1) For telephone stations, a sound-proof booth or waist-high acoustical ~shictd and a noise cancelling microphone in the handset instrument are provided.
- 2) The paging _ system coverage is reinforced by providing paging loudspeakers with additional audio power (through line matching l transformers) and locating them closer together.
!~
- 1) The sound powered headset, used in these areas, is provided with a noise shleided microphone and is specially designed to operate clearly L in areas with noise levels up to 130 db(a).
i j 4) Portable handheld radios can be provided with plug-in type l headsets furnished witt. noise shielded microphones, designed to operate l In areas with noise levels of 120 db(a) as required. b) Areas with noise levels between 80 and 100 Decibels, db(a) l) Telephones are provided with noise cancelling microphones. A l walst-htgh acoustical shield Is provided as required for each station.
- 2) Paging coverage procedures aimilar to the ones stated in
! Paragraph a)2) above 'are followed. l
- 1) Sound powered headsets are provided with a boom microphone designed to operate within this noise level range.
- 4) Portable handheld radios can he provided with plug-in type headsets furnished with hoom microphones as required.
I c) Areas with noise levels below 80 Decibels, dh(a)
- 1) Communication facilities at working stations located in these areas are Individually evaluated to determine if there is a need to l provide them with special equipment as noted in Paragraph b) above. If Paragraph b) requirements are not necessary, standard type communication instruments are furnished.
The following communication facilities are provided at or near each working ! station described in a), b), and c) above: a) A telephonn station b) A paging speaker e) A sound powered Jack station 9.5.2-5 Amendment No. 15 ! l L- j
b SWIFF FSAR
- d) Radio communication is also available to those working stations that are able to receive radio signals. . An interior antenna system for inside radio sl:tnal coverage is provided for this purpose.
T1u' communication system and its associated power supplies are provided as
.lene r t heil helow: .)) liigh level Intraplant . Paging System - 120V AC power 'is supplied f rom the non-Class IE Uninterruptthle Power Supply (UPS) bus through power distribution panels. De non-Class IE UPS System consists of rectifier / inverter source.
Inverter is normally. supplied through its rectifier from a non-Class IE 4A0V 11CC (ID21). Should this voltage drop below the required level, the inverter is supptf ed automatically from the 250V DC battery (DP-1-250). In addition, each inverter can he bypassed manually and directly fed through the 440V non-Class IK MCC. The configuration of the IIPS System is shown on Pig. 4.1.'l-3 of SifMPP FSAR. h) Radio Communication System (Operations / Maintenance & Security) - Same as intraplant Paging System c) Sound Powered Headset Intercom System - Does. not require R1ectrical . Pouer Supply d) PARX System -
- 1) Primary Unit (2250 Line): During normal plant operatton, 4 ROV Ac power is supplied from 480V power center located in the administrative building 1-4A71. Upon loss of normal AC power a battery is provided to keep the PABX System operating for approximately one hour after power interruption. D e hattery and charger is located in the backup unit (900 Line) PABX room.
- 2) Rackup Unit (900 Line): A 480V feed f rom the Motor Control Center SD in the security building is provided to supply power to the 900 Line PARX System. In the event of loss of normal power this MCC will he automatically supplied by the auxiliary (security) diesel engine generator assuring a reliable power supply to the 900 Line PABX.
c) Microwave Equipment - Some as described for 900 Line PABX System f) Southern Bell - Same as described for 900 Line PARX System Residea the reliability provided with each subsystem, the strength of the onsite communication system lies in the overlapping coverage given by the suhnystems. - 9.5.2.2.2 Of fsite Communication l>uring normal operations, of fsite telephone service is provided to the plant hy Southern Bell central office trunks and dial tie trunks connected to the CPhl, telephone network. In the event that commercial telephone service is lost, tie lines may be used or an emergency communications link can he set up ; 1 9.5.2-6 Amendment No. 10 L
SHNPP FSAR f rom the Control Room or f rom the central alarm station via the two-way radio system, and/or CP&L's microwave system, which are both available to the plant. 9.5.2.2.3 Communications During Fire Emergencies During a fire emergency, the operation and maintenance two-way radio system t will he used by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown. This system is totally independent from the plant security radio system and will not interfere with it in any manner. The system is designed to satisfy the requirements of Appendix A of BTP 9.5-1. 9.5.2.1 Inspection and Testing Preventive and corrective maintenance programs will be implemented by Carolina Power & Light Company. Communication equipment purchasing specifications require vendors to furnish complete operating and maintenance instructions for I power plant personnel use. j A functional test will he performed to assure effective communications between l plant personnet in all vital areas during maximum plant noise conditions under varlons operating conditions. All systems are to be inspected regularly and undergo operational checks to ensure service readiness and ef fectiveness. A complement of necessary spare parts, tools and test equipment are available. Communication system protective measures are in some cases butit in the equipment, in other instances they are provided in the design of the l subsystems. Each of the subsystems is provided with a dedicated conduit l nystem. The wiring is sectionalized by areas, floors and/or buildings to facilltate trouble-shonting. The PAHX and loudspeaker paging systems are monitored by control room annunciators. 9.5.2.4 Ins t rinenta t ion The following are annunciated in the Control Roomt 15 a) less of power to the PABX Telephone System and b) Loss of output of any of the paging preamp 11fiers, power amplifiers or the site alarm generators. 9.5.2-7 Am H ment No. 13
TABLE 9.5.2-1 SIDetART OF ONSITE CottfUNICATION SYSTFJf CAPARILITIES AND
. NOISE CONSIDERATION DURING TRANSIENTS AND/OR ACCIEENTS I
MAXIMUM COMMUNICATION SYSTFJtS AVAILABLE AND MAXIMITM , ANTICIPATED BACKCROUND NOISE FOR EFFECTIVE COPHUNICATIONS SOUND TELEPHONE SOUND POWERED HICH LEVEL PORTABLE UHF RADIO I LEVELS . JACK STATIONS PACING I STATION dBA (dBA) (h) (dBA) (h) (dRA) (g) (dRA) (h) Main Control Room 70 80 (b) 80 (b) 115 80 (a) Auxiliary Control Panel Area 75 80 (b) 80 (b) 115 80 (a) I containment Spray Pump Areas 95 100 (c) 100 (e) 115 100 (e) ! I Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Areas 95 100 (c) 100 (e) 115 100 (e) 120 (f) { Diesel Cenerator Rooms 115 125 (d) 130 (f) 115 to Charging Pump Areas 95 100 (c) 100 (e) 115 100 (e) L.P. Safety Injection Pump Areas 95 100 (c) 100 (e) 115 100 (e)
=
CCW Pump Areas 95 100 (c) 100 (e) 115 100 (e) Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Areas 95 100 (c) 100 (e) 115 100 (e) H.P. Safety Injection Pump Areas 95 100 (c) 100 (e) 115 100 (e) Essential Switchgear Rooms 85 100 (c) 100 (e) 115 100 (e) Y - $ Notes: I $ a) Subject to verification during startup. " b) Standard type communication equipment. y c) Telephone equipped with noise cancelling microphones.
- d) Soundproof booth or acoustic she11d and noise cancelling microphones.
g e) Boom microphone with ear-suff type headset. f) Noise shielded microphone with ear-suff type headset. g) Provided with additional power and additional spacing as appropriate. h) Af ter the plant is operational communication capability in light of actual background noise will be evaluated. Modifications will be made if necessary. I l
SHNPP FSAR
- 9. '). ') LIGHTlNG SYST6fiS e
- 9. % '). I Design Bases 1.lght tog Systems are designed to provide illusination throughout the plant during normal and other than norreal plant operation. The levels of illumination are the seinimise average, maintained foot candles as specified in the Llltaninating Engineering Society H.andbook, fourth edition.
Piereury-containing illumination sources (floucescent, mercury, metal halide and hich-pressure sodium lassps, all containing small amounts of mercury) are prohlh t ted in the vieinity of systems that could return mercury contamination to the primary systein. The above criteria prohibits the use of mercury illumination sources in tlw Containment, and areas where fuel is handled (this does not include the entire Fuel Handling Building). Where mercury illianination sources are prohibited, incandescent sources are ul t i t zed . The tinhting systerns and their power sources are designed to provide nutttelent illumination to enable tlw plant operators to perform all manual operations required at all times and to soove safely through essential areas of the plant. .
- 9. 5. J. 2 hystems Description Plant lighting is divided into three main systerms:
a) Nuriaal AC l.ightlng Systein b) 14oriaal/ Emergency (N/E) AC Lighting Systeu l c) DC IWiergency Lighting Systers i Norymal AC_ Lighting System , The nor,aal AC lighting (H Ondr$1 sed Continuously from the plant nonsafety l rutated 460V auxiliary system notor control centure through 3 phaso, 4 wire, 4hu -4 boy /277V or Abu -208Y/120V dry type transformers. These transformers tout local area Ituhting panels. The floriaal AC highting System is operable when Llw plant is in a normal operating roodo or when of fsite power is availahlo. The norreal opurating mode includes the plant startup mode with uitsite power availabic, the plant running mode with the unit auxiliary tranaturmers supplying auxiliary power, and the plant hot or cold shutdown undo with of talte power available. The normal lighting systers provides approximately 80 porcent of the total plant 111tseination. gr, mal /Lawrgency (N/E) AC Lightina System The Normal / Emergency AC Lighting Systeve which is non Class 18 non-Seimate category 1 in unorgisod continuously frois tlw plant safety related 480V aux!L inry systein motor control centure through 3 phana, 4 wire, 480 -480Y/277V or 4Hu -20bY/120V dry type transforrears. 9.5.3-1
T SHNPP FSAR . These transformers feed normal / emergency local area lighting panels.
~
The > normal. emergency Lightin;; is available under all plant conditions. A redund mt system consisting of two-separate and distinct trains, A and B, of N/K. lighting is provided. Upon normal offsite power failure, each train of the N/K tighting load is. reenergized automatically from its associated emetgency diesel generator source. N/E lighting comprises approximately 20 percent of the normal plant Ilghting load. Either train of the N/E Lighting provides the necessary lighting essential to the safe and orderly operation of the plant during loss of normal AC power. Normal / Emergency Lighting is provided to all. plant areas, including those areas required for safe shutdown of the reactor and evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident, except for Turbine Building Elevation 314 ft. and the Yard Area. The. Yard Area is serviced by security lighting. Appropriate 19014 tion is provided between the non safety related N/E 1ighting and the safety related equipment. OC, Emergency Lighting System The DC Kmergency Lighting System, which is non Class IE and non-Seismic Category 1, provides illumination during loss of either train of the normal coergency 1Lghting sources in the Control Room, the auxiliary control panel, and the computer room. The source of power for the DC Emergency Lighting System, which is automatically energized upon loss of either train A or 3 of 15 the normal / emergency lighting system, is the station 125V battery. Operation of the DC Emergency Lighting System is annunciated in the Control Room to prevent accidental depletion of the battery. , In the balance of plant areas, DC emergency lighting is provided by self-contained storage battery lighting fixture assemblies. 9.5.3.3 Safety Evaluation Light ing systems provide illumination throughout the plant during normal and abnormal plant operation. Upon loss of normal power, the DC Emergency highting System is automatically energized. Approximately 10 seconds af ter the loss of normal AC power, the redundant AC Normal Emergency Lighting System ( A and M) receives power f rom the standby diesel generators so failure of one system will not result in failure of the other system, and the DC Emergency Lighting System is automatiently deenergized. The DC Emergency Lighting , System is automatically energized in the event that the redundant AC Normal / Emergency Lighting System ft.11s. l These provisions are further enhanced in the control room by providing a support system for the Itghting and suspended ceiling that has been j seismically designed for the design basis seismic event. In all other safety- ~ related. areas of the plant, seismically designed lighting supports are
- ut t t tzed ' in locations where their f ailure would adversely af fect safe shutdown of the reactor.
g I Amendment No. 15 l5 9.5.3-2
SHNPP FSAR 9.5.4 DIKSEL GKNKRATOR PUEL OIL STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM The function of the Dieset Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System (DGFOSTS) is to store, maintain, and supply fuel oil to the standby diesel generators as required for all modes of- diesel generator operation during nor na l and abnormal site and plant conditions. . 9.5.4.1 Design Bases , The DCFOSTS design is based on the following requirements and criteria: a) The onsite storage capacity of the system provides sufficient fuel oil for continuous operation of each diesel generator at maximum rated load for at least seven days. h) The system ensures the availability of fuel to at least one of the two diesels assuming any' single active or passive failure of one of its l15 components. c) The system is designed to Seismic Category I requirements and as such will remain functional during and af ter the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
<l) The system is protected from the effects of other natural phenomena including the probable maximma flood, the design basis' wind loading, and the design basis tornado.
e) The system is protected from the effects of internally generated misslics, high energy line breaks and through wall leakage cracks associated with moderate energy pipe ruptures. f) Redundant elements of the system are physically separated to the extent necessary to ensure that no single active failure in the system will af fect reitundant components. 15 g) All system components are designed and arranged to permit inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and repair of the system. b) The system is designed to minimize the chance of deleterious material from entering the system during refilling periods. l) The emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System complies with i att requirements of ANSI Standard N195-1976, " Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," except for the following: a) "An over-flow line from the day or integral tank to the supply tank shall be provided b) "A strainer shall be provided for each engine. . ..The strainer shall be of duplex design."
;c) "One dif ferential pressure d.adicator for each duplex strainer and l15 control room alarm."
9.5.4-1 Amendment No. 15
p.- SIINPP FSAR The day tank overflows to the building floor drain system and then is pumped to an ott separator unit located in the yard for eventual disposal. This arrangement has sufficient margin between the day tank high level signal and the overflow conneetton to allow for thermal expansion and permit the return of unused fuel oil to the tank without overflow. In addition, if the fuct oil transfer pump falls to stop upon receipt of high day tank level signal, the solenold operated valv.e, located in the inlet to the day tank, will close on high-high level signal, thereby preventing overflow. The diesel fuel oil transfer pumps are provided with a single basket strainer in the pump suction Line. The strainer was conservatively sized and the pressure drop across the strainer is negligible at the design flow rate even when the strainer is 90 percent clogged. Therefore, clogging during seven days of operation of the diesel generator is unlikely. However, for pump protection, the suction line is provided with a flow switch to alarm abnormal conditions. 9.5.4.2 System Description IS The system consists of two separate, independent fuel oil supply subsystems, each serving one of the two standby diesel generator engines. Each of these redundant subsystems consists of one fuel oil storage tank, one transfer pump, 15 l one day tank, interconnecting piping valves, and associated instruments and controls. The flow diagram is shown on Figure 9.5.4-1. The two fuel oli storage tanks are horizontal, reinforced concrete tanks with steel liners, located underground in the yard and designed to Seismic Category I requirements. Fuel consumption of the diesel generator at rated 15 load is 445 gal /hr. Each fuel oil storage tank will contain enough diesel fuel for continuous operation of the diesel generator for seven days at rated load plus adequate additional capacity for testing in accordance with ANSI Nt95-1976. A comparison of design basis fuel oil consumption and fuel oil storage tank capacity is shown in Table 9.5.4-1. This storage capacity provides ample time for obtaining additional fuel oil, since additional fuel oil is readily available within eight hours. See Section 9.5.4.6 for a discussion of local sources of fuel oil. Fuel delivery to the plant is by rait car or truck. Two rail car fuel oil unloading pumps are provided for the two fuel ott storage tanks. The fuel oil unloading pumps transfer the fuel oil from the delivery vehicle to the fuel oil storage tanks. Two connections are provided so that fuel can be received f rom trucks. The diesel fuel oil transfer pump is a horizontal, centrifugal pump located below grade in a separate compartment adjacent to the fuel oil storage tank. The fuel oil transfer pump powered by its associated diesel generator is sized to provide a flow of approximately three times the maximum engine consumption rate and is automatically controlled through the use of level switches activated by day tank fuel level. Upon demand, the diesel fuel ott is pumped from the fuel oil storage tank and through one simplex strainer into the diesel fuel ott day tank. A recirculation line is provided at the discharge of the fuel oil transfer pump to protect the pump in the event of flow blockage. 9.5.4-2 Amendment No. 15
i SHNPP FSAR ) l l a In each fuel _oll supply subsystem,-the fuel oil transfer pump The maintains day tanks the luel oil level within its associated diesel generator day tank. isolated, fire resistant are vertical-steel tanks located in separate,and situated so as to assure sufficient enmpa rt ments , The volume of cach' day tank provides approximately six engine fuel pumps. i fuel consumption. . The tank drains
-hours of. storage. assuming maximum eng ne i d to an and overflows to the building floor drain system and is-then del l disposal. Thevere handling of . oil separator unit located in the yard for-eventua 5d. However, this excess fuel is at variance with the SRP 9.5.4 Paragraph 111- between day tank arrangement, is acceptable since suf ficient margin is providedfor thermal expansion -high level signal and the overflow connection to allow h tank of the contents and to permit the return of unused fuel oil to t eIn add d valve, without overflow.
upon receipt of high day tank level signal, the solenoid operateto the day located in the inlet thereby preventing overflow. h The diesel day tank enclosures are provided with exhaust ventilation to t e ' outside, with three hour fire rated walls and doors and can contain the maximum oil spill resulting f rom a day tank f ailure. the diesel engine shaft Ilpon receipt of a signal initiating diesel start, driven fuel d by the pump takes s to the diesel as required and recirculates that portion not consumeA the day manual is diesel back to the day tank. tank nozzle in the fuel oil . supply piping to the diesel engine. 4 -1. Design parameters for the system components are listed in Table 9.5. Safe g Evaluation 9.5.4.3 1 The Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System tion (DGFOSTS) following is a i safety related system required to support diesel generator opera i
' loss of of f site power under all postulated conditions, i
Kach fuel oil storage tank provides a source of fuel oil to an independent k contains 15 ) supply train serving the diesel of one redundant train andd each diesel.tan A single tlw design basis onsite storage capacity for each associate talture analysis of the system is presented in Table 9.5.4-2. r the first flange outside the main fuel oil l15 All fuel oil piping commencing at d piping and storage tank and continuing up to the diesel engine mounteEngine mounted piping components is ASME Section III, Class 3. Figure 9.5.4-2 shows. fuel are non-ASME II[ and designed to ASTM requirements.
. oil piping schematic.
Fuel oil supply piping. to the main fuel oil storage tank is non-safety The fuel related 15 and not required to support the operation of the diesel generator. ity for two oil storage capacity provides the design basis onsite storage capac , i l 1 Amendment No. 15 9.5.4-3
l SHNPP.FSAR 5 diesels and is provided with a manway located on the top which could be used : to fill the tank. Non-ASME, Section III,' Class 3 tank penetrations are embedded in the reinforced concrete walls of the storage tank. The DGFOSTS, except for the fuel unloading pumps, the fuel oil storage tanks, the fuel oil transfer pumps and associated piping and valves, is located within the confines of the Diesel Generator Building as shown on Figure 9.5.4-1. The Diesel Generator Building is designed to withstand the effects of the safe shutdown earthquake, the design bases tornado, the probable maximum flood with the associated wave runup, and the design bases wind as discussed in Chapter 3. This precludes damage to protected portions of the system from these sources. Those components not within the Diesel Generator Building are protected against design basis natural phenomena as follows: a) The fuel oil unloading pumps and associated piping require no protection since an alternate means of filling the fuel oli storage tank is provided in the form of a manway located at the top of each tank; b) The fuel oil storage tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps with associated
- piping and valves are located below plant grade. This combined with the reinforced concrete design of the storage tanks and transfer pump rooms assures protection from tornado effects. These components are also designed to withstand SSE effects; c) The fuel oil storage tanks' vent and fill pipes are located at an elevation so as to provide design flood level protection, and protection from maximum net water accumulation for design storm conditions in the plant area.
The fuel oil storage tank vent is equipped with a flame arrestor, which provides fire protection, and is located within a concrete enclosure which provides protection from tornado missiles; and d) The only buried piping (labeled yard on Figure 9.5.4-1) in the DGFOSTS is cathodically protected and protected from missiles by approximately five feet of earth cover. Refer to Section 3.5 for missile protection of buried components. The routing of fuel oil lines between the diesel oil st'orage tanks and the Diesel Generator Building is such that they pass under the two railroad l tracks, several roadways, and over the circulating water intake and discharge pipes. The portions of fuel oil lines under the railroad tracks and roadways are 5 1 cated 6 ft. 7 in. below the grade elevation. The circulating water intake and discharge pipes are located 3 f t below the fuel oil lines (measured between the pipe outside diameters). The fuel oil piping wiLL have a uniform bedding for the entire length of the l crossing under the railroad and the roadway. The angle of intersection between the fuel oil lines and the railroad / highway is 90 degrees. The depth of the fuel oil lines underneath the railroad / roadway is such that the l o s 6_4 4...a...e we s L--
.- . . ~_. _ - - -
L l i -
.SHNPP FSAR '
[. l r combined circumferential stress in.the pipe created by the maximum anticipated j internal pressure and/or the external loads at the crossing does not exceed the maximum stress allowables for ASME materials. l .. ! . Calculations using Boussinesg's equation demonstrate that with 6 ft. or more ! soil cover, the surface loads (external loads) have a negligible effect on 5 pipe wall stresses. It is highly unlikely for a break in the circulation water pipe to undermine the 10-15 foot span required to result in exceeding
- the allowable stress levels for unsupported two (2) inch fuel oil pipe. It
- should be no. ed that following a Loss ' of Offsite Power, the non-safety related r
circulating water system will no longer operate, thereby limiting the area which could be undermined by postulated flooding. Additionally, the diesel generator fuel oil day tanks allow approximately 7 hours of uninterrupted operation without makeup at the' maximum rate of_ consumption. Manual day tank replenishment could be initiated should be need arise. The DGFOSTS and associated structures have been evaluated to determine the effects of internally generated missiles, considering separation and compartmentalization of subsystem components. 'The results show that system equipment and structures are capable of withstanding internally generated missiles without al loss of function in redundant components. The consequences of the-limited size wall cracks in the moderate energy fire protection system piping within the complex have been evaluated and are acceptable. Diesel- Generator trains A and B are completely separated from each other by a twenty-four inch thick reinforced concrete wall. There are no openings located in this wall. This concrete wall will provide adequate missile protection and physical separation between the two redundant diesel generator units. The Diesel Generator design also incorporates an overpressure protection ' system in order to minimize the occurrence of internally generated missiles. 5 Each starting air receiver tank is provided with a relief valve normally set at 275 psi. The diesel generator lube oil system is protected from overpressure events by the use of an internal relief valve normally set at 70 psi. 'The engine crankcase pressure is provided with a pressure switch which initiates an alarm in the control room on high pressure. The engine is also provided with relief vents and valve covers which will operate in case of ,high crankcase pressure. In addition to these overprotection devices, the twenty-four inch thick concrete wall is considered to be an adequate barrier for any credible missile. Missile protection is discussed in Section 3.5. High and moderate energy piping systems, criteria for protection against postulated breaks, and evaluations are discussed in Section 3.6. Flood protection measures for Seismic Category I structures and components are discussed in Section 3.4. Check valves are provided in the Floor Drain System at each fuel oil transfer pump compartment to prevent backflow to the various pump compartments. A program for regular surveillance of the quality of the stored fuel oil is included in the plant Technical Specifications (see Chapter 16). Growth of 5 algae in the diesel fuel oil storage tank will be prevented by use of a fuel additive containing a biocide. If in the unlikely event the fuel oil quality i l I l 9.5.4-5 Amendment No. 5 ) _ __ _ _ O
l i SHNPP FSAR
. falls below an acceptable level, tank drain connections are provided in each fuel oil transfer pump compartment for removing fuel oil by means of mobile pumping units. This assures that the fuel oil will be of satisfactory quality 1 1
at all times. There are no specific provisions in the design of the fuel oil storage fill system to minimize the creation of turbulence of the sediment in the bottom of the storage tank. However, each diesel generator is provided with fuel from a 5 separate fuel oil storage tank. If operation is required beyond seven (7) days and tank "A" requires filling, redundant division "B" Loads will be operated from diesel generator "B" which is supplied with fuel oil from tank "B". The individual diesel day tanks are located within three hour fire barrier cubicle walls with same rating fire doors. The diesel oil tanks are each located in individual cubicles in the Diesel Generator Building, thus separating them from potential ignition sources such as high energy electrical lines and hot surfaces such as the diesel exhaust lines. The connecting fuel oil piping is routed to minimize exposure to these ignition sources. Automatic fire detection and extinguishing systems are provided for diesel generator units and diesel fuel oil transfer pump area. For a detailed description refer to Section 9.5.1.2. , The two reinforced fuel oil storage tank structures are located below grade more than 50 feet from the nearest building in excess of the minimum distance called for in NFPA 30, " Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code." Thus, in the unlikely occurrence of a fuel oil storage tank fire, the effect of the fire will be confined to the area of the tank and will not affect reactor operation and safety. A three-hour firewall separates each of the fuel oil transfer pumps, thus ensuring that a single event such as a fire will not cause the failure of more than one pump. Due to the non-explosive characteristics of diesel oil, if in an unconfined atmosphere, an explosion is not considered a credible occurrence. The fuel oil storage tank liner will be coated with 3 to 5 mils of inorganic zine primer to protect against corrosion. The liner will be cleaned and sandblasted prior to coating. Following are the applicable industry standards: SSPC-PA-1 Shop Field and Maintenance Painting SSPC-PA-2 Measurement of Dry Paint Thickness with Magnetic Gauges SSPC-SP-3 Power Tool Cleaning 5 SSPC-SP-10 Near-White Blast Cleaning. Buried field oil piping will be provi~ded with a cathodic protection system and either coated with hot applied coal tar enamel and asbestos felt or wrapped with plastic tape. Properties of hot applied enamel are per AWWA Spec C-203, i Section 2.2. ( Physical properties of asbestos felt wrap materials are per AWWA Spec C-203, i Section 2.6. Tape material shall be 20 mil pressure sensitive tape such as ! Scotchwrap #51, Trantex #V-20 or equal, 2 in. wide and 1/2 in. lap. 9.5.4-6 Amendment No. 5
SHNPP FSAR 9.5.4.4 Instrionentation Application The control of each subsystem is identical.. It maintains the proper supply of diesel oil-in each day tank by means of interlocks between the high and low-lovel switches'in the day tank, the corresponding fuel oil transfer pump motor starters, and supply valves at each day tank inlet. The Main Control Room is provideal with high and low level annunciators for all day tanks and fnet oil storage tanks in the system, and control switches for remote control of each complete transfer system train.. Each diesel fuel oli storage tank is provided with a level transmitter which gives high level alarm, low. level. alarm and level indication on the fuel oil storage tank panel which is located near the fuel oil unloading pumps. Control switches are provided on the fuel oil storage tank panel for control of the fuel oil unloading pumps. Each ilay tank is provided with alarms and -indication on its respective diesel engl.no control panel and on the main control room panel to: 15 a) Open supply valve on low-level, if necessary, and start transfer pump h) Stop the fuct oil transfer pump on high level c) Energize a control room and a local annunciator on low-low level
- d) Close supply valve and energize a control room and a local annunciator on high-high level e) Monitor oil level by a level indicator
! Mach of the fuel oil transfer pump strainers is equipped with discharge flow switches which cause an alarm in the Control Room and local engine control panel whenever the low flow setpoint is reached. Each fuel oil transfer pump discharge Itne is provided with a pressure indicator. Each fuel oil transfer pump and its associated day tank inlet valve is d provided with control on its respective diesel engine panel and on the main control panel. Primary control is provided from the Main Control Room. 15 llowever, control can he transferred to the corresponding diesel engine panel via a selector switch on the diesel engine panel. If the Main Control Room is evaenated and plant control is transferred to the auxiliary control panel, j then control of the DGFOSTS will automatically be transferred to its respective diesel engine panel. Instrumentation and Control Design Criteria are discussed in Sections 7.1 and 7.6.
- 9. 5.4. 5 Inspection and Testing Requirements The system is tested in conjunction with the periodic diesel generator test (Refer to Chapter 16 for details). The system is subject to the in-service inspection requirements of ASME XI in accordance with 10CFR50.55a(g) (refer to Section 6.6). Isolation valve bypass piping, and pressure test connections I
i i l 9.5.4-6a Amendment No. 15 I I
SHNPP FSAR are. provided to allow pressure testing of that' portion of the piping which is buried in the yard. Manways are provided to allow inspection of the buried fuel ott storage tanks and their instrumentation, and allows access for tank cleaning if required. The access hatch to the tank manways is shown 'in Figure 3.8.4-22 (intersected by Section A-A on elevation 263.00 f t.). The system
. components are inspected and cleaned prior to installation. Instruments are -
calibrated during periodic testing and automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper setpoints. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during plant preoperational testing and during every periodic diesel test. At the end of each diesel test period, the fuel' oil transfer pump is automatically started to raise the fuel oil day tank level to full. Fuel oil trans'er pumps are operated and tested during plant
- preoperational testing. Fuel oil transfer pumps are operated and tested
. initially to check factory test curves and to determine the initial pump characteristic as installed. Periodically during normal Unit operation,, fuel oil storage tank and day tank levels are checked with a hand gage; fuel oil
> transfer pump and motor availability is checked by conducting a flow test from . the storage system to the fuel oil day tar.h. Surveillance of the quality of the fuel oil is accomplished by periodic sampling for water and other cor.caminants in the storage system, and sampling - of new fuct oil prior to transfer to the storage system. Sampling procedures shall be in accordance with ASTM Standard D270-75. Fuel oil samples shall be 8 tested per ASTM Standard D975-81 and shall meet the specifications listed in Table 1 of ASTM D975-81. 9.5.4.6 Diesel Fuel Distribution Sources The primary supplier of diesel fuel is located in Greensboro, 'N orth Carolina. Deliveries are made from: Selma, North Carolina, approximately 45 miles . Greensboro, North Carolina, approximately 75 miles Charlotte. North Carolina, approximately 140 miles Spartanburg, South Carolina, approximately 200 miles Wilmington, North Carolina, approximately 120 miles Deliveries are routinely made under unfavorable environmental conditions such as storms, snow, ice, etc. With the amount of time that deliveries can be j scheduled, no problems are anticipated. l l l l i Amendment No. 8 9.5.4-6b _ _ _ _ _ ~ . _ . __ - . _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ ._ ._
SHNPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.4-1
~ DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL, GIL STORAGE SYSTEM COMr0NENT DES [GN DATA -1. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Quantity 2 175,000 gallons, 15 Capacity Type Horizontal Design Pressure, psig Atmospheric Maximum Design Temperature, *F 105 (Note 1)
Materials Reinforced Concrete with Carbon Steel Liner Code (Liner) ASME B&PV Code, Section V[II (Note 2) Seismic Category 1
- 2. Diesel Fuel 011 Transfer Pumps Quantity- 2 15 Capacity 40 gpm llorizontal, centrifugal stainless 5 Type steel Code ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3 Seismic Category I
'l . Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tanks Quantity 2 15 Capacity 3,000 gallons Type Vertical Design Pressure, psig Atmospheric Design Temperature, "F 125 Mate ria ls Carbon Steel Code ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3 Seismic Category I
- 4. Fuel Oil Strainers Quantity 2 15 Type Basket Strainer with Mesh Liner Code ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3, Subsections ND-3600 & NA Seismic Category- I
.N'lt e.*}
I) The steel liner was designed considering the maximum design temperature and a dif ferential temperature between the tank / liner and the tank's t.ontents.
- 2) The liners were fabricated and erected in accordance with the ASME H&PV Code, Section VIII, and thermal stresses were evaluated using the rules of the ASME H&PV Code, Section IIL, Subsection NE.
Amendment No. 15 9.5.4-7
'SHNPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.4-l'(Cont'd).
DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL STORAGE 15 SYSTEM COMPONENT DESIGN DATA,
- 5. Valves Design Pressure, psig 100 Design _ Temperature, F 125
. Material ~ Carbon Steel Codes ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3, NA & ND 3500 Salsmic Category I
' h. Piping
-Design Pressure, psig. 100 Design Temperature, F 125 Material Carbon Steel-Codes ASHE B&PV Code, Section III, Class 3, NA & ND 3600 I
Seismic , Category l I l'
- Design Basis Fuel Oil Consumption = 445 Gal x 24 Hr x 8 days 15
= 85,400 Gal. Diesel-Hr Day E
Amendment No. 15 i 9.5.4-8 t i i-
m
)
l Sl!NPP FSAR l TABLE 9.5.4-2 1
' SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS FOR DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM , g l
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences Fuel Ott Storage Tank Rupture The redundant system (i.e. Train A and B) is capable of tolerating the passive- . 15 failure of one fuel ott storage I tank due to the fact that the redundant diesel generator is not supplied 15 from the same tank. l 15 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Pump fails Fuel transfer capability to one to start diesel generator will be lost. Since redundant, independent diesel generator trains are provided the failure of any component in one 15 train will not preclude the availability of at Icast one diesel. Pump fails Day Tank high-high level signal to stop closes solenoid inlet valve to prevent overflow. Fuel Oil Transfer Piping Piping Same as pump fails to start. Rupture Fuel Oil Transfer Valves Valves fail Same as pump fails to start. to open Fuel Oil Day Tank Rupture Same as pump fails to start. C 9.5.4-9. Amendment No. 15 -
SHNPP FSAR 9.5.5 DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM 9.5.5.1 Design Basis The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System is designed to: a) provide full load cooling to the diesel engines in order to maintain proper operating temperatures.under all loading conditions, b) withstand Safr Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) loads without loss of function, c) assure that a single active failure of any system component, assuming a loss of offsite power, cannot result in a complete loss of functio,nal capability of the diesel generators, and d) maintain the diesel generator cooling water in a warm condition to facilitate starting. The dies'le generator jacket water heat exchanger is designed to Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I requirements. Compliance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.68 is described in Section 1.8. 9.5.5.2 System Description The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System is shown on Figure 9.5.5-1. Component design parameters are given in Table 9.5.5-1.' Each diesel engine is provided with a separate closed loop cooling water system. This system is a forced circulation cooling water type to directly remove heat from the engine by means of Jacket water. The closed loop system is designed and supplied by the equipment manufacturer and includes an engine driven jacket water pump, standpipe and heat exchanger with the required interconnecting piping. The closed loop subsystem is equipped with an electric immersion heater and a motor-driven keep-warm circulating pump which maintains the engine in a ready-to-start condition. The tube side of the heat exchanger is supplied with cooling water from the Emergency Service Water System. (The Service Water System is described in Section 9.2.1 and those portions pertaining to the diesel generator are shown in Figure 9.5.2-2). The standpipe is initially filled by the potable water supply. The jacket cooling water circulating pump is an engine driven centrifugal pump, designed to provide cooling water during all diesel engine loadings. The pump draws water f rom the bottom of the standpipe and discharges through the heat exchanger before entering the diesel engine cooling passages. The standpipe serves two purposes: it is the storage tank for the system, and it absorbs the changes in cooling water volume as the diesel engine heats up and cools down. Makeup to the system is from the potable water supply. Normal water level in the standpipe is above the highest point in the engine (refer to FSAR 5 Section 9.5.5.3). A three-way temperature controlled valve controls the flow through the heat exchanger to maintain the required water temperature, (170 F to 180 F) during diesel generator operation. l l 1 9.5.5-1 Amendment No. 5
SHNPP FSAR During periods of diesel generator standby, the jacket water cooling system is automatically maint'ained at 150 F by means of an electric jacket water keep-warm heater, jacket water keep-warm thermostat, and a motor driven jacket ' water keep-ware pump (see Figure 9.5.5-1). High and low temperature alares monitor the Jacket water temperature and the " keep ware" pump is tripped automatically upon start of the engine. The jacket water heater is provided with power f rom a non-safety power distribution panel in the diesel generator building. Engine cooling water system design precludes trapping of air within the engine spaces. Vents are provided in the jacket water cooling system standpipe in order to assure that all spaces are filled with water. Provisions are 5 provided to treat the jacket water by adding or removing chemicals. Corrosion is controlled by utilizing potassium chromate, within limits specified by the manufacturer, and maintaining water pH. Sodium hydroxide and sodium hypochloride will be used to control pH and organic fouling, respectively. These chemicals are compatible with the diesel generator cooling water system materials and are in conformance with the engine manufacturer's recommendations. The jacket water heater is conservatively sized and will maintain jacket water at 150 F when the room ambient temperature drops to a minimum of 50 F. The minimum room temperature of 50 F will be maintained by two electric unit heaters and is based on an outside air temperature of -2 F. A description of the Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System is provided in FSAR Section 9.4.5. Freezing of the jacket water is precluded by the addition of an antifreeze compound ethylene glycol, which is recommended by the manufacturer and is compatible with the diesel generator cooling water system materials. The total heat rejection at 110 percent load from the jacket water heat exchanger is 18,078,456 Btu /hr based on 95 F Emergency Service Water maximum inlet temperature. The heat exchanger is designed to a duty of 20,662,000 Btu /hr. 9.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System is designed to have adequate
- capability to carry away the waste heat from diesel generator units under all loading and ambient conditions. The diesel generator is capable of '
operating fully loaded without secondary coolirg for a minimum of one minute. Sufficient water is contained in the engine and standpipe to absorb the heat generated during this period. The normal supply of cooling water for the diesel generator is the normal service water ' pump. Upon loss of of fsite power the emergency service water pump will supply cooling water , to the diesel generator af ter a period of 20-25 seconds. The Diesel Generator vendor, Transamerica De Laval, ran a continuous 24 hour load test on a diesel engine-generator set similar to Shearon Harris' unit. 5 The test engine ran for 22 hours at 100 percent load, followed by two (2) hours at 110 percent load. Test indicated that less than three (3) gallons of water was lost due to evaporation, boil off, and minor leaks. l I 9.5.5-2 Amendment No. 5
l SHNPP FSAR ; 1 1 iThe NPSH ' requirement for the engine jacket water pump correspon'ds to a minimum { standpipe level of 53 1/16 in. Normal water level is at 212 3/4 in. and low ! water level alarm is at 185 1/2 in. Assuming a standpipe water level of 186 1/2 in. at start of seven (7) days of continuous _100 percent load operation, 5 approximately 400 gallons of water is available between elevation 186 1/2 in. and 53 1/16 in. The standpipe, with a capacity of 400 gallons, provides more
'than adequate water to maintain the required pump NPSH and make-up for seven days lof continuous operation.
All components of the Diesel Generator Cooling Water System are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. The jacket water heat exchanger and connections to the Emergency Service Water System are also designed to Safety Class 3 requirements. Failure of -any non-Seismic Category I otructures and components will not affect the safety related performance of the system. The diesel engine mounted cooling water system piping was designed, manufactured, 5 and inspected in accordance with ASTM standards. Each diesel generator has its heat exchanger's tube side connected to the respective emergency service water system train. Therefore, a single failure of a component, or the loss' of a cooling source will not reduce the safety related functional performance capabilities of the system. The jacket water stan.dpipe is provided with low level instrumentation for leak detection. In addition each diesel generator room is equipped with a sump and sump pu'ap to collect and dispose of leaking fluids within the Diesel Generator Building. The sump pumps are automatically actuated on high sump
- level. Pump operation is annunciated in the Control Room.
This system is housed in a Seismic Category I Structure (Diesel-Generator ' Building) that is capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and missiles. As shown on i Figures 1.2.2-86 and 1.2.2-87, each diesel generator is located in a separate room. Protection against postulated piping failures in high and
; moderate energy fluid systems is discussed in Section 3.6.
9.5.5.4 Testing and Inspection
- Testing of the diesel generator is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1. All instrumentation, which is provided to monitor the cooling water temperature,
, pressure, standpipe water level and to alarm abnormal water jacket temperature, will receive annual calibration and inspection to verify
- ' their operability and accuracy.
9 The cooling water in the closed loop system is periodically analyzed to monitor its condition and treated as required to maintain its quality. 9.5.5.5 Instrumentation Application The following alarm points with local annunciation are provided in the Diesel Generator Cooling Water System for each diesel generator: { a a) Jacket water inlet high/ low temperature j- b) Jacket water outlet high/ low temperature I 9.5.5-3 Amendment No. 5 1
SHNPP FSAR c) jacket water high temperature trip d) standpipe low level e) jacket water pressure f) Jacket water low pressure trip Jacket water pressure switch (PS-22C) and jacket water low pressure trip (PS-21C) are separate pressure switches which are connected to a common process tap (refer to Figure 9.5.5-1). Pressure settings for jacket water pressure switch is 12 psi and decreasing (alarm point), jacket water low pressure trip switch is 10 psi and decreasing. Operation of any of the above mentioned local alarms is indicated by annunciation on the Diesel Generator Control Panel and also " trip" or
" trouble" alarms on the Main Control Board. In addition, pressure and temperature devices are provided for local indication and thermocouples are provided for remote indication of temperature. Temperature settings for Jacket water low temperature inlet / outlet alarm switch actuation is 140 F 5 decreasing respectively. This alarm is functional only during the diesel generator operational mode. In addition, temperature settings for the jacket water high temperature inlet / outlet alarm switch actuation is 175 F increasing and 190 F increasing respectively. One thermocouple is placed in the piping between the return header and standpipe (jacket water outlet high/ low temperature) and the second thermocouple is placed in the piping between the heat exchanger and the diesel engine (Jacket water inlet high/ low temperature). A high temperature of 200 F will trip the diesel generator if an engineered safety feature signal is not present. , The jacket water low pressure trip is designed to be an anticipatory trip to protect the diesel from a loss of cooling water if the diesel is started by a
- non-emergency start. This trip is not functional if the diesel receives an automatic, emergency start signal.
?
i 9.5.5-3a Amendment No. 5
SHNPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.5-1 6ksidN"pil0diETI'i$ ' Ydll"D'itSYT"6E'NifAT6it"C6d'I'f$d' Vii"Ei SUBSYSTEM s't'iddpTfi Capacity, gal. 733 tEgYii"6slVii"fidEii~ ffiiir"l diIfi _ 1_, Flow, gpa 2000 Total dynamic head, ft. 70 JEcViE ViEe'i'iGiif 'llifi"ItiiFii Power, 103 75 voltage, v 480 V AC 3EcEiY MiYdi'Editii Quantity 1
$Ee'ff thVi Flow, gpa 1800 1250 Discharge pressure, peig 75 75 Temperature, Inlet, F 175 95 Temperature, Exit, F 152 128 Code ASME Section III TEMA Class R 9.5.5-4 Amendment No. 2 u
.SHNPP FSAR 9.5.6 DIESEL GENERATOR AIR STARTING SYSTEM 9.5.6.1 -Design Bases The~ Diesel Generator Air Starting System is designed to the following bases:
a) Each starting air receiver will supply sufficient compressed air to crank the cold diesel' engine five times without recharging the receiver. Each cranking cycle brings the diesel generator up to a speed of 200 rpm.
-b) Operate under the same environmental conditions as the diesel generator which it serves.
c) The portions of the air starting system necessary for emergency operation meet Seismic Category 1, Safety Class 3 requirements. d) Complete redundancy so that in the case of a single faiure of any component, the diesel generator can be safely started. The air receivers, 3' ping and valves from the receivers up to the diesel engine are designea to Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I requirements (refer to Table 3.2.1-1). 9.5.6.2 System Description The Diesel Generator Air Starting System is shown on Figure 9.5.6-1. The general arrangement diagram for the Diesel Generator Air Starting System is shown on Figures 1.2.2-86 and 1.2.2-87. There are no interconnections among the systems serving separate diesel generators. A physically separate air starting system is provided for each of the diesel generators. The starting air system consists of two AC motor driven air compressors, two air dryers and two air receivers each capable of five cold start attempts. The system is designed such that failure of one receiver will not-interfere with the ability of the remaining receiver to deliver the required quantity of air. Each compressor is capable of recharging both receivers within thirty minutes af ter a discharge corresponding to five ; starting attempts. Each air receiver is equipped with an air dryer and tank l drainage capability. The two compressor discharges for.each diesel engine feed both air receivers. Therefore, either compressor has the capability of filling both receivers. Each air receiver is equipped with a safety valve (set at 275 psig), a drain valve, and isolation valves. The air receivers are maintained at a nominal pressure of 250 psig by automatic starting of the compressor at 200 psig receiver pressure, and stopping at 250 psig. Each air receiver is connected to the diesel engine starting mechanism independently. Upon receipt of a diesel generator start signal, all start air aduission valves are opened simultaneously, delivering air to the air distributors and the individual air start valves in proper sequence, admitting starting air directly into the engine cylinders for cranking. Adequa te 9.5.6-1 L ,, ,
SHNPP FSAR cranking power is obtained from any one of_the start air admission valves. A description of diesel generator starting signals is found in Section 8.3.1.1.2.14. The starting air dryer has two desiccant filled towers and provides air at a design dewpoint of -40 F. One tower is used to dry the inlet air while the other tower is being reactiviated. An automatic control system reverses the tower's operation and provides continuous drying of the starting air. Regeneration is accomplished by depressurizing the tower and then purging it with a small amount of dry outlet air at atmospheric pressure. Air flow is upward during drying and downward during reactivation. This limits moisture 5 accumulation to the inlet side of the dryer and provides the driest desiccant at the outlet end of each tower to assure a maximum drying of the air. The dessicant will retain its ability to absorb moisture for a long period of time under normal service so that generally no maintenance of the towers is required. The dryer is provided with a pre-filter and an af ter-filter to prevent , contamination of the desiccant and ensure that starting air is free of desiccant carried over from the drying tower. Air supply to each receiver is provided by a safety-related motor driven air compressor and is isolated from the receiver by a safety grade check valve. ] The engine is started by the air in the tank. The compressor is used to maintain pressure in the tank by pressure switches provided on the air receivers. Each air receiver is capable of starting the engine at least five
- times without being pressurized by the compressor.
i 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation _ Each Diesel Generator Air Starting System is capable of supplying a sufficient quantity of air from its associated air receivers to ensure a successful starting operation of the diesel engine independent of normal plant power sources. Each engine has redundant and independent air starting facilities of adequate starting capacity. Each engine can be started by either one or both of the dual train pressurized air starting systems. These air starting systems do
- not depend on normal plant power or any other plant system for starting pewer once the air receivers are charged. However, safety related 125V DC power of the same division is provided for initial control, field flashing and solenoid i valve operation. The safety related 125V DC power is discussed in Section 8.3.2. Alarms are provided to alert the operating personnel if the a'ir l receiver pressure falls below the minimum allowable value specified by the manufacturer. A drain valve for each air receiver receiver is provided to periodically blowdown accumulated moisture and foreign material.
The air starting systems for one diesel are physically and electrically separated from those for the other diesel to assure that no single failure in an air-starting system can lead to a loss of function of the other diesel engine. l l 9.5.6-2 Amendment No. 5 l
, . . , .- - _=_ _- . - - - . . . .
N
'SHNPP FSAR Thefstarting air system. piping. mounted on the, diesel engines was'designe'd, 5
. . manufactured, and inspected in accordance with ASTM standards.
- g .The essential portions.of this system external to the engine necessary for' i emergency operation, which consist of air receivers, valves, instrumentation
< L and associated piping are designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements and ASME Section Ill Code Class ' 3. This essential portion is housed within a Seismic Category I structure to protect the system from p . extreme' natural phenomena. Failure of any non-Seismic Category 1 structure or component will'not affect the . safety related performance iof the system. Protection against postulated piping failures in high and moderate energy fluid system breaks is discussed in Section 3.6. t 9.5.6.4 Tests and Inspection l Testing of the diesel generator is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1. The starting air compressors for each diesel engine are periodically test-started to assure continued operability. Inspection and scheduled maintenance will be performed
' periodically using the manuf acturer's recommendations and procedures and in accordance with Chapter 16.
The starting air dryer desiccant will be periodically inspected for evidence of deterioration and will be replaced when it no longer meets the manufacturer's specifications. The dryer pre-filters and after-filters will be inspected as part of normal maintenance procedures and cleaned or replaced I as needed. 5 1 Specific testing, calibration, and inspection procedures and their frequencies will be developed for the diesel air starting system by utilizing the manufacturers' recommendations, the relevant regulatory requirements, and included in the plant preventative maintenance program. r For compliance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.68 as related to preoperational and start up testing of the Diesel Generator Air Starting System, refer to Section 1.8. 9.5.6.5 Instrumentation Application The following instruments are provided in the Diesel Generator- Air Starting System for each diesel generator: o a) Pressure switches on each air receiver which control the operation of
- the corresponding compressor, and i
b) local pressure indicator on each air receiver. The following alarm points are provided in the air starting system, with local l annunciation on the Engine Control Panel. l- l L a) Air starting system low pressure (each receiver), I l b). _Barring device engaged. When the barring device is engaged for maintenance, the diesel engine cannot start. I r 9.5.6-3 Amendment No. 5 f \ -.-,..-,\
m: SHNPP FSAR Operation of any of these alarms is indicated by a " trouble" alarm in the Control Room. The following indicators are provided. on the diesel generator engine control panel (local): a) Starting air pressure (left bank) b) Starting air. pressure (right bank) s 9.5.6-3a
SHNPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.6-1 DESIGN DATA - DIESEL ENGINE STARTING SYSTEM COMPONENTS Air Compressor Quantity 2 Type Two Stage Piston Capacity, scfm 88 Discharge pressure, psig 250 Discharge temperature, F 140 Approx. Speed, rpm 790 Code , ANSI N45.2.2 Driver Type Electric AC Motor Motor Rating 30 HP, 3 Phase, 460V AC, 60 Hz Air Dryer Quantity 2 Type Heaterless Desiccant Dryer Flow rate, scfm 76.1 . Pressure operating / design, psig 0-275 Operating /275 Design Temperature operating / design, F 70-140 Operating /300 Design Drying Chambers, quantity 2 Desiccant Activated . Alumina Dew Point, F -40 5 i Air Receiver Quantity 2 Type Vertical-cylinder with Dished Head Capacity, cu. ft. 305 Diameter, in. 60 Height, ft. 18-3/4 approx. (including lifting eyes) Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, F 250 Material SA 515, Gr 70, Shell and Heads Code ASME Section III Code, Class 3 Piping and Valves l Pressure, operating / design, psig 250 operating /300 design Temperature, operating / design, F 140 operating /400 design Material ASME SA-106 Gr. A I l 9.5.6-4 Amendment No. 5
SENPP FSAR 9.5.7' DIESEL GENERATOR LUBRICATION SYSTEM
~
9.5.7.1 Design Basis The Diesel Generator Lubrication System (DGLS) is designated to the following bases: a) To provide essential lubrication to the components of the diesel generator unit during all modes of operation. b) To have the ability to maintain the required quality of the oil during engine operation. c) .To automatically maintain the temperature of the lubricating oil above a minimum value, d) To ensure that a single active failure cannot cause loss of both diesel generators. e) Tb preclude the possibilities of damage'due to natural phenomenon and pipe rupture. The components required for safety are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. 9.5.7.2 System Description The Diesel Generator Lubrication System is shown in Figure 9.5.7-1. The lubrication system piping mounted on the diesel engine was designed, 5 manufactured, and inspected in accordance with ASTM standards. Design parameters for system components are provided in Table 9.5.7-1. The system consists of the following equipment (per diesel engine generator set): a) .one engine driven pump, b) one motor driven standby pump (motor driven auxiliary lube oil pump), c) one lube oil cooler, d) three lube oil strainers, e) two lube oil filters (one duplex filter and one keep warm filter), f) one lube oil keep warm pump g) one lube oil prelube electric heater (lube oil heater), and h) piping, valves and instrumentation l The main circulating lube oil pump is an engine driven screw type pump which takes its suction from a lube oil sump tank located on the auxiliary module, through a strainer and circulates oil while the diesel engine is running. 9.5.7-1 Amendment No. 5
e SHNPP FSAR The tube oil is pumped through the tube oil cooler, filters and strainer hofore it flows to the diesel engine bearings. The filter is capable of filtering out particulates >10p. The tube oil system is equipped with two full capacity tube. oil filters with replaceable cartridges. Change of these cartridges can be ef fected while the engine is operating. Heat la rejected via the lube oil cooler, to the Diesel Generator Cooling Water System discussed in Section 9.5.5. The lubricating oil header pressure is controlled by a pressure regulating valve 5 located in the pump discharge piping. It is set at 50 psig, senses header pressure, and regulates the bypass volume to maintain header pressure at 50 psig. During periods of diesel generator standby, the lubricating oil is kept at the proper temperature (150 F) by circulating it with a motor driven keep warm 5l pump through an automatically controlled electric heater located in the lube oil sump tank. This assures optimum viscosity and lubricating properties and provides for pre-start lubrication. The ASME Section III 100 percent capacity auxiliary lube oil pump is a Class IE motor driven back-up to the main engine driven lube oil pump. This pump is required to operate only when the engine is running and the main engine driven lube oil pump has failed. The auxiliary lube oil pump is 5 controlled via pressure switches located in the lube oil piping. The auxiliary lube oil pump is not required for an emergency start. Power for the auxiliary tube oil pump motor is provided from the 480V safety related MCC located in the diesel generator building, so that power to the auxiliary lube oil pump will be available during a loss of of fsite power. The lube oil system is designed to preclude the entry of deleterious material into the system, having a blind bolted flange padlocked to the charging terminal. To prevent excessive wearing of the turbocharger bearingo due to lack of lubrication before the engine starts, a tap from the keep warm system provides a slow drip of oil onto the bearings. Admission of air into the lube oil system is prevented by the coolers being located below the generator lube oil level. The starting sequences for a normal start 'and an emergency start are the same except that most of the trips associated with the automatic safety shutdown system are disarmed after an emergency start. Engine overspeed, generator dif ferential, and generator bus faults are the only trips active in the emergency mode. 9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation The Diesel Generator Lubrication System is capable of supplying sufficient lubrication to the diesel generators under all loading conditions. All components of this system required for safety are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. 3 The instrumentation, service, location, and description of alarms provided for monitoring the diesel engine lubrication oil system are provided in Table 9.5.7-2 If a failure in the system prevents the operation of its associated diesel generator, the remaining diesel generator is not affected. 9.5.7-2 Amendment No. 5
SHNPP FSAR
.Each Diesel Generator Lubrication System is housed in the same Seismic Category T structure as its own diesel generator and, therefore, is independent and physically separated from the redundant diesel generator system (Figures 1.2.2-86 and 1.2.2-87). Failure of any non-Seismic Category I structures and components will not affect the safety related performance of the system.
The system is protected from tornado winds, externally generated missiles, and flooding by virtue of its location .inside the Diesel Generator Building. As each lube oil system associated with its diesel generator is located in that diesel generator room with no interconnecting piping, missiles generated by one diesel generator will not damage the lube oil system associated with the other diesel generator. Relief valves, relief doors, and crankcase vents have been provided in order to prevent crankcase explosions and to mitigate the l5 consequences should such an unlikely event occur. Protection against postulated piping failures in high and moderate energy fluid systems is discussed in Section 3.6. The Diesel Generator Lubrication System is designed by the diesel generator manuf acturer. Design parameters for system components are provided in Table 9.5.7-1. The lube oil sump tank is provided with low level instrumentation for leak detection. In addition, each diesel generator room is equipped with a sump and sump pump to collect and dispose of leaking fluids within the Diesel Generator Building. The sump pumps are automatically actuated on high sump level. Pump operation is annunciated in the Control Room. Oil may be safely added to the system via the sump tank while the engine is 5 running or with the engine stopped. 9.5.7.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements For the initial preparation for operation, the system will be flushed and then all filters used during the flushing process will be either cleaned or discarded and replaced. Testing of the diesel generator is discussed in Section 8.3.1.1. The Diesel Generator Lubrication System is operationally tested during the startup and checkout of the diesel generator. Lube oil pressure and temperature are monitored to ensure operability of the engine driven pump. Operation of the lube oil keep warm and sump removal pump and electric heater are evidence of their operability. Inspection and testing of the system can be performed without disturbing normal plant operations. Representative oil samples will be submitted to a qualified laboratory for analysis on a periodic basis to ensure that the engine manufacturer's specifications are met. The following tests will be conducted oil viscosity, water / glycol contamination, neutralization value, pentane and 5 bezine insolubles and spectrographic analysis. A review of these test results by Carolina Power and Light, the oil supplier, and the testing laboratory will be the basis for deciding whether or not the oil needs to be changed. The diesel generator lubrication system sensors will be calibrated on an annual basis. The reliability of the electrical circuitry, with the 9.5.7-3 Amendment No. 5 w-
SHNPP FSAR associated alaons, interlocks, and trip activation signals, will be tested on 5 the same f requency as the associated instrument by shmulating the alaom/ trip condition. 9.5.7.5 Instrumentation Application The following local alarm points are provided in the lube oil systen for each
~
diesel generator: a) low oil pressure b) low oil pressure trip
~
c) low oil temperature; in/out d) high oil temperature; in/out e) high oil temperature trip - ' f) high differential pressure across filter J g)
~
high differential pressure across strainer h) low oil level in the sump
- 1) low turbocharger oil pressure; lef t/right j) low turbocharger oil pressure trip k) auxiliary lube oil pump on
- 1) high crankcase pressure trip Operation of any of the alarms is indicated by " trouble" or " trip" alarms in the Control Room.
In addition, the following pressure and temperature switches are provided for tripping the diesel engine unless the diesel generator is operating due to a loss of off site power or an engineered safety f eature actuation signal (ESFAS): a) high oil temperature, b) low oil pressure c) low turbocharger oil pressure, right or lef t 4 d) high crankcase pressure , The following pressure and temperature devices are provided f or local i
- indication. Theosocouples are located downstream of the filter and crankcase
! f or remote monitoring. a) lube oil pressure 4 9.5.7-4 Amendment No. 5
i I SHNPP FSAR 1 i 1 b) differential pressure-lube oil filter -
. c) turbocharger oil pressure; left/right '
d) . crankcase pressure
- e) lube oil sump tank level s
s e
+
i I i i I l ! I 1 9.5.7-4a - I Amendment No. 5
SHNPP FSAR , TABLE 9.5.7-1 DESIGN PARAMETERS FOR DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL SYSTEM COMPONENTS Engine Driven Lube Oil Pump Type Screw Flow, gpa 60 Discharge Pressure, psig 50 Lube Oil Yeep Wara Pump Type Positive Displacement, Screw Flow, gpa 99 Discharge Pressure, psig 20 Motor Rating 7.5 HP, 3 Phase, 480V AC, 60 Hz Speed, rpm 1800 Motor Driven Auxiliary Lube Oil Fump Type Positive Displacement, Screw Flow, gpa 575 Discharge Pressure, psig 85 Motor Rating 60 HP, 3 Phase, 480V AC, 60 Hz Speed, rpm 1200 Lube Oil Heater (Lube oil Prelube Electric Heater) Quantity 1 Power, kW 50 Voltage V 480 V AC Lube Oil Coolers Quantity 1 Shell Tube Flow, gpa 500 800 Discharge Pressure, psig 75 75 Temperature, Inlet F 185 152 Temperature, Exit F 158.7 160.4 l5 Lube Oil Strainer Quantity 3 Pressure, psig 100 (Operating) Flow, gpm 500 Temperature, F 148 9.5.7-5 Amendment No. 5 m !
SIDIPP FSAR TABLE 9.5.7-1 (continued) Lube Oil Filter, Full Flow Quantity 1 Duplex Pressure, peig 100 (Operating) Flow, gym 500 2 Temperature, F 200 Filtration 10 Micron Lube 011 valves a way plug Pressure, psig 100 + 10% (Operating) Temperature, F 185 b - Check Pressure,,psig 150 Temperature F 185 Code ANSI - 316.1 c - Ball Pressure, psig 0 - 50 + 10% (Operating) Temperature, F 185
-1 9.5.7-6 Amendment No. 2 i
i
TABLE 9.5.7-2 Annunciation f or t%e Diesel Engine Lubrication Oi l System Instrumen-Number
- Service location Description PS-25C 1.ow Lube Oi l Wessee Engine Control %nel Annunciates on the Diesel Engine Control %nel and redundant annunciation -
appears on the Annunciator Light Box on the Main Control Board. Tils
' alarm annunciates on the MCB under a trouble signal. The alarm is actuated when f alling lube of I pressure reaches a set value of 43 osig.
PS-42C l.ow Lube Oi l Pessa*e Engine Control %nel Annunciates on the Diesel Engine Control %nel and redundant Trip annunciation appears on the Annunciator Light Box on the Main Con + ol Boar d. This alarm annunciates when the diesel generator trips on los tube oi l pressure. Annunciation will appear under the %nerator Trio" window. The trip is actuated when f alling tube oli pressure reacSes 30 5 e psig.
. tn m
N/A l.ow Lube Oi l Teocers+urw Annunclates on the Diesel Engine Control Nnel and redundant E b IN/DUT annunciation appears on the Annunciator Light Box on the Maln Cont ol ' Board. This alarm annunciates on the MCB under the annunciator mlndow ) f or generator trip. The alarm is actuated when the lube oil temperature k In reaches 140*F and temperature out reaches 140*F f alling. N/A High Lube Oi l Te cerature Annunciates on the Diesel Engine Control Nnel and redundant IN/00T annunciation appears on Annunciator Light Box on the Main Control Board. This alarm annunciates on the MCB under the " Generator Trouble" annunciator window. The alarm is actuated when the tube olI tempe ature reaches a high temperature value of 175'F rising (in) and 190T risthg (out). g
- EBASC:'s or Wndor's tag number e
D
.G D
rr Z w
TABLE 9.5.7-2 (Continued) Instrument Number" Service Location Description PS-16C High Lube Oi l Mounted on Engine Annunciates on the Diesel Engine Control %nel and redundant Temperature Trio annunciation appears on the Annunciator Light Box on the MCS. This alarm annunciates under the " Generator Trouble" annunciator window. The trip is actuated when the tube of I temperature reaches a high temperature value of 200'F and rising. A P-4 High Dif ferential Engine Control Panel Annunciates on the Olesel Engine Control Panel and redundant Pressure Across Filter annunciation appears on the Annunciator Light Box on the MC8 This alarm annunciates under the " Generator Trouble" annunciator window. The alarm is actuated when the dif ferential pressure across the filter reaches 20 psig and rising. ? tn ? A P-1 High Di f f erentia l Engine Control Panel Annunciates on the Diesel Engine Control Panel and redundant $ y Pressure Across Strainer annunciation appears on the Annunclator Light Box on the MC8. This alarm @ annunclates under the " Generator Trouble" annunciator window. This alarm is actuated when the dif ferential pressure across the strainer reaches 20 g psig and rising. LS-2 tow Lube Oi l tavel in Engine Control Penel Annunciates on the Diesel Engine Control Panel and redundant the Sump annunciation appears on the Annunciator Light Box on the MCB. This-switch annunciates under the " Generator Trouble" annunciator window. The alarm is actuated on low sump level.
" EBASCO's or Wndor's tag number k
u o. a rt 2 .U v.
T4BLE 9.5.7-2 (Continued) Instrument Nu mber
- Service location Description PS-20C # S-4 3C ' l.ow Turocharger Oil Engine Contro l Pane t Annunciates on the Olesel Engine Control Panel and redundant Pressure left/right annunclation appears on the Annunciator Light Box on the MCB.
This alarm annunciates on tne MC8 under the " Generator Trouble" annunciator window. R essure setting for alarm actuation is 20 psig f alling lef t/rlght respectively. The trip is actuated at 15 psig f alling. PS-19C Low Turbocharger 01 i Engine Control %nel Annunciates on the Diesel Engine Control Phnel and redundant Pressure annunciation appears on Annunciator Light Box on the MCB. The alarm annunciates under the " Generator Trouble" annunciator window. The alarm Is actuated when the turbocharger oil pressure reaches a low value of 15 5-psig and f alling. e. tn N /A Auxillary Lube 011 Pump Engine Control Panel Annunciates on the Diesel Engine Control Panel and redundant annunciation., N 1 appears on the Annunciator Ligit Box on the MC8 Status lights Indicate
- pump activity (start - red, stop green, auto - amber). The alarm for @
~
the auxillary lube of 1 pump ooeration wl11 appear under the " Generator . k Tr i p" annunciator window. PS-27C High Crankcase Engine mounted Annunciates on the Diesel Engine Control Phnel and redundant Pressure Trir, annunciation appears on the Annunciator Light Box on the MC8 The alarm for high crankcase pressure is annunciated under the " Generator Trouble" annunciator window. The alarm is actuated at .3 to .5 psig and rising above a present value. The trip is actuated when the crankcase pressure reachss .3 psig and rising, y
- E34SCO's or Wendor's tag number n
C. R
- =
rt Z w __ _m
SHNPP F3AR
- 9. 'i . H . D i v. SKI. .:KNKtM r0R COMIMISTION AIM INTAKS AND KtlAllST SYSTK1 9.4.H.1 t h -s i a,n ,Il yin, ,
The Dir tel Gener;stor Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System is designed to nupply adequato combustion air to the diesel generators and to exhaust the comlnist lon products to the atmosphere. As shown on Figures 1.2.2-86 and 1.2.2-87, the combustion air intakes are arranged in a manner that affords protection from external missiles and high winds. The combustion air intakes and exhausts are designed to withstand safe shutdown earthquake and tornado forces. The system meets minimum safety requirements assuming a single failure. 9.5.8.2 System Description The diesel -generator combustion air intakes and exhausts are shown on Figure 9.5.5-2. The combustion air intakes are composed of intake screens (bird screens) located on the exterior wall of Diesel Generator Building at Elevation 297 ft.
.ind lutake ducts located in the missile protection wall behind the bird screens at Elevation 307 f t. The vertical offset between the bird screens , and intake ducts acts to protect the combustion air intakes from external missile damage. The intake ducts vent to a plenum formed by the floor at Mievation 292 ft., the roof at Elevation 312 ft., the vertical walls forming the exhaust silencer enclosure and the vertical diesel generator building walls extending f rom Elevation 292 f t. to 312 ft. A dry type intake filter and silencer for each diesel generator is installed indoors with intake piping of adequate size to prevent excessive pressure drop. The exhaust piping from each diesel generator exhaust outlet to the exhaust silencer is located above Mlevation 279 ft. The exhaust silencer is located at Elevation 292 ft.
Exhaust piping f rom the silencer exits the Diesel Generator Building through a missile protected enclosure above roof Elevation 312 ft. The exhaust piping is of sufficient size to prevent excessive back pressure. The engine is provided with an 8 in, non-safety, non-seismic atmospheric vent to prevent 5 huildup of crankcase pressure. Refer to Figures 1.2-86 and 1.2-87 for equipmont location. Expansion joints for exhaust and intake piping are provided to protect the orpii pmen t from forces due to thermal expansion or vibration. 9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation The combustion air intake to each diesel generator is designed to Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category 1 requirements (see Section 3.2), protected from tornado generated missiles, and shielded from direct wind, rain or snow. The systems are designed such that a single active failure in an engine combustion air intake or exhaust system will not lead to the loss of f, unction of more than one diesel generator. These intake and exhaust systems are independent, and they are sized and physically arranged such that no degradation of engine function will be experienced when the diesel generator set is required to operate continuously at the maximum rated power output. The combustion air intake system is provided with filters in order to reduce airborne particulate material over the entire time period that emergency power is required, assuming the maximum airborne particulate concentration at the combustion air 9.5.8-1 Amendment No. 5 L
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SHNPP FSAR lutake.- The combustion products exhanst system is designed to Safety Class 3 an.I, Seismic Category I requirements as described . tn Table 3.2.1-1. The
-exhaust. system piping is fabricated and' designed-in accordance with ANSI H il. l. . A 10.CFR 50 Appendix B QA program has been applied to the exhaust
. system. The hot gases are exhausted approximately 30 ft. above and 100 ft.
lateralty from the air intakes, thus avoiding the possibility of recirculation-of diesel combustion products. 15 The air intakes for each ' diesel generator compartment are located at Elevation 292.00 ft.'in the east wall of the diesel generator butiding. This air is supplied through the combustion air intake filter' located on Elevation 292.00 ft. to the diesel-generator located on Elevation 261.00 ft. There are two exhaust ducts penetrating the west wall of the~ diesel generator compartment at about Elevation 280.0 ft. These ducts continue west from this walI to the vicinity of the west wall of the building, turn up at 90* piercing the concrete floors at Elevations 292.00 f t. and 312.00 ft., respectively, to terminate in separate exhanst plena. Each plenum exhausts to atmosphere through an opening located just under the roof at Elevation 327.00 ft. in-the west walI of the building. In the event of a fire in a diesel generator compartment coincident with a single fatture of the fire protection system, the hot air and smoke would he exhausted through the openings in the west wall of-the diesel generator hullding air exhaust plena which are at a higher elevation than that of the " air intakes located in the cast wall of the diesel generator butiding. In the event of-a fire in the diesel fuel oil day tank room, the heat and smoke f rom this area will he discharged f rom one of the plena described above. i Since air totake and exhaust openings are about 105 feet apart at opposite ends of the diesel generator butiding with hot air and smoke being discharged , at an elevation higher than the intake for the cooler alt, the combustion air for'the remaining diesel will not be degraded by a fire. Diesel generator exhaust piping is fabricated and tested in accordance with the requi rements of ANSI 331.1 and meets all Quality Assurance requirements of j Safety Class 3 piping. Intake piping is fabricated and tested in accordance . with ASMK Section Itt, Class 3 requirements. ' intake and exhaust system components (silencers, filters, and expansion joints) are manufactured in accordance with applicable industry standards and meet Setsmic Category I requirements. + ' To minimize the amount of concrete dust, the floors, walls, and ceilings on the inside of the diesel generator butiding will be painted or coated. See Sect ton 9.4.5.2.5 for other dust control measures. d 1% l r i l p Amendment No. 15 I I 9.5.8-2 t
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. .h 9.5.8-2a Amendment No. 15
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SHNPP FSAR-1 Jany chemical storage tank, the minimum oxygen concentration (18 percent by l g . volume) required for diesel engine operation would be maintained at the diesel
'l engine' combustion air intakes.
l l Protection against postulated piping failures in high and moderate energy fluid systems is discussed in Section 3.6. Failure of any non-Seismic Category I structures L and components will not affect the safety related performance of the system. The pressure drop due to a tornado, which is the lowest barometric pressure expected, is taken into consideration in the design of the diesel generator , air intake and exhaust flow. As stated in FSAR Section 2.3.1.2.1 the SHNPP site lies in Region I for Design Basis Tornado. For a Region I Design Basis Tornado the pressure drop is 3.0 psi and the rate of pressure drop is 2.0 psi /sec. The diesel generator building is designed to withstand the' 3 psi pressure drop
' in 1.5 seconds (rate 2 psi /sec) as a result of tornado. Interior walls are 5 designed for 2 psi differential pressure.
t i Transamerica-DeLaval, the manufacturer of the Shearon Harris diesel generator, has performed a test to evaluate the " Dynamic Performance of Enterprise Diesel Engine". The test results indicate no adverse effect on the performance of the diesel generator set due to a pressure drop of 3 psi in 1.5 seconds.
- 9.5.8.4 Test and Inspection To ensure the integrity of the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust subsystems, scheduled inspection will be performed as part of the overall
; engine performance check. All filters will be replaced in accordance with
, manufacturer's recommendation. J The Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System instrumentation will be calibrated annually. Testing of the system will occur with the 5 periodic tests of the emergency diesel generators per Regulatory Guide 1.108. For compliance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.68 as related to preoperational and start-up testing of the combustion air intake and exhaust subsystems, see Section 1.8.
, 9.5.8.5 Instrumentation Local . indicators are provided for the following combustion air and exhaust gas g parameters:
.a) Combustion Air Pressure - Combustion air pressure gauge located on the diesel generator control panel provides the operator with a visible means, without alarm or annunciation, of determining the perfor'mance of the turbocharger. No interlock is required.
5 b) Cylinder. Temperature (lef t bank, right bank) - Cylinder temperatures are determined during the operator's periodic inspection of the operation of the diesel generator. Temperatures for both banks of cylinders are obtained 9.5.8 Amendment No. 5 b
1 SHNPP FSAR by the operator turning the temperature controlled selector switch, which is mounted on the Diesel Generator Control Panel, to the desired cylinder for temperature investigation. No alarm, annunciation, or interlocks are required. c) Exhaust Manifold Temperature (lef t, right) - Exhaust manifold temperatures are determined during the operator's periodic inspection of the diesel generator. Temperatures for the left manifold and right manifold are obtained by the operator turning the temperature controlled selector switch, which is mounted on the Diesel Generator Control Ranel, to the desired exhaust 5 manifold for temperature investigation. No alarm, annunciation, or interlocks are required. The Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System instrumentation will be calibrated annually. Testing of the system will occur with the periodic tests of the emergency diesel generators per Regulatory Guide 1.108. None of the Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System instrumentation provide an alarm condition to alert the operator. An out-of-specification valve will present itself as a decrease in engine performance, i.e., less load carrying capability or uneven engine operation (increased vibration) which are monitored or alarmed at the local and remote control panels. These allow operator action to localize the source of the abnormal condition and to prevent damage to the diesel engine. i l l f I 9.5.8-4 Amendment No. 5
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Appendix 9.5A Fire Protection Hazards Analysis
S11NPP FSAR' APPENDIX 9.5A FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS TABLE OF CONTENTS ~ Title Page No. Appendix 9.5A.1 9.5A-1 Containment Building 15 I-C,-Containment Building. Appendix 9.5A.2. 9.5A-21 Reactor Auxiliary Butiding lI 15 l-A-ACP, Auxiliary Control (Panel) Room Appendix 9.SA.') 9.5A-25 Reactor Auxiliary Building 15 l-A-BAL, Reactor Auxiliary Building Balance Appen.lix 9.5A.4 9.5A-62 Reactor Auxiliary Building 15 l-A-BATA, Battery Room lA l-A-BATB, Battery Room IB Appendix 9.5A.5 9.5A-67 Reactor Auxiliary Butiding 15 l-A-CSKA, Cable Spreading Room 1A Appendix 9.5A.6 9.5A-72 i Reactor Auxillary Butiding l 15 l-A-CSRB, Cable Spreading Room IB Appendix 9.5A.7 9.5A-77 Reactor Auxiliary Building 15 l-A-EPA. F.lectrical Penetration Area IA Appendix 9.5A.8 9.5A-84 Reactor Auxiliary Building l 15 l-A-SWGRA, Switchgear Room lA . Appendix 9.5A.9 9.5A.-90 Reactor Auxiliary Building l 15 l-A-SUCRB, Switchgear Rocm IB Appendix 9.5A.10 9.5A-96 Reactor Auxiliary Building Balance 15 12-A-BAL, AnxiLiary Building Balance Appendlx 9.5A.I1 9.5A-106 Reactor Auxi11ary Butiding 1 12-A-CR, Control Room 15 I i Amendment No. 15 I l
SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A TABl.K OF CONTKNTS (Cont'd) , Title Page No. Appenitix _9.5A.12 9.5A-ll7 l e, Reactor Auxiliary Building 12-A-CRC, Control Room Complex . 15 Appendix 9.5A.13 9.5A-125 ) Reactor Auxiliary Butiding 12-A-flV & IR, Heating, Ventilating, and Instrument Repair Appendix 9.5A.14 9.5A-l32 Fuel Handling Building 5-F-BAL, Fuel llandling Building Balance l Appendix 9.5A.15 9.5A-143
, ,, l Fnot llandlin); Building 5-F B-CilF A , 5-F-3-CHFB, 5-F-3-DMN1, 5-F-3-DMN2, and 5-F-3-CliF-B AL Appendix 9.5A.16 9.5A-154 15l Fuel llandling Building 5-F-FPP, Fuel Handling Building Fuel Pool
! Appenitix 9.5A.17 9.5A-162 g r, Diesel Generator Building I-D-l)CA, Diesel Generator IA l-D-DGB, Diesel Generator 18 Appendix 9.5A.18 9.5A-178 g r, I)iesel Generatur Butiding . I-D-DTA, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank 1A Enclosure I-D-DTB, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank 1B Enclosure Appendix 9.5A.19 9.5A-184 Diesel Oil Storage Area 1-0-pA, Diesel Oil Pump Room lA l l-0-PB, Diesel Oil Pump Room 18 Appendix 9.5A.20 9.5A-189 15 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area l 12-0-TA, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1A and 2A 12-0-TB, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 18 and 2B Appendix 9.5A.21 9.5A-192 Intake Structure l 's 12-1-ESWPA, Emergency Service Water Pumps lA & 2A 12-1-KSWPB, Einergency Service Water Pumps 1B & 2B Appendix 9.5A.22 9.5A-197
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5-W-BAL 11 Amendment No. 15
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. APPENDIX 9.5A FIRE RAZARDS ' ANALYSIS LIST OF FIGURES F f t:llRE TITLE
- 9. 5A-l . Fire Protection Legend 9.5A-2 Fire ' Protection - Containment Building - Plan EL 221.00' and 236.00' 9.5A-3 Fire Protectio ~n - Containment Building - Plan EL 261.00' and 286.00' 9.5A-4 Fire Protection - Containment Building Sections - Sheet 1 9.5A-5 Fire Protection - Containment Building Sections - Sheet. 2 9.5A-6' Fire Protection - Reactor Auxiliary Building - Plan EL 190.00' and 216.00' 9.5A-7 Fire Protection - Reactor Auxiliary Building - Plan EL 236.00' 9.5A Fire Protection - Reactor Auxiliary Building - Plan EL 261.00' 9.5A-9 Fire Protection - Reactor- Auxiliary Building - Plan EL 286.00' 9.5A-10 Fire Protection - Reactor Auxiliary Building - Plan EL 305.00' 9.5A-ll Fire Protection - Tank Area Plans and Sections 9.5A-12 Fire Protection - Reactor Auxuliary Building - Sections -
Sheet 1 9.5A-13 Fire Protection - Reactor Auxiliary Building - Sections - Sheet 2 9.5A-14 Fire Protection - Fuel Handling Building - Plans - Sheet 1 9.5A-15 Fire Protection - Fuel Handling Building - Plans - Sheet 2 9.5A-16 Fire Protection - Reactor Auxiliary Building - Plan EL 190.00' and 216.00' 9.5A-17 Fire Protection - Reactor Auxiliary Building - Plan EL 216.00' iv Amendment No. 15 ! 1
.1 l
SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS LIST OF FIGURES (Gont'd) FIGURE TITLE 9.5A-18 Fire Protection - Fuel Handling Building - Sections - Sheet 1 9.5A-19 Fire Protection - Fuel Handling Building - Sections - Sheet 2 9.5A-20 Fire Protection - Fuel Handling Building - Sections - Sheet.3 9.5A-21 Fire Protection - Diesel Generator Building - Plans 9.5A-22 Fire Protection - Diesel Generator Building - Sections 9.5A-23 Fire Pro,tection - Diesel Oil Storage Tank Area Plan and Section 9.5A-24 Fire Protection - Waste Processing Building - Plan EL 211.00' and 216.00' 9.5A-25 Fire Protection - Reactor Auxiliary Building - Plan EL 216.00' 9.5A-26 Fire Protection - Waste Processing Building - Plan EL 236.00' 9.5A-27 Fire Protection - Waste Processing Building - Plan EL 261.00' 9.5A-28 Fire Protection - Reactor Auxiliary Building - Plan EL 261.00' 9.5A-29 Fire Protection - Waste Processing Building - Plan EL 276.00' 1 9.5A-30 Fire Protection - Waste Processing Building - Plan EL 286.00' and 291.00' 9.5A-31 Fire Protection - Waste Processing Building - Sections - Sheet 1 ' 9.5A-32 Fire Protection - Waste Processing , Building - Sections - l Sheet 2 l
- 9.5A-33 Fire Protection - Waste Processing Building - Sections -
Sheet 3 9.5A-34 Fire Protection - Turbine Building - Plan EL 240.00' 9.5A-35 Fire Protection - Turbine Building - Ground Floor Plan l v Amendment No. 15 l
SilNPP FSAR APPENDlX 9.5A FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS LIST OF FIGURES (Cont'd) FICURE TITLE 9.5A-36 Fire Protection - Turbine Building - Mezzanine Floor Plan 9.5A-37 Fire Protection - Turbine Building - Operating Floor Plan 9.5A-38 Fire Protection - Turbine Building - Sections - Sheet 1 9.5A-39 Fire Protection - Turbine Building - Sections - Sheet 2 9.5A-40 Fire Protection - Emergency Service Water Intake Structure 1 i l vi Amendment' No. 15
SIINPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.1
-l.- Identification Fire Area: C Hullding: Containment 15 Fire Area: 1-C, Containment Building Fire 7,ones: Detailed under Item 4,. " Combustible Loading" l
'Shown on Figures: 9.5A-2, 9.5A-3, 9.5A-4, 9.5A-5
;55 Iliameter (ft.): 130 Height (ft.):
' Total Area (al1~ fire zones) (sq. ft.): 50,000 W iume (cu. f t.):
2,400,000
- 2. Occupancy The area contains-the reactor vessel, steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, associated piping, miscellaneous equipment, associated controls, wiring in condnit and cable in trays.
- 1. Boundaries Walls, floors, and roof are of reinforced concrete construction, as detailed in Section 3.8, with a fire rating of three hours. The containment walls also have a steel liner. Wall openings for personnel access are protected by containment closures which are equivalent to Class A fire doors.
A circumferential section of the reactor vessel mirror insulation between Kievation 246.6 ft. and Elevation 251.2 ft. was modified to incorporate neutron shielding. The neutron streaming shield is a composite of approximately 3 in. thick, consisting of 1 1/2 in. of "Microtherm" h i gh-tempe ra t ure insulation manufactured by Micropore Insulation Limited bonded to a varying thickness layer of "Ricorad" neutron shielding material manufactured by the Richardson Company. Each component of the composite is indicated by its manufacturer to have " Excellent Fire Resistance Properties." Furthernore, the neutron streaming shield is encapsulated in stainless steel which will provide an adequate barrier. Since the " shield assembly" is ene. sed and isolated inside the reactor vessel cavity, it is not considered to . have a significant combustible loading and no fire will be postulated for this fonture.
- 4. Combustible Loading, Transient combustibles inside the Containment are present during' refueling, repair and maintenance operations only and are included in the combustible loading for the fire area / zones to reflect their maximum possible fire loading.
9.5A-1 Amendment No. 15 l L _ _., _ _ _ _ - , _ .,_
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Cal./lb./RF 1000's Combustible Sq. Ft.
-15 Fire Area: 1-C, Containment Building Total Floor Area: 50,000 sq. ft.
Cable Insulation Power 1,073 194,000 4,000 Control 335 53,000 1,000 Instrumentation 335 31,500 1,000 Liquids: oil (gal.) 930 102,000 2,000 Sotids: charcoal-(Ib.) 7,500 75,000 1,500 Max. Transient: charcoal (ib.) 3,750 37,500 1,000
- fiber drums (1b.) 95 1,000 20 Total 494,000 10,520 Fire Zone: 1-C-1-RCP-1A, Reactor Coolant Pump 1A Floor Area: 800 sq. ft.
Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrumentation (LF) 0 0 0 Liquids: ott (gal.) 310 34,000 , 42,000 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 8,000 Total 40,000 50,000 9.5A-2 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in- BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's Sq. Ft. Fire Zone: 1-C-1-RCP-13, Reactor Coolant Pump 1B Floor Area: 1260 sq. ft. Cable lasulation Po u r (RF) 71 13,000 11,000 Control (RF) 0 0 0 (in conduit) Instrumentation (in conduit) 0 0 0 Liquids: oil (gal.) 310 34,000 27,000 Solids: 0 0 0 Transients oil (gal.) 55 6,000 5,000 Total 53,000 43,000 Fire Zone: 1-C-1-RCP-lC, Reactor Coolant Pump IC Floor Area: 810 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Powr 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrunentation 0 0 0 Liquids: oil (gal.) 310 34,000 42,000 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 8,000 To tal 40,000 50,000 9.5A-3 l
. SENPP FSAR i- -
Quantity BTU in STU/ Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's so. f. Fire Zone: 1-C-1-CRFA, Charcoal FLiter A Floor Area: 390 sq. fc. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrumentation 0 0 0 1.iquids : 0 0 0 Solids: charcoal (ib.) 3,750 37,500 96,000 Transients: charcoal (ib.) 3.750 37,500 96,000 fiber drums (ib.) 95 1,000 3,000 Total 76,000 195,000 Fire Zone: 1-C-1-CHF5, Charcoal Filter 3 Floor Area: 350 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrumentation 0 0 0 Tiquids: 0 0 0 Solids: charcoal (ib.) 3,750 37,500 107,500 4 Transients: i charcoal (ib.) 3,750 37,300 107,000 I fiber drums (15.) 95 1,000 3,000
;l Total 76.000 217.500 i
9.5A-4 Amendment .No. 1
SHNPP FSAR Quantity ETU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF
- 1000's Sq. Ft.
Fire Zone 1-C-3-EPA, Electrical Penetration A Floor Area: 3,700 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 510 92,000 25,000 conerol 170 27,000 7,500 Instrumentation 170 16,000 4,500 Liquids: 0 0 0 , Solids: 0 0 0 l ( Transient: 0 0 0 To tal 135,000 37,000 Fire Zone: 1-C-3-EPB, Electrical Penetration B
- Floor Area: 2,600 sq. ft.
Cable Insulation Power 492 88,500 34,000 Contro1 164 26,000 10,000 Inserunentation 164 15,500 6,000 Liquids: O O O Solids: 0 0 0 Transienc: 0 0 0
~
To tal 130,0';0 50,000 9.5A-5
r -, I i SENPP FSAR Quantity BTU in STU/ Coebuscible Cal./lb./RF 1000's so. fe. Fire Zone: 1-C-1-SAL, Cc .cainment Building Balance Floor Area: 3,600 sq. fc. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 ') 0 Instrumentation 0 0 0 Liquids: 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: oil' 55 6,000 2,000 1 Total 6,000 2,000
- 5. Control of Rasards Electrical, mechanical and MVAC penetration seals through the Containment walls are considered equivalent to three-hour raced fire stops.
Sloped floor drainage to the containannt sump prevents spread of combustible 11gulds releases beyond the fire area. Structural barriers, partial or full _ height, are provided between redundant safety-related components within the
~
area. Suitable fi.e barriers are provided at points of close proximity between safety and non-safety related cable trays where Regulatory Guide 1.75 criteria cannot be fully sec. Fire breaks are provided in solid bottom crole trays with covers.
. Based on the smoke essoval race reccomended for ene cembustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.) comparable smoka removal would be achieved for this area by a race of approximately 0.08 cfm/sq. ft. Secke.
heat and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the normal ventilation system for this area: Supply: AH-82( LA-NNS) Exhaust: ARRS-5-1A i AR.'tS-5-13 ~ AH-82(15-NMS) 1 Safety i Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/so. f:.) l Recirculation (1A) NNS Operating 7,220 ').66 9.3A-6 Amendment No. 1 l l 1 j i
--_.- 1
E.
.SHNPP FSAR Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq. ft.)
Noruai Operation -NNS operating .1, 500 0.11 Purge-(IA) Recirculation (18) NNS Standby- 7,220 0.66 Normal Operation NNS Standby 1, 500 0.11 l Purge (115) . I Fire protection water discharges which are potentially radioactive are cuitected in the containment sump which discharges to the Liquid Waste I Processing System. Potential airborne radioactive releases froe equipment are absorbed by charcoat filters provided in the building ventilation system at i hievation 221 f t. of the Containment Building.
- b. Fire Detection Types of detection, actuation and signaling sys tems provided and their tunctions for this fire area are as follows:
11ain Fire De tec tion Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres
. De t Systera Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm I-C 1 -1 Thenaal Equipment X X X X X X KCI'-lA l -C 1-2 Thermal Equipment X X X X X X RCP-lis -
1-C 1 -3 Thermal Equipment X X X X X X KCP-lC 1 1 - 1 -4 Thennal Area X X X X X X CliFA 1 -C 1-5 Thermal Area X X X X X X 9.5A-7
7 SHNPP FSAR Main Fire Detection
-Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Alarm Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann CilFB l-C-3-EPA 1-6 Thermal Area X X X X X X Ionization Area X X X No X X l-C-3-EPB l-7 The rmal Area X X X X X X Ionization Area X X X X X X l-C-t-BAL Manual Area X X X X X X fire alarm r.tations
- The local fire detection control panel servicing the Containment Building -
15 .is located in the RAB, Elevation 263 ft. adjacent to the containment personnel hatch.
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or -trouble condition, both visual and audihte, are provided at the local control panel and for a fire condition, an andthic alarm sounds at the fire zone inside the Containment.
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided through the personnel and equipment hatches located at Elevations 236 ft. and 286 ft., respectively. Carbon dioxide and dry chemical type manual fire extinguishers are provided in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe and hose. stations are also provided in the Containment.
During normal operation the Containment is accessible through the personnel hitch, on limited basis. The standpipe and hose system are dry downstream from the Containment isolation valve which is controlled from the Control Room as required by the Control Room Operator. During either maintenance, repair, or refueling shutdowns there is controlled access of employees to the Containment, through the personnel hatch. Should the equipment hatch be opened, controlled access may take place through either or both hatches. Because people may be present in the Containment at this stage, the standpipe and hose system is wet. 9.5A-8 Amendment No. 15
l SHNPP FSAR'
'8. Fire Suppression System l
The fire suppression system provided in this area is an automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. . for either reactor coolant pump surface, airborne ra.lloactivity removal unit housing top area, or cable tray run area.. The system is actuated automatically-by the thermal detectors located around.each i
-reactor coolant pump, over airborne radioactivity removal unit housing top, or over cable tray run area, when the area temperature reaches 200 F. The sprinkler heads open when area temperature reaches 225 F. The system water flow is shut off automatically from the. control valve when the area temperature drops below 200 F. The multi-cycle control valve for the system ts located outside this fire area, in the RAB, Elevation 236 ft.
( F igu re 9. 5A-7 ) . Sprinkler System piping is seismically supported inside the dontainment, and in areas containing safety related equipment inside the RAB. Manual actuation of the system is provided from the multi-cycle control valve emergency mechanical release. Remote manual actuation of the multi-cycle system is provided from any manual alarm station strategically located throughout the Containment Building. Electrical supervision of this suppression system, includes control valve position,. system valve position
, supervisory air pressure and lack of water flow through the control valve.
Plant equipment subject to water damage is protected by watertight enclosures and floor pedestals. Damage to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of water discharged from sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the pitch of the floor towards floor drains provided throughout the hutiding. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be minimal in the containment sump area. Excess water can overflow to adjacent floor areas. Runof f is directed to the containment sump. 9 Analysis of Ef fects of Postulated Fires t , in Fire Area: 1-C, the Containment Building fire hazard combustibles include 15 normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, metallic confuit, connection boxes, limited amounto of cable insulation within control cabinets and panels, required quantities of charcoal used within airborne radioactivity removal system filters and specified quantities of lubricating oils contained within the reactor coolant pumps and steam generator snubbers. Transient materials are not anticipated to be present in the area during normal operation. However, transient materials, such as rags, wood, plastics, charcoal, oil, etc., may be brought into the area for maintenance and repair during plant shutdown. , ] The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires, and consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities is reduced. 4 4 9.5A-9 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR
- by the use of flame retardant cables which meet the requirements of IEEE 383, except the cable .for the load cell of the containment circular bridge crane, which is . neoprene insulated (the neoprene cable was . considered and accepted for functional reasons. The short length of:
cahle - 160 ft. - and its isolated location from all other cables in the. Containment does not create a fire hazard).
- hy limiting the continued spread of fire by.the provision of fire-breaks as required, fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations, and separational barriers at points if possible fire ~ communication. '
- hy the confinement of released combustible liquids through provision of drainage of released oil to area sumps.
hy controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures, to limit quantities to those required for immediate. needs and to prescribe supplemental fire protection measures during such exposure periods. The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by structural barriers within the area to separate redundant trains or equipment and by fire-rated fire barriers enclosing the Containment fire area. The types of fires postulated for the Containment are based on the types and concentrations of combustibles present in the area such as: oil, cable, and charcoat.
- a. Oil Fires
' The oil fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire reasonably expected in the area, of localized concentrations of oil released from a reactor coolant pump or a steam generator snubber lubricating oil system reservoir with a spillover adlacent area and impingement on nearby equipments (refer to Figures 9.5A-2
- 15 through 9.5A-4, Fire Zones 1-C-1-RCP-1 A, -1B and -lC). Transient combustibles a are present in the area only during refueling, maintenance and repsir a 55 gal. oil drum, charc'oal for a charcoal filter refill, wood, rags and plastic coverings.
The automatic thermal detection system installed around each reactor coolant pump senses the heat generated by the fire. When the temperature reaches 200 F, the multi-cycle sprinkler valve is actuated, as detailed under Item 8, , 15 fire alarms are transmitted to the Control Room via the Communications Room, to the local fire detection control panel, and locally to the fire zone. The potential maximum propagation of the oil fire will be reduced, by initial possible use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and 1 I t l 9.5A-10 Amendment No. 15 i
--.---a- - -- ~ " ^ ' - * ' ^ ' ^ ~ ~ ~
* '~
SHNPP FSAR supplemental'use of hose lines on developing fires by employees either responding to.this fire or present in the Containment during refueling,'
- maintenance or repairs.
. lf the multi-cycle sprinker system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might involve the reactor coolant pump from which the
. lubricating oil has been released and damage contiguous associated piping, Eftttings, cabling, and controls within the spill area. However, the automatic molti-cycle sprinkler system can be actuated manually from either the system control valve (RAB, Elevation 236 ft.), or any manual alarm station located inside the Containment, thus reducing the potential fire consequences described above.
Even without actuation of the multi-cycle sprinkler system in the area, the
~
oil fire will be sensed by the thermal fire detection system which will alarm fire (high temperature) and trouble (lack of water) conditions in the Control Room. 1The Control Room Operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual firefighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, as described above, thus reducing the potential .for the fire spread. The postulated oil fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause failure of relundant safety-related cable trays, plant equipment and associated cabling and controls, which are isolated by spacial separationand partial structural anil fire barriers. The fire area is enclosed within three-hour fire barriers. Therefore, the capability of the plant for safe shutdown and control of radioactive releases to the environment is not impaired by an oil fire in the Containment.
- b. Cable Fires The cable fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe aingle fire expected in the area, of localized concentrations of insulation on cables in trays and in conduit located in and traversing tha cable penetration areas (Refer to Figure 9.5A-3, Fire Zones 1-C-3-epa and 1-C-3-EPB). Transient combustibles may be present in the area only during refueling, naintenance, and repair activities within the Containment. They could he small amounts of wood, rags and plastic.
The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire is reduced by early detection through ionization type smoke detectcrs strategically located above the cable trays, on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses the products of combustion generated by the smoldering cable inst 1ation tire and alerts employees locally at the fire zone and at the local fire detection , control panel and in the Control Room, via the Communications Room, so that 15 mannat fire response can be initiated 'promptly. Initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines on developing fires is made possihte through limited access into the 9.5A-11 Amendment No. 15
U SHNPP FSAR ConLainment: from RAM during norual operation, or controlled access during
. ' either inaintenance, repair,,or refueling shutdownc. (As described under LLem 7).
Fire protection is provided by an automatic multi-c'y cle sprinkler system, as detailed _under itere 8, located above the cable tray stacks. Damage will then be limited to the immediate area of inception with only limited propagation along the cable tray (s), to adjacent cable trays, to other exposed adjacent cabling and adjacent transient combustibles, if any. if the multi-cycle sprinkler system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might involve the cable tray in which ignition is assumed as well as the tray above it, extend to the nearest fire break along the run, or to the area . fire barrier penetration seal. However, the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system can be actuated manually from either the system control valve (KAH, Elevation 236 f t.) or a9y manual alarm station located inside the Containment, thus reducing the potential fire consequences described above. Dawage in this case will be limited significantly and confined to the immediate area of ignition with only very limited exposure to adjacent cabling. The early warning ionization detection system will alarm a fire condition (products of combustion) in the Control Room. The control room operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of ef fective manual firefighting through the use of portable fire extinduishers, hose lines and/or inanual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, as described above, thus reducing the potential for the tire spread. The postulated cable fire is not considered to have suf ficient magnitude or potential for spread to cause failure of redundant safety-related cable trays, plant equipment and associated cabling and controls, which are isolated by spacial separation and partial structural barriers. The fire area is enclosed within three-hour fire barriers. Therefore, the capability of the plant for sale shutdown and control of radicactive releases to the environment is not imguired by a cable fire in the Containment.
- c. Charcoal Fires The charcoal tire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent develo pment into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of localized concentrations of charcoal within filters located on Elevation 22l it., Fire Zones 1-C-1-CliFA or 1-C-1-CHFB (Refer to Figure 9.5A-2).
Transient cmabustibles present in the area are. charcoal for filter refill and/or oil in a 55 gal. oil drum. These transients are present only during maintenance and repair or refueling shutdowns not during normal operation. The potential maxiiataa propagation of the postulated fire is reduced by early detection using line type detectors installed in the charcoal bed. The temperature of the air leaving the charcoal filter is monitored. On temper.iture rising above a pre-high temperature level visual and audible
- 9. 5 A-12
SHNPP FSAR
' alarms on the charcoal filter housing detection panel and in the Control Room
~
'are activated. The Control Room Operator will.stop the air flow through this
-filter allowing for cooling of the charcoal through starvation of oxygen
~ . supply to the.ftre.
Should the fire not extinguish _itself, the temperature will continue to rise, the filter housing will become hot, and the automatic thermal detection system f(using rate compensated detectors) installed on an area basis over each charcoal filter housing senses the heat generated by the fire. When the temperature reaches 200 F, the multi-cycle sprinkler system is. actuated, as-detailed under item 8,~ fire alarms are transmitted to the Control Room via the 15 Communications Room, to the local fire detection control panel and locally to the fire zone.- The potential maximum propagation of.the charcoal fire will be reduced by possible initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of_ hose lines on developing fires by employees either responding to this fire or present in the Containment during refueling, maintenance or repairs in the Containment. If the multi-cycle. sprinkler system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might involve the charcoal filter and damage associated ducts, fittings, cabling, and controls. However, the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system can he actuated manually from either the system" control valve (RAB, Klevation 236 ' f t.), or any manual alarm station located inside the Containment, thus reducing the potential fire consequences described above. Damage in this case will be confined to the immediate area of inception with limited exposure to adjacent cabling, adjacent combustible materials, if any, and limited damage to exposed equipment. Tlie early warning (line detectors) from the charcoal bed will alarm in the Control Room. The Control Room Operator will stop the air flow through this filter and will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual fire fighting if necessary, through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, as described above, thus reducing the potential for the fire spread. The postulated charcoal fire is not considered to have suf ficient potential for spread to cause f ailure of redundant safety related cable trays, plant equipment and associated cabling and controls, which are isolated by special cepara*. ion and partial structural barriers. The fire area is enclosed within three hour fire barriers. Therefore, the capability of the plant for safe shutdown and control of radioactive releases to the environment is not impaired by a charcoal fire in the Containment.
- 10. Fire Area Equipment 1.lsted below is the mechanical and electrical equipment both safety and non-safety related shown on-the plant general _ arrangement drawings for this area.
-9.5A-13 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP'FSAR l
)
Safety Related Redundant Counterpart Separation I; qui guaen t Barriers or Space Fire Fire ID No. Retard
& Safety - Enclosures Be- Re sist Name or Desc ription Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Zone: 1-C-1-RCP-1A, Reactor Coolant Pump 1A
- Reac tor Coolatit X Pump 1A-SN X Steam X X Generator LA-SN
- Co n t.a ln- All-37 inent Fan (LA-NNS) X Co t t Unit and witti(2) Att-3 7 Fans ( L B-NNS) X Fire Zone: 1-C-1-RCP-14, Reactor Coolant Pump 1B
- Reac tor Coolant LB-SN X X Pump Steam X X Ge n'e ra to r IB-SN
- Pres-X X sur L ze r LX-SN Co n t.a ln- Alt-38 iaent Fan (LA-NNS) X N/A Coll Unit and witti (2) All-38 Fants and (L B-NNS) X N/A Assoc iated Duc twork
- Contaln- All-39 ment Fan (lA-NNS) X N/A i
9.5A-14 .
SENPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire , Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Ratard l Description .. Div. _ . _ Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coatina - Unit with and (2) Fans AH-39 and As- (IB4(NS) X N/A sociated Ductwork Fire Zones 1-C-1-PCP-1C, Reactor Coolant Pump IC Reac tor Coolant Pump IC-SN X X Steam Generator IC-SN X X Sump Pumps (4) NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 1-C-1-CHFA, Charcoal Filter A
~
Airborne Radio-activity
- Removal Unit (1A-S-1) X X Reac tor S-4 Supports (I A-SA) X X Cooling Fan Reactor S-4 Supports (18-SB) X X Cooling Fan Fire Zone: 1-C-1-CHFB, Charcoal Filter B
~
Airborne S-1 Radio- (IB-NNS) activity X X Removal Unit 9.5A-15
SHNPP FSAR Safety Related Redundant Counterpart Separation Equipment ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire
& Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Name or Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Costing
- Contain-ment Fan Cooler AH-1 IB-SB I X Fire Zone: 1-C-3-EPA, Electrical Penetration A
- Contain-ment Fan Cooler AH-3 1A-SA X X
' - Contain- , ment Fan Cooler - - AH-3 15-SB X X Accus-mulator 1A-SA I X Reactor Coolant Pump Standpipe NNS X N/A i
- Electric Hydrogen Recombiner 1A-SA I X Fire 7 net 1-C-3-EPB, Electrical Penetration B
' - Con- AH-4 1A-SA X X tain- AH-4 15-SB 1 X sent Fan Cooler
- Accum-ulator IB-SB I X
- Accum-i ulator IC-SA X X 4
- Emer-gency Escape
- Lock NNS X N/A 9.5A-16 .
SHNPP FSAR
,l l
Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard i Description' Div. Yes g 3 br. Less tween Constr. Coating l l
. Reactor ' s-Coolant Pump Standpipe NNS X -N/A' Fire Zone: 1-C-1-BAL, Containment Building Balance - . . . - - . - . . . - . -
Reactor Vessel IX-SN X X Contain-ment Fan AH-1 Cooler (1 A-SB) X X X Contain-ment Spray Valve Chamber (2) LA-SA X X Racirc-ulating Valve Chamber (2) LA-SA X X Meac tor Coolant
. Drain Tank Heat Ex-changer IX-SN X X -
Haactor Coolant
. Drain Tank Pumps (2) 18-NNS- X X Instru-ment Rack Cl-R1 X ~
Electric Panels (3) NNS i X N/A N 9.5A-17 i . . . . . . . . . _ . .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _J
l SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire l Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. less tween Constr. Coating
- Primary S-2 Shield (IA-SA) X X Cooling and Fans (1A-SB) X X
- Valve Motor NNS X N/A Contain-ment Purge Exhaust NNS X N/A Contain- AH-2 ment Fana (IA-SA) X X and (15-SB) X X
- Fuel Trans-for Tube NNS X N/A Drivers (5) NNS X N/A Personnel
- Lock and Equipment Removal NNS X N/A Contain-ment Purge Makeup NNS X N/A
- Hydrogen Purge Makeup NNS X N/A Regen Heat Exchanger 1X-SN X X
- Reactor Coolant Drain Tank IX-NNS X N/A Pressurizer Relief Tank IX-NNS X N/A, 9.5A-18 L.
SENPP FSAR Safety . Equipment Related' Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard , _ _ . . Description _.. Div. . _ Yes No 3 hr. Imss tween Constr. Coating Excess Let-down Heat Exchanger 11-SN X X Hydrogen Purge Exhaust NNS X X Instrument C1-R2 X N/A Racks (14) Cl-R3 X N/A (NNS) Cl-R4 X N/A i Cl-R5 X N/A l Cl-R6 X N/A j C1-R7 I N/A l Cl-R8 X N/A ; Cl-R9 I N/A j Cl-RIO X N/A l Cl-R11 I N/A C1-R13 X N/A Cl-R14 X N/A Cl-R15 X N/A C1-R16 X N/A Electrical Panel NNS X N/A Reactor Vessel Integrated Head 1X-SN X X Electric 1A-SA X X Hydrogen and Recombiners IB-SB X X Digital Rod 1A-SA X X Position IB-SB X X Cabinets 5-Ton Port-able Jib Crane NNS X N/A Vacuum 2CB-VISA-1 I N/A Relief 2CB-VISB-2 (2) 9.5A-19 bui- - -- -
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire
.Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes g 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating
- Equipment Hatch - NNS X N/A Elevator Machine Roon NHS X N/A Removable
! Unloading Platform (El.292 ft.)NNS X N/A
- Strong Motion .
Triaxial Ac-celograph NNS X N/A Fuel Trans-far System Control Panel and Hydraulic Unit NSS X N/A
- Trolley (E1.370 ft.) NNS X N/A Circular' Bridge Crane NNS X N/A
- Rod-Cluster Control Changing Fixture Drive Mechanisa NNS X N/A
- Rod Cluster Control Changing Fixture Guide Tube NNS X N/A 6
9.5A-20
SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.2-
- 1. Identification Fire Area: 1-A-ACP Hullding: ~ Reactor Auxillary 15 Fire Area: 1-A-ACP, Auxiliary Control (Panel) Room, Elevation 286 ft.
Shown on Figures: 9.5A-9, 9.5A-13 I.ength (ft.): 2R Width (ft.): 11 ' Height (ft.): 17 Area (sq.): 310 Volume (cu. ft.): 5,250
- 2. Occupancy The area contains the auxiliary control panel, associated controls, wiring in conduit and cable in trays.
- 1. Boundaries Walls, floor, and ceiling are of reinforced concrete construction, with a fire rating of three hours. One wall o~pening for personnel access is provided and la protected by a certified three-hour A lable type fire rated door. There are no concealed spaces or floor trenches.
]
l l i
- 4. Comhuntihle loading l Quantity RTU in BTU /
Comhustible Cal./1h/RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 1-A-ACP, Auxiliary Control (Panel) Room Cable Insulation Power 130 23,400 76,000 control 240 37,680 122,500 Instrumentation 120 11,400 37,000 , I.t q u id s : 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient (Negligible) 0 0 0 Total 72,480 235,500
- 5. Control of flazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three hour rated fire stops at all floors and at rated fire barrier walls. IIVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers ~ are sealed between duct and harrier opening with Amendment No. 15 9.5A-21
y SHNPP FSAR flexlhic or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided within safety related ducts. Full height,-three-hour rated fire barriers are provided between SA and SB safety related cable trays within the area (at E-39). ~ Supplemental barriers are provided where safety and non-safety related cable trays are Lat close pr'o ximity and Regulatory Guide 1.75 criteria cannot he met fully. Fire breaks are installed in this fire area. Based on the smoke -removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5. cfm/sq. ft.) comparable smoke removal would :be achieved for this area by a rate of approximately 1.77 cfm/sq. f t. - ' Smoke, heat and products of incomplete _ combustion will be removed'by the normal ventilation for this area.- Supply: AH13 (IA-SB) Exhaust: E-29 (IA-SA) AH13 (15-SB). E-29 (15-SB) Safety Function Class Mode Flow (Cfm) cfm/sq. ft.)' supply 3 operating 550 1.77 3 Standby 550 1.77 Exhaust 3 Operating 550 1.77 3 Standby 550 1.77 There are no radioactive sources in this area.
- 6. Fire Detection The type of detection system provided in this area and its functions are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone g Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 1-43 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X I-A-ACP tion 15 *The local fire detection control panel located in the RAB on Elevation 286 f t. . covers ' the fire areas and fire zones on the same elevation.
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audthle, are provided for each area at the local control panel 'and an audible alarm at the fire zone.
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from the adjacent switchgear Room IB, Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB (see Figure 9.5A-9). Carbon dioxide extinguishers are 9.5A-22 Amendment No. 15
]
I U SHNPP FSAR provided in and adjacent to the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Stand pipe houe stations have- been provided adjacent to the area.
- b. Fire Supression Systems There are no automatic- fire supression systems provided to protect this area.
Plant equil mient subject to water damage is protected with watertight ene Losures and are mounted . a floor pedestals. Dauane'to plant' areas and equipment from the accunulation of water discharged trom bose lines is minimized by the provision of a floor drainage system. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant. Excess water can over tiow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to the storm drainage system.
- 9. Analysis of Ef fects of Postulated Fires in Fire Area 1-A-ACP, the auxiliary control panel room, -area fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays and conduits and limited amounts of cable insulation. within control cabinets. Transient materials are not normally anticipated to be present in the area. Transient materials, such as rags, may be brought into the area for normal tacilities maintenance and repair.
The quantity or combustible materials which may be involved in area fires, and consequently, the nagnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant tacilities is reduced:
- by the use of LEEE 383 qualified cables
- by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire-breaks along cable trays and fire-stcps at fire barrier penetrations
- by fire rated barriers at redundant cable tray close proximity points
- by separational barriers at points of possible fire communication
- by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures.
The tire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development -
~tnto the uost severe single fire expected in the area, of localized concentrations of insulation on cables in trays.
The testulated fire might involve several cable trays above the tray in which ignition is assaned, extend to the first fire-break along the run or to a crossover, or to the area fire barrier fire stop.
~1he gutential propagation of the postulated fire will be reduced by early detection using ionization type suoke detectors installed at the ceiling on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of combustion generated by the incipient fire and alerts employees both locally and in the 9.5A-23 m.
1 l SIINPP FSAR
- g e, respective Unit Control Room via Communications Noom,~so that manual fire response can be initiated promptly.
-Ready access is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines located in adjacent areas by employees responding to the fire.- The postulated electrical fire is not considered to have sufficient potenttal for spread to cause failure to redundant safety related plant-equipment and associated cabling and controls which are separated by three hour rated fire barriers. Thus, the capability for a safe shutdown of the plant will not be impaired by the postulated electrical fire in the area.-
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the electrical equipment shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this area:
Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes jijt 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Auxillary ACP-Control Panel SAB X- X r l 9.5A-24 Amendment No. 15 l
SHNPP FSAR
, APPENDIX 9.5A.3'
- 1. Identi fication Fire Area: 1-A-BAL Rullding: Reactor Auxiliary 15 Fire Area: 1-A-BAL Reactor Auxiliary Building Balance, Elevations 190, 216, 236, 261, and 286 f t.
Fire 7.ones: Detailed under Item 4 Shown on Figures: 9.5A-6, 9.5A-7, 9.5A-8,_9.5A-9, 9.5A-ll, 9.5A-12, 9.5A-13 and 9.5A-26 1.ength (ft.): Variable Width (ft.): Variable 11eight (ft.): Variable-Area (Sq.-ft.): 134,850 Volume (cu. ft.): 2,700,000
- 2. Occupancy The area contains various safety and non-safety related equipment such as:
pumps, tanks, filters, electrical equipment, heat exchangers, HVAC and associated controls, wiring in conduit and cable in trays.
- 1. Boundaries Walls, floors, ceilings, and structural columns supporting the area boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction, with a minimum fire rating of three
-hours. Wall openings for personnel access are protected by certified three-hour A label type fire rated doors and by certified one-and-a-half-hour H label type fire rated doors at stair towers. Floor, ceiling and roof openings for handling of equipment are protected by reinforced concrete hatch covers. Openings within fire area boundaries have a three hour fire rating. Concealed spaces consis* of pipe tunnels, manholes, pipe chases, valve pits, valve galleries, sumps and inspection openings.
- 4. . Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 1-A-BAL, Reactor Auxiliary Building Balance 15 Floor Area: 134,850 sq.ft. Cable Insniation Power 8,128 1,463,000 10,900 Control 7,520 1,181,000 8,800 - Instrumentation 5,184 493,000 3,700 -
)
1 1,lquids: Grease (th.) 2 40 0 011 (gal.) 158 17,000 100 Solids: Charcoal (Ib.) 2,460 24,000 200 9.5A-25 Amendment No. 15
C, S WPP PSAR Quantity BTU in RTU/ Combustible Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Transient:' Oil (gal.)- 55 6,000 45 Fiber Drums (ib.) 30 , 300 5 Charcoal (th.) 1,230 12,300 95 , 1 TOTAL 3,196,640 23,845 Following is a listing of Fire Zones .within Fire Area 1-A-BAL which have negligible combustible loadings: 1-A-1-ED, Equipment Drain Transfer Tank, Elevation 190 f t. 1-A-1-FD, Floor Drain Transfer Tank, Elevation 190 ft. I-A-2-COR, Access Corridor, Elevation 216 f t. 1-A-2-PT, Pipe Tunnel, Elevation 216 f t. 1-A-3-TA, Tank Area,. Elevation 236 ft. 1-A-34-RHXB - Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 18, Elevation 236 and Elevation 261 ft. I-A-4-TA, Tank Area, Elevation 261 ft. 1-A-46-ST, Steam Feedwater Tunnel, Elevation 261 f t. through 305 ft. 1-A-5-CEH, Cont. Equipment Hatch Area, Elevation 286 f t. 1-A-5-HV3 HVAC Equipment, Elevation 286 f t. Fire 7ene: 1-A-1-PA, Residual Heat Removal Pump Room lA, Elevation 190 ft. Floor Area: 2,900 sq. ft. Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 109 19,600 6,700 control 22 3,500 1,200 instrumentation 22 2,100 700 Liquids: oil (gal.) 60 6,500 2,200 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 2,000 Total 37,700 12,800 9.5A-26 Amendment No.1
SBIPP FSAR Fire Zone: 1-A-1-PB, Residual Heat Removal Pump Room IB, Elevation 190 ft. - Floor Area: 2,900 sq.-fc. Quantity BTU in BTU / Cosbustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's so. ft. Cable Insulation Power 77 13,800 -4,700 Control 55 8,600 2,900 Instrumentation 22 2,100 700 Liquids: oil (gal.) 60 6,500 2,200 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 - 6,000 2,000 Total .37,000 12,500 Fire Zone: 1-A-2-MP, Miscellaneous Equipment and Pumps, Elevation 216 f t. Floor Area: 13,000 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 134 24,000 1,900 Control 104 16,300 1,300 Instrumentation 30 2,800 200 Liquids (negligible, integral 0 0 0 with equipment) Solids 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 400 Total 49,100 3,800 Fire Zone: 1-A-3-COMB, Columns 41 to 43 and B to E, Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 4,400 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 380 68,400 16,000 control 340 53,300 12,000 Instrumentation 340 32,300 7,300 Liquids: grease (ib.) 1 20 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 1,300 Total 160,020 36,600 9.5A-27 Amendment No. 1
SWIFF FSAR - Fire Zone: 1-A-3-COME, Columns 41 to 43 and E to ~4, Elevacion 236. ft. Floor Area: 5,200 sq. tc. . Quanticy BTU in 3TU/ 1 Combuscible Gal./lb./RF 1000's so. ft. Cable Insulacion Power 340 61,200 12,000 Control 340 53,400 10,000 Inscrweentacion 340 32,200 6,000 Liquids (negligible) 0 0 0 Solids - 0 0 0 Transione: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 11,000 Total 152,300 39,000 4 Flee Zone 1-A-3-COMI, Columns 41 to 43 and I to L Elevacion 236 f c. Floor Area: 7,200 sq. fc. Cable Insulation Power 601 108,000 15,000 Conteal 208 33.000 a .500 Instrumencacion 501 18,000 6,600 Liquids: grease (ib.) 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transione: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 800 Total 195,200 26,900 Fire Zone 1-A-3-COR Access Corridor, Elevacion 236 f t. Floor Area: 2,200 sq. f t. Cable Insulacion Power 40 7,200 3,300 Control , 0 0 0 Instrumentation 0 0 0
- Liquids: 011 (gal.) la 1,500 1,000 Solids: 0 0 0 Transtene: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 2.700 Total 14,700 ,
7.300 . 9.5A-28 Amendmenc No. 1 e
SHNPP FSAR Fire Zone 1-A-3-MP Mechanical Penetration Area, Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 13,000 sq. ft. Quantity - BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb ./RF 1000's sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 95 17,000 1,300 Control 45 , 7,000 500 Instrumentation 30 2,800 200 Liquids: (integral with 0 0 0 equipment) Solids 0 0 0 Transient: Grease (ib.) 5 <1 0 gg Total 26,800 2,000 Fire Zone 1-A-3-PB Pumps and Equipment, Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 15,000 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Powe r 690 124,000 8,300 Control 258 40,500 2,700 Instrumentation 180 17,100 1,100 Liquids: Grease (ib.) 1 20 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: Grease (ib.) 5 <1 0 Total 181,620 12,100 11 Fire Zone: 1-A-4-CIIFA, Charcoal Filter Room 1A, Elevation 261 ft. Floor Area: 2,900 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 450 81,000 28,000 Control 360 57,000 20,000 In strumentation 360 34,000 12,000 Liquids: 0 0 0 Solids: Charcoal (ib.) 1,230 12,300 4,200 Transient: Charcoal (ib.) 1,230 12,300 4,200 Fiber Drums: (ib.) 30 300 100 Total 196,900 68,500 9.5A-29 Amendment No. 11
SHNPP FSAR
. Fire Zone: 1-A-4-CHFB, Charcoal Filter Room IB, Elevation 261 ft.
Floor Area: 2,600 sq. ft. Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Cable Insulation' Power 350 63,000 24,000 Control 265 42,000 16,000 Instrumentation 265 25,000 9,700 Liquids: 0 0 0 Solide charcoal (ib.) 1,230 12,300 4,700 Transient: charcoal (ib.) 1,230 12,300 4,700 fiber drums (ib.) 30 300 100 TOTAL 154,900 59,200 Fire Zone: 1-A-4-CHLR, Chiller Room Elevation 261 ft. Floor Area: 14,000 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 2,730 - 492,000 35,000 3 Control 3,560 559,000 40,200 Inst rumentation 1,670 159,000 11,200 Liquids: 011 (gal.) 25 2,600 1,200 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 400 Total 1,218,600 88,000 Fire Zone: 1-A-4-COMB, Columns 41 to 43 and 8 to E, Elevation 261 f t. Floor Area: 4,200 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 400 72,900 17,400 3 control 580 91,000 21,700 Inst rumentation 370 35,150 8,400 Liquids: 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,400 3 . Total 205,050 48,900 l 9.5A-30 Amendnwnt No. 3
1 I SHNPP FSAR Fire Zone: 1-A-4-COMB, Columns 41 to 43 and E to H, Elevation 261 f t. Floor Area: 5,100 sq. ft. Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 240 43,200 8,500 Control 240 37,700 7,400 Instrumentation 240 22,800 4,500 Liquids: 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: .011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,400 1 Total 109,700 21,800 Fire Zone: 1-A-4-COME, Columns 41 to 43 and E to H, Elevation 261 ft. Floor Area: 5,100 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 240 43,200 8,500
. Control 240 37,700 7,400 Instrumentation 240 22,800 4,500 Liquids: 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 109,700 21,400 Fire Zone: 1-A-4-COMI, Columns 43 and I to L, Elevation 261 ft.
Floor Area: 1,500 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 110 19,800 13,000 , Control 111 17,400 12,000 Instrumentation 111 10,500 7,000 Liquids: 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 4,000 Total 53,700 36,000 1 9.5A-31 Amendment No. I w-
g. SHNPP FSAR i Fire Zonet 'l-A-4-COR, Access Corridor, Elevation 261 f t. ' I Floor Area: 2,300 sq. ft. Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal./lb./RF, 1000's sq. ft. Cable Insulation ' Power 729- 131,000 58,000 Control 259 41,000 18,000 Instruentation 240 23,000 10,000 Liquide: 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: Oil (gal.) 55 6,000 2,600 Total 201,000 88,600 Fire Zone: 1-A-5-HVA, HVAC Room 1A, Elevation 286 ft. Floor Area: 2,700 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 125 22,800 8,300 Control 130 20,400 7,600 Instrusentation 65 6,800 2,300 Liquids: (integral with 0 0 0 equipment) Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: Crease (ib.) 5 <1 0 11 , Total 50,000 18,200 Fire Zone: 1-A-5-HVB, HVAC Room 1B, Elevation 286 ft. Floor Area: 3,600 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Pou r 440 79,000 22,000 Control 645 101.000 28,000 Instraentation 395 37,500 10,000 Liquids: (integral with 0 0 0 equipment) Solids: , 0 0 0 Transient: Crease (ib.) 5 <1 O_ 11 Total 217,500 60,000 Amendment No. Il 9.5A-32
SENFP FSAR Fire Zone: 1-A-5-BATN, Battery Roon Neutral (Non-Safety Related) Elevation 286 ft.
' Floor Area 210 sq. fC. -
Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft.
-Cable Insulation Pownr 60 10,800 51,000 Control (in conduit) 0 0 0 Instrumentation (in conduit) 0 0 0 Liquids: 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient 011 (gal.) 0 0 0 Total 10,800 51,000 Fire Zone 1-A-34-RHXA, Residual Heal Removal Heat Exchanger 1A, Elevation 236 ft. and 261 ft.
Cable Insulation Power 20 3,600 8,000 Control (in Conduit) 0 0 0 Instrumentation (in Conduit) 0 0 0 Liquids: (integral with 0 0 0 equipment) Solids: 0 0 0 Transient 011 (gal.) 0 0 0 Total 3,600 8,000
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three hour ratsid fire stops at all floors and at rated fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire barrier walls are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblie s. Fire dampers are not provided within safety related ducts.
Partial or full height structural barriers may be provided between redundant , safety related equipment within the area, as shown on the figures. ! Three hour rated fire barriers were provided between redundant safety related l cable trays at points of close proximity. Barriers consisting of cable tray l covers were installed between safety and non-safety related cable trays, where Regulatory Guide 1.75 cannot be fully met. Fire breaks are installed ' throughout this fire area as required. , Based on the smoke 'remo' val rate recommended for the combustible load in the ! Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.) comparable smoke removal would be 9.5A-33
- - , , - -. , .w,, --.-..-e,-_,,,
. . , _ . - . ~ , , . . . , , - - ~nnn-,--. n,..n,m-,v,,-.v--- ,r.,. ~ ., nnm ,-..mmn-e-,-.
i SHNPP FSAR achieved for this area by a rate of approximately 0.2 cfm/sq. ft. Smoke, heat and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the normal ventilation system for this aress Supply: S-3 (1A-NNS) Exhaust: E-17 (1X-NNS) E-6 (1A-SA) S-3 (18-WNS) E-18 (1X-NNS) E-6 (1548) E-19 (11-NNS) E-20 (1X-MNS) Entire fire area except for fire sones: 1-A-541VA, 14-5-41VB, and 14-5-BATN. Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) cfm/sq. ft. Supply (IA) NNS Operating 132,000 1. 0 Supply (18) NNS Standby 132,000 1.0 Noreal Exhaust NSS Operating 134,800 1.0 (E-17 E-18, E-19 E-20) Beerg Exhaust (1A) 3 Operating 6,000 .045 Energ Exhaust (IB) 3 Standby 6,000 .045 Fire Zone 1-A-5-HVA Supply: AH-12 (IA4A) Exhaust: E-28 (1A-SA) AH-12 (18-SA) E-28 (184A) Supply 3 Operating 1,800 0.67 Supply 3 Standby 1,800 0.67 Exhaust 3 operating 1,800 0.67 Exhaust 3 Standby 1,800 0.67 Fire Zone 1-A-5-HVB Supply: AH-13 (1A-SB) Exhaust: E-29 (1A-SB) AH-13 (15-SB) E'-29 (1845) Supply 3 operating 2,100 0.58 Supply 3 Standby 2,100 0.58 Exhaust 3 Operating 2,100 0.58 Exhaust 3 Standby 2,100 0.58 Fire Zone 1-A-5-BATN Supply: AH-12 (IA-6A) Exhaust E-28 (1A-SA) AH-12 (18-SA) E-28 (15-SA) Supply 3 Operating 300 1.4 Supply 3 Standby 300 1.4 Exhaust 3 Operating 300 1.4 Exhaust 3 Standby 300 1.4 9.5A-34 _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . ___ _ _ _ - _ ______m
l SENPP FSAR l f Sources of radioactive releases for this area include: Floor and Equipment Drain Transfer Systems, component cooling water heat exchangers and peps, RER } heat exchangers and pumps, sampling rooms, decontamination area, seal water heat exchangers, letdown heat exchangers, RAB filter backussh, recycle evaporator feed package, recycle holdup tank, charging pumps, voltme control j tank, refueling water storage tank, domineraliser and boron recycling system, condensate storage tank, reactor makeup water storage tank.
- 6. Fire Detection _
The types of detection, actuation and signaling systems provided in this area and their actions are as .following: Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone h Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 1 -A-1 -PA 1-6 Thermal Area X X X X X X loniza- Ares X X X No X X tion Manual Area X X X X X X Alarm Stations 1-A-1 -PB 1-9 loniza- Area X X X No X X tion Manual Area X X X X X X Alarm Station Thermal Area X X X X X X 1 -A-1 -F D 1-10 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion 1 -A-1 -E D 1-11 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion 1-A-2-COR 1-12 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X .
tion Manual Area X X X No X X Alarm Station 1-A-2-+1P 1-14 loniza- Area X X X No X X tion Manual Area X X X No X X Alarm Station ( 9.5A-35 L
r. SENPP FSAR 1 Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone g Basis Local ** g Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 14-2-PT 1-13 Manual Area X X X No X X Alarm Station 14-3-PR 1-17 Thermal Area X X X X X X
< Manual Area X X X X X X Alarm Station Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion 1-A-3-COR 1-18 Manual Area X X X X X X Alarm Station 14-3-t17 1-19 Manual Area X X X No X X Alarm Station I-A-3 -CCHB 1-20 Thermal Area X X X X X X Manual Area X X X X X X Atarm
- station Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion i 1-A-3-C0HE 1-21 Thermal Area X X X X X X Manual Area X X X X X X Alarm Station Ioniza- Ares X X X No X X tion 1-A-3-COMI 1-22 Thermal Area X X X X X X ,
Manual Area X X X X X X 2 Alarm Station Ionisa- Area X X X No X X tion 1-A-4 COR 1-23 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion
'lanual Area X X X X X X I
Alarm ' Station Area X X X X X X X X / Thermal Area X X X X f 9.5A-36
SHNPP PSAR Main Fire De tec tion Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres De t Systen Fire Zone Zone h Basis Local **- Ann Alara Actu Ann Alara 1 -A-4 -CllLR l-24 Thennal Area X X X X X X loniza- Area X X X No X X tion Hanual Alara Stations Area X X X X X X l
l-A-4-CurtB l-28 loniza- Area X X X No X X tion The nsal Area X X X X X X Hanual Alanu i Station Area X X X X X X 1 -A-4 -CollK 1-2b Loniza- Area X X X No X X tion Thennal Area X X X X X X l Hanual Alana Sta tion Area X X X X X X l-A '4-Cotil 1-27 toniza- Area X X X No X X tion Thennal Area X X X X X X Hanual Alaria Station Area X X X X X X l -A CitFA 1-28 Thennal Area X X X X X X loniza- Area X X X No X X tion I-A-4 -CliF B 1-29 Thennal Area X X X X X X loniza- Area X X X No X X tion I-A-4 -TA 1-23 Itanual Alans \ Station Area X X X No - X X l 1 -A-5-Chit 1-32 ilanual Alaria Station Area X X X No X X l 9.5A-37 L
l F ! SHNPP FSAR Main Fire Detection Loa.1 Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Plre Zone Zone ]rjy r e, Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 1-A-5-HVA 1-33 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X l-A-5-HVB l-34 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion Manual Alarm Stations Area X X X X X X l -A-5-RATN 1-37 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion I- A- 5-ilV 3 1-33 Hanual Alarm Stations Area X X X No X X 15
- The local fire detection control panels located in RAB on Elevation 190, 216, 236, 261, 286 ft. cover the fire zones and fire areas located on those elevations.
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and nudthle, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panet and an audible alarm in the fire zone.
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from adjacent areas, corridors and stair towers, ad shown on the figures.
Carbon dioxide and dry chemical type extinguishers are provided in and adjacent to the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in and adjacent to the area.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systen The fire suppression systems provided in this area are four automatic multi-cycle sprinkler systems installed at the ceiling level, hydraulically ,
designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq.ft. of floor area protected. Each system is actuated automatically by thermal detectors located also at the celting level when the area temperature reaches 135 F. The sprinkler heads open when the area temperature reaches 165 F. The system water flow is shut off automatically from the multi-cycle valve when the aren' temperature drops holow 135 F. The multi-cycle control valve for these systems are located 9.5A-38 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR inside these fire areas, accessible'from stairways or an aisle in fire area 1-A-HAL, ,f ire zones : 1-A-4-COMB, 1-A-3-COMB, 1-A-1-PA and 1-A-1-PB (see Figures'9.5A-6 through 9.5A-8). Sprinkler systems piping is seismically supported in areas containing safety related equipment. Manual actuation of the system is provided from each multi-cycle control valve emergency mechanical releases. Remote manual actuation of ~ each multi-cycle system is provided f rom the dual-action manual-alarm stations located inside or outside each fire zone on the elevation, where the suppression system is provided. Electrical supervision of each suppression system includes control valve position, system valve position, supervisory air pressure and lack of water flow through the control valve. Motors for safety-related HVAC equipment are totally enclosed. Motor control centers, switchgears and power centers, safety and non-safety related are installed on 4 in. (minimum) high pedestals, for protection against sprinkler wat er damage. The batteries are installed on racks for the same reason. Damage to plant areas and equipment f rom the accumulation of water discharged f rom sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of floor drainage systems. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant , since excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to the floor drainage transfer tank or storm drainage system, as detailed in Section 9.3.3. I 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires In Fire Area 1-A-BAL, the Reactor Auxiliary Building Balance (remaining zones af ter separating vital fire areas) fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, conduit, connection boxes, limited amounts of cable insulation within control panels, minor quantities of permanent Class A materials (ordinary combustibles), required
- quantlties of charcoal used within filters, lubricating oil contained within r equipment, as detailed in the combustible loading under item 4 of this i analysis.
! r Transient materials such as charcoal in fiber drums, rags, wood, plastic sheets, cleaning solvents and lubricating oil may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair. The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires and consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities is reduced By the use of IEEE 383 qualified cables, except for the building elevators cables which are neoprene insulated; the neoprene insulation - was accepted for use, for functional reasons. liy limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire breaks alnng cable trays, fire stops at fire barrier penetrations and at all , floors, three hour fire barriers at redundant cable points of close l proximity and separational barriers between non-safety and safety cable trays at points of possible fire communication. i 9.5A-39 l l L
,- s y
SHNPP FSAR
- By. Ilmiting permanent quattities of ordinary combustible (Class' A)'
materials. to amounts actually requLred for normal operations.
~
- ' By controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through
= administrative procedures.
~
. The. entent of damage within and beyond the fire ares 'is further limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke and other products of combustion-through continued operation of the.norest ventilation system; by provision of structural barriers within the area separating redundant equipment; and by three hour barriers enclosing the 1-A-BAL fire area.
The types of fires postulated for the reactor auxiliary building balance are
-haned on the types of. combustibles present in the area and their-concentrations. Charcoat, cable and oil fires are being considered in this analypis.
A. CHARC0AL FIRES The charcoal fire postulated for the reactor auxiliary building balance assumes ignition and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area of localised concentrations of charcoal within filters located on Elevation 261 ft., fire sones 1-A-4-CHFA or 1-A-4-Ci1FB (see Figure 9.5A-8). Transient combustibles present in the+ area may be charcoal for filter refill and/or oil in a 55 gal.' oil drum. These transients may be present dnly during maintenance and repair operations. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated charcoal fire is reduced by early detection using line type detectors installed in the charcoal bed. The temperature of the air leaving the charcoal filter is monitored. On temperature rising above a pre-high temperature level, visual and audible alarms on the charcoal filter housing detection panel and in the Control Room are activated. The Control Room Operator will stop the air flow through this filter alowing for cooling of the charcoal through starvation of the oxygen supply to the fire. Should the fire not extinguish itself the temperature will continue to rise, the filter housing will become hot and the automatic thermal detection system (using rate compensated detectors), installed on an area basis over each charcoal filter housing senses the heat and activates the fire suppression system as described at item 8 of this analysis, fire alarms are transmitted to g the Control Room via the Communications Room, the local fire detection control pannt and locally to the fire sone. The potential maximum propagation of the charcoal fire will be reduced by initial use of area portable fire entinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of hose lines on developing fires by employees either responding to this fire or present in the area for maintenance or repairs of equtpment (as deserthed under item 7). If the multi-cycle sprinkler system has not actuated automatically the postulated fire might involve the charcoal filter and damage associated ducts, fittings, cabling and controls. However, the multi-cycle sprinkler system can 9.5A-40 Amendment No. 15 L .
SHNPP FSAR he actuated' manually from either the system control valve on Elevation 261 ft. Fire' Zone I-A-4-COMB or any dual action manual alarm station on this elevation. Damagu will then be confined to the area of inception with only
- very ~ timited exposure to adjacent cabling, adjacent combustible materials, if, any, and damage to exposed equipiment.
The~ early warning (llne detectors) f rom the charcoal bed and/or the tonLzation amoke detectors located at the cetting of the fire zones will alert the
~ Control Room Operator to stop the air flow through the filter and dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of ef fective manual fire fighting, if necessary, through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hoselines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system. The postulated charcoal fire is not considered to have suffletent potential for spread to cause failure of redundant safety related cable trays, plant equipment and associated cabling and controls, which are isolated by special separation, partial structural and fire barriers, and provision of an automatic fire extinguishing system. The fire area is enclosed within three-hour fire barriers. Therefore, the capability of the plant for safe. shutdown and control of radiation releases to the environment in not impaired by a charcoal fire in the reactor auxiliary building balance. 15 B. CABLE Fil:ES The cable fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of localtzed concentrations of insulation on cables in' trays and in conduit located in and traversing the area, located on Elevation 190 ft. (Fire Zones I-A-t-PA and t-A-t-PB, See Figure 9.5A-6) Elevation 216 f t. (Fire Zone I-A-2-Mp, See Figure 9.5A-6), Elevation 236 f t. (Fire Zones 1-A-3-COMB, 1-A-1 COMK, I-A-3-COMI , I-A-3 -COR , 1-A-3-MP, 1-A-3-PB, See Figure 9.5A-7),
Mlevation 261 ft. (Fire Zones 1-A-4-CHFA, 1-A-4-CHFB, 1-A-4-CHLR, 1-A-4-COME, 1-A-4-CONI, 1-A-4-COR, See Figure 9.5A-8), Elevation 286 ft. (Fire Zones I -A-5-IIV A, I-A-5-HVB, 1-A-5-BATN, See Figure 9.5A-9). Transient combustibles may be present in the area as detatted under Item 4 of this analysis. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated cable fires are reduced by early detection using ionization type smoke detectors installed in each zone at the ceiling on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of combustion generated by the smoldering cable insulation and alerts employees both locally and in the Control Room, via the Communications Room, 15 no that manual fire response can be initiated promptly. Ready access is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas, as described under Item 7, facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines on developing fires by employees responding to the fire, or present in the area for maintenance or repair of the equipment. Additional fire protection defense is' provided for some fire zones, as shown on the figure by the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler systems, as described under item 8. If the multi-cycle sprinkler has not actuated automatically the postulated fire might: 9.5A-41 Amendment No. 15 m
SHNPP FSAR
'- Involve other cable trays above the tray where _ ignition occurs.
Estend to the first fire break'along the cable -run, the area _ fire
. harrier penetration seal or to the nearest floor penetration seal.
t
- Involve adjacent transient combustibles, if any are present in the area. i
- However, the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system can be actuated manually by caployees responding to the fire..either for a dual action manual fire
- alarm-station located in or adjacent to the _ area or from the system control' >
valve emergency manual release, thus reducing the potential fire consequences i described above. Damage will be limited to the immediate area of inception with very limited damage to exposed equipment.
^
Before the actuation of the automatic fire suppression system early warning , smoke detection system (ionization detectors) will alarm a fire condition in tle Control Room. The control room operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade ,' for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of ef fective manual fire fighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, as described above thus reducing the fire spread. < The postulated fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause failure of redundant safety related cable trays, plant equipment and 1 associated cabling and controls which are isolated by special separation partial structural barriers, and provision of automatic suppression systems. , i Therefore, the capability of the plant for a safe shutdown and control of radioactive releases to the environment is not impaired by a cable fire in RAR hatance. I Should an oil fire due to the spillage of a 55 gal. oil drum occur in the Fire Zones I-A-3-COMR, 1-A-3-COME, 1-A-4-CHLR, 1-A-4-COME, since all cable trays are located at ceiling level due to the size of the spillage area, the magnitude of the fire is not expected to affect the cable trays above. The products of combustion from the oil fire will be sensed by the fire detection system and an alarm will ' sound in the Control Room. The control room operator I will immediately dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual fire fighting through use of : portable fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the fire suppression system. Should the oil fire prove to be more severe than anticipated the heat released l will actuate the multi-cycle sprinkler, as described under item 8 of this l analysis. This will control the fire and prevent possible damage to the r redundant cable trays prior to the arrival of the Fire Brigade. !' C. OIL FIRES ' The oil fires postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire reasonably expected in the area, of localized concentrations of oil released from containment spray pumps, i
-i I' 9.5A-42 .l j
, - . - _ , _ . ~ . _ , . _ _ . _ - - . . _ - _ -__ _ _ _ _ __.___-._.. __ - _.
,- _ .-. ]
r -'
~
s . SHNPP FSAR-restdual heat removal pumps (Fire Zones 1-A-1-PA, 1-A-t-PB on Elevation 190 f t.),' charging pumps, auxiliary feed pumps, component cooling water pumps,
- service water booster pumps (Fire Zone I-A-3-PB on Elevation 236 f t.), with spill over a.ljacent area and impingement on nearby equipment (see Figures 9.54-6 anil 9.5A-7). Common traostent could he n 55 gal. oil drum,
. wood, rags. and plastic coverings, used for maintenance and repair operations.
J -The potential maximum propagation of the postulated ott fire in Fire Zones
.; -l-A-t-PA and 1-A-1-PR on Elevation 190 f t. and ' Fire Zone 1-A-3-PB on Elevation
l116 ft. is reduced by early detection using ionization type smoke detectors Installed at the. ceiling, on an area basis. The automatic detection system spnses products of combustion generated by the burning ott and alerts
- cmployees both locally and in the Control Room, via the Communications Room, 13 no that manual fire response can he initiated promptly.
Rearly access to provided to the area from adjacent plant areas, stairways at Colomos Gt5 Land C39, access aisles from Fire Zones 1-A-3-COMs and 1-A-3-COR, facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental usn/of standpipe hose lines on developing fires by employees responiling to the fire. Aililitional fire protection defense'is provided by the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler systems, as deserthed under item 8. If the multi-cycle sprinkler nystem has not actuated automatically the postulated fire might Involve other equipment or cable trays, above area where ignition occurs. Extend to the area fire barrier or nearest floor penetration. Ilowover, tho automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system can be actuated manually by employees responding to the fire, either from a dual action manual fire alarm stntion located in or. adjacent to the fire zone from the system control valvo emergency manual release, thus reducing the potential fire consequences iloscrt hed above. Damage will be limited to the immediate area of inceptica with very limited damage to exposed equipment. Ilefore the actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, early warning smoke detection system (ionization detectors) will alarm a fire condition in the Control Room. The Control Room Operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade 15 for prmnpt annessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual fire fighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, as described above thu9 reducing the fire,apread.
.The postulated fire is not considered to have sufficient potential spread to
'causo fatture of redundant safety related plant equipment, associated cabling and controls, relundantJ safety related cable trays, which are isolated by special separation, partial an/. full structural barriers, provision of automat te fire suppression syste:as. *lhe fire area is enclosed within t hree hour fire barriors. . Therefore, the capahtlity of the plant for a safe shutdown and control of radioactive relonses to the environment is not impatreil by an ott fire in any of these zones, within RAB halance.
p
- < 9.5A-43 Amendment No. 15
-[$
SHNPP FSAR lei. FIRE AMEA EQUIPHENT Liste below is the anechanical and electrical equipment both safety and non-* Luty related shown on the plant deneral arrangement drawings for this a re. i . Note N/A = Not Applicable Safety Equipinen t kelated Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Namo or & Safety Enclosures Re- Re sist ke tard Description Div. Yes g 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 1 -A-t -F D, Floor Urain Tank Roois, Elevation 1 %) Lt. Floor Drain Te matur Tank IX-NNS X N/A l-A-t-ED, Equipment . Urain Tank Koose, Elevation LW t L. l hqulguent Drain i Trannter Tank. !X-NHS X N/A Equignment Drain Tranatur Pumps. lA-NNS X N/A l pA-1-l'A, ken tdual l tien t Kemoval Pump Rooi. LA, l hievation IW lt. Floor drain t rana tu r tank ptmaps. lA-NHS X N/A Floor drain transfer tank pienps. Iti-NNS X N/A Kiin t p Su'm p Pus.ip 1A-NHS X N/A r,ipilp Susap Pump til-NNS X N/A ilhv Unit AHS-L A-S A X N/A X 9.5A-44 t
l SHNPP FSAR l l l Safety Equipment 'Related Redundant Countarpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire ,
. Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Ratard De scription Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Resid. Heat Removal Pump _ lA-SA X N/A X Contain Spray Pump 1A-SA X N/A X Contain Mat Submerg.
Drainage Pump. lA-NNS X N/A Contain Mat Submerg. 4 Drainage Pump. 1B-NNS X N/A 1-A-1-PB, Residual heat Removal Pump Room 18, Elevation 190 ft. H&V Units AH-5 13-SB X X Contain Spray Pump 1B-SB X X Resid.-Heat Removal Pump 1B-SB X X Equip. Drain s IC-NNS X N/A Stasp sPumps 1D-WNS X N/A Contain Mat IC-NNS X N/A Submerg. Pumps ID-NNS X N/A 1-A-2-COR, Access' Corridor, Elevation 216 ft. Safe-Shutdown IX-NNS X N/A Fire Proc. Booster Pump I N/A 10 Ton Honora11 HMS X N/A l
- ~
s 9.5A-45 s
SENPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Se paration ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 1-A-2-PT, Pipe Tunnel Elevation 216 ft. - Floor Drain 1A-NNS X N/A Stamp Pumps (2) 13-NNS X N/A 1-A-2-MP, Miscellaneous Equipment & Pumps, Elevation 216 ft. . H&V Unit AH-2P 1B-SB X N/A X Component Cool Water IX-NNS X N/A Drain Tk. Inst. Rack Al-R32 NNS X N/A Inst. Rack Al-R5 NNS X N/A Component . Cool Water 1X-NNS X N/A Drain Tank Pump Boron Inject Tk. IX-SAB - X N/A X MCC 1u22 NNS X N/A MCC 1E22 NNS X N/A inst. Cab Al-C1 1 N/A doron Inject LA-SA X X Recirc. Pumps (2) 1B-6B X X Inst. Rack Al-Rl-NNS X N/A Cont. Spray X X Additional Tk 1A-SAB Inst Rack Al-R2-NNS X N/A KVAC Condensate IA-NNS X- N/A
. se 9.5A-46
SHNPP FSAR Safety . Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Re sist Retard Description. D_iv. . Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Transfer Tank Pumps (2) IB-fins X N/A HVAC Cond. Transfer Tank IX-NNS X N/A Inst. Rack Al-R31 X N/A dV Unit AH-28 1A-SA X - X Inst. Rack Al-R4 X N/A 1-A-3-COMB, Coltsans 41 to 43 and 8 to E, Elevation 236.00 ft. CVCS Chillers lA-NNS X N/A CVCS Chiller Pump 1B-NNS X N/A CVCS Chiller Pump 1A-NNS X N/A d&V Unit AH-30 1X-NNS X N/A Rinse Tanks NNS X N/A Untrasonic NNS X N/A Tank Drying Out NNS X N/A Table Seal Water heat Exchanger IX-SN X X Sprinkler Equipment l Area NNS X N/A 9.5A-47
p SHNPP FSAR . Safety Related Radundant Counterpart Separation Equipment Barriers or Space Fire Fire ID No. Retard Enclosures Be- Resist Name or & Safety Coating Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. IAss CWeen COnstr. Service Water X Booster Pump 15-SB X AH-8 X X H&V Unit AH-8 Boric Acid X Trana. Pump 1A-SN X Boric Acid X
-Trans. Pump 15-SN X Ultrasonic Cen. NNS X N/A Detergent Drain Sump Pump IX-NNS X N/A Detergent Drain Sump Pump 2X-NNS X N/A 1-A-3-PB, Pumps and Equipment Elevation 236 ft.
Component Cooling Water IB-SB X X X Heat Exch. Component Cooling 15-SB X X X Water Pump Instr. Al-R40 NNS X N/A Rock Instr. Rack 1A-1-11 NNS X N/A 15-SB I X REM-1CC AH7-1B-SB X X H&V Unit 9.5A-48 l L___ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _
SHNFP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be-- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Aux. Steam Gen. Feed Pump (Turbine Driven) Pump IX-SAB X X Turbine IX-NNS X X Aux. Steam Gen. Feed Pump (Motor Driven) IB-SB X X Aux. Steam Gen. Feed Pump (Motor Driven) 14-SA X X Inst. Rack Al-R14 X N/A Monorails 3 ton NNS X N/A Inst. Rack Al-ill3 NHS X N/A . Inst. Rack Al-R29-WNS X ,N/A Steam Gen. Aux. Feed l Pump Control
- Panel 3 X X REM-lCC 1A-SA X X Component Cooling Water Pump 1A-SA X X .
Component
- Cooling Water Pump IC-SAB X X ;
4 i Component j Cooling Water Heat Exchg. lA-SA X X H&V Unit AH-6 1A-SA X X H&V Unit AH-6 13-SB X X H&V Unit Ah-9 1A-SA X X 9.5A-49
. . ~ . , _ _ . . _ , , _ _ _ ,_..._, _ __. _ _ _ _ . _
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No T hr. 1. ass tween Constr. Coating l Inst. Rack Al-R16 NNS X N/A Service Water Booster Pump 1A-SA X i I Instr. Rack Al-R30 NHS X Instr. Rack Al-RIO NNS X Charging Pump IC-SAB X X Charging Ptamp 1A-SA X X ) Charging Pump LB-SB X X l-A-3-COHE, Coltaans 41 to 43 and E to H, Elevation 236 ft. 14tdo m Heat Exchanger IX-SN X X Letdown Reheat Exchanger IX-SN X X Moderacing Heat Exchanger LX-SN X X Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger IX-6N 1 X Aux. Building IX-4(NS 1 X . t Filter Back-wash Transfer Pumps (2) 2X 4NS X X Aux. Building IX-NNS X X Filter Sack-wash Transfer Tank l 9.5A-50
l SHNPP FSAR 9 Safety - l Equipment Ralated Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire
. ~ . . Name or & Safety ,
Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Inst. Rack Al-R34 NNS X X Inst. Rack Al-R36 NNS X X 1-A-3-COMI, - - ~ ~ ~ ~ Columns 41 to 43 and I to L. Elevation 236 ft. H&V Unit AH-23 II-SA X X MCC 1-4A11 NHS X X Recycle Holdup Tank 1-2A-SN X X MCC 1A22-SA X X
~
480V-Aux. Bus 1-4A-1 X X Recycle Evaporator Feed Pump 1&2A-SN X X Recycle Evap. Package 1&2A-SN X X RE 21AC0150A NNS X X Inst. Rack Al-R8 NNS X X Recycle Evap. Control Panel 1&2A-SN X X H&V Unit AH-63 1X-NNS X N/A 1-A-3-g, Mechanical Penetration Area Boron Injection X l Surge Tank IX-SN X Inst. Rack Al-R6 NNS X N/A l l 9.5A-51 l
SHNP'P FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Se paration
-ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist- Retard Description Div.. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating H&V Unit AH-9 18-SB X X Gross failed Fuel Detector NHS X N/A tl&V Unic AK-11 18-SB X X Inst. Rack Al-R7 NNS X N/A ri&V Unic AH-11 1A-SA X X H&V Unit AH-10 1A-SA X X H&V Unic AK-10 IB-SB X X Hydro Test Pump LX-NNS X N/A Inst. Rack Al-R9 NNS X N/A 1-A-3-TA, Tank Area Elevation 236 ft. .
Waste Monitor Tank 1&2B-NNS X N/A Waste Monitor Tank 1&2A-NNS X N/A Waste Monitor Tk. Pumps 1&2A-NNS X N/A Radiation Monitor REM-IMD 1 N/A ED Susp and Pumps IA-MNS X N/A IBWNS X N/A FD Sump and l Pumps (2) 1A-NNS X N/A l IB-NNS X N/A 9.5A-52
SHNPP FSAR Safe ty Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire _ . . . . _ Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description , Div. Yes Noo 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Tank Area Drain Pump IX4NS X N/A Secondary Waste Sample Tank - 1&2X-NNS X N/A Radiation Monitor REM-21WL X N/A Radiation Monitor REM-21WS X N/A Secondary Waste Sample Tank 1&2A-NNS X N/A Pumps (2) 1&284NS X N/A Reactor Makeup Water Pumps (2) 1A-S X X IB-SN X X Condensate Transfer Pump IX-NNS X N/A inst. Rack A1,2-15 NNS X N/A 1 Inst. Rack I A1, 2-17 NNS X N/A Inst. Rack A1,2-k37 NNS X N/A i 1-A-34-RHXA, Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger IA RHR Heat . Exchanger LA-SA X X 9.5A-53
SHNPP FSAR Ssfety Equipment Related, Redundant Counterpart Separation i Barriers or Space Fire Fire ! ID No. I Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 1-A-34-RHXB, Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger IB RHR Heat Exchanger LA-tiB X X I-A-4-CHFA, Charcoal Filter Room 1A Elevation 261 ft. H&V Unit E6 1A-SA X X AH Unit AH-21 NHS X N/A Air Handling Unit AH-26 1A-SA X X Normal Exhaust Plantaa NNS X N/A 1-A-4-CHFB, Charcoal Filter Room IB Elevation 261 ft. H&V Unic E-6 IB-SA X X Air Handling Unic AH-26 IB-SB X X H&V Unic E-4 1X-NNS X N/A 9.5A-54
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Re tard Description Div. _ Yes o N_o, 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 1-A-4-4. HLR, ~ ' Chiller Room Elevation 2bl ft. hVAC Chiller WC-2 IB-SB X X . l Monorail NNS X N/A Air Handling Unit AH-20 1A-SA X X Air Handling Unic AH-20 IB-SB X X l Pump P7 IB-SB X X I Pump P4 IB-SB X X Closed l Expansion Tank 1B-SB X X Chemical Addition Tank 1B-NNS X N/A 11CC 1E-12 NNS X N/A Electronic Console NNS X N/A Chemical IX-NNS X N/A tiix Tank , l Voltsae Control , l Tank IX-SN X X Inst. Rack Al-R33 NNS X N/A inst. Rack Al-R22 NNS X N/A Inst. Rack Al-R27 NNS X N/A Inst. Rack Al-R23 NNS X N/A 4 9.5A-55
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related R,edundan t Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 br. Less tween Constr. Coating l Inst. Rack Al-R24 NHS X N/A Inst. Rack Al-20 NHS X- N/A Inst. Rack Al-19 NHS X N/A l H&V Unit AH-19 1A-SA X X H&V Unit AH-19 18-SB X X HVAC 1A-SA X X Chiller WC-2 Monorail NNS X N/A Ptap P4 1A-SA X X Ptamp P7 1A-SA X X Chem Add. Tk. lA-NNS X N/A Closed Expansion Tank 1A-SA X X HCC 1D12 NNS X N/A 1-A-4-COME, Coitsans 41 to 43 and E to H, Elevation 261 ft. , Recycle Evap. Cond. Filter 1&2A NHS X N/A Recycle Evap. Concent. Filter 1&2A NNS X N/A Recycle Evap. X X Feed Filter 1&2A NNS Spara Domineralizars (3) NNS X N/A t 9.5A-56
l f 1 SHNPP FSAR I i Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire _ _ . . Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Re sist - Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Boric Acid Filter IX-SN X N/A X Aux Bldg N2 Accumulation IX-NNS X N/A Boron Monitor System IX-NNS X N/A Keactor Coolant Filter IX-SN X X Seal Water Return Filter IX-SN X X Seal Water Injection Filter 1A-SN X ~X Seal Water Injection Filter IB-SN X X Cation Bed Demineralizer IX-SN X X Spare Filters (2) NNS X N/A 3 Ton Honorail (2) NNS X N/A Recycle Evap. Cond. Demin 1&2A NNS X N/A Hacycle Evap. Feed Domin. 1&2A SN X N/A Mixed Bed l Domin. IB-SN X X I l 9.5A-57
l SHNPP FSAR Safety Related Redundant Counterpart Separation Equipment Barriers or Space Fire Fire ID No.
& Safety Enclosurg Be- Resist Retard
_ . _ _ Name or Coating Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Thermal'Reger lA-6N X X Domin. Thermal Regen. 15-SN X X Domin. Thermal Regen. IC-SN *X X Demin. Thermal Regen. 1D-SN X X Demin. MCC 1A-22SA X X MCC IB-22SB X , X Instr. Rack NNS X N/A liixed Bed Demin. LA-SN X X 1-A-4-COMI, Column 43 and I to L. Elevation 261 ft. Recycle Evap. Reagent Tank 1&2X NNS X N/A Exchange NHS X N/A Air Plenus Elev. Shaft NNS X N/A 1-A-4M:OMB, Columns 41 to 43 and 8 to E, Elevation 261 ft.' Hacycle Monitor Tank 1&2A NNS X N/A 9.5A-58
1 SHNPP FSAR Sa fe ty ' Isqui pmen t Related Redundant Counterpart Separa tion ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire N.tue or & Sa fety Enclosures Be- Resist Re tard Description Div. Yes N_oo 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 1 -A-5-11ATN , t$attery Koorn Ne u t r,a l , blevatton 28b tt. Isnerdency Sitower
. inst Eyewasil Sta t ion NNS X N/A tlattery & Racks NNS X X l-A-5-ilV A ,
11VAC Koom 1 A, Elevation 2 bt> ft. ^ li6V Unit All-12 1 A-S A X X In -SA X X ticG L A-21 -S A X X HCt: L A-31 -S A X X . NCG 1 A-34-S A X X liy<t rogen 3 X X Recomb. Pinet PICC 1D21 NNS X N/A tice lull NNS X N/A il6V Unit All-82 1A NNS X N/A All-82 1:1 NNS X N/A 11&V Unit All-81 1A NNS X N/A Alt-Ul 16 NNS X N/A l i 9.5A-59
SHNPP FSAR Safety E<luipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation
.ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire N,une or. & Safety .
Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes o N_o, 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 1-A-5-HVB, ilVAC Room 18, Elevation 286 ft. Ilyd rogen X N/A Recomb. 3 Panet MCC 1E21 NNS X N/A MCC IEll NNS X N/A HCC 1821 SB X N/A ,X Plenum 5-501B NNS X N/A 5-501A NNS X N/A MCC IB-34-SB X N/A X MCC LS-31-SB X N/A X 15 1-A-5-HV3, ilVAC F/luipment, Klevation 286 ft. Il&V Fan S-3, IA-NNS X N/A H&V Fan S-3, IB-NNS X N/A Duct NNS X N/A Duct Shaft NNS X N/A Bag Filters NNS X N/A 9.5A-60 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR
\
Safety l Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ' ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Electric NNS X N/A tienting Coil P-5 1-A NNS X N/A P-5 1-B NNS X N/A EAC-1 1-X NNS X N/A i e l l 1
-I 9.5A-61 j
SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.}A.4
-l. Idontification Fire Areas: 1-A-BATA and 1-A-BATB iluilding: Reactor Auxiliary 15 Fire Areas: 1-A-BATA Battery Room 1A, Elevation 286.ft.. ., 1-A-BATB Battery Room IB, Elevation 286 ft.
Shown on Figures: 9.5A-9 and 9.5A-13 Length (f t.): 15 Width (ft.): 14 Height (ft.): 8 , 1 l Area (sq. ft.): 21b Volume (cu. ft.): 700 )
- 2. Occupancy The areas contain hatteries, for safety trains SA and SB respectively, racks, associated controls, wiring in conduit and cable in. trays.
- 3. Boundaries Walls, floors and ceilings are of reinforced concrete construction, with a minimum fire rating of three hours. Only one opening in the wall of each fire - l area is provided for personnel. access protected by a certified three-hour A label type fire rated door. There are no concealed spaces or floor trenches.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in Stu/
Combustible Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 1-A-BATA. Battery Room 1A
-Cable Insulation (RF)
Power 20 3,600 17,500 Control (in condult) 0 0 0 Instrumentation (in conduit) 0 0 0 ' Liquids 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 Total 3,600 17,500 t 9.5A-62 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Quantity. BTU in Stu/ Comhustthie Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. 15 Fire Area: 1-A-BATB, Battery Room IB Cable Insulation (RF) Power 60- 11,000 51,500 control (in condutt) 0 0 0 Instrumentation (in conduit) 0 0 0 Liquids 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient (negligthle) 0 0 0 Total 11,000 51,000 5.- Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three hour rated fire stops at all floors and at rated fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations
-through fire barriers are anchored *or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire 1
stop assemblies. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed hotween. duct and harrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided within ductwork or transfer i openings in safety related ducts. Curbs 6 in. high are provided at each access door to prevent the spilling of battery electrolyte into the adjacent arons. 4 Hased on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms, 1.5 cfm/sq. ft., comparable smoke removal would be i achieved for each aren by a rate of approximately 0.13 cfm/sq. f t. for area 1-A-BATA and 1.0 cfm/ft. for 1 A-BATB. Smoke, heat and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the normal ventilation system for each area: Area: 1-A-BATA Supply: AH-12(IA-SA)& Exhaust: E-28(IA-SA)& 1 (18-SA) (18-SA) 1-A-BATB AH-13(IA-SB)& E-29(IA-SB)& (IB-SB) (IB-SB) Safety , Fire Area Function Class Nbde Flow (cfe) (cfm/sq. f t ._) i l-A-BATA Supply 3 Operating 300 1.43 Supply 3 Standby 300 1.43 i- Exhaust 3 Operating 300 1.43 Exhaust 3 Standby 300 1.43 t 9.5A-63 Amendment No. 15
SliNPP FSAR Safety Fire Area Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq. f t ._) 1-B-BATB Supply 3 Operating 350 1.67 Supply 3 Standby 350 1.67 ! Exhaust 3 Operating 350 1.67 {~^ Exhaust- 3 Standby 350 1.67 , There are no radioactive sources in this area.
- h. Fire Detection i
The type of detection and signaling systems provided in this area and its-functions are as follows: Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone . Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm l
1-A-RATA 1-38 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion , 1 1-A-BATB l l-39 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X } tion
- The local fire detection control panel located in the RAB, Elevation 15 286 ft. covers the fire areas and fire zones on the same elevation.
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audible, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panel. Fur the rmore , for a fire condition, an audible alarm sounds at the fire area.
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to areas 1-A-BATA and 1-A-BATB is provided from adjacent switchgear room 1-A-SWGRA and 1-A-SWGRB respectively. Carbon dioxide extinguishers are provided adjacent to these areas in accordance with NEPA 10. Standpipe hose stations -have been provided adjacent to the areas.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems There ar. no automatic fire suppression systems provided to protect these areas. Plant equipment subject to water damage is mounted on racks four inches high. Ihmage to plant areas and equi ~pment from the accumulation of water dischar:;el from hose lines is minimized by the provision of the Floor Drainage System. I'loor water surcharge is estimated to be significant. Excess water can overflos to adjacent areas.
.9.5A-64 Amendment No. 15 L
SHNPP FSAR'
- 9. . Analysts of Ef fects of Postulated Fires In Fire Areas I-A-BATA and 1-A-BATB, 'the Battery Room 1A and 18 respectively area fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable losulation in cable trays. Transient materials are not anticipated to be prssent in the area. Ilowever, transient materials, such as rags, may he
, brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair. The, quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires, and consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant factLities, is reduced:
- by the use of IEKE 383 qualified cables
-- by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire stops at fire barrier penetrations.
' - by controtting the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures. The extent of damage within and beyond the fire areas is further Ilmited by controlled removal.of heat, smoke and other products of combustion through f continued operation of normal ventilation systems provided in these areas and i by fire-rated barriers enclosing the fire area. The fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of localized 4 concentrations of insulation on cables in trays. The postulated fire might involve several cable trays above the tray in which ignition is assumed, and extend to the area fire barrier fire stop. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire will be reduced by early detection using ionization type smoke detect, ors installed at the ceiling on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of comhnstion generated by the incipient fire and alerts employees both locally g r, and in the Control Room via the Communications Room, so that manual fire response can he initiated promptly. Ready access is provided to the area (as described under Item 7) from adjacent plant areas where extinguishers are located, f acilitating initial use of portable fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines located in adjacent areas by employees responding to the fire. The postulated electrical fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause failure or redundant safety related plant equipment and
- associated cabling and controls which are separated by three hour rated fire harriers. Thus the capability for a safe shutdown of the plant will not be impaired by the postulated fire in th'ese areas.
9.5A-65 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electricel equipment shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this area.
NOTE: N/A - NOT APPLICABLE Safety Equipment Related Redundan t Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire
,. Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard ,_ . _ _ Description. Div.. - Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Area: 1-A-BATA, Battery Room 1A Battery & Racks lA-SA X X Emergency Shower and Eyewash Station NNS X N/A Fire Area: 1-A-BATB Battery Room 13 Battery & Racks 1B-SB X X Emergency Shower -
and Eyewash
! Station NNS X N/A l
9.5A-66 f l l
I SHNPP FSAR
-APPENDIX 9.5A.5
- 1. Identification Fire Area: 1-A-CSRA l Huilding: Reactor Auxiliary 15 j i i Fire Area: 1-A-CSRA, Cable Spreading Room 1A, !!
Elevation 286 ft. i Shown on Figures: 9.5A-9, 9.5A-12, 9.5A-13 ; Width (ft.): Variable . Height (ft.): 1, Length (f t.): Variable Area (sq. ft.): 4,700 Volume (cu. ft.): 79,500
- 2. Occupancy ,
1 The area contains cable in trays and conduit associated with safety train A. l
- 3. Boundarles Wall, floor, ceiling, and structural columns supporting the area boundaries !
are of reinforced concrete construction, with a minimum fire rating of three hours. Multiple wall openings provided for personnel access are protected by certified three-hour A label type fire rated doors. The concealed space in this area is a pipe chase located at Columns 36 and B. There are no concealed , floor trenches. 1 I
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in Btu / .
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Area: 1-A-CSRA, Cable Spreading Room 1A ; t Floor Area: 4,700 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (RF) Power (in condutt) 0 0 0 Control 4,683 735,300 157,000 Instrumentation 1,495 142,000 31,000 , Liquids 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient (Negligible) 0 0 0 Total 877,300 188,000 9.5A-67 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR S. Control of llazards hlectrical genetrations are scaled with three-hour rated fire-stops at all tiours and at rated fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations
; through tire barriers are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire j- stop usemblies. IIVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are scaled between duct and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop i assemblie s. Fire dampers are not provided within safety related ducts.
Three-hour rated fire barriers are provided between safety trains SA and SB at l building columns E-B and 43. Barriers consisting of covers and/or fire
'- retardant coatings are installed between safety and non-safety cable trays ! where Regulatory Guide 1.75 cannot be full'y met. Fire . breaks are provided as required.
tkised on the smoke reisoval rate recommended for the combustible load in the C.ible Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.) comparable smoke removal would be achieved tor this area by a rate of approximately 1.4 cfm/sq. f t. Smoke, heat and products of incomplete combustion are reinoved by the smoke purge system tur this area: Supply: All-12 (IA-SA) Smoke Purge: ES-2 (IA-NNS) AH-12 (IB-SA) ES-2 (1B-NNS) Sa fe ty Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq. ft.) kee t rc ulation 3 operating 2,200 0.5 ( ! A-S A) ltec treula tion 3 Standby 2,200 0.5 (! B-SA) heaoke Purge NNS Operating 8,000 1. 7 Smo ke NNS Standby 8,000 1. 7 i The normal ventitation system for this area is a recirculated system, which in case ot tire, can be switched to once-through operation. The change from the normal ventitation to the smoke purge is manually initiated by the control room operator, ba. sed on the information received from the snoke i detection system installed in the Cable Spreading Room 1A. l The saoke resulting from a fire in Cable Spreading Room 1A is removed by fan i. LS-2 (I A-NNS, IB-NNS), which is normally turned on. I There are no radioactive sources in this area. I i i.
, 9.5A-68 i
S!!NPP FSAR . 6. - ' Fire Detection
' Die types of detection, actuation and signaling systems provided in this area and their functions are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres JDet System
~
Fire Zone' ' Zone Tyjy_ Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm-1-41 Thermal Area -X X X X X X 1-A-CSRA Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion Manual Alarm Stations Area X X X X X X 15
- The local fire detectt'on control panel located in the RAB, Elevation 286 f t. covers the fire . areas and fire zones on the same elevation.
** Local alarm and annunctation of fire or trouble ecndition, both visual and audihte, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panet. Furthermore, for a fire condition an audible alarm sounds at the fire zone.
- 7. Access and initial Response Access to this area is provided from adjacent fire areas, Cable Spreading Rooms: 1-A-CSRB, switchgear room 1-A-SWGRB and 12-A-BAL fire zone 15 12-A- 5-D ill . Carbon dioxide and pressurized water fire extinguishers are provided in the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided adjacent to the fire area.
H. Fire Suppression Systems The fire suppression system provided in this area is an automatic pre-action sprinkler system designed hydraulically to provide water density of 0.3 gpm/nq. f t. of the floor area protected. The system is actuated automatically by the thermal detectors located also at the ceiling level when
- the area temperature reaches 135 F. The spinkler heads open when area temperature reaches 165 F. The system water flow is shut off manually by authorized personnel when the fire is out. The pre-action control valve for the system is located outside of this area, in the switchgear room 18, fire area 1-A-SWGRB (see Figure 9.5A-9). The sprinkler system piping is solsmically supported.
ifanual actuation of the system is provided from the pre-action control valve emergency mechanical release. Remote manual actuation of the pre-action system is provided from the manual alarm stations. located inside or'outside the fire area on Elevation 286 f t. and Elevation 305 f t. 9.5A-69 Amendment No. 15 1
[1 SHNPP FSAR
' Electrical supervision of the suppression system includes control valve position, system valve position, supervisory air pressure, and Lack of waterflow.
flamage to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of oter discharged from sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of a floor drainage system. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant. Excess water can overflow to. adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to the storm drainage system.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires in fire area 1-A-CSKA, the Cable Spreading Room 1A, area fire hazard combustthlen include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays. Transient materials are not anticipated to be present in the area.
The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires, and consequently the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced:
- by use of the IEEE 383 qualified cables ,
- by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire-breaks along cable trays, fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations, three-hour fire barriers between safety train points of close proximity and separational barriers between non-safety and safety cable trays at points of possible fire communication.
- by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further Itmited by controlled removal of heat,. smoke and other products of combustion through continued operation of normal ventilation systems and emergency operation of smoke purge systems provided in this area of high smoke generation potential, and by three hour fire barriers enclosing the fire area. The fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire reasonably expected in the area, of localized concentrations of insulation on cables in trays. The postulated fire might involve severe cable trays above the tray in which ignition is assumed extend to the first fire-break along the run or to the area fire barrier fire stop. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire will be reduced by early detection using ionization type smoke detectors installed at the cetilng, on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of combustion generated by the smoldering cable insulation and alerts employees - both locally and in the Control Room 'via the Communications Room, so that I5 mannat fire response can be initiated promptly. 9.5A-70 Amendment No. 15
3..
'G c r,> ' T A/,
4 1 , s
,l' SENPP FSAR
;g .
s) / J c ., kaady access is provided to tu ' area from adjacent p"lant areas (as described under item 7) . facilitiating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines located in
, adjacent areas by employees responding to the fire.
Additional fire protection ' defense is provided by the pre-action sprinkler system (as described under Item 8). If the pre-action sprinkler syste2, haa,not actuated automatically the postuited fire might involve other cable trays.above the trays where ignition occurs and extend to the nearest fire-break along the cable tray or area fire barrier fire-stop. However, the automatic pre-action sprinkler system can be actuated manually by employees responding to the fire either from the dual action manual fire alarn station located inside or adjacent to the fire area, or from the system valve emergency manual release, thus reducing the potential fire consequences
- described above. Damage will be limited to the immediate area of inception with very limited damage to exposed cable tray.
Before the actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, early warning detection system (ionization detectors) will alarm a fire condition in the Control Room. The control room operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade i for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual fire ! fighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the autostic fire suppression system, as described above, thus reducing the fire spread. The postulated - fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause failure of redundant , safety related plant equipment and associated cabling and controls which are separated by three hour rated fire barriers. Thus, the capability for a safe shutdown of the plant will not be impaired by the postulated fire in the area. j 10. Fire Area Equipment The general arrangement drawings indicate no major mechanical and electrical equipment in the cable Spreading Area lA. A t \ t, % s 7, i l t I 9.5A-71 a .
.,k'- "
w.---m-gm.,,.w.+,. n.,n,_o, _,..,-no_,,,., + , , , ,. ,, .,, ,, . , .
SilNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A d I. Identification Fire Area: 1-A-CSRB. Building: Reactor Auxiliary 15 Fire Area: 1-A-CSRB, Cable Spreading Room IB, Elevation 286 ft. Shown on Figures: 9.5A-9, 9.5A-12, 9.5A-13 Length (ft.): Variable Width (ft.): . Variable Height (ft.): 17 Area (sq. ft.):. 2,125 Volume (cu. ft.): 36,125
- 2. Occupancy
~
This area contains cable in trays and conduit associated with safety train B. I. Boundaries Walls, floor,' ceiling and structural columns supporting the fire area , boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction, with a minimum fire rating of'three hours. Multiple wall openings provided for personnel access are-protected by certified three-hour A label type fire rated doors. There are no concealed spaces or floor trenches.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Area: 1-A-CSRB, Cable Spreading Room IB Floor Area = 2,200 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power (in condutt) 0 0- 0 Control 2,050 321,900 151,500 Instrumentation 1,100 104,500 49,200 Liquids 0 0 0
. So lids 0 0 0 Transtent (Negligible) 0 0 0 ;
Total 426,400 200,700 9.5A-72 Amendment No. 15 l
ot n SHNPP FSAR
- 5. Control of Hazards
- Electrlhal penetrations are sealed with three-hour- rated fire stops at all floors and at rated barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire harrlers are-anchored or eealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop- .
assemblies. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct'and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided .within safety. related ducts. 3- \': Three-hour rated fire barriers are provided twetwein; safety trains SB and SA at building columns E-D and 41. Barriers consisting of Lcovers and/or fire retardant coatings are installed between safety and non-safety cable trays where Regulatory Guide 1.75 cannot- be fully met. -Fire breaks are provided as required. . Based on the smoke removal recommended fori the combustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.)' comparable . smoke removal would be achieved for this area zone room by a rate of approximately 1.0 cfm/sq. f t. . Smoke, heat and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the smoke purge system for this area: Supply: AH-13 (1A-SB) Smoke Purge: ES-2 (1A-NNS) AH-13'(18-SB) ES'-2 (1B-NNS) s Function . Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq. f t.) ~ Ree t reula tion 3 Opera ting 2,200 1.0 j (IA-SB) j Recirculation 3 - Standb) ' 2,200 1.0 (IB-SB) , Smoke Purge NNS ~ < Ope rating. 8,000 3.8 Smoke Purge NNS , Standby 8,000 3.8 The normal ventilation system for this area is a recirculated system which in case of fire can-be switched. to once-through operation. The change from the normal ventilation to the smoke ' purge is manually initiated by' the control room operator, bared onjthe- information received from smoke detection system installed in the Cable" Spreading Room IB.
.The smoke resulting froin a' fire in Cable Spreading Room IB is removed by the f ans~ ES-2 (I A-NNS,15-NNS), which are normdlly turned of f.
s k There are no radioactive' sources in this area. 6 9 4 V 9.5A-73 s t <
1
'SHNPP FSAR
- 6. Fire Detection -
The types of detection,' actuation and' signaling system provided in this area
~
an.1 their functions are as follows: Main Fire Detection
' Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local **. Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm
- l-A-CSRB 1-42 Tliermal Area X X X X X X Ioniza- Area' X X X No X X tion Manual Alarm Station Area X X X X X X 15
- The local fire detection control panel located in the RAB, Elevation 286 ft. covers the fire areas and fire zone's on the same elevation.
** I,ocal alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audible, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panel. Furthermore, for a fire condition, an audible alarm sounds at the fire zone.
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from adjacent fire areas: 1-A-CSRA, 1-A-SWGRB 15 anil 12-A-BAL fire zone 12-A-5-DIPS Carbon dioxide and pressurized water fire
. extinguishers are provided in and adjacent to the area in accordance with NFPA
- 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in and adjacent to the fire area.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems The fire suppression system provided in this area is an automatic pre-action sprinkler system designed hydraulically to provide- water density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. of the floor area protected. The system is automatically actuated by. the thermal fire detectors located also at the ceiling level when the area temperature reaches 135 F. The sprinkler heads open when area
, temperature reaches 165 F. The system water flow is shut off manually by authorized personnel when the fire is out. The pre-action control valve for the system is' located outside of this area, in the switchgear room IB, fire i aren I-A-SWGRB (see Figure 9.5A-9). The sprinkler system piping is l
- . seismically supported. j i .{'
flanual actuation of the system-is provided from the pre-action control valve emergency mechanical release. Remote manual actuation of the pre-action system is provided from the manual alarm stations located inside or outside the fire area on F.levation 286 ft. and Elevation 305 ft. l I 9.5A-74 _. _ ___ _ _ _ _ - - . .j
SHNPP FSAR' Electrical supervision of the suppression system includes' control. valve
~
position, system valve position, supervisory air pressure and lack of water flow. Damage to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of water discharged
. f rom sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of . the
. Floor Drainage System. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be
. insignificant.- Excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is
-directed to the storm drainage system.
- 9. Analysis of Ef fects' of Postulated Fires in Fire Area I-A-CSRB, the Cable Spreading Room IB, area fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable
- trays. Transient materials are not anticipated to be present -in the area.
The quantity of combustible materials-which may be involved in area fires, and consequently,- the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced:
- by the use of IKKK 383 qualified cables
- by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of 1 fire-breaks along cable trays, fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations, '
and three-hour fire barr.iers at safety related cable tray points of close proximity, and separational barriers between non-safety and safety trays at points of possible fire communication.
- by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administration procedures.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke and other products of combustion through continued operation of normal ventilation systems, emergency operation of smoke purge systems provided in this area of high smoke generation potential and by three-hour fire barriers enclosing the fire area. The fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of localized concentrations of insulation on cables in trays. The postulated fire might involve several cable trays above the tray in which ignition is assumed extend i, to the first fire-break along the run or to the area fire barrier fire stop.
. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire 'will be reduced by early detection using ionization type smoke de'tectors installed at the ,
, ceiling, on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of l combustion generated by the smoldering cable insulation and alerts employees j 35 both locally' and in the Control Room via 'the Communications Room, so that manual fire response can he initiated promptly. 4 9.5A-75 Amendment No. 15 h
, - - - - _ - - - - - , - . n . - , - . - . - , . - - - . - - , . . . . . - , , . , . . - - . , .--
SENPP FSAR Ready access is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas (as described under Item 7) facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hoselines located in the area and adjacent to the area by employees responding to the fire. Additional fire protection defense is provided by the pre-action sprinkler system (as described under Item 8). If the pre-action sprinkler system has not actuated automatically the postulated fire might involve other cable trays above the tray where ignition occurs and extend to the nearest fire-break along the cable tray or area fire barrier fire stop. However, the automatic pre-action sprinkler system can be actuated manually by employees responding to the fire, either from the dual action manual fire alarm station located inside or adjacent to the fire area, or from the system control valve emergency manual release, thus reducing the potential fire
- consequences described above. Damage will be limited to the immediate area of inception with very limited damage to exposed cable tray.
= Before the actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, early warning smoke detection system (ionization detectors) will alarm a fire condition in the Control Room. The control room operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual fire fighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, as described above, thus reducing the fire spread. The postulated fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause failure or redundant safety related plant equipment and associated cabling and controls which are separated by three-hour rated fire barriers. Thus, the capability for a safe shutdown of the plant will not be impaired by the postulated fire in the area.
- 10. Fire Area Equipment The general arrangement drawings indicate no major mechanical and electrical equipment in the Cable Spreading Area IB.
9.5A-76
' - - - - -- - .u,., .u. , is
1 SHNPP FSAR ! APPENDIX 9.5A.7 Fire Areas: 1-A-EPA and
- 1. Identification 1-A-EPB 15 Hullding: Reactor Aux 11Lary Fire Areas: 1-A-EPA, Electrical Penetration Area IA (Elevation 261 ft.)
1-A-EPB, Electrical Penetration Area IB (Elevation 261 ft.) Shown on Figures: 9.5A-8, 9.5A-12 Height (ft.): 23 Length (ft.): 63 Width (ft.): 58 Area (sq. ft.): 3,700 Volume (cu. ft.): 8,500
- 2. Occupancy _
Kach of the areas contain electrical penetrations into the Containment, air handling units MCC's, pressurizer heater controls and back up associated
' controls, wiring in conduit and cable in trays.
- 1. Boundaries Walls, floor, ceiling, and structural columns supporting the area boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction, with a minimum fire rating of three hours. Wall openings for personnel access into each area are two certified three-hour A label type fire doors and a certified one-and-a-half-hour n label type fire rated door at each stair tower. Floor openings for handling of equipment are protected by reinforced concrete hatch covers with a three-hour fire rating. There are no concealed spaces or floor trenches.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
1000's sq. ft. Combustible Cal./lb./RF Area: 1-A-EPA, Electrical Penetration Area IA Cable Insulation 730 131,400 35,960 - Power 635 99,695 27,280 Controi 375 35,625 9,750 Instrumentation 9.5A-77 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal. /lb. /RF 1000's sq. ft. Liquids (Minor Inte-gral with Equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient (Negligible) 0 0 0 Total 266,720 72,990 Area: 1-A-EPB, Electrical Penetration Area IB Cable Insulation Power 924 166,320 45,520 control 573 89,960 24,620 Instrumentation 378 35,910 9,830 Liquids (Minor Inte-gral with Equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient (Negligible) 0 0 0 Total 292,190 79,970
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire stops at rated f tre barriers. Mechanical piping. penetrations through fire barriers are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. RVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duet and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided within safety related ducts. Supplemental barriers, fire retardant coatings, and/or fire breaks are provided at cross-overs between safety and non-safety related cable trays at points of close proximity where Regulatory Guide 1.75 criteria cannot be fully met.
Curbs six in. high are provide 1 at the two access openings protected by Class A fire doors, to prevert water from flowing into or out of the fire a reas . 'these curbs also prevent spread of flammable liquids from adjacent ftre area into the areas. 9.5A-78
SHNPP FSAR Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cahic Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.), comparable smote removal would be achieved for each area by a rate of approximately .55 cfm/sq. f t. for 1-A-EPA and .60 efm/sq. f t. for 1-A-EPB. Smoke, heat and products of incomplete emnhustion are removed by _the ventilation system for these areas, as follows: Supply-Normal: .S-3 (IA-NNS) Exhaus t-No rmal: E-17 (1X-NNS) S-3 (18-NNS) E-18 (IX-NNS) E-19 (1X-NNS) Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm /sq. ft.) Fire Area: 1-A-EPA, Electrical Penetration Area 1A Supply NNS Operating 6,200 1.7 Supply NNS Standby 6,200 1.7 Normal Exhaust NNS Operating 6,200 1.7 Normal Exhaust NNS Standby 6,200 1.7 Fire Area: 1-A-EPB, Electrical Penetration Area 1B Supply NNS Operating 5,600 1.5 Supply NNS Standby 5,600 1.5 Normal Exhaust NNS Operating 5,600 1.5 Normal Exhaust NNS Standby 5,600 1.5 There are no radioactive sources in these areas.
- 6. Fire Detection The types of detection, actuation and signaling systems provided and their funettons for these fire areas are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 1-A-epa 1-30 Thermal Area X X X X X X Ioniza- Area X X X No X X t ion 9.5A-79
SHNPP FSAR Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm Manual Alarm Station Area X X X X X X 1-31 The rmal Area X X X X X l-A-EPB X Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion Manual Alarm Station Area X X X X X X 15
- The local fire detection control panel located in the RAB, Elevation 261 ft. covers the fire areas and fire zones on the same elevation.
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audible, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panel, an audible alana sounds at the fire zone.
- 7. Access and initial Response Access to area 1-A-EPA is provided from the adjacent corridors (fire zones I-A-4-COR, and 1-A-4-CHLR), f rom the fire area 1-A-BAL and stairwell at Col 15HG .
Access to area 1-A-EPS is provided from the adjacent fire zones 1-A-4-CHFB, 1-A-4-CHLR, part of fire area 1-A-BAL and stairwell at Col 38-C. Carbon dioxide type extinguishers are provided in and adjacent to the areas in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in and adjacent to these areas.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems The fire suppression system provided in 'these areas is an automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system installed at ceiling level and hydraulically elesigned to provide water density of 0.3 gpm/sq. f t. of the floor area protected. The system is actuated automatically by thermal detectors located also at the ceiling level when the area' temperature reaches 135 F. The sprinkler heads op' en when area temperature reaches 165 F. The system water flow is shut off automatically from the control valve when the area temperature drops below 135 F. The multi-cycle control valve for'the system is located outside these fire areas, accessible from an aisle in fire area 1-A-RAL, fire zone 1-A-4-COMB (See Figure 9.5A-8).
Amendment No. 15 9.5A-80
1 SHNPP FSAR
= Hanual actuation of the system is provided from the multi cycle control . valve emergency mechanical release. Remote manual actuation of the multi cycle system is provided f rom the dual action manual, alarm stations located inside or outside each fire area on this elevation. Electrical supervision of the suppression system includes control ~ valve position, system valve position, Enupervisory air pressure and lack of water flow through the control valve.
Sprinkler system ' piping is seismically supported.
~
Plant icleetrical' equipment subject to water damage is protected by. four in. I floor pedestals. . - The motor of air handling units are totally enclosed and mounted on eight .in. steel support mounted on six in. concrete base. Damage to; plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of water discharged from sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of the Floor
. Drainage-System. Floor surcharge is estimated to be insignificant. Runoff is directed to the floor drain transfer tank.
- 9. ' Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fire in Fire Areas 1-A-EPA'and 1-A-EPB the fire hazard combustibles include
.normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, conduit, connection boxes and pull boxes. Transient materials are not anticipated to be present in the area. However, transient materials such as rags, wood, or solvents may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair.
The quantity of combustible-materials which may be involved in area fires, and consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced:
- by the use of IEEE 383 qualified cables.
- by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of ,
fire-breaks along cable trays and fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations, and separational barriers between non-safety and safety-cable trays at points of possible fire communication.
- by provision of six in. curbs at the door which prevent any combustible liquid spill from getting into the fire area. -
- by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administration prueedures.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke and other products of combustion through
. continued operation of normal ventilation systems and by three-hour fire rated - fire . harriers enclosing the fire area.
The fire postuinted for these areas assumes ignition and sub' sequent development into'the most severe single fire expected in the areas of localized. concentrations of insulation on cables-in trays. 9.5A-81
f p SHNPP FSAR The; potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire wiLL be reduced by early detection using ionization type smoke detectors at the ceiling, on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of combustion generated by the smoldering cable insulation and alerts employees both locally 15 and in the Control Room, via the Communications Room, so that manual fire response can he initiated promptly. Ready access is provided to.the area from adjacent plant areas (as described under item 7 factittating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines on developing fires by employees responding to the fire. Additional fire protection defense is provided by the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system (as described under item 8). If the multi-cycle sprinkler system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might:
- involve other cable trays, above the tray where Lgnition occurs.
- extend to the nearest fire break along the cable tray or the area fire barrier fire stop.
Ilowever, the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system can be actuated manually by employees responding to the fire, either from the dual action manual fire alarm station located adjacent to the fire areas, or from the system control valve emergency manual release, thus reducing the potential fire consequences described above. Damage will be limited to the immediate area of inception with very Limited damage to exposed equipment. Before the actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, early warning smoke detectioa system (ionization detectors) will alarm a fire condition in the Control Room. The Contro1 Room Operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt annessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual fire fighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, as deserthed above, thus reducing the fire spread. The postulated fire is not considered to have suf ficient potential for spread to cause failure of redundant safety related plant equipment and associated cabling and controls which are separated by three-hour rated fire barriers. The capahtitty of the plant for safe shutdown is, therefore, not impaired by the postulated cable fire for any of these areas.
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electrical ' equipment, both safety and non-safety related shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this area:
N/A = Not Applicable 9.5A-82 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire L_ Name or di Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coatina Fire Ares 1-A-EPA, Electrical Penetration Area lA Press. her. backup group "A" distrib. panel 1A-SN X X Press. her. backup group "D" distrib. panel ID-SN X N/A Press. her. control group "C" I distrib. panel IC-SN X N/A f
\
anV Unit AH24 ) IX-SA X X MCC 1A-24 X N/A Containment Electrical Pene-trations (Ref. Section 8.3.1.1) IE X Fire Area 1-A-EPB, Electrical Penetration Area 18 t%V Unic AH25 IX-SB X X MCC 18-24 NNS X N/A l Press. her, backup i group "B" panel 18-SN X X ! Fress. her. backup group "E" panel IE-SN X X Containment . diectrical Pene-trations (Ref. Section 8.3.1.1) IE X 9.5A-83 - L.. . .
SHNPP-FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.8
- 1. Identification Fire Area: 1-A-SWCRA Building: Reactor Auxiliary 15 Fire Area: 1-A-SWCRA, Switchgear Room 1A, Elevation 286 f t.
Shown on Figures: 9. 5A-9, 9. 5A-12, 9. 5A-13 Length (f t.): 72 Width (f t.): 71 Height (ft.): 16 Area (sq. ft.): 5,200 Volume (cu. ft.): 83,000
- 2. Occupancy The area contains 6.9 kV and 480V emergency switchgears, DC panels, diesel sequencer pane t I A-SA, transfer panel 1A-SA, battery chargers and associated controls, miscellaneous electrical panels, wiring in conduit and cable in trays.
- 1. Boundaries Watts, floor, ceiling, and structural columns supporting the area boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction, with a minimum fire rating of three hours. Multiple wall openings are provided for personnel access protected by certifled three-hour A label type fire rated doors. Floor and ceiling opening for handling of equipment are protected by reinforced concrete hatch covers with a three-hour fire rating. There are no concealed spaces or floor trenchen.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Area: l-A-SWGRA, Switchgear Room lA Cable Insulation Power 410 73,800 14,250 , Control 165 25,900 5,000 Instrumentation 165 15,700 3,050 Liquids (minor inte-gral with equipment) 0 0 0 9.5A-84 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in RTU/
~ Combustible Cal . /lb. /RF 1000's sq. ft.
Solids 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 'O Total 115,400 22,300
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire stops at all
. floors and at rated fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire barriers are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assembites. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duet and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop
- assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided within safety related ducts.
c Supplemental barriers consisting of cable tray covers, fire retardant enatings, and/or fire breaks are provided at crossovers between safety and non-safety related cable trays or points of close proximity where Regulatory i Guide 1.75 cannot be fully met. To prevent the spread of flammable liquids or hazardous materials spill into this area, 6 in. high curbs were provided at the neeens doors from fire areas 1-A-BAL (fire zones 1-A-5HIVA and 1-A-5-BATN) and 1-A-BATA.
- Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.) comparable smoke removal would be achieved for this area by a rate of approximately 0.17 efm/sq. f t. Smoke, i
heat and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the normal ventilation system for this area, which in case of fire is switched remote
; manually to onee-through operation.
4 Supply: AH-12(IA-SA) Exhaust: E-28(!A-SA) l AH-12(IB-SA) E-28(!B-SA)
, Smoke Purges Valved Roof Vents i Safety l
Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/sq. f t.) Supply 3 Operating 22,400 4.3 1 Supply 3 Standby 22,400 4.3 Reetreulation 3 Operating 21,800 4.0 , Ree t reula t ion 3 Standby 21,800 4.0 i Exhaust 3 Ope rating - 600 6.1 l t ( 9.5A-85 l-i
, ~ _ _ , _ _ . - , , . - . , , -~ .< . . - . . . ~ , . .-.._,m_,.- o-.,_....--- . . . . . . . _ _ . - - . . _ . - , _ , - . . . - - - ,
SilNPP FSAR I Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (c fm/sq.. f t .1 Exhaust 3 Standby 600 0.1 Smoke Purge 3 Standby 21,800 4.0 There are no radioactive sources in this area.
- h. Fire Detection The type of detection and signaling system provided in this area and their Iuncttons are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local *
- Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm I-A-SWGRA 1-35 Ionization Area X X X No X X Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X
- The local fire detection control panel located in the RAB, Elevation 15 286 ft. covers the fire areas and fire zones on the same elevation. l
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and a nil l ble , are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panet. Furthermore, for a fire condition, an audible alarm sounds at the fire area.
7 Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from adjacent fire areas: 1-A-SWGRB, 1-A-BAL (fire zones: 1 -A-5-ilV 3, 1-A-5-l!VA, 1-A-5-BATN) and 1-A-BATA. Carbon dioxide portable extinguishers are provided in and adjacent to the area in accordance wlth NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided adjacent to the area. 8 Fire Suppression System There are no automatic fire suppression systems provided to protect this area. Plant equipment subject to water damage is mounted on four in. high floor pedestals. Damage to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of water discharged from hose lines is minimized by the provision of the Floor Drainage System. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant. Excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to the storm drain system.
r SHNPP FSAR 9.- Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires In Ftrc~ Area 1-A-SWCRA, Switchgear Room 1A, area fire hazard combustibics incliule normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, connection boxes and limited amounts of cable insulation within control panets. Transtent materials are not anticipated to be present in the area. Ilowever..transtent materials, such as rags, wood, solvents, etc., may he brought in'to the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair. The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires, and consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced:
- by the use of IEEE 383 qualified cables.
- by provision of six in. high curbs at the doors from areas where combustible liquids may be introduced, thus preventing propagation of combustibles into the area.
- by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire-breaks .along cable trays and fire-stops at fire barrier.
penetrations. Fire retardant coatings and/or separational barriers are provided between safety and non-safety related cable trays at points of possible fire communication.
- by controtting the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by three hour fire barriers enclosing the fire area. The fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development
- into the most severe single fire expected in the area of localized concentrations of insulation on cables in trays. The postulated fire might involve several cable trays above the tray in which ignition is assumed, and extend to the first fire-break along the run or to the area fire barrier fire stop.
The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire will be reduced by early detection using ionization type smoke detectors installed at the cetting, nn an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of combustion generated by the smoldering cable insulation and alerts employees y$ both locally and in the Control Room via the Communications Roon, so that manual fire i response can be initiated promptly. Ready access is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use , of standpipe hose Itnes located in adjacent areas by employees responding to the fire. l The postulated fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause f at ture 'of redundant safety related plant equipment and associated i 1 9.5A-87 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR cabling and controls which are separated by three hour fire barriers. Thus, the capability for a safe shutdown of the plant will not be impaired by the postulated fire in the area.
- 10. Fire Area Equipment ,
Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment both safety and non-safety related shown on the plant general arrangement drawing for this areat Note N/A = Not Applicable Safety Equipment' __ .._ Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes g 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 6.9 kV Emergency Switchgear 1A-SA X X 480V Emergency Switchgear 1Al X X 480V Emergency Switchgear 1A2-SA X X 480V Emergency Switchgear 1A3-SA X X 480V Switchgear 1D1-NNS X N/A 6.9 kV Switchgear 1D-NNS X N/A 480V Switchgear 1D2-NNS X N/A 6.9 kV Switchgear 1A X N/A I B-CH 1A-NNS X N/A DC-Panel 1A-NHS X N/A 9.5A-88
SENFP FSAR . Safety Related Redundant Counterpart Se paration h.quipment ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire
,- Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes -g 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating B-CH IB-WNS X N/A n-CH 1A-SA X X d-CH IB-SA X X CF-EllC-28 IX-NNS X N/A DC-Panel 1A-4A X N/A DC-Panel 1A-1 X N/A oc-Panel 1A-SA X X Transfer Panel A 1A-SA X X biesel Sequencer Panel A 1A-SA X X Exhaust Fan E-Zu 1A-SA X X ,
Exhaust ' Fan E-28 IB-SA X X I i l I i l l 9.5A-89 I
f SHNPP FSAR f APPENDIX 9.5A.9
- 1. Identification Fire Area: 1-A-SWGRB Building: Reactor Auxiliary 15 Fire Area: 1-A-SWGRB, Switchgear Room IB, Elevation 286 ft.
shown on Figures: 9.5A-9, 9.5A-12, 9.5A-13 Length (f t.): 76 Width (ft.): 71 Height (ft.): 16 Area (sq. ft.): 5,400 Volume (cu. ft.): 86,400
- 2. Occiipancy The area contains 6.9 kV and 480V emergency switchgears, DC panels, transfer panel 8, diesel sequencer panel B, exhaust fans, battery chargers and associated controls, wiring in conduit and caole in trays.
- 3. Boiinda ries .
Walls, floor, ceiling, and structural columns supporting the area boundaries pre of reinforced concrete construction with a three-hour minimum fire rating. Multiple wall openings are provided for personnel access protected by certified three-hour A label type fire rated doors, one certified one-and-a-half-hour B label type fire rated door is provided at the stair tower. Floor and ceiling openings for handling of equipment are protected by reinforced concrete hatch covers with a three-hour fire rating. There are no concealed spaces or floor trenches. 1
- 4. Comhiistible Loading >
Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's s3. ft. Fire Area: 1-A-SWGRB, Switchgear Room lA Floor Area: 5400 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (RF) Power 1,220 219,600 40,700 , Contro1 555 87,200 16,200 Ins t rumenta tion 680 64,600 12,000 blquids (minor inte-gral with equipment) 0 0 0 9.5A-90 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Solids 0 0 0 - Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 Total 371,400 68,900
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire stops at rated fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire barriers are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct and harrler opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided within safety related ducts. To prevent the spread of flammable liquids or hazardous materials spill into this area six in. high curbs were provided at the access doors from fire areas 1-A-BAL (fire zone I-A-5-ilvB) and 1-A-BATB. Supplemental barriers consisting of covers, fire l} hreaks, and/or fire retardant coatings are provided at crossovers between safety and non-safety related cable trays or points of close proximity where Regulatory Guide 1.75 cannot be fully met.
Raned on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.) comparable smoke removal would be achieved for this area by a rate of approximately .51 cfm/sq. f t. Smoke, heat an products of incomplete combustion are removed by the ventilation system for this area which in case of fire is switched remote manually to once-through operation. Supply: AH-13(IA-SB) Smoke Purge: Valved Roof All-13( I B-SB) Vents Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq. ft.) Recirculation 3 Operating 22,800 4.2 i Rectreulation 3 Standby 22,800 4.2 Smoke Purge 3 Standby 22,800 4.2 There are no radioactive sources in this area.
- 6. Fire Detection The type of detection and signaling system provided in this area and its functions are as follows:
9.5A-91 Amendment No. 1
SHNPP FSAR Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm l-A-SWGRB 1-35 Ionization Area X X X No X X Manual Alarm Stations Area X X X No X X
- The local fire detection control panet located in the RAB, Elevation 15 286 ft. covers the fire areas and fire zones on the same elevation.
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audible, are provided for. each area / detection zone at the local control panet. _Furthermore, for a fire condition, an audible alarm sounds at the f i re a rea.
- 7. Accessible and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from adjace"' fire areas: 1-A-SWGRA, 1-A-CSRA, 1-A-CSRB, 1-A-ACP, 1-A-BATB, 1-A-BAL (fire zone 1-A-5-HVB), stair tower column 36-D and Turbine Building. Carbon dioxide portable extinguishers 15 are provided in and adjacent to the area in accordance with NFPA 10.
St:indpipe hose stations have been provided adjacent to the area. H. Fire Suppression Systems There are no automatic fire suppression systems provided to protect this area. Plant equipment subject to water damage are mounted on four in. high floor pedestals. Damage to plant area and equipment f rom the accumulation of water discharged Irom hose lines is minimized by the provision of a floor drainage system. I'loor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant. Excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to the storm drain system.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postualted Fires in Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB, the Switchgear Room IB, area fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, conduit, connection boxes and limited amounts of cable insulation within control panels. Transient materials are not anticipated to be present in the area.
Iloweve r , transient materials, such as' rags, wood, solvents, etc. may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair. The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires, and consequently the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced: 9.5A-92 Amendment No. 15
(. SilNPP FSAR
- by the une of IEEE 383 qualified cables;
- by provision of six in. high curbs at the doors from areas where combustthle Itquids may be introduced, thus preventing propagation of combustibles.into the' area;
- by list.ttng the continued spread of fire a13ng cable surfaces by ,
proviston of fire-breaks along cable trays and fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations. Fire retardant coatings and/or separational barriers are provided between enfety and non-safety related cable trays at points of close proximity.
- by controlling the introduction of transient comaustibles through administrative procedures.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke and other products of combustion through continued operatton of normal ventilation system and by three-hour fire barriers enclosing the fire area. The fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of localized concentrations of insulation on cables in trays. The postulated fire might involve several cable trays above the tray in which lanition is assumed and extend to the first fire break along the run or to the area fire barrier fire stop. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire will be reduced by early detection using ionization type smoke detectors installed at the ceiling, on an area basis. The automatio detection system senses products of combustton generated by the smoldering cable insulation and alerts employees both locally and in the Control Room via the Communications Room, so that manual fire response can be initiated promptly. Ready access (as detailed under Item 7) is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines located in adjacent areas by employees responding to the fire. . The postulated fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause fatture of redundant safety related plant equipment and associated cahling and controls which are separated by three hour fire barriers. Thus, the capahtlity for a safe shutdown of the plaat will not be impaired by the postulated fire in the area. 9.5A-93 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR
- 10. Fire Area Equipment ,
l
- Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment both safety and )
non-safety related shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this area. Note: N/A = Not Applicable Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Ba- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less twee_n Constr. Coating 6.9 kV Emergency IC-NNS X N/A Switchgear 6.9 kV Emergency 15-NNS X N/A Switchgear 480V Emergency 1El-NNS X N/A Switchgear 480V Energency 1Ei-NNS X N/A Switchgear 6.9 kV Emergency IE-NNS X N/A Switchgear 480V Emergency 152-SB X X Switchgear 480V Energency 183-SB X X Switchgear 480V Emergency 151-SB X X , Switchgear 6.9 kV Emergency 15-SB X X Switchgear Diesel Sequencer Panel B X N/A Transfer X N/A Panel B D.C. Panel 1A-2NNS X N/A D.C. Panel IB-SB X X - S.S. Panci NNS X N/A 9.5A-94 m.
SHNPP FSAR Safe ty Equisanent Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Nasse or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Sprinkler Equipment NHS X N/A Exhaust Fan E-29 1A-SE X X Exhaust Fan 1:.-29 18-SS X X 'O i N [ i . t l l l 9.5A-95
,-c..-- - ,, , . ,. - - - . . - , - - - - , - ,,-----,,,v. ,,-_-~,-,,.n,., . - - - . . - , ,. -r,... , , - - - . - -,.n.-r., - ..-<-
t SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.10
-1.' identificatton Fire Area: 12-A-BAL Ruliding: . Reactor Auxiliary Building f
15 Fire Area: 12-A-BAL, Reactor Auxiliary Building Balance, Elevation 286, 305 and 324 ft. Fire 7,ones: As detailed under Item 4 Combustible Loading. l. 6 Shown on Figures: 9.5A-9, 9.5A-10 and 9.5A-13 Length (ft.): Variable Width (ft.): Variable Height (ft.): Variable. Total Ploor Area (sq. ft.): 29,000 Volume (cu. ft.): 181,000-
- 2. Occupancy _
The area contains ll&V units, smoke purge fans, 3-ton monoraits, exhaust fans, Air llanditng Units, associated controls, wiring in condult and cables in trsys.
- 3. Moundaries Fire area houndary walls, floor, ceilings, roof, and structural columns l nupporting the area boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction, with a ttre rating of three hours as marked on the figures. Wall openings for personnel access are protected by certified three-hour A label type fire rated doors, and certified one-and-a half-hour B label type fire rated doors at state towers.
f< Floor openings for handling of equipment are protected by concrete hatch covers with a three-hour fire rating where required. Concealed spaces consist of valve pits approximately 5 f t. x 1.5 f t. size located in the Demineralizer Fill and Service Area in f Lre zone 12-A-5-DIH, on Elevation 286 f t. There are no concealed spaces in the other Ctre zones.
- 4. Combustthle fondig Qunntity BTU in nTU/
Combustihie Cat./th./ItF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 12-A-BAL, Auxiliary Building Balance g3 l Total Floor Area: 29,050 sq. ft. Cable insulation (RF) Power 895 161,100 5,550 Control 1,218 191,200 6,600 Instrumentation 1,063 101,000 3,500 9.5A-96 Amendment No. 15
I i SittPP FSAR Ouantity BTil in RTif/ Combustthie Gal./1h./RF 1000's sq. ft. I,1 quids (Minor inte-gral with equipment) 0 0 . O Solids: charcoat (ib.) 89,100 1,7A2,000 61,400 Transient: charcoal (th.) 11,125 111,300 3,000 fiber drums (th.) 280 2,300 An oil (gal.) 55 6,000 200 I Total '2,354,900 A1,230 Fire 7enet 12-A-5-CHF, Charcoal Filter Room Elevation 286 ft. Floor Area: 7,500 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 370 66,600 A,AA0 (in condult) Control (RF) 320 50,100' 6,710 Instrumentation 320 10,4f.3 4,050 (RF) I,1 quids (minor) 0 0 0 Solids: charcoal (ib.) 44,500 445,000 59,400 Transient: charcoat (th.) 11,125 111,200 14,800 fiber drums (ib.) 280 2,300 300 oil (Aa1.) 55 6,000 A00 Total 711,A00 94,940 Fire Tone: 12-A-5-DIH, Dominera11:ers, Instruments, WAC Equipment Room, Elevation 286 ft. Floor Arent 6,100 sq. ft. 9.5A-97 Amendment No. 1
f '~ !- SHNPP FSAR k I Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustthte Cal./lb./RF . 1000's sq. ft2 Cable insulation (RF) Power 0 0 0 Control 378 59,300 9,720 Instrumentation 248 23,600 3,870 Liquids (minor inte-gral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: ott (gal.) , 55 6,000 1,000 Total 88,900 14,590
. Fire 7.one 12-A-6-CHF1, Charcoal Filters, Elevation 305 f t. g3 Floor Area: 3,900 sq. ft.
Cable insulation (RF) Power 195 35,200 8,950 j Control 180 28,300 7,200 ins t rumentation 180 17,100 4,350 Liquids (minor) 0 0 0 Solids: 22,300 223,000 57,100 charcoat (ib.) Tennaient: charcoat (ib.) 11,125 111,300 28,600 fiber drums (th.) 280 2,300 600 oil (gal.) 55 6,000 1,550 Total 423,200 108,350 15 9.5A-98
^" " **" *I
a 3 , 7
' SilNPP FSAtt ,s u o ,e 4
i s a f 3 8 15 i s
. s _
g t ,' . N r Fire 7.one: 12-A-7-IIV, Heating , Ventilating Room, F.levation 324 f t. I'loor Area: > 7,550 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (F) . Power 150 27,000 3,600 Control 160 25,100 3.350 Instrumentation 135_ 12,900 1,750 1.1 quids (minor) 0 0 0 Solids 1 0 0 0 Transients oil (gal.) 55 6,000 800 Totsi 71,000 T3M
- 5. Control of Hasards tInctrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire stops at all floors and at rated fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations throir,h fire barrier walls are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid ftre-stop assemblies. IIVAC ductwork penetrations throtuh fire barriers are scaled between duct and barrier opening with flexihte or semi-rigid fire-stop noncebites. Fire dampers are not provided within ductwork or transfer upontrus in safety-related ducts. Supplemental barriers consisting of covers, fire-breaks, and/or fire-retardant contirgs are provided at crossovers between 9.5A-99 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR safety and non-safety related cable trays or points of close proximity where Regulatory Guide 1.75 criteria cannot be fully met. i Maned on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.), comparable smoke removal would be
- achieved for this area by a rate of approximately 0.3 efm/sq. f t. Smoke, heat, and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the normal ventilation system for this area:
Supply: AH-14(lX-NNS) f Exhausts. E-22(IX-NNS) Funetton Class Mode l' Flow (cfe) (cfm/sq. f t.) ! Supply NNS Supply 22,100 0.8 Exhaust NNS Exhaust 22,100 0.8 There are no radinactive sources in this area.
- 6. Fire Detection The types of detection, actuation, and signaling systems provided in this area and their functions are as follows:
1 Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel *' Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 12-A-6-CllF 1 1-54 The rmal Area X X X X X X ionization Area X X X No X X i Manual ) Ala rm Area X X X X X X ! Station Area X X X No X X 12- A-7-Ilv I-55 tonization Area X X X No X X Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X Elevator 1-56 Ionization Area X X X No X X Shaft 12-A-5-CllF 1-45 Thermal Area X X X X X X - Ionizatton Area X X X No X X Manual Alarm Station Area X X X X X X 9.5A-100
SHEPP FSAR Hain Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det ' System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 12-A-5-n1If I-44 lonization Area X X X No X X Hanual Alarm Station Area X' X X No X X i
l 15- I
- This fire area is covered by three local fire detection control panels as follows:
- fire zones 12-A-5-CHF and 12-A-5-DIH alarm on the panel located 15 .in the RAB, Elevation 286 ft.
- fire zones 12-A-6-CHF1 and 12-A-7-HV alarm on the panel located in the 15 RAR, Elevation 305 ft.
- fire zone 12-A-CHF2 alarms on the panel located in the RAB, 15 Elevation 305 ft.
**l.ncal alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and andthle, are provided for each detection zone at the local control panel and an andthle alarm in the fire zone.
- 7. Accessible and Initial Response 1
Access to this area is provided from adjacent corridors, stair towers, and service elevators as shown on figures. Dry chemical type extinguishers are provided in fire zones 12-A-5-CHF and 12-A-5-DIH only, in accordance with , NF PA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in all fire zones of this area.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems
.The fire suppression system provided in this area is an automatic preaction sprinkler system designed hydraulically to provide area density of -
0.3 gpm/sq. ft. The system is actuated automatically by therma 1' detectors located at the cetting level when the area temperature reaches 135 F. The sprinkler heads open when area temperature reaches 165 F. The system water flow is shut off manually from the control valve by authorized personnel when the fire is out. The preaction control valve for the system is located in t i i ! 9.5A-101 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR switchgear room IR on Elevation 286 f t. Access to the pre-action valve can be gained through the stairwell located at column D36. Manual actuation of the system is provided from the pre-action control valve emergency mechanical release. Remote manual actuation of the preaction system is provided from the manual alarm stations located inside or outside each fire area on this elevation. Electrical supervision of the suppression system includes control valve position, system valve position, supervisory -air pressure, and lack of , water.through the control valve. The sprinkler system piping is seismically supported in areas containing safety related equipment. Plant equipment subject to water damage is protected with water tight enclosures and mounted on floor pedestals. Damage to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of water discharge from sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of a floor drainage system. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant since excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. Runof f is directed to the storm drain system. 9 Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires in Fire Area 12-A-RAL, the RAR Ralance, fire hazard combustibles include 15 normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, conduit, connection boxes, and required quantities of charcoal used within charcoal filters. Transient materials, such as charcoal, rags, wood, solvents, etc., may he brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair. The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires and, consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced:
- by the use of IEEE 383 qualified cables
- by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire-breaks along cable trays and fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations and at every floor penetration for electrical cable tray and/or conduit runs
- by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke, and other products of combustion through continued operation of normal ventilation systems and by three-hour fire harriers enclosing the fire area. The charcoal fire postulated for this area assumes ignition and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area of localized concentrations of charcoal within filters. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire is' reduced by early detection using line-type detectors installed in the charcoal hed. The f temperature of the air leaving the charcoal filter is monitored. On temperature rising above a pre-high temperature level, visual and audible 9.5A-102 Amendment No. 15 l l l
- . ,; , -s ...,3.. s , . . . , .e... . . . . ,
....c... ..... .. ..
l
SHNPP FSAR , alarms on the charcoal filter housing detection panel and in the Control Room are activated. The Control Room Operator will stop the air flow through this filter, allowing for cooling of the charcoal through starvation of the oxygen supply to the fire. Should the fire not extinguish itself, the temperature will continue to rise;
' the filter houging will become hot; and the automatic thermal detection system (using rate compensated detectors) installed on an area basis over each charcoal filter housing senses the heat and activates the fire suppression system as described at Item 8 of this analysis.
if the multi-cycle sprinkler system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might involve the charcoal filter and damage associated ducts, fittings, cabling, and controls. However, the pre-action sprinkler system can he actuated manually from either the system control valve on Elevation 286 f t. or any manual dual-action alarm station in the area. Damage will then be confined to the area of inception, with.only very limited exposure to adjacent enhling, ad jacent combustible materials, if any, and damage to exposed equipment.. The early warning (line detectors) from the charcoal bed will alert the Control Room Operator to stop the air flow through the filter and dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of ef fective manual fire fighting, if necessary, through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines, and/or'nanual actuation of the automstic fire suppression system. The postulated charcoal fire is not considered to have suffielent potential for spread to cause failure of redundant safety-related cable trays, plant equipment, and associated cabling and controls, which are isolated by spacial separation and fire barriers enclosing the Fire Area. Therefore, the capability of the plant for safe shutdown is not impaired by a g5 charcoal fire in the Reactor Auxiliary Balance. 10 Fire Area Equ'ipment I.inted below is the mechanical and electrical equipment, both safety- and non-saf ety related, shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this area. Nocc a N/A = Not Applicable Safety Redundant Counter par t Separation Equipment Related, ID No. Barriers ot Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes jijt 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Zone: 12-A-5-CHF, Charcoal Filter Room, Elevation 286 f t. Il&V linit E-17 IX-NNS X N/A 9.5A-103 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR l t Safety l Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes }io, 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Il&V Unit E-17 IX-NNS X N/A H&V Unit E-18 IX-NNS X N/A l 15 Fan E-22 IX-NNS X N/A l 15 3 l Fire Zone: 12-A-5-DIH, Demineralizers, Instruments, HVAC Equipment Room, Elevation 286 ft. 3-ton Honorail (4) NNS X N/A Smoke Purge ES-1, IA-NNS X N/A 15 Exhaust Fan ES-1, IB-NNS X N/A 15 ES-2, IA.NNS X N/A ; ES-2, IB-NNS X N/A 15 ES-3, IA-NNS X N/A ES-3, IB-NNS X N/A Rosin Filler llopper NNS X N/A Sheet Metal Plenum NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 12-A-6-CHF1, Charcoal Filters, Elevation 305 ft. 15 . Exhaust Fan E-23-NNS X Exhaust Fan E-24-NNS X N/A 9.5A-104 Amendment No. 15
r , 1 SHNPP FSAR I Safety Related Redundant Counterpart Separation Equipment ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Name or & Safety Coating Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr._ H&V Unit F.19, IX-NNS X N/A H&V Unit E20, IX-NNS X N/A k 15 l Fire Zone: 12-A-7-HV, Heating, Ventilating Rcom, Elevation 324 ft. H &V lin tt All-14, IX-NNS X N/A Il&V Unit AH-14, 2X-NNS X N/A H&V tintt All-57, X N/A 1-4X-NNS Il&V Unit AH-58, X N/A 1-4X-NNS Il&V Unit AH-59, X N/A 1-4X-NNS Il&V Unit AH-56, X N/A 1-4X-NNS 9.5A-105 Amendment No. 15
. SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.ll
- 1. Identification Fire Area: 12-A-CR Building Reactor Auxiliary Fire Area: 12-A-CR, Control Room Eievation 305 ft. 15 Fire Zone: 12-A-6-CR1, Control Room 12-A-6-RT1, Terminal Cabinet Room - Unit 1 Shown on Figures: 9.5A-10, 9.5A-12, and 9.5A-13 )
Length (f t. ): 210 Width (ft.): 52 Height (ft.): 17 Area (sq. ft.): 10,700 Volume (cu. ft.): 140,800
- 2. Occupancy i j
The area contains control room panels, computer consoles, radiation monitoring panels, alarms, incore instrumentation, desk relay panels, exhaust fans, component cooling water surge tank, associated controls, wiring in conduit, living quart.ers, visitor's gallery.
- 3. Boundaries Walls, floor, roof, and structural columns supporting the area boundaries are ut reinforced concrete construction, with a fire rating of three hours.
Openings through walls for personnel use, including stairwells, are protected by airtight, seismically designed security doors with a fire rating equal to certified three-hour A label type fire-rated doors. A cast-in place concrete trench approximately 11 ft. long, 2 f t. wide, 8 in. deep is provided under HVAC Control Board located in the Control Room. Covers 15 were not provided for the trench because of its small size and location, internal to the HVAC Control Board. 15
- 4. Combustible Loading ,
The combustible loading is assumed to be negligible since there are no cables in cable trays or other combustibics in the Control Room area at any time. The only fire hazards considered for the area are limited quantities of control and instrumentation cable insulation inside the cabinet and some computer material transients. 9.5A-106 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire-stops at all floors and at rated fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire harriers are anchored or sealed with flexihte or semi-rigid fire-stop assenhites. NVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct .and harrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire-stop assemblies. Automatic fire dampers are not - provided within safety-related ducts.
' Smoke, heat, and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the smoke purge system for this area:
Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq. ft.) 15 Supply: All-15 (IA-SA)&(IB-SB) Exhaust: Normal: Opera-tion: E-9 (IA-NNS)&(IB-NNS) Smoke , Purge ES-1(IA-NNS)&(IB-NNS) Fire Zones: 12-A-6-CRI and 12-A-6-RT1, Control Room and 15 Terminal Cabinet Room Floor Area: 5,600 sq. ft. Normal Supply 3 Operating 14,000 2.5 Normal Supply 3 ' Standby 14,000 2.5 Normal F.<haust NNS Operating 800 0.15 Normal Exhaust / Smoke Purge NNS Standby 800 0.15 Supply / Smoke Purge 3 Operating 14,000 2.5 Supply / Smoke Purge 3 Standby 14,000 2. 5 Smoke Purge NNS Operating 14,050 2.5 Smoke Purge NNS Standby 14,050 2.5 15 9.5A-107 Amendment No. 15
. . . . . ~
SHNPP FSAR-
- 5. Control of Hazards (Cont'd.) 1 Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/sq. ft.)
15 There are no radioactive sources in this area.
- 6. Fire Detection The type of detection and signaling systems provided in this area and their functions are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 12-A-6-CRI l-48 Ionization Area X X X No X X 9.5A-108 Amendment No. 15
. SHNPP FSAR
, 1
- 6. Fire Detection (Cont'd), l l
Main Fire I Detection ) Local Control Panel
- Control Panel 1 Suppres l I
Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 12-A-6-RTl 1-46 Ionization Area X X X No X X Manual Alarm Station Ares .X X X No X X 15 . 4
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audihte, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panel.
Fur ther more , for a fire condition, an audible alarm sounds at the fire zone.
- 7. Access and Initial Response 15 Access to this area is reduced to fire areas: 12-A-CRC (fire zones 12-A-6-ARPI and 12-A-6-CR), Turbine Building and stair tower at Column D-39. Carbon i dioxide and pressurized water fire extinguishers are provided in the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in and adjacent to the area.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems .
There are no automatic fire suppression systems provided to protect this area. Plant equipment subject to water damage is mounted on floor pedestals. 1 Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant. Excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to storm drainage system. 1 l 9.5A-109 Amendment No. 15 j i 1
~
SHNPP FSAR l
- 9. Analysis of Ef fects of Postulated Fires
~
In Fire Area 12-A-CR, the Control Room, area fire hazard combustibles include limited' amounts of cable insulation within control cabinets and panels and limited quantities of ordinary combustibles necessary for the Control Room computer.and instrumentation operation. . Transient materials such as paper and' rags may he' brought into the area during normal operations or for normal facilities maintenance and repair or during plant shutdown. The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires,' and consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced by limiting the permanent quantities of ordinary combustibles.(Class A) and controlling the introduction of transient
. combustibles through the administrative procedures.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controlled removal of heat', s moke , and other products of combustion through continued operation of. normal ventilation systems, by structural' harriers within the area to separate redundant trains or equipment, and by three hour fire barriers enclosing the fire area. The fire postulated for this area assumes ignition and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area of localized concentrations of combustibles permanently present in the area. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire will be reduced by early detection using ionization-type smoke detectors installed at the < ceiling, on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of combustion generated by the incipient fire and alerts employees both at the location of the local control panel and in the Control Room via the Communications Room so that manual fire response can be initiated promptly, as 15 the fire area is permanently occupied. In addition, ready access is provided to the area from adjacent plant area factittating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines on developing fires by employees responding to the fire (as detailed under Item 7). The postulated fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause f ailure of redundant safety-related plant equipment and associated cabling and controls based on the fact that the Control Room is permanently attended, the control cabinets are of the self-ventilated' type, and any products of combustion will quickly migrate to the ceiling of the room, where the automatic detection system will sound an alarm, which will alert the control room operators. As stated in FSAR Sections 7.4.1.2 and 7.4.1.11, in
.the event the Control Room must be evacuated, the plant can be safely shutdown from the Auxiliary Control Panel. The capability of the plant for safe shutdown in therefore not impaired by the postulated fire for this area.
10 Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment, both safety- and
-non-safety, shown on.the' plant general arrangement drawings for this area:
Note: N/A = Not Applicable
=1 9.5A-110 Amendment No. 15 O , m-
SHNPP FSAR Safety Eqkil pment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No, 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Zone: 12-A-6-CR1, Control Room 35 Control Room Panel Area lAl Class 1 X X As required Control Room Panel Area IA2 Class 1 X X As required Control Room Panel Area IC Class IE' X X As required Control Room Panet Area IMI Class IE X X As required Control Room Panel Area 182 NNS X N/A Control Room Panel Area 188 Class IE X X As required Control Room Panel Area llVAC, DI Class IE X X As required Engineered Safety Features Hypass Indication X N/A Control Room Panel Area llVAC, D2, Class IE & NNS X X As required PEN & PAM Instrumen-tation Class IE X X As required Incore Instrumen-tation NNS X N/A Niiclear Instrumen-tatton Class IE X N/A Compiater Operating Console NNS X N/A log & Alarm Typer NNS X N/A , 9.5A-111 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR l Safety l Equipment Related Red undant Counterpart Separation ID No.' Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Descriptisn Div. Yes lio 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Zone: 12-A-6-CR1, Control Room (Cont'd) 15 Radiation Monitoring Panel SA X No Radiation Monitoring Panet NNS X N/A Radiation Monitoring Panet SB X No Start-up Transformer Panet NNS X N/A Generator Relay Panel NNS X N/A Cooling Tower & River Makeup NNS X N/A Setsmic Monitoring Panel NNS X N/A RCP Vibration Monitoring Panet NNS X N/A Loose Parts Monitoring Panet NNS X N/A . Gross Failure Detection Console NNS X N/A Remote Control Lighting Panet NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 12-A-6-RT1, Terminal Cabinet Room 15 Component Cooling Water Surge Tank IX-SAB X X Exhaust Fan E9, IA-NNS X N/A Exhanst Fan E9, IB-NNS X N/A Chemical Additive Tank IX-NNS X N/A 9.5A-112 Amendment No. 15 L
SHNPP FSAR Safety Eq e 1 pment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No.' Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or. & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Desacription Div. Yes N_o, o 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Cc.2 ting Fire Zone: 12-A-6-CRI, Control Nom (Cont 'd.) load Frequency Cabinet NNS X- N/A Turbine Emergency Trip Cabinet NNS X N/A 7.5 kV Uninterruptible Power Supplies IDP-IA-S1 X X 7.5 kV Uninterruptihte Power Siipplies IDP-IA-S3 X X 7.5 kV Uninterruptible Power Suppites IDP-1A-S2 X X
~
7.5 kV Uninterruptible Power Supplies IDP-IA-S4 X X Kltchenette NNS X N/A Ilydrogen Recombiner Control Panet SA,SB X X 112 Recombiner Frame NNS X N/A 15 I i 9.5A-113 Amendment No. 15- [ L r
- . .~. - _ - . _., , . - . - . . _ , _.. _.- _, . _ - = . - - . . _.
SHNPP FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY DELETED BY AMENDMENT No. 15 15 t 9.5A-114 Amendment No. 15 4
r-- SHNPP FSAR l l l l l i I i i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY DELETED 15 BY AMENDMENT NO. 15 Amendment No. 15 9.5A-115
SHNPP FSAR l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY DELETED BY AMENDMENT NO. 15 15 9.5A-116 Amendment No. 15
I SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.12
- 1. Identification Fire Area: 12-A-CRCl Building: Reactor Auxiliary 15 Ftre Area: 12-A-CRC, Control Room Complex, 15 Elevation 305 f t.
Fire Zones: 12-A-6-PICR 1, 12-A-6-CR, 12-A-6-RCC1, 12-A6-ARP1 Shown on Figures: 9.5A-10, 9.5A-12, 9.5A-13 Length (ft.): Variable Width (ft.): Variable Height (ft.): 17 Area (sq. ft.): 5,800 Volume: (cu. ft.): 98,400
- 2. Occupancy The aren contains the plant computer room process instrunent and control racks, auxiliary relay panels, Communications Room, rod control cabinets, reactor trip switchgear, motor generator sets providing DC power for the control rod drive, associated controls, wiring in conduit, and cable in trays.
- 3. Boundaries Walls, floor, roof, and structural columns supporting the area boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction, with a fire rating of three hours. Wall openings for personnel access are protected by certified three-hout A label type fire-rated doors. Cast-in place concrete raceway 10 in. wide, 8 in.
deep, running approximately 100 linear feet is provided in the computer room for the purpose of containing the interconnecting cables for the computers.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 12-A-CRCl, Computer Room Complex 15 Cable Insulation Power 0 0 0 (in conduit, concrete trenches, cabinets) Control 860 135,020 23,500 Instrumentation 860 81,700 14,500 9.5A-117 Amendment No. 15
c SHNPP ' FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal./lb./RF 1000's , sq . ft.
~
Liquids (minor inte-gral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 Total 216,7Y0 38,000 15 Fire Zone: 12-A-6-PICR 1, Process Instru. & Control Racks, Fire 7,one Area: 2,100 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Powe r 0 0 0 (in conduir) Control 860 135,020 65,000 Instrumentation 860 81,700 39,000 Liquids (minor inte-gral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 Total 216,770 104,000 The combustible loading for the remaining three fire zones: 12-A-6-CR, Computer Room, 12-A-6-RCC1, Rod Control Cabinets, 12-A-6-ARP1, and Auxiliary Relay Panels is assumed to be minor since there are no cables in trays or any other types of combustibles present in these zones. The hazards considered j for these zones are limited quantities of control and instrumentation cable j insula, tion within cabinets and panels, as well as limited quantities of l computer material transients. There is a small amount of exposed PVC cable l associated with the distribution frame in the Communications Room, which is an ( insignificant fire loading. l-
- 5. Control of Razards .
Electrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire-stops at rated fire barriers. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed , between duct and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire-stop j assemhties. Fire drapers are not providei within safety related ducts. A fire wall 13 ft. Long 11 ft. high y 1 ft. thick poured concrete is provided 9.5A-118 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR !. between the Motor Generator sets within the area. Supplemental barriers constating of tray covers, fire breaks, and/or fire-retardant coatings are provided at crossovers between safety-and non-safety related cable trays or points of close proximity where Regulatory Guide 1.75 cannot be fully met. Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cable . Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.), comparable smoke removal would be achieved for this area by a rate of approximately 0.08 cfm/sq. f t. Smoke, heat, and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the ventilation system for this area: Fire Zone 12-A-6-RCCI Supply: AH-13 (IA-SA) Smoke Purge: To atmosphere AH-13 (IB-SB) via exhaust port Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq. f t.) Supply & 3 Operating 4,000 2.9 Recirculation Supply & 3 Standby 4,000 2.9 Rectreulation Smoke Purge 3 Standby 4,000 2.9 The Rod Control Cabinet and Communications Rooms are normally ventilated by reetreulation systems. They also have a manual smoke purge capability which exhausts directly to the atmosphere. Fire Zones 12-A-6-PICRI, 12-A-6-CR, and 12-A-6-APRI Supply: AH-16 (1A-SA) Smoke Purge: ES-3 (IA-NNS) AH-16 (IB-SB) ES-3 (IB-NNS) Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq. f t.) Supply & 3 Operating 10,820 2.5 Reelreulation Supply & 3 Standby 10,820 2.5 Recirculation Smoke Purge NNS Operating 10,820 2.5 . 4 Smoke Purge NNS Standby 10,820 2.5 Ventilation system is normally recirculated with a manual smoke purge enpability provided for the Auxiliary Relay Panel Room (1000 cfm), Process I&C t i 4 r 9.5A-119 ,
SHNPP FSAR Solid-State Protection Room (6,200 cfm) and Computer Room (3,620 cfm) through the smoke purge system fans ES-3 (IA-NNS) and ES-3 (1B-NNS). There are no radioactive sources in- this area. I
- 6. Fire Detection The type of detection systems provided in this area and their functions are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System local ** Ann Alare Actu Ann Alarm Fire Zone Zone Tm Basis 12-A-6-RCC1 1-47 Ioni- Products zation of Com-bustion X X X No X X 12-A-6-PICR 1 1-52 Ioni- Products zation of Com-bustion X X X No X X 12-A-6-ARPI l-49 Ioni- Products zation of Com-bustion X X X _ No X X 12-A-6-CR l-50 Ioni- Products zation of Con-bustion X X X No X X
- The local fire detection control panel located in the RAB Elevation 15 305 f t. , fire zone 12-A-6-RT1, covering all fire areas / zones located in RAB Elevation 305 ft. and 324 ft.
** Local alarm and annunication of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audible, are provided for each arca/ detection zone at the local control panel; an audible alarm sounds at each fire detection zone location.
j l 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from adjacent plant areas 12-A-CR and 12-A-HV&lR. ' Carbon dioxide-type extinguishers are provided in and adjacen.e to the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been l provided adjacent to the area. I {. I 9.5A-120 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems j
-There are,no automatic fire suppression systems provided to protect this area. .
There.is no requirement for adequate drainage of fire suppression system I
' water. Floor water. surcharge is estimated to be insignificant since excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to storm drainage system.. . 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires 15 In Fire Area 12-A-CRC, the Control Room Complex fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, trenches, connection boxes, limited amounts of cable insulation within control cabinets, and minor quantities of permanent Class A materials (ordinary .
combustibles). Transient materials, such as rags, wood, light lubricating . otts, and cleaning solvents may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair. The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires and, consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced or minimized:
- by the use of -IKEE 383 qualified cables.
- by limiting the continued spread of fire along cable surfaces by the provision of fire-breaks along cable trays and fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations. Barriers consisting of covers are provided at safety- and non-safety cable trays at points of possible fire communication.
- by limiting permanent quantities of ordinary combustibles (Class A) materials to amounts actually required for normal operations and by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures.
3 The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by 4 controlled removal of heat, smoke, and other products of combustion through continued operation of normal ventilation systems and of the smoke purge , systems in areas of high smoke generation potential, as detailed in Section 9.4.5, and by three-hour fire barriers enclosing the fire area. The fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development 3 Into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of localized concentrations of insulation on cables. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire will be reduced oy early detection using ionization-type smoke detectors installed at the ceiling, on an area basis. The automatic system senses products of combustion generated by the incipient fire and alerts employees both locally and in the Control Room via the Communications Room so that manual fire response can be 15 initiated promptly. 9.5A-121 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Keady access is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines by employees responding to the fire. The postulated cable fire is not considered to have suf ficient potential for spread to cause tailure of redundant safety-related plant equipment and associated cabling and controls which are isolated by special separation or provision of supplemental barriers and by enclosure of this fire area within three hour tire-rated barriers. Therefore, tlw capability of the plant for a safe shutdown ~ is not impaired by the postulated fire for_ this area.
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment, both safety- and non-safety related, shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this j area:
l N/A = Not Applicable j l Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpar t Se paration ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Re sist Re tard Description Div. Yes pict 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Zone: 12-A-6-CR, Computer Room (Elevation 305 f t.) Program Console NNS X N/A Paper Tape Kead Punch NNS X N/A Eng Console NNS X N/A Line Printer NNS X N/A Main Frame Cabs NNS X N/A P tlain Frame Backup Cabs NNS X N/A nag Tape NNS X N/A Type & Card Keader Desk NNS X N/A Main Frame Cabs NNS X N/A I 9.5A-122 l
r-SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Descript ion Div. Yes pio, 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating l i
-Fire Zone: 12-A-6-CR, Computer Room (Elevation 305 f t.) (Cont'd.)
Program Console NNS X N/A Paper Tape Reader Punch NNS X N/A ) l Eng Console NNS X N/A l I.i ne Printer NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 12-A-6-RCCl, Rod Control Cabinets Room 15 (Elevation 305 ft.) Rod Control Cabinets NNS X N/A Reactor Trip Swgr NNS X N/A Motor Gen-erator Set A - (provides DC power for control rod drive) NNS X N/A Motor Gen-erator Set B - (provides DC power for control rod drive) NNS X N/A Radio Equipment NNS X N/A Amendment No. 15 9.5A-123
r . SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Description Div. Yes }lct 15 Fire Zone. 12-A-6-PICRI. Process Instruments and Control Racks ~ (Elevation 305 ft.) Auxiliary Re-tay Racks Solid State Protect. Sys. Racks X (Train A) 3 X Aux. Relay Racks Solid State Protect Sys. Racks (Train B) 3 X X Aux. Relay Racks (8) (empty) NNS X Aux. Relay Racks (10) (empty) NNS X 15 Fire Zone: 12-A-6-ARP1, Auxiliary Relay Panels, (Elevation 305 ft.) Aux. Relay Panels Main Ter-mination
- Cabinets 3 X X X 9.5A-124 Amendment No. 15
l 2 SHNPP'FSAR s APPENDIX 9.5A.13
- 1. Identification Fire Area: 12-A-HV&IR Building: Reactor Auxiliary Building 15 i
. Fire Area: 12-A-HV & IR, Heating, Ventilating and Instrument Repair, Elevation 305 ft.
Fire Zones: 12-A-6-HV7, 12-A-6-IRR Shown on Figures: 9.5A-10 and 9.5A-13 length (ft.): Variable, Width (ft.): Variable, Height (ft.): 17 Area (sq. f t. ): 3,700 Volume (cu. ft.): 59,700
- 2. Occupancy The area contains air handling units, heating coil control panel, two exhaust fans, MCCs radiation detectors, air cleaning unit (charcoal filter), steam generator, associated controls, and wiring in conduit.
- 3. Boundaries ,
Walls, floor, roof, and structural columns supporting the area boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction, with a fire rating of three hours. Wall openings for personnel access are protected by certified three-hour A label type fire rated doors. There are no concealed spaces or floor trenches.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 12-A-HV&IR, Heating, Ventilating, and Instrument Repairs Floor Area: 3,600 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrumentation 0 0 0 Liquids: (negligible, integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids: Charcoal (ib.) 2,740 27,400 7,500 - Transients: Charcoal (ib.) 1,400 14,000 4,000 , Fiber Drums (th.) 35 280 100 Grease (ib.) 55 6,000 1,700 TOTAL 47,680 13,300 Amendment No. 15 9.5A-125 L
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Zone: 12-A-6-HV7, HVAC Equipment Room Floor Area: 2,600 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Ins trumentation 0 0 0 Liquids (minor, integral 0 0 0 with equipment) Solids: Charcoal (ib.) 2,740 27,400 10,550 Transients: Charcoal (ib.) 1,400 14,000 5,400 Fiber Drums (ib.) 35 280 100 Crease (ib.) 5 <1 0 11 TOTAL 41,680 16,050 Fire Zone: 12-A-6-IRR, Instrument Repair Room Floor Area: 1,000 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 control 0 0 0 Instrumentation 0 0 0 Liquids 0 0 0 So lids 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 TOTAL 0 0
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire-stops at all floors and at rated fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire barrier walls are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire-stop assemblies. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire-stop assemb lies. Fire dampers are not provided within safety-related ducts.
l Based on the smoke removal rate provided for the combustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms, 1.5 cfm/sq. ft. comparable smoke removal would be achieved 9.5A-126 Amendment No. 11
r, _ . SHNPP FSAR 1 i1
' for this area by a rate of approximately .09 cfm/sq. f t. Smoke, heat, and '!, '
. products of incomplete combustion are removed by the ventilation system for this area:
Safety l Funetton Class Mode Flow (cfa) cfm/sq. f t. il Fire Zone 12-A-HV7 . Supply: AH-16(IA-SA) Exhaust: E-10(I A-S A)&( IB-SB) AH-16(IB-SB) E-10(IB-SB) Supply 3 Operating 7,100 1.9 , I ll
. Supply 3 Standby 7,100 1.9 Rec t reula tion 3 Operating 6,200 1.7 Recirculation 3 Standby 6,200 1.7 -
Exhaust 3 operating 850 0.32 3 Standby 850 0.32 Fire Zone 12-A-6-IRR Supply: AH-16(IA-SA) Smoke Purge: ES3(IA-NNS) AH-16(IB-SB) ES3(IB-NNS) Recircula tion 3 Operating 1,600 1.6 Recirculation 3 Standby 1,600 1.6 Smoke Purge NNS Ope rating 1,600 1.6 Smoke Purge NNS Standby 1,600 1.6 There are no radioactive sources in this area.
- 6. Fire Detection The type of detection, actuation, and signaling systems provided in this area and their functions are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 12-A-6-IIV7 1-53 Thermal Area X X X X X X
[ 9.5A-127
SHNPP FSAR - Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone h Basis local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion Manual Alana Station Area X X X X X X 12-A-6-IRR 1-: 4 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X
- The local fire detection control panel covering all fire areas and zones in 15 the RAB, Elevations 305 ft. and 324 ft., is located on Elevation 305 ft.,
adjacent to the Control Room.
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audihte, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panel and an audible alarm within each fire zone.
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from adjacent plant fire areas: 12-A-BAL, 12-A-HV&IR, and 12-A-HV8. Carbon dioxide-type extinguishers are provided adjacent to the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in the area.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems The fire suppression system provided in this area is an automatic preaction sprinkler system hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gps /sq.
ft. over charcoal filter housing area. The system is actuated automatically by thermal detectors located also at the ceiling level when the area temperature reaches 135 F. The sprinkler heads open when area temperature reaches 165 P. The system water flow is shut off manually from the control valve by authorized personnel af ter the fire is extinguished. The preaction control valve for the system is located on Elevation 305 ft. of the RAB. Sprinkler system piping is seismically supported in areas containing safety-related equipment. 9.5A-128 Amendment No. 15
.. . ..z. - - .. .. . . _ _ _______
SHNPP FSAR Manual actuation of the system is provided from the preaction control valve emergency mechanical release RAB (Elevation 305 f t.). Remote manual actuation of the preaction system is provided from the manual, dual action alarm stations located inside or outside the fire area on this elevation. Electrical supervision of the suppression system includes control valve position, system valve position, supervisory air pressure, and lack of water flow through the control valve. Motors of the air handling units are totally enclosed. The MCC are mounted on 4-in. pedestals. Damage to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of water discharged from sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of a floor drainage system. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant since excess water is removed by the floor drainage system and can overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to the floor drain transfer tank.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires In Fire Area 12-A-HV&IR, the Heating, Ventilating, and Instrument Repair, area fire hazard combustibles include only minimal amounts of cable insulation within panels, equipment, conduit, connection boxes, and required quantities of charcoal used within filters. Transient materials, such as charcoal, wood, rags, solvents, and oil in 55-gal. drums may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair.
The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires, and consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced by the use of lEEE 383 qualified cables installed in conduit by limiting the continued spread of fire-stops at fire barrier penetration and by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures. The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke, and other products of combustion through continued operation of normal ventilation systems and by three-hour fire barriers enclosing the fire area. The fire postulated for this area assumed ignition and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of localized concentrations of charcoal within filters. The charcoal fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area, fire zone 12-A-60HV7 of localized concentrations of charcoal within filters. Transient combustibles present in the area are charcoal for filter refill and/or lube oil in a 55-gal. oil drum. These transients are present only during maintenance and repair of the equipment in the area. 9.5A-129
SENPP FSAR The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire is reduced by early detection using line-type detectors installed in the charcoal bed. .The temperature of the air leaving the charcoal filter is monitored. On temperature rising above a pre-high temperature level, visual and audible alarms on the charcoal filter housing detection panel and in the Control Room are activated. The Control Room operator will stop the air flow through this filter, allowing for ' cooling of the charcoal through starvation of oxygen supply to the fire. Should the fire not extinguish itself, the temperature will continue to rise; the filter housing will become hot; and the automath d areal detection system -
- (using rate-compensated detectors) . installed on an area basis over each charcoal filter housing senses the heat and actuates the fire suppression system as described in Item 8 of this analysis.
If the preaction sprinkler system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might involve the charcoal filter and damage associated ducts, fittings, cabling, and controls. However, the preaction sprinkler system can be actuated manually from either the system control valve on Elevation 305 f t. or any manual alarm station in the area. Damage will then be confined to the area of inception, with only very limited exposure co adjacent cabling,
- combustibic materials, and damage to exposed equipment.
The early warning (line derectors) from the charcoal bed will alert the control room operator to stop the air flow through the filter and dispatch the Fire Brigade for proept assessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual fire fighting, if necessary, through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines, and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire - suppression system. The postulated charcoal fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause failure or redundant safety-related cable trays, plant , equipment, and associated cabling and controls, which are isolated by special separation. Other factors are the presence of an early-warning automatic detection system in the area and the area's proximity to the Control Room. Therefore, the capability of the plant for safe shutdown is not imparied by the postulated fire in the area. .
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment, both safety and l non-safety-related, shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this area:
N/A = Not Applicable 4 l 9.5A-130
SENPP FSAR Safety Equipment ,, Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description. Div. _ Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Zone: 12-A-6-HV7, ~ HVAC Equipment Room H&V Unit 1A-SA X X AH-15 H&V Unit 1A-SA X X AH-16 H&V Unit IB-SB X X AH-16 H&V Unit IB-SB X X HA-15 l Elect- e Htg Cc1 Cor.r'tol Panel NSS X N/A Exhaust Fan E-10 1A-SA X X Exhaust Fan E-10 IB-SB X X MCC NNS X N/A Steam . Generator NNS X N/A }- l Air Cleaning Unit NNS X N/A Fan R-2 1A-SA X X Fan R-2 IB-SB X X 9.5A-131
SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.14 1.~ identification Fire Area: 5-F-BAL Rutiding: Fuel Handling Fire Area: 5-F-BAL, Fuel Handling Building Balance, Elevation 216, 236, 261, and 286 ft. Fire Zones: Detailed in Item 4 Shown on Figures: 9.5A-14 through 9.5A-20 tength (ft.): Variable. Width (f t.): Variable Height (ft.): Variable Area (sq. ft.): 91,000 Volume (cu. ft.): 2,700,000
- 2. Occupancy The area conteins new and spent fuel pools, fuel transfer canals, new fuel containers, cranes, decontamination facilities, various pumps and filters, tanks, associated controls, wiring in conduit, and cable in trays.
- 3. Boundaries j
Walts, floor, roof, and structural columns supporting the area are of j reinforced concrete construction, with a fire rating of three hours. { l Walt openings for personnel access are protected by certified three-hour A ) label type ftre rated doors and by certified one-and-a-half-hour B label Type ftre-rated doors at stair towers. Floor and ceiling openings for handling of equipment are protected by reinforced concrete hatch covers. There are no concealed spaces or floor trenches.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 5-F-BAL, Fuel. handling Buidling Balance l Floor Area (sq. ft.): 91,000 Cable Insulation Power 13 2,350 30 Control 13 2,050 25 Instrumentation 0 0 0 (in conduit) 9.5A-132
~- _ -__.--_--__-.--L-__.___-__-.____--.--__---------__
SHNPP FSAR . Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal./lb./RF 100's sq. ft. Liquids: grense (ib.) 2 50 0 Solids Transient: lube oil (gal.) 55 6,000 70 TOTAL 10,450 125 Fire Zone: 5-F-1-TK, Component Cooling Water Tank, Elevation 216 f t. Floor Area (sq. ft.): 6,120 Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrtsmentation 0 0 0 Liquids: grease (Ib.) 2 50 50 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 6,050 1,050 g r, Fire 7.one: 5-F-1-CI, Auxiliary Steam Condensate Tanks Elevation 216 f t. Floor Area (sq. ft.): 4,400 Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Ins t etsnentation 0 0 0 Liquids (integral with 0 0 0 equipment) Solids 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 1,400 TOTAL 6,000 1,400 g r, Fire 7.one: 5-F-1-C2, Auxiliary Steam Condensate Tanks Elevation 216 ft. Floor Area (sq. f t.): 4,400 Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Ins t etsnentation 0 0 0 Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 1,400 TOTAL 6,000 1,400 9.5A-133 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU 'in - BTU / Combustible Gal ./lb./ RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire 7.one: 5"F-3-DEC, Decontamination Area Equipment. Elevation 261 f t. Cable Insulation Power 13 2,350- 3,100
-Control 13. 2,050 2,700 Instrumentation (in conduit) 0. 0 0
~ Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0
-Solids 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 TOTAL -4,400 5,800 Total combustible loading for cable insulation and all other combustible materials for the following fire zones are found to be inshgnificant for the -
purposes of this analysis: 5-F-1-AAl, Access Aisle, Elevation 216 f t. 15
.5-F-2-DEC, Decontamination Area .and Transfer Tank, Elevation 236 f t.
3 5-F-23-NF P1, New Fuel Pool, Floor Elevation 246 f t. 5-F-23-NF P2, North Spent Fuel Pool (small), Floor llevation 246 f t. 5-F-23-SFP1, South Spent Fuel Pool, Floor Elevation 246 f t. 15 l 5-F-23-SF P2, North Spent Fuel Pool (large), Floor Elevation 246 f t. 5-F-23-FTC1, Fuel Transfer Canal Floor Elevation 251 f t. 5-F-23-FTC2, Fuel Transfer Canal Floor Elevation 251 f t. 5-F-23-CLP, Cask Loading Pool, Floor Elevation 240 f t. 5-F-3-DE, Decontamination Enclosure, Elevation 261 ft. 5HF-3-CllG, Change Area, Elevation 261 f t. 5-F-3-STR, Cask Storage , Elevation 261 f t. 5dF-3-NF , New Fuel Containers , Elevation 261 f t. 5-F-3-SC, Spent Fuel Shipping by RR car, Elevation 261 f t. Si?-3-ilV, H&V Area, Elevation 261 ft. 5-F-3-MPTC, Main Fuel Transfer Canal, Floor Elevation 260 f t. 5-F-4-BAL, Elevation 286 f t.
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire-stops at all floors and at rated fire barriers. Mechanical piping penetrations throu6h fire barriers are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire assemblies. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct and barrier openings with flexible or semi-rigid fire-stop assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided within safety-related ducts.
Supplemental barriers, ' fire-breaks, and/or fire retardant coatings are provided at crossovers between safety-and non-safety-related table trays or points of close proximity where Regulatory Guide 1.75 criteria cannot be fully met. ! l 9.5A-134 Amendment No.15 ! 1
- , - . . . .)
SHNPP FSAR Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. ft.), comparable smoke removal would be achieved for this area zone room by a rate of approximately 0.001 cfm/sq. ft. Smoke, heat, and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the venttiation system for this area: Supply: North: AH-21 (1-4A-NNS) Exhaust: NorC : E-11 (1-4A-NNS) AH-21 (1-4B-NNS) E-11 (1-4B-NNS) Supply: South: AH-22 (1-4A-NNS) Exhaust: South: E-14 (1-4A-NNS) AH-22 (1-4B-NNS) E-14 (1-4B-NNS) Safety Function Class Mode _ Flow (cfm) cfm/sq. ft. Supply NNS Operating 47,000 0.5 (North & South) Supply NNS Standby 47,000 0.5 (North & South) Exhaust NNS Operating 47,000 0.5 (North & South) Exhaust NNS Standby 47,000 0.5 (North & South) P.>tential radioactive releases in this area can be expected from the Spent and New Fuel Racks (where spent fuel is stored) and Spent Fuel Pools on = Elevation 261 ft. 6. Fire Detection The signaling and alarm systems provided for the Fuel Handling Building 5-F-Balance consist of manual alarm stations only, as indicated below: Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local *
- Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 5-F-BAL 1-78 Manual Area X X X No X X Alarm Stations 35
- The local fire detection control panel located in the RAB covers all fire areas in the Fuel Handling Building.
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audthle, are provided for each fire area / detection zone at the local control panel and an audible alarm in the af fected fire area.
9.5A-135 Amendment No. 15
I SHNPP FSAR
- 7. Access and Initial Response -)
Access to this area is provided from adjacent plant areas in the Reactor ; Auxiliary Building and from the yard as shown in the f$gures listed in Item 1. 15 Carbon dioxide-type extinguishers are provided in the area in accordance with M? PA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in the area.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems There are no automatic fire suppression systems provided for this area. Plant dama;e to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of water discharged f rom hose lines is minimized by the provision of an adequate floor drainage system. Floor water surchange is estimated to be insignificant since excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. -Runoff is directed to radioactive floor drain system.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires in Fire Areas 5-F-BAL, the Fuel Handling Building Balance, area fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, conduit, connection boxes, pull boxes, and control panels.
Transient materials such as rags, wood, plastic, and lube oil in 55, gal. drums may be brow;ht into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair. The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires and, consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant factitties, is reduced or minimized
- by the use of IEEE 383 qualified cables, except for the Fuel Handling Butiding elevators cables which are neoprene-insulated. The neoprene cable was found to be acceptable for functional reasons. - by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire-breaks.
along cable runs and fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations and all floors; ,
- by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke, and other products of combustion through continued operation of normal ventilation systems and by the three-hour fire barriers enclosin6 the fire area. i The types of fires postulated for a fire area depend on the types of combustible. materials present in the fire area and their concentrations. In the Fuel Handling Building Balance area, the' predominant combustible material is cable insulation in cable trays. However, the combustible concentration of cables in trays for the Fuel Handling Building Balance is only 55 Btu /sq.f t. , - as shown in Item 4 of this analysis. This combustible concentration is not considered to have suf ficient potential for causing a cable fire that would 9.5A-136 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR i
=
cause failure of plant equipment or pose a threat to plant personnel. Furtherisore, manual fire fighting equipment such as CO2 extinguishers and hose stations, as well as the manual alarm stations, will enhance the personnel ability to contain the spread of a fire in this area. 10 Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment, both safety- and
- area.
nonsafety-related, shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this Safety
-Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Se paration ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be-Description Div. Re sist Retard Yes M 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Zone: 5-F-1-TK, Component Cooling Water Tank Elevation Zit> tt.
Componen t cooling water liuldup tank 1 -4X-NNS X N/A Component cooling water transfer ptmap 1-4X-NNS X N/A Lea k-de tec ting sta t ions ( 3) NNS X N/A Fliter backwash transter pump 2 & 3X-NNS X N/A Filter backwash transfer tank 2 & 3X-NNS X N/A Floor drain sump ptmap 2 & 38-NNS X N/A Floor drain utsap ptmap 2 & 3A-NNS X N/A hig u lpaen t drain simap pianp 2 & 3B-NNS X N/A 9.5A-137
SHNPP FSAR Safety E3 nipment -Related- Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or- 6 Safety - Enclosures Be- Resist Rbtard Description Div. Yes fict 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Equipment drain sump pump 2 & 3A-NNS X .N/A Fuel pool & refueling water purifi-cation pump 2 & 3B-NNS X N/A Fuel pool & refueling water water purifi-cation pump 2 6.3A-NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 5-F-23-NFP1, New Fuel Pool 1, Floor Elevation 246 ft. New & spent fuel storage racks NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 5-F-23-FTCl, i Vil[I1' Transfer Canal (Southend) l 15 Floor Elevation 251 ft. Iturnable poison rod assembly NNS X N/A hand tool Fuel transfer system NNS X N/A l 15 Fire Zone: 5-F-23-SFPI Spent Fuel Pool 1, , Floor Elevation 246 ft. Spent fuel , storage racks NNS X N/A i i-I 9.5A-138 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name-or. & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating F ire Z one: 5-F-3-W TC, Main Fuel Transfer Canal, Floor Elevation 260 ft. Pool gates storage (2) NNS X N/A j5 F 1re Z one 5-F-23-!F P2, Spent Fuel Fool (North), Floor Elevation 246 ft. Spent fuel storage racks NN S X N/A g r, F1re Z one: 5-F-23-F TC2, Fuel Transfer Canal (Northend) Floor Elevation 251 ft. Burnable Poison Rod Assembly NN S X N/A Iland Tool g e, Fuel transfer , system NN S X N/A j
- Spent Fuel llandling Tool NN S X N/A New Fuel Elevator NN S X N/A .
y5 Fire Zone: 5-F -2 3-NF P2 , Fuel Pool (North), Floor Elevation 246 ft. 15 Fuel storage racks NN S X N/A i l l 9.5A-139 Amendment No. 15 J
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related _Re_dundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire
-Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes g 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating
]
Fire Zone: 5-F-23-CLP Spent fuel shipping cask (by NLI or GE) NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 5-F-3-STR, - - Cask Storage. Elevation 261 ft. Cask heads NNS X N/A NLI Cask Yoka "B" NNS X N/A G.E. Cask Yoke NNS X N/A NLI Cask Yoke "A" NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 5-F-3-DE, Decontamination Enclosure, Elevation 261 ft. Spent fuel shipping cask (by NLI or GE) NNS X N/A Permanent stand 18" high NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 5-F-3-NF, New Fuel Containers, Elevation 261 ft. New Fuel containers (6) NNS X N/A Fire Zone 5-F-3-DEC, Decontamination Area Equipment, Elevation 261 ft. Decontamination chemical additive tank 1-4K-NNS X N/A l
- 9.5A-140
SENPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes g 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Decontamination rinse pep 1-41-NNS X N/A Decontamination wash pump 1-41 44NS X N/A Exhaust Fan EB-4 1-41-NNS X N/A Ultrasonic Generator NNS X N/A Service Sink NNS X N/A Kinse Tank NNS X N/A Ultrasonic Tank NHS X N/A Propeller Fan 1-4X-NNS X N/A Fan EB-4 Fire Zone: 5-F-3-HV, H&V Area, Elevation 2b1 ft. H&V Unic H-22-1-4A-NNS X N/A H-22-1-4B-NNS X N/A CP-EHC-15 NNS X N/A Propeller 1-4X-NNS X N/A Fan E-15 Fire Zone: 5-F-3-CHG, Change Area, Elevation 261 ft. Hot Water Tank NHS X N/A Sins (8) NNS X N/A H&V opening NHS X N/A 9.5A-141
SHNPP FSAR Safety
.. Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire
_ _ _ . _ . Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr.14ss tween Constr. Coating Light Panels (3) NNS X N/A Elevator shaft. NNS X N/A Detergent Drain Sump NNS X N/A Showers (2) NNS X N/A Lavatories (2) NNS X N/A , Fire Zone 5-F-4-BAL 10 Ton Auxiliary Crane NNS X N/A 150 Ton Cask Handling Crane NNS X N/A Fuel Handling Bridge Crane 14A-NNS X N/A Fuel Handling Bridge Crane 148-NNS X N/A Elevator Shaft NNS X N/A Elevator Machinery ] Room NNS X N/A Fire Zone: 5-F-BAL, FHB Balance, Elevation 286 ft. Spent Fuel pools Pools (2) SA X X , Fuel transfer canal (2) SA X X ~ New fuel pool (2) SA X X X ' Main fuel transfer canal (2) SA X X i Cask Loading Pool SA X X 9.5A-142
~ . - , , . . - - . . . - . . . - . - . - _ . - - - . - _ . . - , - . , . - . _ . . .-.- . - - . . . .
SHNPP FSAR , APPENDIX 9.5A.15 [' l f 1. Identification Fire Area: 5-F-CHF Building: Fuel Handling, Elevation 261 ft. 15 Fire Area: 5-F-CHF, Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust Fire Zones: 5-F-B-CHFA, 5-F-3-CHFB, 5-F-3DMN1, 5-F-3-DMN2 and 5-F-3-CHF-BAL, as detailed in Item 4. Shown on Figures: 9.5A-15, 9.5A-18 Length (f t.): 160 Width (ft.): 31 Height (ft.): 23 Area (sq. f t.): 5,000 Volume (cu. ft.): 114,000
- 2. Occupancy The area contains emergency exhaust systems, exhaust plenums, air conditioning units, motor control centers, auxiliary relay panels, associated controls, wiring in conduit, and cable in trays.
- 3. Boundaries Walls, floor, ceiling, and struct' ural columns supporting the area boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction, with a fire rating of three hours.
Wall openings for personnel accees are protected by certified three-hour A label type fire rated doors. Floor openings of handling of equipment are protected by concrete hatch covers. Concealed spaces consist of valve l galleries, fuel pool demineralizer cubicle, (10 ft. - 6 in. x 9 ft. - ' 6 in x 13 ft.) and FHR Auxiliary Relay Room located in the fuel pool domineralizer rooms. Relay Room located in the fuel pool demineralizer rooms.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 5-F-CHF, Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust Floor Area: 5,000 sq. f t. Cable Insulation , Power 223 40,140 8,100 control 223 34,000 7,000 Instrumentation 136 13;000 2,600 Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids: charcoat (1b.) 2,458 24,600 5,000 9.5A-143 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in . BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Transients: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 1,200 fiber drums (ib.) '30 200 40 charcoal (ib.) 1,229 12,300 2,500 TOTAL 130,240 26,440 Fire Zone: 5-F-3-CHFA, Charcoal Filter 1-a x-SA Floor Area: 560 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 30 5,400 9,650
- Control 30 4,750 8,500 Ins trumentation 30 2,850 5,100
. Liquids 0 0 0 Solids: charcoal (ib.) 1,229 12,300 22,000
- Transients
- charcoal (ib.) 1,229 12,300 22,000 fiber drums (ib.) 30 200 350 oil (gal.) 55 6,000 10,800 i TOTAL 43,800 78,400 Fire Zone: 5-F-3-CHFB, Charcoal Filter 1-41-SB Floor Area: 560 sq. ft.
Cable Insulation 4 Power 30 5,400 9,650 ) Control 30 4,750 8,500 Instrumentation 30 2,850 5,100 Liquids 0 0 0 Solids: charcoal (ib.) 1,229 12,300 22,000 Transients: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 10,800 fiber drums (ib.) 30 200 350 charcoal (ib.) 1,229 12,300 22,000 TOTAL 43,800 78,400 l 9.5A-144
~ _ - . - - - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
SHNPP FSAR Quantity. BTU in BTU / , Comhuntihte Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Zone: 5-F-3-DMN-1, Fuel Pool Demineralizer Room 15 Floor Area: 750 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power- . 83 14,950 20,000 control 83 13,050 17,400 Instrumentation 38 3,600 4,800 Liquids (minor, integral l with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 8,000 TOTAL- 37,600 50,200 Fire Zone: 5-F-3-DMN-2, Fuel Pool Demineralizer Room 15 I Floor Area: 750 sq. f t. 1 Cable Insulation
- I Power 80 14,400 19,200 control 80 12,600 16,800 Instrumentation 38 3,600 4,800 Liquids (minor, integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 8,000 TOTAL 36,600 48,800 Fire Zone: 5-F-3-CHF-BAL, Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust Balance Floor Area: 2,600 sq. ft.
Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrumentation 0 0 0 - 9.5A-145 Amendment No. 15 e
l SHNPP FSAR l Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transients: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 2,300 charcoal (ib.) 1,229 12,300 4,700 fiber drums (ib.) 30 200 100 TOTAL 18,500 7,100
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three-h(ur rated fire-stops at fire barriers. Mechanical piping penetrations througt fire barriers are anchored or senled with flexible or semi-rigid fire-stop assemblies. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct and barrier opening with flexihte or semi-rigid fire-stop assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided within safety-related ducts. Supplemental barriers fire-breaks and/or fire-retardant coatings are provided at crossovers between safety-and nonsafety-related cable trays or points of close proximity where Regulatory cuide 1.75 criteria cannot be fully met.
Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cable. Spreading Rooms, 1.5 cfm/sq. ft., comparable smoke removal would be achieved for this area by a rate of approximately 0.2 cfm/sq. f t. Smoke, heat, and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the normal ventilation system for this area: 1 i Supply: AH-21(I-4A-NNS) Exhaust: E-14(I-4A-NNS) ' AH-21(I-48-NNS) E-14(I-4B-NNS) Function Safety Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/sq. ft.) Supply NNS Ope ra ting 18,500 3.7 Supply NNS Standby 18,500 3.7 Exhaust NNS Operating 18,500 3.7 Exhaust NNS Standby 18,500 3.7 Sources of potentially contaminated releases in this fire area are the spent and new fuel racks (where spent fuel is stored), demineralizers, and the normal exhaust HVAC equipment. 9.5A-146
SHNPP FSAR I L 6. Fire Detection b Types of detection, actuation and signaling systems provided in this area and f'
.their actions are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 5-F-3-CHF A 1-74 Thermal Equip- X X X X X X ment 5-F-3-CliF B l-74 Thermal Equip- X X X X X X ment 5-F 1-77 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X CllF-RAL tion 5-F-3-DMN I l-77 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion 1-74 Manual Area ,
X X X X X X Alarm Station 5-F-3-DMN2 1-77 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion I-74 Manual Area X X X X X X Alarm Station
- The local fire detection control panel located in the RAB, 15 Elevation 261 ft. covers all areas in the entire Fuel Handling Building.
** 'ocal alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and andthle, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panet and an alarm that sounds locally in the affected fire zone.
- 7. Access and Initial Response l
Access to this area is provided from adjacent Reactor Auxiliary Buildings, Elevation 261 ft., fire zones, 1-A-4-CHFB, and 1-A-4-COMI. 15 and 2-A-4-CHFB. Carbon dioxide-type extinguishers are provided in the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in the area. H. Fire Suppression Systems The fire suppression system provided in this area is an automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system installed over the charcoal filter housings at the ceiling Amendment No. 15 9.5A-147
SHNPP FSAR level and hydraulically designed to provide water density of 0.3 gpm/sq. f t. over the charcoal filter housings. The system is actuated automatically by thermal detectors located also over the charcoal filter housings when the area temperature reaches 135 F. The sprinkler heads open when area temperature reaches 165 F. The system water flow is shut of f automatically from the control valve when the area temperature drops below 135 F. The multi-cycle control valve for the system is located inside this fire area, adjacent to Columns 43 & L, accessible from the . door located at that column. Manual actuation of the system is provided from the multi-cycle control valve emergency mechanical release. Remote manual actuation of the multi-cycle system is provided from the dual-action manual alata stations located inside the fire area. Electrical supervision of the supression system includes control valve position, system valve position, supervisory air pressure, and lack of water flow through the control valve. Sprinkler system piping is seismically supported. Plant equipment subject to water damage is protected by being enclosed in a separate room; HVAC motors are totally enclosed; and provision of pads 4 in. to 6 in. high for electrical equipment. Damage to plant areas and equipment f rom the accumulation of water discharged f rom sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of an adequate floor drainage system. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be significant. Runoff is directed to radioactive floor drain waste.
, 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires In Fire Area 5-F-CHF, the Feel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust Systems, area fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, conduit, connection boxes, and limited amounts of cable insulation within control panels, as well as required quantities of charcoal used within filters. Negligible quantities of lubricating oils or grease are contained within equipment. Transient materials, such as charcoal, luhricating oil, rags, may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair.
The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires and, consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced or minimized:
- by the use of IEEE 383 qualified cables. - by enclosing cable in conduit. .
- - by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire-breaks along cable trays and fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations.
9.5A-148
SENPP FSAR
- by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through E nd,ministrative procedures, to limit quantities to those required for immediate needs, and to prescribe supplemental measures during such exposure periods.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controlled removal of heat, smoka and other products of combustion through continued operation of normal ventilation systems and by three-hour fire barriers enclosing the fire area. The types of fires postulated for the Emergency Exhaust Systems Area in the Fuel Handling Building are based on the types of combustibles present in the area and their concentrations. Cable and charcoal fires are being considered in this analysis. A. Cable Fires The cable fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the acea, of localized concentrations of insulation on cables in trays, and in conduit located in and traversing this fire area (see Figure 9.5A-15, Fire Zones: 5-F-3-CHFA, 5-F-3-CHFB, 5-F-3-DNN-1, and 5-F-3-DNN-2). Transient combustibles may be present in the area during maintenance and repair. Common transients could be oil in a 55-gal. oil drum, charcoal for one charcoal filter refill in fiber drums, and small amounts of wood. rags, and plastic coverings. j The potential maximum propagation of the postulated cable fire in this fire j area will be reduced by early detection using ionization-type smoke detectors
-installed at the ceiling, on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of combustion generated by the smoldering cable insulation and i alerts employees botn locally and in the Control Room, via the Communications 15 Room, so that manual fire response can be initiated promptly.
i l Ready access is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas, as described l under item 7, facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines on developing fires by employees responding to the fire. Additional fire protection defense for fire zones 5-F-3-CHFA and 5-F-3-CHFB only is provided by the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system, as detailed l under item 8. If the multi-cycle gprinkler system has not actuated l automatically, the postulated fire in these senes might
- involve other cable trays above the tray where ignition occurs.
l i - extend to ,the nearest fire-break along the cable tray or to the area .* ire i barrier fire-stop. . However, the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system can be actuated manually by employees responding to the fire, either from the dual-action manual fire i alarm stations located in the fire area or from the system control valve ! emergency manual release, thus reducing the potential fire consequences l i 9.5A-149 Amendment No. 15 l
- -,-...m-m. ._,_ ___. ,, - , , - , . . , , . . - . - . , , . . . , . - . , . - . , - . , . - - . ,.m,-,y -.,,.,,,y,. ,-3...y,n.,.,m...,,.--_mm
SHNPP FSAR described above. Damage will be limited to the immediate area of inception, with very limited damage to exposed equipment. The early warning ionization smoke detection system (products of combustion) will alarm a fire condition in the Control Room. The control room operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of ef fective manual fire fighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines, and/or manual actuation of the auutomatic fire suppression system, as described above, thus reducing the fire spread. The postulated cable fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause failure of redundant safety-related plant equipment and associated cabling and controls. Therefore, the capability of the plant for a safe shutdown and control of radioactive releases to the environment is not impaired by a cable fire in the fuel handling building emergency exhaust area. B. Charcoal Fires The charcoal fire postulated for this area assumes ignition and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area of localized concentrations of charcoal within filters, fire zones 5-F-3-CHFA and 5-F-3-CHFB. Transient combustibles present in the area may be charcoal for one filter refill in fiber drums, oil in a 55-gal. oil drum, and small amounts of woud, rags, and plastic coverings. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated charcoal fire is reduced by early detection using line type detectors installed in the charcoal bed. The temperature of the air leaving the charcoal filter is monitored. On temperature rising above a pre-high temperature level, visual and audible alarma on the charcoal filter housing detection panel and in the Control Room are activated. The control room operator will stop the air flow through this (11ter, allowing f or cooling of the charcoal through starvation of the oxygen supply to the fire. Should the fire not extinguish itself, the temperature will continue to rise; the filter housing will become hot; and the automatic thermal detection system (using rate-compensated detectors), installed on an area basis over each charcoal filter housing, senses the heat and activated the fire suppressions system, as described under Item 8 of this analysis. The potential maximum propagation of the charcoal fire will be reduced by initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of hose lines on developing fires by employees either responding to the fire or present in the area for maintenance or repair. If the multi-cycle sprinkler system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might involve the charcoal filter and damage associated ducts, fittings, cabling, and controls. However, the multi-cycle sprinkler system can be actuated manually from either the system control valve or any manual diml-action alarm station in the area. Damage will then be confined to the 9.5A-150
SHNPP FSAR. area of inception, withonly very limited exposure to adjacent cabling, adjacent combustible materials, and exposed equipment. The early warning (line detector) from the charcoal bed.will alert the control room operator to stop the air flow through the filter and dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of effective
' manual fire fighting, if necessary, through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines, and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, thus reducing the potential for fire spread. The postulated charcoal fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause failure of redundant safety-related cable trays, plant equipment, and associated cabling and controls, which are isolated by special separation, structural separations, and provision of automatic fire suppression system. The fire area is enclosed within three-hour fire barriers.
Therefore, the capability of the plant for a safe shutdown is not impaired by a charcoal fire in the fuel handling building emergency exhaust area.
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment, both safety-and nonsafety-related, shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this a rea.
NOTE: N/A - Not Applicable . Safety
; Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation
?
- ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire
- Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coatina i Fire Zone: 5-F-3-CHF BAL, j Fuct flandling Building Emergency Exhaust Balance i
i Exhaust fan NNS X N/A l E-14(1-4A/NNS) l Exhaust fan NNS X N/A E-14(1-45/NNS) i Air Cond Unit 3 X X
- , All- 17( 1-4 A-SA) l Air Cond Unit 3 X X
l All- 17 ( 1-45-SB) I Exhaust Plenum (2) NNS X N/A i l FilH Auxiliary Panels
- (!&4B-SB) 3 X X i
1 i 9.5A-151 l l' L
s SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Red undant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes jijt 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 3 X X (2&38-SB) FilR Auxillary Panels 3 X X (l&4A-SA) 3 X X (2&3A-SA) Exhaust Fan NNS X N/A E-It(1-4A/NNS) Exhaust Fan NNS X N/A E-II(1-4B/NNS) t1CC l&4A 33SA X X MCC 2&3A 33SA X X HCC 1&45 33SB X X MCC 2&38 33SB X X Control Panet 1-4X-SA X N/A CP-KHC-17 Control Panet 1-4X-SB X N/A C P-EllC-18 Fire Zone: 5-F-3-CHF-A, Charcoat F8 Iter 1-4X-SA Emergency Exhaust System E-12 1-4X-SA X X (1-4X-SA) Fire Zone: 5-F-3-CHF-B, Charcoat Filter 1-4X-SB Emergency Exhaust System E-13 (1-4X-SB) X X Fire Zone 5-F-3-DMNI, Fuel Fool Demineralizer g *, Room 9.5A-152 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Safety Fstuipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No_ 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fuel Pool Demine ralize r (!&4X-NNS) NNS X N/A HCC(1-4A-1021) NNS X N/A HCC(1-4A-1022) NNS X N/A Fire 7.one: 5-F-3-DNN2, Fuel Pool Demineralizer Room 15 Fuel Pool Demtnera1Lxer NNS X N/A (2&3X-NNS) McC(1-48-1021) NNS X N/A HCC(1-48-1022) NNS X N/A I l 9.5A-153 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR
- APPENDIX 9.5A.16 ,
i
- 1. Identlfication Fire Area: 5-F-FPP 15 Building: Fuel Handling Building, Elevation 236 ft.
Fire' Area: 5-F-FPP, Fuel Handling Building Fuel Pool Heat-Exchangers Fire Zones: 5-F-2-FPC, Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers 5-F-2-FPV1, Fuel Pool Valves Area 1 15 5-F-2-FPV2, Fuel Pool Valves Area 2 Shown on Figures: 9.5A-14 and 9.5A-18 Length (ft.): Variable Width (ft.' *,ariable Height (ft.): 16 Area (sq. ft.): 8,000 Volume (cu. ft.): 124,000
- 2. Occupancy The area contains fuel pools heat exchangers, pumps, strainers, filters, skimmers, instrument racks, control panels, leak detection stations, Nitrogen accumulators, associated controls and wiring in conduit.
1
- 1. Boundaries Walls, floor and ceiling are of reinforced concrete construction with a fire rating of-three hours. Wall openings for personnel access are protected by certified three-hour A label type fire rated doors. Floor openings for handling of equipment are protected by concrete hatch covers with a three-hour i fire rating. Concealed spaces consist of pipe and valve spaces in fire zones
- 4. 5-F-2-FPV1 and 5-F-2-FPV2 and pipe trenches in fire zone 5-F-1-FPP. Trenches are provided for the purpose of containing pipe runs and are covered with j metal plates.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. ! Fire Area: 5-F-FPP, Fuel Handling Building Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 8,000 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 9.5A-154 Amendment No. 15 il . . - . _ - . . _ , _ . _ . _ - _ . ~ , . . . -
~ . . _ _ . , _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ . . . - . _ _
A SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in- BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's 'sq. ft. 0~ 0 Instrumentation 0 40 5 ll Liquids: grease (Ib.) 2 0 0 0 Solids: Transient - lube 750 oil'(gal.) 55 6000 To'als t 6040 755 1 Fire Zone: 5-F-2-FPC, Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers, Elevation 236 f t. Floor Area: 5050 sq. f t. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0: 0 0 0 Control 0 0 Instrumentation 0 8 1l Liquids: grease (ib.) 2 40 0 0 0 Solids: Transient - lobe 1190 oil (gal.) 55 6000 1 Totals 6040 1198 s The combustible loading due to cable insulation for fire zones 5-F-2-FPV and 5-F-2-FPV2 was found to be insignificant since all cables are in conduit. The only combustible loading considered in this analysis is a transient lube oil
- drum with a capacity of 55 gal.
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire stops at rated i fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire barrier walls are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. RVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct and Fire harrier. opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies.
dampers are not provided within safety related ducts.
~
- Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the l Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.) . comparable smoke removal would be achieved for this area zone room by a rate of approximately 0.006 cfm/sq. ft.
9.5A-155 Amendment No. 1 i _ . . ~ _ . . __ __ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ _. . _ _ . . _ . . _ - . . . _ . _ _ _ . . . _ . _ - _ . _
SHNPPFSAht Smoke, heat and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the normal ventilation system for this area: Supply: AH-22 (1-4A-NNS) & (1-48-NNS) Exhaust: E-11 (1-4A-NNS) & (1-4B-NNS) Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/sq. ft.) -Supply _NNS Operating 6,000 1.2 Supply NNS Standby 6,000 1.2 Exhaust NNS Operating 6,200 1.24 Exhaust NNS Standby 6,200 1.24 There are no radioactive sources released in this area, during normal operation.
- 6. Fire Detection The types.of detection, actuation and signaling systems provided in this area and their functions are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire 7.one Zone h Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 5-F-2-FPC 1-73 Thermal Area X X X X X X 5-F-2-PPV1 1-73 Hanual Area X X X X X X Alarm Station 5-F-2-PPV2 1-73 Manual Area X X X X X X Alarm Station
- The local fire detection control panel located in the RAB, Elevation 15 261 ft. covers all areas in the entire Fuel Handling Building.
** Local alarm and annunication of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audible, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panel.
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from adjacent areas located in the Reactor '
Auxiliary Building Elevation 236 f t. 15 Carbon dioxide extinguishers are provided in the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in the area. 9.5A-156 Amendment No. 15 i
SHNPP FSAR
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems -
The fire suppression system provided in this area is an automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system installed at the ceiling and hydraulically designed to provide water density of 0.3 gpe/sq. f t. of the fire zone 5-F-2-FPC floor a rea. The system is actuated automatically by thermal detectors in fire zone
. 5-F-2-FPC, located also at the ceiling level, when the area temperature reaches 135 F. The sprinkler heads open when area temperature reaches 165 F.
The system water flow is shutoff automatically from the control valve when the area temperature drops below 135 F. The multi-cycle control valve for the system is located inside this fire area, adjacent to columns 43 & L and are accessible through the nearby door. Manual actuation of the system is provided from the multi-cycle control valve emergency mechanical release. Remote manual actuation of the multi-cycle system is provided from the dual action manual alarm stations located inside t he fire area. Electrical supervision of the suppression system includes
. control valve position, system valve position, supervisory air pressure and a
lack of water flow through the control valve. Sprinkler piping is seismically s uppo rt ed. f Plant equipment subject to water damage is protected with watertight i enclosures, or are mounted on floor pedestals. Damage to plant area and i equipment from the accumulation of water discharge from sprinklet systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of the floor drainage system. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant since excess water can
, overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to radioactive floor drain waste system.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires In Fire Area 5-F-FPP, the Fuel Pools Pumps & Heat Exchanger Room, area fire hazard combustibles include expected amounts of grease, cable insulation in
! conduit, connection boxes and control panels. Transient materials, such as rags, wood, cleaning solvents and lubricating oil in 55-gal. druas may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair. ! The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires, and i
consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant j facilities is minimized by:
- use of IEEE 383 qualified cables i
- limiting the amount of combustible and spread of fire through enclosure of cables in conduit
! provision of fire-breaks along cable tray runs and fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations
- controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures, to limit quantities to those required for immediate needs and to prescribe supplemental fire protection measures during such exposure periods.
9.5A-157
SHNPP:FSAR The extent of damage within or beyond;the fire area is further limited by l 15
, - controlled removal of heat,-smoke and other products of combustion through the continued operation of the normal ventilation systems and the three-hour fire-
. harrters enclosing the fire area.
The ~ type of fire postulated for the fire area 5-F-FPP assumes ignition and subsequent' development into the most severe single fire expected in the fire zone 5-F-2-FPC, of localized concentrations of grease and/or transient
' lubricating ott in a 55-gal. drum, with spill over adjacent zones and impingement on nearby equipment (see Figure.9.5A-14). Other common transients which could be present in the area are small amounts of wood, rags and plastic coverings.
The automatic thermal detection-system installed at the ceiling level of the fire zone F-2-FPC senses the heat generated by the fire. When the temperature reaches 135 F, the multi-cycle sprinkler system valve is actuated as detailed under Item 8, fire alarms are transmitted to the Control Room via 4 Communications Room, to the local fire detection control panel.and locally to 15 the fire zone. The potential maximum propagation of the oil fire will be reduced by initial , use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of hose lines on developing fires by employees either responding to the fire or present in the area for maintenance and repairs.
- Ready access is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas as described a under Item 7, facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hose lines on developing fires.
Additional fire protection defense is provided by the automatic multi-cycle
- sprinkler system, as described under Item 8. If the multi-cycle sprinkler system has not actuated automatically the postulated fire might involve the
! fuel pool heat exchangers, and other equipment present in the area, damage i contiguous associated piping, fittings, cabling and controls within the spill j area and extend to the area fire barrier. However, the automatic multi-cycle i sprinkler system can be actuated manually by employees responding to the fire,_
- either from the dual action manual fire alarm stations located in the fire area or from the system control valve emergency manual release, thus reducing the potential fire consequences described above. Damage will be limited to the immediate area of inception with limited damage to exposed equipment.
4-Even without actuation of the multi-cycle sprinkler system in the area, the ! ott fire will be sensed by the thermal fire detection system which will alarm a fire (high temperature) and trouble (lack of water) condition in the Control Room. The control room operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual fire fighting
- through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines, and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, as described above, thus reducing the potential for fire spread. Because of spacial separation of redundant safety related equipment, provision of fire extinguishing systems, j and enclosure of the fire area within three-hour fire barriers, the postulated l fire does not have sufficient potential spread to impair safe shutdown or j radioactive release mitigation capabilities.
9.5A-158 Amendment No. 15 r- - -- ..%. , w ,.,-e-,-- ,- m,w.-- -..,y , e._ - . _,,.w._.-,w..-..~,.r--,..-=e..m.,w,w-,-,.%,--m-..,,-m ,~.e,,-.-w-- , ,-4=., - . -,,..,.,,.v.-
SHNPP FSAR
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is tlw mechanical and electrical equipment both safety and non-safety related shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this ,
area. No te : N/A = Not Applicable Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Re sist Retard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Zone: 5-F-2-FPC, Fuei Pooi Heat Exchangers Fue L Poo L heat exchg. 1 & 4B-SB X X Fuel Pool heat exchg. 2 & 3B-SB X X Fuel Fool twat exchg. 1 & 4A-SA X X Fuel Pool heat exchg. 2 & 3A-SA X X l.eak detect sta. (2) NNS X N/A Fuel pools strainer 1 & 4A-SA X X Fuel pools cooling pump 1 & 4A-SA X X Fuei pool strainer 1 & 48-SB X X Fuel pools cooling ptsap 1 & 48-SB X X ; Fuel pools cooling pump 2 & 3B-SB X X tuei pools strainer 2 & 33-SB X X i 9.5A-159 i
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist- Retard Description Div. Yes pi jt . 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fuel pools cooling pump 2 & 3A-SA X X Fuel pools strainer 2 & 3A-SA X X Fire Zone: 5-F-FPVI, Fuel Pool Valves Area 1 15 Fuel pools skimmer pump I & 4X-NNS X N/A , Nitrogen accum. 1 & 4X-NNS X N/A 2 ton monorail NNS X N/A i instr. Rack F-R3 NNS X N/A Filn Constr. pan F-P7 NNS X N/A Fuel pools itemin. filter I & 4X-NNS X N/A Fuel pools
& refuel.
water purif. filter I & 4X-NNS Y N/A Fuel pools skimmer filter 1 & 4X-NNS X N/A Fuel pools skimme r pump strainer 1 & 4X-NNS X N/A Instr. rack F-R1-NNS X N/A Instr. rack F-R2-NNS X N/A 9.5A-160 Amendment No. 15
7 SHNPP FSAR Safety Eqisi pment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist- Retard Description Div. Yes b 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire 7.one: 5-F-FPV2 15 Fuel Pool Valve Area 2 2 ton monorail NNS X N/A Fuel pools skimmer filter 2&3X-NNS X N/A Fuel pools
& refuel water, purif 6
f11ter 2&3X-NNS , X N/A Fuel pools *
& demin ,
fitter 2&3X-NNS X N/A inst. rack F-R4-NNS X N/A FHH Control panel F-P8-NNS X N/A Nitrogen accum. 2&3X-NNS X N/A Fuel pools
- skimmer pump 2&3X-NNS X N/A Leak detect.
sta. (2) NNS X N/A Instrument rack F-RS-NNS X N/A Instrument ' rack F-R6-NNS X N/A Fuel Pools Skimmer Pump Strainer 2&3X-NNS X N/A
~
9.5A-161 Arnendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.17 1.
' dentification i Fire Areas: .1-D-DCA and 1-D-DGB 15 Building: Diesel . Generator
. Fire' Areas: 1-D-DCA, Diesel Generator IA (Elevation 261, 280, 292 ft.)
1-D-DGB, Diesel Generator IB (Elevation 261, 280, 292 ft.) Fire Zones: Detailed under Item 4 " Combustible Loading" Shown on Figures: 9.5A-21 and 9.5A-22 Length (ft.): 105 Width (ft.): 38 Height (ft.): 50 Total Area (all fire 8,900 Volume (cu. ft.): 200,000 zones sq..ft.)
- 2. Occupancy Kach fire area contains the diesel generator IA-SA and IB-SB respectively with accessories, electrical room, HVAC equipment, associated piping, controls, and wiring in conduit. ,
- 1. Boundaries Wall, floor and roof are of reinforced concrete construction, with a minimum i fire rating of three hours. The East wall has an opening for air intake considered to have an equivalent of three-hour fire rating based on physical i separation from other structures. Two wall openings protected by certified three-hour A label type. fire rated doors are provided for personnel access.
Roof opening for handling of equipment is protected by a concrete hatch to maintain three-hour fire barrier integrity. There are no concealed spaces or < floor trenches. The stairway landing is separated from the Exhaust Silencer l Room (Fire Zone I-D-3-DCA-ES) by a two-hour fire rated enclosure with a certified one-and-a-half hour B label typa fire rated door for personnel safety.
- 4. Combustihte loading l Quantity BTU in BTU /
I Combustible , Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Areas 1-D-DCA or 1-D-DGB, Diesel Generator lA-SA or IB-SB Floor Area: 8,900 sq. ft. C.1hle Ins'ulation (in conduit)
- I Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0
~
Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Instrumen-tation 0 0 0 Liquids: Lube oil 3 (gal) 450 48.600 5,500 Solide: , 0 0 0 Transient:. oil (gal.) 55 6.000 710 3 Total 54,600 6,210 Fire Zones: 1-D-DGA-RM or 1,-D-1-DGB-Ra, Die'sel Generator Room 1A or la (Elevation 261 ft.) Floor Area: 2,300 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 control 0 0 0 Instrumen-
. tation 0 0 0 Liquids: Lube oil (gal.) 450 48.600 21,000 Solids: 0 0 0 Transients oil (gal.) 55 6,000 3.000 Total 54,600 24,000 Fire Zones: 1-D-1-DGA-ASU or 1-D-1-DGB-ASU, Diesel Generator 1A or la Air Starting Units (Elevation 261 ft.)
Floor Area: 1,300 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrumen- ! tation 0 , 0 0 l 9.5A-163 Amendmen t No. I i
-- - - , .-_.,.,n...-,.-..,--,.,- - ~ . - . . , . , - . - - - , , - - . . . - , , . - - - , , - , - . , - - - ~ , . - , - , - - - , . , - - -
SENFF FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal. /lb. /RF 1000's sq. ft. Liquids: (integral with equip-ment) 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: oil (gal.) .-- - 55 6,000 5,000 Total 6,000 5,000 Fire Zones: 1-D-DCA-ER or 1-D-1-DGB-ER, Diesel Generator Room 1A or 15 Electrical Room (Elevation 261 ft.) Floor Area: 400 sq. ft.
- Cable Insulation (in conduit)
Power 0 'O O Control 0 0 0 Instrumen-tation 0 0 0 Liquids: (integral with equip-ment) 0 0 0 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 Total 0 0 Fire Zones: 1-D-2-DGA-HVD or 1-D-2-DGB-HVD, Diesel Generator 1A i or 1B R&V Duct Area (Elevation 280 fc.) l Floor Area: 1,300 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in conduit) , Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 . I I Instrumen-cation 0 0 0 I 9.5A-164
~-
SENFF FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal. /lb. /RF 1000's sq. ft. Liquids 0 'O O Solids 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 Total 0 0 Fire Zoneet 1-D-3-DGA-ES or 1-D-3-DGB-ES, Diesel Generator 1A or 1B Exhaust Silencer Room (Elevation 292 ft.) Floor Area: 1,900 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrumen-tation 0 0 0 Liquids (integral 0 0 0 with equipment) Solids 0 0 0
, Transient (negligible) 0, 0 0 ]
Total 0 0 Fire Zones: 1-D-3-DCA-HVR or 1-D-3-DGB-HVR, Diesel Generator 1A or 1B R&V (Elevation 292 f t.) Floor Ares: 1,700 sq. ft. Cable Insulation (in condult) i e 0 0 0 i Power 0 0 0 Control Instrumen-0 0 0 tation 9.5A-165 I
~ _ _ _ _ . - - ~ , _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ , _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ , . . - _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _
r SHNPF FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Liquida (integral 0 0 0 with equipment) Solids 0. 0 0 Tranntent (negligthle) 0 0 0 i Total 0 0
- 5. Control of Hazards l Electrical penetrations .are sealed with' three-hour rated fire stops at all
! floors and at rated fire barrier walls. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire barriers are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop annemblies. HVAC duct work penetrations through fire-barriers are sealed l hetween duct and harrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop annemhties. , Equi pment containing combustible liquids is enclosed within curbs and . retaining walls as indicated on the drawings to limit the spread of anticipated oil releases, to retai'n the released oil from the diesel tube oil nystem and to route the releases to the diesel generator room sump from where I it in pumped to the oil disposal system. Curbs, retaining walls and watertight doors prevent spread of combustible liquid releases between fire zonen, beyond or into the fire area. Full height structural barriers with a fire rating of three-hours are provided between redundant adjacent safety related diesel generators IA-SA and 15-S8, day tank areas 1-D-DTA and 1-D-DTB. 15 Maned on the smoke removal rate recommended for the Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/nq. f t.) comparable smoke removal would be achieved for these areas at a rate of approximately 0.18 cfm/sq. f t. Smoke, heat and products of incomplete combustible are removed by the ventilatio4 system for this area: Supply: By transfer Exhaust E61(IA-SA, 15-SA) AH-85 (IA-SA, IR-SA) E86(IA-SA, IR-SA) Safety l Function Class Mode Flow (cfe) (cfm/sq. ft.) Fire Zoner 1-D-I-DCA-RM, Diesel Generator Room lA Normal Operating Conditions ! Exhaust E-61 - l
\
(IA-SA) 3 Operating 2,100 0.9 l l 9.5A-166 Amendment No.15
SMNFP FSAR Safety . Function Class Mode . Flow (cfa) cfs /sq. ft.) (18-SA) 3 Standby 2,100 0.9 Emergency Operation Condition Exhaust: E-86 (IA-SA) 3 Operating 51,000 22 (18-SA) 3 Operating 51,000 22 Fire Zones: 1-D-1-DGA-ASU and 1-D-2-DGA-HVD Diesel Generator 1A, Air-Starting Units and R6V Duct Area Normal Operation Exhaust: E-61 (IA-SA) 3 Operating 2,000 1.6 Exhaust: E-61 (15-SA) 3 Standby 2,000 1.6 Emergency Operation Exhaust: E-86 (IA-SA) 3 Operating 6,000 4.6 Exhaust E-86 (18-SA) 3 Standby 6,000 4.6 Fire Zone: 1-D-1-DCA-ER, Diesel Generator 1A Electrical Room Normal & Emergency Recirculatingt (AM-85 (15-SA) 3 operating 12,000 30 Restreulating (AM-85 (15-SA) 3 Standby 12,000 30 l 9.5A-167 i
SWIPP FSAR ,. Safety l Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) efm/so. ft.) Fire Zones: 1-D-3-DGA-ES and 1-D-3-DGA-WVR, niesel Cenerator IA. Exhaust silencer and av Wooms Moreal Operation Exhausc: E-61 (IA-SA) 3 Operatins 1.100 0.6 Exhaust E-41 l (Is-SA) 3 Standby 1,100 0.6 Emerzency operacion , Exhaust: E-41 (IA-SA) 3 operatina 3,260 24 Exhaust: E,-41 ( ll-SA) 3 Standby 5,200 14 Fire Zone I-D-t-DGM-RM, Diesel Generator Moon in 1 Normal % ratine Condition . Exhaust: E-41 (IC-SS) 3 operatina 1.100 o.4 i
!xhaust: E-41 (1D-55) 3 Standby 2,100 n.4 twreeney operatina Condition Exhaust: E-M6
- (IC-53) 3 operatina 51,600 22 i
Exhaust E-4 l l (10-58) 3 operatine $1,000 22 l l 9.5A-168 Amendment No. 1 1
r- - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _
$1DIPP FSAR Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfs/sc. f t.)
Tire *.one 1-0-1-0C3-ASU,
& 1-0-l-068-RVD, Diesel Generator 13, Air Starting Units and 96V Dust Area
*Iormal Operation Exhause E-61 (1C-58) 3, Ope rating 2,000 1.6 Exhausc: E-61 (1D-58) 3 Standby 2,000 1.6 taergency Operation:
Exhaust E-86 (IC-53) 3 ope rating 6,000 a.6 Exhausc: E-86 (10-58) 3 Standby 6,000 4.6 Fire Zone 1-0-1-0C5-(1, Diesel Generator 13, Electrical toom Normal and Enerlency Oper,ations
, tecir:ulating:
AM-85 (IC-58) 3 Operating 12,000 30 llecir:ulating : AH-85 (10-51) 3 Standby 12,000 30 Fire toner 1-0-3-OC3-ES and 1-0-3-0C3-MV1t, Otesel Generator 13. Exhaust .: 511enser and MV Room
*!arsal Operations l Ixhaust 1-41 i
(IC-58) 3 operating 1,100 0.6 tahaust E-41 (10-53) 3 Standby 1,100 0.6 l t , I 9.3A-L69
I SHNPP FSkR Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/sq. ft.) Einorgency Operation: K*haust: E-61 (IC-SB) 3 operating 5,200 2.8 Exhaust: E-61 (ID-SB) 3 Standby 5,200 2.8 Thure are no radioactive sources in these areas.
- 6. Fire Detection Types of detection, actuation and signaling systema and their functions provided for this fire area are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone g Basis local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alare I-D-1-DGA-RM l-86-1 Thermal Area X X X X X X and I-D-1-DGB-RM l-89-1 Flame Area X X X No X X (UV)
Manual Area X X X X X X l-DI-DGA-ASU 1-86-2 Thermal Equip- X X X No X X and ment 1-D-t-DGB-ASU 1-89-2 l-D-3-DCA-ES l-86-3 Flame Area X X X No X X i and (UV) 1 -D-3-DGB-E S l-89-3 , 1-D-1-DCA-ER l-88 Smoke Area X X X No X X and (Ioni-l-D-1-DGB-ER l-91 sation)
- The local fire detection control panel servicing fire areas in the Diesol 15 Conerator Building is located in the access corridor of the building.
adjacent to the areas.
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and andthlo, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panol. Fur the rmo ro , for a fire condition, an audibio alarm sounds at the fire arca/ zone location.
9.5A-170 Amendment No. 15
_ _ _ . . _ . _ ._.. .._m ._ ___ _ 1 SHNPP FSAR 1 7. Access and Initial Response , 4 . Access to each fire area is provided from-the building access corridor, i Elevation 261 f t., adjacent to the areas and communicating with the yard. Manoni fire fighting capability is provided by carbon dioxide and dry chemical type notable extinguishers located in these areas. Hose stations have been provided adjacent to these fire areas, located in the access corridor of the building. i
- 8. Fire Suppression System The ftre suppression system provided for each area is on automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 spe/sq. f t. for Diesel Generator Room (Fire Zone s .1-D-1-DCA-RM or 1-D-1-DGB-RM, respectively). The system is actuated automatically by thermal j detectors located also at the ceiling level when the area temperature reaches 200 F. The sprinkler heads open when area temperature reaches 225 F. This system water flow is shut off automatically. from the control valve when ' the
- area temperature drops below 200 F. The multi-cycle control valve for each
, area is located in the access corridor adjacent to the respective fire area' i (Figure 9.5A-21). Manual actuation of the system is provided from the
} multi-cycle control valve emergency mechanical release. Remote manual actuation of the multi-cycle system is provided from the dual action manual l alarm station located in the access corridor, adjacent to the entrance to the j respective fire area. Electrical supervision of each suppression system 4 includes control valve position, system valve position, supervisory air j pressure and lack of water flow through the control valve. Sprinkler system piping is seismically supported. , i Plant equipment subject to water damage is protected with watertight
- enclosures and/or pedestals. Damage to plant areas and equipment from the necumulation of water discharged f rom sprinkler systems and hose lines on Elevation 261 ft. is minimised by the provision of adequate floor drainage to ele diesel generator sump. A 6 inch curb is provided at the access door to i the electrical equipment room (fire zones 1-D-1-DCA-ER and 1-D-1-DGB-ER) and '
i the electrical equipment is installed on four in. pedestals to prevent their i flooding. Curbs six in. high are provided at the access doors to each diesel ,
- generator room and to the access corridor. Watertight doors and'three it.
! retaining walls are provided at the access to the fuel oil day tanks (fire i areas I-D-DTA and 1-D-DTB) and diesel generator rooms (fire sones 1-D-1-DCA-RM j a nd 1-D- 1-DGB-RM) . Water can overflow into the corridor to adjacent areas and j out into the yard.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires
{ In Fire Areas 1-D-DCA and 1-D-DGB, fire hasard combustibles include cable ; insulation in conduit, connection boxes, cable insulation within contrdi ; l cabinets, panels, MCC, and limited quantities of lubricating oils contained I within the diesel generator lube oil system. Transient materials, such as
- lubriesting oil, wood, and rage may be brought into the area for normal j facilities maintenance and repair.
1 F , l 9.5A-171
SHNPF FSAR-The quantity of combustible asterials which may be involved in area fires, and
. consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the ' resultant damage to plant facilities, is reduced or minimised:
- by the use of IEEE 383 qualified cables.
- hy limiting the continued spread of fire by enclosing cables in metallic conduit.
- by providing fire-stops at fire barrier penetrations, to maintain the integrity of the fire barrier.
- hy the controlled removal of released combustible liquide through collection in area sumps and pump out to the oil disposal systems.
l - by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through l administrative procedures, to limit quantities to those . required for immediate needs and to prescribe supplemental fire protection measures during such exposure periods. The extent of damage within or beyond the fire area is further limited by l controlled removal of heat, smoke and other products of combustion through , i continued operation of normal ventilation systems, by three hour fire-rated barriers enclosing the fire areas and separating the fire zones within the
- areas.
The fire postulated for each of these areas may occur in the Fire 7.ones : 1-D-1-DCA-RN or 1-D-1-DGB-RM, which contain the diesel generator units. Ignition is assumed and subsequent development into the most severe single fire reasonably expected in the area, of localized concentrations of combustihte liquids released from the diesel engine lubricating oil system or att lines with resultant spill over adjacent area and impingement on nearby equipment. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire will be reduced by early detection using flame scanning (uttraviolet) type detectors installed at strategic locations in each Diesel Generator Room, Fire Zones: 1-D-1-DGA-RM or 1-D-1-DGB-RM. The automatic detection system senses the flame-stage fire l and alerts employees both locally and in the Control Room, so that manual fire 15 l response can be initiated promptly. l l Ready access is provided to the area through the building access corridor, (as detailed under Item 7), from the yard facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of homelines on developing fires, by employees responding to t'he fire. Prompt response by plant operators and fire brigade personnel will limit the fire damage - -
- significantly by confining it to the area of ignition.
i ! Additional fire protection defense is provided by the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system (as described under Item 8). l l
\
9.5A-172 Amendment No. 15
SNNPP FSAR Lt the automatic multi-cycle fire suppression system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might:
- involve either of the diesel generators IA-SA or 18-SB from which the lubricating oil has been released
- damage contiguous associated piping, fittings, cabling in conduit and controls within the spill area of this oil
- expose HVAC equipment or exhaust silencer above to serious damage.
However, the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system can be actuated manually by employees responding to the fire, either from the dual action manual fire alarm station located adjacent to the fire area entrance, or from the system control valve emergency manual release, thus reducing the potential fire consequences described above. Damage will be limited to the inusediate area of inception with very limited damage to exposed equipment. Before the actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, early warning flame scanning de:ection system (ultraviolet detectors) will alarm a fire condition in the Control Room. The control room operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of ettective manual fire fighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, thus reducing the fire spread. The postulated oil fire is not considered to have suf ficient potential for spread to cause failure of redundant safety.- related plant equipment and associated cabling and controls which are separated by three-hour rated fire barriers. Therefore, ths capability of the plant for safe shutdown is not impaired by a fire in any of the Diesel Generator Fire Area.
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment, both safety-and non-satety related, shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this t ire area, listed by fire zones.
Sa fe ty Equipment Related Red undant Counterpar t Separa tion ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or 6 Safety Enclosures Be-Desetiption Div. Resist Retard Yes pijl 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coatina Fire Zone 1 -D-1 -DGA-kM, Diesel Generator Room lA
- Diesel 1 A-SA X X Genera to r i
i 9.5A-173 b
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes g 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating -Diesel Gen-erator Lube Oil Equip-ment Area 1A-SA X X -Jacket Water Cooler 1A-SA X X -Neutral Grounding Trans-former IA-SA X X -Lube 011 Heat Ex-changer 1A-SA X X -Air Intaka Manifold 1A-SA X X - Fire Zone 1-D-1-DGA-ER, Diesel Generator LA-SA Electrical Roou .
-Generator Control Panel 1A-SA X X -+1CC 1A-SA X X -Engine Control 1A-SA X X -DC Panel 1A-SA X X 9.5A-174
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment kelated Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Re tard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coatina Fire Zonet 1-D-1-DGA-ASU, Diesel Generator LA-SA Air Starting Units Area -Air SCart-ing Unit 1A-SA X X -Air Start ing Tanks (2) 1A-SA X X Fire Zonet 1-D-2-DGA-HVD, Diesei Generator 1A-6A H6V Duct Area -Exhaust Fans (2) E-b6 (IA-SA) X X E-86 (15-6A) X X . Fire Zonet 1-D-3-DGA-ES, utesel Generator LA-6A Exhaust Silencer Room
-Exhaust Silencer 1A-SA X X Fire Zonet 1-D-3-DGA-HVR, Diesel Generator LA-SA luV Room -Exhaust Fans (2) 1A-SA X X -Air Hand-ling Units (2) 1A-SA X X -Air In-take Fil-ters (2) 1A-SA X X l
9.5A-175
SENPP FSAR 1
- l Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes g 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coatina Fire Zone 1-D-1-DGB-BM, Diesel Generator Boca 15-6B wiesel Generator 1B-6B 1 X
-Diesel Generator Equipment ,
Area 18-68 X X
-Jacke t Water Cooler 18-SB X X
-Neutral Grounding Trans-former 1B-68 X X 1 -Lebe Oil Heat Ex-
< changer 15-6B X X
-Air Intake i
Manifold 18-S B X X ' Fire Zone: 1 -D-1 -DG B-ER , Diesei Generator la-SB j hiectrical Roos
-Generator Control Panel 18 -SB X X
+tCC 18-SB X X l -Engine Control 15-SS X X 1
-DC Panel 1B-SB X X 9.5A-176
, - - - ---,------,n,-,- - - , , . - - , - - - . - - - - , - . -----,---,,-.-.-~-~~---,-,-.--~-,-----,-----,e~--,--...--~ - - - - - -
SENFP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Ratard Description Div. Yes No 3 hr. less tween Constr. Coatina Fire Zone: 1-D-1-DGB-ASU, Diesel Generator 15-55 Starting Units Area
-Air Start-ing Unit 15-SS X X
-Air Start-ing Tanks (2) 15-55 X X Fire Zone 1-t>-2-DCS-HVD ,
Diesel Generator 15-SE H&V Duct Area
-Exhaust Fans (2) E-86 (1C-58) X E-86 (1D-SB) X Fire Zone: 1-D-3-DGB-ES, Diesel Generator 15-55 Exhaust Silencer Roce
-Exhaust Silencer (15-55) *X X X Fire Zone: 1-D-3-DGB-HVR, Diesel Generator 15-55 B&V Room
-Exhaust 15-55 K X X Fans (2)
-Air Handling 18-55 X X X Units (2)
-Air Intake Filters (2) 15-55 X X X t
9.5A-177
r-SHNPP FSAR *
- APPEND 1X 9.5A.18
- 1. Identification Fire Areas: 1-D-DTA and I-D-DTR Rutiding: Diesel Generator 15 Fire Areas: 1-D-DTA, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank 1A Enclosure 1-D-DTB, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank 15 Enclosure i Shown on Figures: 9.5A-21, 9.5A-22 length (ft.): 12 Width (ft.): 12 Height (ft.): 29 Area (sq. - f t. ): 144 Volume (cu. ft.): 4,200
- 2. Occupancy Each area contains the diesel generator fuel oil day tank 1A-SA and 18-S8 respectively, piping in a pipe chase and tank access ladder.
'l . Boundaries k Walls, floors and cettings are of reinforced concrete construction, with a fire rating minimum of three hours. One wall opening is provided for each area for personnel access, Protected by a watertight, three-hour A label type fire rated door, three ft. above the floor level to allow for a three ft. high retaining wall capable of containing approximately 110 percent of the tank j vnlume.
l I There are no concealed spaces or floor trenches. A 12 in. x 12 in. air intake l opening is provided in the West wall of the fire area (Elevation 303 f t.). protected by a three-hour rated automatic fusible link fire damper. ( ! 4. Combustible Loading . l Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal /lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Areas: 1-D-DTA and 1-D-DTB, Diesel Ce,nerator Fuel 011 Day Tank (I A-SA and IB-SB) Enclosure l l Cable insulation (in conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control ' 0 0 0 Instrumentation O O O l.lqui ds t diesel '3,000 324,000 2,250,000 oil (gal.) Solids 0' O O 9.5A-178 _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - . _ - ~
SHNFp FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / , combustible Gal /lb/RF 1000's eq. ft. Tranatents (negligible) 0 0 0 Total 324,000 2,250,000 i
- 5. Control of usaards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three hour-rated fire stops at the rated fire barriers. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire barriere are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. MVAC exhaust ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct and barrier opening with flesible or seel-rigid f tre stop assemblies.
Each diesel fuel oil day tank, containing diesel ott is located within en enclosure provided with a three it. retaining wall (capable of retaining appronteately 110 percent of the tank volume). A watertight door is also provided to prevent spread of combustible liquide releases beyond the fire area, when the floor drata valve, located in the valve pit adjacent to this '. area (Fire Zone 1-D-1-DCA-ASU or 1-D-1-DGB-ASU) remains closed, in its normal operating position. Af ter the valve to annually opened the drainage flows by gravity into the Diesel Generater Room (Fire Zone 1-D-1-DCA-RN or 1-D-1-DGB-RM) over from where it to pumped to the oil disposal systes. Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the ; i Cable Spreading Roos,1.5 cfn/sq. f t. comparable seoke removal would be achieved for each of these areas by a rate of approxiestely 17 cle/eq. f t. Seoke, heat and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the ventilation system for this areat Supply: By transfer air f rom access corridor. Exhaust E-61(1A-SA) (1-D-DTA) E-61(18-SA) Exhaust E-61(IC-58) (1-D-DTB) E-61(1D-88) Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfe)_ (efe/sq. ft.) Exhaust 3 Ope rating 1,100 8 Exhaust 3 Standby 1,100 8 , Exhaust 3 Operating 1,100 8 l Exhaust 3 Standby 1,100 8 \ There are no radioactive sources in this area. 1 O ( 9.5A-179
SHNPP FSAR
- 6. Fire Detection .
Tio elotection and actuation system provided and its functions for this fire area are ng follows: . Main Fire Detection local Control Panel
- Control Panet Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone Type Rasta Incal** Agn, Alarm Actu Ann Alarm I-D-DCA-TK l-87 Thermal Area X X X X X X l-D-DCM-TX l-90 Thernal Area X X X X X X
- The local fire detection control panel covering all fire areas is located g$
in the access corridor of the Diesel Generator Building.
** Incal alarm and annuneintion of fire or trouble conditions, both visual and nudthlo, are provided for each area / detection sono at the local control panel and for a fire condition, an audthle alarm sounds at the fire area.
- 7. Accena and initial Response Accons to each area 1-D-DTA and I-D-DTB is provided through a watertight fire door, f rom the adjacent fire area 1-D-DCA, Fire Zone 1-D-t-DCA-ASU and I-D-Dun, Fire Zone I-D-DOR-ASU, respectively, which in turn are accenathle from the hu11 ding access corridor.
Manual fire fighting capahitity is provided by portable fire extinguishers of ilry chomical and carbon dioxide type, loacted in the adjacet fire areas I-D-DUA and I-D-DGB backed up hose stations located in the building access enrridor. Accong to theno arcan wit! he gained only if the fire han heen datormined to be amall and that opening of the fire door to the area will not enuno aprend of f lamen, oil or water to the I-D-t-DCA-AMU and I-D-1-DCR-ASU fire sonomi which are part of adjacent fire arean 1-D-DCA and 1-D-008. Control of larger firca will he by operation of suppression systema installed in the tank aream. H. Fire Ruppresalon Ryntem The notomatte fire suppression system provided in thin area is an automatic , multi-cycle nprinkler system, designed hydraulically to provide area donetty of D.1 gem /nq. ft. 1he syntes in actuated automatteally by thermal detectorN located nlao at the ceiling level when the area temperature reachen 200 F. The ' aprinkler heads open when the temperature reaches 225 F.1he nystem water flow in abut off automatteally from the control valto while the pron temperatura dropa holow 220 F. The multi-cycle control valve for the nyntem in located in tho building neensa corridor. Manus 1 actuation is provided from the multi-cycle control valve amorgency manual rolesse. Remote manunt actuntion in 9.SA-180 Amendment No. 15 w -
SHNFP FSAR avattahlo from a dual action manual fire alarm station, located adjnennt to accosw door to fire area 1-D-DCA or 1-D-DC8 respectively. Elec* tcal supervleton of the multi-cycle system includes control valve positio.. eygtem valve position, supervisory air pressure and lack of water flow, through the control velve. Sprinkler system piptog to notemically supported. This ftro aret to containeel within a watertight cuhtete. Tho water discharged from the spriukler system and hose lines is drained after a fire to the Dianol Convrator nuep through a normally closed valved connection located outside the fire area. Racess water cannot overflow to adjacent areas, due to the presence of a rotatning watt and watertight door.
- 9. Analyste of Ef fects of Fostuteted Fire in Ftro Areas l-D-DTA and I-D-DTS the diesel generator fuel oil day tank 1A-SA and 14-5s respectively area fire hasard combustible includes the 3,000 gal. of dtoget ott contained in each of the diesel generator day tanks. Transient materials are not anticipated to be present in the area. thwever, minimal amounts of tranetent materials, such as rage, wood and notwents may be brought into the area for normal maintenance and repair.
Tho quantity of combustible materials Which may be involved in area fire 9, and conwoquontly, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant factittive, le minimtaedt
- by the confinement of released combustible Ltquids within three hours fire rated barriers provided around the day tank. - by contro11tng the introduction of transient coisbustibles throegth adminigtrative procedures, to limit quantities to those required for immodtate neods and to prescrthe nupplemental fire protection measures duringt such esposure periodg. - by limiting esposed ott surfaces so that only a thin upper layer of ott is involved in a fire.
Tho ottent of damage within the fire area is further timited by controtted romovat of heat, smoke and other products of combustion through continued oporat ton of norrent ventilation system Which beco'ses a smoke purge system after tho automatic closing of the fire damper on thr air intake opening and h/ fire-rated barriers enclosing the fire areas. The fire pontulated for each of these areas assumed ignttion, and development into the most severe vingle fire espected in each area, of localised concentrations of diesel ott released from either diesel generator fuel of day tank (IA-SA) or (18-58) respectively. Tho potential mantmum propaljation of the pottulated fire W111 he reduced by prompt detection of the tiro through the antomatic therm 41 detection systers in4talled at the catting of the enclogure on an area basis, which senses the boat etenerated by the firn, Ithen the temperature reaches 200 F, the molti-cycle sprinkler valve is actuated, the piping system is filled with li witer, fire alarm 4 are trangmitted to the Control Roma via the n.5A-181 Amendment No. 13
SHNPP FSAR Communications Room, to the local. fire detection control panel, and locally to the fire area. The sprinkler heads are opened when the temperature reaches 225 F. The multi-cycle valve is shut off automatically af ter all thermal detectors indicate that the fire is out (all detectors cease to sense heat, the temperature falls balow 200 F). Thus damage will be limited to the immediate area of inception only, with limited damage to exposed equipment. If the multi-cycle sprinkler system has not actuated automatically, the
. postulated fire might involve the diesel generator fuel oil day tank from whfth the diesel oil has been released (IA-6A or IB-SB) and damage contiguous associated piping, fittings, cabling and controls within the spill area.
However, the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system can' be actuated manually from either~the system control valve, or the manual dual action fire alari station located in the access corridor thus reducing the potential fire' consequences described above. Even without actuation of the multi-cycle sprinkler system in the area, the oil fire will be sensed by the thermal fire detection system which will alarm fire (high temperature) and trouble (lack of water) conditions in the Control' Room. The control room operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual . fire-fighting through the use of portable fire extinguisherr, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, as described aboye, limiting the resultant fire damage and reducing the potential for the fire spread. The postulated oil fire is not considered to have sufficient potential for spread to cause failure of redundant safety related cable trays, plant equipment and associated cabling and controls, which are separated by - three-hour rated fire barriers. Therefore, the capability of the plant for safe shutdown is not impaired by an oil fire in a diesel generator fuel oil day tank.
- 10. Fire Area Equipment i
Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment both safety and non-safety related, shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this , area: Note: N/A = Not Applicable Safety Equipment. _ Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- -Resist Retard Description Div. Yes No, 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating l Resid. Heat l Fire Areas: 1-D-DTA and 1-D-DTB, Diesel Generator Day Tank 1A and IB Enclosure (Respectively) Diesel Fuel LA-SA and X X 011 Day Tank 1B-SB l i i 9.5A-182
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID.No, Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & . Safe ty Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description _.Div. -_ Yes o N,o, 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Ladder NNS X N/A Pipe Chase' NHS I N/A I 1 1 l 9.5A-183
,,p , , v- ,
w-w ,n,.-
l SHNPP FSAR l l APPENDIX 9.5A.19 ,
- 1. Identification Fire Areas: 1-0-PA and 1-0-PB 15 Building: Diesel Oil Storage Area Fire Areas: 1-0-PA, Diesel Oil Pump Room 1A Elevation 242.25 ft.
1-0-PB, Diesel Oil Pump Room IB Elevation 242.25 ft. Shown on Figure: 9.5A-23 Length (ft.): 10.5 ' Width (ft.): 9 Height (ft.): 10.5 Area (sq. ft.): 95 Volume (cu. ft.): 1000
- 2. Occupancy .
Each fire nrea contains the diesel fuel oil transfer pump 1A-SA and IB-SB respectively, with associated piping, valves, fittings, the exhaust fan and duct, associated controls and wiring in conduit.
- 3. Boundaries Walls, floor and roof are of reinforced concrete construction, with a fire rating of three hours. Wall openings for personnel access are protected by certified three-hour A label type fire rated doors. Wall openings for air makeup are protected by three-hour fire door dampers. Concealed spaces consist of catch basins, one for each pump room, approximately 2 ft. X 2 ft.
In size.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Areas: 1-0-PA or 1-0-PB, Diesel Oil Pump Room 1A or IB Cable Insulation (In Conduit) Power 0 0 0 Control 0 0 0 Instrumentation 0 0 0 Liquids (integral with 0 0 0 equipment) Solids O O O Transient: oil (gal.) 55 6,000 63,000 Total 6,000 63,000 9.5A-184 Amendment No. 15
. SHNPP FSAR
- 5. Control of Hazards tiectrical penetrations are sealed with three-hour rated fire stops at the rated fire barriers. tkchanical piping penetrations through fire barrier walls are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop a ssemblie s. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed between duct and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. Automatic fusible like operated fire door dampers are provided within transfer openings. Catch basins provided in each area prevent spread of ott releases beyond the fire area. Structural three-hour rated barriers are provided between redundant adjacent safety-related equipment.
Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the cable Spreading Rooms, 1.5 c6m/sq. f t., comparable smoke removal would be achieved for these areas by a rate of approximately 0.5 cfm/sq. f t. Smoke , heat and products of incorsplete combustion are removed by the normal ventilation system for these areas. Supply: By Transfer Exhaust: E-85(1A-6A) and (18-SA) E-85(1A-SB) and (18-SB) Sa fe ty Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq.ft.) Ex haust 3 Operating 1,300 13.7 Exhaust 3 Standby 1,300 13.7 There are radioactive sources in this area.
- b. Fire Detection The types of detection and , actuation systems provided and their function for these tire areas are as follows:
Main Fire De tec tion Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres De t System Fire Zone Zone Tyge Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 1 PA 1-92 Thermal Area X X X X X X UV Area X X X No X X l
1-0-Pu l-93 Thennal Area X X X X X X l UV Area X X X No X X l *The local fire detection control panel servicing fire areas 1-0-PA and (MJ-PB in the Diesel Oil Storage Area is located in the access stairway. l
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audible, are provided for each area / detection zone at the local control panel
- and an audible alarm sounds at the affected area.
1 9.5A-185 I l l a
SHNPP FSAR L '
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from the yard through access stairways and corridor. Carbon dioxide and dry chemical type extinguishers are provided in and adjacent to the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Yard hydrants and hosellnes have been provided adjacent to this area.
B. Fire Suppression Systems The itre suppression system provided in this area is an automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system, hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. f t. of floor area. The system is actuated auto'matically by thermal detectors located at the ceiling level when the area temperature reaches 135 F. . The sprinkler heads open when area temperature reaches 165 F. The system water flow is shut off automatically from the control valve when the area temperature drops below 135 F. The multi-cycle control valve for the system is located outside tlese fire areas, in the access corridor. tuutual actuation of the system is provided from each multi-cycle control valve # emergency mechacical release. blectrical supervision of each suppression system includes control valve position, system valve postion, supervisory air pressure and lack of water tiow through the control valve. Sprinkler system piping is seismically suppo rted. Dauage to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of water discharged , trom sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of an adequate floor drainge system. This floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant. Runoff is directed to diesel fuel oil sump and then pumped to the yard oil separator.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires in Fire Area 1-0-PA or 1-0-PB the diesel fuel oil transfer pump 1A-SA or IB-SB, area fire hazard combustibles include limited quantities of. diesel oil contained within the transfer pumps, piping, valves and fittings. Transient materials such as rags, cleaning solvents and lubricating oil may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair.
The quantity of combusti' ole materials which may be involved in area fires and, consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant tacilities is reduced or minimized: '
- By use of IEEE 383 qualified cables.
- By limitind the spread of fire by the provision of metallic conduit and fire atops at fire barrier penetrations.
- By the confinement of released combustible liquids through provisions of drainage of released oil to diesel fuel oil sump and -yard oil separator system.
9.5A-186
SHNPP FSAR J- By controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures. The extent of damage.within.and beyond each fire area is further-limited by the three-hour fire-rated barriers enclosing each transfer pump room. The type of fire postulated in any of these areas 'is determined by the. combustibles present in the areas and their concentrations. In the fuel oil transfer pump areas an oil fire is postulated, due to localized concentrations of . diesel oil which may be released from one diesel fuel oil transfer pump, 4 piping,- valves or fittings and transient oil in the area. J The potential maximum propagation of the postulated fire will be reduced by early detection using flame scanning (ultraviolet) type detectors installed in each area.at' strategic locations. The automatic detection system senses the flame-stage fire and alerts employees both locally and in the Control Room 15 via the Communications Room, so that manual fire response can be initiated promptly. 5 Ready access is provided to each area from the yard through the building
, access corridor (as detailed in Item 7), facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires 'and supplemental backup of yard hose lines on
- developing fires by employees responding to the fire.
Additional defense for each fire a'rea is provided by the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system (as described in Item 8). If the automatic multi-cycle fire suppression system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might involve the diesel fuel. oil pump IA-SA or IB-SB and equipment from which the fuel oil has been released, damage associated piping and fittings and HVAC equipment within the spill area of the However, the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system can be 1 diesel oil.
- actuated manually by employees responding to the fire from the system control valve emergency manual release, thus reducing the potential fire consequences described above. With prompt response by plant operators and fire brigade personnel, using portable fire extinguishers located in the fire area _and yard 1
hoselines from hydrants located in the yard adjacent ~ to the building, the resultant fire damage in each area will be limited significantly and confined to the localized area of ignition. Before the actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, early warning flame scanning detection system (ultraviolet detectors) will alarm a fire
- condition in the Control Room. The Control Room Operator will dispatch -the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of effective manual fire fighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, yard hoselines and/or manual actuation of the automatic fire suppression system, thus reducing the fire spread. The postulated oil fire is not ,
considered to have 'suf ficient potential for spread to cause f ailure of . redundant safety related plant equipment and associated cabling and controls which are separated by three-hour rated fire barriers. Therefore, the . capability of the plant for safe shutdown is not impaired by a fire in any of the Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Areas. , l l . 9.5A-187 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR I
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment, both safety and non-safety related, shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for these areas.
Safety Equipment Ralated Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire __ Mme or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description _ Div. ;_ Yes No 3 hr. 14ss tween Constr. Coating Fire Area: 1-0-PA, DEasel Oil Pump Room 1A Diesel Fuel 1A-SA X X Oil Transfer Pump HVAC Fans (IA-SA)(IB-SA) 'I X Fire Area 1-0-PB, Diesel Oil Pump Room IB Diesel Fuel IB-SB X X Oil Transfer Pump HVAC Fans (1A-SB)(IB-SB) X X b i ' I I i l 1 l i I
~
! 9.5A-188 1
- l-i__ _ . . - - .. __ . , _ . . -
SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.20
- t. Identification Fire Areas: 12-0-TA and 12-0-TB Building:.-Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area Fire Areas: 12-0-TA. - Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1A and 2A 15 12-0-TB, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1B and 2B Shown on Figure: 9.5A-23 Length (ft.): 66 Width (ft.): 21 Height (ft.): 18.5 Area (sq. ft.): 1,400 Volume (sq. ft.): 26,000
- 2. Occupancy Each area consists of the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1A and IB, respectively. 15
- 3. Boundaries niesel fuel oli storage tanks are buried and of Seismic Category I construction, which is considered to be equivalent to a fire rating of three hours.
- 4. Comhustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 12-0-TA or 12-0-TB Cable Insulat' ion Power (In conduit) 0 0 0 Control (In conduit) 0 0 0 Instrumentation (In conduit) 0 0 0 Liquids: oil (gal.) 175,000 18,900,000 13,500,000 Solids: 0 0 0 Transient: 0 0 0 TOTAL 18,900,000 13,500,000
- 5. Control of Hazards Mechanical piping penetrations through fire barriers are sealed with flexible ;
or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. There are no electrical or HVAC ) penetrations. 1 l l 9.5A-189 Amendment No.15 I 1 t.
9 SHNPP FSAR
- 5. Control of Hazards (Cont'd)
Natural ventilation around tank vents and hatch closures is provided which is ' adequate for smoke control. Flame arrestors are installed to prevent spread of fire. 1 - There are radioactive sources in these areas. ,
- 6. Fire Detection Detection systems are not required for this area.
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from the yard. Dry chemical portable fire extinguishers are provided adjacent to the area. Hose lines from yard hydrants located adjacent to the area can.be used as backup.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems There are no automatic suppression systems provided to protect these areas.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires 15 In fire area 12-0-TA or 12-0-TB, t'he diesel fuel oil storage tank 1A&2A or 1B&28, area fire hazard combustible is the diesel oil contained inside each tank. Transient materials are not anticipated to be present in the area.
t The extent of damage beyond the fire area is limited by the tank construction, equivalent to three-hour fire barriers. as well as installation-buried j under ground. The fire postulated for each area assumes ignition and subsequent development into the most severe single fire, expected in these areas is the diesel fuel l ott contained in each tank. With prompt response by plant operators and fire j hrigade personnel using nortable fire extinguishers and hose lines from the yard hydrants for cooling and control, the resultant' fire damage in each area will be limited to the area of ignition. Even with the loss of a diesel fuel oil storage tank, the capability of the plant for a safe shutdown is not impaired by the postulated oil fire due to the tank construction and installation underground, which will contain the fire to the area of inception. The redundant diesel fuel oil storage tank will be available for the plant safe shutdown. l 1
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the equipment present in this area.
9.5A-190 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR . Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes jio, 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating Fire Area: 12-0-TA, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1A Diesel Fuel.011 Storage 15 Tank 1A 3 X X Fire Area: 12-0-TB, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank 18 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage 15 Tank IB 3 X X
. l l
l 1 l l 9.5A-191 Amendment No. 15 _ _ .. . _ . . .-- . - . ~ . _ _ _ _. . _ . _
l SHNPP FSAR 1 l APPENDIX 9.5A.21 1 l
- 1. Identification Fire Areas: 12-I-ESWPA and 12-1-ESWPB Building: Intake Structure Fire Areas: 12-I-ESWPA, Emergency Service Water Pumps IA, 15 Elevation 262 ft.
12-I-ESWPB, Emergency Service Water Pumps IB , Elevation 262 ft. Shown on Figure: 9.5A-40 Length (ft.): 85 Width (ft.): 24 Height (ft.): 16 Area (sq. f t.): 2,100 Volume (cu. f t.): 34,000
- 2. Occupancy Each area contains the emergency service water pumps, IA-SA and IB-SB, 15 respectively, associated piping and valves motor control centers, switchgear ,
cables in conduit and controls. 3. Boundaries Walls, floor, roof and structural columns supporting the area boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction with a fire rating of three hours. Wall openings that allow access of personnel from outside the areas are protected by security doors, which are considered to have an equivalent of three hour fire rating based on the special separation from other structures and limited fire loading inside the fire area. Wall openings for personnel access witnin the areas are not protected.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 12-I-ESWPA or 12-1-ESWPB Cable Insulation: Power (In Conduit) 0 0 0 Control (In conduit) 0 0 0 Instrumentation (In Conduit) 0 ~0 0 Liquids: 011 (gal.) 82.5 9,280 4,500 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 3,000 TOTAL 15,280 7,500 Amendment No. 15 9.5A-192
SHNPP FSAR
- 5. Control of Hazards Mechanical piping penetrations are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. Electrical penetrations are sealed with three hour fire stops at rated fire barriers. 'there are no HVAC penetrations.
Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. ft.) comparable smoke removal would be achieved for these areas by a rate of approximately 0.02 cfm/sq. f t. A once through ventilation system is provided for the pump and MCC rooms which can be used to remove smoke and products of incomplete combustion: 15 a) Pump Room lA Floor Area: 1,600 sq.ft. Supply: Louvers: Exhaust: E-88(IA-SA)
^~
15l 15 h) Pump Room IB Floor Area: 1,600 sq. ft.' Supply: Louvers: Exhaust: E-88(IB-SB) L-105(IB-NNS) 15 Safety Function Class Mode Flow (cfm) (cfm/sq. ft.) Supply NNS Operating 11,750 7.3 Exhaust 3 Operating 11,750 7.3 Exhaust 3 Standby 11,750 7.3 15 e) Electrical Equipment Room 1A Floor Area: 500 sq. ft. Supply: AH-86(IA-SA) Exhaust: Louvers: L-109(IA-NNS) d) Electrical Equipment Room IB Floor Area: 500 sq. f t. Supply: AH-86(IB-SB) Exhaust: Louvers: L-109(IB-NNS) 15 9.5A-193 Amendment No. 15 L
I SHNPP FSAR Safety Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/sq. ft.) Function Supply 3 ' Operating 9,500 max. 19
- Supply 3 Standby 9,500 max. 19 Exhaust NNS Operating 9,500 max. 19 There are no radioactive sources in this area.
- 6. Fire Detection Detection systems are not provided in this area.
~
- 7. Access and Initial Response
. Access to thin area is provided from the yard provided in each area in accordance with NFPA 10. Hose lines from yard hydrants located adjacent to the area can be used as backup for fire fighting.
- 8. Fire Suppression Systems There are no automatic suppression systems provided to protect this area.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires In fire area 12-1-ESWPA or 12-I-ESWPB, Emergency Service Water Pumps IA, or 15 In, fire hazard combustibles consist of lubricating oil, 41.25 gal. per pump contained within each emergency service water pump.
All cables are IEEE-383 qualified and enclosed in metallic conduit and as such are not considered fire hazards. Transient combustibles such as ott in a 55 gal. drum, rags, wood, etc., may be brought into the area for repairs or maintenance. 15 The extent of damage beyond the fire is limited by the three hour fire rated barriers enclosing the fire area. The oil postulated for this area assumes ignition and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of the lube oil contained in the pump lube oil system and/or transient lube oil from a 55 gat. drum. With prompt response by plant operators and fire brigade personnel using portable fire extinguishers and hose lines from the yard hydrants for , cooling and control, the resultant fire damage in the area will be limited and I confined to the area of ignition. In the event that a fire damages the safety train A emergency service water pump (IA-SA), the redundant safety 15 train B pump (18-SB) will remain functional due to the separation of the fire areas by three hour fire barriers. The capability of the plant for safe shutdown is therefore not impaired by a fire in this area. l l
~
9.5A-194 Amendment No. 15 , 1 J
SHNPP FSAR
- 10. Fire Area Equipment Listed below is the mechanical and electrical equipment both safety- and non-safety related shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this area.
Note: N/A = Not Applicable Safety Equipment Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description .Div. Yes ]Ijt 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 15 Fire Area: 12-I-ESWPA, Emergency Service Water Pump, IA Emergency Service Water - Pump 1A-SA 3 X X 15 I Illscharge Emergency Service Water Screen Wash Pumps (2) PIA NNS X N/A Motor Control Centers IA32-SA 1R X X l-4A10ll NNS X N/A 15 l Electric Unit Heaters (4) EUH-59(IA-SA) NNS X N/A KUt!-60( IB-S B) NNS X N/A 15 480V Switchgear NNS X N/A (1-4A 101) Air Randling Unit AH-86( I A-S A) 3 X X 15 l l Amendment No. 15 9.5A-195 l l
SHNPP FSAR Safety Equipment . Related Redundant Counterpart Separation ID No. Barriers or Space Fire Fire Name or & Safety Enclosures Be- Resist Retard Description Div. Yes }ki, 3 hr. Less tween Constr. Coating 15 Fire Area: 12-I-ESWPA, Emergency Service Water Pumps, 1A Fans (2) E-59 NNS X N/A Exhaust Fans E-88(IA-SA) 3 X X 15 Fire Area: 12-1 ESWPB, Emergency Service Water Pumps, IB Emergency Service Water Pump IB-SB 3 X X 15 Discharge Emergency Service Water Screen d Wash Pumps (2) PIB NNS X N/A Motor Control Centers IB-32SB 1B X X 15 1-481011 NNS X N/A Exhaust Fans (2) E-88(IB-SB) 3 X X 15 Air flandling Units (2) 15 AH-86(IB-SB) 3 X X Electric Unit Heaters (4) EHH-59(!B-NNS) NNS X N/A l 15 EUll-60( IB-NNS) NNS X, N/A
- l 15 480V Switchgear NNS X N/A (1-48101) l 9.5A-196 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.22
- 1. Identification Fire Area: 5-W-BAL Building: . Waste Processing Fire Area: 5-W-BAL Fire Zones: Detailed in Item 4 Shown on Figures: 9.5A-6, 9.5A-8, 9.5A-14, 9.5A-18, 9.5A-24 through -33.
Length (f t.): Variable Width (ft.): Variable Height (ft.): Variable Area (sq. ft.): 231,500 volume (cu. ft.): 3,500,000
- 2. Occupancy The area contains various tanks, pumps, compressors, evaporators, laboratories, drumming areas, health physics facilities, offices, laundries,
. locker rooms, decontamination areas, computer room, HVAC equipment, demineralizers, miscellaneous equipment, associated controls, wiring in conduit and cable in trays.
- 3. Boundaries
) 1 j Wa lls , floor, roof and structural columns supporting the area boundaries are of reinforced concrete construction, with a fire rating of three hours. Wall j openings for personnel access are protected by certified three hour A Label
- type fire rated doors. Certified one and a half hour B Label type fire rated doors are provided at stair towers. Floor and roof openings for-handling of d
equipment are protected either by metal or reinforced concrete covers. Concealed spaces consist of suspended ceilings and are constructed of noncombustible materials. Other concealed spaces consist of valve galleries, pipe tunnels and pipe chases.
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Area: 5-U-BAL, Waste Peccessing Building, all floors Total Floor Area: 231,500 sq. ft. Cable Insulation i Power 9,825 1,702,500 7,400 ) 1 9.5A-197 Amendment No. 15 l l
0 SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible. Gal . /lb. /RF 1000's sq. ft. ~
' Control 14,695 2,3f3,500 10,100 Instrumentation 8,315 791,000 3,400 '
I.tquids: 011 (gal.) 24 2,500 15 Solids: Charcoal (ib.) 44,500 445,000 2,000 Transients: Charcoal (ib.) 22,200 222,000 1,000 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 30 Fiber drums (ib.) 1,160 9,000 55 15 5,491,500 24,000 TOTAL 15 Fire Zone: 5-W-1-WHTK1, Waste Holdup Tank, Elevation.211 ft. Floor Area: 7000 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 530 95.400 13,600 Control 680 107,000 15,300 Instrumentation 300 28,500 4,000 l Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 So lids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 236,900 33,900 Fire Zone: 5-W-l'-PDTK, Floor Drain Tanks, WPB Elevation 211 f t. Floor Area: 10,400 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 380 68,500 6,500 control 200 31,500 3,000 l Instrumentation 200 19,000 2,000 Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 4 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 500 TOTAL 125,000 12,000 8 9.5A-198 Amendment No. 15 I
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's 'sq. ft. 4 Cable Insulation Power 580 105,000 15,000 control 550 86,000 12,500 Instrumentation 430 41,000 6,000 Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 238,000 34,500 Fire Zone: 5-W-1-VG-1, Valve Gallery 1, Elevation 211 f t. Floor Area: 7000 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 260 47,000 6,700 control 430 67,500 9,700 Instrumentation 260 25,000 3,600 Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: Oil (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 145,500 21,000 1 Fire Zone: 5-W-1-TKS, Miscellaneous Tanks, Elevation 211 ft. Floor Area: 10,400 sq. ft. Cable Ins'ulation Power 370 66,600 6,500 Control 910 143,000 13,800 Instrume ntation 340 32,400 3,200 Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 t TOTAL 248,000 24,500 Fire Zone: 5-W-1-VG-2, Valve Gallery 2, Elevation 211 ft. Floor Area: 7000 sq. ft. l 9.5A-199 Amendment No.1 (
i SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible . Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. l 15 Fire Zone: 5-W-1-HCHTK, High and Low Conductivity Holding Tanks, Elevation 216 ft. l Floor Area: 4100 sq. f t. Cable Insulation Power 65 11,600 3,000 , Control 65 10,200 2,500 Instrumentation 65 6,200 1,500 Liquids (negligible integral 0 0 0 with equipment) Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,500 TOTAL 34,000 8,500 i ! 9.5A-200 Amendment No. 15 w
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Zone: 5-W-1-SW, Secondary Waste, Elevation 216' f t. Floor Area: 3900 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 110 19,800 5,100 control 110 17,300 4,400 Instrumentation 110 10,500 2,700 Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient 55 _6,000 1,500 TOTAL 53,600 13,700 Fire Zone: 5-W-2-TKS1, Cas Decay Tanks 15 Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 5600 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 400 72,000 12,900 Control 630 98,900 17,800 Instrumentation 400 38,100 6,800 Liquids 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 215,000 38,500 l l l l l 9.5A-201 l
y- - SHNPP FSAR i Quantity. BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Fire Zone: SHd-2-IITR, Heaters, Elevation 236 f t. Floor Area: 5800 sq. ft. Cable insulation Power 220 40,000 6, 80 0 Control 220 34,500 6,000 instr umenta tion 220 21,000 3,700 Liquids (negligible) 0 0 0 Solid s 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 101,500 17,500 Fire Zone: 5H4-2-EVAP, Waste Evaporator, Elevation 236 f t. Floor Area: Shou sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 370 66,500 11,500 Control 640 100,000 17,200 . Instrumenta tion 4 80 45,500 7, 800 Liquids (negligible) 0 0 0 Solid s 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000-TOTAL 218,000 37,500 Fire Zone: 5-W-2-IIVAC, HVAC Equipment, Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 5800 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 320 57,600 9, 900 Control 660 104,000 17,900 Instr umen ta tion 520 49,400 8,700 Liquid (minor, integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solid s 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 217,000 37,500 9.5A-202 t-
E SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft.
' Fire Zone: 5-W-2-RPOR, Relay and Process Instrument Room, Elevation -
236 ft. Floor Area: 1700 sq. f t. Cable Insulation Power 0 0 0 Control 1,160 182,000 107,000 Instrumentation 410 39,000 23,000 Liquids 0 0 0 Solids 0. 0 0 Transient 0 0 0 TOTAL 221,000 130,000
, Fire Zone: 5-W-2-TLHSTK, Treated Laundry and Hot Shower Tanks, 15 Elevation 236 ft.
Floor Area: 5900 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 270 50,000 8,700 Control 380 60,000 10,000 Instrusentation 250 24,000 4,000 Liquids (negligible) 0 0-0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 140,000 23,700 Fire Zone: 5-W-2-LHSTK, Laundry and Hot Shower Tanks, Elevation 236 ft. 15 Floor Area: 5800 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 170 30,600 5,400 control 170 26,700 4,600 Ins trusentation 170 16,200 3,000 , Liquids (minor, integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 ,
)
I
\
9.5A-203 Amendment No. 15
, . ~ - . . . - - - - -. . b
SHNPP FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. , Tranatent: Ott (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 79,500 14,000 Fire Zone: 5-W-2-CMPT, Computer Room, Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 1700 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power (in conduit) 0 0 0 control 630 98,000 58,000 Instrumentation 500 47,600 28,000 Liquids 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: (negligible) 0 0 0 TOTAL 145,600 86,000 Fire Zone: 5-W-2-CR, Waste Processing Control Room and Cable Vault, l Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 2200 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power (in conduit) 0 0 0 Control 1,170 184,000 84,000 Instrumentation 430 41,000 18,500 Liquids 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 TOTAL 225,000 102,500 15 Fire Zone: 5-W-2-LCHTK-1, Low Conductivity Holding Tanks, Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 3200 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 150 27,000 8,500 Control 150 24,000 7,500 Instrumentation 150 14,500 4,500 Liquids 0 0 0 9.5A-204 Amendment No. 15
T~ _ l l SENFP FSAR ! Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal ~./lb./RF 1000's so. ft. Solids- 0 0 0 Transient 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,500 TOTAL 71,500 22,000 2 Fire Zone: 5-W-2-COND, Solid Waste Evaporator Distillate Condenser, Elevation 236 ft. Floor Area: 2000 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 190 34,000 17,000 Control 320 50,000 25,000 Instrumentation 300 28,500 14,500 Liquids 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 3,000 TOTAL 118,500 59 ,500 Fire Zone: 5-W-34-DRM, Drumming Area, Elevation 261 f t. Floor Area: 11,800 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 240 43,000 3,900 Control 240 37,900 3,300 Instrumentation 240 22,800 2,000 9.5A-205 Amendment No. 2 ht- _
4 SWPP FSAR Ouantity BTU in BTU / , l Combuscible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: Fiber drums (ib.) 600 4,800 400 TOTAL 108,500 9,500 Fire Zone 5-W-3-STR, Storage Area, Elevation 261 f t. Floor Area: 11,800 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 700 126,300 10,900 Control 630 94,900 4,400
- Instrumentation 340 32,300 2,700 Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 500 1l TOTAL 263,500 22,500 Fire Zone: 5-W-340CWHE1, Waste Processing Building Cooling Water Meat Exchangers 1-4A, Elevation 261 ft.
Floor Area: 4700 sq. fc. Cable Insulation Power 820 148,000 31,500 Control 260 40,800 4,700 Instrumentation 260 24,700 5,300 Liquids (negligible) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,500 TOTAL 214.500 47.000 Fire Zone: 5-W-34-C'4E-2, vaste Processing Building Cooling Water Heat Exchangers 1-43, Elevation 261 ft. 1 Floor Area: 4,700 sq. f t. Cable Insulation Power 870 157,000 33,400 ( Control 330 52,000 11.100 Instrumentation 330 31,400 6,700 Amendment No.1 9.5A-206 L >
SHNFF FSAR Quantity BTU in BTU / Combustible Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Liquids (negligible) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transtent ~ 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,500 TOTAL 246,400 53,000 l2 Fire Zone M-34-CWF, Waste Processing Building Cooling Water Pumpe 1-4 Floor Area: 2900 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 47 0 85,300 29,300 Control 220 34,500 12,000 Instrumentation 160 15.200 5,000 Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solide 0 0 0 Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 2 000 TOTAL 141.000 ~M l2 Fire Zone M-4-SWC2, Switchgear Roca 2. Elevation 276 f t. Floor Area: 1900 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 280 50,000 26.000 Control 250 39,000 21.000 Instrumentation (in conduit) 0 0 0
~
Liquids 0 0 0 Solids ,, 0 0 0 Transient (negligible) 0 0 0 TOTAL 49,000 47,000 Fire Zone M-4-SWC1, Switchgear Room 1, Elevation 276 f t. Floor Area: 1300 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 220 34,600 30,!00 Control 220 35,000 27,000 Instrumentation (in conduit) 0 0 0 9.5A-207 Amendment No. 2 o J
S WFP FSAR Ouantity STU in BTU / Cosbustible Cal./lb./R.? 1000's so. ft. Iiquids 0 0 0 Solide 0 0 0 Transient (neglisible) 0 0 0 TOTAL 74,600 57,500 Fire Zone 5-W-4-URK, Working Area, Elevation 276 f t. - Floor Area: 4500 sq. ft. Cable Insulation l Fouer (in conduit) 0 0 0 Control 290 52,300 12,000 Instrumentation 70 6,700 1,500 t,1guids 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 Transient (neg11 bible) 0 0 0 TOTAI. Se 000 1J,500 Fire Zone 5-W-5-ilv, R & V Area, Elevation 291 f t. Floor Area: 5900 sq. ft. Cable Insulation Power 110 19,400 3,400 l , Control 130 20,400 3,600 Instrumentation 80 7,600 2,300 1,1 quids 0 0 0 Solids: Charcoal (ib.) 11,100 111,000 1A,900 : Transient: Charcoal (ib.) 11,100 111,000 19,900 Tiber drums (ib.) 280 2.200 400 - 1 TOTAL 272,000 t*7,500 Fire Zone: 5-W-5-FAN, Miscellaneous Fans, Ilevation 291 f t. Floor Area 5900 sq. ft. t Cable Insulation l Power 240 43,200 7.300 . Control 400 41,900 10,600 ! Instrumentation 130 12,400 2,100 l l Amendment No. 1 9.3A-208
SNNFF FSAR Ouantity RTU in RTU/ - Coahuetthle Cal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Liquids (integral with equipment) 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 s Transients 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 124,500 21,000 2 Fire Zones 5-W-5-CHF, Charcoal Filter Room, Elevation 291 f t. Floor Area r $900 sq. f t . Cable Insulation l Power 250 45,000 7,600 Control 6 50 102.000 17,300 Instrumentation 250 23,000 4,000 Liquids (minor) 0 0 0 Solids: Charcoal (Ib.) 33,400 334,000 56,400 l Transient: Charcoal (ib.) 11,100 111,000 1A,900 ' Fiber drums (ib.) 280 2,200 400 TOTAL 617,200 105,000 l2 Fire Zone 5-W-CHL, Waste Frocessing Butiding Chillers. Elevation 291 ft. Floor Area: 5900 sq. f t. Cabin insulation Power 210 37,A00 6,400 Control 410 64,400 11,100 Inst rumentation 120 11,400 1,900 Liquids: 011 (gal.) 24 2,6 00 400 Solids 0 'O O Transient 011 (gal.) 55 _ 6,000 1,000 TOTAL 122,200 20,400 2 i Fire Zones 5-W-5-SLD, Waste Solidification Area Elevation 291 f t. Floor Area: 5900 sq. f t. Cable Insulation Power 190 14,400 5,900 Control 220 34,600 5,900 Instrumentation 190 18,000 3,200 9.5A-209 Amendment No. 2
l
.SHNPP FSAR .
)
I l Quantity . BTU'in BTU /~ Combustible Cal ./lb./ RF 1000's sq. ft.. Liquids (negligible)- 0 0 0 Solids 0 0 0 l
. Transient: 011 (gal.) 55 6,000 1.000 L TOTAL 93,000- 16,000 L
The amount of combustible materials accounted for the fire zones listed below are insignificant, and thus, their combustible loading is neg ligible. These fire zones are: 5-W-1-C1, Auxiliary Steam Condenser Tank and Pumps, Elevation 216 ft. 15 5-W-1-C2, Auxiliary Steam Condenser Tank and Pumps, Elevation 216 ft. 5-W-1-TK, HVAC Condensate Recirculation and Transfer Tank and Miscellaneous Pumps, Elevation 216 ft.~ 5-W-2-DMNE , Secondary Waste Demineralizer, Elevation 236 f t. 5-W-3-MLR, Men's Locker Room, Elevation 261 f t. 5-W-34-IC, Instrumentation and Controls Shop, Elevation 261 ft. e 5-W-4-LAL, Low Activity Lab, Elevation 276 ft. 5-W-4-HL, Hot Laboratory, Elevation 276 f t. 5-W-4-DRM, Drumming Area by Drum Filling Station, Elevation 276 f t. ( 5-W-5HP A, Future Volume Reduction System Area, Elevation 291 f t.
- 5. Control of Hazards ,
Electrical penetrations are sealed with three hour rated fire stops at all
~
floors and at rated fire barriers. Mechanical piping penetrations though fire barrier walls are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barriers are sealed J between duct and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided within safety related ducts. Partial or full height, structural barriers, are provided in many cases between components within the area. Supplemental barriers, fire breaks and fire' retardant coarings are provided as required. 4 Based on the smoke removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the , Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.) comparable smoke removal would be achieved for this fire area by a rate of approximately 0.2 cfm/sq. ft. l i l - l i 9.5A-210 Amendment No. 15 i
l
- -SENPP FSAR l
- Smoke, . heat and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the ventilation system for_ this area:
l Supply: EAC-5 (1-4X-NNS) Exhaust: E-45 (1-4X-t3NS) EAC-6 (1-4X4NS) E-46 (1-4X-NNS) From E-47 (1-4X-NNS) Contaminated E-49 (1-4X-NNS) Spaces E-83 (1-41-NNS) (Standby) E-59 (1-4A-tins) From R-7 (1-4A-NNS) non-R-8 (1-4A-NNS) contaminated Spaces Note: The following areas have their own independent systems which have once-through capability:
-1) Control Room and Cable Vault
- 2) Office and Idundry Areas
- 3) Laboratory Areas Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/sq. ft.)
Supply NNS Operating 92,000 0.8 Supply NNS Operating 92,000 0. 8 Exhaust NNS Operating 32,700 0. 7 Exhaust NNS Operating 32,700 0. 7 - Exhaust NNS. Operating 32,700 0.7 Exhaust NNS Operating 32,700 0. 7 Exhaust NNS Operating 25,000 0.11 Exhaust NNS Operating 24,400 0.11 i Exhaust NNS Operating 24,400 , 0.11 Potential liquid borne radioactive releases from waste processing building
; equipment are contained by 6 in. curbs provided in areas where such releases 2 are likely to occur, such as Waste Holdup Tanks, Floor Drain Tanks, Iow and high Conductivity Holding Tanks, etc.
Potential air borne radioactive releases from equipment are absorbed by - 1 charcoal filters provided in the building ventilation system at Elevation 291 ft.
- 6. Fire Detection The types of detection, actuation and signaling systems provided. in' this area and their functions are as follows:
4 9.5A-211
,- r- -
v--e- -
,m e . , - - - e e, ,- -w -
,-v ,,,,wr-
- - - - ,e, - - - , - - - - - , - - ~ , - , ---,,----,,,,w,-ge.,e- ,--
SENPP FSAR Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone- ' Zone g Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 5-W-1-WHTK2 1-101-1 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-4-1-FDTK . 1-101-2 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 5-W-1-WHTR1 1-101-3 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 5-W-1-VG2 1-101-4 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 5-W-1-TKS 1-101-5 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 5-W-1VG1 1-101-6 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-W-1-LCHTK 1-102-1 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X
'5-W-1-SW 1-102-2 Ioniza- X X X No X X l tion Area Manual
, Alarm Station Area X X X No X X ( l 9.5A-212
SHNPP FSAR Main Fire De tection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Dec System Fire Zone Zone T_ype Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 5-W-1-HCHTK 1-102-3 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 5-W-2-RPIR l-103-1 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-W CR l-103-2 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-W-2-CMPT l-103-3 loniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-W-2-LCHTK2 1-103-4 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-4-2-COND 1-103-5 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 5-W-2-LChTX1 1-103-6 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 5-4-2-TKS1 1-103-6 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-W-2-HTR 1-103-1 Ioniza- X X X No X X l tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 5-W-2-LRSTK 1-103-1 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area l 9.5A-213 l t
p SENPP FSAR Main Fire-De tec tion
- Local Control Panel
- Control Panel
- Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone g Basis Local ** Ann ~ Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 5-41-2-TLHSTK 1-103-1 Ioni u - X X X No X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No . X X 5-41-2-TKS 2 1-103-4 Ioniza-- X X X No X X tion Area X X X No X X 5-W-247AP l-103-3 Ioniza-tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 1-103 -3 Ioniza- X X X No X X 5-W tiVAC tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X l-104-7 Ioniza- X X X No X X 5-W-34-ORM tion ARas Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X X X X No X X 5-W-34-cWE1 1-104 -1 Ioniza-tion' Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X l
l-104-2 Ioniza- X X X No X X 5-W-34-CHP ~ tion Area X No X X 5-W-34-CWE2 1-104-3 Ioniza- X X tion Area Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X X X ! S W MLR l-104-4 Thermal Area X X X No Manual Alarm Station Area X X X No X X 9.5A-214
[ SHNPP FSAR f Main Fire t. Detection local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone g Basis local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 5-U-3-STR 1-104-5 hermal Area X X X X X X Manual Alarm Station Area X X X X X X
, 1-104-6 hermal Area X X X X X X Ioniza-tion Area X X X No X X 5-W-34-IC 1-104-7 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-W-4-DRM 1-105 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-U-4-LAL 1-105 hermal Area X X X X X X 5-W-4-WRK 1-105 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area hermal Area X X X X X X Manual Alara Station Area X X X X X X 5-W-4-SVG1 1-105 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tion 5-U-4-HL 1-105 Manual Area X X X X X X Alarm Station 5-W-4-SUG2 1-105 Ioniza- X X X No X X tion Area 5-W-5-HV 1-106 hermal Equip X X X X X X Manual Alara Station Area X X X X X X 5-W-5-CHF 1-106 hermal Area I X, X X X X 5-W-5-SLD 1-106 Hanual Area X X X X X .k Alarm Station Area X X X X X X .
9.5A-215
, . . . . - ,~-_ - - , - - - , . . - - , - -- , -- . , . . . _ , - - - -
SMtPP F5AR wa in firs Detection Local Control Panel
- Control annel suoores Dec ivstem Fire Zone Tone Tvoo 9 asis local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm 5-U-5-FA 1-104 Manual Area X X X Y X Y Alars Station 5-W-5-FAN 1-106 Ioniza- X X X No T T tion Area Manual Alarm
;l Station Area X X X No T T
*The local fire detection control panel located in the Vasca Stocessist Building Control Room on Elevacion 236 ft. covers all fire zones wi:51n the 5-4-RAL fire area.
** Local alarm and' annunciation of fire or trouhte condi: ion, both visual and audible, are provided for each detec:1on zone at local control
. panel ar.d an alarm sounds at the affected fire zone. 7 Access and Initial Resoonse Access to this area is provided from adjacent corridors at the Fuel ~4nditar Building and Reactor Auxiliary Ruildine at various elevations and th e vari area. Carbon dioxide and dry chemical type extinguishers are provided in and adjacent to che area in accordance with NFPA lo. Standpice hose scations have been orovided in and adjacent to the area. Yard hydrants as backuo are 4 available. R. Fire Sueoression Svstem The fire suppression systems provided in this area are three automatic preaction sprickler systems hydraulically designed to provide either ecutoment or surface area density of 0.3 rpe/sa. ft. The system is actuated automatically by thermal detectors located ac the ceiling level when the area temoerature reaches 135 F. The sprinkler heads ooen when ares temperature reaches 165 F. The system water flow is shut off manually from the control valve by cualified personnel respondiar :o the fire. The ore-secion centrol valves for the systems are located inside the 'Jasce *rocessing Auilding on Elevacions 261, 276, and 291 f c. (see Firure 9.5.1-5) . Manual actuacion of each system is provided from each, ore-ac:1on control valve emergency e chanical release. # emote innual actuation of the ore-ac: ion system is provided from the dual action manual alaen stacions lecteed adiscer.c
- o the hazards.
9.5A-216 Amendment No. 1 l l
SHNPP FSAR , l Flectrical supervision of the suppression system includes control valve position, system valve position, supervisory air pressure and lack of water flow through the control valve. Plant equipment subject to water damage is protected with watertight enclosures, floor pedestals or other means such as curbs at the door to the rooms where such equipment is located. Damage to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of water discharged f rom sprinkler systems and hose lines is minimized by the provision of a floor dra tnage system. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant since excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed to sanitary drainage system for Storage Areas, Storage Room and Janitors Closet (Elevation 261 f t.), Storage Room and Chemical Records Room, Health Physics Storage Room, Health Physics Storage Area (Elevation 276 f t.) and HVAC Equipment (Elevation 291 ft.). The sprinkler water runof f from Hot and Cold Laundry Areas is drained to detergent waste hot shower and laundry tank (Elevation 236 f t.). Runof f sprinkler water f rom the Chemical Storage Room is directed to the radioactive floor drainage system.
- 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires In Fire Area 5-W-BAL, the Waste Processing Building area fire hazard combustibles include normally expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, conduit, connection boxes, limited amounts of cable insulation within control pancis, minor quantities of permanent Class A materials (ordinary combustibles), required quantities of charcoal used within filters limited quantities of lubricating oils contained within equipment.
Transient materials, such as clothing, rags, plastics, or wood may be brought into the area for normal facilities maintenance and repair. The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires and, consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant facilities is reduced:
- by the use of IEEE 383 qualified cable..
- by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire breaks along cable trays and fire-stops at all floors and fire barrier penetrations, and fire retardant coatings at cable crossovers, or points of close proximity.
- by limiting permanent qucntities of ordinary combustible (Class A) materials to amounts actually required for normal operations and by controlling the introduc' tion of transient combustibles through administrative procedures. (CP&L's Operation Responsibility) 9.5A-217
f l SHNPP FSAR The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke and other products of combustion through - continued operation of normal ventilation systems and by the three-hour fire harriers enclosing the fire area. The types of fires postulated for the Waste Processing Building are based on the types of combustibles present in the area and their concentrations. Only charcoal and cable fires are being considered in this analysis, based on the combustthle loading of the area. A. Charcoal Fires The charcoal fire postulated for the Waste Processing Building assumes ignition and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of localized concentrations of charcoal within filters located in the fire zones 5-W-5-CHF or 5-W-5-HV on Elevation 291 f t. (See Figure 9.5.A-30). Transient combustibles present in the area are charcoal filter for filter refill and/or oil in a 55 gal. oil drum for the air handling unit maintenance. The potential maximum propagation of the postulated charcoal fire is reduced by early detection using line type detectors installed in the charcoal bed. The temperature of the air leaving the charcoal filter is monitored. On temperature rising above a pre-high temperature level visual and audible alarms on the charcoal filter housing detection panel and in the Control Room are activated. The control room operator will stop the air flow through this filter allowing for cooling of the charcoal through starvation of the oxygen supply to the fire. Should the fire not extinguish itself the temperature will continue to rise, the filter housing will become hot and the automatic thermal detection system (using rate compensated detectors), installed on an area basis over each charcoal filter housing, senses the heat and actuates the fire suppression system an described in Item 8 of this analysis, fire alarms are transmitted to I5 the Control Room via the Communications Room, to the local fire detection control panel and locally to the fire zone. The potential maximum propagation of the charcoal fire will be reduced by Initial possible use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of hoselines on developing fires by employees responding to i ( the fire. ! If the pre-action sprinkler system has not actuated automatically the l postulated fire might involve the charcoal filter and damage associated ducts, fittings, cabling and controls. However, the pre-action sprinkler system can j he actuated , man *ually from either the system control valve or any manual dual l action manual alarm station located in or adjacent to the area. Damage will ! then he confined to the area of inception with only very limited exposure to aillacent cabling, adjacent transient combustble materials, if present at the l time of fire. The early warning (line detectors) from the charcoal bed will alert the control room operator to stop the air flow through the filter and dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation and initiation of
. Amendment No. 15 9.5A-218
3
/
i SHNPP'FSAR ef fective manual fire fighting, if necessary, through the use of portable fire extinguishers,' hose' lines and/or manual-actuation of the automatic fire i suppression system as described above, thus reducing the potential for the fire ~ spread. The postulated charcoal fire is not considered to have suf ficient potential for spread to cause failure of safety related cable trays, plant equipment and associated cabling and controls, nor cause radioactive releases since the fire area is enclosed within three hour fire barriers. Therefore.-the capability of the plant for safe shutdown is not impaired by charcoal fire in the Waste Processing Building. M. Cable Fires The cable fire postulated for this area assumes ignition, and subsequent development into the most severe single fire expected in the area, of localized concentrations of insulation on cables in trays and in conduit located in and traversing the various zones such as 5-W-2-CR, 5-W-1-WHTKl, 5-W- t -WIITK2, 5"W-1-TKS, etc. as shown by the presence of cables in the , combustible loading for each fire zone. Transient combustibles may be present ' in the area during maintenance or repair activities.. They could be oil in a 55 gal. drum, small amounts of wood, solvents rags and plastic. , The potential maximum propagation of the postulated cable fire in these zones will be reduced by early detection using ionization type smoke detectors installed in on an area basis. The automatic detection system senses products of combustion generated by the smo'1dering cable insulation and alerts employees both locally and in. the Control Room, via the Communications Room, so that manual fire response can be initiated ' promptly. Ready access is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas, as described under Item 7, facilitating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient fires and supplemental use of standpipe hoselines on developing fires by employees responding to the fire, thus reducing the potential for maximum propagation of the fire.
~
15 Early warning smoke detection system (ionization detectors) will alarm a fire condition in the Control ~ Room. The Control Room Operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the situation And initiation of effective manual fire fighting through the use of portable fire extinguishers, hose lines thus reducing the fire spread. Damage in this case will be limited significantly and confined to the immediate area of ignition with only very limited exposure to adjacent cabling. The postulated fire is not considered to' have sufficient potential for spread
'co cause failure of redundant safety related plant equipment and associated I cabling and controls nor cause radioactive releases since the fire area is enclosed within three hour rated fire barriers. Therefore, the capability of
- the plant'for a safe shutdown is not impaired by a cable fire inside the Waste lYocessing Rutiding. -
10 Fire Area' Equipment I This fire area contains non-safety related equipment only. The mechanical and electrical equipment shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for this c l l r. l L 9.5A-219 Amendment No. 15 r_ l
-. - _ __ - _ . _ _ _ ~ .,., _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ ... _ _ _ -._. _ _ _ . _ ., _ . _ ~
1_ SHNPP FSAR area are saiscellaneous pumps, tanks, MVAC equipment, motor control centers, control panels, instrumentation and controls, as show on Figures 9.%-6,
- 9. M-8, 9. %-14, 9. %-18 and 9. %-24 theoush 9. %-33.
t t f l l l t
-9.SA-220
SHNPP FSAR APPENDIX 9.5A.23
- 1. Identification Building: Turbine Building 15 Fire Area: Turbine Generator Shown on Figures: 9.5A-34, 9.5A-35, 9.5A-36, 9.5A-37, 9.5A-38, and 9.5A-39 Length (ft.): 350 Width (ft.): 160 Height (ft.): 74 Area (sq. ft.): 164,200 Volume (cu. ft.): 4,144,000
- 2. Occupancy The area contains the turbine generator, condensers, condensate pumps, water treatment system, feed pumps, turbine generator lube oil system, hydrogen seal oil system, L.P. heaters, 6.9 kV switchgear, 480V MCCs and switchgear, associated controls, wiring in conduit and cable in trays, and charcoal filter.
- 3. Boundaries The Turbine Building is an open structure of non-combustible construction.
The building floors (Elevation 240 ft. and 261 ft.), walls between Elevation 240 ft. and 261 ft., and structural columns supporting these floors are of
- reinforced concrete construction equivalent to three-hour fire rating. Above
- Elevation 261 ft. the building is constructed of steel and concrete slab on 4
steel frame and metal form decking, and has no walls or roof. Steel columns and beams used for structural support are not fireproofed. Stairways leading to Elevation 240 ft. are enclosed within two-hour fire rated construction and are provided with certified one and a half hour B label type fire rated doors. Miscellaneous structures on each elevation, such as Switchgear Room Elevation 261 f t.) and Electrical Room (Elevation 286 f t.) are enclosed in concrete block masonry, equivalent to three-hour fire barrier construction. Structural barriers constructed of reinforced concrete are provided between equi'p ment on Elevation 240 ft. Floor and ceiling openings for handling of equipment are protected by either concrete or metal hatch covers. There are no concealed spaces or floor trenches.
- 9.5A-221 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR
- 4. Combustible Loading Quantity BTU in- BTU /
Combustible Gal./lb./RF 1000's sq. ft.
- I "i . Ftre Area: 1-C Turbine Generator Floor Area: 164,200 sq. ft.
Cable Insulation Power 6,490 1,168,000 7,100 Control 6,680 1,049,000 6,400 Instrumentation 3,170 302,000 1,800 1 1.tquids : 011 (gal.) 3,225 3,265,000 20,000 Solida: Charcoat (ib.) 7,600 76,000 500 Transients: ott (gal.) 55 6,000 40 charcoat (ib.) 7,600 76,000 500 Fiber drums (ib.) 380 3,000 20
' TOTAL 5,945,000 36,360 Elevation 240 ft., Basement Floor Area: 52,200 sq. ft.
Cable Insulation Power 590 106,300 2,100 control 680 107,000 2,200 Instrumentation 470 45,000 900 f.tquids: oil (gal.) 25 2'700 100 Sol.ds: charcoat (Ib.) 7,600 76,000 1,500 Transients oil (gal.) 55 6,000 100 charcoal (ib.) 7,600 76,000 1,500 Fiber drums (ib.) 380 3,000 100 TOTAL 422,000 8,500 Elevation 261 ft., Ground Floor Floor Area: 56,000 sq. ft. 9.5A-222 Amendment No. 15
7 SWFP FSAR
- Quantity BTU in BTU /
Combustible Gal./Lb./RF 1000's sq. ft. Cabis Insulation Powar 3,500 630,000 11,100 conerol - 2,200 345,000 6,200 Instrumentation 16 500 143,000 2,600 Liquidst oil (gal.) 30,000 3,240,000 58,000 Solids 0 0 0 .
. _ ._ _ Transients _ oil (gal.) 55 6.000 100 TOTAL 4,364,000 78,000 Elevation 286 ft. Hassanine Floor Floor Area: 56,000 sq. ft. -
Cable Insulation Po w r 2,400 432,000 7,800 *
. Control 3, 800 597,000 10,700 Instr uentation 1,200 114,000 2,000 Liquids: oil (gal.) 200 22,000 400 Solids 0 0 0 Transients oil (gal.) 55 6.000 100 TOTAL 1,171,000 21,000 ,
- 5. Control of Hazards Electrical penetrations are sealed with three hour rated fire stops at all floors and at fire barrier equivalent. Mechanical piping penetrations through fire barrier equivalents are anchored or sealed with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. HVAC ductwork penetrations through fire barrier equivalent are sealed between duct and barrier opening with flexible or semi-rigid fire stop assemblies. Fire dampers are not provided within duc twork.
EquipenVcontaining combustible or flammable liquids is enclosed within curbs or sumps to retain the released oil and to route the releases to drainage systems. Curbs and drains prevent spread of combustible liquids releases beyond the fire area. Supplemental barriers, fire breaks and/or fire retardant coatings are provided as required. Based on the smoka removal rate recommended for the combustible load in the I Cable Spreading Rooms (1.5 cfm/sq. f t.), comparable anoke removal would be acheived in the cable vault on Elevation 250 f t. by a rate of approximately 9.5A-223 l
SENFF FSAR
- 0. 04 cfm/ sq. f t. Seoka, heat, and products of incomplete combustion are removed by the ventilation system from the Turbine Building as follows:
Condensate Polishina Desineralizer (Fl. Area = 15.100 sq. ft.) Supply: S-60(1A 44NS) Exhaust: E-60(1A-WNS) S-60(134fMS) E-60(15 4fNS) Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/ sq. ft.) Supply NNS Operating 22,500 1. 5 Supply NNS Standby 22,500 1. 5 Exhaust NHS Operating 24,500 1. 6 Exhaust NNS Standby 24,500 1. 6 Electrical and Battery Room (Fl. Area = 2.100 sq. ft.) Louver L-50(1X WNS) Louvers L-48, L-49(1X4NS) Supply: AH-34(1A-WNS) Exhausts and Recire. - Elec. Es. only l AH-34 (15-WNS) E-42(IA-NNS) Batt. Rm. E-42(18 WNS) only Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/ sq. ft.) Supply NSS Operating 39,000 18.5 Supply NNS Standby 39,000 18.5 Batt. Exhaust NNS Operating 3,000 1.4 Satt. Exhaust NNS Standby 3,000 1. 4 Elec. Exhaust NNS Operating 36,000 17.2 Gen. Service Switchaear Ra. and Cable Vault (Fl. Area = 1700 sq. ft.) ' Louver L-89(1X-NNS) Louvers: L-96 (1X4fNS) or recire. Supply: AH-35(IA-NNS ) Exhaust: L-51(1X-NNS) Switchgest AH-35 (18-NNS) Ra. Only L-99(1X 4 INS) Cable Vault only Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/sq. ft.) Supply NHS Operating 9,000 5.3 Supply NHS Standby 9,000 5.3 Swgr. Exhaust (L-96) NNS Operating 3,500 2.0 Swgr. Exhaust (L-51) NNS operating 3, 500 2.0 Cable Vault Exh. (L-99) NNS Operating 2,000 1. 2 Elevator Machine Room (Fl. Area = 170 sq. f t.) i 9.5A-224
SENPP FSAR touver L-101(1X-NNS) Louver t L-100(1X-NNS) Supply: S-66(1X-WNS) Exhaust: or Recirculation Function Class Mode Flow (cfa) (cfm/sq. ft.) Supply NNS Operating 3,200 18.8 Exhaust. NNS Operating 3,200 18.8
- 6. Fire Detection The types of detection actuation and signaling systems provided in this area and their actions are as follows:
Main Fire Detection Local Control Panel
- Control Panel Suppres Det System Fire Zone Zone h Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm Cable 1-58-1 Thermal Area X X X X X X Vault Ionisa-Elevation 250 ft. Area X X X . .No X X 1-58-1 Hanual A ea X X X X X X Alarm Station Charcoal 1-59 Thermal Ares X X X X X X filter room Manual Elevation 1-59 Alarm Area X X X X X X 240 ft. Station Cable 1-60 Ioniza- Area X X X No X X tunnel tion Elevation 240 ft.
MCC 1-58-2 loniza- Area X X X No X X Elevation 240 ft. tion 1-62 Thermal Equip. X X X X X X H2 Seal 011 Unit Manual Elevation 261 ft. Alarm 1-42 Station Area X X X X X X Condensate 1-63 Thermal Equip. X X X X X X Pumps Manual Elevation 261 ft. Alarm 1-63 Station Area X X X X X X 9.5A-225
SENFP FSAR ! e Main Fire Deteetion Local Control Panel
- Control Panel i Suppres Det Systes Fire Zone Zone g Basis Local ** Ann Alarm Actu Ann Alarm Turbine 144 h rmal Equip. X X X X X X
! Oil Tanks Manual Elevation 261 ft. Alarm 1-64 Station Area X X X X X X Cond. 145 h rmal Equip. X X X X X X booster Manual pep Alarm E14vation 145 Station Area X X X X X X 261 ft. 4 St. Gen. 1-66 h emal Equip. X X X X X X Feed Pa ps Manual Elevation 261f t. Alarm
. 1-66 Station Area X X X X X X l Switchgear 1-67 Ioniaa- Area X X X No X X Moom tion Elevation 261 ft. Manual Alarm 1-67 Station Area X X X No X X 4
Operating 1-68 Hanual Area X X X No X X j Floor Alarm Elevatiou 314 ft. Stations i Me zzan .ne 1-69-1 h rmal Area X X X X X X
! Floor Manual Elevation 286 f t. Alarm
- 1-69-1 Stations Area X X X X X X 1-69-2 h rmal Area X X X X X X i Manual I Alarm 149-2 Station Ares X X X X X X L
Turbine 1-70 h enal Equip. X X X X X X l i Bearings j Elevation 286 ft. f Electric 1-71 Ionisa- Area X X X X X X t f km. Elevation tion 1 286 f t. i l l f 9.5A-226
~
- . SHNPP FSAR i
'*This fire area is covered by 4 local fire detection control panels, as follows:
l Control Panel No. Areas Served Panel Location ILFDCP-8 Turbine Building Elevation TB-240. Ay & 22 j 240 and 250 f t. ! ILFDCP-9 Turbine Building Elevation TB-261 Aa & 11 - l 261 and 286 f t. LLFDCP-10 Turbine Building Elevation TB-286, Aa & 11 286 f t., Bearings & General (LFDCP-11 Yard Transformers TB-261, Aa & 11
** Local alarm and annunciation of fire or trouble condition, both visual and audihic, are provided for each floor in the Turbine Building, at the 15 local control panel and an audible alarm at the affected fire area.
- 7. Access and Initial Response Access to this area is provided from the yard, through stairways, service elevators, Reactor Auxiliary Building at all elevations certified three hour A Label type fire rated doors. Dry chemical and carbon dioxide type extinguishers are provided in the area in accordance with NFPA 10. Standpipe hose stations have been provided in the area. Yard hydrants are available for backup protection.
H. Fire Suppression System The fire suppression systems provided for the Turbine Building consist of two pre-action sprinkler systems provided below the operating floor with extensions to turbine hearings and five water spray systems for several areas on Elevation 261 ft., as indicated on Figure 9.5A-35. The pre-action sprinkler systems are hydraulically designed to provide area and/or equipment water density of 0.3 gps /sq. ft. for the most remote 3000 sq. ft. and 0.2 gpm/sq. f t. of any 10,000 sq. f t. The water spray systems are hydraulically designed to provide area and/or equipment water density of 0.3 gpm/sq. f t. Local manual actuation is provided at the respective control valves and remote manual actuation is provided at the dual action manual fire alarm stations ! located throughout the building. Suppression systems supervision includes ( control valve position, supervisory air pressure and lack of water flow. i The two pre-action sprinkler systems are automatically actuated by thermal . ! detectors installed at the ceiling level on an area basis, for the cable vault j and the charcoal filter room below Elevation 261 ft. and under the turbine generator operating floor respectively. I The thermal detectors actuating the pre-action sprinkler below Elevation 261 f t. are actuated when the area temperature reaches 135 F and the heads open when area temperature reaches 165 F. The thermal detectnes actuating 9.5A-227 Amendment No. 15 e
N SHNPP FSAR ,
- tiw pre-action sprinkler below the turbine generator operating floor are -
actuated when area temperature reaches 200 F and the heads open when the *
. temperature reaches 225 F. -
t The water sprays are installed at Elevation 261 f t. on equipment and curbed ; areas basis and serve the turbine lube oil reservoir, the condensate pumps, , the steam generator feed pumps, the condensate booster pumps and the Hydrogen
-seat oil unit. The water spray is actuated when the thermal detectors register a temperature of 200 F. ,
Both the pre-action sprinkler systems and the unter spray systems are shut of f ; manually by authorised personnel when the fire is out. Plant equipment subject to unter damage is protected with watertight enclosures, or are mounted on pedestals. I j Damage to plant areas and equipment from the accumulation of unter discharged t f rom sprinkler systems, water spray systems, and hose lines is minimized by the provision of a floor drainage system. Floor water surcharge is estimated , j to be insignificant since excess water can overflow to adjacent areas. Runoff is directed by means of floors sloped to floor drains to either the j acid-caustic (Elevation 240 ft.) or the industrial waste sumps (Elevation 261, j 286 ft.). 1 i 9. Analysis of Effects of Postulated Fires In fire area 1-G, the Turbine Generator area fire hasard combustibles include ! expected amounts of cable insulation in cable trays, conduit, connection i hoxen, limited amounts of cable insulation within control panels, required
! quantities of charcoal used within filters, and limited quantities of l lubricating oils contained within turbine lube oil reservoir, condensate
} pumps, steam generator feed pumps, condensate booster pumps, batch oil tank, i oil conditioner, and seal oil unit. t I ! Transient materials, such as lubricating oil, rags, wood, cleaning fluids, I plastic coverings may be brought into the area for normal facilities l maintenance and repair or during plant shutdown. . i l The quantity of combustible materials which may be involved in area fires and, consequently, the magnitude of these fires and the resultant damage to plant j facilities is reduced or minimized i
- by the use of IEEE 383 qualified cables, except for the turbine i building gantry crane cables. The gantry crane is installed above Elevation 314 f t. in an open structure where spread of fire is
! considered unlikely.
- by limiting the continued spread of fire by the provision of fire breaks along cable tray runs and fire stops at every floor and fire stops at fire barrier penetrations.
P
- by the confinement of released combustible liquids through provision of curbs around equipment containing significant amounts of oli and ,
drainage of released oil to area sumps. i l t l
- 9.$A-228 i
(
SHNPP FSAR ,
- by guarded lubricating' oil pressure lines on the turbine generator with drainage and venting to remote safe discharge points.
- by controlling the introduction of transient combustibles through administrative procedures.
The extent of damage within and beyond the fire area is further limited by controt ted removal of heat, smoke and other products of combustion through continued operation of normal ventilation systems provided for enclosed areas and natural circulation throughout'the remainder of the building. The west wall of the RAR has a three-hour fire rating thus limiting the extent of 15 damage beyond the Turbine Building fire area. l The types of fires postulated for an area depend on the types of combustible l materials present in the respective area and their concentrations. l l In the Turbine Building, the type of fire postulated is an oil fire due to the j breakage of a pressurized lubricating oil supply line to the turbine generator i hearings. The pressure in the oil supply line will cause the oil to spill j over a large area under the turbine generator operating floor and overflow to l odlacent areas and impinge upon equipment in the vicinity of the pipe break. l The automatic thermal detection system installed under the operating floor, on an area basis, senses the heat generated by the burning oil, actuated the pre-action sprinkler system, as de' scribed under item 8, and alerts employees of a fire condition, both locally and in the Control Room, via the 15 Communications Room. The potential maximum propagation of the fire will he reduced by initial' possthte une of area portable fire extinguishing equipment, by employees either present in the area during maintenance or repair, or responding to the fire. Ready access is provided to the area from adjacent plant areas, as described under Item 7, factittating initial use of area fire extinguishers on incipient Itres and nupplemental use of standpipe hose lines on developing fires by
- employees responding to the fire.
If the pre-action sprinkler system has not actuated automatically, the postulated fire might invove the equipment from which the oil has been rolcased and damage contiguous associated piping, fittings, cabling, and controls within the spill area. However, the automatic pre-action sprinkler systems and the spray systems can be actuated manually by employees responding to the fire, either from a dual action manual fire alarm station located
- adjacent to the fire area or from the system control valves emergency asnual l release, thus reducing the potential ~ fire consequences described above.
l I)amage will'he limited to the immediate area of inception with limited damage to exposed equipment. ' ' Even without actuation of the pre-action system in the area, the oil fire will , ho sensed by the thermal fire detection system which will alarm fire (high j temperature) and trouble (lack of water) conditions in the Control Room. 'the control room operator will dispatch the Fire Brigade for prompt assessment of the attuation and initiation of effective manual fire fighting through the une l 9.5A-229 Amendment No. 15
SHNPP FSAR ot gurtabte fire extinguishers, hose lines and/or manual actuation of the autoieatic fire suppression system, as described above, thus reducing the fire. spread. Tiw p>stutated oil fire in the Turbine Building is not considered to have mut tle tent potential to spread and cause failure of plant safety related equipment and associated cabling and controls, which are separated by structural and fire barriers. Therefore, the capability of the plant for safe shutdown is not impaired by an oil fire in the Turbine Building.
- 10. Fire Area Equipment This fire area contains non-safety related equipment only. The mechanical and electrical equipment shown on the plant general arrangement drawings for the Turbine lluilding ares the turbine generator, the condenser and associated equipment necessary for the turbine operation such sat miscellaneous pumps, tan kes , heat exchangers, H6V equipment, motor control centers, 6.2 kV and 480 V s wi te:lgent , instrissentation and controls, as shown on the Figures 9.5A-34 t hrotc h 9. 5A-39.
i I l l , 9.$A-230 i
)
LEGEND: 1-A-BAL - FIRE AREA DESIGNATOR
\
(1-A-3-PB)- FIRE ZONE DESIGNATOR
- PRE ACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEM
- MULTI CYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEM i WATER SPRAY SYSTEM l Ol -
lONIZATION TYPE SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM THERMAL DETECTION SYSTEM ULTR A VIOLET FLAME OETECTION OllV SYSTEM g - MANUAL FIRE ALARM STATION fT1lrriirY1lrY1 HR FIRE BARRIER
= = = = = = = = = = = = - 2 HR FIRE BARRIER h -
3 HR RATED FIRE DdOR 11/2 HR RATED FIRE DOOR 1aa===as - SPRINKLERED/ SPRAYED AREA BOUNDARY r.
* * * * * * * * * * - FI RE ZONE BOUNDARY ,.
SHEARON HARRIS FIGURE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Carolina FIRE PROTECTION LEGEND Power & Light Company 9.5A 1 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
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- AMENDMENT NO.15
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- SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 3L..,
Carolina Power & Light Company AN A1 EL 306 06 ' FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIRE PROTECTION - REACTOR . AUXILI ARY BLDG - PLAN EL 305.00' ! FIGURE 9.5A-10
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