ML20207N381
| ML20207N381 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1987 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2628, REF-10CFR9.7 OL, NUDOCS 8701140181 | |
| Download: ML20207N381 (154) | |
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ORIGINAL
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Discussion /Possible Vote on Full Power Operating License for Shearon Harris lPublic Meeting)
Location:
Washington, D.
C.
Date:
Thursday, January 8, 1987 Pages: 1 - 126 ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters 1625 I St.,
N.W.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C.
20006 (202) 293-3950 PDR
e 1
D 1 SC LA I M ER 2
3 4
5 6
This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on 3
1/08/87 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
'N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open.to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain
- ./
12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of op i n. i on in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, cxceot as the Commission may 21 authori=e.
22 23 24 25
1 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 DISCUSSION /POSSIBLE VOTE ON FULL POWER OPERATING LICENSE 5-FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
6 7
Public Meeting 8
9 9
10 THURSDAY, JANUARY 8, 1986 11 1717 H Street, N.W.
12 Washington, D.C.
13 14 The Commission met, in open session, pursuant to 15 notice, at 2:00 p.m.,
the HONORABLE LANDO W.
ZECH, JR.,
16 presiding.
i 17 18 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
19 LANDO W.
ZECH, J r., Chairman of the Commission 20 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Commissioner 21 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Commissioner 22 FREDERICK M.
BERNTHAL, Commissioner 23 KENNETH M. CARR, Commissioner 24 25
2 1
STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
2 3.
S.
CHILK W.
PARLER 4
P.
BOLLWERK M. MALSCH 5
S.
SMITI:
E. UTLEY 6
J. WILLIS K.
LONG.
7 W. EDDLEMAN J.
SHARP 8
M. OSBORN W. CUMMINGS 9
R.
EPTING J. MYERS 4
STELLO H. DENTON 12 D. MATTHEWS 13 14 AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:
15 16 J.LENAHAN B. RUSSELL 17 T. NOVAK E. ROSSI 18 B.
BUCKLEY 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
(
o -
3 1
PROCEEDINGS 2
(2:00 p.m.]
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:. Good afternoon, ladies and 4
gentlemen.
5 The purpose of today's meeting is for the Commission 6
to conduct its immediate full power effectiveness review of 7
the Shearon Harris plant and to possibly vote to authorize the
~8 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, after making 9
appropriate findings, to issue a full power operating license 10 for the Shearon Harris facility.
11 We have a number of speakers appearing before the 12 Commission today.
In addition to the Licensee and the Staff, 13 the Commission will hear from representatives from the State 14 of North Carolina as well as a number of other groups and 15 individuals who have requested to appear before the Commission 16 today.
17 I would like to encourage all the speakers to keep 18 their presentation brief.
In that regard, I have asked the 19 Secretary at this end of the table to watch the time for us 20 and to give us a signal when it is time to move along.
I 21 would appreciate very much your cooperation in this regard.
22 I would like the Licensee and/or the Staff to 23 specifically address the following during their presentation, 24 these four specific items: first, shift staffing experience, 25 status and plans at Shearon Harris; second, simulator exam
4-4 1
experience; third, exemptions requested and granted in 2
association with the Shearon Harris full power license; and 3
fourth, status of the 2.206 petition to show cause whether the 4
Shearon Harris construction permit should not be revoked.
5 I understand there are handouts at the back of the 6
room, and I hope everyone interested has a copy if you desire.
7 Do any of my fellow commissioners have opening 8
comments to make?
9
[No response.)
10-If there are no comments to make, I will ask 11 Mr. Sherwood Smith to begin the presentation on behalf of the 12 Licensee.
i 13 Mr. Smith.
14 MR. SMITH:
Thank.you, Mr. Chairman, and good 15 afternoon.
I am Sherwood Smith, Chief Executive Officer of 16 Carolina Power.and Light Company.
With me at the table today 17 on my right is Mr. E.E. Utley, our Senior Executive Vice 18 President, and Mr. Jim Willis, the plant manager of the Harris 19 plant.
20 We also have with us today Mr. Jim Sally, who j
21 represents the North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency, 1
22 a co-owner of the plant, representing the fact that 32 l
23 electric cities in North Carolina own a portion of the Harris 24 plant.
25 Mindful of your comments about being brief and, of
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1 course, because of the-many. speakers after me, I will seek to 2
shorten my opening remarks, saving a few minutes for the end 3
in the event that there.are other matters commented upon which 4
I should address at the conclusion of this proceeding, if I -
5 may.
6 We do appreciate this opportunity to be here, and I 7
. will discuss the last two items which the Chairman mentioned, those two items being the emergency planning process-for the 8
9 plant and the 2.206 petition allegations.
Mr. Jim Willis, on 10 my left, the plant manager, will discuss the shift staffing 11 and the simulator experience, among other things.
'12 We should report to the Commission that the Harris i
13 plant achieved criticality at 2:32 p.m. on Saturday, January a
t 14 3rd.
Low power testing and low power physics tests since then 15 have gone very well.
We expect to be ready to go above low 16 power over this weekend, prior to Monday of next week.
i 17 We are an experienced utility, as the Commission 18 knows. This is our fourth operating unit.
We have been f
19 operating units since 1971.
We would incorporate by reference 20 our record of operations, and particularly the most recent 4
i 21 SALP report of all three of our projects, where we have j
22 received excellent marks, we believe, on numbers 1 and 2, our l
23 Brunswick plant, our Robinson plant, and this our Harris 24 plant.
1 j
25 The Harris plant is a three-loop Westinghouse i
6 e
1 design, 900 megawatts electric.
It is a proven design with no 2
unusual features, and we anticipate absolutely no quirks or 3
difficulties through the rest of our ascension to full power.
4 Mr. Willis, whom I introduced on my left, has 29 5
years of experience in civilian and Navy nuclear propulsion 6
systems.
He is backed up by a very experienced operations 7
manager who has held a senior reactor operating license at our Robinson plant, and the plant will use four 12-hour shift 9
operating crews which will meet all of the NRC requirements 10 for experience and qualifications, 11 We place a great emphasis on training.
Our company 12 was the first multi-unit, multi-site utility to have all of 13 its eligible training programs accredited by the Institute of 1
14 Nuclear Power Operations.
We have more programs accredited 15 than any other utility.
We have undergone the NRC's 16 integrated design inspection team and construction appraisal 17 team audits as well as INPO evaluation audits, all very 18 successfully.
19 We have had a quality check program in order to give 20 anyone leaving the site an opportunity to express any 21 questions or concerns with regard to quality assurance or 22 testing.
23 We have followed the recent startup experience of 24 other plants and we have learned lessons from them as 25 appropriate.
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1 With respect to the two items that I mentioned that 2
I would comment upon, first the exemptions that we have
'3 requested, the Harris plant has undergone a full-scale 4
emergency drill in May of 1985.
In that drill the NRC, the 5
Federal Energy Management Agency, the State of North Carolina, 6
represented by the Emergency Planning Division, all 7
appropriate local and state agencies, participated.
It was a 8
very successful drill.
The Nuclear Regulatory' Commission 9-staff in June of 1985 filed its comments reflecting the 10 success of that drill.
11 The Intervenors, some of whom are here today, 12 challenged some of the activities in that drill.
All of those 13 challenges were fully aired before the Appeals Board in 14 licensing proceedings. The earlier drill has been a full-scale 15 drill, challenged, tested.
The Licensing Board affirmed the 16 validity and success of the drill, the Appeals Board 17 confirmed, and that matter, we submit, is concluded.
18 We have requested a schedule exemption from the 19 requirement that a 12-month full-scale drill be held within 20 one year or 12 months of permission to go to full power, and 21 we believe our written submittal shows that we meet the 22 critoria for that exemption.
We have a full-scale drill 23 scheduled in February, next month, and it is on the basis of 24 our writton submittals and our statoment to the commission 25 today that we have conducted an on-sito drill in October of
6 8
1 last year and conducted drills at our --
~
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
October of '857 3
MR. SMITH:
1986.
All went very successfully.
The 4
State of North Carolina supports our exemption request, and 5
Mr. Myers is on the schedule to testify later today.
6 If there are any questions with regard to that, of 7
course, we would be glad to respond to those fully at any 8
time, but as I said, we have a full-scale drill scheduled at 9
the end of February. We have simply requested a change in the 10 schedule that would authorize us to go to full power when we 11 are ready, this weekend, and conduct the drill as scheduled in 12 February.
13 I might say that with respect to some of the 14 contentions that I expect to be made by Intervenors in this 15 proceeding that there appears to be sort of an allegation 16 that we are moving too quickly, why not stop and wait, there 17 is a rush to completo this process.
I want to assure this 18 Commission that the word " rush" is totally inapplicable to the 19 Harris plant and all of these proceedings.
20 (Laughter.)
21 The notico for hearing was issued five years ago.
22 During the period of time that full-scalo hearings waro 23 conducted, from June of 1984 through March of 1986, over GOO 24 contentions woro filed by Intervenors, 39 days of evidentiary 25 hearings woro hold, over 100 witnessos testified, a record of
9 1
more than 200 exhibits and 11,000 transcript pages.
We have 2
had four Licensing Board decisions and four Appellate Board 3
decisions affirming those Licensing Board decisions.
This 4
matter has been fully litigated, and all Intervenors have had 5
an opportunity to have had their concerns aired before the 6
Licensing Board.
7 With respect to the second matter that I said I 8
would address, the status of the 2.206 petition, this petition 9
was filed by several of the Intervenors and one party, the 10 Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris, which is not a 11 party.
It was filed in October of this year, I believe on the 12 16th.
It was before the Commission prior to the time our 13 license to load fuel and go to low power was received.
14 There was nothing in that petition that indicated to 15 the Staff at that time or us that there was any reason that 16 the safety of the plant had at all been compromised or was 17 challenged.
The allegations in that petition, first of all, 18 and we have responded in writing, wo disputo very vigorously 19 their truthfulness, their accuracy; but going beyond that, wo 20 have assumed for the purposes of discussion that oven if those 21 allegations were true, lot's see what the offect would be on 22 the plant.
23 During the month of December, we have conducted 24 cxtensivo physical testing.
Assuming that the allegations 25 woro true, what impact would they havo?
The tests show, and
10 1
these were done under the observation of the NRC officials on 2
site, that the allegations themselves, even if true, which 3
again we vigorously deny, would not have had a significant 4
impact at all, if any impact, on the safety of the plant.
We 5
think the record clearly shows that.
6 We would be glad to respond to more questions, if 7
thero are any, about the 2.206 allegations.
8 With respect to a motion that we were handed as we 9
came in filed by two intervenors and one party that is not an 10 intervenor requesting that this entire proceeding be delayed 11 until after the 206 petition is ruled upon, our response --
12 which we will make now, if we may -- is that since there is l
13 nothing new in this motion, it is simply a late-filed motion, 14 we think, solely for the purposo of delay. We would 15 respectfully request that our response be taken as a request 16 that this motion be denied.
i 17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I recognize that I asked you the 18 four questions in addition to your presentation, but I would i
19 ask that you move right along because your time is coming up.
20 We will give you a few extra minutes because of my questions 21 but ask you to proceed promptly, please.
I 22 MR. SMITH:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
23 At this time I bolicvo that I would liko to turn to i
24 Mr. Willis, who will discuss the current status of the plant, 25 our roadiness to go to full power, and the staffing, including
{
11 1
the two items that you mentioned.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
3 MR. WILLIS:
Thank you.
4 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I am happy to report 5
that currently the reactor is critical, conducting low power 6
testing, preparing for the natural circulation test. There are 7
two others that follow that.
Our testing progress over all 8
has been good and consistent with other Westinghouse plants 9
for this phase of testing of about seven to ten days.
10 We have approached this testing in a very careful, 11 methodical manner.
I think that our good progress reflects 12 the earlier quality cf our engineering and construction 13 testing and our operator training.
14 We have about 36 to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of testing remaining at 15 this plateau.
In order to continue further testing would 16 require a full power license authorization to go above five 17 percent power.
We would intend to conduct that testing in the 18 same careful, methodical manner that we have the previous 19 testing.
20 This is a program that escalates powor in the plant 21 in a controllod, pro-planned platoau in accordance with 22 standard Wootinghouco prosaurized water reactor tost sequenco.
23 As to shift staffing, wo havo 47 fully qualified 24 operators, licensed in all roopocto.
We havo four fully 25 qualified shifts which will contain from novon to nino
12 1
licensed operators, which is far in excess of the NRC minimum 2
requirement.
3 We are on a 12-hour shift rotation, which gives us 4
an average work week of about 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br />, with a maximum of 48 5
hours.
6 We have one additional qualified individual who is l
7 currently on medical leave.
We would expect that he would 8
return in two to three weeks.
We have to other individuals 9
who will have attained the necessary hot license experience in 10 the early February, and upon any one of those three being 11 available, we would plan to go to five-shift rotation.
12 Our simulator experience.
As I indicated, we have 1
13 ha1 47 fully qualified individuals who have passed simulator 14 examination.
We have another 14 scheduled to take the 15 examination in February.
Our pass rate and progress on the l
16 simulator examinations have steadily improved, and in the last 17 examination, seven of sovon first-time takers of that l
18 examination were successful.
I 19 In summary, Shoaron Harris meets all of the 20 requirements for on-shift experienco.
We are ready for a full 21 power licenso and power operation.
Our curront schedule would 22 show that we would bo in nood of a full powar licenso by 23 morning of Saturday, and our current schedulo would havo un 24 synchronized to the grid for tho first timo Saturday 25 aftornoon.
L
13 1
Thank you.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
Questions from 3
my fellow Commissioners?
Ccmmissioner Roberts?
Commissioner 4
Asselstine?
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think I will pass for 6
the moment.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, maybe I would ask if 8
you would simply verify or explain to me, how you view the 9
emergency planning exercises that have boon conducted and 10 whether the sum or parts here equal some reasonable whole?
I 11 refer, of courso, to the full participation exercise in which 12 the State of North Carolina participated in the Catawba 13 exorciso about a year ago, and then the partial exerciso which 14 you hold for the Shearon Harris facility a short time ago, and 15 whero a stato, except for communications, as I understand it, 16 did not fully participato?
17 Would it be a correct inforenco to draw from that 18 sum that those two taken jointly reprocent in a conso the 19 exorcico of the full omorgency planning apparatus for thin 20 plant?
Or perhaps rather than my charactorizing it, you 21 should charactorizo it for me.
22 HR. SMITH:
I'd bo glad to charactorizo it, if I 23 may, Mr. Bornthal.
Doth of thoco evento dioplayed the skill 24 and ability of the Stato Emergoney planning Diviolon in 25 conjunction with all othorn involved, to conduct adoquato,
l.
14 i
1 successful drills.
It was our early drill in May of 1985 that 2
was a full scale drill of participation by all appropriate 3
agencies.
The intervanors were involved.
They raised 4
contentions.
Those were heard by the Licensing Board and all 5
concluded satisfactorily, coupled with our drill in October of 6
1986, coupled with the four counties who are involved in our 7
ten mile emergency planning zone that support our request for 8
the schedule, that is that we be allowed to go to full power i
l 9
now with the drill in February of 1986 and I would add 10 that we believe that our position also is consistent with the 11 Commission's proposed rule, which provides a two year period 12 within which the full scale drill -- the state has also 13 experience with drills that have been successful at other 14 sites.
Brunswick, Duke McGuire, Duke Catawba.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But the point is that in the 16 recent past, within the last year, and I realize it is not 17 necessarily directly dispositive of one of the questions here, l
18 within the last year, the state has fully exorcised its 19 emergency response capabilities and facilitics, presumably, if f
20 not in connection with this particular facility, and then very 21 recently, there has been a partial exorcise which was not 22 completo, only in the sonne that tho utate did not fully 23 participato.
24 In that a correct characterization?
Perhapn you 25 should charactorizo that.
1 h
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15 1
MR. SMITH:
Well, I'll characterize the last drill 2
in October as an en-site drill.
We had on-site drills and 3
off-site drills.
The off-site drill is what we call the full 4
scale drill.
It was not appropriate for the state er others 5
to participate in october more than they did.
They 6
participated as planned in the on-site drill.
In the earlier 7
off-site drill in May, the state and all others, and all 8
volunteer rescue squads, fire departments and so forth, l
9 dealing with the public off at the site fully participated.
10 It is our position that the state has demonstrated 11 both with the actual activities at the Harris plant, at our 12 Brunswick plant in North Carolina, as well as at the Duko 13 Power Company Catawba plant within thJ last year, and the 14 McGuire drill I think was a little bit longer, the capability l
15 and the intent to go forward and of courso the stato is 16 supporting our request hero.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNT!!AL:
Okay.
Thank you.
18 Cl! AIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
Mr. Carr?
19 Mr. Asselstino?
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Lot ma go back, if I 21 could, Shorwood, to tho 2.206 potition.
I would liko to focus 22 just a little bit more on tho first olomont in that.
As I 23 understand the petition, basically the potitionors havo 24 roforrod to a numbor of inspection reports that our inspectorc 25 havo conducted over the past coveral yours, that havo
16 1
highlighted at least some quality assurance failures in 2
particular areas, a lot of it focusing on cable trays and 3
supports.
4 From that, petitioners conclude that there has been 5
a programmatic breakdown in the quality assurance area and 6
that basically a fairly extensive re-inspection program is 7
required.
8 I wonder if you could address both the question of 9
whether you think the inspection findings constitute a wider 10 scale or programmatic kind of breakdown and if not, why not, 11 and second, if you could describe in a little more detail, 12 what kind of a re-inspection effort you have conducted in the 13 areas, particularly cable tray supports, where some of these 14 problems have been identified, to satisfy yourselves that in 15 fact, if there were individual problems in some of these 16 areas, those problems did not result in deficiencies in the 17 plant as built?
18 MR. SMITH:
Yes.
I'll be glad to address that, 19 Mr. Asselstine.
20 Last summor, in conferoncos with the Region on thin 21 very point, that 10, cable tray caparations, the company and 22 the NRC togethor mountad a vary extenttive affort to re-inopect l
23 cubstantial parts of thn cablo installations.
As a result of 24 that, a conclusion wan mado by the Rogion after their 25 inspection, and that in a mattor of record hero with tho
17 1
Commission, and I'm looking quickly in the many papers I have 2
before me to see if I can cite the date and the document, that 3
there was not evidence at all of any programmatic breakdown in 4
the quality assurance program.
In fact, the finding of the 5
Region was just to the opposite.
6 I think, although I can't put my finger on the 7
letter, I think it would probably be a letter in September 8
following work and presentations in July and August.
9 What was shown was the cable tray separations that 10 we had installed actually were more conservative than the 11 minimum design requirements called for, that while there 12 occasionally was a variation perhaps between a document and 13 the location of the cable, that the cable as it actually is 14 installed in the plant, which of course is the key question, 15 is the cable placed in adequate separation, well met by a 16 substantial safety margin the safety requirements.
That was 17 based on a re-inspection conducted under the oversight of the 18 Regional staff.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Havo you boon involved 20 also in looking at the technical issues that have been 21 identified by the confidential informant, or has that boon 22 dono strictly by the NRC staff?
23 MR. SMITH:
That's boon dono both by our staff and 24 by the NRC staff.
As I said, while wo disputo the allogations 25 as to their voracity and their impact, not rosting on that, wo
I 18 1
have conducted actual physical tests with photographs, all of 2
which have been submitted to the staff and are a matter of 3
record in this proceeding, that shows that even if some of 4
these activities did occur, as has been alleged, they would 5
not have any safety impact on the plant.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One other question on the 7
question that the Chairman raised at the outset, that is to 8
the simulator examination experience.
The first group of your 9
operator candidates that took the simulator examinations 10 didn't do as well on those as I think our staff would have 11 liked, and they certainly did less well on those then your 12 otherwise high record of success on the written and oral 13 examinations.
14 You have highlighted that in subsequent 15 examinations, there has been a trend in an improving 16 direction, more towards the higher success rates you have had 17 on the written and oral examinations.
18 Do you have a fool for why you had difficulties, 19 particularly at the earlier stago, and could you highlight ab 20 it more core of the specific things you have done that you 21 think bring about an improving success thus far on the 22 simulator examinations and if there was a problem, what do you 23 think the problem was and why do you think you fixed it.
24 MR. SMITH:
Yos; I'd bo glad to.
25 I think wo do know what the problem is and I believe I
19 1
we have fixed it satisfactorily.
The problem was due to a 2
number of circumstances.
one being that the plant had a
-3 non-referenced simulator up until. late 1985.
The earlier 4
training done for the licensed operators had all been done on I
5 a'non-referenced simulator.
CP&L, Shearon Harris, was one of 6
the first plants to have a simulator very early in the 7
construction phase.
It was used very successfully.
8 However, from the human factors re-design of the 9
control boards, the control room was considerably re-designed 10 and therefore, it was determined that we needed a simulator j
11
-that more accurately reflected the plant.
That was contracted 12 for and was delivered in 1985, very late in the training phase i
13 for our licensed operators.
l 14 Actually, the simulator was not put into operation 1
15 for training Harris operators until February of 1986.
At that i
16 time, we had our first simulator examination scheduled to meet 17 what we then thought would be our fuel load date, to occur 1
18 within just a few weeks after putting that simulator into I
]
19 operation.
20 We gave what we thought would be a sufficient amount 21 of training to those operators.
In retrospect, looking at the q
4 7
22 amount of training they had on the non-referenced simulator i
i 23 before, the period of time it had been since they had any 4
l 24 simulator training, and also the fact that training period was I
25 split into segments rather than being a continuous four week 4
4
.. ~ _ _ _ _
20 1
cycle, it was two weeks, some time off, and.then two more 2
weeks..Obviously, in retrospect, that was not enough.
3 We were equally as disappointed as everyone else.
4 What we learned is the training needs to be more concentrated, 5
it needs to be continuous, and we have done that and we have 6
been much more successful and expect that we will continue to 7
be more successful.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's all I have for 9
right now.
Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Mr. Bernthal, do you have a 11 question?
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
A question, just as a matter 13 of curiosity, a quick one.
You have built here a three loop 14 plant.
Is that simply because of the vintage of the plant 15 when it was started or is there a reason that you have opted 16 for somewhat smaller capacity than the current large PTRs?
17 MR. SMITH:
Mr. Bernthal, based on the size of our 18 system, at the time the plant was ordered in about 1970, the 19 size of the plant, 900 megawatts electric, I believe, is 2,775 20 thermal, the three loops was an appropriato sized plant.
21 Also, that was the vintago more or loss, the state-of-the-art 22 at the timo.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
Thanks.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Any other questions?
25 (No responce.]
21 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Thank you very much.
2 I am going to ask the Secretary to call up the 3
following presentations.
I believe the Attorney General's 4
office will speak first.
Ms. Karen Long, please.
- Welcome, 5
Ms. Long.
You may proceed when you are ready.
6 MS. LONG:
Thank you.
Good afternoon, gentlemen.
7 My name is Karen Long.
I am representing Attcrney General 8
Lacey Thornberg of the State of North Carolina.
9 As an initial matter, let me first thank */ou for 10 allowing the North Carolina Attorney General as an intervenor 11 and as an interested Government entity to speak to you this 12 afternoon.
13 As a representative of the Attorney General of North 14 Carolina, I am here to make some common sense observations, l
15 which can sometimes get lost in the maze of procedural and 16 technical details entailed in licensing a nuclear plant.
17 I speak for the Attorney General of North Carolina i
18 and through him, for a host of people, many of whom are not 19 represented by the organized bodies who will appear before you 20 this afternoon.
These are people who have contacted our 21 office by telephone, by letters and by personal visits and 22 expressed a deep, genuine and continuing concern about the 23 adequacy of Shearon Harris' construction and evacuation plans.
24 My first common sense observation is simply to say 25 that in our opinion, the decision to license a nuclear plant
22 1
is not solely a technical one.
That is why the Atomic Energy 2
Act gave the authority to license to a commission, not a 3
single individual, and why this Commission, after Three Mile 4
Island, now meets and discusses in some detail procedural and 5
technical issues before it delegates the authority to license 6
to the Director of NRR.
7 My second common sense observation is actually a 8
question, and that is simply this; why delegate the decision 9
to license Shearon Harris today to the technical staff, when 10 there are at least three and perhaps more pending unanswered 11 questions about this plant.
12 One pending question involves the allegations in the 13 2.206 petition, which have already been discussed this 14 afternoon.
The Attorney General's understanding is that 15 investigation of the allegations presented by an anonymous 16 person is not yet finished.
While the Attorney General is 17 pleased at the seriousness with which Region II is presently 18 investigating these allegations, our understanding is that at 19 least two pieces and perhaps a third of the investigation have 20 yet to be finished.
21 One is the final chemical analysis of certain 22 materials alleged to have been substituted for quality assured 23 materials.
My understanding was based on conversations with 24 Region II people on Friday, January 3, and Tuesday, January 25 6th and than with a conversation immediately before this
23 1
meeting.
The analysis is being done by the Applicant and the 2
final results are yet unavailable.
I understand the 3
individual at Region II responsible for this was handed a 4
preliminary chemical analysis yesterday.
The final analysis 5
is not yet in.
6 While the allegation may be entirely may be entirely 7
unsubstantiated and while in fact an analysis may indicate 8
that materials are sufficient technical specifications to be 9
safely used, the fact is at this moment, there is no final 10 resolution of this question.
11 Another unfinished piece of this investigation is a 12 paper audit of ' alleged bogus work plans.
Our understanding, l
13 based on conversations with Region II, is this paper audit 14 will not be finished until the end of January.
15 Another unfinished piece of business regarding this 16 investigation is an currently ongoing investigation of an 17 allegation that certain grouting surfaces are barren 18 surfaces.
My understanding is that there are presently two 19 people at th3 plant, as we speak, investigating this 20 allegation.
Preliminary indications are not substantiated, 21 however, it may be a third person will return to the plant 22 tomorrow and koop investigating this.
23 The whole point of it is there are some unfinished 24 pieces with theco particular allegations.
25 My cocond unanswered question has to do with the
24 1
evacuation plans for this plant.
The decision to grant the 2
company a waiver from the NRC's regulation requiring a full 3
participation emergency exercise within a year prior to 4
. commercial operation, seems to us to be a bit hurried, given 5
the level of current dissatisfaction with the plant.
Most 6
especially, parents of school children, both within and 7
without the EPZ, have told us and others that they do not 8
believe the plan is adequate, and they fully intend to go to 9
the affected schools and get their children, despite 10 instructions to the contrary.
The current plan does not 11 adequately deal with this reality, and to make you aware of 12 the magnitude of the problem, the EPZ includes 16 schools and 13 5,600 school children.
Of those 16 schools, eight are 14 pre-schools; four are elementary schools; two are middle 15 schools.
I guess that is the current term for junior high.
16 Two are high schools.
17 A third pending question is the company's experience 18 in running this particular plant.
As we speak, they have been 19 critical five days.
Region II has informed me that its 20 technical staff is not even prepared to begin discussing 21 evaluating preliminary operations until next Monday, which is 22 January 12th.
I do not doubt that the goal of the Commission, 23 the company and the Attorney General of North Carolina is the 24 same in this instance, and that is to make absolutely certain 25 the public is reasonably assured that the plant has been built
25 1
safely, can be operated safely and those most at risk, 2
children, can be adequately protected in the event of an 3
evacuation.
4' For this reason, the Attorney General requests that 5
you delay delegating your authority to NRR until January 22nd 6
or 29th, at your normally scheduled affirmation hearings on
'7 Thursday afternoons, or in the alternative, and at the very 8
minimum, that you explicitly require NRR to have answere 9
these issues before it grants a full power license.
10 I thank you very much.
If you have any questions, I 11 would be glad to respond.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
Mr. Roberts?
13 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Very quickly.
You departed 14 from your prepared remarks.
What was this?
I missed the i
15 point about a grouting surface or a barren surface?
Would you 16 repeat that?
17 MS. LONG:
The allegations in the 2.206 proceeding 18 wore there is certain epoxy that was used on barren surfaces.
19 I think Region II has perhaps expanded that, my understanding 20 is, and it can be corrected, to certain grouting surfaces 21 which should not be barren surfaces and the allegation is that l
22 they are.
23 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Thank you.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just a quick comment and 25 than ono question.
First, I think all three of your points
---.--n-
' 4 26 1:
are good ones and I think they' deserve serious consideration 2
as we go through the rest of the afternoon, particularly when 3
we hear from the NRC staff.
I want to pursue each of them 4
with them.
5 One question on the emergency planning issue that 6
you identified, and that is the adequacy of the arrangements 7
for school children.
Could you tell me how that issue has 8
come to light?
Was it identified as a deficiency in any of 9
the previous exercises?
The one question I'm having a little 10 difficulty with is how is an exercise prior to a full power 11 licensing decision likely to shed some additional light on 12 this particular problem?
13 MS. LONG:
I understand what you are saying.
In 14 other words, the NRC really cannot have a full drill because 15 you cannot say to those civilians, we are going to pretend it 16 is the real thing.
What you say is to the various Government 17 officials.
18 First of all, it has come to light basically through 19 contact with the Attorney General's Office by people, and I'm 20 talking about letters and phone calls, to the extent where if 21 people know who you are, and apparently they do, they will 1
22 come up to you in the grocery store.
23 As far as those official governmental people aware 24 of what could be a very serious problem -- in other words, the 25 highway patrolmen who are supposed to direct traffic, people 1
.-----m
-n- -, -
..-,,_,,-,,--..,_..---.,-me.,
e.---
e-w-v,,,--
27 1
at schools, bus drivers -- you know, you might get.some 2
suggestions during the emergency exercise, just how to 3
proceed.
4 As an example, there is a person whom I know, a 5
professional woman, who has children outside the EPZ in a 6
bedroom comrsnity which feeds Raleigh and the -Research 7
Triangle, which is rapidly growing.
Her comment to me was, 8
"In the event of an evacuation, my children aren't within ten 9
miles.
I'm heading the wrong way down Route 1, which is a 10 major artery in the emergency plan, and I don't care who gets 11 in my way.
I'm getting my children."
12 Now this is a reasonable, educated woman, that I 13 don't think that she is unusual, and I think that that kind of 14 traffic on U.S.
1 is going to be a problem which should be 15 addressed and, at least during an exercise, provided for or at 16 least expected.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
My reaction is that 18 I agree with you.
The question of arrangements for school 19 children and how parents are going to react and building 20 confidence in the plan, so that they will work as we hope they 21 will work is a serious question.
I think it's one that I keep 22 hearing in a number of different locations.
23 I guess my reaction also is, we shouldn't have to 24 wait for an exercise to try and address that kind of a 25 question.
It sounds to me like in many respects it's a
28 1
planning question, and it's one that we ought to be able to 2
tackle and can do something about fairly quickly.
And I guess 3
I'd like the opportunity later on to raise it with the State 4
Emergency Planning official as well, to get his reaction to 5
the nature of the problem and what can be done right away to 6
address it.
7 MS. LONG:
My understanding is that the Wake County 8
Commissioners intend or have been discussing the idea of 9
having their own evacuation of school children during a normal 10 day.
That has met with some resistance by the County School 11 Board.
They don't want to waste a school day.
12 There is also another problem with the school 13 evacuation program which has been brought to our office by 14 complaints.
Apparently there's a lot of misunderstanding 15 about where you will pick up your child, once he or she has 16 been bussed.
I have one person who swears to me that the 17 school she has been told exists does not.
I didn't follow up 18 on that.
I don't know what that problem is.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Thanks very much.
l 20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Bernthal?
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, I only had an 22 appendage, really, to the questions that Commissioner 23 Asselstine has raised, because it wasn't clear to me either 24 that the question of confidence -- and really, it sounds like 25 in some cases education, public information, if you will -- on l
29 1
the emergency planning and the assurance that it will work, 2
that that sort of thing necessarily is resolved by the kind of 3
exercises that we conduct.
4 And although you can comment on it, perhaps our 5
Staff or others should comment on the point that I believe, if 6
I'm not wrong, that normally our emergency planning takes into 7
account a certain amount or assumes that there will be a 8
certain amount of spontaneous action on the part of 9
individuals and that there is at least an element of leeway 10 provided for that uncertainty.
At least that issue has i
11 cropped up in similar considerations.
12 It certainly wouldn't surprise me if some people 13 decided that they weren't going to run their own life exactly 14 by the book in the event of an emergency.
But perhaps our 15 Staff can comment a bit more on that, or you may wish to 16 comment on it as well.
17 MS. LONG:
I don't want to prolong this.
My comment 18 to you is that a lot of the contact we have had are from 19 people outside the EPZ.
I think most of the planning focuses 20 on those ten miles.
We're talking about -- I think the 21 literature after Three Mile Island talked about the shadow 22 effect.
For some reason, if you evacuate within ten miles, 23 people within a larger area self-evacuate.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.
25 MS. LONG:
And that is -- those are the comments.
30 1
In fact, there was a survey done in late summer, closer to 2
Chernobyl than presently, which indicated that 65 percent of 3
the residents outside the EPZ will go and get their kids, and 4
we're talking about two counties, Wake and Chatham.
You know, 5
that is a phenomenon which is widespread in its impact and I'n 6
not sure has been addressed at all.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Mr. Carr?
8
[No response.]
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much, Ms. Long.
We 10 appreciate it very much.
11 MR. EDDLEMAN:
Thank you.
I'm Wells Eddleman.
Is 12 it okay if I start off standing up for a moment?
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Certainly.
Would you be more 14 comfortable at the other microphone, rather than bending over 15 like that?
16 Okay.
You can do that, if you like.
17 MR. EDDLEMAN:
The first thing on my agenda was 18 greetings and salutations, and I'd particularly like to greet 19 the members of the public who are here, who usually don't have 20 their voice heard in these proceedings very much, in my 21 opinion.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Would you face the Commission, 23 please.
You're addressing us.
You're not here to make a l
24 speech to the public, but they are invited, and they are 25 here.
They're present.
You're welcome.
You are here to I
i l
l
31 1
address the Commission.
Please do so.
2 MR. EDDLEMAN:
And you have just anticipated the 3
rest of my remarks.
Thank you.
4
[ Laughter.]
5 MR. EDDLEMAN:
I would also like to thank the 6
Commissioners for this opportunity to address them.
As far as 7
I know, this is a unique forum in America where, so far as I'm 8
know, on operating licenses, the public has never been able to 9
win.
We want to see what we can do.
10 I'd also like to salute Mr. Denton, who told the 11 truth about the Shearon Harris plant when he was asked what 12 the worst accident possible was there.
He said, "It could be 13 as bad as Chernobyl."
14 What I'd like to emphasize to you is that the public 15 has never wanted this plant, and that although many government 16 agencies are used to overriding the public will, I would 17 remind you of the John Peter Zenger case:
You always have the 18 independent freedom of action.
19 I'd like to start in with some commentary on 20 whistleblowers and intimidation.
I think there's been a 21 severe problem at this plant with people being afraid to come 22 forward.
I have had quite a number of people contact me and 23
- say, "I want to tell you so-and-so and such-and-such, but I 24 won't tell you who I am.
I won't go public.
I'm afraid of i
25 the power company.
I'm afraid the NRC will botch the
32 1
investigation.
I don't trust any of them."
And there's not 2
much you can do with somebody like that, except to try to take 3
the information and carry it through the Staff, which 4
sometimes I've tried, and that's not very successful either.
5 I'd like to particularly point out that when some of 6
these people come forward, the investigation that they get 7
does not appear to be at all competent.
For example, the case 8
of Mr. Chan Van Vo, he named people to OI who he said could 9
confirm his story.
Most of these people were not interviewed.
10 one of the things that was in his personnel file 11 after he started blowing the whistle was a large number of 12 comments and complaints about him being like four minutes late 13 to work or leaving six minutes early.
OI's investigation 14 revealed one comment that Van Vo's immediate boss, Alex 15 Fuller, was a person who had a reputation onsite for letting 16 his people come in a little late and take long lunch breaks 17 and so on.
It would seem to me that a competent investigator 18 would have followed up on that.
There was no follow-up.
19 I want to skip a little bit here.
Mr. McWheeney, 20 who was raising the problems with the pipe supports and 21 apparently was fired because he wouldn't process these things 22 fast enough, which was done because, of course, he wanted to 23 find out what was wrong and get it fixed, he has a number of 24 allegations -- and I understand these are the subject of a 25 criminal investigation now -- but we can't get any information
33 Q-1 out of it under the Freedom of Information Act.
They're 2
holding all the stuff, including the safety-related deals that 3
I understand the Staff is making ~with CP&L, because they say 4
it relates to a criminal investigation.
5 There was a second witness who came forward besides 6
Mr. Pegeese, the secret witness, who-informed OI of a number 7
of problems and could not obtain a copy of OI's report on 8
their allegations.
I don't know if they have been able to 9
since, but as of last-June, they could not.obtain a copy of 10 OI's report on their own allegations.
This is the person who 11 told me that there was a large contingent of people at Shearon 12 Harris whose job was basically to fabricate documents.
Since 13 the NRC does a lot of checking mainly on documents, I think 14 this is extremely serious.
15 There are also the unknown, the people who didn't 16 come forward becausge they never thought they had a chance.
t 17 They never tho71ght that it was worth it, or they never thought 18 that they could get anywhere.
19 Based on what I've seen and the experience I've had, 20 I think all these fears have some justification, for fear of 21 retaliation and so on.
Any reasonable persen would consider 22 them, and also fears of NRC botching the investigation are 23 fully justified in most cases.
24 The NRC has also condoned intimidation.
Now we had 25 a security consultant to the Intervenors who was losing
-34 1
clients because he was employed by us. -The Judge's comment at 2
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on this was, if I recall 3
correctly:
"Isn't that just the way the world works?
If you 4
work for one side, you don't work for the other."
5 Now we're talking about the intimidation of a 6
witness here, okay, cnd that's the reaction you get.
7 As I was saying, to move to Section 3, the public 8
has never approved of this plant and still does not.
The 9
public opinion polls show a local plurality is against it.
10 Strong majorities favor expanding the emergency evacuation 11 zones, probably on the order of 25 miles.
12 We did file this document here -- I believe you have 13 copies of today -- which gives some of the arguments, and I 14 won't go over those in duplicate, but I believe you have that.
15 The first thing that went in was the rush to dig 16 these holes in
'74.
I believe Mr. Smith was the attorney for 17 CP&L when that was done.
Then they had to stop, and as you 18 know, they've had to fill in some of those holes because they 19 didn't need them, but that was done before even a construction 20 permit was issued, and the AEC went right along with it.
21 Then the plant was delayed because CP&L didn't need 22 it and couldn't afford it.
j 23 Then at the construction permit stage, you have onc 24 of the more outrageous forecast errors that I'm aware of, 25 approving all four units.
Within five years of that date --
35 o
1 pardon me -- within six years of the issuance of that, three 2
of those four units had been cancelled by the power company.
3 This continues.
4 In the construction permit remand of
'79, 5
mismanagement was charged against the company, and CP&L 6
claimed that they had fixed it.
Subsequently, in '80 to
'82, 7
their record just went to pot at Brunswick.
It was just 8
terrible, and even the NRC concedes this, but they don't 9
appear to have dealt with the problem.
10 Then finally, post-decision, after this was raised 11 in an operating license hearing, there was mismanagement of 12 non-destructive examination at Brunswick, four or five 13 incidents over a period of months from approximately November 14
'84 through May of
'85, cause identified as poor management.
15 The NRC Staff considered it serious enough to have an 16 enforcement conference with CP&L, but as far as I know, the 17 Staff never informed the Licensing Board of this, even though 18 it's a material fact related to Intervenors' Contention.
19 This is kind of typical of the way the NRC Staff 20 does, in my opinion; they instead were resisting and delaying 21 and denying FOIA requests about various information relating 22 to CP&L management.
23 NUREG-0654, as you know, the rule was changed to 24 delete the footnote that incorporated 0654 into the rules.
25 The effect is that then FEMA can get away with swea' ring an
36 1
affidavit, as they did many times in the Harris case, saying 2
that language in 0654 that says "the following shall be in the 3
plan," quote / unquote, does not mean it actually has to be in 4
the plan, and the Licensing Board could accept this outrageous 5
affidavit as factual, as they did in summary disposition of a 6
number of Contentions.
7 Finally, I would say in dThe Ignorance is Bliss 8
Department," that the NRC is still -- still seems to be 9
determined to ignore the more cost-effective alternatives to 10 operation of a nuclear plant.
If you were to deny this 11 license, you would have the side effect of saving CP&L 12 billions of dollars and their customers many more billions, 13 probably on the order of $5 to $10 billion in present-day 14 dollars.
15 Probabilities.
Well, probability is what it is.
16 It's not what you think it is.
But actual chance does not 17 only defy estimations, but it defines your biases and errors.
18 If you think the chance is X and it turns out to be Y, that 19 tells you something about the way you're thinking, and I wish 20 the NRC could figure that out.
21 Of course, the probability is 100 percent when 22 something has already happened.
I ask you to consider the 23 following:
24 Suppose there had been a proceeding before the NRC I
i 25 to license the launch of the space shuttle and that there were
37 1
Intervenors in '84 and '85 who uncovered the documents in NASA 2
files and the evidence we now know exists of serious flaws in 3
the design of the space shuttle and excess pressure to launch 4
it.
5 Can there be any doubt-that_if that decision had 6
been made by the NRC, that the shuttle would have been 7
launched, the shuttle destroyed, its crew killed, and 8
incredible damage done to the space program?
9-CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Let me interrupt you for a moment.
10 You've exceeded your time a bit.
Would you please conclude?
11 MR. EDDLEMAN:
Okay.
I believe everybody else has 12 exceeded their time, too.
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
You've done your share, so please 14 conclude promptly.
15 MR. EDDLEMAN:
All right.
Well, Murphy's Law works 16 and regulatory capture works.
The regulators tend to work for 17 the regulated.
18 My conclusion is basically to refer you to the 19 remarks of Mr. Fomin, Reference 1 in the "True Facts" thing 20 that you have.
I would contrast his courage with that of 21 Mr. Zakharov, who has told the truth at great risk to himself 22 and looks to be turning out well.
So what I would ask you, as 23 Commissioners, is:
Which of you are Zakharovs and which of 24 you are Fomins?
25 Thank you very much.
38 1
[ Applause.]
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I would ask you to refrain from such 3
expressions.
It does not help our proceeding a :oit.
4 Ms. Sharp, welcome.
5 MS. SHARP:
Thank you very much.
I have a name tag 6
here which might be helpful.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
You may proceed when 8
you're ready.
9 MS. SHARP:
Thank you.
10 I'm Jane Sharp of the Conservation Council of North 11 Carolina.
I live in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
And I would 12 like to reiterate that the testimony which John Runkle of the 13 Conservation Council submitted on December 9th is still the 14 official position of the conservation Council, protesting 15 full-power licensing before, one, the required emergency 16 exercise was completed, before full investigation and 17 resolution of construction safety issues, and before low-power 18 testing is completed.
The conservation Council still holds 19 those positions.
20 However, in regard to safety of the plant and 21 further health problems with the plant, we find the CP&L's 22 safety record at its existing Brunswick Nuclear Plant is one 23 of the poorest in the nation, which frightens us.
It has one 24 of the largest fines ever levied in 1983, '84 for safety 25 violations.
39 1
I am skipping No.
2.
2 Data from Public Access, Incorporated shows 3
increases in all kinds of mortality rates in counties 4
surrounding North Carolina's nuclear plants in the period 5
1975 '82 versus the earlier pariod, 1965
'69.
Onslow County 6
near the Brunswick Plant showed a 94.9 percent increase and 7
Duplin a 51.7 percent increase and Pender, 32.5.
This was far 8
above the national average; it was above the average for 9
nuclear counties throughout the country, 175 of them, and 10 above the North Carolina average increase in cancer mortality 11 between these two time periods.
I 12 Further, the North Carolina cancer mortality 13 increase for this period was the highest in the nation, 1.374 14 expressed as a ratio of change, or 37.4 percent.
15 We feel that these numbers are a definite indication 16 that something is happening to increase the cancer rate and 17 that it's not all chemicals and it's not all air pollution.
18 We think that radiation is part of it.
19 The nuclear industry claims emissions of one-tenth 20 millirems per person per year from, quote, " properly operating 21 nuclear plants."
Yet they energetically resist lowering the 22 allowed exposure from 170 millirems per person per year, where 23 it now stands.
Why do they resist lowering it, if the plants 24 are so safe?
f 25 The 5000 millirems allowed workers, often stated as
40 1
5 rems, we think to confuse the issue, per year is often 2
exceeded, and the 500 millirems allowed the general public is 3
under pressure to be increased to the same 5000 for workers by 4
many nuclear proponents.
Yet the July 1986 proceedings of the 5
U.S. National Academy of Science article by Waldren, et 6
al notes that "the effect of a low dose of radiation is more 7
than 200 times that previously assumed on the basis of 8
high-dose studies."
9 We have been told that there has never been a 10 nuclear casualty because of an ope: ating nuclear plant or even 11 a nuclear accident, and yet when we talked to the people from 12 Three Mile Island -- and when we saw their charts and graphs 13 and maps and their own studies that they had done -- this 14 morning, because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would not 15 investigate their allegations of damage from the Three Mile 16 Island accident, we were appalled and very frightened.
17 I would like to show you the kind of study that 18 these people are doing on their own without any help from 19 their governments, local, rtate or national, if Mary Osborne 20 is here.
21 MS. SHARP:
Can we show you these maps that indicate 22 uhat they are doing all by themselves?
23 MS. OSBORN:
I just want to explain to you briefly 24 that the need for an evacuation plan of ten miles or five 25 miles is not enough.
We have had indication of severe
41 1
radiation damage during the accident at least 12 to 15 miles 2
out.
And I mean severe, hair falling out and bone marrow 3
suppression.
4 So on here, because Chernobyl proved to me and 5
everybody else, that this is in my back yard as well.
And it 6
is very relevant and I just want to get through this as 7
quickly as I can, because I know that time is limited.
8 We have TMI here and ten miles is approximately 9
here.
10 (Indicating.]
11 In the city of Harrisburg, way out of the ten mile 12 zone, we had two bone marrow suppression cases uhere the 13 children were hospitalized by Easter after the TMI accident.
14 In a little place called Summerdale, we had a report of a lady 15 whose daughter's hair fell out in clumps.
16 On the ABC Special last year, there was a lady who 17 lived in Lizburn, which is right about the ten mile zone.
Not 18 only did her hair fall out, she had the sunburn effects.
Her 19 hair first turned salt and pepper, which I never even know was 20 possible.
That was ten miles away.
21 And these are just from the lawsuits from the 22 newspapers that we have been collecting data.
These are just 23 more of the people that are suing Three Mile Island for health 24 effects.
This is the ten mile zone.
These black dots 25 represent cancers of people living that are suing Three Mile
.,-.._.r y.. - -. -.
e
.m-.
42 1
1 Island.
The pink dots represent the leukemias.
2 You also have three workers, two with cancer, one 3
with leukemia, that are still living, that are suing Three 4
Mile Island.
5 This plot represents people that have died and they 6
have the cancers and leukemias again, and here is one worker 7
at Three Mile Island.
A real interesting thing is i
8 Wernersville Substation which the EPA uses as a. comparison for 9
background levels of radiation.
They are using that area to 10 compare.TMI, that used to have an extremely low level of 11 background radiation.
12 And the Reading prong, which has high background 13 radon, is right here.
So you are using one area that is 14 already too high.
15 These are just some of the plumes that we have
-16' gotten that shows where some of the radiation went.
There are 17 some real interesting effects here but the sheer fact of the 18 matter is that we had severe effects ten miles and beyond.
We 19 had a dentist who is on this purple dotted line, where all his 20 film clogged.
In the area beyond him, there was a small 21 street where everyone -- there was a member in each family 22 that had a cancer or cancer death, which could possibly be 23-related to the accident.
24 Once again, you have neonatal hyperthyroidism in 25 Lancaster county, which is only one county that we have
43 1
listed.
And here is the ten mile zone and here is only one 2
here.
The rest are out here and beyond, which is not even on 3
the map, is incredible.
There were extremely a large amount 4
in 1979.
5 These are just cluster cases.
The red dots are 6
citizen surveys and the NRC had never followed up.
They took 7
the word of the Pennsylvania Department of Health that there 8
was no problem.
That health department, who had refused to 9
give us our own forms.
They wo,uld refuse to study the areas lo that needed help.
So we did it on our own.
11 Three of these study areas are the amount study 12 areas.
There are ones that Mrs. Lee had just completed.
And 13 then the other area, which was Goldsboro, so many people moved 14 out of that area that we could not do a valid study.
15 This diagram, underneath, is really important 16 because it represents where people were when they experienced 17 certain sensations during the accident.
If you can see, the 18
~ silver dots represent where people were when they experienced 19 a metallic taste during the accident.
And whether that was a 20 chemical or a radiation or a combination, that stuff occurred 21 during.the accident.
We had three guys working way out of the 22 ten mile zono on a roof in the city of Lancaster.
And two of 23 those three had thyroid nodulen since then.
24 And it is extremely important for you peoplo to 25 know that a one or two mile evacuation zone is as good as
m 44 1
none.
And you owe it~to everybody in this country to do a 2
better job.
You people, with some of the documentation we 3
have gotten since the accident, one of the most crucial things 4
I.have learned was you knew there was an accident -- and maybe 5
you didn't know right away there was a severe problem.
But 6
nobody took the responsibility.
Everybody kept hedging.
7 Hendrie kept saying they didn't want to be the 8
person responsible.
If there is another problem, are you 9
going to let this utility, that'I really don't know a whole 10 lot about, are you going to let them be in charge or are you 11 going to take control and err on the side of safety and 'get 12 people'out before it is too late?
13 People did not leave.
The accident started 14 Wednesday.
They didn't know much until Friday and people were 15 only told in five miles to leave, in the five mile radius, to 16 leave..And we have had savore effects.
Some of the severes 17 have been from the five to ten. mile zone.
18 So you owe it to us, especially to the people hero, 19 who have not had their accident yet.
20 And that is all I have to say for now.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
22 (Applause.)
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I will ask you again to refrain frcm 24 those expressions.
It does not help our proceeding a bit.
25 MS. SHARP:
I am sorry.
45 l'
I have three more points that I want to take about 2
one minute for.
Even without a serious accident, the normal-3 emissions of a properly operating plant are such that 9,000 4
excess deaths per year are possible in the 175 nuclear 5
counties in the USA, the same people that I referred to in 6
number four.
7 We all know that male sterility and prostate cancer 8
are both rising.
We have to use all kinds of strategems today 9
for childless couples who want to have babies.
We know that 10 our SAT scores are falling and that the need for care for 11 handicapped infants and children is growing.
12 Last June, our Raleigh newspaper ran a small piece 13 saying America is losing the war on cancer.
I have seen it 14 three times since then.
15 The stress involved in wondering if every siren one 16 hears may mean a nuclear emergency, if one may have to leave 17 home and all possessions forever, will also take a toll on 18 citizen's immune systems and normal healing processes.
The 19 number of claims for chemical and radiation damages have been 20 paid for stress manifesting, in one way or another.
21 Actually, the increase in costs, I understand CP&L 22 has applied for a rate hiko of 14 percent, even before they 23 finished their low power testing on Shearon Harris, stresses 24 some people to the point where the combination of stress and 25 the inability to provide the protective foods that they may
46 1
need to protect themselves from such radiation as a "normally" 2
plant will emit and other problems that they have, are 3
diminished by their high electric biils that they have to pay.
4 Nuclear waste produced by nuclear power plants is as 5
great a time bomb as the genetic mutations we are creating by 6
permitting these plants.
Shearon Harris is planned for waste 7
storage for both cf CP&L's other plants, Brunswick 1 and 2 and 8
Robinson,_ South Carolina.
9-Even of Harris were not to operate, present plans 10' for high level waste storage in a new, untried plant with a 11 number of new and inexperienced workers is dangerous-and 12 unacceptable.
Since transportation of waste is considered one 13 of the most dangerous things we have to do with them, we think 14 it is extremely unwise to plan to move those wastes from the 15 cooling pools where they are, into the casks, onto trucks or 16 railroad trains, truck them up to Shearon Harris, unload them, 17 put them in the Shearon Harris cooling pools and leave them 18 there for goodness knows how long.
19 You are creating a high level nuclear waste dump in 20 the conter of North Carolina and we think that is extremely 21 dangerous to the health and welfare of our citizens.
a 22 I ask you to please not do it.
23 Thank you.
i 24 (Applauso.)
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
47 1
Any questions?
2 MR. CHILK:
Mr. Williams Cummings, speaking for the 3
Kudzu Alliance and for the Chapel Hill Anti-nuclear Group.
4 MR. CUMMINGS:
I would like to thank you for the 5
opportunity to be here.
I speak for many of the folks that 6
sit behind me.
As you may be aware, a large number of people 7
have made the trip, of these hundreds of miles. up here, to 8
Washington today to carry their concerns.
9 Also, I bring with me the concerns of the many 10 thousands of people that have made those concerns evident over 11 the recent months and, indeed, years.
I, today, am speaking 12 for the Kudzu Alliance.
Kudzu is an exotic import but we are 13 from down home.
We live in North Carolina, where this plant 14 is about to be licensed, unless you exercise the wisdom that 15 we hope you have, to put a halt to what we believe is a 16 precipitous and reckless course of action at this stage.
17 I think people have been concerned about Shearon 18 Harris for a number of years.
This is a plant that now is 19 close to 11 years behind schedule, as some of our speakers 20 have mentioned today.
We are well up over $4 billion.
I know 21 cost is not your concern, but I have been led to believe that 22
-- and I hope I am right -- that safety is.
And I think that 23 is the concern that brings us all together.
24 In the last two days, I have spent, on behalf of 25 peoplo back home, a number of hours meeting both here on the
48
.1 Hill with our Congressional delegation, Senator Sanford; newly 2
. elected delegate David Price; Jamie Clark of North Carolina.
3 I flew back to North Carolina yesterday, met with the 4
Lieutenant Governor and also with Governor Martin as well' 5
as his' science advisor.
6 All of us have been searching for some common 7
ground, a common ground of concern.
North Carolinians are 8
proud of their homes.
Certainly in the triangle, where this 9
plant is located, we take great pride in our standards of 10 excellence.
We have wonderful universities.
We have the best 11 basketball in this United States, I think.
12 And we also want to be sure-that if we are going to l
13 have a plant that operates, that it is the best plant in the 14 United States, and right now we have no such assurance.
15 I don't think it matters, what matters to us in our 16 position is certainly that this plant is neither safe, 17 economical, or necessary.
But those within North Carolina, 18 there are of course some people that think nuclear power is 19 okay.
And I don't think that is the issue here today.
The 20 issue is Shearon Harris.
21 And I think where we all come together is that 22 right now there is no assurance that that plant is capable of 23 full power operation.
Low power operation began last 24 Saturday.
Despite tho statements of Mr. Willis and Mr. Smith, 25 I would remind you that Carolina Power & Light has never yet
49 1
made a single schedule that they have laid out.
As I said, 2
that plant is 11 years behind.
3 Especially in a situation as significant as this 4
one, in which this is really your opportunity to assess that 5
utilities' ability to operate that plant safely.
There are 6
thousands of people.
You have received numerous 7
communications yourselves, as have most of the state and local 8
officials.
9 We are here to really speak from our hearts, to ask 10 you what is the rush?
I know I talked to a lot of people.
I 11 became acutely involved in this issue beginning last January.
12 I think a lot of us felt that with the cancellation of the 13 three other units that CP&L was finally waking up to some 14 common sense and that this other reactor was never going to 15 open.
16 We were appalled when we began to learn that their 17 original plan, of course, was to load it and get it operating 18 this summer.
They didn't make that, and as 1 said, they 19 haven't made any of their other schedules.
20 So I come before you today really carrying those 21 concerns from people in Lee County, from people in Chatham 22 County, from people in Wake County, from people in Orange 23 County, from people in Durham County.
Indeed, the whole 24 central part of North Carolina.
25 Since Chernobyl, we have seen that radiation doesn't
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50 l'
stop at one mile, if you were to reduce the EPZ to.that.
It 2
doesn't stop at ten.
Indeed, it makes us all neighbors.
And 3
also, sitting behind me today, are people are folks that have 4
come down and joined us from Seabrook, _from Shoreham, from 5
Vermont Yankee, from Three Mil's Island, as you have heard, 6
_because I think across this country there is an incredible 7
amount of concern since Chernobyl.
8 Our feeling is that that concern may not -- at least 9
in a public sense -- have been forthcoming from you as 10 Commissioners.
I don't know what President Reagan expected of 11 you when he put you on the Commission, but I feel like we are~
12 up here because this is our government.
It is good to get up 13 here a little' bit and see how it works and co forth, and just 14 sit with you.
15 But we really expect you to represent us and to act 16 in our interest.
And I think, across this country, there-is a 17 sense right now -- we have certainly see it, unfortunately, in 18 the White House -- of an executive branch in disarray, of a 19 National Security Council that has become a government of its 20 own.
And I know many folks feel that the NSC, the NRC, is a 21 feudal barony that may be being run decisions for the industry 22 and not for the people.
23 And I tell you these things, because that is what is 24 on people's minds where I live.
And I know that is what they 25 would want me to say to yo*2.
51 1
We see an agency that has yet, as far as we can
- 2 tell, not dealt with any of the implications that are going to 3
impact on us from Chernobyl.
We know that you must have 4
learned something from that action.
I know you sent S-Mr. Denton over there, and he has been down a couple of 6
times.
He-is a Tarheel himself.
7 But we see a rush to judgment, perhaps an industry 8
that is desperate to show that it is not succumbing, an 9
industry that is vainly trying to say everything is fine.
I 10 know CP&L spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in the time 11 since we have been active with advertisements and so forth, 12 saying it could never happen here.
There is more graphite in 13 Sherwood Smith's tennis racket than there is in Shearon 14 Harris, and that sort of thing.
15 We have never been able to have, I think, a true 16 dialogue either with the utility or -- I would certainly 17 second the Attorney General of North Carolina's concern with 18 the emergency and evacuation plan.
All we have got is 19 stonewalling from the state.
20 And as a parent -- and I know there are many parents 21 behind me who have children that are within the EPZ.
My own 22 are just a few miles out.
We don't have a plan that works.
23 Wo have a paper plan, one that the stato says will work, but 24 one that hasn't been tested at Shearon Harris.
25 The man you are going to hear later, Mr. My3rs, is
52 1
the guy that never listens to anything anybody has to say that 2
is a criticism.
He is the fellow that couldn't get people off 3
the beach during the last hurricane and I don't trust that 4
plan and I don't think it is going to work.
5 And I know that has probably been the biggest 6
concern of folks around that plant.
We have got people that 7
can't hear the sirens when they go off, and I hope you will 8
ask him about that when he is up.
9 In fact, when I was in Mr. Denton's office on the 10 13th -- or just before the 18th, when you originally had 11 scheduled this hearing -- we learned from the FEMA folks that 12 actually the FEMA test of the sirens isn't even neant to occur 13 until January or February, well after the license, were you to 14 grant it today.
15 I just -- you know, people can't understand how 16 you can do stuff like that.
You know, it is our safety, 17 you are asking us really to bet our lives on CP&L and frankly, 18 from our experience, and looking at their operation at 19 Brunswick, and seeing how they have responded to genuine 20 public concerns over these recent months.
It is not a gamble 21 that we want to take.
22 We don't know you all very well, but the decisicns 23 that we have seen you make with the Perry plant and the stuff 24 up at Seabrook and Shoreham and stuff, scares us.
You are 25 asking us to really trust everything we have got.
That is our
53 1
home.
And we want to live there forever.- We want to turn 2
that area over to our children in that form that we got it, or 3
better, not as it stands now, on Saturday, this radioactive 4
waste that they have begun to produce there.
Where is that 5
going to go?
I think we are going to get stuck with it.
6 You have got these big stainless steel pools.
I 7
toured the plant with you, Chairman, and again just on Monday 8
with Commissioner Asselstine.
I was touring the plant on 9
the 18th with Harold Denton.
I have walked through those 10 areas where those spent fuel rods are supposed to come from 11 Brunswick and Robinson.
12 92 percent of the people in North Caroline, last 13 May, stood strong in a referendum against the high level waste 14 repository.
And we see here, here is an opportunity where 15 none of our public officials have had a say, where the public 16 hasn't had a vote at all, and somehow slipped into the third 17 page of a license from the NRC, is permission for CP&L to 18 begin moving high level waste right into the heart of our 19 region, right where we live, just miles from our children.
20 And we are mad.
I don't know how -- I am trying to 21 be friendly up here with you, but we are outraged and we take 22 it really as an insult to the people of North Carolina, that 23 you could make a decision this way.
24 Low power testing hasn't been done.
CP&L is here 25 coming up asking to be excused from the law.
We are not s
______~
m,,,_ _. _ _
54 1-asking you to do more than your jobs, but there is a law on 2
the books that says they should do a full scale test of that 3
evacuation plan within one year prior to operation.
Ee don't
-4 see why you don't make them do it.
5 All of us depend on that plan.
We have got 20,000 6
beaters some days out there en that lake in the summertime.
7 They are not even in the plan at all.
When that siren goes 8
off, they have got to put up the signs around the lake that 9
say if you see a red flare get to shore and turn on your 10 radio.
11 Well, if you have ever seen 10,000 boats or 2,000 12 boats at once try and get up on those landings, it is going to 13 be totally chaotic.
14 There are trails and campsites.
They are not part 15 of the emergency evacuation plan.
There is bible camps and 16 kids camps out there.
And they are not part of the plan, 17 unless Mr. Myers has been doing some work that he hasn't told 18 us.
19 The other issue, of course, is the safety things, 20 and you know, I think there has been some discussion of the 21 2.206.
I was there, and I remind you that CP&L had originally 22 requested to have this hearing on December 18th, before any of 23 this investigating would have been done, and I really think 24 you-all would have gone ahead with that vote if we hadn't 25 raised our voices, got on the phone and got newly-inaugurated
u 55 1"
[ Senator Sanford on the phone, and of course the Attorney 2-
' General was on the horn to you, too.
3 But my goodness, here is an investigation, stuff 4:
that was revealed to you in October.
Nothing happened on 5-that.
I was with Mr. Denton rightfdown there on December 6
18th, the very day that you were going to vote, and I think it 7
is a testimony to someone that instead of voting, he was down 8
there on his hands and knees looking at some of these bolts.
9 But until that time, and your Region II folks were right 10 there, no one had even picked up a wrench.
You know, I 11 brought a little wrench.
Unfortunately, I couldn't find it in my pocket to give him that day, to say, look, let's go ahead 13 and test one of these bolts right now.
You know, why does it 14 take two months?
15 You know, the other thing I've noticed out there --
16 and now that I've been out there three times, I see how some 17 things are changing -- this whole cable tray thing.
Now, I 18 don't think that is going --
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Mr. Chairman, if you will 20 excuse me, I hate to be the heavy here, but I thought we had 21 five minutes per speaker here, and it is --
22 MR. CUMMINGS:
No, I've got ten minutes.
I'm sorry 23 to correct ycu.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is it ten minutes per 25 speaker?
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MR. CUMMINGS:
For me.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
3
[ Laughter.]
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, we are past that.
5 MR. CUMMINGS:
I will try and bring it.to a close 6
for you.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Go ahead and take several more 8
minutes, but please do --
9 MR. CUMMINGS:
I just wanted to enter into the 10 record on the cable tray thing.
You know, and I have talked 11 to your Region II folks out there about this, you know, I've 12 seen them putting up these potholders, really, is what I call 13 them.
They are that silver kind of potholder used at home, 14 not these.
These are my personal potholders from my grandma, 15 but I'm going to leave them here anyway for you because the 16 solution to these cables, which if one of them was to short or 17 catch on fire could short out a lot of other stuff, 18 safety-related stuff, has been now instead of having the 19 proper distance in the plant, right, between these cables, is 20 to start wrapping them up with stuff, wrapping them up with 21 potholders.
22 Well, if they can't do that, they said, well, I'll 23 tell you what else we are doing, we are testing them with a 24 computer out in Colorado, we have got a computer where we say, 25 oh, we have got this wire here and this wire here and this
57 l'
wire here, and we push a button and it comes out and says, 2
well, it's really no problem.
3 You know, that is the kind of thing that you are 4
asking us to depend on.
We see you sitting here now, without 5
low power testing being completed, with an exemption request 6
before you, with a safety-investigation that we haven't been 7
able to.see any results of, and you are about to hand over'a 8
full power license to a utility that has never met its 9
schedule, and you are asking us to bet our lives on that, and 10 we.say, you know, it's a bad gamble.
11 I implore you, as I think the attorney general of 12 the state has done on behalf of many other people -- I'm 13 speaking now for the future, for our children who can't be 14 here today and.for their children, for indeed all the people 15 in North Carolina affected by this plant -- to act with 16 prudence.
We believe a decision to fully license this plant 17 now would be reckless, would be precipitous.
It does an 18 injustice to all of us in this country.
We believe it is our 19 government. He hope to recover the future of our region that 20 way, and if necessary, I would just also say that we are also 21 here.to say that we are not going away.
It's our home, it's 22 not their business, it's not your business; it's where we 23 live, and we are going to keep on keeping on with this until 24 we are sure that we are safe.
25 I ask you to hear us, to hear the thousands of
58 1
people that have been concerned over the recent months and 2
years -- opposition to this plant goes back from the very 3
beginning -- to. listen to us, to put yourselves in our shoes 4
looking up at an agency that is far away, that seems to be 5
capricious sometimes in its decisions, that the public is 6
beginning to lose confidence in, that we feel hasn't responded 7
to what was the worst nuclear accident in the world today, the 8
Chernobyl, and to please hear our voices.
9 Right now we are saying no.
We are saying don't 10 license this plant until we are sure and until you are suro 11 that it is safe, and we don't see how you can tell that until 12 they have completed low power testing, until you have had a 13 chance to evaluate the results of this investigation, of the 14' 2.206, and until we can have a full participation exercise 15 that, you know, shows us that we have got an emergency and 16 evacuation plan that works.
17 If I have any other time, I will reserve it as 18 Mr. Smith did to comment later.
Thank you very much.
19
[ Applause.]
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
21 Mr. Epting, proceed when you are ready, please.
22 MR. EPTING:
My name is Robert Epting.
I am from 23 Chatham County.
I guess you have heard of Chatham County.
I 24 am a practicing lawyer and I have for some time done some 25 legal work for the Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon m
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59 o.
1 Harris.
I also am here teday on behalf of Dr. Dick Wilson, 2
and in that regard, I believe, have been granted ten minutes 3
to talk to you.
I hope-I won't use it all.
4 I prepared a statement, as Mr. McCosker asked us to 5
do, and sent it in, but in checking with your docketing 6
control yesterday, I understood that it may not have_ arrived.
7 In any event, for that reason I would like to read from that 8
statement for you.
It was a summary of my remarks, and I 9
apologize that it's not here.
It was mailed last week.
10 We strongly oppose and urge the Commission not to 11 proceed with licensing proceedings for the Shearon Harris 12 Nuclear Power Plant on today because issues pending before the 13 Commission have not been duly considered or resolved in a 14 manner consistent either with applicable regulation 9 vc the 15 Commission's statutory charge, making public safety 16 considerations paramount to economic and political issues 17 raised by licensing issues.
18 In particular, the Commission's staff's 19 recommendation to grant Applicant's request for an exemption 20 from the regulatory requirement that a full-scale exercise of 21 the emergency response plan be conducted within one year prior 22 to operation at greater than five percent of rated power, and 23 without even conducting a public hearing on the exemption 24 request, is extraordinary, if not in direct violation of this 25 agency's own regulations.
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60 1
The Commission's delay in ruling on this request and 2
the various objections filed'by Intervenors and the elected 3
public officials of North Carolina state and local 4
governments, especially in view of the record of Applicant's 5
inability to complete the plant in accordance with its 6
announced and published schedules, suggests that the 7
Commission desires for some reason to diminish the opportunity 8
for appellate review of its decision prior to full power 9
operation of the plant.
10 Instead, the Commission staff has now made a delayed 11 recommendation to grant the exemption request on the basis of 12 the State's participation in an exercise held hundreds of 13 miles from the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, at a power 14 plant run by Duke Power Company.
15 This Commission should need no reminder that Duke 16 Power Company and Carolina Power and Light Company are 17 entirely different business corporations; that Mecklinburg 18 County is far from the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant; and 19 that the exercise relied upon tested neither the Shearon 20 Harris Nuclear Power Plant emergency response plan nor the 21 personnel nor the equipment which the Federal Emergency 22 Management Agency and the State Division of Emergency 23 Management found in need of correction as a result of that May 24 1985 exercise.
25 If the exemption request is, indeed, granted by this
61
.1 Commission,-that exemption will be granted on the basis of no 2
evidence that the additions and corrections to the plan found 3
to be necessary by that May 1985 exercise have, in fact, been 4
completed and that that plan is now currently adequate to 5
protect the citizens, the lives and property of the people who 6
live near this plant in the event of any disaster at Shearon 7
Harris.
8 Notwithstanding the deficiencies in additional 9
personnel, training, equipment and facilities noted to be 10 necessary as a result of that 1985 exercise, Carolina power 11 and Light Company has contested every effort by interested 12 citizens to assure or even to question the correction of 13 deficiencies in the emergency response plan.
For that reason, 14 many thousands, over 30,000 concerned citizens, including the 15 Attorney General of North Carolina and at least five local 16 elected governing bodies, have petitioned this Commission by 17 formal resolutions, letters and telegrams to require the 18 Applicant to conduct a timely full-scale exercise of the 19 emergency response plan, as dictated by your regulations.
20 In view of the Applicant's absolute refusal to 21 acknowledge any deficiency in the emergency response plan --
22 and departing from remarks just a minute, you saw another 23 example of that today.
Mr. Smith camo up here and told you 24 that FEMA and the State agency both found that that plan was 25 fine.
Well, that's true. I want to say Mr. Smith told you the l
..?
62
.I
'l truth about what was written on the cover sheet of those 2
reports, but if you read the 20-page reports, what you read 3
are 20 pages of itemized deficiencies for which ccrrections were required, by not just the State agency but the FEMA 4
5 agency.
6 Mr. Myers is going to come up later, and I suppose 7
he will have something to say about that.
What I wish he will 8
tell me is how the citizens who live near me -- I'm 11 miles 9
from the plant, so I'm just outside your magic circle -- how 10
'we can be assured that the things that were found to be in 11 need of correction 19 months ago -- and I remind you that 12 exercise was not just a year ago or just a little more than a 13 year ago, but was 19 months ago now -- how we know those 14 things have been corrected, how you know they have been 15 corrected.
16 I would just urge the commissioners to have a look 17 at those particular reports.
Well, let me go back to my 18 prepared remarks.
19 In view of the Applicant's absolute refusal to 20 acknowledge any deficiency in the emergency recponse plan or 21 to willingly demonstrate in some way that the defects and 22 deficiencies in the plan have been corrected since May of 23 1985, those whose lives and property depend upon the adequacy 24 of the plan must rely upon you to require the Applicant to 25 comply with the law.
63
- ~
1 Under these-circumstances, an exemption from the 2
current exercise requirement would demean the high purpose of 3
this commission and would further undermine public confidence 4
in the reputation of this Commission.
This commission will 5
insult the legitimate intorests and safety concerns of all 6
those citizens and elected boards and officials if it 7
determines to proceed with the full power licensing issuance 8
and to licenso the plant for full power operation while 9
withholding its determination of the exemption issue so as to 10 prevent timely judicial review of its action in that regard.
11 Furthermore, the Commission's conduct of a full 12 full-power licensing hearing only five days -- actually, it 13 has been five days now, about five days plus an hour -- after 14 Applicant began low power testing at the plant -- and I did 15 note here that Applicant began testing last Saturday afternoon 16 at 2:32 p.m. -- and while serious concerns raised by 17 Intervenors' petition under Section 2.206, which was filed 18 back in October, are still unresolved would be wholly 19 unjustified.
20 I take it, by the way, again parenthetically, that 21 that is what the Commission is interested in today too, since 22 those were at least two of the items that you asked Mr. Smith 23 to respond to.
24 I would ask you when, if ever, has this Commicsion i
held a full power licensing hearing within five dayc of an 25
64 1
applicant's beginning low power testing of a new plant; and 2
why, given Carolina Power and Light Company's record with this 3
and its other nuclear plants, should CP&L be the first 4
beneficiary of such an extraordinary writ?
5 What motive now justifies such haste to finalize a 6
full power license less than one week after the first reaction 7
was started in the new plant, and while NRC Staff 8
investigations of serious safety and quality assurance 9
questions are still unresolved?
What motive?
10 The Commission Staff did not begin to investigate on 11 site the allegations made in Section 3 -- that's the 12 confidential informant allegations -- of the petition until 13 almost two months after the petition was filed on October 16, 14 1986.
15 And though I was assured by NRC Staff that if I
'16 arranged an interview with the informant cited in the petition 17 with the NRC Staff, I would be provided, as would be the 18 informant, with written reports of the substance of the 19 findings of the investigation as it proceeded, notwithstanding 20 that assuranco, neither I nor the informant or any
'f the 21 other intervonors have been provided with any information as 22 to what has boon found as a result of that investigation or 23 how the findings were to be treated by the NRC.
I 24 How, let me put a footnote there because there vas a i
l 25 noto at the back of the room today about all that.
Let me put 1
l i
(
65 1
a footnote 2: How on earth am I, as counsel for that 2
informant, as counsel for the Coalition, or as an interested 3
citizen, supposed to prepare adequately and respond today in 4
this forum to the issues before you when I have had no 5
information with respect to what was going to happen either 6
with respect to the agenda today or with respect to what had 7
happened on the 2.206 until you, Mr. Chairman, announced at 8
the beginning of the meeting today?
9 And let me say to you, I know that you don't answer 10 the phone when I call up here, but those who have answered the 11 phone this week when I called and when the Attorney General's 12 office called and asked what is to happen, what will be 13 considered, what is the Commission's purpose for the Thursday 14 meeting, why was it changed on the agenda to something called 15 a Public Meeting, did that mean you weren't going to vote or 16 does that mean you are going to vote, nobody could tell us.
17 Nobody could tell us what the issues would be that would be on 18 this agenda.
I think if you need any verification of that, I 19 think Ms. Long could como back up and give you that.
20 When I sat down today and heard you say what would 21 be considorod, that was the first time wo know what it was we 1
22 were supposed to respond to, and it is for that reason that we 23 filed a motion asking you to continuo your deliberations about 24 this until the 2.206 petition is cleared up, we havo gotten
+
i 25 some information, sono reports about thoco allegations, until L.
66 1
low power testing is completed, and until after you have made 2
a determination on the exemption issue.
3 Now let me go back to my remarks.
I did just want 4
to make that additional point.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
And please move along, if you 6
please.
7 MR. EPTING:
I will wrap it up.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
9 MR. EPTING:
In chort, if the Commission proceeds to 10 license before adequato determinations are made of the 11 allegations in the 2.206 petition, the Intervenors will be 12 deprived of any avenuo of effective review of the Commission's 13 determination of the impact of thoso allegations upon safety 14 at Shearon Harris.
15 Finally, I am compelled to question what end this 16 haste to hold the final licensing hearing must serve.
Tho 17 Commission noods no reminder that this plant is now already 18 nore than ten years pact schedulo, that its cost has already 19 cxceeded projections by more than 1700 percont, and of the 20 Commission's SALP report last September which found 21 substantial reason to note the ineffectivo quality assuranco 22 procedures of tho applicant constructing the plant.
23 Now, theco circumstancos demand prudent 24 deliberation, not hauty acticn.
Right now, before a license 25 is issued, the substantial issuos mentioned abovo must be
67 1
resolved.
The public is entitled to a careful assessment of 2
these issues, and that entitlement is paramount to the 3
financial interests of the Applicant and pales beside their 4
interest in receiving a full power license prior to February 5
1987.
6 I have one more paragraph and I will be through, 7
with your leave.
8 Therefore, what have we come to ask you today?
We 9
have come to ask you that the Commission deny their rcquest 10 for an exemption from the requirement under the law that they 11 conduct a full-scale exercise within one year prior to opening 12 the plant.
As I say, it has already been more than 19 13 months.
We would like your ruling on that.
14 Secondly, we request that any further considoration 15 of the licensing of the plant be delayed until such timo as 16 adequate reports of the NRC's investigation of the already 17 partially-vorified allegations of the deficiencies noted in 18 the 2.206 petition have boon circulated among the interested 19 parties and have been fully considered by appropriate staff 20 members.
21 Now, I said one more paragraph.
I thought of one 22 other thing I am compelled to tell you.
I sat in a mooting 23 yesterday, the nocting Mr. Cummings told you about with the 24 Governor, and I heard the Governor's scienco advisor, Dr. Earl i
25 McCormick, whom I think most of you know, adviso the Governor
68 1
that he thought it was extremely unwise and imprudent and that 2
he opposed licensing this plant before completion of the low 3
power testing or before completion of the Commission's 4
investigation into the 2.206 allegations.
5 I think you ought to know that.
I don't know why he 6
is not here today.
I told the Governor I intended to 7
communicate that to you, and I have done that.
8 I want to thank you for making us welcome here 9
today, and I want to encourage you to do what we believe is 10 your job in this matter, 11 (Applauss.]
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Mr. Chairman, while we are 14 waiting for the next speaker, I would just ask staff, in its 15 presentation to attempt to clarify what I think is in part a 16 misunderstanding, about the time table and the schedule that 17 the Commission often follows on low power and full power 18 licensing of these plants, and also the fact that different 19 plant types often have a much different time requirement 20 between the initiation of low power testing and the assumption 21 of full power operations.
22 I might just make that request to the staff when 23 they make their presentation.
I think there is a 24 misunderstanding here.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
We will ask the staff to refer to
.c 69 1
that when they come up.
Mr. Myers?
2 MR. MYERS:
Thank you.
My name is Joseph Myers and 3
I am the Director of North Carolina Division of Emergency 4
Management.
With me today is Mr. David Crisp on my left, who 5
is the Chief of our Plans, and Mr. Alvin Joiner, who is our 6
lead fixed nuclear facility planner.
7 I welcome the opportunity to address the Nuclear 8
Regulatory Commission today regarding the licensing of the 9
Shearon Harris nuclear power plant.
10 Today I am representing the Governor of North 11 Carolina, the Secretary of the Department of Crimo Control and 12 Public Safety, and the professional emergency management 13 communities throughout the state.
14 Unfortunately, over the past several months, much of 15 the controversy that has surrounded the licensing of the 16 Shearon Harris plant has focused on emergency preparedness 1* '
issues.
It has been alleged there are inadequacies in the IP emergency plan and the capabilities of the emergency workers 19 who woilld respond to an accident at the plant.
20 I am very concerned that in the face of so many 21 allegations and criticisms, it will bo too easy to loco an 22 accurato perspective on the true level of emorgency 23 preparednoss for the Harris plant.
Because it is so often 24 said that a person's percpectivo depends on where they sit, I 25 thought the Commission should be informed of the perspectivec
- s 70 1
of the people who number one, are professional emergency 2
planners, educators, and responders with years of experience; 3
second, are charged with planning and directing emergency 4
response, to protect the people and the property of North 5
Carolina.
Of course, this responsibility is that of the 6
Division of Emergency Management, which is within the 7
administration of the Governor of North Carolina.
8 Third, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, seven days a week, 365 days a 9
year, we effectively deal with literally hundreds of both 10 largo and small scale emergencies of all types.
Fourth, we 11 work with, support and guide county and municipal emergency 12.
management agencies in their duties.
Fifth, we have developed 13 effective emergency plans for response to all types of 14 hazards, from large scale national disasters, such as 15 hurricanes, to sophisticated technological emergencies, such 16 as radiological and chemical hazardous material accidents.
We 17 have evacuated literally thousands of people in North Carolina 18 due to these types of emergencies.
I might say in the last 19 two years that I have boon Director of Emergency Management, 20 we have responded to over 2,500 emergencios.
21 From my perspective, it is important that tho
'22 Commission understand that our emergency preparodnoss skills 23 are among the highest in the nation, and we have proven 24 ourselves and our omorgency plans timo and timo again.
25 Directly rolated to the discuccion today, wo have a
71 1
very favorable record in emergency preparedness for nuclear 2
power plants.
3 As you know, the Shearon Harris plant is not the 4
only nuclear power plant wo deal with.
We just completed a 5
very successful full participation exercise for the Brunswick 6
nuclear power station, on the loth and lith of December of 7
1986.
In this exercise, we, as the state emergency response 8
team, what we call SERT, not only tested the emergency
?
responso plan for the ten mile area, but also for the 50 mile 10 ingestion pathway.
11 FEMA in their critique of the exercise said it was 12 the best nuclear plant exerciso they had yet seen anywhere in 13 the Southeast.
The stato emergency response team has also 14 been a frequent participant in small and large scale exercises 15 for the McGuire and Catewba nuclear plants.
16 I am pleased with our track record, for exercison on 17 the Shearon Harris plant itself.
In May of 1985, we 18 successfully conducted a major full participation oxorciso for 19 the plant.
According to FE!!A's evaluation, wo demonstrated 20 that the stato emergency responno tonn and the county's 21 capabilitics wore offectivo for responding to an accident at 22 Shearon Harris.
23 This demonstration of our proficiency was 24 substantiated even under the scrutiny of the Atomic Safety and 25 Licensing Board's roview of intervonors' challenges to our
72
./
1 response capabilities, i
2 The Division of Emergency Management took an active
)
3 role in the NRC hearings, providing affidavits for summary 4
disposition, on many of the more 30 emergency planning 5
contentions which were litigated, included in these were 6
several contentions on the evacuation of schools and the 7
consequences of parents' attempts to pick up their children at 8
schools. In addition, I personally testified at the hearings 9
before the Board as did members of my staff.
10 We have again demonstrated our skills in an exercise 11 held just last October, to confirm the emergency management 12 capabilities of the four counties within the ten mile EPZ for f
13 the Harris plant.
The performance of each of the four 14 counties during the oxercise was evaluated by emergency 1
15 response professionals from other parts of North Carolina.
16 They found that all the ccunties had again demonstrated they 17 were indeed prepared for an emergency at the plant.
i 18 In noting just these two major tests of the state's l
19 and counties' emergency response capabilities for the Harris l
I 20 plant, I am overlooking the numerous small skill drills and i
i 21 practico exorcison wo no frequently hold to sharpon our 22 skills.
23 Dased on the proficioney demonstrated in the 24 oxnrcison to dato, and tho ongoing programs of training and i
25 drills, tho Stato of North Carolina, through the Dopartmont of l
73 1
Crime Control and public Safety, has supported the request for 2
an exemption from the requirements for a full scale exercise 3
within one year of full power licensing.
4 From my perspectivo, there is no doubt in my mind 5
that the emergency response plan and organization in place for 6
the Shearon Harris plant can effectively respond to any 7-potential emergency at the facility.
I have personally boon 8
involved with all of the state's fixed nuclear facility 9
exercison sinco 1979.
That includos the seven at Brunswick, 10 two at Shearon Harris and all of tho Duke power plants, i
11 In my oloven and a half years of experience in 12 omorgoney planning, it has taught no an important losson, and 13 it is one which I and my staff practico in our daily 14 activition.
Wo do not tako our capabilitics for granted.
Wo 15 don't stop ovaluating our plans in ordor to mako them bottor.
16 We constantly oncourago support and conduct training of 17 omorgency respondors throughout the stato, and wo are always 18 searching for ways and the resources to improve our 19 operations.
20 Wo havo heard in the past the amargency preparedness 21 program for Shonron Harris had problems and noods to bo 22 improved and wo responded by ovaluating our programs and 23 unking improvements whoro they woro noodod.
24 Whatevor you may hear about the omorgoncy plan, I 25 want you to know that from my porupactivo, we are highly
.a 74 1
confident, that the people who would implement the plan, if 2
needed, are very capable and they are ready to respond, and 3
they have demonstrated this several times.
4 I have conferred with the Secretary of crime control 5
and Public Safety, Joe Dean, and the Governor is satisfied 6
with the state emergency response plan at Shearon Harris and 7
feels the stato can adequately respond to an emergency.
8 I appreciate the opportunity to address you today on 9
such an important issue.
I or the members of my staff would 10 be pleased to answer any questions or comments you may have.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
Any questions?
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE Just a couple.
I don't 13 want to prolong this unnecessarily.
l 14 Could you go through a little bit of a summary of 15 the deficiencies that were identified during the May, 1985 16 Harris full scale oxercise and talk a bit about what has boon 17 done to addroca thoco deficiencies since that exercise, and I 18 would be particularly interested in hearing how they broke 19 doun between deficiencies or concerns that may have attached 20 to the state plan and then what your oubsequent experience has 21 boon in the oxorcicon at other plants, whero you get a toat of i
22 thoso aapoets of the stato plan, and then how many of them 23 really fall down to local governmont problomu, problemo which 24 may not have boon or at least had the opportunity to bo 25 re-examined in the oubsequent on-sito tests at Harrin.
75 3
1 MR. MYERS:
I have a list of the deficiencies.
2 Before that, I will say that the deficiencies that were l
3 identified were tested or incorporated into the Brunswick 4
plan, which was tested this past December.
A large number of 5
the deficiencies were in local government.
1 6
Mr. Joiner?
f i
7 MR. JOINER:
There were actually five reportable 8
deficiencies and these were deficiencies that we have to 9
answer back to FEMA on.
Of the five, three of them were 10 against the state.
Those three were training.
One was 11 training no far as transmitting data from the computer system 12 at the radiation protection to the SERT lleadquarters, where r
i 13 the decision makers are.
They felt it would take too long in 3
1
)
14 the operator sending the data.
The operators have been 1,
i 15 trained to do this a little bettor.
1 t
16 The other two were in the Media contor of the Joint
^
I 17 Information Centor on training, and the public information i
4 in putting out the EDS mossagoc, they failed --
l 18
- people, i
19 they montioned in the first monoage that the identification of pick-up sites and thin type of things for people without ridos 20 21 and so forth would como out in a subsequent monongo.
They 22 failed to put the subacquant mensago out.
That was a i
j 23 deficiency.
24 The other enn was on rumor control, betwoon an 25 utility and a stato, wo had kind of a soparato typo rumor k
I k
l
r-76
.1 control and the recommendation was we have a coordinated joint 2
rumor control, which we have done.
We have met with them.
3 Now we have a bank of telephones, on-site and off-site people, 4
and then rotary, if anyone calls in, for instance, if it is an 5
on-site question, someone answers on-site, and it's a 1-800 6
number.
Anyone for off-site, there is an off-site person 7
there that can answer that also.
8 The other two deficiencies, out of the four 9
counties, there was only cne county that got deficiencies at 10 all, three of the four counties got clear blue out of the 11 entire evaluation.
That county was hit on two things.
- one, 12 their actual EOC facility was inadequate.
Since that time, 13 there has been quite a bit of work done on giving them a new 14 location, a better EOC, and now they have a real workable 15 EOC.
As far as wo aro concerned, that is pretty much 16 completed.
17 The other one was the communications capability.
18 What they Woro doing in their particular situation in this 19 cmall county, they had not up their EOC in the hall of the 20 courthouso, next to the ouront communications, which gavo them 21 communicationa capability.
Thoy woro limited to only throo 22 telephonon, which was inadoquate for tho entiro county's staff 23 to bo operating.
In tho now EOC, they actually havo 12 24 installed linen uith la inutrumento.
Everyono that ncedo a 25 tolophono can havn a tolophono.
That deficiency han boon 4
77 1
done.
2 What we did, we answered this bacx to FEMA in a 3
report back in November of 1985, after we received the final 4
report and told them what we were going to do.
On April 22, 5
1986, we sont them an update stating where we were and what 6
had been completed.
As far as being able to furnish this 7
document, this is a public document.
It is available to 8
anyono on what we havo dono.
9 MR. MYERS:
I might say, of cource, the purposo of 10 an exercise is to identify any errors whoro planning can bo l
11 improved.
We felt any deficiencies wore of a minor naturo.
12 As I said earlier in my speech, we are trying to improve from 13 this May, 1985 exercise, which wo thought was a very 14 succonsful exorciso.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I take it the results when 16 you ran the Brunswick exercico, was nono of those throo things 17 popped out again no a problem?
18 MR. MYERS We have improved in thoso aroan.
- Again, 19 it was recognized by FEMA as the moct outstanding oxorcico 20 they had soon in the Southosst, in the 50 milon.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
On tho two incal problems, l
22 which I gather woro basically hardwaro or facility kindo of 23 problomo, havo you gotton any responna back or foodback from 24 FEMA after you cubmittod the April, 1986 report on what had 25 boon dono, or do they basically wait for tho next oxorcico to l
L
r 78 1
take a look at it?
2 MR. JOINER:
My understanding is, of courso they 3
look at what our answer is when we send it back in and if it 4
is satisfactory to them, they probably won't do anything until 5
the next exorciso and then ovaluato it.
6 For instanco, the exorcise we had back in October, 7
wo evaluated the facilities themselves as far as the now EOC, 8
and wo felt it was adoquate and we felt the communications 9
were adequato.
FEMA did not evaluato that oxorcico.
Tho l
10 stato evaluated that oxorcise.
FEMA will evaluato the one in 11 February.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The school children l
13 problom, I got the improccion from talking to omorgon :y 14 planning people ac well as members of the public around the 15 country, that this in a question that concerns a lot of folks, 16 about what is going to happen with school kids.
Aro parents 17 going to got involved?
In that going to diurupt the kind of 18 arrangements that are mado?
19 can you talk a little bit about it, throughout the 20 ntatos but also with particular emphaolo on Harrio, what tho l
21 nituation la now, what you have boon doing to tako a look at 22 thin particular acpoet of the problom?
I recogni:o it in a 23 real concorn.
I sucpoet not only here but in a lot of pincoc.
24 MR. MYERS Tho Liconoing Deard contended that the 25 proviolons for paronto attempting to pick up their children
79 1
were adequate.
2 We have conducted training with all the schools.
We 3
have met with all the teachers.
We have developed brochures l
4 for the schools incorporated with our plans and also conduct 5
training for the school bus drivers manually.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But is the posture still 7
basically, though, that the arrangemonts arc, you would move i
8 the kids to a relocation area, and then the parents would pick 9
them up there an opposed to going to the schools?
10 MR. MYERS Yos.
We would movo the childron, of l
l 11 courno, out of the ten-mile area, yes.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
Tho siron question, 13 I know that wo have a gonorio issuo about peoplo being ablo to l
14 haar the sirono, particularly in como locations in the wintor 15 and at night.
I thought that incuo had boon addrenced in the l
16 caso of !!arris.
This in a placo whore our Board brought thin l
17 matter to our attention.
la could you rafroch my momery on what's boon dono at 19 Ilarrin to deal with the problem and how you'vo assured 20 youroolvon that, in fact, peoplo are going to bo notified if 21 thoro'n an omorgoney, ao that they can bo informed of what 22 protectivo action noods to be taken?
23 MR. MYERS Of courno, the cirons havo boon tonted, 24 and they all worked.
The fixed airon syntom lu, of courco, 25 throughout tho ten-milo EP.
Un also have a backup routo l
l
80 1
alerting system made up of emergency workers throughout the 2
system, along with informal notification.
Plus, I might add, 3
what goes beyond the requirements, the tone-alort radios have 4
been put into the homes within five miles of the EPZ, and for 5
any accidental soundings of airens, we have implomented a plan 6
that would cover that area.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
Does that go beyond 8
what has boon dono for the other planto in North Carolina, the 9
tono-alorta?
10 MR. MYERS:
Yes, it does.
Yoc, it does.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
The tranniont 12 population quantion in another one that came up earlier in 13 como of the other commento -- the beators on tho lake, hikors, 14 people who are at campo in the vicinity around the plant.
15 What havo you dono to deal with transient 16 populations, peoplo that don't normally livo year-in and 17 year-cut in the vicinity of the plant, but who may bo using 18 recreational facilitica or camping, to mako ouro that thoco 19 poopic first aro awaro of the nituation thoro, and cocond, 20 you'vc got a way to notify them that will work?
21 MR. MYERS:
Of courno, wo work very clonoly with tho 22 difforont agencloc that are involved in notification of the 23 public, whether it bo trannient people or local people on the 24 lako, and wo hava put in a communicationn nyatom that given 25 all thono omorgoney workorn tho ability to communicato with
81 1
each other, where they all are.on the same system.
There are 2
notifications to be posted around the lake, in case of 3
emergency, this is what you would do.
And we feel very good 4
about our ability to warn the people on the lake.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I guess the last question 6
I have is somewhat of a difficult one, and to a certain 7
extent, I'm wrestling with it myself.
And that is, it seems i
8 to me that part of an effectivo emergency planning system is 9
building confidence in the people who live in the vicinity of 10 the plant, that, in fact, the plans are good, that they've 11 been carefully developed and tested, that people are properly l
12 trained, that they have the facilities and the equipment and 13 the resources that they need to do the job, because you need 14 public confidence in these things and in the people who will 15 be carrying them out, really if the plans are going to work.
16 And I get the impression, at least from como of the 17 speakers that we've heard thus far, that, you know, there are lo a lot of people with questions.
l 19 I guous what I'm wondoring 10, what can you do and 20 what can wo do to help resolve thoco concerno and questions 21 and build confidenco in people that, in fact, wo'ro at a-levol 22 of preparodnoon that's going to do tho job, and that thoy can 23 really have faith in, becauno it doos directly affect them?
24 MR. MYERS:
Woll, first of all, thoro'n boon coveral 25 outreach programs whero wo'vo gono into cach individual homo i
l 82 1
and addressed the citizens with their concerns on the 2
emergency situation.
3 of course, we're very proud of our ability in North 4
Carolina to respond to emergencies.
There are a lot of 5
citizens that agree with this.
Right now, the ongoing 6
emergency operations on our coast, our agency is involved 7
routinely three or four times a day.
We do a constant public 8
education program.
We have programs where we have met with 9
all the elected officials in the counties involved, and 10 actually about 80 out of 100 counties in the last 24 months in 11 North Carolina.
l 12 So wo feel there is confidence in our abilities to 13 respond to emergencies.
It's demonstrated daily, as I say, 14 and we receive a tremendous amount of support from citizonc l
15 throughout our statn on the State Emergency Management's 16 abilities to do this.
As a matter of fact, we think that wo 17 have the best agency in the country.
l l
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Carr?
i l
19 (No response.)
20 CHAIRMAN ZECit Thank you very much, Mr. Mycro.
Wo 21 apprecinto it.
22 All right, tho Staff, ploaco.
23 HR. STELLO:
Why don't wo have !!arold Donton mova 24 quickly to summarizo it, and then wo vill move through n 25 number of pooplo on the staff to addroco a variety of innuon
83 1
that we think are important for the Commission to know where 2
we are on those particular questions?
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Again, they are very important 4
issues, but I would ask you to be as crisp as you can, too, 5
please.
6 MR. STELLO:
We will try to.
7 MR. DENTON:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
8 North Carolinians have long been known for their 9
hospitality, but as you can tell, there is also a strong, 10 free-thinking, independent-thought trait among us also.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
We recognize you, Mr. Denton, as one 12 of them.
13
[ Laughter.]
14 MR. DENTON:
In the interest of time, what I'd like 15 to do is move directly to the issues that are in contention, 16 and not give the usual type of overview.
17 Commissioner Bernthal did ask about whether it is 18 routine to brief the Commission so quickly after criticality.
19 I don't think this timing is unusual at all.
Often we brief 20 the Commission between initial criticality and the need for a 21 full-power license, and my recollection, without checking, is 22 that a time this short into it is not uncommon, and it's 23 because of the fact that the testing has been done many times 24 in similar plants, and it would be unusual to have anomalous 25 results turn up.
L
-a
84 1
So'let's move directly first to emergency planning.
2 What we'd like to do is give you a three-or-four-minute 3
summary of each of the issues in contention.
4 CHAIPMAN ZECH:
All right, fine.
5 MR. DENTON:
Then we can answer questions.
6 Dave Matthews will just summarize the bases for the 7
Staff recommendation that we grant the exemption.
8 MR. MATTHEWS:
This is Dave Matthews of the Staff, 9
and by the way, I also have with me today Craig Wengo, who is 10 Chief of the Operations Branch in the Division of 11 Technological Hazards at FEMA, who would also be prepared to 12 respond to any questions you have with regard to some of the 13 issues you've heard today that I might not touch on.
14 To summarize very briefly, the basis for the 15 exemption is one primarily related to the underlying purpose 16 of the rule having been served insofar as there is an adequate 17 state of emergency preparedness that has been demonstrated in 18 the past and exists to date at Shearon Harris.
19 That conclusion is based primarily on three 20 factors:
one, the succassful conduct of a full-participation j
21 exercise in May of 1935, where the Staff identified no 22 significant deficiencies in onsite preparedness, and it also l
23 led to a favorable FEMA finding on offsite preparedness in 24 August of
'85.
25 I may clarify here, to clarify terms just a bit for I
85 1
those of you who are familiar with the phrases " deficiencies" 2
versus " inadequacies"'versus " areas requiring corrective 3
action," that the areas that you discussed with the State of 4
North Carolina with regard to the May 1985 exercise, those 5
were areas that were areas identified as needing corrective 6
action by FEMA, but didn't rise to the level of areas that the 7
correction would have been needed to demonstrate adequate 8
public health and safety.
And so the summary actions that you 9
have heard that the State has taken and that FEMA has 10 reviewed, they will confirm that those have indeed been 11 completed through future demonstrations, but they are not ones 12 that would have interfered with FEMA making a favorable 13 finding on offsite preparedness.
14 The second factor, of course, was the continued 15 participat?on by the State of North Carolina in exercises at 16 areas other than Shearon Harris, most notably the one in 17 support of Catawba in February of
'86.
3 18 Furthermore, the local response organizations not 19 only played fully in the May '85 exercise, but also were f
20 involved in support of the onsite drill that Shearon Harris 21 conducted in October of
'86.
22 Based on all of those factors, the Staff determined 23 that we believe that the underlying purpose of the rule was 24 met and that the exemption ought to be granted.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Thank you.
86 1
MR. DENTON:
We'd like to turn next to the 2.206 2
Petition.
That presented three questions to the Staff.
Two 3
of the sections of the petition, we were able to make headway 4
on pretty much from the time it came in.
5 The third part, which dealt with issues raised by an 6
anonymous individual, were more difficult to deal with.
7 Mr. Epting did arrange for a number of us to talk by telephone 8
with that individual.
As you know, he does not wish to become 9
known.
A lot of work has been done since we've had a chance 10 to talk to him, and I'd like to have Nelson Grace summarize 11 what we've done.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Proceed.
13 MR. GRACE:
Yes.
We've been looking forward to this 14 opportunity to meet with the Commissioners and apprise you of 15 the status and progress of low-power testing and our 16 assessment of the ratings for full-power operations at Shearon 17 Harris; however, we will abbreviate our remarks as requested 18 and limit it to the 2.206.
19 I must interject here, though, that our 20 investigation of this sort is not limited to allegations and 21 2.206 kinds of inquiries.
I'd like to remind the 22 Commissioners and the audience that Region II has expended 23 over 30 nan-years of inspection effort at the Harris facility 24 over the yearn, and in addition, we've had extensive 25 experience ever these years with Carolina Power & Light at
87 1
their operating plants at Robinson and Brunswick, and we have 2
found'them responsive to NRC concerns.
3 I might add that they've also had enough courage in 4
their convictions to give us a good argument from time to 5
time, which has been conducive to healthy and constructive 6
dialogue.
7 I have some people here from Region II, and in 8
particular, Al Gibson sitting to my left, who is Director of 9
the Division of Reactor Safety, will address the 2.206 issues.
10 I also have back in the audience Roger Walker, who 11 is Director of the Division of Reactor Projects; Dave Aurelli, 12 the responsible Section Chief or Branch Chief; and Paul 13 Frederickson, the responsible Section Chief; plus our 14 Residents from the ' site, George Mar:all and Steve Burris, and 15 our Reactor Inspector, Joe Lenahan, who investigated the 2.206 16 issues.
17 MR. GIBSON:
Thank you, Nelson.-
18 The 2.206 Petition, as you've heard, is divided into 19 three qucations, and I'd like to briefly summarize what we 20 have done on each of those three.
21 The first involved the electrical cable separation 22 issues, which you, Commissioner Asselstine, asked a question 23 on earlier.
We found, through our inspection program, that 24 industry standards that the utility had committed to for 25 maintaining separation between electrical cables had not been
I
.?
88 j.
1.'
1 met in.all cases, and the-utility, in response to that, did a' 2:
much more extensive inspection and determined that the problen-3 was, in fact,' widespread.
Fellowing that, they have inspected 4
essentially all of-the safety-related cabling in the plant and
[5
~ corrected a number of problems.
There were a number of cases 6
where cable had to lua moved.
7 Our concern -- we had the same concern initially 8
that's mentioned in the petition, that this indicated a 9
breakdown in QA, and, in fact, we do believe that QA in the 10 area of cable separation did break down.
We were concerned 11 that it might have extended into other areas, and we 12 encouraged the utility to take a look into other areas to see 13 if similar problems existed.
14 They selected a number of areas, as I recall, six or 15 eight areas in which they went in and did a thorough review 16 and reached the conclusion that this type of problem did not 17 extend into other areas, and then our Staff from Region II 18 selected two of the areas that they had looked at, and Region 19
.II inspectors went in and looked at those two areas and 20 supported the utility's conclusion that the QA problem was 21 limited just to the electrical cable separation area.
22 The second item I'd like to discuss, the second part 23 of the petition, states that there were two cases in which 24 CP&L employees or contractors -- there were two cases that 25 were brought to the Department of Labor for discriminatory
89 1
action.
CASH asserted that "these two instances of 2
discriminatory behavior by the Licensee indicates that the 3
. Licensee lacks the requisite character and competence to 4
operate a nuclear plant and also raises substantial issues 5
about the adequacy of work performed by these individuals or 6
others."
7 The first case involves a Mr. John McWheeney, who 8
was discharged because of raising concerns about the design of 9
cable tray supports, and that case was referred to the 10 Department of Labor.
The Area Director found that he had been 11 discriminated against for engaging in a protected activity.
12 The Licensee requested a hearing, but on December the 3rd, 13 Mr. McWheeney and CP&L entered into a settlement agreement 14 resolving all the issues between them.
15 We have reviewed this case.
We have reviewed the 16 technical aspects of the case.
We found that the cable tray 17 supports in question did indeed not meet industry standards 18 that the utility had committed to.
Although the utility had 19 tested the cable trays and found them suitable for service, 20 since that time, the cable tray supports have been redesigned.
21 There was another issue involving alleged 22 discrimination, Hr. Van Beck, an employee of Daniel 23 Construction Company.
He was terminated from his employment 24 at Harris in January 1986, when he refused to perform 25 inspection work inside containment during hot functional
90
=
1 testing because of-fears for his personal safety.
'2 An Administrative Law Judge for th'e Department.of
'3 Labor found that Mr. Van Beck was engaging in a protected
-4 activity _when1he refused to work and concluded that refusal to 5
work was related to concerns that conditions that existed in 6
the containment locations to be inspected and the inspector's 7
. anxiety about them could impair the inspector's ability to 8
perform adequate inspections of electrical raceways.
9 The utility, in response to this, went back and 10 reviewed the work, the inspection work, that Mr. Van Beck had 11 done inside containment and reviewed the work of other 12
-inspectors who had worked in containment in an effort to 13 determine if anxiety might have adversely affected the 14 performance of their work, and no problems were identified.
15 We have also, in follow-up of this part of the 16 petition, reviewed cases that have been handled by the office 17 of Investigations, involving alleged intimidation and 18 harassment.
There have been several of these cases over the 19 past several years.
None of the cases have been 20 substantiated, however.
21-We also note that the Atomic Safety and Licensing l
l Eoard for operating license proceedings at Shearon Harris, in 22 12 3 its consideration of the Contention alleging harassment of 24 employees at the Harris facility, directed that the utility 25 post a public notic.e inviting employees who wished to provide
--P-
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gy 5
-r
-9
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91 1
information about harassment and intimidation to provide this 2
information.to the Board.
There were two such individuals who 3
provided information of this type to the Board.
Both of the 4
allegations were investigated, and neither was substantiated.
5 "So in conclusion, the two instances that are cited 6
in the petition and the other cases that have been reviewed by 7
the Staff, have led us to conclude that there is no pattern of 8
harassment of employees at the Shearon Harris cite for raising 9
safety concerns and that the two instances cited by the 10 Petitioner do not raise substantial safety concerns requiring 11 additional reinspection or reevaluation of work performed."
12 Section 3 of the petition includes eight specific 13 items of concern regarding the quality of construction at 14 plant Harris, which were brought to our attention by CASH 15 through an anonymous informant.
And I would like to say that 16 we do appreciate CASH and the informant stepping forward and 17 bringing these matters to our attention.
We take them very 18 seriously.
It is the type of information 'that we do encourage 19 to help us reach a more informed conclusion regarding the 20 quality of construction at a nuclear plant.
21 We have taken each of these concerns and, contrary 22 to the misconception of some other speakers today, we did move 23 out promptly from the time we received the petition on October 24 the 20th and began onsite review by the resident inspectors 25 and evaluation back in the office and attempted to arrange an
92 1
interview with the informant who, until December the 8th, I 2
believe refused our invitations or our requests for an 3'
interview.
4 I would be happy to go through -- we have evaluated 5
each of the concerns.
As you heard earlier today, some of our 6
work is not complete.
But we have done a substantial amount 7
of work on each of.the eight concerns cited and in each case, 8
we believe that we do have reasonable assurance that even if 9
the alleged improper construction occurred, that the safety of 10 the plant was not significantly compromised.
11 We have substantiated some of the allegations.
We 12 have, for example, one you may have heard of, sand was placed 13 around anchor bolts to make them hold.
We have substantiated 14 that that did, indeed, occur.
But tests that have been 15 performed by the utility, and observed by the NRC, show that 16 this does not cause the anchor bolts to fail to meet their 17 design requirements.
18 I can go through each of the eight, if you would
-19 like.
Or perhaps you had some specific questions on some of 20 the eight that I could cover.
~21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I think that is enough, unless you l
22 want to go into more detail.
l 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think all of us probably f
24 preferred to see the complete written response on the 2206 l
25 petition.
Since we don't have that, I think it is important l
l l
93 3
1
'to go through, in some detail, each of these items.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:.All'right,. let 's do : th. at.
3 MR. STELLO:
Let me interject one point, recognize 4
that the Commission has a policy with respect to allegations 5
that are raised.
As'we conclude the licensing process --
6 while at this time I believe we can go further than we 7.
normally do, we are well outside what the policy of the 8
Commission is, with respect to handling these kinds of issues.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Let's finish this-one up right now.
10 Go ahead.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Before you leave the sand 12 in the anchor bolts, why would you put sand around the anchor 4
13 bolts?
Why would you do that?
Why didn't you just use a l'4-bigger anchor bolt?
15 MR. GIBSON:
That is a good question.
-16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
What is the answer?
17 MR. GIBSON:
We asked the same question.
I believe
'18 the inspectors believe that, in most cases, a larger anchor 19 bolt was used.
But we have also, through our interviews, 20 determined that in some cases the mechanics found it easier 21 just to sweep some sandblasting grit in around the bolt, 22 between the hole and the bolt, and that this caused the bolt 23 to seize in the hole and meet the torque requirements.
24 And I guess it was considered the most expedient or 25 easiest solution by the mechanic at the time, although a large
94 1
bolt would not have required a substantial amount of 2
additional effort, it would appear.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But what you are saying is 4
you found the bolts where the sand was put in, they had been 5
tested, and they are just as good as if they have used the 6
large bolt?
Is that what you are saying?
7 MR. GIBSON:
No, not entirely.
We have not 8
identified bolts where the sand was put in, but we have --
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But people have told you 10 they did that?
11 MR. GIBSON:
People have told us that they believe 12 that it was a practice.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
14 MR. GIBSON:
And we have done the best.we can to 15 duplicate that procedure, by going to the same type of 16 concrete, drilling holes oversized, putting bolts in the 17 holes, trying to torque them with and without sand, applying 18 both torque test and pull tests on the bolts, and comparing 19 the results with the design specifications.
(
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Have actual installed 21 bolts been tested, in terms of torque?
22 MR. GIBSON:
Not to my knowledge.
Oh, Joe Lenahan, 23 who has been inspecting this area.
24 MR. LENAHAN:
Yes, my name is Joe Lenahan.
I think 25 I can answer most of your questions.
100 percent of the bolts
.f.
~~
95
-1 have been torque tested at installation.
And they did a pull
'2 test on one out of every 100, actual tension tests.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Satisfactory tests, I 4
'would. imagine?-
5 MR. LENAHAN:
Yes, satisfactory tested.
They had to.
6 meet the -- 115 percent of the design specification on the 7
pull test and they had to reach torque on 100 percent of them.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Fine.
9 MR. LENAHAN:
Now, on the ones in question, 10 specifically addressed in the 2.206 request, they had -- at 11 the time of installation -- had another problem with those, 12 but they had pull tested 34 out of 100 of those.
e 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let's see.
Do I understand 14 that you were unable to find any of these -- the special cases 15 where the sand was put into the larger bolts?
16 MR. LENAHAN:
One individual onsite said that he 17 heard another individual tell somebody to pour sand in it, in 18 one instance.
So based on that, we said that is probably 19 partially substantiated.
20 Now, we cuplicated this and most of the installers 21 that were working with us on this, it took a tremendous H22 amount of time to do this.
It is so much easier to follow 23 procedures and do it right.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Get a bigger bolt.
25 MR. LENAHAN:
Use a bigger bolt.
They were named L
96 1.
but they're buried.
They are covered with equipment and we 2
just can't get to them.
3 MR. DENTON:
Maybe I should interject.
Some of 4
these allegations go back several years, as the practices 5
during construction.
It is very difficult to establish the 6
validity of it without massive interviews.
So wherever 7
possible, we went to direct physical inspection verification 8
testing of what the impact would be, if it were true.
So that 9
is why hardness tests were done, pull tests were done, 10 replications were done.
11 And I think it is on that basis, of physical 12 attempts to reproduce the circumstances, that we have reached 13 our conclusions.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
You just assumed it was 15 true and tested to see if it would create a problem.
16 MR. DENTON:
If we could find a way to make that 17 test.
la COMMISSICNER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
19 MR. GIBSON:
The first concern I will discuss is 20 called improper signoffs and the petition states that the 21 design approval block on some concrete anchor placement 22 reports was not signed by either the area or discipline 23 engineer, as required by CP&L procedures.
24 Our review revealed that some signatures were made 25 by the discipline engineer's supervisor and that this was, in
97 1
fact, consistent with CP&L policy.
It should be noted that
'2 the signature was not intended to signify design approval, as implied, but rather to certify that the proper design 3
4 documents -- that is drawings, procedures, and specifications 5
-- referenced on the form were correct.
6 The fact that the area engineer did not sign the 7
form did not violate CP&L procedures or NRC requirements and 8
is not of safety significance.
We have reviewed the 9
particular forms that were cited by the informant and 10 determined, in those cases, that the signatures were by the 11 engineer's supervisor and we are in process of selecting other 12 forms at random to see if there are problems in other areas.
13 So that is the nature of the incomplete work in this 14 area that was mentioned by an earlier speaker.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How many have you looked 16 at already?
17 MR. GIBSON:
I will have to ask Joe.
18 MR. LENAHAN:
I would say -- we looked at all seven 19 named in the petition and we looked at probably 300 or 400 20 others, out of 1100 total.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So 300 or 400 you have 22 looked at and the seven specific ones you were directed to, 23 you have looked at all of those?
24 MR. LENAHAN:
We haven't found any problems so far, 25 as of two o' clock today.
98 l'
MR. GIBSON:
The second item, I think, we have 2
already discussed pretty fully and that involves putting sand 3
in the anchor bolt holes.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I would like to hear more 5-about that, but I will do it privately.
I am intrigued by 6
that whole notion, but go ahead.
7 MR. GIBSON:
Yes, we would be happy to talk with 8
you.
We were, indeed, also initially.
But after observing 9
it, we understand how it works and it did pass the tests.
10 Material substitution is the next area that I would 11 like to discuss.
The concern states that unnamed persons had 12 bogus stamps to mark non-safety or non "Q" material as "Q" 13 material.
The material in question is ASTM-36 steel plate.
14 The Licensee had previously identified and evaluated 15 this problem or a problem that was related with substituting 16 other steel for the ASTM A-36 steel and determined that such 17 substitutions posed no safety problem.
18 Our review showed that with a minor exception, all 19 steel onsite that was suitable for substitution -- that is, 20 plate of the same type -- had higher strength than the A-36 21 steel.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
How did that happen?
That 23 can happen in the real world for a long time, but you can't 24 buy anything that is inferior to A-36.
25
[ Laughter.)
99 1
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
That is just like we spent 2
hours one day talking about we were going to impale somebody 3
because they had welded to the ASME code, rather than the AWS, 4
when everybody who knows anything about welding knows that the 5
ASME code is nuch more stringent.
6 MR. GIBSOll:
Commissioner, that was our conclusion, 7
but we did find that there was less than one percent of the 8
steel onsite did have a lower strength.
Slightly lower.
And 9
we can't discount the possibility that some of that might have 10 been.used, 11 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
You had to do your job, I 12 understand it.
13 MR. GIBSON:
If it was used, the difference in yield 14 strength was so slight, that the safety factors in design 15 would more than compensate.
16 The next iten I want to talk about is document 17 control.
The concern states that unidentified craft perconnel 18 altered design documents to agree with installations to avoid 19 rework.
Our review indicates that it is unlikely that craft 20 personnel could circumvent the document control system at 21 Harris and alter such documents without detection.
22 Further, both the utility and our inspectors have 23 inspected a large number of installations, on the order of 24 1100 anchor bolt placements, to determine if the installation 25
-- if the location of the placements met the original design
100 1
specifications -- and we have identified no problems.
2 The reason we feel that it is unlikely that this 3
practice took place without inspection is that QC inspectors 4
routinely inspected the work and QC inspectors normally 5
brought their own documentation with them.
So if the craft 6
person changed his own copies of the documentation, there was 7
a high risk that the QC inspector would identify it when he 8
came to inspect the job.
9 It seems not credible to us that the craft personnel 10 could succeed in changing all the copies onsite to avoid 11 detection.
12 It is true that QC inspectors sometimes borrowed the 13 craft copy to do the inspection, but this was not the normal 14 practice and there would be no way for the craft to have 15 confidence that this is what would happen.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Were there instances in 17 which the document control system turned up discrepancies?
18 That is, where the QC inspector would come out with his set of 19 drawings and they wouldn't match those of the craft?
20 MR. GIBSON:
Not that we have been able to identify.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
22 MR. GIBSON:
The fifth item involves alleged 23 compromise to the QC procedures in the emergency service water 24 intake structure. And there are really three parts to this.
25 The first is a concern that QC inspectors failed to
101 I
1 check undercut tolerances for maxi-bolt anchor holes.
This is 2
a special type of anchor bolt that is put in a hole that has a 3
large diameter at the bottom, so that the bolt expands on the 4
bottom and it makes it more difficult to pull out.
The 5
allegation is that this undercut or enlarged diameter at the 6
bottom of the hole was not properly checked by QC inspectors.
7 And to test this, the utility bored holes in similar 8
concrete, using anchor bolts that were used for other 9
installations with no undercut area.
And the bolts held to 10 design specifications.
11 We also reviewed QC records and found that the QC 12 records were complete, showing that the undercut diameters 13 had, in fact, been inspected at installation.
So based on 14 that, we don't see a problem in this area.
15-The next part is a concern that there was rampant 16 unauthorized material substitution made in areas which are 17 inaccessible for inspection because they are under water, and 18 the testing of materials in the intake structure that I --
19 well, I don't know if I covered that under the anchor bolt 20 discussion or not -- but the Utility did drain two intake bays 21 and performed in-place hardness tests of base plates and 22 removed samples of base plates to perform tensile tests, and 23 the testing all shcwed that the material that was used in 24 these underwater locations met the design specifications.
25 This is the material for which the chemical analyses
102 1-have.not'been completed.
I understand the Utility is 2
performing chemical analyses.
The NRC has collected 3
independent samples, but we at this point are not planning to 4
-perform an~ analysis.
We believe that the hardness tests and 5
the tensile tests that have been done so far are sufficient to 6
show that the proper material was used.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Are the Licensee's tests 8
done?
9 MR. GIBSON:
The Licensee's hardness and tensile 10 tests are done.
I'm not sure if the chemical tests are done-11 or not, but we don't really feel that that information is 12 necessary to establish that the material is proper.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Because you think the 14 first two tests are satisfactory?
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
That is only indicative of 16 what the physical properties will be; is that not correct?
17.
MR. GIBSON:
That's correct.
18' COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Were the two intake bays 19 among the areas that you were directed to?
20 MR. GIBSON:
Yes.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay. Good.
22 MR. GIBSON:
And the third item, subpart of concern 23 number 5 is that craft personnel made unauthorized changes to 24 shear plate locations in the intake structure.
We followed 25 up on this by inspecting shear plate locations when the
103 1
structures were drained, and we id'entified no problems and we 2
were using.the record copy of the design documentation.
3 The sixth and -- well, I say the final concern 4
involved the use of epoxy that you heard something about 5
carlier.
The concern is that a congressive'1411 epoxy grout 6
material, which is a proprietary grout material, is sensitive 7-to heat from welding and should not be used as a load-bearing 8
surface under base plates because the material would melt if 9
some structure were later welded to the plate.
10 This is a potential problem that has been recognized 11 in the industry for some time and was the subject of the NRC 12 Information Notice 83-40, and Harris procedures have been 13 written to preclude use of this material.
14 Our investigation showed that this epoxy material is 15 widely used at the station but it is used in applications
' 1 46 where there is not a bearing surface involved.
There was an 17 earlier statement that we had not completed our evaluation of 18 that.
19 We have recently completed our evaluation and 20 concluded that epoxy material has not been used as a bearing 21 surface. It is used when the base plate does not fully contact 22 the concrete surface under it by design, and for cosmetic 23 reasons the crack around the edge is sealed.
So the 24 allegation is cubstantiated in the sense that the material is 25 indeed used, but we don't believe that the use had any safety
104 1
significance.
2
' COMMISSIONER ASSELST.INE:
How have you verified that 3
it wasn't used in a load-bearing situation?
4 MR. GIBSON:
Have we?
Yes, sir.
5.
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How have you?
6 MR.'GIBSON:
I would ask Joe to address that.
7 MR. LENAHAN:
Yes, sir.
There is a sign-off on an 8
anchor installation record which either indicates it is a load 9
bearing or non-load bearing surface.
We went out and 10 inspected several of those that we were directed to plus some 11 additional ones in the diesel generator building, and we could 12 verify that the form wac properly filled out.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:- Okay. So first they had a 14 procedure that covered it, and second, you verified by 15 actually looking at the hardware to r.ake sure that in fact the 16 procedure was followed.
17 MR. LENAHAN:
Yes, sir.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Did you look at the hardware as well 19 as the form?
20 MR. LENAHAN:
Yes, sir.
We went out and inspected 21 the base plates, and you could readily see, and we verified 22 that if it said it was a bearing surface, it had cement grout 23 under the base plate.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
25 MR. GIBSON:
An additional inspection effort that we
O 105 o
I had planned in that area is to make sure that the 2
documentation accurately reflected whether or not the surface 3
should have been a load bearing surface, but we feel that we 4
have reasonable information at this point to conclude there is 5
not a problem.
6 MR. DENTON:
I am glad we were able to discuss these 7
because we thought we were following the normal Commission 8
policy on late allegations.
If we had found problems, we 9
would have regrouped, but the fact that, while we were able to 10 ascertain that some of these occurrences may have happened, 11 the fact that the safety significance is small, we are going 12 to continue to pursue some of the things and eventually write 13 it up and respond to the petition, get back to the person that 14 wrote them, and continue to work these problems.
15 If they turn out differently in the area, we will 16 continue that, too, but based on what we were able to find, we 17 don't see any reason for that being a bar to issuance of a 18 full power license based on the results that we have turned 19 up.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
But in any case, investigations will 21 continue until you are satisfied.
22 MR. DENTON:
Yes, sir.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Do you have tuo more?
24 MR. GIBSON:
That was it.
The subparts totalled 25 eight.
106 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
If I could just inquire, we 2
did have a number of comments and statements that seemed to 3
indicate that there was a massive amount of reinspection and 4
reworking to be done yet.
Could you just summarize for us the 5
items which -- Harold has already indicated so far he finds no 6
reason based on what you have looked at to deny a license, but 7
what remains for you to do?
8 MR. GIBSON:
On the grout material, we will look to 9
make sure that the documentation that said which surfaces were 10 bearing surfaces and which were not is accurate.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The chemical testing?
12
- 12. GIBSON:
Chemical testing.
We don't yet have 13 the Utility's chemical test results.
We want to see that.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But you physically tested 15 those items, so that is what counts.
16 MR. GIBSON:
Yes, sir, so we have done the physical 17 test.
On the document control, on the forms that were not 18 properly signed off, we have looked at the ones that the 19 informant referred us to, but we wanted to select some others 20 to look at, as well.
21 Joe, have I overlooked anything?
22 MR. LENAHAN:
No.
I would estimate -- there are 23 two inspectors down there now covering this, and I would 24 estimate that probably another ueek of inspection, which will 25 probably be the week after next, the week of the 19th,
o 107 1
probably three or four days of the.three of us will be 2
finished.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Do you have an estimate 4
.for how loing beyond that it will take to write up the 5
response?
6 MR. LENAHAN:
Up until February 15th.
7 MR. DENTON:
I think this concludes the points we 8
wanted to make.
9 MR. GRACE:
Since our planned presentation was not 10 possible because of time running out, if I could have one more 11 minute, and time me, please, I would like to make a point.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Go ahead.
13 MR. GRACE:
I have mentioned that we have expended 14 over 30 man years of inspection effort over the years, and I 15 want to add that, speaking for myself and the division 16 directors and my managers in Region II, we are not 17 office-bound burenuerats who sit there and read inspection 18 reports and talk on the telephone; we get out to the sites 19 quite frequently.
In fact, I myself have been to the Harris 20 site about a half-dozen times. The first time was when I led 21 the CAT inspection two years ago at the Harris site when I was 22 in I&E, and I have made numerous trips there for SALP 23 meetings, presentation of operator licenses, our operational 24 readiness review, and I have accompanied the Chairman and 25 Commissioner Carr and Harold Denton, most recently, on their
108 1-
. visits to the site.
2 During these visits we talked to the managers and 3
the workers at all levels, we talk to the operators and get 4
to know them, and we sense, we get an impression'of attitudes 5
and understanding and their background and their dedication to 6
the job.
Now, these indicators are mostly subjective and they 7
cannot be quantified, but nevertheless, for me and, I think, 8
the rest of us, they provide essential input to our assessment-9 of readiness for operations.
10 MR. STELLO:
Thank you.
11 Mr. Chairman, we are through.
Our recommendation 12 stands.
We have more work to do, consistent with the policy 13 of the Commission.
I think in this particular case we are 14 able to go further with respect to technical judgment, with 15 respect to the allegations we received December 18th.
We are 16 satisfied that when and if pre-op. testing and, initial 17 criticality, power ascension up to low power is okay, we are 18 prepared to go forward.
With the understanding we will be 19 watching and looking, I would suggest that the Commission, in 20 fact, delegate to us the authority to move ahead.
21' CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Let me see if there are any 22 questions from my fellow commissioners.
23 Commissioner Roberts?
24 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
No.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Asselstinc?
c i
109 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, I have got a few.
2 Start.with operator qualifications and the simulator 3
examinations. 'Both when I visited the plant earlier.this 4
week and then earlier today, I heard the company's view on the 5
question of the simulator examinations.
I know from looking 6
at the materials in preparation for going down to.see the 7
plant that the Staff was concerned about the lower pass rate 8
on the simulator portion of the exams, and I would be 9
interested in hearing what the Staff wanted to see in terms of 10 further testing of the operators to ensure that the operators 11 do have a good knowledge and understanding of the plant and 12 its procedures and its systems, and your own assessment of the 13 operators and their qualifications based upon what has been 14 done to test them.
l 15 MR. DENTON:
Let me have Bill Russell respond to 16 that.
17 MR. RUSSELL:
Your opening comments are correct.
18 The Staff was surprised by the poor performance of the senior 19 reactor operators on the simulator examinations.
That was 20 unusual in that the performance on the written examinations 21 and the oral examinations was substantially above that of the 22 national average for the last fiscal year.
23 Thoro were a number of things which contributed to 24 that and I think the company has indicated that the failure on 25 their part to provide sufficient time for the early classes
110 1
which took the simulator exam was a major contributor.
They 2-just did not have sufficient familiarity with the new machine, 3
compared to the earlier non-plant replicate simulator.
4 Subsequent performance did improve. And as a 5
result of the findings on the May simulator exam, indeed the 6
region went back and did examine the performance of the 7
earlier candidates on the simulator and were confident with 8
those that have been examined that they can, indeed, 9
manipulate the controls and direct the activities of license 10 operators in a satisfactory manner.
11 With respect to the other question, related to 12 operator staffing, that is the experience levels, the 13 questions about hot operating experience at a light, large 14 nuclear reactor.
They have four individuals, one on each 15 shift that meet all of the requirements of the generic letter 16 84-16, with respect to experience at a light reactor.
17 In addition to that, they have a number of operators 18 that have had. prior experience at the Brunswick facility, 19 which are not being considered.
In addition, they have two 20 operators that have prior experience, six months, at the 21 Robinson facility.
But based upon the credit of only 75
-22 percent, they need an additional six weeks of experience on an 23 operating facility, which would be achieved sometime in 24 mid-February.
So in mid-February, they would have six.
25 Based upon also the return of one operator who was
111~-
n:
1 out for surgery, they would have seven.
2
-Now these are' operators with prior experience on a 3
light reactor.
In addition to that, they have approximately 4
seven senior reactor operators on each shift.
This is a far 5
larger complement of licensed operators than we-have seen on a 6
new facility, actually in shift positions.
I think that is an 7-indicator of the company's approach to getting additional 8
people experienced.and trained and putting them onshift at a
~9
~ time when you'are going through power escalation.
10 We have no concerns at this point in time, with
'll respect to experience or performance on NRC examinations.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Bill, as I recall, they 13 are working five shifts now.
14 MR. RUSSELL:
They are in'four.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Four?
16 MR. RUSSELL:
That is correct.
As a result of the l'7 four.12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts, one individual is unavailable because of 18 surgery, and so they went to four shifts with experience.
19 They are not using --
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So there will be one 21 person with the necessary hot operating experience for each 22 shift?
23 MR. RUSSELL:
That is correct.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
So they will meet our policy 25 requirements for --
4 112 q
-1 MR. RUSSELL:- That is correct.
They meet all of the 2
policy requirements, both for experience and for the policy on
.3 use of overtime.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I agree with you, by the 5
-way, that the number of licensed operators -- particularly the 6
SRO's on shift, which is substantially higher than our minimum 7
requirements and that at most other plants -- is a plus.
I 8
agree with you.
9 MR. RUSSELL:
It is also not unusual for a facility 10 to have an experience of a high failure rate on the first 11-group of candidates on the simulator.
Recall that occurred' 12 also at Millstone 3.
Both the combination of the new symptom 13 based emergency operating procedures, plus a new simulator, 14 and not sufficient time in training, tends to have a higher 15 failure rate that first time around.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I have two other questions 17 on the 2.206 petition.
One that was identified, I guess by 18 several of the participants this morning, and also in the
. 19 submittal that I received from one of the parties, I guess 20 from CASH, when I was at the plant on Monday.
21 The first is, was there a delay in the staff 22 starting to work on the 2.206 of a couple of months?
And if 23 so, why did it happen?
Could we have gotten this wrapped 24 up much earlier than we are dealing with it, if we had gotten
- 25 started earlier on it?
g 113
..(*2 L-1 MR. GIBSON:
Yes, sir.
I can~ respond to that..
I 2-have a few cryptic notes here t'o job my memory.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
4
.MR.- GIBSON:- The petition was dated ~ October the 17th 5:
- and was received by us on October the 20th.
And on October li
.the 20th, the Resident Inspector began onsite work.
He began
~7 inquiries with the Licensee and gathering of documentation.
8 on October the 22nd, Mr. Berelli of our office contacted CASH 9-and requested an interview of the informant and offered 10 confidentiality and mailed the forms off to be signed.for a-11
. guarantee ~of confidentiality.
12 On November the 13th, CASH telephoned us and 113 informed us that the informant refused to be interviewed.
14 We continued to-review, in the office and onsite, 15 but we lacked specific information and on December the loth --
16 I guess it was a couple of days ahead of that -- the informant
- 17 agreed.that he would meet with Mr. Denton and offer a 18 statement and that.is when the telaphone interview occurred 19 and we were able to get more specific information.
- 20 It was during the December time period that.we 21 devoted most of the time that we expended for onsite review.
22 We did work from the time we received it, although I will say 23 that most of the onsite work was delayed until after we had 24-more specifics to work with.
25-COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
114 1
In the submittal that CASH gave me Monday, they have 2
one statement -- I think'we have covered most all of the rest 3
of it -- but one statement where they said and only last' week 4
I understand that NRC investigators determined that-the INPO 5
radiation detectors had been constructed in such a way as to 6
make their services intended impossible and so as to require 7
reconstruction.
That is the first I had heard about that 8
issue.
9 Could you address tha. one?
10 MR. GIBSON:
That was a problem that had been -- I 11 don't have dates and specifics, but the problem had been 12 identified earlier by the utility and Westinghouse had been 13 called upon to fix it.
They thought there was some 14 obstruction in the tube, attempted to clean it, assumed the 15 problem was fixed and it wasn't until more recently that the 16 utility discovered that the tube was indeed undersized and not 17 obstructed.
18 That is the -- perhaps someone has more to offer on 19 that.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Well, I guess what I am 21 asking is is there a problem with the detectors and, if so, 22 what has to be done to fix them?
23 MR. GIBSON:
That particular problem has now been 24 fixed.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
115 l'
MR. GIBSON: 'The tubes have been changed.
.2 COMMISSIONER'ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
3 MR. GRACE:
They.had to change them out before they 4
went to three percent power.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One last question on the 6
2.206 petition, the cable separation question.
When I was 7
reading the latest SALP report that was done for the plant, 8
this is a problem that is highlighted there as well.
And if I 9
recall correctly, the Staff points out that basically you 10 brought this problem to the Licensee's attention some three 11 years ago.
12 MR. GIBSON:
Yes.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Or two to three years 14 ago.
And basically the Licensee wasn't very responsive in 15 getting after it.
When you conducted more recent inspections, 16 you found that the same. problem existed, it simply hadn't been 17 corrected.
18 MR. GIBSON:
Yes.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
There is another element 20 in your SALP report that talks about management attitudes.
21 Under the licensing section you say that management takes a 22 strong and aggressive approach in resolving issues and 23 continues to show good understanding of the various technical 24 and licensing issues.
25 I guess what I am wondering is to what extent are i
116 1-you concerned about their failure to pursue the cable 2
separation issue?
If they had pursued it more vigorously to 3-start with, would we not have had the problem in the more 4
recent. inspections and how do you square that with your 5
overall assessment that, in general, this company pursues 6
things pretty vigorously and effectively?
7.
MR. GIBSON:
We believe that -- well, the problem 8
had been identified earlier by the NRC and numerous individual 9
discrepancies had been identified by the utilities' QC 10 inspectors.
But the QA program had failed to recognize the 11 trend and direct management action to the overall problem.
12 We viewed the entire issue as an illustration that 13 the QA program in this area was not effective.
But when we f
14 looked in other areas, we didn't see the same thing.
So my 15 response is that the problem was limited to this particular 16 area and not consistent with our overall view of the 17 aggressiveness of the utility.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Have you looked enough at 19 the operational QA program to satisfy yourselves that the 20 operational QA program doesn't suffer from this weakness and 21 that, in fact, as the plant goes into operation there will be 22 a vigorous and effective operational QA/QC program?
23 MR. GIBSON:
Yes, sir, we have looked specifically 24 at that.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The next question I have
117 1
has to do with the Brunswick experience.
Several people have 2'
raised that issue, and I think we probably ought to talk about 3
it for a couple of minutes.
4 I. visited Brunswick myself, I know most everybody 5
here has.
I think there is no question that for a good while, 6
the Brunswick performance didn't satisfy either us or the 7
company.
There have been a number of corrected programs 8
underway down there for several years now and I would be 9
interested in just hearing an update from the regional people 10 on where you see the company's performance with its existing 11 plants -- particularly at Brunswick -- and is the Staff 12 continuing to be satisfied with the progress that is being 13 made in achieving a satisfactory level of performance at 14
' Brunswick and that, in fact, the attitude of this company for 15 their new plant is likely to be one in the direction of strong 16 and effective and safe operations?
17 liR. GRACE:
Let me begin to answer that question and 18 I will ask for help.
The problems at the Brunswick plant 19 occurred before I joined the NRC in 1983.
And in fact, when I 20 first joined the NRC and NRR, I was learning about the big 21 improvement at the Brunswick plant.
22 From our experience there, that improvement has been 23 sustained.
We have had good interaction with the Licensee 24 management, with the site people, and they have been 25 responsive to our concerns.
We have seen no indication that
118 s,
1 they are not dedicated and committed to safe operations at 2.
that facility.
3 Now, I first learned about the turnaround, the 4
change, at Brunswick from my boss at the time, who was Harold 5
Denton.
So I think it is appropriate, as you requested, that 6
he comment on this.
7 MR. DENTON:
I think Brunswick is now a solid 8
average performer.
They have been improving for some time, 9
but the rest of the industry has been improving also.
So they lo have come a long way.
I think'they still have a ways to go 11 before I would call them a stellar performer.
They are not 12 like the ones that we ranked at the top of the list, and we 13 take inspections away from.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I guess the next question 15 I had had to do with the length of the low power testing 16 program.
When I was at the plant, we talked a bit with the 17 company about the length of the low power testing program and 18 they basically described a program of some -- I guess seven to 19 ten days or a week to two weeks.
Say that as a little broader 20 characterization of it.
21 I guess what I am wondering is how that compares 22 with the length of the low power testing program and the 23 number of tests to be conducted before getting a full power 24 license for a number of the similar Westinghouse PWRs.
Say 25 plants like Millstone, Callaway, Wolf Creek, Byron, and Diablo
119 o
1 Canyon.
2 My reaction is that that is pretty short.
It is 3
certainly on the short side.
And I guess what I am wondering 4
is are there tests that aren't being conducted during the low 5
power program or am I just not perceiving it?
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I thought Harold answered 7
that question?
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Well, Harold said the 9
length of time, when we vote on a full power license from when 10 they get a low power license.
What I am asking about is the
.11 length of the lower power testing program itself.
Maybe it is 12 the same question.
13 MR. DENTON:
They are performing the same low power 14 series of tests that Westinghouse recommends and we require at 15 all plants.
Let me have Tom give you the details.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Fine.
17 MR. NOVAK:
Some specifics.
On Catawba 2, that same 18 period was seven days.
On Millstone 3, it was eight days.
19 Diablo Canyon Unit 2, seven days.
Wolf Creek, 13 days.
Palo 20 Verde seven days.
Waterford, 12 days.
21 Summer, which was probably the last plant of this 22 type, took 21 days.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So it really is 24 consistent?
i 25 MR. NOVAK:
Yes, it runs and it depends on the
..o.
120 1
. prob. ems.--
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:' Okay.
3 I have got.just a-few others that were a little more 4-minor.
On the license, page four of the package that you sent 5
down, for the. full power license.
.6 Page four, item number five, steam generator tube 7
-rupture.
You say prior to start up, following_the first 8-refueling outage, Carolina Power & Light shall submit for the 9
NRC. review and receive approval of a steam' generator tube 10 rupture analysis.
11 I was just wondering, why is that an open item at 12 this point for this plant?
.13 MR. NOVAK:
Well, we carry basically that concern as 14 an open item on Westinghouse plants since the.Ginna event.
We 15 learned several things about the Ginna event, in the sense 16 that the operators took several actions up until three and 17 three-and-a-half hours after the initial event.
18 And what we arc. doing through this generic analysis 19 is really clarifying what operator actions are necessary and 20 how soon should they be assumed to be completed.
And it is 21 just that straightforward.
That is something that we gained 22 from the Ginna event that we want to be sure we understand.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And the same license 24 condition has been carried in all the other Westinghouse PWRs?
25 MR. NOVAK:
Yes, sir.
_, _ _ - ~ ~ _. _ _ _ _. _,. _
121
-1:
' COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I also had a question on 2.
ztech specs, which is I guess the safety evaluation.
The draft 3'
that was in the' package, as well, e-page 14 and then'page 15 4
m in particular.
5 Licensee submitted some proposed changes and I 6
gather that the Staff is giving them some flexibility in terms 7
of being able to change response. times.
And what I would be 8
interested.in is how much flexibility, particularly for 9
reactor trip system instrumentation and ESF actuation system 10 instrumentation.
How much flexibility or how much can the 11 Licensee change the response times, using just the 50.59 12' analysis for those two items?
13 MR. ROSSI:
The response -- I an Ernie Rossi of the 14 Staff.
15.
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
16 MR. ROSSI:
The response times would have to be 17 consistent with whatever analyses-they either had or redid.
18 And the main goal of the tech spec changes that have been 19 approved is to take things out of the formal toch specs and
.20 put them into other control documents so that tables of things 21 and values can be donc under 50.59 rather than have to go 22 through a formal tech spec change.
23 We wouldn't have any particular range within which 24 he could change them.
The key would be that he would have to 25 change them only based on analyses that either existed or were
122 1
redone.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
On Supplement 4 to the 3
SER, a couple of questions there, as well.
One has to do with 4
tests, operational procedures, and support systems, pages 5-5 5
and 5-6.
And it has to do with natural circulation tests.
6 Given the fact that this is a 3-loop plant, the 7
Staff says that -
let's see -- that the issue has to be 8
satisfactorily resolved before the start up after the first 9
refueling.
You talk about the things that have to be done.
10 I guess what I am wondering is what are you doing to 11 make sure that that test is valid for the 3-loop plant, since 12 I gather the test that has been conducted so far has been on 13 Diablo Canyon, which is 4-loop?
14 MR. NOVAK:
This is Tom Novak again.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
16 MR. NOVAK:
Basically, we don't expect any abnormal 17 behavior from any natural circulation tests.
What we were 18 concerned about, really, after Three Mile Island, is the 19 behavior to cool down the plant and bring it down in an 20 orderly fashion, with natural circulation.
And then, in the 21 startup tests, there are natural circulation tests that are 22 performed.
23 You go back and you compare the actual data to the 24 analysis.
That is basically what is left to be done, is the 25 verification of the data that you obtained from the natural
i 123 1
circulation' test is consistent with theidesign parameters that 2
~ you. expected.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Are they going to do the 4
tests?
~5.
MR. NOVAK:
Yes, they are.
6-COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
For this plant?
7 MR. NOVAK:
Well, they do a natural; circulation --
3 MR. BUCKLEY:
That is at low power.
9 MR. NOVAK:
At low-power, right.
10 MR. BUCKLEY:
The one you are talking about is at-11 100 percent power.
And you either have to show similarity 12 between Diablo and Harris --
13 MR. NOVAK:
Or they have to do the tests themselves.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One last question on 15 equipment qualification, page 3-18 of the 4th supplement, 16 under outstanding equipment.
You say for items not having 17-complete qualification documentation, the Applicant has 18 provided a commitment for corrective action and a schedule for 19 completion.
20 By letter dated September 19th, the Applicant 21 committed to have equipment installed as environmentally 22 qualified before declaring it operational.
I guess what I am 23 wondering is what does that mean, in terms of equipnent in the 24 plant?
25 Is it operational now?
Is it qualified?
And if
124
~1 not, what more has to be done?
21 MR. BUCKLEY:
I can't say right offhand, but I 3
believe it is operational.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
5 That is all I had.
Thank you.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
Commissioner Bernthal?
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
We have gone through a good 8
deal of detail here.
I would like to ask one question.
9 Harold, you have been around a long time and seen a 10 lot of plants, a number I guess like this plant, up for 11 licensing.
There seems to be a lot of well organized public 12 interest in this particular case and maybe, for the record,-I 13 would like you simply to provide your opinion on the broad 14 state of preparation and readiness for operation of this 15 plant, as compared with many others that you have looked at, 16 very generally speaking?
17 MR. DENTON:
Let me first start by saying it is a 18 3-loop Westinghouse plant.
There are almost a dozen of those 19 plants operating around the country, so it is not a unique 20 reactor system.
If you look at what else they have at the 21 site, it was originally a four unit site, as you have you 22 heard, and they have managed to retain some of the features of 23 the larger site.
24 They have a large waste handling capability.
They 25 are able to use some of the buildings they built for staff,
- i.
'125 1-who_are very near the plant.
2:
So in that sense, they have more equipment available 3.
for a lot of abnormal occurrences, say than an average 3-loop 4
' Westinghouse plant would have.
It has a large strong 5-containment building, so I don't have any qualms about the-6
' containment' aspect.
The staffing, they do have a lot of SRos..
7 They didn't come in with an abundance of experienced 8
SRos on a similar plant.
I took a look ahead at.Vogle, which 9
is coming in next.
I think they will have 14 SROs with six 11 0 months experience or more on similar plants.
This applicant 11 only has four, but-they meet the minimum.
But they have a lot 12 of SRos.
13 I don't see any reason to treat this utility 14 differently than the plants we have licensed in the past.
I 15 would expect that with the staffing they have got, the plant, 16 the procedures, that they are ready or will be ready when 17 they complete the low power testing, to go to full power.
18 And I would not intend to_ issue a full power 19 license, even if you were to grant it, until the region has 20 certified that all the required tests at low power have been 21 done and that everything else that we would like to see done 22_
at this stage, has been satisfactorily completed.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Carr?
24
[No response.]
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, I presume that, Mr. Stello,
126 1
you agree with what Mr. Denton has said,.as far as the plant 2-being ready for further operations?
3 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Let me just ask my fellow 5
Commissioners then if, having heard a lengthy session here 6
today on the immediate effect this review, are we ready to 7
vote on the plant?
8 All Commissioners in favor of authorizing the Staff,
'9 after appropriate findings, to issue a full power license to 10 the Shearon Harris facility, signify by saying aye.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Aye.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Aye.
13 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Aye.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:- Aye.
15 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Aye.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
The vote is five to nothing.
17 The meeting is adjourned.
18 (Whereupon, at 5:00 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.]
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1-
- _, _. _. _ _ _,, _,., _., _..... _ _.. _ _.. _ -,..... _.. _... -,, _ _ _ -,., _,,, _, - - - _..... _ _ _ _ -. ~ _,.
1 2
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3
4 This is to certify that the attached events of a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
6 7
TITLE OF MEETING: Discussion /Possible Vote on Full Power Operating License for Shearon Harris 8
PLACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING: Thursday, January 8, 1987 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken
('
13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 ne or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
17
/
/
18 l
7 ---- Adsusnne(p. v 19 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
23 24 25
1/8/87
^4 SCHEDULiiG-NOTES.
TITLE:
DISCUS $10N/POSSIBLE VOTE ON FULL POWER OPEFATING LICENSE FOR SHEARON HARRIS SCHEDULED:
2:00 P.M., THURSDAY, JANUARY 8, 1987 (GPEN)
DURATION:
APPROX l-1/2 HR$
PARTICIPANTS: LICENSEE 10 MINS
- SHERWOOD H. SMITH CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT CAROLINA PcWER AND LIGHT LOMPANY
- E. UTLEY SENIOR EXECUT!VE VICE PRESIDENT CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY J. WILLIS, PLANT MANAGER STATE OFFICI ALS/INTERVENORS/PUetIC INTEREST GROUPS
- ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE OF NORTH CAROLINA 5 MINS KAREN LONG OR JOANNE SANFORD
- WELLS EDDLEMAN 5 MINS CONSEPVATION COUNCIL OF NORTH CAROLINA 5 MINS JANE SHARP KUDZU ALLIANCE 5 MINS WILLIAM CUMMINGS
- CHANGE (CHAPEL HILL ANTI-hUCLEAR GROUP EFFORT) 5 MINS WILLIAM CUMMINGS
- COALITION FOR ALTERNATIVES TO SPEARON 5 MINS HAPRl$ (CASH)
ROBERT EFTING
- INTEP EN00 RICHARD WILSON 5 MINS ROBERT CPTlNG
- CFFICE #
EMEPCENCY MANAGEMENT OF 5 MINS NORTH CAROLINA JCSEPH MYERS DEB 10 MINS
- T. NovAx EEnlo II 10 MIN 3
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- NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCT (16';)
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- cpi:L OPERATOR OF H.E. ROBINSON 2 AND DEUN5 FICK hTCLEAP. PLANTS j
- ROBINSON-2 665 MFe PWR; IN C0'aIERCIAL OPERATION ELNCE 1971 j
- BRUNSWICK-17901Me BWR; IN COMMERCIAL OPEPaTION SINCE 1977
- BRUNSWICE-2 790 MWe BWR: IN COMMERCIAL OPEPdTION SINCE 1975
- GENERAL PLANT DESIGN
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- ARCIIITECT/ ENGINEER: EBASCO SERVICES
- GENEFul. CONTRACTOR: DANIEL INTERNATIONAL
- SlIE
- ORIGINALLY FOUR UNIT SITE: 10,600 ACRES i
- LOCATION: CILGH.OI AND WAKE COUNTIES. NORIB CAROLINA l
- POPULATION (1983)
- NEAREST CITY: APEX, N.C. (9 M1)
POPULATION: 2.890 1
- NEAREST POPLUATION CENTER: RALEIGH, N.C. (16 MII_ES)
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- XS?3CT::0X STYYA3Y CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION PROGRAM PREOPERATIONAL INSPECTION PROGRAM SPECIAL INSPECTIONS
- ALLEGATIONS
- OPERATION READINESS
- CONCLUSION SLIDE 5
o l
SYST3YA"2::C ASSESSY3X"2 I
0:? :1::C3XS33 P3XT0XYAXC3 (SA:2}
CONSTRUCTION TRANSITION SALP SALP 5/1/84 11/1/85 10/31/85 7/31/86 OPERATION READINESS FUNCTIONAL AREAS PREOPEATIONAL TESTING 2
2 OPERATIONAL READINESS NI 2
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS NR 2
FIRE PROTECTION NI 2
SECURITY 1
NI 1
TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION NI 2
EFFECTIVENESS QUALITY PROGRAMS AND NI 2
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AFFECTING OUALITY COPS)
NI= NOT INSPECTED NR= NOT RATED SLIDE 6
O i
SYS" 3YA".?::C ASSESSY3X".?
V..
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CONSTRUCTION TRANSITION SALP SALP 5/1/04 11/1/85 10/31/85 7/31/86 CONSTRUCTION FUNCTIONAL AREAS SOILS AND FOUNDATIONS 1
NI CONTAINMENT, SAFETY RELATED 1
NR STRUCTURES, AND MAJOR STEEL SUPPORTS PIPING SYSTEMS AND SUPPORTS 1
1 SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS (M) 2 NR -
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2
1 ELECT. EQUIPMENT & CABLES S
2 INSTRUMENTATION 2
2
!~
QUALITY PROGRAMS &
2 2
i ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AFFECTING QUALITY (CONST.)
LICENSING 2
1 ARCHITEC'/ ENGINEER DESIGN 2
NI NI= NOT INSPECTED NR= NOT RATED 1
SLIDE 7
=
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- PROCEDURE REVIEW
- TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVIEW
- SHIFT STAFFING PLANT STATUS:
LOW POWER LICENSE TO PRESENT
- READINESS REVIEW PANEL
- REGIONAL INSPECTION EFFORT:
PRESENT TO TULL POWER LICENSE SLIDE 8
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C 12/31/86 OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION DOCKET 50-400 (SHEARON HARRIS)
SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE 1
INTERVENOR: WELLS EDDLEMAN I.
Greetings, Salutations and Introduction II.
Whistleblowers and Intimidation A.
Known Whistleblowers B.
Unknown C.
Intimidation, etc.
III. History - the AEC and NRC and SHNPP A.
The rush to dig the holes
- the fault below unit 1/ radwaste bldg.
B.
The first big delay (unneeded plant which CP&L can't afford)
C.
The construction permit - outrageous forecast error by ASLB (coverup) of inspector's concerns D.
The CP remand of '79 - mismanagement revealed -
CP&L claims they've fixed it E.
1980 - 82 at Brunswick - Mismanagement gone wild F.
The management OL hearing / post-decision mismanagement-F.1. NUREG-0654:
When is a rule not a rule?
G.
Ignorance is bliss: NRC ignores the more cost-effective alternatives IV.
Probability as applied to Nuclear decision making A.
Probability in the real world (as opposed to theories on which NRC all too of ten relies) 1.
Actual chance has no respect for your calculations 2.
Actual chance defies and defines your biases and errors 3.
When the probability is 100%
l
n B.
"Why do the nuclear authorities insist that what they approve is safe?"
C.
The importance of feedback D.
Murphy's Law and regulatory capture (control of
" regulators" by the " regulated")
V.
Conclusion Sakharov and N. Fomin of Chernobyl rd I
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PART C o STATEMENTS CF CGNSIDERAT13N With the promulgation of this final However. it is only one of many safety.
Reorganization Act of1974, as amended.
AnVS rule. the Commission has related systems which must be closely and sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the completed action on PRM-80-2g.The monitored and carefully memtamed to United Statee Code, the followmg petitioner's requests have been granted ensure a plant's safety and reliability. It amendment to 10 CM Part 50 is in part through the incorporation of is my view that a mom logical approach published as a document subject to requirement into the final rule which to reliability assurance would be to codification.
address the followmg issues:(1)(For CE consider such a program embracing i
BWRs)(a) recirculation pump trip those several safety systems which following an event indicative of sa experience and analyses show could be u,
6-ATW S. end (b) independent. redundant sigmficantly improved by such a l
and diverse electncalimtlation of scram program. This program should be followmg an event Indicative of an revtewed separately from the ATWS Q
AT% S. (2)(For CE and B4W PWRs) rutemaking effort.
)
automatu: initiation of auxiliary Furthermore. the Commission should feedwaterindependent of the reactor not call upon the industry to implement protection system: and (1)(For complicated and costly reliability West:nghouse PWRs) automatic assurance programs untilit more inattation of turbine trip and auxiliary thoroughly analyzes the concept and feedwater independent of the reactor until it provides specific guidance.
protection system. The petitioner s
,,g,,,,,,yg,,g,;,
request for promulgation of specific y
provisions within r/te context o/an The Commission has prepared a p,,, m A TH SrulemaArg for the followmg regulatory analysis for this regulation.
sys' ens are hereby denied:(t)(For CE The analysis examines the costs and BWPW e scram discharge volume benefits of the rule as considered by the
~
svsten (this provmon was not mcluded Commission. A copy of the regulatory in the final ATWS rule because analysis is available for mspection and 10 CFR Part 90 licen,-es already hase mstalled or are copying for a fee at the NRC Public insish ce this s)stemh and (2) f For CE Document Room.1717 !! Street. NW.,
Emergency Planning and and r tW FWRs) an attemale means to Washington. D.C.Sirigle cooies of the Propreenees shut Mwn the reactor that is diverse analysis may be obtained from David from and redundar.t to the electncal W. Pyatt. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Acasocy: Nuclear Regulatory portion of the reactor protection 5) stem Research. U.S. Nuclear Reetatory Commission.
to tv. vt stor mcMre tt:e trip t'realiers Commission. We shington. O C. 20555.
ACTiese Final rule.
Lhe t: 41 ATWS n.!e includes a Telephone (301) 441-76J1.
eq.t' ment for 6e installation of an sumasAavt lhe Commisalon is amending Paperwork Reduction Act Statement its regulauons to relax the frequency of 1
alterr ate shut.ilown system which.nust nc!.m the inp breakers l.
This final rule amends informanon participation by State and local collection requirements that are subject governmental authonties in emergency Additmnal b..ow of Commissioner to the Paperwork Reduction Act of1980 preparedness exercises at nuclear
^ " #'"'
(44 U S.C. 3501 et. seq.). These power reactor sites. This relaxation W hde I approve this rule. I would requirements were approved by the reflects expenence gained in observing
.Na.c rqutred automattart of the Office of Management and Badget and evaluarms over 150 emergency v.trv Uquid C wrol Sy stem (SLCS) approval number 315&0011.
preparedness exercises emco 1980.
.br as 506ng water reactors. In N cam August 6.1m Rer21atory Ffesibility Certification idditqn. 4hde I approve the elements roa cumvwas gesconesanoes cosetAct:
cf the :inal rule dadh.1g with future in acccrdance with the Reeslatory
%chaelT.Jamnochian. Accident Source teattars. I am not sa9sfied that Flexibihty Act of 1980. 5 U S C. 605tb).
Term Program Office. Office of Nuclear sufficient attention h is been gnen to the Commission hereby certifies that the gefu!atory Reseerth. U.S. Nuclear future reactors. It appaars that ru:a will not have a sientCrant e. cnomic Regulatory Comnussion. Washington.
@iiic. int, additicnal reducuans in the impact on a substanual numter cf sma!!
DC 20555 telephone (301)443-7615.
Ai% 3 nsa can be ach esed without entities. This rule atfects or.ly licersees mummy usecauana & W ncia" i esurmcu stable economic that own and upera'e naclear utiht.tien 21.1983. the Commission published in ecsts.i sah measurns are considered facihties hcensed under sections 10J the Federal Register a proposed rule d nna trie desgr4 phase. I behes e this and 104 of the Atomic Energy Act of relatmg to emergency preparedness ale suuld not be takan as a barner to 1954. as amended. These hcensees do exercises (48 FR 33307). The proposed f.ch*r cansideration of measures for not fall withm the def nition of small j
e mom h My ed
.uture reactors that can redece AT% S businesses set forth m section 3 of trie annual. full.ptrticipation exercise with a usk t !ow : hat achiaed by this rule.
S 11 Bus nes. t.15 S 632.or p
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\\ddi:.unal bews of Commissioner emer8ency plan are performed in a Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121.
Rnberts satisfactory manner dunna the annual in addition to specSi:u measures to Ust of Subjects in to CFR Part 50 exercise. FT.MA may recommend and reduce :he nsk from AT%S ev:nts. the Artitrust. C!a ssified information. Fire the NRC may find that another exercise Statement uf Caneranons w h.ch pres ention. Intergovernmental rela tions, with State and local government aCCCmdanies this ru:e directs licensees incorporanon by reference. Nuclear participation is not required for up to 2 ta " volar.teer" to implement a rehabihty power plants and reactors. Penalty, pars. The proposed rule did not.relsx in nsurance proitram for the Reictor inp Radiation protecuon. Reactor sitmg any manner the annual requirement for
% ste*1 cntena. and Reportmg and onsite exeresses that each heensee 18 The Reat. tor Tnp System is one of the recordkeepmg requirements.
required to conduct which include most ir portant safety systems at Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of exercismg the control room. technical
(
commercial nuclear power plants.
1954. as amended. the Energy support center. and emergency operat on facabty functions.
I 50.SC.120 July 31,1984
)
PART 50 o STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Immediately after the Commission governmental participauca la reduce the level of safetyf approved pubhcation of the proposed emergency pmparednese eneroen were Discvssion: A few commenters, rule, the Director of FEMA wrote to NRC en informauon service, environmental primanly citizene and govemmental Chairman Pa!!adino, urgmg the groups, a State Governor. State and organtastions. addrused this issue by Commiseton to -* *
- adopt biennial local governmental agencies. EPA and pointtna out that State and local exerctee frequencylanguage * * *"in10 private citizens.
emergency response organizations must CFR Part So, Appendix E to assure The comments raised several frequently respond to venous natural consieurney in the regulations.
eignificant issues, to which the and man.made emergencies. Die Comminion moponde se foUm continuum cireallife emergencin FEMA's final regulation. 44 CFR 3SIL emettlee8 Personnel. equipment.
publishedin the Federal Registar on Issue No. I communication networks and September 28.1983 (es FR 44332).
.Should the Commission adopt a organisational structures on a ftequent reduced State and local participation in biennial exercise frequency for State beefs.
emersency preparednese exercises to a and local sovernment participauon with ne following quota frora a comment frequency of once every 2 years. De a proviso for remedial exercises for the letter sumraarues this concern:
FEMA final rule is not consistent with correction of senous deficiencies rather while en emergency estueues at a sudeer the position taken by the Commission la than the exercise frequency contained in power plant may call for some procedures the NRC propond rule (an annual the pmposed rulef that om d.ffemndrom thou md under other frequency with a specific NRC finding Discussicx nie leaue wee addressed emergency ortuettone. many of the response necessary for relaxation). Die by many State and local governmental and evecennon messen will be euruler. if difference was a source of some concern comment letters whose concerne are not idenucal A myned of mope end miner to M agencies and to some of &e 8'nerely charactented by the following
"'8'"*'ee demand the meistennene of a commenters on the NRC proposed rule.
quote fmm the NA comment low fone o,fg, By respondans to asher troisedinthese ne }TMA reigulation requires that a vn_
State mthm the plume exposure The Mtc proposal will be deceit to einerseacy eituettone eudi as chemical opdle, adaumeter. For esemple obtecove critene the emergency response pereoanoi enu be pethway EPZ fully participate in an will need to be deve oped for use is reheereme many of the procedures they exercise every 2 years with no deteruuning whether State and local would use to the event of en emergency requirement on the return frequency at a governmente have perforised La e estisfactory situesson et a neclose power plant. Some specific este. Typically. therefore, a State enoush menner to warrent en exempuan esemples cd th procedures weeld inctede with Iwo sites might be expected to fully from the succeedans year's exercies. It enil be nouncence of approenete local authenties.
particaste in an exercise at a specific dimcult to apply such mtene to the selebbehang comununicehon Imke terwees site at 'eset every 4 years, a State mth neuefection of Steie end local sovern'nente, locat, reeional and siete emereency rnposee three estes. every 6 years: four estes.
The NRC proposal would create complex personnet and eveceanns er fiedme shelter situanone euca es what te do if some for the effected popalence, every 4 years: five estes, every 10 years, etc. Wherees. the enclosed NRC rule
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Commission Responser Because chans* stipulates that a State mthin the manner would eil sunedicoens beve to emergency response personnel at the
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plume exposure pathway EPZ fu!!y exercin the nest yeer or only the State and local govemment level particmate in an exercise every 2 yeare unseusfactery ones!If only the contmoously respond to actual with 6,eturn frequency of at least once uneeuefactory ones. en unworkable condition emergencies the Commission does not every 7 years at a specific site. Both would result wrierem some junedicoons consider that relaxmq the frequency of rules raquire a multi. site State, when not would he on annual and othere on biennial State and local government perticipation fully participetmg in an exercise at a frequency Nguaties would result. Funher, in emergency preparedness exercises specif c site.to partially participate g
a[ue ans would adversely affect the health and se gg, every 2 years at that specific site in State and locei governments to take safety of the public.
order 'o support the participation of the corrective actione. hee proved tune A provisaon has been added la the approt note local gavernments.
consumins in the past. If we add time for the final rule to permit State or local The Commission has selected a return Mtc to make e nndme after FD4A's govemment participanon in the frequency of 7 years because presently recommendauen. e sood portion of a yes' Ticensee's annual exercise. A State or no State hee more than 7 operating and/
could be consumed. nis would cause local govemment may consider its c
Stete ocal or planned reactore and States mth that n]and eb ijy response capability to be less than number of sites or less would not be optimal because of an unusually large requirt d to exercise in a full Comtmssion Responser De personnel turnover er becaose there particastion mode more often than Commission recastruses the have been hmated seeponses to ree!
about once a year. -
implementation dtificulties with the enerpncies un the comm.mity.no Enat proposed NRC approach (annual ruta requires the licenses to provide foe Mlic Comments.
frequency with a findmg to relax l.nia State or local govemment participanon The NRC proposed rule was published was pated out by the NRC emergency if they adkate such a desire.
In the Federal Register with a 00< lay preparednese regionalinspectots, a comment period on july 21.1983'(48 nt majonty of the comment letters.the Issue No. 3,
33307). Seventy one comment letters general thrust in two petitless for Will the deletion of NUREC4e64 eas were received and evaluated by the rulemaking ' and the ACRS-a footnote adversely affect the laterface between offsita emergency plana and NRC vaff.
lasue N the licensee's emergency plans?
Thee commenters (55) favoring Willless frequent exercises esult la Discussioa; The proposed nale relemmq tne frequency of State and local makin8 personnel and equipment less includen a provision to delete references governmental participation in effective or rel able and therefore emersency preparedness exercises were utilities, consulting firms representmg
'on Moroiit uus. on cmnemien reaewed a
.ceee.mase um e, seem ei es utsh es, two State Governore. State and Peanaa fa. r*8.=ame M'M-86881 f=a messoas e,,rta seson e Pubhc Docurnent RaoaL n* r H i
E"o'"l u'ne C'ommisesos remed a pentes fa"s=' a
'"'"""'"**'^**"'""*U"^
smt. m. wutunem o c ass c+n et local governmental agencies. EMA and to these hm og W WaW bee me g
pnvate citizens.
rwemama mumi from me wooni cesaret c,-,,,pm m %
I, Those commenters (14) opposing of the staie t.f sooth carahne ne secuni theset or
,,icee mer be eateinas by =ntine me usmoen, bee pe.ima ms me meuum enne troosacy si,,we,on commun% wunmcorL o c 'osas, relaung the frequency of State and local of emeyeacy p eparvenees eumose Anentson Pubhcanona Sa.ee Maneser.
50 SC 121 July 31,1984
I PART 50 o STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION 1
t to NUREC-case throughout the
- 3. Provides that at least once every r has evaluated approximately 150 regulations.NUREC esse provtdes yeare, all States withis the plume exercises. In only five instances did g-specific criterta for the evaluation of the exposure pathway EPZ of a given site FD4A determme that State and local eteodards la 8 50.47 and la titled, m.ust fully participate in an offette governments did not demonstrate "Cnteria for Fmpareden and Evalundes exercise for that setow adequate preparedness.ne of RadiologicalEmergency
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- 4. Requires licensees to provide sa Comnuseson beliesee that this enhanced p
Plans and Preparedness la Support of opportunity for State and local level of preperednesa should be Nuclear Plants." A few commenters, government participation in the recognized by allowmg State and local prfmartly a utility and a state licensees annual emergency govermnente to exercise lointly with govermoentalemclel felt that the preparedness exercies and utilities on a binennial frequency.
deletion of the NUREG eese footnote in
- 5. Requires FEMA to determine the On March 17.1982, the Commisalon the regulations would preclude its use cred for and extent of remedial nceived a petition for rulemaking by reviewere in deterinining the exercises.
[PRM-50-33) from National Emergency adequacy of emergency preparednese.
The final rule le not totally consistent Management Association.On August 30.
Commiss/ ort Response ne delegation with FEMA's final regulation (44 CFR 1962, the Comminion received a petition of a re'erence to NUREC 4sse will not 350). nis inconstetency lies in the area for rulemaking (PRM-80-34) from the effect its see as a guidance document for of return frequency for muluple.eite Adjutant General of the State of South emareency planning. la the teso states as previously discussed.no Carolme. De petition from the Nadonal rulemaking. the Commiselon istcluded FDdA position on return frequency is a Emergency Management Association this reference as a means of formally significant departure from the NRC's requested the NRC to relax the approving the noe of NUREC-osse. See proposed regulation (4e FR 33307) dated frequency of full participation by State 45 FR 55402. 5540s (August 19. tes0).
juiy 21.1983. The Commission believes and local governmenta in emergency NUPEG-eese is endorsed by Regulatory that more study is needed before preparednese exercises from annually to CuMe 1.101.' and wdl contmus to be deletion of the return fisquencF biennially. De petition from South used by reviewere in evaluating the requirement can be lust:5ed-Carchne requested that the NRC reduce ade uscy of emergency preparednaos at The Commission to adopting a the frequency with which local nucicar power reactor estes.
biennial exercies frequency for State governmenta must participate in a full
/sses Na 4 and local government participauon with scale emergency preparedneu exercies.
a provao for rernedial exercises to 3, p,,,,ilgation of this final rule f> adequate procedures exist for NRC essure the correction of eenous relaxes the frequency of full ana EMA to evahiate whether maior deficiences. These changes to the participation by State and local eierr area are performed satisfactorily emergency preparedness regulations are governments in emergency preparednese dwm an exeressei bems made because:
exercises from annually to biennially.
DocussuurMany commenters.
- a. Experience in oboarving and Die rule completes NRC action by pnm only State and local governmental evaluatmg over 150 exca:ises has shown sweimnties as wen as utilities, pomted that a disproportionate amount of Feriting both petitions for rulemaking.
(
out me there 6e a need for uniform Federal. State and local government and Flading of No Significant Enviremmental es e,. ertoe of exercise performana.
licensee resources are bems expended Impact In order to conduct and evaluate armuel C
e no Co nmission has determined comenters. In arder to provide for emergency pmparednesa exercises. As a under the National Environmental Policy enuit of the substantial expenditure of Act of 19ee, as amended, and the uniform evetuation of emergency r**0ufCe8 I0f th"*efCf8'e fe*ef premrednese exercises. FEMA has Cornmisoton's regulatione in Subpart A
""#C"*"*""*
- '*"I*
dewtoped and now voes a document
. of to CFR Part St. that this rule la not a mamtein the essential day-to-day motor Federal action etsnificantly titled "Procedes al Policy on Radiological
'i Emersency Preparedness Plan Reviews.
Upgraded state of emergency affectma the quahty cf the human Exerr.:se Observations and Evaluations preparedness.
, enytronment and therefore an and intertm Findings." nese
- b. State and local governments environmental impact statement le not procedures were forwarded to the respond to a variety of actual reqmred. See to CFR 51.20(a)(1).
FEMA regions for use on August 5,1983.
emergencies on a contmums basia, thus Moreover, the Commission has Having considered all commente frequently exercisms their emergency detarmmed, pursuant to 10 CFR 51J2.
recewed. experience gamed since 1900, preparednese capabilities, thatthe final rule has no significant input from emergency preparednese
- c. De flexibility provided for in a environmen'al impact. Hjo regionalinspectore, the general thrust of biennial frequency will be an incentive determmation has been made because two petitions for rulemaking, and ACRS for State and lar,al governmenta to the Commnoion cannot identify any I
comments, the Commisalon has perform in a satisfactory manner in impact on the human environment l
concluded that the requiremente for order to avoid conductma remedial ase cisted wuh mducm3 the fmquency of full parDcipation of State and local freqtency of participation by State and exercises.
g vernmente m emergency pmparednese locai governmental authortties in And lastly the Commiselon notes that emergency paredness exercises ytMA has had s!most 3 years of
- $*,'i pp,,
around nuc ear power reactore abould espenence with evaluatmg State and considered in this rulemaking be ra'ssed. De Commission therefore le local government radiological eed promdgeting a final rule which:
emergency planning and preparedness.
Tor armuel full
- 1. Cortinues to require limneees to With few exceptions, this experience participation exercise with a provision conduct an annual onsite emergency has revealed a significant increase in to enable relaxation to every 2 years.
preparednese exercise, the level of State and local government 2.To incorporate by reference mto the
- 2. Requires that State and local radiological preparedness as NRC*a regulations, the FEMA gowmmente participate in emergency demonstrated m joint exercises. FEMA regulatione govermns the frequency of preprednese exercises every 2 years full participation of State and local wits a provtsion for remedial exercisee 7
to aerare that deficiencies are conected.
,,,,, g,,#,%,,,a,e tieme deve. aped governmente in ernergency preparednese cwo u, tu emrmunm b mee i far. and exercises.
July 31,1964 50 SC.122 i
1
I PART 50 o STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION g
3.To relas the frequency of fun Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of capacity is available to assure the safe participedon of State andlocal 1964, as amended, the Energy disposal of all high. level radioactive (j".'N governments is emergency r, _ _ ' ---
Reorganisation Act of1g74. as amended, waste and spent fuel and section saa and 563 oflitle 5 of the (4) no Commieston finds reasonable exercisse from annusuy to bienalauy.
here were no sevtraamantalimpacts United States Code.nouco is hereby assurance that. If necewery, spent fuel idenuned fme any of the alternatives given that the following amendment to generated in any reactor can be stored comeldered.
Title 10. Chapter L Code of Federal ufely and without significant Because FEMA is directly involved in Regulations. Part 80 is published as a environmentalimpacts for at least 30 the evaluettee of offsite emergency document subject to cod 1Bcatice, years beyond the expiration of that A ' -. exercises and is effected reactor's operating licenses et that hy the promulseuen of these reactor's spent fuel storegs basin, or et amendments bNRCconsulted either anstte or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.
- mtensively with FEMA during b 88FR 3d888 (5)no Comnussion finds reasonable i
developoset of this rule
- Pupense stai/sa assurance that esfe independent onette C
J_ Eeducelos Act Statement or offset opent fuel storage will be made ave able if such storage capacity is ne final rule contains no information 10 CFR Porta 50 and 31 needed.
collection requirements and therefore is
!" k"E "I "i*h i ***"II"'"I '8 l
not subject to the requirements of the Waste Conf!dence Cecialen issue a rule providing procedures for Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980(44 UAC 3801 et esq.).
Asesect: Nuclear Regulatory constdering environmental effects of Commiselon.
extended onelte storage of spent fuelin eguisamry W Actiosc Final Weste Confidence IIC'"*ms prWaa-the Commluton f a issuing, elsewhere in this issue. final h t nannt aaa has prepared a Decision.
amendments to 10 CPR Ports 30 and St.
regulatory analysis of this regulation.
h analysis examines the costs and suesesaav:De Nuclear Regulatory poa pusmeen tosponesafiose coerracTt benefits of b rule as considered by b Commisoton snitiated a rulemakms Dennis Rathbun or Clyde Jupiter. Office Commission. A copy of the regulatory proceeding on October 25.1979 to aseees of Policy Evaluation. UA Nuclear analysis is avellable for inspection and genencedy the dooree of soeurance now Regulatory Commiselon. Washington, available that radioactive weete can be D.C. 20555. telephone (202) 834-3298. or copyms, for a fee, at the NRC Pubtfc Docurnent Room 1717 H Street NW.,
safely disposed of. to determine when Sheldon Tnibatch. Office of the General Wash:ngton. DC. Single copies of the such disposal of off site storage wtlkbe Counsel. UA Nuclear Regulatory avetlable, and to determine whether Commiselon. Washington. D.C. 20855:
analyets may be obtained from Michael radioactive westes can be safely stored telephone (202) 634-3224.
T.Ja:Plaa Office of Nuclear on site past the expiretton of existing N ca=iaila='a='s Decision Regulatomy Research. UA Nuclear facility licenue until off site disposal or Regu2atory Commiseloe. Washinston.
storsse is avetlable, nie proceedm; In the AforterofRf/l.EMAKINGon DC 20555. Telephone (301) 443-7615.
became known ae the " Waste the Storage and DisposalofNuclear gegug e.,y leadduty CerdScadse Confidence Rulemaking* and was Weste (Weste Confidence Rulemo/ung) p conducted partlaUy in response to a
{PR-aa -61 H4 FR e13721)
In accordance with the Regulatory remand by the UA Court of Appeals for g*
Flexibdity Act of1980. 5 UAC. 806(b).
the D.C Circust. State of Afinnesota v.
Ca*#888 the Commission hereby cert 1 flee tAst NRC 6021' 2d 412 (1979). The this final rule will not, if promulgated.
Commission also stated that in the event comoueston's decision have s slanificant economic impact on a it determined that on.stte storage of Addendum to the docteum substantial number of small entittee. The opent fuel would be necouary or AFP'"d5 t
final rule clattfies certain elements and appropriate after the expiration of Deciolos findmte necouary for the leeuence of an facthty licenges. it would propose a rule h I M ucdos operstmg !! cense for a nuclear power addressing the environmental and safety plant licensed pursuant to sections 103 implications of such storese.
J.J Imtiotion of the Weste Confidence and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of no Commiselon's dectaton is Rulemoking Proceeding I
1964, as amended. 42 UAC 2133,2134b.
summarised in the following findings:
In response to the tcmand of the UA h electric utility companies which (1) The Commission finds reasonable Court of Appeals for the District of own and operate nuclear power plants assurance that safe disposalof high Columbia Circuit (State ofMinnesota v are dominant in their servios areas and level radioactive waste and opent fuelin NRC. 802 F.2d 412 (1979)), and as a do not fellwithin the deAnittee of a a mined geologic repository la continuati n of prevtous pmceedings small business found in Sectice a of the technically fusible.
8 mall Businees Act.15 UAC, ess, or (2) The Commluton finds reasonable
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g within the Small Businees Sise anurance that one or more mined Standards set forth in la CFR Part 121.
geologic repoettortes for commercial
$",*,"ber 25.
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f Accoraingly, there is no significant high-level radioactive weste and spent Propoud Rulemaking, the Commission economicimpact on a substantial fuel will be available by the yeare 2007-stamd bt 6 ** purpose of diis number of small setf ties under the
- 09. and that sufficient repository g, gy g Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, capacity will be available within 30 genencally tne degree of assurance now h of Subjecein se CFR Part se fp*,"rs aveilable that radioactive wsete can be 11 ne t po of e safely disposed of. to determine when Antitrust, Classified information. Fire commercial hfsh level radioactive wsete such disposal or off-site atorage will be prevention. Incorporation by reference, and spent fusi originating in such available, and to determine whe:her Intergovernmental relations. Nuclear reactor and generated up to that time.
radioactive wastes can be safely stored power plants and reactors. Penalty.
(3) The Comnussion finde reasonable on-site past the expiration of existing aseurance that high-level radioactive
(
Radlauon protection. Reactor siting facility licensee until off site disposal or 8'
storage is available/* The Commieston
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t The "TRUE FACTS" about Nuclear Power "Both man and nature are completely safe.
The huge reactor l-is housed in a concrete silo, and it has environmental protection
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systems. Even if the incredible should happen, the automatic h y cd control systems would snut down the reactor in a matter of seconds.
The plant has emergency core cooling systems and many other 1
tecnnological safety systems and designs." (1)
"The odds of a meltdown are one in 10,000 years.
The plants have safe and reliable controls that are protected from any breakdown with three safety lines.
The lines operate independently."(2)
"The environment is also securely protected.
Hermetically sealed buildings, closed cycles for technological processes with radioactive agents, and systems for purification and harmless waste disposal preclude any discharge into the external environment.
" Nuclear plants are ecologically much cleaner than (coal-burning) plants that curn huge quantities of fossil fuel." (2)
"Even before the first (nuclett) unit was started up, mobile laboratories recorded the natural radiation background within 30 miles of the plant.
They tested the flora and fauna, the air and water. Every year since then the same tests have been made and the results compared.
The reactors have in no way affected the health of the environment.
The (nuclear) station is ecologically pure." (3)
" Robots and computers have taken over a lot of operations.
Nonetheless, the occupational dafety and nealth agency requires that all personnel strictly aDice my the rules and regulations.
In order to hold a joD here, ycu have to know (nuclear) safety rules to perfection and pass an exam in them every year." (4)
" Working at a nuclear plant is safsr than driving a car."(5)
"There is more emotion in fear of nuclear power plants than real danger" (6)
"In the 30 years since the fi:st nuclear poaer plant opened, there has not been a single instance ahen plant personnel or nearDy residents have been seriously threatened; not a single disruption in normal operation occurred that would have resulted in the contamination of the air, nater or soil.
The dose of raciation from a nuclear poner plant is rougnly pne-thousandth of the natural background radiation.
Thorough stuoles... have proved completely that nuclear power plants do not affect the nealtn of the population, including the incidence of (cancer), to say notning of genetic defects." (7)
REFERENCES:
(1) Nikolai Femin, Chief Engineer, Chernocyl Nuclear Power Station, Soviet Life, February, 1986. (2) Vitaly Sklyarov, Minister of Power of tne Ukraine, Soviet Life, same date. (3) Vladimir KoroDeinikov, Chief Ecologist, Chernobyl. (4) Pyotr Bondarenko, Shift Supervisor, Chernobyl. (5) Bondarenko (6) Boris Chernov', turDine op-erator, Chernobyl. (7) Priroca, Russian government magazine, reprinted in Soviet Life, February, 1986, from which all the acove 6 Q upWSQ The (...)
in reference 7 are PLACES IT SAYS THESE ARE RUSSIAN STUDIES.
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STATEMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA TO THE-U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION THURSDAY, JANUARY 8, 1987 Good afternoon.
My name is Karen Long.
I am representing the Attorney General of North Carolina.
Let me thank you for allowing the North Carolina Attorney General as intervenor and as an interested government entity to speak to you this afternoon.
I realize time is of the essence so I will attemot to confine my remarks to 3 minutes.
As a representative of Attorney General Lacy Thornburg of North Carolina I am here to make the common sense observations which can sometimes get lost in the maze of technical and procedural details entailed in licensing a nuclear olant.
I speak for the Attorney General of North Carolina and through him for a host of people--many of whom do not belong to any of the organized intervenors present today--who have contacted our office by telephone, letter and personal visits expressing a deep, genuine and continuing concern about the adecuacy of Shearon Harris' construction and evacuation plan.
First, the decision to license a nuclear plant is not solely a technical one.
That is why the Atomic Energy Act vested authority to license to this Commission, and why this Commission after Three Mile Island now meets and discusses all kinds of details before delegatina the authority to license a new plant to NRR.
4.
.\\ Second, why delegate that decision today to the technical staff when there are at least three and perhaps more pending but unanswered questions about this plant?
One - our understanding is that the investigation of allegations presented by an anonymous person in a 2.206 petition filed October 17, 1986 is not yet finished.
While the Attorney General is pleased at the seriousness with which Region II is currently pursuing these allegations, our understandinq is that at least two pieces of the investigation have yet to be finished.
One is the chemical analysis of certain materials alleged to have been substituted for cuality assured materials.
My understanding based on conversations of Friday, January 3 and Tuesday, January 6 with Region II is that this analysis is being done by the Applicant Company and final results are heretofore unavailable.
When they will be available is uncertain.
While the allecation may be entirely unsubstantiated when the analysis returns or while analysis may indicate materials used are of suf ficient specification to be safely used, the fact is that at this moment the results are not known.
Another is a paper audit of alleged bogus work packages which will probably not be finished, we have been told, until the end of January.
I 4
N Two, the decision to grant the Company a waiver from your regulation requiring a full participation emergency exercise within a year prior to commercial licensing seems to us to be a bit hurried given the level of current dissatisfaction with the plan.
Most especially, parents of children who go to school within the EPZ and who go to school immediately outside the EPZ have told us and others they do not believe the plan is adequate and fully intend to go to the affected schools and get their children out.
The current plan does not adequately deal with this reality.
Three, the Company's experience in running this plant is limited at the moment.
As we speak, they have been critical 5 days.
Region II informs me that your technical staf f is not even prepared to evaluate the Company's initial performance in operating the plant at 5% until next Monday, January 12th.
I do not doubt that the goal of the Company, the NRC and the Attorney General of North Carolina is the same in this instance--
to make absolutely certain that the public is reasonably assured that the plant has been built safely, can be operated safely, and that in the event of an evacuation, those most at risk--children-
-can be adequately protected.
For this reason, the Attorney General requests that you delay delegating your authority or at the very minimum that you explicitly require NRR to have answered these issues before it tssues a full power license.
Tsstimony of Jane Sharp, Conservation Council of North Carolina January 8, 1987 Before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of United States REASONS FOR DELAYING LICENSING OF SHEARON HARRIS NUCIEAR PLANT UNTIL FURTHER HEALTH STUDIES ARE COMFIElED CP&L's safety record at its existing Brunswick Nuclear Plant is one of the poorest 1.
in the nation. It had the largest fine ever levied in 1983-84 for safety violations.
2.
Low level wastes were buried in the municipal landfin near Brunswick, and were or-dered removed, but not until after radioactivity had leached out into adjacent waters.
Data from the Public Data Access Inc., 30 Irving Place, NY, 10003-(212)529-0890 3
show increases in au cancer mortality rates in counties surrounding North Carolina's nuclear plants, in the period 1975-82 versus 1%5-69, but Onslow County near the Brunswick plant showed a 94.9% increase: Duplin a 517% increase, and Pender* 32 5%.
This was far above the national average, the average for nuclear counties, and 4.
the North Carolina average increase in cancer mortality from 1%5-69 to 1975-82.
(Council on Economic Priorities - Newsletter, December 1986 (No. N86-12) 5.
Further, the North Carolina cancer mortality rate increase for this period was the highest in the nation,1.374, expressed as a ratio of change.
Pb2 - 4 NpJ D ON IMWM 4% R 6.
The $6.5 binion cap agreed to in the last session of Congress by 3 House panels 3
and the Senate Environment Committee could not be passed by the Congress: yet the damage for a full melt-down is estimated at up to $100 billion by Gofman and others.
7.
The nuclear industry claims emissions of 0.1 minirems_ per person per year from i
" properly operating nuclear plants": yet they energetically resist lowering the 4
allowed exposure from 170 mr per person / year. Why?
8.
The 5000 minirems allowed workers (often stated 5 rems) per year is often exceeded, and the 500 minirems anowed for the seneral public is under pressure to be in-creased to the same 5000 for workers by soiae nuclear proponents.
Yet the July 1986 proceedings of the US National Academy of Science article by 9.
Waldren et al notes that the effect of a low dose of radiation is more than 200 j
times that previously assumed on the basis of high dose studies.
Rosalie Berte11's book "No Immediate Danger" documents escalating radiation levels I
10.
worldwide that have already caused over 16 million casualties, including increased infant mortality, mental retardation, congenital malformations, genetic diseases such as asthma, arthritis, and allergies, as well as damaged immune systems.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission iteelf estimated after Chernobyl and TMI that 11.
the chance of a major meltdown in USA before the year 2000 is 45, ranging from 6% to 95 for various types of reactors under various management scenarios.
- 12. Such an event would imperil further minions of innocent unborn human beings for a plant that is not needed--we already have a 30% extra-power " safety-margin" in the country, but need only 15-20% for prudence-and that has substantial unre-solved safety defects, with more coming to our attention almost weekly, at present.
Far from benefitting permanently from the lessons of TMI and Chernobyl, "the ac-13 tual operating experience of our existing plants and the industry's failure to i
l heed the lessons of experience [acrg care, less haste = safer plant _s/ indicate that we can expect to see another serious accident in this country in the next 20 years... resulting in 10's of binions of dollars property losses and injur-j l
ies to the public" said NRC's own Commissioner Asselstine. We agree.
l
Sharp - Safsty & Hen 1th Concerns - Shearon Harris - 1/8/87 page 2 14 Even without a serious accident, the " normal emissions" of a " properly operating" plant are such that 9000 excess deaths per year are postulated from the 175 nuclear counties in USA, defined as those with reactors + 2-3 down-wind adjacent counties, subject to fall-out (See reference No. 4) i 15 We know that male sterility and prostate cancer are both risings we have to use all kinds of stratagens today for childless couples who want babies.
-16.
We know that our SAT scores are fallings and the need for care for handicapped infants and children is growing.
- 17. Last June our Raleigh newspaper ran a small piece: " America is losing the War on Cancer". Must the loss continue, or will you help us reverse it?
- 18. Even the rising costs of electricity as we struggle to pay for these unnecessary dangerous, over-priced plants are a health hazard, as our poorer fami1*es are forced to buy less nourishing, less protective foods, because heating and cooking i
costs are so high.
CP&L has already filed for a 14)G rate increase for Shearon Harris, before low-power testing is completed, and before full power licensing has occurred, and intends to file another similar increase in September 1987.
- 19. The stress involved in wondering if every siren one hears may mean a nuclear emergency--if one may have to leave home and all possessions forever--will also take a toll on citizens' immune systems, and normal healing processes. A number of claims for chemical and/or radiation damaaes have been naid for stress manifesting in one way or another.
- 20. The trends of d===-e from low level nuclear rnM= tion from conventional nuclear operations are now fully as clear as are damages from cotton dust, cigarettes, automobile emissions, acid rain, coal particulates, PCB's, DDT, and kepones--
all of which have been banned, reduced, controlled -- and importantly--admitted.
21.
It is time for the nuclear industry, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Congress, and state and local governments to protect the health and welfare of our people as they are charged to do-----and to reverse this. life-threatening trend.
The place to start is with Shearon Harris-not the last American nuclear plant to be ' licensed, but the first to be denied a license because it is too l
much already.
l 22.
Nuclear waste, produced by nuclear power plants, is as great a time bomb as the genetic mutations we are creating by permitting these plants.
Shearon Harris is planned for waste storage for both of CP&L's other plants, Brunswick I and II and Robinson, in South Carolina.
Even if Harris were not to operate, present plans for high level waste storage in a new, untried plant, with a number of new inexperienced workers is dangerous and unacceptable to local people.
23 Minimizing transportation of wastes has usually been one of the guidelines for waste management technology, in most plans. The balance between keeping spent fuel rods at the plants that generate them versus shipping them to Shearon Harris would be nearly even, in terms of which plant would be safer. But the loading and unloading of dozens of fuel bundles, from cooling pool, to casks, to trucks or trains, and back into new pools makes greater danger than keeping them where they are.
and immediately initiating conservation and load management measures to allow other power plants, add CP&L's formerly planned coal plant with adequate scrubbers and filters to supply the decreasing loads we exnect when the next price increase occurs.
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