ML20091D452

Control of Heavy Loads

ML20091D452
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	05/31/1984
From:	NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20091D451	List: B11170, Forwards Response to Auxiliary Systems Branch Draft SER Open Items ASB-10 & ASB-11 Re Control of Heavy Loads ML20091D452
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8405310233
Download: ML20091D452 (37)

Text

.

~

y. L

.-2

!i - ,

O' ...=,

4 6 A CONTROL 0F HEAVY LOADS

'O

.O -

d-L

, Northeast Utilities Service Company ,

May 1984 a

4 mumrama,

.E .PDR

r TABLE OF CONTENTS 7% .Section- Pg Introduction 1 Purpose 2 Response to NRC Letters 2 LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title

' 1. Crane Heavy Load List and Lif ting Devices 2 . Comparison of Requirements of ANSI N14.6 g

3- Load Drop and Impact Analysis i-j; LIST OF FIGURES j

j Figure

! No. Title i

l '

• 1 Control of Heavy Loads - Containment (Vessel Head Removed)

2 Control of Heavy Loads - Containment (Vessel Head in Place)

[ 3 Control of Heavy Loads - Fuel' Building (Shipping Cask Crane)

l. 4 Control of Heavy Loads - Fuel Building (New Fuel Handling Crane) 5~ 5 Control of Heavy Loads - Fuel Building (Receiving Decontamination

_ Crane) 1.

6 Control of Heavy Loads - Auxiliary Building (Lower Elevation)

} 7- Control of Heavy Loads - Auxiliary Building (Upper Elevation) l' l'

i l-11

This report is in response to NRC letters of December 22, 1980, and

- February 3, 1981, requesting information concerning the handling of heavy f loads at Millstone 3. Specifically, the reference letters requested

\ information from Applicants for operating licenses via Enclosure 3. This report is intended to address Items 2.1 through 2.4 of Enclosure 3 as required.

2.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, identifies several general guidelines related to the design and operation of overhead load-handling systems in the areas where spent fuel in stored, in the vicinity of the reactor core, and in other areas of the plant where a load drop could result in damage to equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

Information provided in response to this section should identify the extent of potentially hazardous load-handling operations at a site and the extent of conformance to appropriate load-handling guidance.

2.1.1 Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all_ overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or heat removal taking no credit for any interlocks, Technical Specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis.

Response

. APPLICABLE OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS Eguipment No. Identification Location 3MHR-CRN1 Polar Crane Containment 3MHF-CRN1 Spent Fuel Shipping Cask Trolley Fuel Building 3HHF-CRN2 New Fuel Handling Crane Fuel Building 3NHF-CRN3 New Fuel Receiving Crane Fuel Building 3NHF-CRN4 Fuel Building Decontamination Fuel Building Crane 3 HHP-CRN1 Auxiliary Building Filter Handling Auxiliary Building Crane /Honorail 3 HHP-CRN2A,B,C Auxiliary Building Charging Pump Auxiliary Building Trolley

(-) Reactor Plant Component Cooling Auxiliary Building Water Heat Exchanger Honorail k

v 1

2.1.2 Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above

, category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation

/

) from any load-impact point and any safety-related components to

(#/'

permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

Response

EXCLUDED OVERHEAD LOAD liANDLING SYSTEMS Mark No. Identification and Reason 3 Milt-CRN-1A,B Turbine Room Traveling Crane - This crane is located in the turbine building which does not contain any safety-related equipment or systems.

3 Mitt-CRN-2 Condenser Waterbox Removal lloist Arrangement - This crane is located in the turbine building which does not contain any safety-related equipment or systems.

3MiiT-CRN-3A,B Turbine Building Strainer Removal Trolley - This trolley is located in the turbine building which does not contain any safety-related equipment or systems.

3MHT-CRN-1 Waste Disposal Building Crane - This crane is located in the waste disposal building which does not. contain any

, safety-related equipment or systems.

/ ,\

( '"

) 3MHT-CRN-3 Auxiliary Building and Waste Disposal Building Filter llandling Monorail - This monorail is in the waste disposal building which does not contain any safety-related equipment or systems and the auxiliary building where a load drop would not result in damage to any system or equipment required for normal plant shutdown.

3MilJ-CRN-4 Waste Disposal Building Demineralizer Removal Holst -

This hoist is located in the waste disposal building which does not contain any safety-related equipment or systems.

3MIIJ-CRN-SA,B Waste Disposal Building Equipment flatch Trolley - This trolley is located in the waste disposal building which does not contain any safety-related equipment or systems.

3MilZ-CRN- 1 Service Building Machine Shop Crane - This crane is in the service building which does not contain any safety-related equipment or systems.

I O )

\ r

\_j 2

i Mark No. Identification and Reason I p 3MHZ-CRN-2 Machine Shop Decontamination Area Trolley - This trolley is located inside the service building which does not j

t

( contain any safety-related equipment or systems.

j 3HMZ-CRN-3 Machine Shop Weld Area Trolley - This trolley is inside l the service building which does not contain any safety-related equipment or systems.

3MHW-CRN-1 Lateral Stop-Log and Trash Cart Monorail - This monorail is located inside the pump house where a load drop would not result in damage to any system or equipment required i for normal plant shutdown.

3MHW-CRN-2 Main Stop-Log Hoint Arrangement - This monorail is in the pump house where a load drop would not result in damage to any system or equipment required for normal plant shutdown.

i 3MHW-CRN-3 Pump House Auxiliary Hoist - This hoist is located in the pump house in an area where a load drop would not result in damage to any systeri or equipment required for normal plant shutdown.

3MHS-CRN-B1 Spent Fuel Bridge and Holst - This crane is located in the fuel building. The maximum load this crane will lift is a fuel element with its handling tool. This, by l

t p)

V definition (NUREG-0612), is not classified as a heavy load.

3MHR-CRN-2 Sigma Refueling Machine - This crane is located inside the reactor containment building. The maximum load this crane will lift is a fuel element with its handling tool. This, by definition (NUREG-0612), is not classi-fled as a heavy load.

3MHR-CRN3A-D Steam Generator Wall Jih Crane - The travel area of these fixed cranes is such that they cannot carry heavy loads over or near the reactor vessel.

3MHJ-CRN-3 Auxiliary Building / Waste Disposal Building Filter Handling Honorail - This monorail is located in the auxiliary and waste disposal buildings in an area where a load drop would not result in damage to any system or equipment required for normal plant shutdown.

3MHP-CRN-3 Auxiliary Building Equipment Hatch Trolley - This trolley is located in the auxiliary building in an area where a load drop would not result in damage to any system or equipment required for normal plant shutdown.

3MHR-CRN-4,5 Steam Generator Access Platform Jib Crane - This crane f( is equipped with a load cell, trolley travel limit switch and boom rotation limit switch to limit the load i \ lift over the refueling cavity area to 1800 pounds.

l 3

."~%

'~'

2.1.3 With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load-handling systems in the containment and the spent fuel pool area and those load-handling systems identified in 2.1.1 above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1. The following specific information should be included in your reply 2.1.3a Drawings or sketches suf ficient to cicarly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel, and safety-related equipment.

Response

Figures I through 7 identify, as much as practical, the location of safe load paths, spent fur 1, and safe shutdown equipment in the areas of concern.

The safe load paths shown on these figures will not be permanently marked on the plant flooring. This is due to the possibility that when loads are being moved, the flooring may be covered with disposable polyvinyl sheeting.

In lieu of the permanent markings a supervising load director will be availabic to verify the load path and help direct the crane operator.

2.1.3b A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling opera-tion remain within safe load paths, including procciures, if any, for deviation from these paths.

m l }i Response Administrative procedures will include the general guidelines and evaluation requirements of NUREG-0612. Load-handling operational procedures will be written au necessary to ensure compliance with the N1'Sco submittal to NUREG-0612. The safe load paths shown in this report will be used as the load-handling paths. Any deviation from these operational procedures will require an approved procedural change.

2.1.3c A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verification that the handling of such loac* is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(2).

Response

Table 1 provides a list of heavy loads that will be carried by each crane along with any designated lifting devices, procedures for the lifting of heavy loads will incorporate the guidance of NUREG-0612.

2.1.3d Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.1.3c above comply with the requirements of ANSI-N14.6-19/8 or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supple-es mented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4) or 5.1.l(5), are not met,

[j}

(

describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.

4

Responses d The two special lifting devices listed in Table 1, the reactor vessel head litting device and the upper internals lifting rig assembly, were both designed prior to the publishing of ANSI N14.6-1978. ANSI N14.6-1978, American National Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 pounds or More for Nuclear Materials, contains detailed requirements for the design, fabrication, testing, maintenance and quality assurance of special lifting devices. To demonstrate compliance with this document, a detailed comparison of the original design, fabrica-tion, testing, maintenance and quality assurance requirements with those of ANSI N14.6 is necessary.

Therefore, the ANSI N14.6 document has been reviewed in detail and compared to the requirements used to design and manufacture the reactor vessel head lift ris, the reactor vessel internals lift rig, load cell, and the load cell linkage. This comparison is listed in Table 2.

As can be seen in Table 2, Section 3.2 of ANSI N14.6 contains the require-ments for use of stress design factors of 3 and 5 for allowable yield and ultimate stresses respectively for maximum shear and tensile stresses.

Westinghouse la currently performing a detailed stress . report to document the degree of compliance of the Millstone 3 lift rigs listed above to these requirements. This analysis is identical in nature to numerous other analyses completed by Westinghouse on lift rigs of similar design. Based on

-the results of those analyses previously performed, the following results are expected:

1. The reactor vessel head lift rig, load cell and load cell linkage at Millstone 3 are nearly identical to those previously analyzed. In all cases, those previously analyzed met the requirements of ANSI N14.6, Section 3.2. Therefore, the requirements for Millstone 3 are expected to conform to these requirements.

2. The reactor vessel internals lift rig at Millstone 3 is not identi-cal in design to those previously analyzed, but many similarities exist. Based on these similarities and past analyses, most but not all of the requirements of ANSI N14.6, Section 3.2 are expected to be met. Nowever, as pointed out in past analyses, the stress calculations will be based on lifting the lower internals. The lower ~ internals are only removed when a periodic inservice inspec-tion is required. Before lifting the lower internals all fuel is removed. As a result, the concern for handling over fuel is non-existant. Normal use of the rig is for handling the upper internals only. The upper internals are approximately one-half the weight of the lower internals. Thur, the stress induced while handling the upper internals would be approximately one-half of that to be analyzed handling the lower internals. Therefore, the handling of the upper' internals is expected to comply with ANSI N14.6, Section 3.2.

5

f '^ S The Applicant concludes that Table 2, with the clarification provided above f I

on Section 3.2, shows that the Westinghouse designed special lift rigs meet the intent of ANSI N14.6. The formal stress report will be provided in October 1984.

For Section 5.2 requirements, the acceptance test actually used was a load lift of 125 percent of the design, inspection for any deformation, and nondestructive testing of welds.

The requirements of Section 5.3 for a 150 percent load test or dimensional testing and nondestructive testing of the lif ting riga is considered imprac-tical due to the space limitations and cleanliness requirements in contain-ment. In lieu of these requirements, written procedures will be developed requiring the special lift devices he attached to their respective loads, lif ted a maximum of 6 inches and held for ten minutes prior to any further movement.

2.1.3e Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with renpect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.

Response

Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures will comply with the

[h

( )

intent of the guidelines of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2. Should any deviations from this standard be required, they will be equivalent to the D' requiremente of ANSI B30.2-1976.

2.1.3f Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards are not provided.

Response

The containment polar crane (3MHR-CRNI), the spent fuel shipping cask trolley (3MHF-CRNI), the new fuel receiving crane (3MHF-CRN3), and the decontamination area cranc (3MHF-CRN4) have been designed to meet the -

criteria and guidelines of CMAA-70, Specification for Electrical Overhead Traveling Cranes, and ANSI B30.2-1967. Although these crancs have been designed to the 1967 ANSI standard, they have been reviewed for compliance with the 1976 standard and there are no significant dif ferences between the two ANSI standards which would affect the operation of the crancs. The new fuel handling crane (3MHF-CHN2) has been designed to comply with the guide-lines of CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976.

The balance of the load-handling devices are not crancs, so CHAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 were not used in their design. Instead, ANSI B30.11,

[ i Standard Monorail System and ifnderhung Crancs, and ANSI B30.16, Standard (v) Overhead lloists, were used.

6

t

[m(

2.1.33 Exceptions, operator training, qualification, and: conduct.

if any, taken to ANSI 100.2-1976 with respect to

Response

An open stor training program is currently being developed and, along with operator qualification and conduct, will be consistent with the intent of ANSI R30.2-1976.

2.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS IN THE VICINITY OF FUEL STOMAGE p0OLS '

NUMEG 0612, Section 5.1.2, provides auidelines concerning the desian and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of stored, spent fuel. Information provided in response to this section should demon-strate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop' which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I throuah !!!.

2.2.1 Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes phystem11y capable (i.e., isnoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stopo, or operating prescedures) of carrying loads, which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool. l n

Mesponse:

Name New Fuel Handling Caanc '

Typer Overhead Bridge, Multiple Girder. Electric Crane Capacity: 10 Tons Equipment Designation 3MilF f;8N2 2.2.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area f rom the above catenary by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy lands or are permanently prevented f rom movement of the hook center-lien closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that for any failure mode, no heavy load can fall into the fuel storage pool.

Mesponse .

i

1. Spent Fuel Bridge 1. Holst (1HMS CNNNI)

The only load handled by' this crane will be a spent fuel assembly and

, its handlina tool. This, by definition of NUMEG 0612, will exclude this crai.e from further discussion.

I

2. Decontamination Area Crane (3nHF CNN4)

This crane is excluded because it is physically incapable of carrying

(

p y heavy loads over or near the spent fuel pool.

l (/ ,

i i

(x :

F s

~ "?

I

.. w

3. New Fuel Receiving Crane (3MHF-CRN3) d

• This crane is excluded because it is physically incapable of carrying heavy loads over the spent fuel pool.

' Spent Fuel' Shipping Cask Trolley (3MHF-CRN1)

([4.

This crane is excluded because it is physically incapable of carrying heavy loads over the spent fuel pool. Also, an analysis has determined that- a cask. drop to the head laydown shelf at elevation 25 feet-9 inches,_ resulting from the cask striking the corner at

,q s -elevation 52 feet-4 inches and . tumbling into the water filled cask j g- storage and loading area, could result in the cask damaging the west f ky* V W F wall of the spent . fuel pool. Installation. of an energy absorption g

.O device will ~ preclude the possibility of the cask tumble accident from damaging the spent fuel pool. Based upon this corrective action,.it is concluded that a postulated drop or tumble of the shipping cask will

.k

n

.not affect the integrity of the fuel pool.

2.2.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.2.1 above which you have evaluated 3 ,: as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a s load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for . this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable

'; alternative or additional design features). For each . crane so

1. evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load- '

combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

Y,( /

Response

9 d;  ;&

r5%There are no cranes in this category in the fuel building.

k f,-

{ Uj 4 2.2.4 For cranes identified in 2.2.1 above, not categorized according to

' 4k (

7 2.2.3, demonstrate that ~ the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 are

' satisfied. Compliance with Criteria IV will be demonstrated in C' . response to Section.2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I

, through III, 'privide a discussion of -your evaluation of crane

, operation in . the spent fuel . area and your determination of com-

_.Q pliance. This response should include the following information for each crane:

?. 2.4a Which alternatives (e.g., 2, 3, or _4) from those identified in.

NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.2, have been. selected.

9, ]esponse:

n .e- ~

[ Alternative 3 has been- selected . for the new fuel handling crane identified

• t S

- A in Section 2.2.1.

lt

\

.3 A e

m,

• y 8 li q

, g y,

• A

'a. , t

(~N 2.2.4b If Alternative 2 or 3 is selected, discuss the crane motion limita-( ) tion imposed by e10ttrical interlocks or mechanical stops and v' indicate the circumstances, if any, under which these protective devices may bc bypassed or removed. Discuss any administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of bypass or removal, and provide any related or proposed Technical Specification (operaticnal and surveillance) provided to ensure the operability of such electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.

Response

The new fuel handling crane spans the northern three quarters of the spent fuel pool. It is used mainly to move new fuel into the fuel transfer canal, but also has the capacity for placing spent fuel storage racks into the spent fuel pool. The crane is nuclear safety-related, QA Category I, and equipped with electrical interlocks to prevent it from carrying any load over the spent fuel pool. When it becomes necessary to position spent fuel racks in the spent fuel pool, it will be necessary to bybass these electri-cal interlocks. The bypassing of the electrical interlocks will require written procedures and approval from the shift supervisor.

2.2.4c Where reliance is placed on crane operational limitations with respect to the time of the storage of certain quantities of spent fuel at specific post-irradiation decay times, provide present and/or proposed Technical Specifications and discuss administrative

[N or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.

(v).

Response

When it becomes necessary to bring a spent fuel rack into the spent fuel pool, the interlocks on the new fuel handling crane will not be bypassed unless the stored spent fuel has decayed sufficiently, as defined in Table 2.1-1 of NUREG-0612. This will preclude any offsite dose of more than 1/4 of 10CFR Part 100 limits as defined in Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612. The bypassing of the electrical interlocks will require written procedures and approval from the shift supervisor.

2.2.4d Where reliance is placed on the physical location of specified fuel modules at- certain post-irradiation decay times, provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical. controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.

Response

When it becomes necessary to place any new spent fuel racks into the spent fuel pool, the crane will lower the racks into the pool the maximum possible

. distance away from any existing spent fuel. It will lower the new racks below the highest elevation of any in place spent fuel racks and then move

{g g

it horizontally. to its permanent location.

by special written, approved procedures.

This movement will be governed s

9

(^3 2.2.4e Analysis performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I through III should conform to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Appendix A.

(% "j Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachments 2, 3, or 4, as appro-priate, for each analysis performed.

Response

No analysis is necessary to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I through III of Section 5.1 due to the responses to 2.2.4c and d.

2.3 REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS IN CONTAINMENT NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.3, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of the reactor core. Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III.

2.3.1 Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., taking no credit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel.

\ Response:

1. Name: Polar Crane Type: Electric Overhead Circular Traveling Capacity: Trolley No. 1, Main Hook - 217 tons Aux Hook - 30 tons Trolley No. 2, Main Honk - 217 tons Equipment Designation: 3MHR-CRN1

2. Name: Steam Generator Access Platform Jib East and West Type: Jib Crane

Capacity

2 tons Equipment Designation: 3MHR-CRN4&S 2.3.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in thir area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from the movement of any load, either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-handling system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel.

Response

1. The sigma - refueling machine (3MHR-CRN2) lifts a maximum load of fg - one fuel element and its handling tool. This, by definition of NUREG-0612, is not classified as a heavy load.

10

/N 2. Steam generator wall jib (3MHR-CRN3A, B, C, D). The travel area (b

\

of these cranes is such that they cannot carry heavy loads over or near the reactor vessel.

2.3.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.3.1 above which you-have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried, and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternatives or additional design features). For each crane so .

evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

Response

There are no cranes which fall into this category.

2.3.4 For cranes identified in 2.3.1 above, not categorized according to 2.3.3, demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in your response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the containment and your determi-nation of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane:

[N f 2.3.4a Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical (d interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circurastances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action. Discuss any related or proposed Technical Specifi-cation concerning the bypassing of such interlocks.

Response

For the polar crane, no reliance is placed on mechanical stops or electrical interlocks. In the case of the steam generator access platform jibs, interlocks are provided to prevent loads greater than 1,800 pounds from being ' lif ted or carried over the refueling cavity. To accomplish this, a load cell, trolley travel limit switch and boom rotation limit switch are provided. Bypassing these interlocks will only be by written approved procedures, or shift supervisor approval.

2.3.4b Where reliance is placed on other, site-specific considerations (e.g, refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed Technical Specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the continued validity of such considerations.

/

O t

\ Y v

11

Response

In all cases, load lifts are governed by procedures. These procedures will be reviewed with operators as part . of their qualification and training program, and will be strictly enforced by. individuals in charge of lifts by the polar crane. These administrative procedures are judged to be adequate to preclude postulating that any of these loads drop into or onto an open reactor vessel. Loads lifted only when the reactor vessel head is in place were not considered as loads that could potentially drop into the core.

2.3.4c Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I through III should conform with the guidelines of. NUREG-0612, Appendix A.

Justify .any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appro-priate, for each analysis performed.

' Response:

There are three potential consequences of concern when considering load drops onto the open reactor vessel. These are: (1) loss of reactor vessel integrity,' (2) fuel cladding damage and the resultant radiological dose, and (3)- fuel crushing . and the possibility of a resulting criticality condition.

Criteria I- through III 'in Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612 address each of these potential consequences. The evaluations discussed below have been performed s

to address these issues.

N Reactor Vessel Upper Internals Drop Onto the Reactor Core t . .

The. bounding load drop for evaluating potential damage to fuel in the core

! -is-a postulated drop of the upper internals. The upper internals package is

located directly - above the reactor core, and is removed as a single com-ponent -before refueling. It weighs approximately 172,000 pounds with its lifting rig and will be removed and replaced according to plant procedures.

The lifting system used to move the upper internals includes the containment polar crane and the internals lifting rig.

The upper ' internals package consists of a cover, upper grid, coatrol rod assembly, guide tube assemblies, and a core package cylinder with openings for.. reactor. coolant outlet flow. The package (about 134 inches in height) consists of a . la rge cylindrical section with an upper flanged ring from which it is: supported, or hung, from its supporting mechanism at the reactor vessel flange.

[ -During - removal 'and replacement of the upper internals, alignment is accom-plished by engagement of the internals lifting rig on the reactor vessel guide studs. Because disengagement from the guide studs causes loss of this alignment, and precise alignment is required for the upper internals to fit into the vessel, the maximum postulated drop height corresponds to the height of the guide studs above the upper internals support. For conserva-

!tism, the postulated drop height is taken as 18 feet. During removal

. operations, it is planned that the upper internals will at all times be submerged.

\

12

N Based on a . consideration of the energy absorbing effects of drag as the I upper . internals travels through water, including the " dashpot" or " flow b through an orifice" effect that exists due to the close tolerance of the internals within the core barrel, the kinetic energy of the drop is deter-mined to be about 1394 kip-feet. This external kinetic energy, calculated based on a conservative understanding of the transfer of momentum at impact, is initially transferred to the support system at the upper internals and core barrel flanges.

Several failure scenarios were investigated to assure that the potential consequences from the upper internals drop are acceptable. For example, an initial failure of the core barrel sup. ort flange will result in a subse- t quent impact of the secondary core support at the RPV bottom head. An energy balance analysis of these lower core support columns indicates that while local yielding is pedicted, the impact energy can be fully dissipated with no significant impact to fuel or the reactor vessel.

.L While the expected response to the upper internals drop is described by the above scenario,- for conservatism, the Applicant also investigated the potential consequences should the fuel be impacted. For fuel impact to occur, overall failure of the . upper internals flange ring would have to

- occur prior to failure of the core barrel support. Based on this failure scenario, the resulting impact emergy imparted to the fuel would be about

. 800 kip-feet.

The kinetic energy reaching the core loading the fuel assemblies, is trans-jN mitted uniformly from the upper grid to the fuel assembly upper end fittings i through the control rod guide tubes, and to the fuel assembly lower end A fittings. The fuel rods are not significantly loaded unless the upper end fittings are driven into the fuel rods due to deformation of the guide tubes through buckling. The energy absorbed by the guide tuber failing in an inelastic buckling mode-has been conservatively ignored.

- Individual fuel rods are predicte'd to buckle elastically between spacer

' grids at - a Euler critical buckling load (P ) of 88 pounds. Strain, energy can be absorbed beyond the point of reaching P through bending until the fuel cladding' strain reaches a value of 1 percenY. This strain criterion is based - upon the irradiated properties of the zircaloy-4 cladding material.

.The total strain energy absorbed up to an allowable fuel rod response is compared to the externally applied kinetic energy of 800 kip-feet. Based on a criterion of 60 percent of the fuel rod fibres measured along the diameter having reached the yield stress, the total strain energy absorbed by the

, rods is approximately 1020 kip-feet. At this response level, the strain in the extreme compression and tension - fibres is approximately 0.00773 and

. 0.00676 respectively. These strain valuer are less than the acceptance strain of 0.01. -Therefore, the resulte af r.his analysis indicate that the total strain energy absorbed by the fuel roh is greater than the calculated impact energy.

• Based - upon this evaluation, in the unlikely event that the polar crane or O

its associated lifting devices fail while the upper internals is at the maximum point of carry at which it could he postulated to impact the core, it . is concluded that the fuel cladding will not rupture or experience 13 k

+

+ , - , - . - . , - , , , - , . - , . . , . . - . . - . , , - , , , + . , , , - , , , -,e.,, , , - . , ...-,__c-. . . . , . -n, , , . , , - + -.m- w, ,e-,

.,--.,-n --n ,,,-,n,,

V

[N is significant . crushing,. and radioactive gases will not be released.

ingly,.-NUREG-0612 Criterion I is met for drops into the vessel.

Accord-In addition, the Applicant has evaluated the potential for a criticality condition. Criterion II, Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612 requires that the resul-tant k not be greater than 0.95. The results of this evaluation indicate that IIeckuse the pre-drop core k fg is expected to be 0.90 or less, at planned refueling boron concentraftons, Criterion II is met based on the evaluation guidance and criteria in NUREG-0612, Appendix A.

Reactor Vessel Head Drop Onto the Reactor Vessel The . bounding load drop for evaluating. reactor vessel integrity (Criterion III) is a postulated -drop of the reactor vessel head. The reactor vessel (RPV) head is hemispherically shaped and weighs approximately 357,000 pounds with the RPV head lifting rig. The RPV head will be removed

.and replaced according to plant procedures.

The head is lif ted from the RPV flange and raised to the operating floor.

, While it is currently ' planned to remove the head while simultaneously raising the refueling canal water level, evaluations were performed con-sidering both a drop through water and a drop through air. The polar crane main hook is . used at slow speed to raise the head to above the operating floor level, i

, Based.on the above, a postulated drop of the RPV head of 27 feet-10 inches was ' considered. Energy dissipation due to a transfer of momentum was accounted for. The RPV is supported at four nozzles by the shield tank.

The impact -load path 'is from the RPV flange through the nozzles to the shield tank.

Evaluating the behavior of the RPV and its support system, based on an energy balance approach, it was determined that although local deformation and buckling of the lower portion of-the shield tank-is expected, sufficient capacity exists to absorb the impact energy without significant damage to the RPV. Accordingly, reactor vessel integrity will be maintained and NUREG-0612 Criterion III is met.

2.4 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN, CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING:

NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.

Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken-to ensure that in these-areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely _small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety-related functions. Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been

%y N

previously identified in your response to 2.1.1, and their loadr in your response to 2.1.3c.

14

f i

4 p 2. 4.1. ' Identify any . cranes listed in 2.1.1 above, which you have evaluated

-* I as having- sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a

. kj' load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried, and the basis

. for this~ evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane t ,

evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

4

Response

-There are no cranes in this category at Millstone 3.

N L 2.4.2 For any cranes identified in 2.1.1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.4.1, a. comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:

2,4.2a ' The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment.

heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided in 2.1.3c. Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some

-other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant

=

general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical matrix.

2.4.2b For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and.

f. impact. area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and

[n redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or

( [k electrical. interlocks, . or other site-specific considerations.

Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned considerations should be supplemented by the following specific information:

1. For load / target ' combinations eliminated - because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis 4

for determining that load drops will not affect ~ continued' system operation-.(i.e., the alility of the system to perform its safety-related function).

t

2. Where mechanical. stops or electrical interlocks are to be provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel-will be prohibited. Additionally, provide a discussion con-cerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed.

. 3. Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis of I other, site-specific considerations (e.g., maintenance sequenc-ing), provide present and/or proposed Technical Specifications and discuss administrative procedures of physical constraints invoked to ensure the continued validity of such considerations.

s e

l- .

g 15 l

4

- [c Response:

-( .

\ See Table 1 and response to 2.4.2d.

^

2.4.2c1 For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.4.2b above, l identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have g: evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likeli-hood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evalua-tion . (i.e. , complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or addi-tional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the 4

load-handling system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

Response

There are no cranes in this category.

2.4.2d For interactions not eliminated in 2.4.2b or 2.4.2c above, demon-strate using appropriate analysis that damage would not preclude

. operation of-sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, Criterion.IV). For each analysis so conducted,' the following i information should be provided:

1. An indication of whether or not, for the specific load being investigated, the overhead crane-handling system is designed and

~ p) -

constructed. such that the hoisting system will retain its load

~d in the event of scismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

^

2. The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical-guidelines of NUREG-0612, Appendix A.

'3. The information requested in Attachment 4.

' Response:

f Load drop and impact analyses have been performed for the cranes listed in Table 3 which are in the auxiliary building and fuel building in the areas of reactor shutdown - and decay heat re oval equipment and piping. No

. scabbing of concrete or structural failure of impacted slabs will occur if the height limitations as specified in the following summary is observed, with the following exceptions. For the new fuel handling crane load drop on the new - fuel pool slab at elevation . 34 feet-0 inches, structural failure will not occur, but backface - scabbing is possible. However,.any concrete fragments will impact. the 24 foot-6 inch slab, and no impingement on Category I equipment or components will result. For the new fuel handling p crane drop on the 24 foot-6 inch slab, again no structural failure will F occur,. but backface scabbing of concrete will. These fragments of concrete will impinge upon the Category I piping located at the 11 foot-0 inch elevation below. Scabbing protection will be provided to eliminate this problem.

16

> \'

\N

\v/

TABLE 1-'

CRANE HEAVY IDAD LIST AND LIFTING DEVICES - .

Safety-Related Special Hazard Capacity Heavy Load Weight- Equipment. Lift Elimination Crrne (tons) Identification (tons) Coordinates Device Catesory Notes Polar crane Bridge-434' Reactor vessel head, CRDM 168 Reactor vessel C,D An exception was taken for (3MHR-CRNI) Trolley 1-217 motors and lift device head lift device considering the polar crane Trolley 2-217 load block as a heavy load.

Aux Hook-30 Reactor vessel upper 76 Upper internals CD Since it was designed and internals and lift device lift rig built as an integral part of the Seismic QA Category I CRDM shield and cooling 68.1 C polar crane, it was not skid considered credible to assume failure of the load CRDM ventilation ducting C block when no load is being upper elbows 0.4 lifted, vertical sections 0.8 lower sections .1 Reactor cavity water seal 11 C ring Mat access checkered plate 24 C Containment operating floor 22.2 C removable slabs (heaviest)

Reactor coolant pump motor 42 C Reactor coolant pump 22.5 C internals Reactor coolant pump 24.8 C casing Reactor coolant system 14.3 C loop isolation valves Spent fuel shipping 125 Spent fuel shipping cask 23 to B,D Weight varies depending on /

cask trolley (3MHF-CRN1) 115 type of shipping cask used.

1 of 2

/ ,b s.q ,

% q.

D)

~

\L

)

a v [.

TABLE 1 (Cont)

Safety . . . . .

Related ~ Special Hazard' Capacity Heavy Load. Weight Equipment Lift Elimination Crane (tons) Identification (tons) Coordinates ' Device Cateaory Notes New fuel handling 10 Spent fuel storage racks 8.4 B,C,D Weight. varies depending on-

' size of storage rack.

crane (3MHF-CRN2)

New fuel receiving 10 . Spent fuel storage racks. 8.4 ' B,C,D Weight varies' depending on size of storage rack.

crane (3MHF-CRN4)

Fuel building decon. 5 Equipment hatch plus 4.5 B,D crane (3MHF-CdN4)

Auxiliary building 10 Removable slabs (heaviest) 9.5 B,D filter handling crane /

monorail (3MHP-CRN1)

Auxiliary building 5 Charging pump- 3.75 A,C,D charging pump trolley Charging pump motor 1.95 (3MHP-CRN2A/B/C)

Reactor plant component A,C,D cooling water heat exchanger monorail General Notes:

Impact area is defined as any area along the safe load path.

Hazard Elimination Categories:

a. System redundancy and separation precludes the loss of capability of a system to perform its safety-related function following a load drop.

b. Sufficient administrative controls will exist to prevent lifting this load to a height sufficient to penetrate the concrete floor separating the lifting device and load from the safety-related equipment. e

c. Sufficient administrative controls will exist to maintain the load within the bounds of the safe load path, and to specify when the load may be lif ted over safety-related equipment.

d. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not violate the guidelines of Criteria I through IV Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612.

2 of 2

/~N

} I L

.~ J l

TABLE 2 COMPARISON OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF ANSI N14.6 AND MILLSTONE NO. 3 SPECIAL LIFT DEVICES ANSI N14.6 Section Description of ANSI N14.6 Requirement Actual Special Lift Device Requirements 1 Scope and Definitions - These sections These sections are definitive, and not 1.1 define the scope of the document and requirements.

to include pertinent definitions of 1.3 specific items 2

e 3 Design A. No design. specification was written 3.1 Designer's Responsibilities - This section concerning these specific requirements.

3.1.1 contains requirements for preparing However, assembly and detailed manu-to a design specification and its' contents, facturing drawings and purchasing 3.1.4 stress reports; repair. procedures; limita- documents contain the following tations on use with respect to environmental requirements:

conditions; marking and nameplate information; and critical items list. (1) Material specification for all the critical load path items to ASTM, ASME specifications or special listed requirements.

(2) All welding, weld procedures and welds to be in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code-Section IX.

(3) Special nondestructive testing for specific critical load path items to be performed to written and approved procedures in accordance with ASTM or specified requirements.

1 of 9 -

TABLE 2 (cont)

ANSI N14.6 Section Description of ANSI N14.6 Requirement Actual Special Lift Device Requirements (4) All coatings to be performed to strict compliance with specified requirements.

1 (5) Letters of compliance for materials and specifications.were required for verification with original specifications.

B. A stress report was not originally

! required but will be prepared.

l 'C. Repair procedures were not identified. t i

! D. No limitations were identified as to the use of these devices under adverse  !

I environments.

E. The Internals Lift Rig and Load Cell .

linkage have nameplates attached whicb include pertinent information.  ;

i F. Critical item lists will be prepared for each device that identify load carrying members and welds of these special lifting devices.  !

! [

l l

I t

I 2 of 9

v y TABLE 2:(cont). .

ANSI N14.6 Section Description of ANSI N14.6 Requirement Actual Special Lift Device Requirements-3.2 Design Criteria 1. These devices were originally 3.2.1 Stress Design Factors - These sections designed to the requirement that the to contain requirements for the use of stress resulting stress in the load. carrying 3.2.6 design factors of 3 to 5 for allowable members, when subjected to the total stresses of yield and ultimate, respectively, combined lifting weight, should not for maximum shear and tensile stresses; exceed the allowable stresses specified high strength material stress design factors; in the AISC code. A stress report special pins; wire rope and slings to meet will be generated which addresses the ANSI B30.9-1971; and drop-weight tests and capability of these rigs.to meet the Charpy impact test requirements. ANSI design stress factors.

2. High strength materials are used in j some of these devices (mostly for pins, load cell). Although the fracture

, toughness was not determined, the i material was selected based on its i

! fracture toughness characteristics.

j However, the stress design factors of r i ANSI N14.6 Section 3.2.1 of 3 and 5 j were used in previous analyses and the resulting stresses were acceptable.

i

. 3. Where necessary, the weight of pins

! was considered for handling.

4. For the head lifting rig, the material  :!

for the clevis pin, the lifting leg, and the clevis meets the Chagy V-notch requirements in.accordance.

j with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel i Code,Section III subsection NF 2300. ,

i 3 of 9

( fR. ,

U Q

) J TABLE 2-(cont) 1 I

' ANSI N14.6

. Section Description of ANSI N14.6 Requirement Actual Special Lift Device Requirements ,

i 3.3 Design Considerations - These sections Decontamination was not'specifically.  ;

3.3.1 contain considerations-for; materials of addressed. Locking plates, pins, etc, j to construction, lamellar tearing; decontam- are used throughout these special 3.3.8 ination effects; remote engagement. pro- lifting devices. ~ Remote actuation is

sions; equal load distribution; lock only used when engaging the internals devices; position indication of remote lift rig with the internals, and position

actuators; retrieval of device if disen- indication is provided from the operating j gaged; and nameplates. platform.

i .

I 3.4 Design Considerations to Minimize Decontam- Decontamination was not specifically I 3.4.1 ination Efforts in Special Lifting Device addressed. However, the design and i to Use - These sections.contain fabrication, manufacture included many of these j 3.4.6 welding, finishes, joint'and machining items, i.e., lock devices, pins, etc.

i requirements to permit ease in decontam-

! ination.

3.5 Coatings - These sections contain provisions The requirements for coating carbon i 3.5.1 for ensuring proper methods are used in steel surfaces are contained.in a l to coating carbon steel surfaces and for Westinghouse process specification

3.5.10 ensuring noncontamination of stainless referenced on the assembly and detail -

I steel items. drawings when applicable. These speci-i fications require a proven procedure,

, proper cleaning, preparation, applica-i tion and final inspection of the coat-

ing. These requirements meet the I intent of 3.5.1 through 3.5.8. No provisions were included in these j designs for ensuring noncontamination of stainless steel items.

i

! 4 of 9 I

a.

TABLE 2 (cont)

ANSI N14.6 Section Description'of ANSI N14.6 Requirement Actual Special Lift Device Requirements 3.6 Lubricants - These sections contain On the head lifting rig, threaded con-3.6.1 requirements for'special lubricants to nections and 63 finishes are coated with' to minimize contamination'and degradation of Fel/ pro N-1000 as indicated on the 3.6.3 the lubricant and. contacted surfaces or drawings. On the internals lift device, water pools. threaded connections are coated with neolube. On the load cell linkage, silicone grease is used where applicable as indicated on the drawings.

- 4 Fabrication A formal quality assurance program for the 4.1 Fabricators Responsibilities - These manufacturer was specifically required.

4.1.1 sections contain specific requirements All the manufacturers welding procedures to .for proper quality assurance, document and nondestructive testing procedures 4.1.12 control, deviation control, procedure were. reviewed by Westinghouse. prior control, material identification and to use. All critical load carrying .

certificate of compliance. members require certificates of compliance for material requirements. Westinghouse performed certain checks and inspections during various steps of manufacturing.

Final Westinghouse review includes visual, dimensional, procedural, cleanliness, personnel qualification, etc, and issuance of a quality release to ensure confor-mance with drawing requirements.

4.2 Inspectors Responsibilities - These Westinghouse Quality Assurance personnel 4.2.1 sections contain requirements for a performed some in-process and final to nonsupplier inspector. inspections similar to those identified 4.2.5 in these sections, and issued a Quality Release. (Also see comments to Section 4.1 above).

5 of 9

i wJ

] [D 0 . A] '

TABLE 2 (cont)

} ,

' ANSI N14.6 Section Description of ANSI N14.6 Requirement- Actual Special Lift Device Requirements i

4.3 Fabrication Considerations - These General good manufacturing processes .

! 4.3.1 sections contain.special requirements- were followed in the manufacture of

! to for ease in decontamination or control these devices. However, the information ,

! 4.3.3 of corrosion. defined in there sections was not

! specifically addressed.

i 5 Acceptance Testing Maintenance, and Both the reactor vessel head and

], Assurance of Continued Compliance Owner's internals lift rigs were proof tested 1 Responsibilities - Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 upon completion with a load of approx-5.1 require the owner to verify that the special imately 1.25 times the design weight.

5.1.1 lifting devices meet the performance criteria Upon the completion of the test, all to of the design specification by reviewing parts, particularly welds, were visually l

5.1.8 recordst and witness of testing. inspected-for cracks or obvious.deforma-tion. Critical welds were magnetic particle inspected. In addition, the f Westinghouse Quality Release verifies I that the. criteria for letters of com-I pliance for materials and specifications i

required by the Westinghouse drawings and purchasing documents was satisfied.

],

8 Section 5.1.3 requires periodic functional Maintenance and inspection procedures l

testing should include a visual check of critical welds and parts during lifting to comply l with this requirement for functional testing.

l Section 5.1.4 requires operating procedure Operating instructions for the reactor i vessel internals lift rig were furnished to the utility and operating procedures l

I were prepared and are used.

4 i

6 of 9 i

l \

v TABLE.2-(cont).

v

. ANSI N14.6 Section Description of ANSI N14.6 Requirement Actual Special Lift Device Requirements Sections. 5.1.5, 5.1.5.1 and 5.1.5.2 It is obvious from their designs.that require special identification and these rigs are special lifting devices marking to prevent misuse. and can only be used for their intended

-purpose. The rigs are identified as indicated in Section E, page 2-5.

Sections 5.1.6, 5.1.7 and 5.1.8 require Operating instructions and maintenance the owner to provide written documentation instructions should be reviewed to assure on the maintenance, repair, testing.and use that they contain the requirements to of these rigs. address maintenance logs, repair and testing history, damage incidents, etc.

5.2 Acceptance Testing and Testing to Verify The head and internals lifting rigs were and Continuing Compliance - These paragraphs tested as indicated in Section 5. The 5.3 require the rigs to be initially tested requirement for 150 percent load testing, 5.2.1 at 150 percent maximum load followed by or dimensional checking and nondestructive to- nondestructive testing of critical load testing is not practical due to the space 5.2.3 bearing parts and welds and also annual limitations and cleanliness requirements and 150 percent load tests or annual.non- in containment. In lieu of these 5.3.1 destructive tests and examinations; requirements, written procedures should to qualification of replacement parts, be developed requiring the special lift-5.3.8 ing devices to be attached to their respective loads, lifted a maximum of six inches, and held for ten minutes prior to use at each refueling. A visual inspection of critical welds and parts should follow. Further note that with the use of the load cell for the head and internals, lifting and lowering is monitored at all times.

Replacement parts should be in accordance with.the original or equivalent requirements.

7 of 9

,m ,,.s

• )

\ h lO ( )'

\ f TABLE 2 (cont)

ANSI N14.6 Actual Special Lift Device Requirements Section Description of ANSI N14.6 Requirement Maintenance and Repair - This section Maintenance an repair procedures should i 5.4 contain, as much as possible, require-5.4.1 requires any maintenance and repair to be l

to performed in accordance with original ments that were used in the original l

5.4.2 requirements and no repairs are permitted fabrication. The critical items list for bolts, studs and nuts. will contain the original type of non-destructive testing. Weld repairs should be performed in accordance with l'

the requirements identified in NF-4000 and NF-5000 (Fabrication and Examination i of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 1, i

Subsection NF.

If pins, bolts or other fasteners neel repairs, they should be replaced in lieu of repair, in accordance with the original or equivalent requirements for material and nondestructive testing.

5.5 Nondestructive Testing Procedures, Liquid penetrant, magnetic particle, Personnel Qualifications, and Acceptance ultrasonic and radiograph inspections 5.5.1 were performed on identified items.

to Criteria - This section requires non-5.5.2 destructive testing to be performed in These were in accordance with ASTM i accordance with the requirements of the specifications, Westinghouse process I

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code specifications or as noted on detailed drawings, and provide similar results to the requirements of the ASME Code.

j i

8 of 9

', ~g. -

! J '

TABLE 2'(cont)

ANSI N14.6

'Section' Description'of ANSI N14.6 Requirement Actual Special Lift Device Requirements l

i i 6 .Special Lifting Devices for Critical Loads -. It is assumed.that compliance with

! 6.1 These sections contain special requirements NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 can be 4

6.2 for items handling' critical loads, demonstrated and therefore this section 6.3 is not applicable to these devices.

-l f

l l

4 ll 4

i 1

i i

i 4

4 4

9 of 9 4

i n ..,_, _. . _ _ - - -w--, r --

-n - - ,. - -

i TABLE 3 1

T LOAD DROP AND IMPACT ANALYSES j

's

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS Location Heavy Load Crane of Drop Height Limitation AUXILIARY BUILDING Filter Handling Crane 2'-0" slab el 43'-6" 2'-0" between F.8-F.9 &

54.4 - 55.9 Directly over remov- 0'-6" able concrete plugs el 43'-6" Directly over N-S 2'-0" central cubicle wall el 43'-6" FUEL BUILDING Decontamination Crane 2'-0" slab el 24'-6" 3'-6"

' ' /% between G.6-H & 51.2

( - 52.8 Directly over removable 3'-6" concrete plugs el 24'-6" New Fuel Receiving Crane 2'-0" slab el 24'-6" 3'-6" between G.5-H & 52.8

- 53.8 New Fuel Handling Crane 2'-0" slab el 24'-6" 19'-0"(I) between G.3-G.5 and 52.8 - 53.8 Directly over filters 10'-0" cubicle roof slab el 43'-0" New fuel pool slab 19'-0"(I) el 34.-0" Spent fuel pool slab 41'-9" el. 11'-3" O NOTE:

1. Drops where scabbing of concrete will occur.

1 of 1

I} l lA  :

l l c^

+ lMo_9 l

I 2 l 2 ,

f e's / ' g , ,.

_ f ,h;9;Ni' l

. x x,, /

m . v-

. /y

^

. ~

f,, .\/v ,

f'  ? > l

?? <. .

/// 4

.)

nvs.^.y i t i t  :'; h x

< @ [ t w

l C,.., v -

'/ QY%g -

c. r * & &*/, -

g

A, C .s fx fv x  : .. , " )

\, .* \e ,

I 2 1

1 0 fa '

N  !

n 4 I I

CONTAINMENT EL. 51'-4" SAFE LOAD PATH FOR REMOVAL OF MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT FROM ~

EL. 24'-6" AND 51 *-4" VESSEL HEAD REMOVED I

(

l

i TABLE

)RTH No. EQUIPMENT No. DESCRIPTION NOTES 1 3RCS

• REV I REACTOR S 2 3 RCS

• SGI A,B,C,G D STEAM GENERATORS S 3 3MHR-CRN 3A,B,C G D STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE WALL JIB CRANES 4 3MHR-CRN 4 G5 STEAM GENERATOR ACCESS PLATFORM dlB EAST / WEST 5 REMOVABLE SL ABS H 6 UPPER G LOWER INTERNALS H (STORAGE )

7 REMOVABLE SLAB STORAGE AREA 8 CRDM MISSILE SHIELD H 9 REMOVABLE CHECKERED PLATE H 10 ELEVATOR 11 STAIRWAY 12 PERSONNEL HATCH TI M4 LEGEND

'PERTURjb CARD -

SAFETY RELATED PIPING AND EQUIPMENT SAFE LOAD PATH i

H HEAVY LOADS Availalire On Aperttire Card S SAFE SHUTDOWN FIGURE 1 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS CONTAINMENT MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 3 HEAVY LOADS ANALYSIS 8405310233-01

i s I

y Cd .

CALLED N-t Y

7 b I

-., .< l I vV - '

t

' 1

.' . i l

p. // ,

I

~^

} .

y, -

l ocxwvx . > .H h . v .

-J '

,Q y. #y . ,

c __.s i _ m;

) ,-

[f(_.

~;.

f ;- . . .; ,.

-x c ,

l l

/

• i o 1 . . i sos 1 h-l 1 i I ,

l lI e d ,

l L

CONTAINMENT EL. 51'-4"

' SAFE LOAD PATH FOR REMOVAL OF MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT-VESSEL HEAD IN PLACE D [.J 3 l

1. s I

i

TABLE

!RJ,H ,, ,,

No. EOUIPMENT No. DESCRIPTION NOTES 1 3RCS

• REV 1 REACTOR S 2 3 RCS

• SGI A,B,C, G D STEAM GENERATORS S 3 3MHR-CRN 3A,B,C G D STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE WALL JIB CRANES 4 3MHR-CRN 4 G5 STEAM GENERATOR ACCESS PLATFORM JtB EAST / WEST 5 REMOVABLE SLABS H 6 UPPER G LOWER INTERNALS H (STORAGE) 7 REMOVABLE SLAB STORAGE AREA B CRDM MISSILE SHIELD H 9 REMOVABLE CHECKERED PLATE H 10 ELEVATOR 11 STAIRWAY 12 PERSONNEL HATCH LEGEND SAFETY RELATED PIPING AND EOUIPMENT SAFE LOAD PATH Also Available On H HEAW LOADS Aperture card S SAFE SHUTDOWN

' TI APERTURFl.

CARD  :

FIGURE 2 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS CONTAINMENT

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

UNIT 3

! HEAVY LOADS ANALYSIS i, 8405310233-ol

k I a -

MA.hkE{

l [-

~

I [

-h' 5

=-

l I I "l 1

!:k AT L. I '-O pCONCRETE ROOF J '

plNSPECTION AR3 i D ECONTAMIN ATi<

• FOR SittPPING C MY

_- SPENT FUEL SH CASK STORAGE l

e B.1 L

- SPENT FUEL SF CASK LOADING <

NEW [

=E FUEL '

@ POOL FUEL BUILDING EL. 52'-4" SAFE LOAD PATH FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CASK CRANE l

e DU1 TABLE No. EQUIP M ENT Nc. DESCRIPTION NOTES I 3 MHF-CRN -1 SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CASK CRANE 2 3MHF-CRN-2 NEW FUEL HANDLING CRANE 3 SPENT FUEL POOL 4 NEW FUEL POOL 5 CASK LOADING / STORAGE AREA 6 FUEL TRANSFER CANAL D PIPING

% AND

>N AREA

%SK PPIN2 AREA LEGEND SAFE LO AD PATH SU dVilII8I)lC ()st C SAFETY RELATED PIPING AND EQUIPMENT A PCflure Cu re]

llPPING H H E AVY LO AD LREA S S AFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT ,,

APERTUng' '

CARD FIGURE 3 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS FUEL BUILDING MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 3 HEAVY LOADS ANALYSIS r

840 5 310 2 3 3 -c3

i

0. I _, -

e I E l^2? !

j I b I

I C 1-

=E

, G_

Il I uv i pCONCRETE ROOF g plNSPECTION AREA

1. DECONTAMINATIOl FOR SHIPPING CA

-SPENT FUEL SHil CASK STORAGE A

-- s s _ _

E

~

~ SPENT FUEL SHI SAFET Y F4 ELATED @ CASK LOADING C PIPING AT EL. It' O"'-M:! }

i

~

( ' ~

]

s> --

@ i I

c El r

-dr -

. oc l

.x, .

k _

FUEL AUILDING EL 54'-4" W SAFE LOAD PATH FOR THE t NEW FUEL HANDLING CR ANE I

\

r

(

q 4

t 1

,t. - . . .> f 4

M

-)l 4 {g <

-)' ;5-

. TABLE s No. EQUIPMENT No. DESCRIPTION NOTES

,j, ,

I 3 MHF- CR N - l SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CASK CRANE 2 3MHF-CRN-2 NEW FUEL HANDLING CRANE

, 3 SPENT FUEL POOL Y 4 NEW FUEL POOL

-) *

.i ,

/

j. .J 5 CASK LOADING / STORAGE AREA

[_II f 6 FUEL TRANSFER CANAL i, .'j iek.Y

f ,n, 4 y

3 i

/

t,ii ~

[AND LK AREll

/

HtH1 EA} LEGEND

^

a

' d ,1 SAFE LO AD PATH

. t.

,, l...... l SAFETY RELATED PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Also Available On i

DING, , H HEAVY LOAD Aperture Card IEAil9', ,

b: ' ;. S S AFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT a

^

TI "d%

1PERTURd.I a1 >

CARD 7 j'

't '

FIGURE 4 i' CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS FUEL BUILDING

-(

, , MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

UNIT 3

,', 'f' j HEAVY LOADS ANALYSIS t{ g

~'

., p I , 840 5 310 2 3 3 -6Y

h I J L._

i~ , J^22

• I l [

I I _j E my 10 TON NEW FUEL 5 TON DECONTN ,- ~E 125 TON SPENT RECEIVING CRANE AREA CRANE -

SHIPPING CASK I I l l / i J l

, Mi. .. -

SAFETY RELATED -

PIPING AT EL.11'-O"< @ @

' '^^^**

-4QUIPMENT DECON'

.- WASHDOWN AREA

]

j-m

- EQUIPMENT HATCH

~

FUEL POOL

~ '

COOLERS ii. ..:j ji b i h ,E L'~O g j t I I ll l Ill f ......... .

L J

== n r l FUEL TRANSFER CANAL @ l

_I I- -

7.

FUEL BUILDING EL. 35'-10" ,[

l SAFE LOAD PATH FOR THE NEW 3

FUEL RECEIVING CRANE AND DECONTAMINATION AREA CR ANE

i U"

TABLE No. EQUIPMENT Na D ESC RI P TI O N NOTES I 3 MHF- CRN 3 NEW FUEL RECEIVING CRANE 2 3 MHF -CRN4 DECONTAMINATION CRANE 3 SPENT FUEL POOL

R AN E 4 NEW FUEL POOL 5 CASK LOADING /STOR AGE AREA 6 3 SFCM EI A,8 FUEL POOL COOLERS H 7 3 S FC - FLT 1,3A,3 B SFC FILTERS H 8 FUEL TR ANSFER CAN AL 9 3MHS-CRN1 SPENT FUEL BRIDGE C HOIST 10 EQUIPMENT HATCH H

[AM! NATION t

LEGEND SAFE LO AD PATH h Fj SAFETY RELATED PIPING AND EQUIPMENT H HEAVY LOAD Also Availalde On S S AFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT PCII"fC b"fd TI '

APERTURE' CARD FIGURE 5 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS FUEL BUILDING MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 3 HEAVY LOADS ANALYSIS o

8405310233-og

E I

\

t l

i C

4 _il,LLD_P(QRTH 1

% L____q_________ r

=

E q L

~

,.,~r<.

ss.r v x um a i x v REACTOR PLANT M'Y X X 7-/sriTK w2^ ~'v= -

_O/V

'~<=^c-

%~ ffMXK COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT 0 ^^ *

.'x'. v v v'"x 1"7.

~v*

v s x i'7 v^^^ -'N#x-t -

EXCHANGERS(TYP.) = x y xysm'x univvv s ge v v x ^y^ x asfvv g ,ygyy[

mmu vis.,m ,xxx .vM17 v ,xmmv- n.v i:

NNI 1 x xus^<v vexv y x

.3 ,,wm ai x xivv<

V.. ^ t MM- --4 5 5 hi YxXXe-4 g

~

CHARGING PUMP J TROL L.EY(TYR)

EVATOR s . . .

PLAN EL. 24'-6"

( LOWER ELEVATION)

J t

1 1

4P l

TABLE No. EQUIPMENT No. DESCRIPTION NOTES I 3CHS* P3A B C CHARGING PUMPS H,S 2 3 MHP- CRNZ A , B ,C CHARGING PUMP TROLLEYS 3 3CCP M EI A,B,C CCP HEAT EXCH ANGER H,S ERS M:NEL iCCESS LCCK L EGEND XAV SAFE LOAD PATH l -:-  :-l SAFETY RELATED PIPING AND EQUIPMENT s, H HEAVY LOAD S SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT EE Also Available Ou

\

I Aperture Card (I'I mw APERTURE' CARD FIGURE 6 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AUXILI ARY BUILDING MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 3 HEAVY LOADS ANALYSIS i

840 5 310 2 3 3 -o g

I p--

0 V

,m

• ~ CALLEO NORTH i

(D WASTE DISPOSAL BLDG.

F ER REMOVABLE O TON HOIST ASSY h$N9 gCRANE-CONC. SLAB j

j

- 3 MHP-CRNI x , ,

I \ f / j X f s.w.a.. -n.-a. .-xmm-y.- .

, n- ,

1

- DNl(([l(([jjl J uphTTT[ii(([

1 I

l c=-

P DN _ l i i .

~

C 7 .

LEVATOR f n n l I I PL AN EL. 43'-6" (UPPER ELEVATION) l l

I I

l [-

4 l

'  ?

TABLE No EQU l PM ENT No. DESCRIPTION NOTES I 3MHP-CRNI AB FILTER HANDLING CRANE 2 REMOVABLE SLABS OVER FILTERS H i

i

+

i LEGEND g, SAFE LOAD PAT H I k l -~-  :-l SAFETY RELATED PIPING AND EQUIPMENT r H HE AVY LOAD S SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT g, 9 . .

e e ii gERTURE CAnn Also Available On Aperture Card FIGURE 7 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AUXILIARY BUILDING MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 3 HEAVY LOADS ANALYSIS

b. -- _ _ . 8.405310 233-07