ML20141D288
| ML20141D288 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1997 |
| From: | NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141D279 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9706270116 | |
| Download: ML20141D288 (56) | |
Text
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h Northeast Utilities System i
MILLSTONE UNIT 3 i
MAINTENANCE RULE i
UNIT BASIS DOCUMENT Revision 3 i
Qft5f97
[/ 7 DO 00cK0500k3 j _ f[qq Unit Expert Panel Chairman Date
Dnit B! sis Document Millstone Unit 3 Rev. 3 1.0 Introduction This documt:nt provides the unit specific decisions and results of the Maintenance Rule compliance processes. Implementation was performed in accordance with the Integrated Maintenance Program Manual Program Instructions referenced in the respective sections below. This document provides the initial results of the compliance effort. Section 6.0 ,
documents the unit specific references used in the decisions documented here.
4 2.0 SSC Scoping The first step in the Rule compliance effort was to identify the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) which are included within the scope of the Rule as well as document the basis for inclusion or exclusion. The scoping decision pmcoss is based on criteria which apply to all plant structures, systems, and componems, safety related as well as i non-safety related.
The scoping process was completed in two phases in accordance with Program Instruction PI-1.1, " Phase 1 Scoping", and PI-1.2, " Phase 2 Scoping." The Phase 1
, scoping effort is focused at the system level and is a preliminary evaluation of each system against the scoping criteria specified in NUMARC 93-01. The Phase I scoping results for all systems are documented in the attached table, " Phase 1 Scoping Results."
Individual scoping criteria or component decisions made conceming a specific system are documented in the " Remarks" section of the Phase 1 Scoping Results.
- Phase 2 scoping included analysis and definition of SSC functional significance as it relates to the Rule scoping criteria. The' specific system functions and their relationship to the scoping criteria were evaluated in accordance with PI-1.2 and are documented in the individual System Basis Documents.
Due to the PMMS system boundaries a decision was made during the Phase 2 Scoping process to roll up systems where a general function would encompass several other PMMS systems, thus reducing the total number of systems requiring monitoring. That process also designated two (2) new systems, the " Normal Power" & " Turbine Generator" Systems.
s General categories ofinstrumentation functions were developed. The function " control signals & functions to other systems were used for process, control, interlock &
protection signals generated in one system which impacts other systeras. The inputt from the various systems to the Engineered Safeguards Function and the Reactor Protection function of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) are captured within the SSPS system. The functions for " indications" and " alarms" identify if there are safety related functions and those non-safety related instrument functions which are specifically called out in the EOPs are included within the scope of the rule to provide information to operations personnel.
Containment penetrations and containment isolation valves which are govemed by 10 CFR 50 Appendix 3 are included within the scope of the Maintenance Rule.
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Uriit Bcsis Dccum:nt k ~
Millstone Unit 3 Rev. 3 i
Containment penetrations and the overall contamment integrity function are momtored within the Appendix J program. Appendix J has its own standards and is subject to its own regulation. It was therefore considered to be redundant to include these monitoring requirements in Maintenance Rule space. Containment Isolation valves which are required to close are monitored by the Maintenance Rule program because the closure i function is not monitored in Appendix J. These valves are specifically addressed in the ,'
Containment Isolation Valve System Basis Document.
The various devices used to support system components that are not specifically included in the structures monitoring program (i.e.: pipe hangers, snubbers and cable trays) are included within the Maintenance Rule. They are monitored as part of the system they are connected to. A failure of any of these components will be counted as a MRFF of the i system ifit results in loss of function.
In evaluating the functional relationship the following assumptions or decisions were made with respect to the scoping criteria.
2.1 The Control Circuit Isolators (3415) System functions would be included with the l appropriate signal function in each system.
2.2 All systems that were only In-Scope due to the "Comainment Isolation" function are included in the Containment Isolation (3312A) System.
2.3 The " Pressure boundary integrity" function is inherent with the function of concern.
2.4 The " Heat Tracing" function is inherent within the system and/or train of concern.
2.5 With the exception of SSFS, the instrument sensors are included with the system they are attached to, using the P& ids, regardless of where PMMS placed them.
The following system scopi ig decisions are documented due to the attention paid to them during the Maintenance Rule Pilot Inspections, (ref. NUREG 1526).
Cathodic Protection - The function of this system is provide long term life cycle protection to minimize corrosion and long term degradation of cenain piping system = ; oning of this system i' :onsidered within the scope of normal ms .' i tfails, the resu'+< se detected through failures of systems whi totection se .ng systems served by Cathodic Protection, such , ' Water Y . performance criteria which, depending on Risk 5. . * .ng Unavailability. Piping degradation will result in _ vhich ifignored will cause the served system to exceed its h. .a, and require (a)(1) actions under the Maintenance Rule. Additionauf, .>pems such as Service Water are subject to routine inspections which will also detect degradation and lead to repair of Cathodic Protection under normal maintenance ifit is determined to be appropriate use of resources at the time.
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.T.ichtnino Protection 'There is no single system for " Lightening Protection." ;
There are miscellaneous electrical components throughout the plant that function J to protect equipment from spurious failures due to voltages surges. The effect of i such surges on in-scope equipment can be failure of that equipment. Such failures
- will be monitored and corrected through the Maintenance Rule program.
l Site Groundino - There is no single system for " Site Grounding." Each system i j contains site grounding elements in the form of grounding straps and lugs. This I l system functions to provide a safe path for electric current. Failures of this function will be manifest in failures of equipment which are in-scope to the Maintenance Rule and be identified as causal factors with corrective actions to resolve.
{
i The Millstone 3 Expert Panel discussed (refer to MP-TS-96-078) how these various
.[
[ support equipment are being handled within the Maintenance Rule context. This i discussion was an outgrowth of several questions raised by the NRC at other utilities over -
the past several months. It was the Panel's consensus that components used for Cathodic
- 1 & Lightning Protection, as well as Grounding are nat in scope to the Maintenance
, ~ Rule and that the initial scoping efforts were correct in so identifying this equipment.
- Poor performance of the related components would be identified by the existing
- Performance Criteria on the systems they support. For example; failures of components used for Lightning Protection and/or Grounding would result in Functional Failures within one or more electrical distribution systems. Similarly, failures of the cathodic '
protection components would result,ifnot identified via the erosion / corrosion program, in Functional Failures within the systems they support. The Cathodic Protection components, also have regularly scheduled maintenance in addition to formal monitoring under the Operator rounds. Thus, the existing Performance Criteria for systems which are in-scope, along with existing practices, adequately capture the occurrence of ineffective maintenance on the components used for cathodic protection, lightning protection, and/or grounding.
Rev. 2 of this document also provided justification for not including the following systems in scope:
- Annunciators e Plant Process Computer e Emergency Lighting Scoping reviews conducted in response to NRC concerns identified during a prelunmary inspection in November 1996 (ref. ACRs M3-96-1211 and M3-96-1212 reversed these decisions and included the systems in scope.
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.- Unit Basis Document j.;,
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Millstone Unit 3 Rev.3 3.0 Risk Significant Determination The NUMARC guideline (NUMARC 93-01) requires that a risk significance determination be made for all SSCs. The methodology used for risk significance determination included the use of PRA calculated values for "cutsets that comprise 90% -
of the Core Damage Frequency", Risk Reduction Worth (RRW), and Risk Achievement Wonh (RAW) and an expert panel Delphi decision process. The risk significance determination process is described in Program Instruction PI-2 and includes the use of PRA, the Expert Panel delphi process, and unit specific Shutdown Risk management procedures. The results of the Risk Significant Determination processes are documented on the attached tables (the forms are from PI-2):
e
, Form 5, PRA Risk Significant Systems, provides the PRA importance measure data e
Form 5A, Expert Panel Risk Significance Delphi Process. provides the results of the Expert Panel Delphi voting process Form 5B, Shutdown Risk Management Evaluation. provides the results of the 4
review of Shutdown Risk Management procedure to evaluated risk in shutdown modes
- Form 6. Risk Significant Systems and Subsystems, provides the final results of the risk significant decision process compiled from Forms 5, SA, and SB and l references the Expert Panel Meeting minutes for system specific decisions.
4 4.0 Performance Criteria Development 4
Program Instruction PI-3, " Performance Criteria", provides guidance for the development
- of all Performance Criteria. Specific system (function) / train level performance criteria i- (such as Unavailability, Functional Failures, and degree of concurrent unavailability) are established to monitor and trend performance of risk significant SSCs. The selection of train specific criteria for risk significant system / functions is documented in the individual System Basis Documents. These criteria were developed by either PRA/ System Engineers or MES/CBM and considered various risk significance measures as determined by PRA models. The methodology used by PRA in development of unavailability l Performance Criteria are described in the following
4 4
Memo from S. D. Weerakkody to K. Hastings, NE-95-SAB-490, "PRA Input to Unavailability Performance Criteria",12/5/95 Memo from J. M. Powers to K. B. Hastings, NE-94-SAB-386," Performance Criteria for CY System Trains", Nov.1,1994. [This was also used for MP3]
SAB Calculation PRA 94NQA-1093-S3,"PRA Inputs to MP3 System Performance Criteria" Rev.1 Memo from E.A. Oswald to R. W. Flanagan, NE-96-SAB-095, "PRA review of the MP3 Unavailability Performance Criteria" 4
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Unit Basis Document Millstons Unit 3 Rev. 3 Memo from S. D. Weerakkody to PRA Section, NE-96-SAB-138," Maintenance Rule Form 5 Update Methodology," 5/22/96 Performance criteria for non-risk Significant SSCs are either system (function) specific or are attached (mapped) to an existing Plant Level criteria. These performance criteria are also documented in the individual System Basis Documents. In all cases the Performance Criteria developed for compliance with the Maintenance Rule are not to be interpreted as l being strictly related to the " Operability" of SSCs. Exceeding the Performance Criteria l only requires that a cause determination take place.
i The selection of unavailability performance criteria for PRA modeled systems / trains was based on a combination of multiple parameters related to trains. These parameters included the historical maintenance unavailability of the system train, the Fussell Vesely importance parameter of the system train as well as the Fussell Vesely importance parameter of the train maintenance unavailability, the risk achievement wonh of the train, the potential impact on the overall core damage frequency, and the time required to take the trains out of service to perform surveillance, preventative maintenance work, and a reasonable amount ofcorrective maintenance. No single parameter was deemed
! sufficient to address all important issues related to the overall goals of the Maintenance rule.
The FV importance measure of the total train unavailability was used to accommodate the safety significance of the train / component. Therefore, this measure was used to decide on the deviation that can be allowed from the current maintenance unavailability used by PRA without a significant impact on the< ore damage frequency, CDF. All trains were allowed a maximum deviation that limits the CDF increase to 2%.
The goal was to select Performance Criteria that recognize degradation in maintenance I unavailability which significantly impacts Plant risk. It is expected that if these criteria are exceeded, steps will be taken to improve maintenance unavailability. This is an important consideration, for it allows reasonable variations in short-term Plant risk, i.e.,
variations in the maintenance unavailability, provided they are not severe enough to affect average Plant risk assumptions. The selected Performance Criteria are expected to maintain PRA assumptions.
Once an assumption was made with respect to the above factors, plant-specific maintenance data was reviewed to determine the reasonableness of the resulting criteria.
Preliminary, the data was viewed to look at the relative distribution and see if the criteria would pick up on obvious deviations from the norm. A second review was made by detennining the standard deviation for each set of maintenance data to see how the relative magnitude compared to the criteria.
The specific Plant Level Criteria selected for monitoring non-risk significant SSCs are:
a < 3 Unplanned Scrams While Critical per rolling 24 month period.
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.- Unit Bisis Dccument - ; Millstone Unit 3 R v. 3
< 6 % Unplanned Capability Loss Factor per rolling 24 month period.
Shutdown Criteria:
< 2 Unplanned entries into " Orange" Shutdowr. Risk Condition per rolling 24 month period.
< 1 Unplanned entry into " Red" Shutdown Risk Condition per rolling 24 month period.
Other Plant Level performance measures may be affected by SSC failures. These other !
performance measures will be evaluated on a periodic basis.
1 Performance criteria development centered on two significant concepts. The first is that I maintenance effectiveness can best be monitored in operating modes 1 through 4, by I considering each system and function required in those modes. This lead to use of
- unavailability, FFs, and plant level criteria for individual systems and functions. The ;
second concept developed from addressing the question of how best to monitor l maintenance effectiveness in shutdown modes 5 and 6. l l
With respect to developing & establishing performance criteria the following i assumptions or decisions were made with respect to performance criteria: l j
4.1 The instrument sensor FFs are charged to the appropriate process control, or protection System. The boundary for high pressure systems is generally the first isolation valve from the process.
4.2 The Plant Level Performance Criteria apply to ALL systems / functions.
4.3 Functional Failures will be counted in all modes regardless of whether the function is required in that mode.
5.0 Pwtormance Evaluation i
I This document will not maintain the current status of the (a)(1) systems and plant level performance criteria. This section will be updated at ihc %e revisions are made. The current status should be obtained from the Unit Coordinator.
1 initial performance evaluation and determination of whether a system was a " good j performer", rule category (a)(2), or a " poor performer", rule category (a)(1), was made in accordance with Integrated Maintenance Program Manual (IMP) Program Instruction PI-4, " Performance Evaluation." and PI-5, " Maintenance Rule Functional Failures." Results of these determinations for all in-scope systems is provided in the individual System !
Basis Documents (SBDs). The following systems were determined to be in need of improvement by the Expert Panel and an ACR was initiated for each: .
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.- Unit Basis Document , Millstone Unit 3 Rev. 3 1
LocalID l PMMSID System ACR l
3301 l RCS Reactor Coolant 96-08895 3312A CNT Containment Isolation 96-08893 (Target Rock valves) l 3314A l RPV Auxiliary Building Ventilation 96-05504 l 3314F ACC Control Building Ventilation 96-05503 l 3316A MSS Main Steam 96-05498 (MSlVs) i 3327 TRS Traveling Screens 96-05497 3344B MCC Vital MCC's 96-05278 3404 l RMS Radiation Monitors 96-07772 l
Since the initial performance assessment. two additional systems were added to the (a)(1) list. I LocalID PMMS ID System ACR l 1
3304 CVC Chemical & Volume Control M3-96-0156 3326 SWP Service Water M3-96-0675 As of December 31,1996. Millstone 3 had exceeded two of three plant level criteria. l Criteria: Less then three (3) reactor scrams within the crecedinc 24 months The unit has experienced no reactor trips within the last 24 months.
l Criteria: > 6 % Unnlanned Canability Loss Factor ner rolline 24 month neriod.
The units UCLF as of December 31,1996 was 40.0 %. ACR M3-97-0792 was issued to document the fact that the UCLF criterion had been exceeded. The major contributors to this were MSIVs. RCS. and the current shutdown. No additional systems were added to (a)(1) as the causes are already addressed in current (a)(1) Action Plans.
' Criteria: Shutdown Criteria
< 2 Unnlanned entries into "Orance" Shutdown Risk Condition ner rollinc_ 24 month neriod.
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< 1 Unnlanned entry into " Red" Shutdown Risk Condition ner rollino 24 month neriod.
[ As of 12/31/97, the unit has experienced S unplanned entries into either " O oc " Red" shutdown Risk Conditions within the past 24 months. ACR M3 0793 was issued to document this condition. The evaluation is not complete at this time.
i i I Results of these determinations along with additional goals and monitoring are also provided in the individual System Basis Documents.
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Millstone Unit 3 i
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6.0 References l 6.1 10 CFR 50.65, " Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintencnce at
, Nuclear Power Plants", Dated 10 July 1991
- 6.2 NUMARC 93 01, " Industry Guidelines for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
- Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", Dated May 1993 l 6.3 Regulatory Guide 1.160, " Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at j Nuclear Power Plants", Dated June 1993 5 6.4 Memo from S. D. Weerakkody to K. Hastings, NE-95-SAB-490, "PRA innut to Unavailability Performance Criteria",12/5/95 f,
6.5 Memo from J. M. Powers to K. B. Hastings, NE-94-SAB-386, " Performance Criteria for CY Svstem Train <", Nov.1,1994. [This was also used for MP3]
l 6.6 SAB Calculation PRA 94NQA-1093-S3,"PRA Inputs to MP3 System Performance Criteria" Rev.1 i
6.7 Memo from R. W. Flanagan to MP3 Expert Panel, MP3-TS-96-187, " P.lant Level Performance",4/15/96 6.8 Memo from R. W. Flanagan to MP3 Expert Panel, MP3-TS-96-078 , "Easn Panel Meeting Minutes for February 14.199C",2/26/96 6.8 Memo from R. W. Flanagan to $1P3 Expert Panel, MP3-TS-96-083 , "Fmergency I ighting System",2/26/96 6.9 Memo from E.A. Oswald to R.W. Flanagan, NE-96-SAB-095, "PRA review of the MP3 Unavailability Performance Criteria",4/10/1995 6.10 Memo from S. D. Weerakkody to PRA Section, NE-96-SAB-138," Maintenance Rule Form 5 Update Methodology ", S/22/96 10 of 29
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.Utit Basis Document '... Millstone Unit 3 Rev. 3 Rev.# Change Summary Date
- 1. Incorporate Shutdown Risk Plant Level Performance Criteria; update 4/24/96 and incorporate applicable reference; Editorial and typographical
+
Corrections.
2 Incorporate the PRA Maintenance Rule update information resulting 6/24/96 from model revisions.
3 Incorporated scoping revisions from resulting from NRC inspection 2/14/97
- and ACRs M3-96-1211 & M3-96-1212. (Section 2.0) l Incorporated revised risk importance measure data for risk significance decision process. No changes to the systems identified as risk
, significant were made. (Section 3.0) 1 Added two systems to the list of(a)(1) systems and updated the status
] of performance against Plant Level Criteria. (Section 4.0)
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EL M5 -
PRA '
RISK SIGNIFICANT SYSTEMS '
Plant: MP3 FRONT-LINE CDF RAW RRW RISK PLANT SYSTEMS SUPPORT SYSTEMS SYSTEM (Y/N) (Y/N) (Y/N) (Y/N) 120 Volt AC N Y N Y Vital 120 VAC Vital 480 Volt 15.29 1.000 Vital 120 VAC Inverters Vital MCC's 125 Volt DC Y Y Y Y DC 125 VDC - Control 6.50 1.010 Accumulators Y Y Y Y Accumulators 12.56 1.014 Auxiliary Feedwater Y Y Y Y Auxiliary Feedwater Vital 480 Volt Motor Driven Train A&ll i1.73 1.026 '
Cond: Storage & Makeup Vital MCC's Turbine Driven Train 7.80 1.055 DC 125 VDC - Control l ESAS (ESF/EGLS)
Main Steam CilG Pump Cooling N Y N Y CHG Pump Cooling Vital 480 Volt 2.51 1.000 Vital MCC's ESAS (ESF/EGLS)
EGLS N Y Y Y EGLS Vital 120 VAC 4.00E-2 1.0400 4.30E01 Vital 120 VAC Inverters
- Emergency Diesel Y Y Y Y EDG - Engine EDG - Fuel Oil Generators 4.49 1.028 EDG - Generator EDG - Lube Oil EDG - Starting Air
. Service Water ESF Actuation Y Y N Y ESAS Vital 120 VAC 2.27 1.004 Vital 120 VAC Inverters 12 0f 29 -
Ei A1_5 PRA RISK SIGNIFICANT SYSTEMS Plant: 11P3 FRONT-I,1NE CDF RAW RRW l RISK PLANT SYSTEMS SUPPORT SYSTEMS SYSTEM (Y/N) (Y/N) (Y/N) (Y/N)
IIPSI & Charging Y Y Y Y RWST Vital 480 Volt 8.00E-2 1.0800 2.12E02 IIPSI Vital MCC's Charging Pump ESAS (ESF/EGLS)
(IIPSI only) N Y N 1.25 1.000 (CVCS only) Y Y Y 2.00 1.031 IIPSI Eump Cooling Y Y Y Y SI Pump Cooling Vital 480 Volt 1.45 1.006 Vital MCC's ESAS (ESF/EGLS)
MSIV Y Y Y Y Main Steam DC 125 VDC - Control 1.0700 2.20E01 ESAS (ESF/EGLS)
OITsite Power =
N Y 'N Y NSST EDG - Engine 2.00E-2 1.0200 1.00E02 RSST EDG - Generator Vital 4160 Volt PORVs Y Y Y Y Reactor Coolant Vital 480 "~ 9 2.23 1.042 Vital' o .s '
DC 125 VDC - Control l
RSS Y Y Y Y Recirculation Spray llPSI 42.60 1.232 Charging Pumps Service Water 13 of 29 .
El AL5 PRA EISK SIGNIFICANT SYSTEMS .
Plant: MP3 FRONT-LINE CDF RAW RRW RISK PLANT SYSTEMS SUPPORT SYSTEMS SYSTEM (Y/N) (Y/N) (YIN) (Y/N)
Vital 480 Volt Vital MCCs DC 125 VDC - Control l ESAS (ESF/EGLS)
RWST Y Y Y Y RWST 790.38 1.005 Service Water Y Y Y Y Service Water Vital 480 Volt 2.48 1.175 Vital MCCs
. DC 125 VDC - Control l ESAS (ESF/EGI.S) L Solid State Protection Y Y Y Y RPS Scram Breaker opening portion of System 6607 1.134 CRD.
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- 1. PSI
- N N N N 2.00E-4 1.0002 1.00E00 Main Feedwater Y N Y Y 1.31 1.014 Quench Spray' N N N N 1.65 1.000 RSS (CTMT Recirc) Y Y Y Y ;
42.60 1.232 NOTE: Not Risk Significant using PRA measures in accordance with Program Instruction PI-2. Shown for comparison Purposes only l 14 of 29 .
s s
Form 5 Update,7/23/96 The following table represents the data transmitted from PRA via memo NE-96-SAB-0178 representing revised risk importance measures. The data in Form 5 above was undated to include i
the date from this table where appropriate. The data and conclusions from referenced memo .
were reviewed and approved by the Expert Panel on July 23,1996. No changes to the risk significant lists were made. However, Expert Panel "open items" were identified to evaluate assumptions in the PRA with respect to HVAC systems, MFW injection function, RCS SRVs.
4 and PORT unavailability requirements.
MP3 System / Train Maintenance Rule importance System / Train Descriotion Too 90% EY RRW RAW
. CME Accumulator Train A Y 0.014 1.014 12.56*
Accumulator Train B Y 0.014 1.014 12.56*
Accumulator Train C Y 0.014 1.014 12.566 Accumulator Train D Y 0.014 1.014 12.53*
Auxiliary Feedwater MD Pump Train A Y 0.026 1.026 11.73 Auxiliary Feedwater MD Pump Train B Y 0.026 1.026 11.73 Auxiliary Feedwater TD Pump Train Y 0.052 1.055 7.80 AFW and Mech Room HVAC Train A Y 0.003 1.003 11.62*
AFW and Mech Room HVAC Train B Y 0.003 1.003 11.62*
Charging Train A Y 0.030 1.031 2.00 Charging Train B Y 0.030 1.031 1.99 Charging Lube Oil Cooling Train A N 0.000 1.000 2.51") l Charging Lube Oil Cooling Train B N 0.000 1.000 2.51") i Charging and CCW Area HVAC Train A N 0.000 1.000 9.02"2 Charging and CCW Area HVAC Train B N 0.000 1.000 9.02"*
Control Building Chilled Water Train A Y 0.062 1.066 32.50*
Control Building Chilled Water Train B Y 0.061 1.065 32.59*
DC Power Train A Y 0.010 1.010 6.50 DC Power Train B Y 0.010 1.010 6.50 Diesel Generator Train A Y 0.028 1.028 4.49*
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1 System / Train Qascriotion Too 90% EY HRW RAW
.C.ME Diesel Generator Train B Y 0.026 1.026 3.96")
SBO Diesel Generator Train Y 0.008 1.008 1.44W Diesel Generator Enclosure HVAC Train A Y 0.007 1.007 1.41 Diesel Generator Enclosure HVAC Train B Y 0.007 1.007 1.41 DWST Y 0.002 1.002 799.32 1
ESFAS Train A Y 0.004 1.004 2.27 ESFAS Train B Y 0.004 1.004 2.27 High Pressure Safety injection Train A N 0.000 1.000 1.25* l High Pressure Safety injection Train B N 0.000 1.000 1.25*
St Pump Lube Oil Cooling Train A Y 0.006 1.006 1.45 St Pump Lube Oil Cooling Train B Y 0.006 1.006 1.45 Intake Structure (SW) HVAC Train A Y 0.040 1.041 34.13* .
Intake Structure (SW) HVAC Train B Y 0.040 1.042 34.23* !
Main Feedwater Train A/B Y 0.013 1.014 1.31* I Main Steam System Train A I Y 0.010 1.010 2.79* '
Main Steam System Train B Y 0.010 1.010 2.79*
Main Steam system Train C Y 0.010 1.010 2.79*
Main Steam System Train D Y 0.010 1.010 2.79*
Main Steam System - Steam Dump to Y 0.025 1.026 2.30*
Condenser MCC/RCA Room HVAC Train A Y 0.004 1.004 7.29 MCC/RCA Room HVAC Train B Y 0.004 1.004 7.29 PORV Train A Y 0.040 1.042 2.23 PORV Train B Y 0.040 1.042 2.23 Quench Spray Train A N 0.000 1.000 1.65*
Quench Spray Train B N 0.000 1.000 1.65")
RCS Safety Relief Valves (SV8010A, B, C) Y 0.032 1.033 1.13*
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2 Svatem/ Train Descrintion Ton 90% EY RRW RAW e CBE
! RPCCWTrain A - N 0.000 1.000 1.110) i RPCCW Train 8 N 0.000 1.000 1.11">
Reactor Protection System Y 0.118 1.134 6606.98 i Residual Heat Removal Train A N 0.000 1.000 1.00">
- Residual Heat Removal Train B N 0.000 1.000 1.00">
[
RHR, OSS and SI Area HVAC Train A N 0.000 1.000 1.02 (ACUS 1A)
RHR, OSS and SI Area HVAC Train B N 0.000 1.000 1.02 (ACUS 1B)
Recirculation Spray Train A Y 0.189 1.232 42.60 Recirculation Spray Train B Y 0.188 1.231 42.11 RSS HVAC Train A Y 0.006 1.006 1.35m RSS HVAC Train B Y 0.006 1.006 1.35m RWST Y 0.010 1.010 790.38 Service Water Pump Train A Y 0.148 1.174 2.48 ,
Service Water Pump Train B Y 0.149 1.175 2.4 ; l Service Water Pump Train C Y 0.146- 1.171 2.13 Service Water Pump Train D Y 0.145 1.169 1.37 SWGR HVAC Train A Y 0.001 1.001 1.43*
SWGR HVAC Train B Y 0.001 1.001 1.43*
120v Vital AC Power Train A (VIAC-1) N 0.000 1.000 15.29">
120v Vital AC Power Train B (VIAC-2) N 0.000 1.000 15.29"> ,
120v Vital AC Power Train C (VIAC-3) N 0.000 1.000 15.29"> l 120v Vital AC Power Train D (VIAC-4) N 0.000 1.000 15.29">
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, MP3 System / Train Maintenance Rule imoortance i
j 1) Computed by requantification of the whole model rather than using the cutset method, j Relatively high RRW/ RAW values resulting from conservative accumulator success criteria.
- 3) HVAC system train value exceeds the NEl criteria; however, the PRA Section recommends that j the Expert Panel determine the actual risk significance since the' common cause factor dominates i
the result. These systems were included in the PRA model as required support systems, since
! room heat-up calculations were not available. In addition, operator action was assumed as a j screening value, and more detailed input could be provided by the Panel.
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- 4) Based on ACR #1892 " Limited capacity of the SBO Diesel Battery," the RRW and RAW values for the DG 'A' & 'B' as well as the SBO DG would be different; however, they would all be considered risk significant.
Reference:
Memo to M. H. Brothers From S. D. Weerakkody, NE-96-SAB-150, t
"PRA Review of ACR #1892: Limited Capacity of Station Blackout Diesel Battery," 5/31/96.
! 5) Although the table does not show HPSI trains 'A' and 'B' as risk significant, the associated
! support system SI pump lube oil cooling train is risk significant under the category of 90% CMF i and RRW. The 'zero' value for HPSI's FV is a result of truncation. The FV of the dedicated tube l
oil cooling trains (.006) must be representative of the FV of the HPSI trains as well. Therefore, the HPSI trains should also be considered risk significant.
- 6) MFW system risk significance is based on the need of MFW to remove secondary side heat following the initial phase of an ATWS event.
- 7) Steam dump to condenser models' failure of any one of nine steam dump valves to reclose following a transient - CSLBO.
% Relatively high RRW/ RAW values based on conservative overpressure relief success criteria ,
following an ATWS. Results in Function 1.03 of Reactor Coolant System being considered risk significant. -
- 9) A main steam train consists of the MSIV, CTV 27A(B, C, D) atmospheric relief valve, PV 20A(B, C, D) and the SG safety relief valves SRVs 22A(B, C, D) and 23A(B, C, D).
18 of 29
i FORM 5A - EXPERT PANEL RISK SIGNIFICANT DELPHI PROCESS RESULTS Plant: MP3 SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM RISK RANKING RISK FACTOR (Y/N)
ESF -Injection RWST & Recirculation 2.47 1 Y ESF -Injection SI Pp Cooling 2.45 2 Y ESF -Injection LPSI 2.43 3 Y ESF -Injection Recirculation Spray 2.42 4 Y Emergency Diesel Auxiliaries 2.42 5 Y ESAS Westinghouse 7300 Racks 2.42 6 Y Electrical- AC Vital 4160 volt 2.41 7 Y ESF - Quench Spray Quench Spray 2.40 8 Y Electrical- AC Vital 480 volt 2.39 9 Y
,eactor Coolant Vessel 2.39 10 Y CVCS Charging Pp 2.38 11 Y !
ESF -Injection Residual Heat Removal 2.36 12 Y Electrical - DC DC 125 VDC - Control 2.35 13 Y Electrical- AC Vital 120 VAC Inverters 2.34 " 14 Y l Electrical- AC Vital MCC's 2.32 15 Y Misc. Inst & Cor.t Main Control Boards 2.31 16 Y Reactor Protection Solid State Protection 2.30 17 Y Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant 2.29 18 Y Emergency Diesel Emergency Diesel 2.28 19 Y Emergency Diesel l Generator 2.28 20 Y l Emergency Diesel l Fuel Oil 2.28 21 Y CVCS l Charging Pp Cooling 2.27 22 Y ;
Feedwater l Feed Pump 2.27 23 Y g
diectrical - DC VDC: 12 - 24 2.25 24 Y 19 of 29
FORM 5A - EXPERT PANEL-RISK SIGNIFICANT DELPHI PROCESS RESULTS ant: h1Pl SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM RISK RANKING RISK FACTOR (Y/N)
Emergency Diesel Engine 2.25 25 Y Electrical- AC Vital 120 VAC 2.25 26 Y Main Steam Steam Generator 2.24 27 Y ESAS EGLS 2.24 28 Y (
ESF -Injection HPSI 2.24 29 Y Emergency Diesel Starting Air 2.24 30 Y Emergency Diesel Lube Oil 2.24 31 Y Feedwater Feedwater 2.23 32 Y Main Steam Main Steam 2.21 33 Y l Auxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater 2.17 34 Y tilectrical - Gen. Main Transformer 2.17 35 Y Electrical - Gen. Normal Transformer 2.17 36 Y Misc. Inst & Cont Foxboro Spec 200 Rack 2.15 37 N Feedwater S/G Level Control 2.14 38 N Service Water l Service Water 2.13 39 N Emergency Diesel EDG Rm. Ventilation 2.12 40 N Electrical - DC VDC: 43 2.11 41 N CVCS Chem & Volume Control 2.11 42 N Structures l Containment Structure 2.11 43 N Feedwater Pump & Drive Lube 2.09 44 N Reactor Coolant l Reactor Vessel Level 2.09 45 N Electrical - Gen. l Reserve Transformer 2.08 46 N ESF Ventilation l ESF Bldg - Purge 2.08 47 N
'eactor Coolant l Incore Thermocouples 2.06 48 N Misc. Inst & Cont Control Circuit Isolators 2.05 49 N 20 of 29
9 FORM 5A - EXPERT PANEb RISK SIGNIFICANT DELPHI PROCESS RESULTS lant: MPl SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM RISK RANKING RISK FACTOR (Y/N)
Electrical- AC Lighting - Emergency 2.04 50 N Emergency Diesel Station Blackout 2.04 51 N Main Steam Steam Dump Control 2.03 52 N Misc. Inst & Cont Aux. Shutdown Panel 2.03 53 N CVCS Letdown 2.03 54 N Control Rod Drive Control Rod Drive 2.03 55 N Structures Diesel Eng. Bldg 2.03 56 N Structures ESF Bldg 2.02 57 N CVCS Boric Acid 1.01 58 N 4
Misc. Inst & Cont Annunciators . 01 59 N Misc. Inst & Cont Plant Computer 2.00 60 N Main Steam S/G Blowdown 2.00 61 N Electro-Hyd. Control EHC 2.00 62 N Main Steam Reheater Vent & Drain 1.98 63 N Main Steam Condenser Air Removal 1.98 64 N Electrical - Gen. High Voltage - 345 KV 1.97 65 N RPCCW RPCCW l.97 66 N Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Pp 1.97 67 N Screen Wash Traveling Screens 1.96 68 N l Compressed Gases Instrument Air 1.95 69 N Structures Auxiliary Building 1.95 70 N Nuclear Instruments Power Range 1.94 71 N CVCS Boron Thermal Regen 1.94 72 N Containtnent Containment Isolation 1.91 73 N l NuclearInstruments Intermediate Range 1.90 74 N 21 of 29
4 FORM 5A - EXPERT PANEL.
RISK SIGNIFICANT DELPHI PROCESS RESULTS l Int: h1Pl
{
SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM RISK RANKING RISK FACTOR (Y/N)
Nuclear Instruments l Source Range 1.89 75 N Control Rod Drive Digital RPI 1.89 76 N 1 Rx Plant Ventilation Aux Bldg Vent 1.88 77 N Spent Fuel Cooling Spent Fuel Cooling 1.87 78 N Containment DBA H2 Recombiner 1.87 79 N Control Rod Drive M/G Sets 1.86 80 N Nuclear Instruments Excore - Gammametrics 1.86 81 N Control Rod Drive Electrical 120-277 VAC 1.86 82 N Control Bldg Vent Control Bldg A/C 1.86 83 N Nuclear Instruments Incore NI's 1.85 84 N xx Plant Ventilation SLCRS Filtration 1.84 85 N Electrical- AC Non Vital 6900 volt ,
1.84 86 N Turbine Generator Turbine 1.83 87 N Rx Plant Chill Water Rx Plant Chill Water 1.83 88 N _ l Main Steam Turbine Plant Drains 1.82 89 N l Condensate Condensate 1.82 90 N Containment Vent Purge 1.82 91 N Chemical Addition Steam Generator 1.82 92 N Radiation Monitors Radiation Monitors 1.82 93 N Control Bldg Vent Control Bldg Chill Water 1,81 94 N Fire Protection Halon 1.80 95 N Containment Support 1.80 96 N Structures l H2 Recomb Bldg 1.80 97 N
ontainment Vent l CRDM Cooling 1.80 98 N Stator Cooling 1.79 99 N l Turbine Generator 22 of 29
FORM SA - EXPERT PANEL' RISK SIGNIFICANT DELPHI PROCESS RESULTS lant: h1PJ SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM RISK RANKING RISK FACTOR 2
(Y/N)
Containment Vent l AirRecirculation 1.79 100 N Electrical- AC Non-Vital 4160 volt 1.79 101 N Fire Protection CO2 1.79 102 N Post Accident Sample Containment Sample 1.79 103 N
- Condensate Storage & Make-up 1.79 104 N Fire Protection Fire Protection 1.79 10f N Reactor Coolant Sampling 1.78 106 N
- Post Accident Sample Post Accident Sample 1.78 107 N Containment Vent Filtration 1.78 108 N Structures Ctmt Exh Bldg 1.78 109 N i Containment Atmosphere Monitor 1.78 110 N Fire Protection Alarm & Detection 1.77 111 N l
Containment Vent Leak Monitoring 1.77 112 N BOP HVAC l MSV Bldg Ventilation 1.77 113 N 4
Fire Protection l Water 1.76 114 N Primary Water l Primary Water 1.76 115 N
{
Rx Plant Ventilation Fuel Bldg 1.76 116 N l Cire Water Cire Water 1.75 117 N
$ Gland Seal Wtr./Exh. 1.73 118 N l Gland Seal Wtr. & Exh.
Containment Vent Vacuum 1.73 119 N N Shield Tk Cooling l N Shield Tk Cooling 1.72 120 N Radioactive Waste l Rx Plant Gas Drains 1.72 121 N Intake Struct. Vent l Supply & Exhaust 1.71 122 N
'itructures l Fuel Bldg 1.70 123 N l Rx Plant Gas 1.70 N l Radioactive Waste 124 23 of 29
FORM SA - EXPERT PANEL" RISK SIGNIFICANT DELPHI PROCESS RESULTS 2nt: ME3.
SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM RISK RANKING RISK FACTOR O'/N)
Service Water Chlorine 1.70 125 N i Radioactive Waste Liquid & AER Drains 1.69 126 N !
Radioactive Waste Liquid 1.68 127 N Radioactive Waste Boron Recovery 1.66 128 N Structures Waste Disposal Bldg 1,66 129 N ,
i BOP HVAC Turbine Bldg Ventilation 1.65 130 N l Rx Fuel Handling Rx Fuel Handling 1.65 131 N Radioactive Waste Gaseous 1.65 132 N Radioactive Waste Glycol Heating 1.65 133 N i
"x Plant Ventilation Waste Disposal 1.64 134 N 1
Misc. Inst & Cont Seistnic Monitor 1.64 135 N Misc. Domestic Serv Hot Water Pre heat 1.61 136 N Auxiliary Boiler Auxiliary Steam l.60 137 N
' NOTE: Systems below the heavy line (Ranking > 36) were not Risk Significant within the Delphi Process :n accordance with Program Instruction PI-2. Shown for comparison purposes only 24 of 29
FORM 5B - SHUTDOWN RISK MANAGEMENT '
EVALUATION .
Plant: MP3 SAFICIT FUNCTION EQUIPMENT PLANT SYSTEMS SUPPORT SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS RCS Decay Heat Removal RHR Residual Heat Removal RBCCW, SW, Vital 480 volt RCS Decay IIcat Removal S/G (2/4) Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Vital 480 volt Steam Dump Control RCS Decay lleat Removal Refuel Cavity (>23')
SFC Decay lleat Removal SFC Spent Fuel Cooling RPCCW, SW, Vital 480 volt SFC Decay lleat Removal SF Pool (>23') Spent Fuel Cooling Inventory CilS (A/C)(B/C) Charging Pump Charging Pp Cooling RPCCW, SW, .
Vital 480 voit .
Inventory Sill HPSI SI Pp Cooling RPCCW, SW, Vital 480 volt Inventory RIIR Residual Heat Removal RPCCW, '
SW, Vital 480 volt Inventory RWST RWST 25 of 29
FORM SB - SHUTDO' I RISK MANAGEMENT ~
~
EVALUATION
~
Plant: MP3 Power EDG Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Emergency Generator Lube Oil Starting Air 8
Pow r RSST Reserve Transformer 345 KV Power NSST/ Main Normal Transformer 345 KV Main Transformer 24 KV Power SBO EDG Station Blackout Reactivity Bomtion Boric Acid t
Reactivity SDM Menitor Excore-Gammametrics Containment isolation Containment Structure Containment Isolation Containment RCS + SG RCS Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Generator Steam Dump Control -
b l
26 of 29
FORM 6 RISK SIGNIFICANT SYSTEMS l
l AND SUB-SYSTEMS lant: MPl SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM PRA E/P E/P RISK Risk Risk Mins.
SIGNIFICANT
(""" 9 (Y/N) (Y/N) (Y/N) nummmmmmmmmma-Auxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater Y N Y l Condensate Storage & Makeup Y N Y Containment Containment Isolation Y" N Y Control Rod Drive Control Rod Drive N N MES-95 305 N MES-95 315 Control Rod Drive CRD - Elect.120-277 N N MES 95 305 N VAC MES 95 315
~
Control Rod Drive CRD - M!G Sets N N MES 95 305 N MES-95 315 CVCS Boric Acid Y" N MES-94 256 N MES-94 300 MES94-428
.VCS Charging Pump Y, Y" Y Y CVCS CHG Pump Cooling Y Y Y Electrical- AC Vital 120 VAC Y Y Y i Electrical- AC Vital 4160 Volt Y Y Y Electrical- AC Vital 480 Volt Y*,Y*
- Y Y Electrical- AC Vital MCC's Y* Y Y Electrical- AC Vital 120 VAC - Y Y Y Inverters Electrical - DC DC 125 VDC - Y Y Y
, Control Electrical - Gen High Volt - 345 KV Y" N MES 94 256 Y MES 94 300 NE 94 SAD-293 Electrical - Gen Main Y** 'N Y I
Electrical - Gen NSST Y, Y" N Y 1
'lectrical - Gen RSST Y, Y" N Y 27 of 29
t
- Emergency Diesel Auxiliaries N Y MES-94 256 N MES 94 300
- l 1ergency Diesel Engine Y,Y** Y Y
, Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Y* Y Y Emergency Diesel Generator Y, Y" Y Y Emergency Diesel Lube Oil Y* N Y
- Emergency Diesel Starting Air Y' N Y i Emergency Diesel Station Blackout Y** N^ Y Emergency Diesel EDG Rm Ventilation Y* N Y I ESAS EGLS Y Y Y ESAS Westinghouse 7300 Y Y Y Racks ESF -Injection Accumulators Y N MES-94 256 Y MES-94 300 NE 94 SAB-293
F -Injection Recirculation Spray Y Y Y ESF -Injection RHR Y" Y Y ESF -Injection RWST Y,Y** Y Y
- ESF -Injection SI Pump Cooling Y,Y** Y Y ESF - Quench Spray Quench Spray N Y Y Feedwater Feed Pump Y Y Y Feedwater Feedwater Y Y Y Main Steam Main Steam Y N Y !
Main Steam Steam Generator Y, Y" N Y Misc. Inst & Cont Main Control Boards N Y MES94-256 N MES94-300 Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Y" Y Y Reactor Coolant Vessel N Y MES-94-256 N MES-94-300
- Reactor Protection SSPS Y Y Y
^
'CCW RPCCW N N MES94-428 Y l NE-94-SAB-407 4
28 of 29
Service Water Service Water Y,Y** N Y Nuclear Instruments Excore - Y" N MES-94-256 N Gammametrics MES94-300 opent Fuel Cooling Spent Fuel Cooling Y "- N MES95-310 N MES95-321 Structures Containment Y" N MES-94-256 Y
MES-94-300 l MES-94-428 l l
Y' indicates that the system is an assumed support system within the PRA for a system that PRA has identified
- as " Risk Significant". l l
Y** indicates that the system was identified from OP 3260A (Conduct of Outages) Form 3260-3 & 4 l
j t
i 29 of 29
Millstone 3 Maintenance Rule: Phase 1 data .
IT-Feb-97 System Name PMess Local Safety Acc'd EOPs Ptsvent Sv.m Resk in ID Bases /Romarks ID Related Trans SR func or SS Sig scop, Auxiliary Bodec Aux BoSer & Controls ABX 3331A No No No No No No No Aux 6ary Bodec Aurdiary Condensate ACN 33318 No No No No No No No i Auxdiary Boder: Aux &ary Steam ASS 3331A Yes No No Yes No No Yes The Cat.1 components are assocated with HELB solabon funcbon to isolate the Aux. Steam supply '
to the Aur. Bldg.
Auxdiary Boder Blowdown ABB 3331C No No No No No No No Aurdiary Boilec Combuston Air ABA 333tC No No No No No No No Auxihary Bodec Feed ABF 3331B No No No No No No No Auxikary Bok Fuel ABO 3331E No No No No No No No Auxihary Boilec Steam ABS 3331A No No No Yes No No Yes HELB concems Aux &ary Feedwater: Auxikary Feedwater AFW 3322 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes BOP HVAC: Aux Boder Ventdaten ABV 3315E Ho No No No No No No BOP HVAC: MSV Bldg Ventdation MSV 33158 Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes BOP HVAC: Tech Support Center TBV 33150 No No No No No No No BOP HVAC: Turbine Bldg Venidaten TBV 33ISA No No No No No No No BOP HVAC: Warehouse 5 TBV 3315C No No No No No No No
- Chemcal Adddion: Condensate CNC 3339A No No No i No No No No Chemcal Adddion: Steam Generator .SGF 3339B No No No No No No No NOTE: The Cat I components contained wdhin this system are ash with the Contaenment isolaten functon only. These components wat be considered a porten of the Containment isolation System.
Circ Watec Cathodic Protecten CCP 3325C No No No No No No No Page1
_ . - _ _ - ~ . - . . - --. = . . _ -- ~. . . . . _ _ - - . . -
,u 3,,% % P"* 1.ocal Sa8 sty Acc'd EOPs Prevent Scram Rask in Bases # Remarks 10 to Related Trans SR func or SS Sig scop, ,
i Cwc Water: Cwc Water CIR 3325A No No k
Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE: The Cat.110 is an eledncal asolatson ,
relayMevice which is monitored with the safety '
related systemffunction it protects EOP for SGTR Recovery Cwc Water: Waterbox Prene CWP 33258 No No No No Yes No Yes a. System added to in-scope for could cause" a scram. Expert Panelmeehng rrunutes MP3-TS 362. b Systemmondored underCirculahngWater '
System (3325A).
Communicatens: Gastronics CMM 3348A No No Yes No No No Yes Communicatens: Paging & Evac Alarm CMM 33488 No No Yes No No No Yes I Communcatens: Radio CMM 3348CR No No Yes Na No No Yrs Communcatens: Sound Powered CMM 3348C No No Yes No No No Yes I Compressed Gases: Contamment Inst. Au CIA 3332B No No Yes No Yes No Yes a. The Containment Instrument Air Compressors i i
were removed System is enentioned in vareus EOPs but provides no signs 6 cant accedent md=Jasm Refer to FSAR 9.3.1 b. Syctem added to scope for could cause .
Refer to Expert Panel meeting nunutes MP.TS '
362. c. System monitored onderinstrument As C.332A).
Compressed Gases: Hydrogen GH2 3334 No No No No No No No 1 Compressed Gases: Instrument Air AIC 3332A No No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE: The Cat.1 components assooated with !
containment isotahan ese sponslosed weh system '
6 3312A, Containment isolahon. These components , /-
will be considered a podson of the Contanment '
Isolation System. Mderenally, elecencal components assooeted with the cold shuidown air compressors are Cat.1 to provide electrical separation from their Cat,1 power source. The coki .
shutdown cornpressors and air supply funciens are not Cat. I but are currently induded in maintenance !
rule scope. For EOPs, restore funden to support !
nuhgabon f i
Page 2 1 t
I i
System Name PMMS Local Safety Acc*d EOPs Prevent Scram Rask in 10 ID Bases / Remarks Related Trans SR func orSS Sig scop, .
Cuivessed Gases: Ndrogen GN2 3333 No No No No No No No The Cat.1 components are assocsated weh containment isolation and are mondored wth system 3312A, Contamment isolation.
Compressed Gases: Stahon Aar ASA 3332C No No No No No No No The Cat 1 components are mancal valves associated with cretamment isolation and are mondored with system 3312A, Contairwnent isolation.
Cond Chem Regen: Cond Chem Regen CNC 3319C No No No No No No No Cond Chem Regen; CPF Liq Radwaste CPL 3319C No No No No No No No Cond Demn CC: Cond Demin CC CDC 3319C No No No No No No No Cond Demin CC: Cond Demm SW CDS 3319C No No No No No No No Condensate: Condensate CON 3319A No No Yes No Yes No Yes Condensate: Condensate Demans CDM 3319C-1 No No No No No No No Condensate: Condenser Air Removal CVS 3329 No , No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE a. System added to in-scope for "could caume"a scram. Expert Panet meetmg rninutes MP3-TS-96-362. b. System mondored under ,
Condensate System (3319A) function. c. EOPs for SGTR Recovery.
Condensate: Storage & Make-up CST 33198 No Yes Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
FSAR (10 4.9 2) states that the Condensate Storage Tank (CST)is NOT Safety Related and therefore NOT considered available for Safety Related purposes. The ONLY funchon placmg the - ;,
- Condensate: Storage & Make asp System "In-Scope". [providmg an attemate source of make-up water to the Aux Feedwater System during accident conditions] Therefore, that function wd be mondored an the Auxihary Feedwater System (3322). Thus removmg the Condensate: Storage &
Make-up System (33198) from "tn-Scope".
Condensata: Turtune Plant Sample CSA 33118 No No No No No No No Page 3
System Name F-1 Local Saigy Acc*d EOPs .^.;.;.e Su-o Risk in Bases #temartis ID 50 Related Trans SR func orSS Sig scop, ,
Containrnent Hydrogen Morwtoring CSF 3311C-2 Yes Yes No No No No Yes NOTE: The Post Acculent Sample System is a back-up to the DBA H2 Recomtuner system. The GASEOUS funchons (3311C-2) are included weh ttus System.
Contamment Vert Air Feltration CPH 3313D No No Yes No No No Yes NOTE-This system is not safety related per FSAR Para 9.4.7.1.3.
The Cat 1 Components contamed unthin this system are assooated with Contaenment isolation function only. These w,~..er.:s we be consedered a portson of the Contamment Isolation system. MEPL
- draft"(CD-1024). The other Cat.1 ids m this system are eledncalisolation relaysMevices which is monitored with the safety related syster.ts# unctions they proted.
The system is used withri the EOP's (3502).
i Ongnialty, this system was removed from the "in-Scope" list. Refer to the Expert Panel meetag i minutes MEMO's MES-95-139. & 170. Approved I:y the Expert Panel at the SEP 27,95 meeting Refer to MEMO MES-95-257. However, subseqeent scopeg reviews changed this system and the system was added to scope, refer to rnemo M3-TS-97-041.
Contamment Vent. Air Recirculation CPH 33138 No Yes Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
Contaenment Vent: Air Recirculation -This system is not safety retaied per FSAR Para 9.4.7.2. ;,
'~
The Cat 1 Components contained withm this system
- 1 are associated with the Fan power supptses These '
components wd be considered a portion of the Electrical Distnbution system. ((Safety Related changed from *Y" to *N"lo rfled FSAR 9.4.7.2) The i Cat.1 ids in this system are eledncalisolation relays / devices which is monsfored with the safety related systems # unctions they proled-Page 4 I
i l
System Name PMMS t_ocal Salety Acc d EOPs Prevent Scram Risk an ID to amC- --ks RefAed Trans SR func or SS Sig scop, ,
Conta. .c4 Vent CRDM Coolmg CPH 3313C No No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE:
Per FSAR page 9 4-39 para 9.4.7.4 3 the sub system is not safety related. The sub system is contained within the un(s EOP's.
Contamment Vent: Purge Air CFYi 3313E No No No No No No No NOTE-In-Save = "Y" CHANGE to V.
Safety Related = "Y"; CHANGE to "N";
The system is non safety .Wed per FSAR Para.
94.7.3.
The Cat.1 ids in this system are 1) temperature contro#ers which should be in system 3314A, Aux.
Bldg Vent. 2) Containnent isolation dampers which are mondored in system 3312A, and SCLRS damper Imt swiches which are monitored in systems 33141. These componerets are monitored by their respective systems.
a s
Page 5 i
L
(
1 System Name PMMS Local Safety Acc'd EOPs Prevent Scram Raset in Bases /Remartis .
10 ID Related Trans SR func orSS Sig Scope ,
Contas-cat Vent: Vacuum CPH 3313F No No Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
i This is NOT a Safety Related System; Only the Contaenment Isolatson function (i e.; 3CVS*CTV 20A
& 21 A. 3CVS*CTV 208 & 218)is Safety Related.
The Contamment isolata funcien mit be mondored System.
under the Contahment Isoistson (3312A)
The system is used watun the EOP's as the fulfunction backup to the DBA H2 recombmers.
However. The system was ongmany not induded in scope. SD 3313F Rev. O. Page 7 of 28 Sedson 1.2.3;% nonnudear safety class porten of the contaanment vacuum system shat not be required to operate for a long trne after a DBA. because of the slow rise in contamment pressure resuteg from inleakage (mnservatsvety. 0 033 psi / day).
Therefore, there would be ample time to repaar or replace the contamment vacuum system equgwnent" However. thrs decision was changed to aciude the system m-scope, ref. rnemo M3-TS4/ .
THIS system DOES NOT provide a Ssgnificant Mdigatsve" fundson and was reno ed from the *1n-Scope" list by unanennus vote of ane Expert Panel on March 28.1995. Refer to MEMO's MES-95-069
& 078.
Contamment: Atmosphere Mondor CMS 3312C No No No No No No .
No The contaenment isolation functions of this system #- .
are induded in system 3312A. The radia ion ,
i monitor is induded in system 3404. '
Contauwnent: Contamment isolatson CNT 3312A Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE: EOPs = N changed to EOP =Y on 10/10/96 (refer to MS-TS-96425) AE Cat.1 ids are currentfy in scope for Safety Related function Contamment isolation. A search of Cat.1 ids assooated weh PMMS system designator "BDS" identered w..,~.wn4s which are anonitored in systems designated as safety related.
i Page 6 I i
, __ . . _ . .. ~ - - - -- '
System Name PMMS Local Sc%;, Acc*d EOPs Prevent Scram R2sk ar ID ID B-C... arks
- Related Trans SR func orSS Sig scop, Containment: DBA H2 Rew.arr.or CPI 3313A Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes SEE FSAR 6.2.5, & 9 4.11 Contauwnent. Leak Mondourg LMS 33128 Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
The Cat I components contaened withm this system are associated wdh Contamment Temperature, &
the Pressure inputs to the ESFAS system.
See: FSAR 6.2.5. 7.6 7 & 9.3.2 6 Coritrol Bidg Vent. Control Bldg A/C ACC 3314F Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Control Badg Vent: Control Bldg Chnt Water CBW 3314F Yes Yes No No No No Yes NOTE-The Control Bldg Vent: Control Badg Chis Water -
System functions are included wdh the Control Badg '
Vent: Control Bldg A/C System.
Control Rod Drive: Cor: trol Rod Drrve CRD 3302 No No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE: 1.13302 - Control Rod Dnve - The Cat 1 components are associated with Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and are montored wdh RCS, system 3301.
Per FSAR Volume 10 Sedion 7.7.1.2 " Control Systems NOT Required for Safety";
EOPs; for ATWS event, have to drive the rods in. ?
Risk Sigruficant = "Y" CHANGE to "N";
Risk Sgrufc' ance was ongir' ally determmed at the system level. The function that is nsk sigrufcant is the Rx Trp Breakers and is mondored/mcluded wdh ,
SSPS function 1.01. Refer to memos MES-95-305
& MES-95-314 ,
Safety Related = "Y" CHANGE to "N";
The Cat I components contained wdlun this system "
are associated wth the Rx Trp Breakers. Those w.g 0,c6ts win be considered a portson of the SSPS system.
Control Rod Dave. Digital RPI CRD 3409 No No Yes No No No Yes NOTE: Per FS/R Volume 10 Section 7.71.3 2
" Control Systems NOT Required for Safety".
Origina#y removed from in scope listing per MP3 l
Expert panel on 12/06/96 (refer to memo MES 344) However, ttus decisiort was later cfianged, ref. !
memo M3-TS-041.
Page 7
. m. - '
System Mr: PMMS Local Safety Acc'd EOPs Prevent Scram Risk in Bases /Remasts ID ID Nated Trans SR func orSS Sig scop, .
ControlRod Dnve: EleGL;120-277 vac ES1 3302B No No Yo No Yes No Yes NOTE:
The Control Red Drive: Electncal 120-277 vac System functeor's are included with the Control Rod Drwe: ControlRod Drwe System.
EOPs; For ATWS event have to dnve rods in.
Risk Sbndcant = "Y" CHANGE to "N";
Risk Signdicance was ongstasy determined at the system level. The function that is nsk sign # cant is the Rx Tnp Breakers and is monitored 4nciuded with SSPS function 1.01 Refer to memos MES-95-305
& MES-95-314 Control Rod Dnve: M/G Sets MGS 3302A No No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE:
The Contros Rod Dnve: M/G Sets System functions are incksded with the Control Rod Ome: Control Rod Dnve System.
EOPs; for ATWS event have to drive the rods in.
Risk Signdicant = T CHANGE to "N";
Risk Signdicance was ongina#y determened at the system levet. The function that is nsk sigr# ant is the Rx Tnp Breakers and is monitored 5nctoded ws: l SSPS function 1.01. Refer to memos MES-95-305
& MES-95-314 CVCS. Bonc Acid BAS 3304C Yes No Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
fM Sagn6 cant = T CHANGE to v.
Per " Expert Panet"MTG of 22 NOV 94.
Refer to MES-94-256. 300 & -428.
The CVCS: Boric Acid System functions are included with the CVCS: Chemscal & Volume #'.
Control System. ,
CVCS: Boron Thermal Regen CVC 3304D Yes No No No No No Yes NOTE: 1.3 32040 - Boron Thermal Regeneration .
The system contains Cat.1 em,~a..:s but was never place in servsce However, because the system has never been formany abandoned or physicaNy isolated from the CVCS system, it wdl be added to sape until the decasons to abandon are made.
in-Scope = T CHANGE tc v.
This System is cunently (29 AUG 94) NOT in t>SE.
Page8
System Name PMMS Local Safety Ace'd EOPs Prevent Scram Rask in BasestRemarks '
10 10 Related Trans SR func or SS Sig scope - !
CVCS: Chargeg Pp CHG 3304A Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE-The CVCS: Charging Pp System functions are meluded with the CVCS: Chemcal & Volume Control System.
CVCS. Chargog Pp Coolmg CCE 33300 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE- The CVCS: Chargeg Pp Coo %ng System functsons are included with the CVCS: Chemical &
Volume ControlSystem.
CVCS Chem & Volume Control CVC 3304 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes CVCS Let10wn CVC 3304A Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes NOTE The CVCS: Letdown System functions are included wth the CVCS: Cl*emcal & Volume Control System.
Electncal- AC: Lightmg - Emergency LTG 37208 No Yes Yes No No No Yes Appenduc R Lighteg Electrical- AC: Lightmg - Grounding LTG 3720C No No No No No No No Electrical- AC: Lighhng - Normal LTG 3720A No No No No No No No Electncal- AC: Non Vdal 120 vac ENV 3345A No No Yes No No No
- Yes NOTE: The Cat.1 ca.. weds provide circud contmudy to safety related loads and are associated '
with system 33458, Vdal 120 vac, which as in scope for safety related functions. This system provkles power to other non safety systems which are m-scope Electrcal- AC: Non-Vdal 480 vot ELC 3344A No No Yes No No No Yes This systems provides power to other non safety systems which are in scope.
Electncal- AC: Non-Vdal MCC's MCC 3344BN No No Yes No No No Yes This system provides power to other n-scope systems. - ;,*
Electrcal- AC:Non-Vdal 4160 voR ES4 3343 No No Yes No Yes No Yes Page 9
System h PMMS Local Safety Ace'd EOPs Prevent Sv.m Risk in am '" r-ks ID ID Related Trans ,
SR func orSS Sig scope Electrcal- AC: Non-Vdal 6900 voit ES6 3342 No No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE:
This is a required support system for the RCPs.
Condensate, & a Feedwater Pump.
Safety Related = *Y" CHANGE to *N";
The Cat I components within this system are associated with annuncsators, interlocks, and computer points for the transforms, load buses & te breakers.
Electrcal- AC:Vdal 480 vot ESO 3344A Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Electncal- AC: Vdal MCC's MCC 33440 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Electreal- AC: Vdal 120 vac EVI 33458 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes NOTE: This system includes the Electncal- AC:
Vast 120 vac inverters. The Cat.1 components, in 3345A AC: Non Vital 120 vac, provide circud contanudy to safety related loads and are associated with this system.
The Cat.1. in 33458-2, are included w:th the safety related functons of this system.
Electrcat- AC: Vdal 4160 von ES4 3343V Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Electrica!- DC: DC 125 vde- Control EDC 3345C Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Electrical - DC: DC 125 vdc - Turbine EDC 3345D No No No No Yes No Yes a. System added to in-scope for *could cause" a scram. Expert Panel meeting minutes MP3-TS 362. b. System mondored under Turtme Generator System (3324).
Electreal- Gen : High Votage - 345 KV E34 3351 No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes NOTE: : .-
Risk Segnsfcant = "N"; CHANGE to % ."-
Per
- Expert Panet".
Refer to MES-94-256. -300. & NE-94-SAB-293.
COORDINATE w/ SITE John Kennedy The Electncal - Gen.: Hagh Votage - 345KV System functons are included with the Normal Power [3347]
System.
Page f0
-. _.. ,__ -...---.-.s-_-+,.-.---=i.ew.m.a..w . - - , - .a.w-an--.,m- --. - - - - - - - --:-h__ .
_ . . _ <_ _ .. _. _ ___ . .m .
System Name r=3 Local Safety Acc'd EOPs Prevent Scram Risk in 8 - t ;21s ID 10 Related Trans SR func orSS Sig Scop, ,
Electrcal- Gen.: Low Voltap -24 KV E24 3324A No No No No Yes No Yes NOTE The Electrical- Gen.: Low Voltage - 24KV System functsons are included with the Normal Stahon Service Transformer (NSST)[3347B]
System.
The CAT 1 components are Generator Bus C temperature elements Electncal- Gen.: Main Transformer TRM 3347C No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes NOTE:
The Electrical- Gen.: Main Transformer System functions are included with the Normal Power [3347]
System.
Electncal- Gen : Normal Transformer TRN 3347B No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes NOTE:
The Electrical- Gen.: Normal Transformer System functions are included with the Normal Power (3347]
System.
Electrical- Gen : Resence Transformer RSE 3347A No No Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE:
h Electrical - Gen.: Reserve Transformer System Systent are included with the Normal Power [3347]
functions Electro-Hyd. Controt EHC EHC 3323C No No No No Yes No Yes NOTE: The Eledro-Hyd. Control: EHC System functions are included with the Turtune Generator Turbine Generator System.
N Cat. t components are electncalisolatson relays / devices which is monitored with the safety related systemsMunctions they protect (RPS). The FSAR indecates that this instrurrentation is NOT Safety Related and NOT credited in any accident analysis.
Emergency Dieset EDG Rm. Ventilation DGV 3314H Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes NOTE:
Risk Segnancant = "N*, CHANGE to "Y*;
Per
- Expert Panel *, Refer to MES-94-300.
Emergency Diesel Engine DES 3346A Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE: The Emergency Dieset Engine functions are induded with the Emergency Deset: Generator System.
Page 11
- W SystMn Name PM***> Local Safety Acc'd EOPs Prevent Sw.m Risk in Es "temarks iD ID Related Trans SR func orSS S% scop,
- E..ogency Deset Erhaust & MNinst DAX 3346A *s No No No No No Yes NOTE:
In Scope = "Y" CHANGE to 'N".
Safety Retsted = P. CHANGE to T.
Risk Sign 4 cant = "Y"; CHANGE to "N";
This system included the EDG - Auxiliaries. Per
" Expert Panef*, Refer to MES-94-256 & 300.
The Emergency Deset Exhause & Misc Inst functions are included with the Emergency Deset Generator System.
Emergency Dieset Fual Od DFS 3346B Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes NOTE:
" s'mergency Dieset Fuel Od System functions Sy ~- tod with the Emesgency Deset Generator Emergency Dieset Genera:or DGN 3346A Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Cmergency Desel- Lube Od DLS 3346A Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE:
The Emergency Deset Lube Od System funciens are included with the Emergency Dieset Generator System.
Ememency Deset. Startsng Air DSA 3346A Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes NOP:The Emergency Deset Starting Aar System furxswis are included with the Emergency Dieset '
Generator System.
Emergency Desel. Statson Blackout SbO 3346C No No Yes No No Yes Yes ESAS: EGLS ESA 3405 Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes NOTE: The ESAS: EGLS System functions are included with the Reactor Protec.aon: SSPS System.
ESA. Westinghouse 7300 Racks ESA 3407A Yes Yes No Na Yes Yes Yes MOTE:
The ESAS: Westinghouse 7300 Racks System functions are included with the Reactor Protection- f ' '4 .
SSPS System.
f k
h Page f2 l
(&
System Name N '~M I4
$% Ace'd EOPs .". .... L. si Risk . In '- - -
- 10 Related Yrans SR func orSS Sig Sem ESF-Infecten: Accumulators Sil 3307A Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE- i j
Risk Seruficant = T; i
SEE WES-94-256 -300 & NE-94-SAB-293.
The outlet check vaeves ase Rd Signdicant and must have performance entena estattehed. The tanks may be monnored under existag programs CTMT isolation Wrs (N2) Check valvesMOV for RCS l=% '
The Containment isolation functon is mondored under the Contamment: Containment isolatson System (3312A).
HPl 3308 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes ESF -Injection: LPSI LPl 3307A Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes The ESF - Laiection LPSI System functions are mctuded with the ESF -Injection Accumulators &
ESF - Ingedeon: Residual Heat Removal systems ESF-Injecton Recuculaton Spray CRS 3306 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes ESF Insection. RestfualHeat Removal RHR 3307B Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes ESF -Irjectran: RWST & Recuculation QSS 3307C Yes Yes Yes No .
No Yes Yes ESF -Ingeden: St Pp Ceolmg CCI * ;J
, Yes Yes Yes t;o No Yes Yes NOTE:
The ESF- hjechon: St Pp Cooing System functens are included with the ESF - Insecten:
HPSI System.
ESF - Quench Spray: Quench Spray QS$ 3309 Yes Yes Yes j No No Yes Yes ESF Ventdaten: ESF Bldg - - I ESG 3314D Yes Yes No Na No No Yes ESF Venidaton: ESF Bldg - Normal Vent ESG 3314DN No No No Y .2 No No Yes Provides indnect support based on shutdown nsk Procedures.
Feedwater: Feed Pump FPS 3321A Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes NOTE:
The Feedwatec Feed Pump System furwJions are ex,luded with the Feedwatec Feedwater System.
Feedwater: Feedwater FWS 3321A Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Page f3
. ~ . - - . . . . - - . _ . - - ~ . . . ~ . . , . . ~ . . - n. - ~ . . _ ~ - . . . - - - .- .
System Name - - ~ ~r ID - %ocal 10 SaletF Acc'd EOPs ?._ _ _. - Scram Rssk an P xT Ms .
Related Trans SR func or SS Sig scope ,
Feater: Pump & Dnve Lub FWL 3321D No No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE:
The Feedwater: Pump & Drive Lub System funchons are induded with the Feedwater .
Feedwater System.
- Feedwater: Recirculaten FWR 3321A No No No No Yes No Yes Feedwater. SG Level Cont of FWS 3321C No No Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
Per FSAR Volume 10 Secten 7.7.1.7 *CorWrol Systems NOT Requeed forSafety".
Safety Related = T CHANGE to V, The Cat I componerds within thes system were r musclassified cwcuit cards, they were downgraded '
per MEPL MP3-CD-1054 Feedwater: Seat & Leakoff FWP 3321B No No Yes No Yes No Yes a. System added to in-scope for "could cause* a scram. Expert Panelmeeting trunutes MP3-TS-E 362. b. System mondored under the Feedwater '
system (3321A).
' we Protecten: Alarm & Detection FtR 33410 No l
Yes Yes No No No Yes Fire Protecten: CO2 FPC 3341C No Yes Yes No No No Yes !
Fre Protecten: Deluge FPD 3341A No Yes Yes No No No Yes L Fre Proteuen: Fire Protecten FIR 3341 No Yes Yes No No No Yes Maintenance Rule seudo systra for other Fire Protecnon System Functions.
Fue Protecten: Halon FPG 33418 i
No Yes Yes No No No Yes Fire Protecten: Water FPW 3341A tio Yes Yes No No No Yes '
Gland SealWtrExh.: Gland Seal & Exhaus GSE 3323D
- No No
' f.
Yes No Yes No Yes a. System added to in-scope for 'couki cause* a scram. Empert Panel rneeeng rrunutes MP3-TS-E 362. b. System morutored under the Turbine i i
Generator System (3324). Scopeng revised to add '
EOP cntenon for SGTR recovery. Refer to EP meg.
MP3-TS-97-041.
Page f4 1
s . _m_. _ _ _ _ .__ . m. ...m .. ~ _.. _. . _._
Sy,,,, % PMM5 a_aeat Safety Acc'd EOPs Pi;.e.it Scram Risk in BasestRomarks 10 10 Related Trans SR func orSS 5 43 scop, .
Gland Seat Wtr1Exh.: Gland Seal Wtr. & Ex SGE 33230 No No Yes No Yes No Yes The CAT I population was reduced to O for scopeng based on MP3-TS-94-449 & MP3-TS-94-579. The S fstem was removed from In-Scope 8/1/94.
System added to in-scope for "could cause" a scram. Expert Panel meetag msnutes MP3-TS 362. Scopmg data was revised to include EOP scopmg for SGTR recovery Heater Drams: Extraction Drains HDS 3318 No No No No Yes No Yes a System added to in-scope for "could cause" a scram. Expert Panelmeetag mmutes MP3-TS 362.
Heater Drams- Feedwater HDS 3320 No No No No Yes No Yes a. System added to in-scope for "couki cause" a scram. Expert Panelmeeting mmutes MP3-TS 362. b. System mon 4ored under the Feedwater System (3321A).
Heater Drams: High Pressee Heaters HDH 3320 No No No No Yes No Yes NOTE:
System added to in-scope for "couki cause* a scram. Expert Panelmeeung mmutes MPJ-TS 362.
Heater Drams: Low Pressure Heaters HDL 3320 No
- No No No Yes No Yes intake Struct. Vert Supply & Exhaust ISV 3314G Yes No No No No No Yes Mam Steam Condenser Air Removat GTM 3329 No i
No Yes No Yes No Yes Per FSAR Volume 12 Section 10 4.2.3 The Conderwer Air Removal system is NOT Safety Related System added to in-scope for "could cause" a scram. Expert Panel meetag rrunutes MP3-TS-96-362. Scopog revised to add EOP 3 cnterion for SGTR recovery, refer to EP rntg. M3-TS- ,-
97-041. '-
Man Steam. Man Steam MSS 3316A Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes i IL*.am Steant Moest. Sep. Vent & Drain DSM 3317 No No No No Yes No Yes mam. Aosture Seperator Reheater MSR 3317 No No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE:
The Moisture Seperator Reheater System (MSR) functions are included with the Main Steam System (3316A).
Page 15
n ~ . . . . - .-- . - . ~ - . - - . - .- . - ..-. ~ - - - . .- ~.
Sy g % 7~ : Local Safety Acc'd EOPs Prevent Scrarn Rosit in ID ID
"-l.'"-
-ks ~
Related Trans SRfune orSS Sig scop.
- r Man Steam: Reheatec Vent & Drain DSR 3317 No No Yes No Yes No Yes isoistoon of MSR, W...J by MSS-MOv50A & B. i MSS-AOV-PDV36A & B, and MSS-AOV-PDV-37A '
& B, are monitored unthin the Main Steam System. j MamSteam S/GBlowdown BDG 3316C No No Yes No No No Yes NOTE: The Cat.1 components are associated with contamment isolation and are monitored anth system 3312A. Contamment isolation.
Man Steam. Steam Dump Control STG 3316B No
[
No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE: Per FSAR Volume 10 Section 7.7.1.8
' Control Systems NOT Required for Safety" !
Man Steam. Steam Generator STG 3316A Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE:
The Main Steam: Steam Generator System i Secondity Side funchons are included with the Main S2eam Main Stearn System. l Man Steam- Turtune Plant Deains [
DTM 3316A No No No No No No No NOTE:
The Cat I components contained within this system are associated unth the Contamment isolation l fundson only. These components will be considered a portion of the Contamment isolation System. The funcbons addressed with EOPs are also Ctmt '
isolabon '
Man Turb. Lube Od Main Turb. Lube Od LOS 3323B No No No No Yes No Yes a. System added to in-scope for could cause" a t
scram. Expert Panelmeehng mmutes MP3-TS ,
362. b. System anonstored under the Turbine Generator System (3324).
Met Tower MET 9999 No No No No No No !
No This in not a PMMS 10. The Met Tower does nrat i have a PMMS 10. The Met Tower detemuned not in scope, by the Expert Panet on 2/4/97, pe. i P3-TS-l 97-054. Not used in EOPs, used in Emenpncy ',f.'
Plan procedures, therefore does not meet the scopeg cntens t Mrsc Domestic Serv: Domestic Water DWS 3340A No No Yes No No No Yes Function to M DWST and provide for feed and bleed coolmg for CCf and CCE systems.
j Misc. Domeste Serv: Hot Water Heating HWH 3331D Yes No No No No No Yes Misc. Domeste Serv: Hot Water Pre-beat HWH 3331F No No No No No No No NOTE The Cat.1 components are elecincal iwd=8 son releysAlevices which are monsored with the safety related systems /funchons they protect.
Page 16 i
System H: : PMMS 4.ocal S1., Acc'd EOPs Prevent Scram Risk an ID Bases / Remarks 10 Related Trans SR func or SS Sig scop, ,
Mrsc. DorreN Serv: Sanitary SAN 3336A No No No No No No No Masc. Domestic Serv: Station Sumps SSS 3950A No No No No No No No Misc. Domeste Serv: Waste OilDrsposal WOS 33368 No No No No No No No Mis mst & Cont: Annunciators ANN 3408 No No Yes No No No Yes NOTE: The Cat. I components are electncal leasahai feleys/ devas whidi are monitored with the safely related systems # unctions they protect.
Annunciators are nonsafety grade (FSAR 7.1.1.5)
ALSO SEE NOTE at Misc. Inst & Cont: Control !
Circuit isolators (34151 system.
Ongmany this system was not included in scope.
Refer to MP3 Expert Panel Meetag minutes MP3-TS-95-083. Ttus decision was later changed Refer "
to EP meetog rmnutes, M3-TS-97-041.
Mist Inst & Cont: Aux. Shutdown Panel ASP 3411 Yes No No No No No Yes NOTE: The panelis safety related.
Mrsc. Inst & Cort Control Circus isolators BOP 3415 No No No No No No No NOTE: The Cat. I components are electncal isolation relays /devsces which are morutored with the safety related systems #unciens they protect.
Per FSAR Vol 9 Secten 1.2.1.1.8, Analog isolators; The analog signals derived from '
protecten (P) channels for non-protectwo functions are obtained through isolation amplifiers. By defwuhon, nca-protective funciens include those ;
signals used for control, remote process indication, and computer monitonng.
Digdal isolators: Are provided where necessary for , i BOP equipment. Isolator catunets provide an '
y, interface between Class IE equipmen and NON-Class IE equipment.
As the (3) genene instrument funchons [ Provide dispany, alarm, and control signais a funchonst wel
(
capture aR Reg Guide 1.97 instruments and their funchons. ,
Masc. Inst & Cont: EEQ Area Temp Mondor ECS 3311E No No No No No No No Page 17
System h PMMS Local Safety Acc'd EOPs .^ie.e,a Scram Rask in Bases /Romarks ID ID Related Trans SR func orSS Sig Scope
- Misc. Inst & Cont: Foxboro Spec 200 Rack CES 34078 Yes No No No No No Yes Misc. Inst & Cont: Foxt'oro Spec 200. This system contams manerous Cat.1 ids (power supphes signal condstoners, isolators, etc) assocated with safety related instrument functions from other systems. Many functions are included in customer systems as wet.
Mesc. Inst & Cont: Main Control Boards MCB 3414 Yes No No No No No Yes NOTE: The MCBs are safety related.
Misc Inst & Cont Plant Computer CMP 3349 No No Yes No No No Yes NOTE The Plant Computer DOES NOT derectly support cribcal safety functions. Further, By lisence the operators are required to perform wth the computerinoperable. Therefore, the system was not ongina5y included in scope to the rule. Refer to MP3 Expert Panet Meeteng Meutes MP3-TS 083. However, this deosion was later changed based on operator desire to have thes system ,
availatde for EOP mitigaten.
Misc. Inst & Cont Securdy SEC 3721 No No No No No No No NOTE:
Security Sysyems are "OUTSIDE the SCOPE of the Maintenance Rule" Per Section 8.2.1.6 of NUMARC 9341.
Mrsc. Inst & Cont. Seism.c Monitor SEM 3413 No No No No A No No NOTE: The only cra@s4s wnhin this system -
which are classifi ed as CAT i as of 11/15/94 are 5 battenes used ethin the seistmc instruments as backup power. The instruments themselves are not Cat L Therefore the system itself is not safety related.
N Stueld Tk Coohng- N Shield Tk Coohng NSC 3330F No No No Yes No No Yes NOTE: The one Cat.1 ID is the neutron shield '
tank. 3NSS7K2 which is safety related because it #-
support the reactor vesset. This funchon win be included in 3301A. Reactor Costant Vesset. The system was added to scope as it provsdes a function to rnoderate neutrons for functioneg of the Excore Nuclearinstrumentatson.
Normal Power System NPS 3347 No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes NOTE-PLACED "tN-SCOPE" AS A ROLL-UP SYSTEM Page f8
System Name PMMS Local Salety Acc'd EOPs Prevent Scram Rask in a- r?-ds .:'
ID ID Related Trans SR func orSS Sig Scope ,
Nuclear instruments- Excore - Gammametri NME 3401 Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
Risk Sigruficant = "Y"; CHANGE to v; Per " Expert Paner". Refer to MES-94-25C & -300.
Nuclear Instruments: Incore Nrs IMS 3403 No No No No No No No NOTE: The Cat.1 component is the seal table '
which is safety related due to its RCS pressure boundary function. This function is monitored with systems 3301. RCS.
Per FSAR Volume 10 Secten 7.7 " Control Systems NOT Required for Safety";
The Incore Instio...oi.i.&m system is hsted in Section 7.7.1.9 Approved by the Expert Panel at L% SEP 13,95 meetag. Refer to MEMO MES-95-230.
Nuclear Instru wts: Intermediate Range NMI 3401 Yes No Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
The Nuclear instruments: Intermediate Range System funchons are included with the Nuclear instruments: Excore - Gammametncs System.
Nuclear instruments: Power Range fatP 3401 Yes Yes Yes .Jo No No a Yes NOTE: The Nuclear instruments: Power Range System fundions are included with the Nuclear instruments: Excore - Gammametncs System.
- Nuclear Instruments: Source Range NMS 340t Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes NOTE: The Nuclear lostrurnents: Source Range System fundens are included with the Nuclear Instruments: Excore - Gammametrics System.
O l
Page 19
__ ~ - ""
-~
System Name ' T- Local Safety Acc'd EOPs ".;.../ S '
ID 10 Riset in "- T _- 1.
Related Trans SR func orSS Sig Scop,
- Post Au uent S .v;w: Liquid Sample PAS 3311C-1 Yes No No No No No Yes NOTE: The Post Acadent Sample System LIQUID functions (3311C-1) ONLY are included with this System.
Some Cat. I components within this system are valves that are aduaNy part of the Aar Sample &
Monitor system 3311C-2.
The Cat.1 ume ..;. associated wsth boundary valves for RCS, LPSI. OSS, and CVCS are monitored by their respective systems. T he Cat.1 components assooated with containment esolation which are morutored with system 3312A.
r' -L-._. ..,Isolaten. The Cat.1 components assosted with electncalisolation relays / devous are morutored with the safety related s,L...Ar.;;; .e they protect. Adddionalpy, the system cortaens numerous expansion joints which are Cat.1 because sample piping originating from safety related equipment out to the sample selechon valves or second manual was desegned as safety class 2 or 3.
Prrnary Water Pdnary Water PWS 3340C flo No No No No No No NOTE: The Cat. I components are associated with contaenment isolation and are monitored with system 3312A, Containment isolaten Rao atron Mondors: Radeten Mocators RMS 3404 Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Radcactrve Waste: Boron Recovery BRS 3335C No No No No No No No NOTE:
In-Scope = "Y" CHANGE to v; Safety Reisted = T CHANGE to Y; NO Safety Related function. The 4 CAT 1 ,
components are loop recorders & alarm modules ' ;/
Radioactive Waste: Gaseous GWS 3337 - No No No No No No No NOTE: The Cat.1 components are associated with containment isolation valves and secondary containment isolatoon which are monitored wth system 3312A, Contaenment isola 00n and 33141, SLCRS. w .;.,.
Radioactive Waste: Gaseous GWS 3337 No No No No No No No Page 20 a _ _ _
_._ . _...__ _ __m . _ _ - - m. _.m -. .._
. _m __ . . _ _ - . . - _ . . _ . _. . . . . ._. . . .
{
t System Name 7;,; i Local Safety Acc*d EOPs Prevent S-- Risk in ID 10
- _- - is '
Related Trans SR func or SS Sig scop.
- Rz,(-ctwe Waste: Glycol Heating GHT 3337 No No No i
No No No No NOTE:
' i in-Scope = "Y" CHANGE to *N"; .
i Safety Reinted = "Y', CNANGE to "N";
- The Cat I components contained within this system are asear= tad with the the Hot Water .~ ' ,
supply & resum Ene SOVs (P&lD 137B) for Area Venida60n Units in the Auxiliary Bldg They do not provide any signdicare maigahve function.
Radioactive Waste: Liquid RLW 33358-2 No No No No No No No NOTE: The EOP 3505A (Loss of Spent Fuel Foot i
t Cochng) cheds er the
- RAD LIQUID WASTE TROUBLE" annurxistor; Nowever, if ht go to AOP - ;
3572 (Fadure of Refuehng Canty Seal), the EOP '
does not provide any signancant nutegatwe '
furu: hon. Approved by the Expert Panel at tre SEP 13.1995 mechng Refer to MEMO MES-95-222, &
230. '
Radoactwe Waste: Liqued and AER Draens RLW 333563-1 Yes No No No No No Yes The Cat.1 components associated with i containment isoashon valves are r cutored with
- system 3312A . The Cat.1 comporWits for esecincat separation are mondored wdh the safety i related sN they protect Radeoactwe Waste: Rx Plant Gas VRS 3337 No No No No No No No c NOTE: The Cat I w,v ..;c.:s contained wittun tius i
i system are assocsated with the Containment +
lsolahon funchon only. They are considered a portiori of the Contaenment isolahon system.
Radeactwe Waste: Rx Plant Gas Draens j DGS 3335A No No No No No No No f30TE: The Cat.1 components are associated with contaoiment isolatron valves wench wie be monitored . !
with the Containment le system 3312A. '
4.'
Radioactrve Waste: Sohd SRS 3338 No No i No No No No No .
Reactor Coolart incore Thermocouples CTS 3410A Yes No No No Yes No Yes NOTE:
Per FSAR Volume to Sedson 7.7.1.9.1 " Control Systems NOT Requeed for Safety". (Safety Reinsed
- changed from "Y* to *N") i This system includes the inadequase Core Coohng Mondor(ICCM)
\
Page 2f f, t
f
.. . . - _ _ _ ~ . . . - - - -. - . . ~.. . - .-. . . . - . . ,.
O System Name PMMS ."
Local Safety Acc'd EOPs Prevent Scram Rask in Bases / Remarks ID ID Related Trans SR func orSS Sig scop, ,
Reactor Cootant: RCP Vibra; ion Monitor RCP 3402 No No No No No No No Reactor Coolant. Reactor Coolant RCS 3301 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes NOTE:
This system includes the Pnmary Sde of the SCs &
the Pressurizer functens.
Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Pp RCP 3301 Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
The Pressure Boundary intepity (Radioactive fluid) functon is included with the Reactor Coolant.
Reactor Coolard p301) system.
Reactor Coolant. Reactor Vessellevel RVL 34108 Yes No Yes No No No Yes Reactor Coolant: Samphng SSR 3311A Yes No No No No No Yes NOTE: The Cat. I components are associated wdh containment isolaten and associated electncal isolaten devices which are nur:itored with system 3312A. Containment isolation. AdditionaNy, the system contains numerous expansion joints which are Cat 1 because sample piping origantag from safety related equipment out to the sample selection wahres or second manual was designed as sfery class 2 or 3. The MEPL indicates that the samphng functon is ned safety related. Thas function is not currently rnonstored through RCS leakage.
Reactor Coolant: Vessel RXX 3301A Yes No Yes No No No Yes NOTE: The Reactor Coolant: Vessel system includes the vessel, intemsts and fuel.
Reactor Protecten: SSPS RPS 3406 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes RPCCW. RPCCW CCR 3330A Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE:
Risk Segneficant = W* CHANGE to "Y"; ,-
Per
SEE MES-94-428 & NE.94.SAB-407.
Rx Fuel Handhng: Rx Fuel Handhng FHS 3303 Yes No No No Yes No Yes NOTE: The Cat 1 ids are asraiated with safety related funciens of the equement for supporting CRDMs and handling fuel. See FSAR Table 3.2-1.
Page 22
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d 2
System Name PMMS Local Safety Ace'd EOPs Prevent Scram Rask in Bases 4Lamarks 10 10 Related Trans SR func orSS Sig Scope '
Rx M nt Chd Water: Rt Plant Chd Water CWD 3330C No No No No No No No NOTE: The Cat.1 components are assocsated with containment isolaten and are monitored ath system 3312A, Contasnment Isan=han Per Volume 10 FSAR Sedion 9.2 2 fcA Systems for Reactor Auxihanes) & 9 2.2.2 (Chdied Water System) %ngte fadure evaluatsons are NOT i presented for the chdled water system since the system is neither safety related nor requered for a safe reactor shutdown" o PlantVentdalson. Aux BkhVent RPV 3314A Yes Yes No No No No Yes Rx Plant Ventdation: Fuet Bldg RPV 3314C Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Rx Plant Ventdahon: SLCRS & ration RPV 33141 Yes Yes No No No No Yes NOTED CD-1145 chariged door WD-43-2 to safety related '
because it is part of the SLCRS boundary This door separates the Aux. Bldg and the Waste Desposal Bldg CD-1145 indicates that the West desposat Badq, System 39000, is not sagety ?
related. Monstering of door WIM3-2 we be
. accomphshed with the SLCRS system,3314L Rm Plant Ventdahon: Waste Disposal RPV 33t4B Yes No No No No No Yes NOTE:
1he Cat I m.@a.as contained within thes system are assxseted with the St.CRS function only.
These w.6a.-3 wW be considered a portion of the Rx Plant Ventdation:SLCRS Fdtrahon (33141)
System.
Screen Wash: Screen Wash SCW 3327 No No Yes No Yes No Yes EOPs for SGTR recovery, refer to EP mig. M3-TS-97-041. ..
Screen Wash: Travehng Screens TRS 3327 No No Yes No Yes No Yes EOPs for SGTR recovery, refer to EP rneg. M3-TS-97-041.
Service Bldg Vent. Othce Bldg Vent OBV 3314E No No No No No No No Service Bidg Vent: Serv. Bldg. Air Condshon ASB 3314E No No No No No No No Servke Bldg Vent: Serv. B8dg. Ventdation SBV 3314E No No No No No No No Page 23
-_ -. .. - -- ~~ ~
I Systern Name PMMS Local Safety Ace'd EOPs Prevent Sw Rssk in Eat,sa/ Remarks **
10 ID Related Trans SR func or SS Sig scop, .
Servce Water: Chlorine CHL 3328 No No No No No ' No No NOTE: The Cat.1 components are to isolate this system from the Sennce Water in accidt.-nt cond.1% This isolation furichor,is currently addressed within the Service Water system,3326.
(3WTC*AOV25A & TATC*AOv258)
Serv:ce Water: Service Water SWS 3326 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NOTE:
The follounng components from the Service Water.
Chlorine System (3326) was be conssered as part of the Service Water: Service Water System (3326)-
- 3WTC*AOV25A
- 3WTC*AOV258 Spent Fuel Coohng: Spent Fuel Coohng SFC 3305 Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Designated Non-risk Signdicant by Expert Panet Refer to memo MES-95-310 & MES-95-321 Structures: Aux Boder Bldg BGB 3900P No No No No No No No Structures: Aux bary Budding BGA 39000 Yes Y=s Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
Part of the SLCRS Boundary S'ructures. Cond Pohsh Badg DJL 3900N No No No No No No No Structures: Containment Enclosure Bidg BG1 3900 fes Yes No No N. No Yes NOTE:
' Part of the SLCRS Boundary Structures: Contauvnent Structure BGC 3312A Yes Yes Yes 'n No Yes Yes NOTE:
Risk Sognticant = 'W*, CHANGE to T.
Per Typert Panet*
Refer to MES-94-256. -300 & 428.
Structures: Control Bidg BGJ 3900H Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
Includes the Cable Tunnel j
- ,f Structures: Cranes & Hoists BGK 3900R No No No Yes No No Yes Polar & high Jib Cranes in Containment.
Structures:DeselEng Bldg BGD 3!A01 Yes No No No No No Yes NOTE:
Includes the Fuel Od Tank Vaut Structures: Descharge BG2 3900 Yes No No No No No Yes NOTE:
includes the Crculating Water Discharge Tunnel.
Structures: Elevators ELV 3900S No No No No No No No Page 24
. _m . . .. . _ . . . . _ __ ..-, . _ .
System Name PMMS *MM Sadety Acc'd EOPs Proverst Scram R:sn are Pr "~
ID ID Related Trans SR func or SS Sig se,p,
- Structures: ESF Bldg BGE 3900E Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes NOTE-Past of the SLCIIS Boundary Structures: Fuel B3dg BGF 3900C Yes Yes No No he No Yes NOTE:
Includes the Railroad Cmopy Structures: H2 Recomb Bldg BGH 3900F Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes NOTE:
Part of the SLCRS Boundary Structures. Intake BGP 3900K Yes No No No No No Yes NOTE:
locludes the Carcelatang & Service Water Pumphouse and the V-% Petainsng Wall.
Structures: Misc Bldgs BGQ 3900T No No No No No No No Structures: MSV Bldg BGM 3900M Yes Yas No No No No Yes NOTE-Part of the SLCRS BoundinY Structures Service Bkig BGS 3900G Yes No No No No No Yes NOiE: The orvy Cat 1. ID is a flood door. FSAR Table 3.2-1 indacates that the Cable Tunnel from the Aux. Bldg. to the Control Budding is Cat.1. The tunnelis considered part of the Service Busiding.
3900G.
Structures: Tectncat Support Cntr TSC 3900J Ho No No No No No No NOTE.
Emergm Facileties Desenbed in tne Emergency Plan ars "OUTSIDE the SCOPE of the Maintenance Rule" Per Section 8.2.I 6 d NUMARC 93-01.
Structures: Turtune Bldg BGT 3900A No No No Yes No No Yes '
Structures: Warehouse #5 BGR 39008. No No No No No No No Structures: Waste DisposalBldg BGW 3900D No No No No No No No NOTE CD-1145 changed door WD43-2 to safety related because it is t set c! the SLCRS boundary.
This door separates me Aux. Bldg and the Waste Disposal Badg. CD-1145 indicates that the Wast disposal Badg. System 39000. is not sagety related. Mondoring of door WD43-2 wr'l be accompleshed with the SLCRS system 33141.
Structures: Yard Areas YDA 39000 Yes No No No No No Yes The Cat 1 components are the safety related man.We covers.
Page 25 i
...-n_.--.-_..__.--,---, ..-.~.- . .~ .. . . . . . _ . - , . - _ . . . . .- . _ . - . . ~
}_ _
m r+
Syg g f -- ; a_ ~ M Safety Acc'd EOPs .".u _, Swism Risk en - '-
ID 10 Related Trans .
SR func or 35 Sig scop, TPCCW: TPCCW CCT 33308 No No No No Yes No Yes System added to in scape for *couM cause* a t
scrant Empert Panet meeting nunutes MP3-TS 362.
Turtune Generator Exceer MEX 3324E No No. No No Yes No Yes NOTE:
The Tambine Generator. Exater System funchons are induded wilh the Turbine Generator. Turbine Generator Systent Turtune Gm.!ur:if2 CO2 & H2 Coohng MGH 3324C No No No No Yes No Yes a. System added to in-scope for 'could cause" a scram. Expert Panei rneeeng manus 94P3-TS 362. b. System mondored under Turbine Generator System (3324).
Turtune Generator Isophase Bus Duct Cool 18 0 3324C No - No No No Yes No Yes NOTE:
The Turbine Generator: Isophase Bus Duct Coohng System funchons are inciudod with the Tambine Generator Turbine Generator System. 1 Turtane Generator. Main Generator MGN 3324A No No No No Yes No Yes a. The CAT 1 c,..,~;a.as arc Generator Sus C "
i temperature elements b. System added to in-scope for "coe*f es rse" a scrar i. Expert Panet 4
meehng nunutes MP3-TS.96-362. ct System mondored under :he Turbine Generator System ;
(3324). '
Turtune Generator: Shaft Seals MGO 3324B Ho No No No Yes No Yes a. System is Hydrogen seal od.' System added to in-scope for"could cause"a scram. Expert Pc.w '
mechng nunutes MP3-1S-96-362. b. Systern mondored under Turtune Generator System (3324).
Turtane Generator Stator Coohng SLC 3324D No No No No Yes No Yes NOTE- .
~-
The Turtune Generator Stator Cochng System Punctions are included with the Turbine Generator i[.
Turtune Generator System.
The CAT 1 components are Stator coolant entemal -
temperature instruments Turtune Generator Supervisory inst TSI 3323E No No No No No No No Erpert Panel detemuned not in scope for "could i cause" a scrum. Expert Panet moetng rrmules MP3-TS-96-420.
I y
Page 26 -
f t
?
. . _ . . . . . _ . , . . ._,m . _ _ _ . . . . __ . _ _ . . _ . _ . , . . _ . .
d Q% T=3 10 1MM Safety Acc'd EOPs Prevent Su-o R:sk in BMemarks 10 Related Trans SR func orSS Sig scep3 ,
Turt>me Generatoc Turbine STB 3323A No No No No Yes No Yes NO1E-The Turbins Generatoc Turbine System functions are incle-;ad with the Turbine Generatoc Tusbine Generator System (3324). a Turbme Generator: Turbane Generator Syst TGS 3324 No No No No Yes No Yes NTE:
PLACED"IN-SCOPE' AS A ROLL-UP SYSTEM Waste Treatment: Waste Water WTW 3340B No No No No No No No 4
J .
i 6
Page 27
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