ML20086L021
| ML20086L021 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek, Callaway, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1984 |
| From: | NUCLEAR PRODUCTS CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086L019 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 GL-82-33, NUDOCS 8402070117 | |
| Download: ML20086L021 (92) | |
Text
- _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW StMMARY REPORT FOR THE STANDARDIZED NUCLEAR UNIT POWER PLANT SYSTEM (SNUPPS)
Wolf Creek Plant - Kansas, Gas and Electric Co.
^
Docket No. STN 50-482 Callaway Plant - Union Electric Company Docket' No. STN 50-483 -
& r
. i
~ '
- In Response To:
. Sup'plement I to NUREG 0737 M
Issued February 2,1984/
4
}
h -
8402070117 840202
_ ABSTRACT This report summarizes the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) conducted for the Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Pl ant System (SNUPPS) plants (Callaway and Wol.' Creek). This review of the human engineering of the control rooms has been performed as prescribed by NUREG-0700. Since the control rooms for the two plants are identical, except for the site-related panels and other minor differences, a connon review has been possible. The review started in late 1980 and is now complete, except for control room environmental aspects, which will be reported in a supplement to this report. The PDA accounts for approximately two-thirds of the findings identified to date. The PDA findings and the planned resolutions to those findings have previously been reported to the NRC. Work is underway to complete implementation of these resolutions prior to fuel load at each pl ant . Resolution of the remaining findings, including any findings from the review of control room environmental aspects, will be completed prior to the end of tne first refueling outage.
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page 1.0 METH000 LOGY l-1 1.1 Review Plan 1-1 1.1.1 General 1-1 1.1.2 Constraints on Program 1-4 1.1.3 Coordination of Control Room Irr.provenents with 1-4 Other Programs 1.2 Management and Staffing 1-6 1.3 Documentation 1-11 1.3.1 Input Documentation 1-11 1.3.2 Output' Documentation 1-12 1.4 Review Procedures 1-13 1.4.1 ' Operating Experience Review 1-13 1.4.2 System Function Review and Task Analysis 1-13 1.4 . 3 Control ~ Room Inventory 1-17 1.4.4 Control Room Survey. 1-17 1.4.5 Verification of Task Performance Capabilities 1-19 1.4.6' Validation of Control Room Functions 1-19 2.0 REVIEW FINDINGS 2-1 2.1 General 2-1 2.2 Control Room-Wide Survey Findings 2-3 2.2.1 Workspace and Environment 2-3 2.2.2 Corrrnunications 2-4 2.2.3 Annunciator Warning System 2-4 2.2.4 Labels and Location Aids 2-4 2.3 Panel / Work Station Findings 2-5 2.3.1- Controls 2-5 2.3.2 Displ ays 2-5 2.3.3 . Process Computer 2-6 l 2.3.4 Panel Layout 2-6 l 2.3.5 Control Display Integration 2-7 2.4 Other Review Findings 2-7 l 2.4 .1 Task Perfonnance Capability 2-7 2.4.2 Validation Program 2-7 3.0 IMPLEMENTATION 3-1 3.1- Completed Improvements 3-1 3.2 Proposed Improvements 3-1 i
L
TABLE OF CONTE,NT,5 1
fase
4.0 REFERENCES
TO SNUPPS SUBMITTALS TO NRC ON DCRDR 4-1 5.0 APPENDICES A. Standard Forms Used in PDA A-1 B. Forms Used for Task Analysis and Verification of B-1 Task Performance Capabilities C. Forms Used in Validation of Centrol Room Functions C-1 D. Supplementary Survey D-1 E. Hwnan Factors Review of Auxiliary Shutdown Panel E-1 F. Verification of Task Performance Capabilities F-1 G. Validation of Control Room Functions G-1 H. Forms for Environmental Survey H-1 I
l l
l l
l 1.0 METHODOLOGY l 1.1 Review Plan 1.1.1 General
. The scope and dates of the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) are summarized in Table 1.1.1.
The human engineering review of the control room was started by SNUPPS in mid-1980 in response to TMI Action Plan Iten I.D.1. The review was initiated early, before construction of the Callaway and Wolf Creek control rooms was completed, in order to provide more time to make modifications resulting from the review. The availability of a working simulator of the SNUPPS control rooms, located at the Westinghouse Training Center in Zion, Illinois, made this early start practicable. The review is applicable to both Callaway and Wolf Creek, since the control rooms are of a standa-dized design, except for the site-specific panels, which control the off-site power systems, the circulating water system and the service water systems. These aspects of the Callaway and Wolf Creek panels were reviewed on a plant specific basis.
The simulator at the Westinghouse Training Center has site-related control panels, indicators, displays and controls identical to the Callaway design.
Although the SNUPPS DCRDR began prior to issuance of NUREG-0700, the DCRDR includes all of the elements prescribed by NUREG-0700 and NRC Generic Letter 82-33. The SNUPPS review included the following tasks:
o Establishment of a multidisciplinary review tean o Review of operating experience o System functions review and task analysis o Control room inventory o Control room survey o Verification of task performance capabilities o Control room validation as an integrated system o Assessment of findings and implementation of resolutions The initial control room survey was perfonned to the guidelines of NURE0/
CR-1580. However, as will be described, the SNUPPS DCRDR included iterations that ensure respcnsiveness to the guidelines of NUREG-0700. For exanple, NUREG-0700 guidelines were used by SNUPPS to evaluate control board modifi-cations and by NRC reviewers of the SWUPPS control room.
The planning and implementation phases of the SNUPPS DCRDR are shown schem-atically in Figure 1.1.1, Most of the actions described within the blocks are self-expl anatory. Those requiring further explanation are discussed in the following sections.
1-1
TRBE 1.1.1 SCOPE OF EFFORP d
S t M ~i t M, En 5 s s a *2 s s s "? s by fg Nx @ DN es zu M en e k9 ec DATE OF GUIDANCE tb a b b UM US REVIN EF10RP PERFORMANCE MU [@ hg[ h h [g REFERENG:
Prelimic.ary Design August 1980 NUREG/CR- / / Ref. 2, 3, 4, 6 Assessment (PDA) to June 1981 1580
[ NRC Audit July 1981 NUREG-0700 V Ref. 4, 5,10 Review of Aux- Sept. 1983 NUREG-0700 Appendix E iliary Shutdown Panel (ASP)
Verification of Jan. 1983 to NUREG-43700 / / / / Appendix P Task Perfonnan Jan. 1984 Capabilities validation of Sept. 1983 NUREG-0700 / Appendix G Integrated System Supplementary Jan. 1984 NUREG-0700 / App 3ndix D Survey (SS)
Review of March 1984 NUREG-0700 / Supplement to this Environmental report.
Aspects
Figure 1.1.1 SCHEMATIC OF REVIEW PLAN Management Actions Review Team Actions Es.tablish objectives; coordinate with other TMI-actions plans 4
Identify & commit resources. Select review team 6
Identify constraints on program: Prepare detailed work
-Construction s. plans. Gather refer-Schedule
' ence materials.
-Supporting WOG programs v i [ Prepare schedule i I
I
- - - - - - - - ,, ,PL ,AN ,, ,NING , ,- - - - - - - - --------
I l
l Perform review l l Joint Actions I
) Integrate with other qp_,
design / construction I _;) requirements.
l ,
l V
l Recommend control l room changes g
I sv ss Concur with control room changes; initiate implementa-tion.
I l
I Final Report -
b - - - __ __ - _ 9
yMonitor Progress I
yline Function 1-3 i
1.1.2 Constraints on Program As previously noted, one of the constraints on the progran was that the DCRDR was started when construction of the control rooms was still underway.
The availability of a working SNUPPS-specific simulator, on which utility operating personnel had initial training, made it possible to perform detailed surveys of the control panels, indicators, displays and controls.
The survey of the simulator was supplemented by surveys of the partially-completed control rooms, including the site-specific p:nels. However, review of control room environmental f actors: lighting, noise lewl, connunications had to be delayed until completion of construction of the first SNUPPS control room (Callaway). Some aspects of these environmental reviews are still pending construction completion and will be described in a supplement to this report.
A second major constraint was that the Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) generic to Westinghouse reactors were still under development by the Westing-house Owners Group, when the SNUPPS DCRDR was begun. The ERGS are the basis for the system functional reviews and task analyses (SRTA) in the SNUPPS DCRDR. This constraint has been accommodated in the following ways. First, concurrent with the detailed survey of the SNUPPS control panels, operators who had trained on the SNUPPS simulator were interviewed about the effective-ness of the design and a limited set of emergency procedures was performed on the simulator under the observation of the Human Engineering Consultant.
Second, following compietion of the generic ERGS, a full set of emergency procedures was performed on the simulator at the Callaway site. The emphasis was on the adequacy of the ERGS, but the program was video-taped and selected procedures were later reviewed by a Human Engineering Consultant with respect to validation of the SNUPPS control room. Third, displays and controls identified by the SRTA as necessary for performance of emergency procedures were examined in the context of a task analysis that followed the guidelines of NUREG-0700.
1.1.3 Coordination of Control Room Improvements with Other Programs An underlying concept of the control room design is that it must be possible to operate the plant if the plant computer and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) are inoperable. Therefore the primary review of the control room design assumed that the computer systems were unavailable. The review provided assurance that instruments and controls, annunci ators and status light panels on the control boards are adequate for performance of normal
( procedures and emergency operating procedures. However, the task analysis i considered the integrated system of control board instruments and controls, I the SPDS, the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) and plant computer.
The SPDS was also reviewed separately from a Human Engineering standpoint in the course of its development by a group of utilities with Westinghouse pl ants . The locations of the CRTs and printers for the plant computer and SPDS have been selected by Utility Operations personnel in concert with the architect / engineer and Utility and Staff engineering personnel.
Because of the relatively advanced state of the SNUPPS design relative to operating PWRs, the modifications in response to Reg. Guide 1.97 have been 1-4
1.1.3 Coordination of Control Room Improvements with Other Programs, continued relatively minor. The instrumentation for post-accident monitoring was reviewed as part of the primary raview of the control boards. So, toe, were controls and displays associated with post-TMI modifications.
Plant specific emergency procedures have been validated on the Callaway simulator. Each SNUPPS site has a simulator. These simulators are being updated to provide virtually complete fidelity to the control rooms. Opera-tor training at each site includes extensive training on the plant simulator.
1-5
1.2 Management and Staffing The SNUPPS DCP.DR has been coordinated by the SNUPPS Staff organization, which is the central organization established by the SNUPPS Utilities to manage the design and . licensing of the SNUPPS plants. A Human Factors Plant Review Group (HFPRG), consisting of a group of professionals from the operations and engineering deparMents of the SNUPPS Utilities, has been continuously involved in the DCRDR. This core group of professionals was supplemented in one or more of the interrelated programs of the DCRDR by personnel from Bechtel (the architect / engineer), Westinghouse (the reactor supplier), and Human Engineering consultants.
The SNUPPS Stafi' and HFPRG members reviewed and became familiar with the methods and content of relevant NRC reports and general human f actors engi-neering objectives and methodology. The HFPRG members are f amiliar with the design and operational aspects of the SNUPPS plants. Several members had training on the SNUPPS simulator at Zion and were able to apply that training directly in the review.
The organizational structure of the DCRDR Team is shown in Figure 1.2.1. The team is headed by the SNUPPS Technical Director, who serves as Project Mana-ger. The Project Manager is responsible to the SNUPPS Technical Comittee, wnich is constituted of the Nuclear Engineering Managers of the SNUPPS Utilities. The Technical Comittee, throughout the SNUPPS project, repre-sented the SNUPPS Utilities and has the responsibility for design decisions.
The SNUPPS Operations Committee, which consists of the Plant Superintendants at Callaway and Wolf Creek, has also provided overview of the DCRDR and has provided input regarding design decisions to the Technical Comittee.
A Project Leader, functioning as Deputy Project Manager, provides the day-to-day coordination of the activities of the DCRDR.
Other major participants in the DCRDR are Human Engineering Consultants, Utility engineering and operations personnel, SNUPPS Staff engineers and represenatatives of the architect / engineer, Bechtel. Three Human Engineering Consultant finns were utilized in order to benefit from special expertise offered by each. Essex Corporation was selected to perform the initial Control Room survey because it had authored NUREG/CR-1580 and had conducted several other control room surveys. ARD Corporation was selected to assist in the preparation of DCRDR Program Plan, because it had authored several other program plans, and to assist in the review of control room environ-l mental f actors and in the task analysis. ARD was also used as the Human Engineering Consultant by the group of utilities that cooperatively developed the SPDS. NUS Corporation was selected for the plant specific review of video tapes of walk-throughs of the emergency procedures on the Callaway simulator, because of the qualifications of NUS personnel.
The experience, qualifications and approximate time spent on the project for each of the core professionals of the HFPRG and SNUPPS Staff is given in Table 1.2.1. In addition to these people, there were several other engineers from Bechtel and Westinghouse involved in the implementation of design ch ange'. .
l l
1-6 i
Figure 1.2.1 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Utility ~ Utility Technical -------------- Operations Committee , Committee DCRDR PROJECT TEAM l
SNUPPS Technical Dir.
(Proj. Mgr.)
SNU)P5 SNUPPS Proj. Leader ------------ Staff (Dep.Proj Mgr) Engineers i
Human Ut ility utility Architect Engrg. Engrg. Operations Engineer Consultants (Bechtel)
I 1
I W555 Other Vendor Vendors W
l l
1-1 1
Human Facters/ Tire Sp:.nt on Title Person License Held Education (Degree) Nuclear Exp. (with) HFPRG Technical Director F. Schwoerer (S) -
MS Marine E 26 yrs. 3 yrs.
(Project Manager) '
Project Leader J. Klein (S) -
BSME 6 yrs. 3 yrs.
(Deputy Proj.Mgr.)
SNUPPS Staff Engr. J. Riley (S) -
BSAeroE,MBA 7 yrs. 1 yr.
SNUPPS Staff Engr. J. Cermak (S) -
Phd Nuc Engr 23 yrs. 2 yrs.
Human Engr. Consultant L. Avery (E) -
MA Ind.Psyc. 5 yrs. 3/4 yr.
Human Engr. Consultant S. Fleger (E) -
MA Ind.Psyc. 4 yrs. 3/4 yr.
Human Engr. Consultant R. Kane (E) -
MA Exp.Psyc. 6 yrs. 3/4 yr.
Hirnan Engr. Consultant C. Krick (E) -
BA Poly. Sci. 3 yrs. 3/4 yr. .
l Human Engr. Consultant C. Baker (E) -
BS Psyc. 6 yrs. 3/4 yr.
Human Engr. Consultant P. Thurmond (N) - Ed.D. ,Res.& St at. 4 yrs. 2 mos.
- Human Engr. Consultant J. Gagnon (N) -
MA Psyc. 5 yrs. 2 mos.
i Human Engr. Consultant E. Silvennan ( A) -
Phd.H.F.Psyc.& MSHE 15 yrs. 2 mos.
J Human Engr. Consultant R. Kirshner (A) -
MA H.F.Psyc. 9 yrs. 2 mos.
Human Engr. Consultant D. Taylor (A) - MS, Human Factors 12 yrs. 2 mo.
Human Engr. Consultant C. Weiss (A) -
MSE, Indus. Engr. 4 yrs. 2 mo.
T' Utility Engr. (I&C) D. Kern (K) -
BSEE 3 yrs. 3 yrs.
Utility Engr M. Hellman (U) -
BSEE 9 yrs. 3 yrs.
Utility Engr. S. Fu (K) -
MSEE 4 yrs. 1/2 yr.
Utility Operations D. Heinlein (U) SR0 certified BSME 4 yrs. 3 yrs.
Utility Operations J. McKinstray (K) SRO certified BSAeroE 11 yrs. 3 yrs.
Utility Operations M. Taylor (U) SR0 certified BSME 11 yrs. 1/2 yr.
Utility Operations S. Putthoff (U) SR0 certified -
9 yrs. 1/2 yr.
Architect / Engr. (I&C) D. Grove (B) -
MSME 7 yrs. 3 yrs.
Architect / Engr. (I&C) J. Harrison (B) -
BSME 2-1/2 yrs. 2 yrs.
Architect / Engr. (I&C) R. Wu (B) -
MSEng.Elec 13 yrs. 3 yrs.
S = SNUPFS Staff U = Union Electric Company K = Kansas Gas and Electric Company N = NUS Corporation E = Essex Corporation A = ARD Corporation B = Bechtel Power Corporation Table 1.2.1 DCRDR Project Team Personnel and Experience
1.2 Management and Staffing, continued The manner in which the members of the DCRDR Team participated in tne various tasks of the DCRDR is stenarized in Table 1.2.2.
The HFPRG was established as a standing review group that will review all proposed control room modifications prior to implemertation.
m.
l-9
l
~
SNUPPS Human l
Proj. Dep. Proj. Staff Engrg. Utility Jtility Arch /
Mgr. Mgr. Engr. Consult. Engr. Oper. Engr.
TASK
- 1. Progran Definition X(1) 9 4 4 0 9
- 2. Master Schedule Preparation X(1) 9 9 9 G
- 3. Sub-schedule preparation X 0 9 6 X e
- 4. Sche.dule Maintenance
- 5. Periodic update reports X 8 9 9 0 8
- 6. Define DCRDR technical X(1) requirements 0 X 0 4
- 7. Define DCRDR human factors requirements
- 8. Authorize changes in #2 X and #3
- 9. Detail schedule for plant- X 0 0 $
specific review (DCRDR) 0 0 8 e
- 10. Conduct plant-specific 0 X review (DCRDR); prepare HEFs.
9 9 0 0 8 8
- 11. Evaluate recommended X(1) changes (HEFs)
- 2. Implement Changes 0 0 0 X
- 13. Program assessment X(1) 0 0 0 0 f
l
- 14. Corrective action sign-off G G X(1) l
- 15. Final report preparation 0 X 0 0 0 0 0
- 16. Final report review X 0 8 0 0 0
~
- 17. Final report approval 0 9 X(1)
- 18. Final report delivery 0 X = Primary Responsibility (1) Utility Technical Comittee 9 = Support Responsibility Approval Authority 0 = Approval Authority Table 1.2.2 DCRDR Task Responsibility Chart for Project Manaaement, l
l-10 l
1.3 Documentation A data base library was established for the DCRDR process. This subsection describes the documentation system (input /uutput documents) and documentation management / control library used to support the Detailed Control Room Design Reviews.
1.3.1 Input Documentation The following references were available and/or developed throughout the DCRDR program.
o NUREG-0700 o NUREG/CR-1580 o FSAR o Systen Lists o System Specification & Functional Description for B0P Computer o Piping and Instrumentation Drawings o Control Room Floor Plan (Lighting, HVAC, Acoustics, etc.)
o Panel Layout Drawings o List of Acronyms, Abbreviations o Color Coding Conventions for CRT o B0P Ccmputer System Displays o Standardized Valve Nomenclature List o Procedures (Emergency, Abnormal and Operating) o Operational Procedure Preparation Guide o Preliminary Design Assessment Report o WOG Emergency Response Guidelines o WOG System Functions Review and Task Analysis Study o Full Scale Mockups of Control Panels o Other liuman Factors / Control Room Studies 1-11
1.3.2 Output Documentation A complete documentation of the review process was maintained during the DCRDR providing data traceability, retrievability and assurance of quality.
The review documentation includes:
o Completed Checklists o Human Engineering Findings (HEFs) o HEF Priority Sheet o Questionnaire Forms Examples of a Human Engineering Finding Form and Priority Sheet may be found in Appendix A.
Exanples of forms used in the Task Analysis are in Appendix B.
Examples of an Operating Sequence Diagram used during the Validation of Con-trol Room Functions effort can be found in Appendix C.
The SNUPPS files contain information on HEFs, beginning with checklists from which they are generated, meetings that document their reviews and letters directing appropriate dispositions. Human Engineering Finding forms document discrepancies resulting from the data reduction process and priorities were assigned by completing a priority sheet for the finding.
The actual data collected to produce findings for the PDA are recorded on checklists that are kept within the Human Engineering Evaluation Report (HEER)
File at the SNUPPS Staff offices.
A detailed explanation of data collection and reduction for the initial control room survey (preliminary design assessment, or PDA) may be found in the Essex report, transmitted to the NRC by reference 2.
Copies of the general data and findings are distributed or otherwise made available to all DCRDR team members to allow access and research by any team member as appropriate.
< Typical forms intended to be used for the remainder of the DCRDR are listed below and are included in Appendix H.
j o Air Velocity Survey Record o Humidity / Temperature Record o Lighting Survey - Luminance and Reflectance Record o Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record o Sound Survey Record Maintenance of the DCRDR document control has provided for traceability, retrievability and assurance of quality throughout the review process.
1-12
l l
1 1.4 Review Procedures i 1.4.1 Operating Exper'ience Review As the SNUPPS plants were under construction at the time of the DCRDR, operating experience was factored into the DCRDR by (1) feedback provided by prospective . operators from the Wolf Creek and Callaway plants who had training on the SNUPPS simulator, (2) utilization of industry experience obtained through involvement of SNUPPS personnel in Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) activities, and (3) use of the Callaway simulator for the WOG emergency procedure validation program.
A SNUPPS Operating Personnel Survey was conducted by Essex Corporation as part of its PDA review in 1980. Prospective operators from the Wolf Creek and Callaway plants who had training on the SNUPPS simulators were given questionnaires and were interviewed regarding their evaluations of control room design features. The questionnaire addressed the areas of:
staffing and workload, workspace design, control / display integration and pl acement, communications, annunciator / warning system, operator protective equipment, computers, procedures /doctanentation, and operation. The interview covered operator feedback as a result of the operators' initial training experiences on the SNUP?S simulator at Zion.
This survey technique provided the SNUPPS review team with feedback on specific problems with the control room design. Examples of these findings were: confusion with the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) status panel; difficulty in following the mimics on the Engineered Safeguard Features panel; difficulty in reading annunciator windows from the operating station; and poor positioning of annunciator acknowledge controls. These observations reinforced the findings of Essex Corporation and were directly utilized in developing improved designs for these aspects of the control room.
Together with other utilities having Westinghouse designed plants in operation or under construction, SNUPPS has participated in the fonnation and functioning of a Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG). A key element of the WOG, accounting for approximately half of the total activity, is the Procedures Subcommittee. This subcomittee consists of senior operating personnel, many of whom hold or have held SRO licenses, frun approximately 20 utilities.
This subcommittee contributed direct operating experience, from many years of operation and several emergency events, to the development of improved Emergency Response Guidelines and the Systems Review and Task An alysis .
1.4.2 System Function Review and Task Analysis The general procedure for the system review and task analysis is illustrated in Figure 1.4.1. The starting point is an emergency plant event or con-dit %n . The term " plant event" is applied to transients or accidents that hav e been postulated by the plant designers and are recognized by the op:frators from instrumentation available to them. The tenn " plant condition" applies to transients or accidents that may not have been postulated or are not recognized by the operators.
1-13
Plant Event or Condition
, ____)
l I
Systems / Subsystems l
I Analysis 1
1 y----------------y I
I l Functions Analysis i
Iterations based on Verification and MAN MACHINE Validation I
I i
j Task Systems / Equipment I
Description Design g
i I
i l n se i l~
Task i An alysis i
I i 1._ _ _ _ _ _I Figure 1.4.1 - System Review / Task Analysis Procedure 1-14
-- ~ '
r .. . _ - -
! 1.4.2 System Function Review and Task Analysis, continued The systems / subsystems analysis referred to in Figure 1.4.1 has been per-formed on a generic basis for all Westinghouse plants by Westinghouse and the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG). Plant events postulated include all combinations of initiating sequences and single or multiple equigment failures with calculated probabilities of occurrence greater than 10- per reactor year and many with probabilities lower than that. For these postulated pl ant events the systems and broad functional requirements to mitigate each event have been defined. This portion of the systems analysis is the basis for " event related" function analysis. Plant conditions (events
< not postulated or not recognized by the operators) have been addressed by identifying critical safety functions (CSFs) necessary to preclude or limit fuel damage and/or release of radiation. A set of generic CSF status trees and broad functional requirements to restore any compromised CSFs have been developed. This portion of the systems analysis is the basis for " symptom
- related" function analyses.
The function analysis consists of developing in detail generic event-related and symptom-related emergency procedures. This work has been done by exper-ienced Westinghouse and utility operations personnel, under the sponsorship of the WOG. Collectively these procedures are termed Emergency Response Guidelines. Extensive background documentation has been developed for the ERGS. The background information includes calculations of emergency events, which serve to identify tne ranges over which plant parameters are expected to vary and to identify parameter values at which operator actions should be taken. The background analysis has also considered which parameters are the most effective indicators to an operator of the plant condition and progress 4
of events. This includes consideration of which instruments and controls are safety-grade and qualified for post-accident conditions and which are not.
This bears on the accuracy with which an instrument indicates the true para-
- meter value. The plant-specific emergency operating procedures for the Callaw~ - and Wolf Creek plants are based on and closely follow the ERGS.
A standard Westinghouse plant design (RESAR-3) was the basis for the SNUPPS design. This standard design had evolved on the basis of many years of licensing and operation of Westinghouse-designed reactors. Most of the decisions of when the response to a functional requirement should be auto-matic (machine) and when manual (man) were made during that evolutionary design process. In only a limited number of cases have changes in the allocation of tasks between man and machine been indicated to be desirable by more recent reactor and simulator operating experience.
I Task descriptions have also been developed on a generic basis by Westinghouse and the WOC. This program was begun in late 1981 to address the recommenda-I tion in Section 3.4 of NUREG-0700. It has consisted of a methodical review of the ERGS and identification of every monitoring task (instrumentation) and operational task (control) identified by each step of each event-related and I each symptom-related procedure. These various tasks, many of which are required by more than one procedure, have been combined into one comprehen-sive set of tasks. Since the SNUPPS emergency operating procedures closely follow the ERGS, this system review and task analysis (SRTA) program con-ducted by Westinghouse is directly applicable to the identification of task descriptions for the SNUPPS control rcom. This effort has identified 141 categories of monitoring tasks (instrumenti. tion) and 119 categories of operational tasks (controls).
i
! l-15
_ _ _ . __.. .r._, , - _ . . . , , _ _ . _ , , ,.._..,._,,m, ,-_.__m, _ , .. _.___.._,__e -
1.4.2 System Function Review and Task Analysis, continued The task analysis function was performed by the SNUPPS DCRDR Team on a SNUPPS-specific basis. The first ;tep was to review the nature of each task description. Most of the tasks (a.; but 17 categories of the monitoring tasks and all but 10 categories of the operational tasks) are strictly " digital" in nature. That is, a typical monitoring task is to ascertain whether a
' component is operating or not, whether a valve or breaker is lined up one way or the other, or whether a flow meter is indicating other than zero flow.
Or, in the case of controls, the typical task is to turn equipment on or off or to reposition a valve or breaker. Several of these " digital" operational tasks are manual backups to automatic actions.
An example category of monitoring tasks is the set of tasks requiring the operator to take action based on the value of reactor coolant system wide range pressure. There are approximately forty subtasks in this category and more than sixteen specific values of wide range pressure are cited as bases for operator action. These subtasks are explicitly defined in the ERGS and SRTA developed for the Westinghouse Owners Group. The task review process has been to examine each of these subtasks against the checklist in Appendix B. Similar procedures have been followed for each of the other 16 categories of monitoring tasks. In addition, since the majority of the monitoring tasks use instruments identified in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2, the instrtment range determined from the SRTA has been checked against the instrument range specified in RG 1.97, Rev. 2. It has been determined that these two sources of range data are consistent.
Ten categories of operational tasks require the operator to exercise some form of modulating control. These tasks were examined using the checklists in Appendix B and were also perfonned on the Callaway simulator to verify task performance capability.
(
l l
l l
l 1-16 j
l
1.4.3 Control Room Inventory The inventory of instruments, controls and displays in the control room is shown on plant design drawings. These drawings include over-all arrangement drawings and drawings of each individual panel. The panel drawings include the labels, mimic lines, and demarcation lines that identify the instrnents, controls, and displays by coded identification number, plant system and function. Individual instrunents, controls, or displays are described in specifications, vendor manuals and/or drawings for each iten.
As-built drawings will be prepared as necessary to reflect differences between the as-built panels and design drawings. These design and as- -
built drawings will be maintained throughout the life of each plant and are sufficient to support the needs of the SNUPPS DCRUR.
By using the approach described in section 1.4.2 for task analysis, a fomal itemization of control room components for comparison with instrumentation requirements was not necessary. A verification of the appropriate control room inventory to adequately perform control room functions as represented in the WOG task description was performed. This process is described in detail in section 1.4.5.
1.4.4 Control Room Survey The control room survey was performed in several stages, as necessitated by the construction schedule.
The first stage was a comprehensive survey of all of the control panels, with coincident interviews of operating personnel and walk-through of a limited set of emergency procedures. Essex Corporation was the Human Er, 'eering consultant for this phase. This initial review, which was perfomed I. ior to issuance of NUREG-0700, used the guidelines of NUREG-CR/1580 and this survey evaluated controls and displays located on the Callaway control room and a SNUPPS simulator, and led to the study of special areas, e.g. annunciator prioritization, safety status monitoring, and control / display enhancement.
This sarvey is temed a Preliminary Design Assessment (PDA).
Instrumentation, controls and other equipment items were examined for human engineering acceptability as components, including reference to their specific uses in task performance. Discrepancies were based on design incompatibility with human perceptual, motor, psychological or size l
characteristics. Results of the SNUPPS review are listed in the Essex Report l
transmitted by reference 2. Sample checklists and actual Human Engineering l
Finding forms are kept in the SNUPPS HEER files.
Subsequent to the Essex review, the NRC (HFSB) performed a review in July 1981 using the human engineering design criteria identified in the NUREG-0700 checklist. A thorough audit was conducted and Findings were identified.
Results were documented in the fom of correspondence and the subsequent l Technical Evaluation Report (TER). Actions taken by SNUPPS in direct response to these reviews have been documented in a series of letters, dated from June 1981 to April 1982 (references 2 through 6).
i 1-17 l
1.4 .4 Control Room Survey, continued The second stage of the control roun survey, which took place from mid-1981 to late-1983, was a review of modifications made to correct findings of the Essex and NRC reviews and to install instruments and controls added in the final evolution of the design. These reviews were performed by the HFPRG, with assistance of a Human Engineering consultant, and were done to the guidelines of NUREG-0700.
The third stage of the control room survey was a review of previously unfin-ished items, as identified in the NRC's Technical Evaluation Report (TER).
This review is termed the Supplementary Survey, or SS. This stage was started in late-1983 and is not yet completed. This portion of the review was addressed mainly to environmental characteristics of the control room.
The procedures for SNUPPS environmental measurements follow the guidance of NUREG-0700 Appendix E, and findings will be handled in a manner similar to those of the control room survey.
1.4.4.1 Sound Survey Procedures The locations for sound measurements will be noted on a control room layout drawing. Measurements will be taken at each operator position that requires verbal comunication and/or auditory discrimination of a signal.
Considerations during measurement will include ambient noise levels (where ambient noise is defined as background control room noise without the contri-bution of alarms, printers or comunications equipment), annunciator alarm levels (work station annunciator and any other annunciators that must be heard at that work station) under both ambient and high noise level con-ditions (e.g., with printers, other alarms and signals), telephones and other communication equipment and evacuation signals and other alarms.
1.4.4.2 Lighting Survey Procedures The location for the illumination measurements will be noted on a control room layout drawing. Readings will be taken:
o In front of each front panel o In the center of the control room l
l o In front of each back panel l
Various combinations of power supplies will be utilized.
1.4.4.3 Humidity / Temperature Procedures i
l Humidity and temperature will be measured by setting meters in an area where they would not be disturbed. Readings at floor level and at 6 ft.
l above floor level every hour for at least one 24-hour period will be taken.
l i
1-18
1.4.4.4 Air Velocity Survey Procedures The locations for air velocity readings will be noted on a control room layout drawing. Measurements will be taken at principal operator work stations at an elevation of 6 ft. for standing positions, and at 4 ft. for sitting positions.
1.4.5 Verification of Task Perfonnance Capabilities The objective of this part of the DCRDR is to compare the instrumentation and equipment requirements derived from the task analysis to items in the control room inventory. This has been done as follows.
Each task identified by the Emergency Response Guidelines is tabulated in the generic system review and task analysis (SRTA). For each of 'these tasks, the SNUPPS DCRDR team has identified the specific instrments and/or ccd.rols used to perform the task and the locations of these instruments and/or controls.
As described in Section 1.4.2, most of the requiret operator tasks are digital in nature. The verification of performance capabilities for these digital tasks emphasizes two points: (1) is the control or instrument properly located in the control room and (2) is the design of the centrol or instrument in accordance with Human Engineering principles?
Instrurnents that must be utilized in other than digital manner have received greater attention. The characteristics of these instruments, such as range, precision and units are compared with the values of the parameter (s) dis-played at which operator tasks must be perfomed. The review also identified alternative sources of the information required by the task analysis.
Controls that perform a modulating (vs. digital) function are reviewed in the context of the objectives of the operator task and the relationship between the controller and the indication of the variable (s) controlled.
Checklists used to verify task performance capabilities of instruments and controls are contained in Appendix B.
l l 1.4.6 Validation of Control Room Functions l
An important feature of the DCRDR is the iteration process shown schematic.
ally in Figure 1.4.1. At several times during the systems function and task analyses, emergency procedures have been perfonned on simulators of the same design as the SNUPPS control boards and the ability for the operators to l
perform the necessary functions and tasks with the procedures, controls, and instrumentation provided has been validated.
l l The validation review determined if the operator tasks needed to implement l the ERGS can be accomplished effectively within the structure of the estab-lished operating and emergency procedures and the design of the control room.
f 1-19
1.4.6 Validation of Control Room Functions, continued An initial validation program was conducted for the SNUPPS control room using video-taped walk-throughs of selected procedures performed at the SNUPPS simulator at Zion. The following plant procedures were evaluated during this validation:
o Immediate Action and Diagnosis o Loss of Primary Reactor Coolant o Loss of Secondary Coolant o Steam Generator Tube Rupture o High Wind / Tornado Station Blackout o Reactor Trip o Turbine Trip o Loss of One Feedwater Pump Each procedure was taped twice, once with a full complement of operators
- without any -interruptions and once with an operator explaining each step.
The videotapes were then used to analyze the operator actions for each of these procedures. Instances of poor control / display relationships, lack of necessary information and inadequate presentation of information were iden-
- tified from the analysis and identified as findings. These findings were included in the Essex Corporation report of the PDA. ,
A second verification and validation program, with focus on the Emergency Response Guidelines, was performed at the Callaway simuletor in June 1982.
The program consisted of a walk-thrcugh of forty-one of the ERGS (the entire
, set). The operators for this program were operating personnel from the Callaway and Wolf Creek plants. Westinghouse engineering and training per-sonnel observed the program. An NRC representative was present part of the time. Though the verification and validation program was specifically focused on the ERGS, the program also served to validate that all necessary instruments and controls are available and conveniently located in the SNUPPS
- control room.
A structured evaluation of these aspects of the SNUPPS control room design was subsequently performed using video tapes made during the ERG verification and validation program. The following f actors were included in this review of. video tapes:
o The indications and annunciators should be referenced in theprocedure(s).
o The units of measurement displayed should be appropriate i and consistent with the procedure (s).
o The operator actions expressed or implied by the proce- -
dure (s) should be within the capability of the operator (s).
l-20
l 1.4.6 Validation of Control Room Functions, continued Operators in conjunction with human f actors specialists performed the analysis. In addition, using a unit floor diagran, work station flow was recorded and the following issues addressed:
o Direction of movement o Sequence of movement o Frequency of the movement o Estimated time criticality of the movement o .Real time estimate of the time that the operator (s) spend at each work station r
l l l-21 1
. x .. ... .. .n .
-2.0 REVIEW FINDINGS 2.1 General- ,
Six processes are recommended by NUREG 0700 to establish benchmarks and identify findings for a complete DCRDR:
(1) Review of Operating Experience (2) System Function Review and Task Analysis (3) Control Room Inventory (4) Control Room Survey (5) Verification of Task Performance Capabilities (6) Control Room Validation Table 1.1.1 outlines these six processes and the anociated SNUPPS reviews performed to date to sastisfy each. ,
Review of environmental considerations, scheduled for March 1984, will complete the DCRDR reviews.
The DCRDR reviews have resulted in a total of 276 findings to date, as shown in Table 2.1. Because of the large neber of findings, individual findings are treated only in samary fashion in the body of this report.
More complete descriptions of the findings and the corrective actions are contained in reference 10, a comprehensive report of the findings of the PDA and their disposition, and in Appendices D through G of this report.
The process for evaluation of findings by SNUPPS begins within the Human Factors Plant Review Group (HFPRG). Upon review of an HEF, the HFPRG first determines whether the finding is valid. Because the control room reviewer, Human Engineering Consultant or NRC reviewer, does not always fully understand the plant design, some of the HEFs have been determined to be not applicable. The HFPRG then takes the following factors into account in developing recommended resolutions to HEFs:
o Priority, which indicates the safety significance of the HEF i
o Difficulty of backfitting changes, e.g., availability of space l
on control panels, Class IE separation requirements, etc.
o Complexity of change, e.g., straightforward change versus signifi-cant redesign.
o Impact on schedules for construction, startup and operation i
2-1
Table 2.1 Control Room Reviews - Summary of Findings Number of Findings NUREG 0700 Section Total Review 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 PDA 10 0 14 16 28 62 12 19 14 175 SS
- 1 8 1 6 21 0 18 5 ,1 61 ASP 6 3 0 5 11 5 0 3 0 33 Totals 17 11 15 27 60 67 30 27 15 269 Task Perf. Cap. 1
__ Valid. Prog. 6 Total 276 PDA - Preliminary Design Assessment SS - Supplementary Survey ASP - Auxiliary Shutdown Panel
- Incomplete. Tc te completed after construction of Callaway control room.
Construction completion is scheduled for February 1984.
2-2
2.1 Review Findings, continued High priority HEFs are considered first. In most cases the HEF includes a recomended change. If the HEF requires physical changes to the control boards or equipment mounted on the boards, the architect engineer evaluates the impact of the changes and advises the HFPRG of any constraints that may exist, e.g., Class IE separation requirements, ability of equipment supplier to change his equipment, schedular considerations. If the change involves significant redesign (e.g., re-prioritization of annunciators, change of system status panels, rearrangment of instrurnents and controls, :edesign of mimics), the HFPRG decides which organization, i.e., architect engineer, Utilities or SNUPPS Staff will have lead responsibility to develop the change. In a limited number of cases the HEF is desned to be impractical to be implemented and/or of low importance and the HFPRG recomends against making the indicated changes.
The actions recommended by the HFPRG are documented by the Deouty Project Manager and referred to the Technical and Operations Committees for their review and endorsement. Upon concurrence by these comittees, the actions necessary to implement the modifications are initiated by the Project Manager or Deputy Project Manager.
Prior to implementation of design improvements, the proposed redesign is reviewed by the DCRDR Team. The procedure for this review begins with an evaluation of the redesign against the HEF and recommended resolution (if provided). Changes involving significant redesign are usually depicted in a full-scale mockup of the control board or full-scale drawings. The revised design is evaluated by Utility operations and engineering personnel and, in most cases, by the Human Engineering Consultant as well . Through these reviews it is determined that:
o The selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction o The improvement does not introduce new HEFs.
These conclusions are verified by walk-through of selected procedures on a full-scale mockup, the simulator or the control room after the changes have been made.
2.2 Control Room-Wide Survey Findings 2.2.1 Workspace and Environment Section 6.1 of NUREG-0700 delineates the aspects of the control room evaluated in this context. A sisnmary of the findings is as follows:
Review No. of Findings, No. to be Corrected Reference PDA 10 4 Ref.10 & Table 3.1 SS 1 0 App. D ASP 6 4 App. E No corrective actions will be taken for 6 of the PDA findings. Only two of these no action findings (1.1,1.8) are category 1 or 2. The justifications 2-3
L 2.2.1 Workspace and Environment,' cont'Inued , , _ -
for not taking corrective actions are given in reference ~.10. 'The NRC has advised SNUPPS that it is in agreement with the decisions lfor no corrective actions except for finding 1.8. ; SNUPPS is reviewing this finding in greater detail and will provide the NRC/with the fina1' disposition of this finding during the NRC s'ite visits planned for February 1984.
The SS finding for' which no corrective action is to be taken is other than categ5ry 1 or 2.
Two of the findings of the ASP review have been evaluated to require no corrective action. Justification is provided in Appendix E.
2.2.2. Comunications Section 6.2 of NUREG-0/00 delineates the aspects of the control room evaluated in this-context. A sunmary of the findings is as follows:
Review No. of Findings No. to be Corrected Reference PDA 0 0 Ref. 10 & Table 3.1 SS S 2 App. O ASP 3 2 App. E The 6 SS findings for which no corrective action is to be taken are other than category 1 or 2. One of these 6 findings (2.3) is still under investi-gation.
The only ASP finding that does 'not ~ require' corrective actio1 is other than category 1 or 2.
2.2.3 Annunciator Warning System' Section 6.3 of NUREG-0700 delineates the aspects of the control room evaluated in this context. A summary of the findings is as follows:
Review No. of Findings No. to be Corrected Reference PDA 14 13. Ref. 10 & Table 3.1 SS 1 0 App D ASP 0 0 App. E i
The one PDA finding for which no corrective action is to be taken (3.7) has been determined by SNUPPS to be an invalid finding. The NRC has l
agreed.
The SS finding identified is other than category 1 or 2 and will be investigated further during the environmental sound study.
-2.2.4 Labels and Location Aids . >
Section 6.6 of NUREG-0700 delineates the aspects of the control room evaluated in this context. A sunmary of the findings is as follows:
2-4
Review No. of Findings No. to ba Corrected Reference PDA 62 54 Ref. 10 & Table 3.1 SS 0 0 App. D ASP 5 4 App. E Of the 8 PDA findings for which no corrective action will be taken, only 3 (6.1, 6.3 and 6.15) are category 1 or 2. The NRC has concurred with the SNUPPS decision for no corrective actions for these 3 safety related findings.
The one ASP finding for which no corrective action is to be taken is not safety-related. The justification for no corrective action is provided in Appendix E.
2.3 Panel / Work Station Findings 2.3.1 Controls Section 6.4 of NUREG-0700 delineates the aspects of the control room evaluatd in this context. A summary of the findings is as follows:
Review No. of Findings No. to be Corrected Reference PDA 16 13 Ref.10 & Table 3.1 SS 6 4 App. D ASP 5 3 App. E The decisions to take no corrective action on 3 findings of the PDA has been concurred with by the NRC. Two of these 3 findings are category 1 or 2.(4.4,4.5).
The 2 SS findings for which no corrective action is to be taken is other than category 1 or 2.
Two of the findings of the ASP review have been evaluated to require no corrective action. Justification is provided in Appendix E.
2.3.2 Displ ays Section 6.5 of NUREG-0700 pertains to these aspects of the control room. A summary of the findings is as follows:
Review No. of Findings No. to be Corrected Reference PDA 28 18 Ref.10 & Table 3.1 SS 21 15 App. D ASP 11 8 App. E Six of the 10 PDA findings for which no corrective action is to be taken are other than category 1 or 2. The NRC has concurred with the decision to take no action on the 4 category 1 or 2 findings. (5.2, 5.9, 5.24, 5.27).
The 6 SS findings for which no corrective action has been identified is other than category 1 or 2.
2-5
The justifica'. ions for actions on the ASP findings are given in Appendix E.
2.3.3 Process Computer Section 6.7 of NUREG-0700 pertains to the computer. A summary of the findings is as follows:
Review No. of Findings No.' to be Corrected Reference PDA 12 4 Ref. 10 L Table 3.1 SS 18 3 App. D ASP 0 0 App. E Only one (7.4) of the 8 PDA findings for which no corrective action is to be taken is considered category 1 or 2. The decision for no action for that finding has been concurred with by the NRC. The response to PDA finding 7.11 has been revised as follows:
PDA Finding 11 Several functions available on the control room (1) process computer keyboard are for the use of the computer programers, not the reactcr operators.
For example, operators have the ability to insert values into the system status displays. No indi-cation appears to identify these as inserted values rather than actual values.
Response During normal operation, control room operators are not required to use the " insert value" function button on the canputer keyboard. It is anticipateo that modification of point values will be infrequent. If point modification is required, it will be performed under the direction of the Shift Supervisor. If values have been inserted via this function button on the computer keyboard, the modified values would be available on the inserted value sunmary display. The control room operator has access to the inserted value point summary display via the same computer keyboard and CRT as is being used for the system status displays. Therefore, no further action on this finding is necessary.
Fourteen 55 findings have been identified as needing no corrective action.
One SS finding (7.1) will be studied further during the environmental lighting tests.
2.3.4 Panel Layout Section 6.8 of NUREG-0700 applies to panel layout. A sunmary of the findings I is as follows:
Review No. of Findings No. to be Corrected Reference PDA 19 14 Ref. 10 & Table 3.1
2-6 i
4 I Five of the 19 PDA findings are listed as no action. Only one the five (8.17) is category 1 or 2 and it has been concurred with as no action by the NRC.
Five SS findings have been identified as requiring no corrective action and are other than category 1 or 2.
One of the 2 no action findings for the ASP is considered category 1 or 2 and appropriate justification for no action is provided in Appendix E.
2.3.5 Control-Display Integration Section 6.9 of NUREG-0700 delineates the aspects of the control room evaluated in this context. A summary of the findings is as follows:
Review No. of Findings No to be Corrected Reference PDA 14 9 Ref. 10 & Table 3.1 SS 1 0 App. D ASP 0 0 App. E Of the 14 findings discovered during the PDA, only 5 have been designated as no action. Three of these 5 findings are category 1 or 2 (9.4, 9.13, 9.14).
For two of these the no action status has been agreed to by the NRC. The remaining finding 9.14, is still under discussion between SNUPPS and the NRC.
The SS finding identified has been listed as requiring no corrective action and is other than category 1 or 2.
The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) has been reviewed separately and is described in reference 11. The presence and displays of the SPDS have been considered in the Verification Task Perfomance Capabilities and their location within the Control Room has been considered in the review of Control Room workspace.
2.4 Other Review Findings l 2.4.1 Task Performance Capability 1
i The results of this review are given in Appendix F. There was one finding
- related to labeling of indicator lights on auxiliary feedwater controllers.
l Upon further investigation, it was determined that this finding was simulator l specific.
! 2.4.2 Validation Program
! The results of this review are given in Appendix G. There were 6 findings.
Two of these will be corrected. Justification for no action on the remaining 4 is given in Appendix G.
l 2-7 i
1 - -. .-- - _ _ _ , - . - -
l l
3.0 IMPLEMENTATION 3.1 Completed Improvements The PDA was performed to provide advance information regarding the human factors acceptability of the Control Room and was accomplished prior to the issuance of NUREG 0700. This advance information allowed early imple-mentation of findings, i.e., prior to fuel load, that would otherwise not be possible if the Control Room review had not begun until l ater. Although implementation of selected findings from other than the PDA will occur prior to fuel load, the vast majority will come from the PDA; therefore, these will be discussed in this subsection only.
Table 3.1 provides a status of implementation for PDA findings. A completed corrective action is shown as either "C" for Callaway jobsite, and/or "W" for Wolf Creek.
Of the total 175 findings,128 are listed for action. Of the 128 findings, Callaway has implemented action for 53 findings and Wolf Creek has imple-mented 46 corrective actions. The remaining corrective actions are scheduled to be implemented prior to fuel load of each unit and largely consist of label type changes.
3.2 Proposed Improvements __
Findings resulting from the TER open items, ASP evaluation, and Validation Program are tracked by Table 3.2 and will have corrective actions implemented by the end of the first refueling outage of each unit. Onei finding resulted from the Task Perfonnance Capability Study and was determined to be specific to the Callaway simulator.
3-1
Strtus of Findings on NRC Devitw of SNUPPS Control Roce (PIR)
January 31, 1984 A A I A A I A A I A A I NRC C C M NRC C C M NBC C C M PRC C C M FINDING : C T P FINDING C T P FINDING l C T P FINDIIG C T P E I L l E I L E I L E I L AND P O E AND P O E AND P O E AND P O E PRIORITY T N M PRIORITY T N M '
PRIORITY T N M PRIORITY T N M 1.1 (1) Al N4 NA 5.6 (31) Al N4 NA 6.23 (1) Al F25 C 7.6 (3) A2 N2 NA 1.2 (3) A2 N2 NA 5.7 (3) O N3 NA 6.24 (2) Al F25 7.7 (3) R1 N6 NA 1.3 (1) Al F10 C 5.8 (1) Al U2 6.25 (3) A2 Pl26 7.8 (3) O N3 NA 1.4 (1) A4 F9 C,W 5.9 (2) Al N1 NA 6.26 (31) Al F25 7.9 (3) R1 N3 NA 1.5 (1) Al F8 C,W 5.10 (1) Al F14 W 6.27 (31) Al F25 7.10 (31) Al N4 NA 1.6 (1) Al F9 C,W 5.11 (3) O N3 NA 6,28 (1) Al F8 C,W 7.11 (1) R1 N NA 1.7 (3) O N3 NA 5.12 (2) A4 F9 C,W C.29 (31) A4 F25 7.12 (2) Al U2 1.8 (1) al N6 NA 5.13 (2) Al F16 W 6.30 (31) Al F25 8.1 (1) Al U1 1.9 (3) O N3 NA 5.14 (31) Al F17 C 6.31 (2) A4 F25 8.2 (3) A2 F25 1.10 (3) O N3 NA 5.15 (3) O N3 NA 6.32 (31) Al F25 8.3 (31) Al N4 NA 3.1 (1) Al Ul 5.16 (3) O N3 NA 6.33 (31) R3 F3 C,W 8.4 (31) Al F25 3.2 (3) A2 F3 C,W 5.17 (1) A4 U2 6.34 (31) A4 F27 8,5 (31) Al F25 3.3 (3) A5 F3 C,W 5.18 (1) Al Ul 6.35 (1) A4 F25 8.6 (31) Al F25 3.4 (1) Al F3 C,W 5.19 (2) Al F9 C,W 6.36 (1) Al F25 8.7 (3) A4 F8 C,W 3.5 (1) Al F22 W 5.20 (3) A2 N2 NA 6,37 (31) Al F27 8.8 (3) O N3 NA 3.6 (3) A2 F3 C,W 5.21 (2) Al F4 6.38 (3) O F25 8.9 (3) A2 F25 3.7 (2) Al N4 NA 5.22 (31) R1 02 6.39 (31) Al F27 8.10 (3) O N6 NA 3.8 (3) 0 U1 5.23 (1) Al F15 C,W 6.40 (31) Al F25 8.11 (3) A2 F7 C 3.9 (3) A5 F22 C,W 5.24 (2) Al N4 NA 6.41 (31) Al F27 8.12 (1) R1 F C,W 3.10 (1) A5 F3 C,W 5.25 (2) Al U2 6.42 (31) Al F27 8.13 (2) Al F8 C,W 3.11 (31) A5 F3 C,W 5.26 (31) Al F9 C,W 6.43 (31) Al Ul 8.14 (2) A4 F8 C,W 3.12 (1) A5 F3 C,W 5.27 (1) Al N9 NA 6.44 (31) Al F25 8.15 (2) Al F8 C,W 3.13 (1) Al F3 C,W 5.28 (1) A4 Ul 6.45 (31) A4 F27 8.16 (2) R1 F8 C,W l 3.14 (1) Al F9 C,W 6.1 (1) Al N4 NA 6.46 (31) Al F27 8.17 (1) Al N4 NA 4.1 (3) A2 N2 NA 6.2 (1) Al F9 C,W 6.47 (31) R1 F27 8.18 (3) O N3 NA 4.2 (1) Al F8 C,W 6.3 (2) Al N4 NA 6.48 (3) R1 N3 NA 8.19 (3) R1 F23 C l 4.3 (2) Al F26 6.4 (31) Al F27 6.49 (31) R1 F25 9.1 (2) A4 F25 l 4.4 (1) Al N4 NA 6.5 (31) Al F25 C 6.50 (2) R1 F25 9.2 (3) O N3 NA 4.5 (2) Al N6 NA 6.6 (1) Al F25 6.51 (31) Al F25 9.3 (1) A4 F25 (1) Al 9.4 (2) Al N4 NA 4.6 (2) Al F9 C,W 6.7 (1) Al F25 6.52 F25 4.7 (1) Al F24 W 6.8 (1) A4 F25 6.53 (1) Al F25 9.5 (3) ,A4 F8 C,W 4.8 (2) Al F9 C,W 6.9 (1) A4 F25 6.54 (31) R1 N6 NA 9.6 (2) Al F8 C,W 4.9 (2) Al F25 6.10 (1) A4 F25 6.55 (31) Al F25 9.7 (2) Al F8 C,W 4.10 (2) A4 F19 C,W 6.11 (3) R1 N3 NA 6.56 (1) Al F25 9.8 (2) Al F8 C,W 4.11 (1) A4 U2 6.12 (31) Al F25 C 6.57 (31) Al F25 9.9 (2) Al F23 C 4.12 (1) A4 F26 6.13 (31) Al F25 C 6.58 (31) A4 F25 9.10 (3) O N3 NA 4.13 (1) R1 RB C,W 6.14 (31) Al N4 NA 6.59 (1) A4 F25 9.11 (2) R1 F8 C,W I
4.14 (3) A2 F18 6.15 (2) Al N6 NA 6.60 (1) A4 F25 9.12 (2) A4 F8 C ,W 4.15 (31) Al F26 C 6.16 (31) Al N4 NA 6.61 (1) Al F25 9.13 (2) Al N4 NA 4.16 (31) Al F9 C,W 6.17 (1) Al F25 6.62 (1) A4 F25 9.14 (2) R1 N6 NA 5.1 (3) A2 F21 C ,W 6.18 (31) Al F9 C,W 7.1 (31) Al N4 NA 5.2 (2) Al N4 NA 6.19 (31) Al F25 7.2 (2) Al F 5.3 (31) Al Fil C 6.20 (2) Al F25 7.3 (2) Al F 5.4 (2) A4 F12 C,W 6.21 (31) Al F25 7.4 (2) Al N4 NA 5.5 (3) A2 F13 C,W 6.22 (31) Al F25 7.5 (3) 0 N3 NA
( ) - ?riority Table 3.1 1
3-2
44 Table 3.1, centinued l ACCEPT - Acceptability of SNUPPS' Response 1
Al - Accepted per NRC (Hopkins, Edison) letter to SNUPPS (UE, KGE) dated 02/16/82 A2 - Accepted per NRC (Youngblood) letter to SNUPPS (Schnell, Koester) dated 03/08/82 A3 - Considered acceptable per SLNRC 82-016,03/16/82 A4 - Accepted per NRC (Youngblood) letter to SNUPPS (Schnell, Koester) dated 07/02/82 A5 - Considered acceptable per SLNRC 82-020, 04/12/82 R1 - Reviewed per NRC (Hopkins, Edison) letter to SNUPPS (UE, KGE) dated 02/16/82 0 - Not yet reviewed by the NRC ACTION - Action as follows:
F3 -
FCWP FJ108 -
003 F4 - FCWP FE094 -
004 F8 - FCWP FJ200 -
008 F9 - FCWP FJ200 -
009 F10 - FCWP FJ200 - 010 Fil - FCWP FJ200 -
011 F12 -
FCWP FJ200 -
012 F13 - FCWP FJ200 -
013 F14 - FCWP FJ200 -
014 F15 - FCWP FJ200 -
015 F16 -
FCWP FJ200 - 016 F17 -
FCWP FJ200 -
017 F18 - FCWP FJ200 -
018 F19 -
FCWP FJ200 -
019 F20 - FCWP FJ200 -
020 F21 -
FCWP FJ200 -
021 F22 -
FCWP FJ200 -
022 F23 -
FCWP FJ200 -
023 F24 -
FCWP FJ200 -
024 F25 - FCWP FJ200 -
025 i F26 - FCWP FJ200 -
026 F27 -
FCWP FJ200 -
027 RB - Rework Plan RJ-200-B 1
F - Work Plan expected to be issued in the near future.
N - No action required per this transmittal.
N2 - No Action Required per NRC (Youngblood) letters to SNUPPS (Schnell, Koester) dated 03/08/82 N3 - Considered No Action Required per SLNRC 82-016, 03/16/82 N4 - No Action Required per NRC (Youngblood) letter to SNUPPS l (Schnell, Koester) dated 07/02/82 l N6 - Considered No Action Required per SLNRC 83-0063, 11/30/83 l U1 - Utility administrative function U2 - Utility to perform hardware change l
l IMPLEM - Implementation as follows:
C - Modification has been made to Callaway control panel W - Modification has been made to Wolf Creek control panel NA - Not applicable (no action required) 3-3
Status of Findings on Supplementcry Survey Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Review, and Validation Program SUPPLEMEFTARY SURVEY ASP REVIEW VALIDATION PROG FINDING A U FINDIhG A U FINDING A U FINDING A U AND CNN AND CNN AND CNN AND CNN PRIORITY T0D PRIORITY T00 PRIORITY T0D PRIORITY T0D 1.1 (5) X 5.20 (6) X 1.1 (2) X 1 () X 2.1 (5) X 5.21 (6) X 1.2 (1) X 2 () X 2.2 (0) X 7.1 () X 1.3 (2) X 3 () X 2.3 (5) X 7.2 (5) X 1.4 (2) X 4 () X 2.4 (6) X 7.3 (5) X 1.5 (2) X 5 () X 2.5 (5) X 7.4 (5) X 1.6 (1) X 6 () X 2.6 '. 5 ) X 7.5 (5) X 2.1 (2) X 2.7 (5) X 7.6 (5) X 2.2 (5) X 2.8 () X 7.7 (5) X 2.3 (1) X 3.1 (4) X 7.8 (5) X 4.1 (2) X 4.1 (6) X 7.9 (5) X 4.2 (4) X 4.2 (0) X 7.10(6) X 4.3 (5) X 4.3 (6) X 7.11 (5) X 4.4 (5) X 4.4 (0) X 7.12 (6) X 4.5 (5) X 4.5 (0) X 7.13(5) X 5.1 (5) X 4.6 (0) X 7.14 (5) X 5.2 (5) X 5.1 (6) X 7.15 (5) X 5.3 (5) X 5.2 (0) X 7.16(6) X 5.4 (5) X 5.3 (5) X 7.17 (5) X 5.5 (5) X 5.4 (5) X 7.18(5) X 5.6 (5) X 5.5 (5) X 8.1 () X 5.7 (5) X 5.6 (5) X 8.2 (5) X 5.8 (5) X 5.7 (5) X 8.3 (5) X 5.9 (5) X 5.8 (5) X a.4 (5) X 5.10(5) X 5.9 (0) X 8.5 (5) X 5.11 (2) X 5.10 (5) X 9.1 () X 6.1 (5) 6.2 (5)
X X
5.11 (5) X 5.12(5) X 6.3 (2) X 5.13 (6) X 6.4 (5) X 5.14 (5) X 6.5 (5) X 5.15 (5) X 8.1 (5) X 5.16(0) X 8.2 (1) X 5.17 (5) X 8.3 (2) X 5.18(0) X 5.19(0) X ACT - Action to be taken NO - No action to be taken
- UND - Undecided - requires further investigation Table 3.2 3-4
4.0 REFERENCES
TO SNUPPS SUBMITTALS TO NRC dN DCRDR
- 1. SLNRC 81-26, 04/21/81: Human Factors Control Room Design Review
- 2. SLNRC 81-51,06/26/81: Human Factors Evaluation of the SNUPPS Control Room - Essex Report
- 3. SLNRC 81-65, 08/12/81: Human Factors Evaluation of the SNUPPS Control Room - Proposed Resolutions to Findings in the Essex Report
- 4. SLNRC 82-04,01/19/82: NUREG-0737, Iten I.D.1 - Responses to NRC Audit Report Findings
- 5. SLNRC 82-016, 02/16/82: NUREG-0737, Iten I.D.1 - Revised Responses to NRC Audit Report findings
- 6. SLNRC 82-020, 04/12/82: NUREG-0737, Iten I.D.1 - Results of Annunciator Prioritization Study
- 7. SLNRC 83-0019,04/15/83: Generic Letter 82 SNUPPS Response
- 8. SLNRC 83-0035, 06/30/83: SNUPPS Program Plan for the DCRDR - Issued 06/83
- 9. SLNRC 83-0062, 11/28/83: SNUPPS Program Plan for the DCRDR - Revised 11/83 10.SLNRC 83-0063, 11/30/83: NUREG-0737, Iten I.D.1 - Revised Responses to NRC Audit Report Findings 11.5LNRC 84-0003,1/13/84: SPDS Safety Analysis l
4-1 l
APPENDIX A Standard Forms Used in PDA i
1 i
I l
l A-1
i APPENDIX Vill L HUMAN EN2tNEERIND FINDINB NO: I PLANT UNIT: DATE:
l REVIEWER NAME:
a) NEF TITLE:
l b) ITEMSINVOLVED:
NOMENCLATURE LOCATION PHOTO NO.
ITEM TYPE
. b, c) FINDING DESCRIPTION (GUIDELINES AT VARIANCE WITH):
i l d) SPECIFIC OPERATOR ERROR (S)THAT COULD RESULT FROM HEF:
l A-2 l . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ - . _ _ _ - _ . ._ . _ - . - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
csucessTiONS FonpoTENTiALsACnP T 4
B SEX MVEW naast 3 ATE NFE KSEAnCNER WAYA COLL WSR.
Pacemans anSn.
i RATE: _
HEF COMMITTEE nNEW DISPOSITON:
DREFER TO OPERATIONS DFURTHER REVIEW SY:
- DUE DAMh DNQ ACTION REQUfRED SPLANATON BELOW OR ATTACHED) l I
l D10 SE CORRECTED BY FCR DOTHER:_ _
FCR #IDATE)
D TO BE CORRECTED BY MR I
SAhelDATE)
DATE: _
EVALUATWN COMPLETED SNUPPS PRDJECT OIRECTOR:_
A-3
. . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - . . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . . - - . _ . _. ._ . a
~
,' ITEMS f & g ARE TO BE 00tIPLETED ONLY IF UTILITf OUESTIONS THE NECESSITY POR THE BACKF O LIST THE PROCEDURES OR OPERATIONS THAT USE THE LISTED ITEMS IN A MANNER TO INDUCE THE OPERATOR ERROR:
g) LIST THE CONSEQUENCES OF OPERATOR ERROR DURING ALL MODES OF OPERATION:
A-4
t HEF PRIORITY SHEET car no.
A,euestions i
- 1. Ren ener escurved, seuld plant safety by jeopardsed er degraded?
e Yes enter a"1"In Ouestion 1
- No enter a T in Ouestion 1 S. N en ener enounod, could plant rolleb111ty be reduced?
- Yes enter a "1"in Question 2 o No enter a vin Question 3
- 3. Would the plant's roepense to to ener both
- e. Prodde the operster sufficient time to sonoot It and
- b. Provide a positive warning (e.g. elarm) Wiet the error has he'an eenusetted?
- Yes enter a T In Questien 8
- No enter a "1"in Ouestion 8 S.Priodtlastien Fenaulo 8 U 1 1 1 x 1 - a sevetyReisted 9 m SS safety fleisted 1 X Rollability Related 8 1 1 = M m 40 Rollability lleisted 0 1 0 8 1 = E0 Ferformerwe Preldom 8
' C.Petenty emessen e enerely 1 a
. l A-5
APPEl: DIX B Forms Used for Task Analysis and Verification of Task Performance Capabilities i
i l
B-1
4 w
s ha' kg E :
bg s x s s N
+Y s s s s x
\ \ \ \ N a
N N s N N
- g3 %
b'X a >
a 4' dE
- P >
ke
- d 6 =3 n 1
\ \ N \ \
3 t m J
Si
'3 '2
} ED* 6 6
'2 '2 6
n
% o 4:
y +1 Si +i 4
SI d9 ho w u i4 %
saE 6 6 6 n j4 41 M +l Si +1 3 q
\
,y#
l hh Q
r g 9 S
a O
s O
a$$ o d
, e +
l 29 2 5 $ 2 S
- E .' b f b f -
\5 ? ? L?r L.c l& 46 W
> s (.
&e 371 s +s e P -
e g m3 1 2- )
- r 4.1f'Al . N43 ? '-2pom
tlf T
i Es N
?
,. 1 4 s* !
s4 tia :v i*
11 3. )j E ~
3 .
l}!I i \
t s a.
Ia
,i1 d9 1! -
.a IS
.I L
0
( b (a! 2 4 1 '
B-3
APPENDIX C Forms Used in Validation of Control Room Functions t
l f
I l
C-1
$4, ll l
[
l h IAJ dSE Y m ik -s a uts hs te;41 m *e e ut t 9 E iz b
+
%d I !
~~ . _,
(g h '
_ _ ~_~._2 ::re---
e49%
9
'M 1( ,
9 9 , '
e s i e 34 m,,,E g M
2 t t
______________ s g
Q 's,.
u (CH'~ ~gp fal s ;Q zu
. l li k a o <
n co ~ \
5 / - e 00 Q 4
ow ...
wy j . e s a gg = L4 N $
gs _____-
.. y g# 1 i (,s,y' F- R 's ; ES!
,,s _ _ ______
v ....
on , n d, f f g E ____-- - --~ q ,, ,,
wh w
i e ec t ~
%, ---__. ___ g
.dj % N "
( A ') Nsb -
id dM' VR iM Id hB !!
l e
N thii\l a II cum av tW El iNi 11!! pe!.il l
~
i$p$']1]r{p 24 hh y& ,jp4i en
.21 Rd Md iati dhg!
-Q d it R gp io3It.didIfsk 1 lo q IIj <w*fs 52 $q r r - e SUN s WJ ,;!
w a s2 o o n m ;
1 t 4 s~f i (? -H 4ii C-2
APPENDIX D Supplementary Suryey l
l l
D-1
Appendix D - Supplementary Survey 1.0 Control Room Workspace Finding 1 There is no coding scheme established to clearly differ-(5) entiate different types, sizes, and styles of expendables and spare parts from each other.
Response Due to the relatively snall amount of spare parts required in the control room, combined with most parts having identifying markings, a rigid coding scheme is unnecessary.
Unlabeled parts will be labeled as deemed necessary.
4 i
f i
l l
D-2
App ndix D - Supplementary Survey 2.0 Comunications Finding 1 Periodic testing is not planned for comunication equipment.
(5)
Response The routine use of communications equipment will ensure the equipment is operating properly.
Finding 2 Control room personnel do not have override priviledges on (0) outside telephone lines.
Response Direct lines out of the control room are provided. Dedicated lines to TSC and E0F will also be provided.
Finding 3 The location and design of the phone on RL003 makes it incon-(5) venient and in the way of the control room operators. Also the cords are not long enough.
Response Further analysis with regard to correcting this HEF is required.
Finding 4 The headsets associated with sound powered phones are uncom-(6) fortable.
Respcnse These headsets are for use by maintenance personnel and their use would result in minor consequences and inconvenience to control room operations. No further action is required.
Finding 5 The drawer in which headphones are stored is not labeled.
(5)
Response This finding would result in minor consequences and incon-venience to control room operations. No further action is required.
Finding 6 There are no speakers associated with the control room (5) public address system located in the control room bathrooms.
Response Speakars in the control room bathroom are unnecessary as operators in the control room can attract the attention of operators in the bathro'om.
Finding 7 The audio gain on the public address system is designed so that (5) the operators could turn the volume down to an inaudible level.
Response It is normal practice to adjust the audio gain to an audible level, therefore, this should not be a problem. No action is required.
Finding 8 There is not adequate communication equipment available to
() control room operators when they are wearing protective gear.
Specifically it is impossible to hear the operators when they talk through face masks.
Response Face masks containing provisions to f acilitate voice com-munications will be provided.
D-3
Appendix D - Supplanentary Survey 3.0 Annunciator Warning Systen Finding 1 The computgr alarms and annunciator horns are not loud (4) enough to properly distinguish the sound from the anbient noise.
Re'sponse This finding will be investigated in the environmental sound study.
e i
D-4 i
. . . . . . .. ~.. . .
L Appendix D - Supplementary Survey 4.0 Controls Finding 1 It is not possible to operate CH E-30 switches or the con-(6) trols on the Foxboro meters when wearing emergency gloves.
Response This finding is a duplicate of NRC finding 4.1. See 3NUPPS response per reference 10.
Finding 2 The scale f ace for the setpoint on the Letdown Hx Outlet (0) Pressure control (BG-PK-131) on RL001 is broken.
Response This finding wiii be corrected at system +.urnover.
finding 3 The design of all of the annunciator acknowledge buttons is (6) such'that the operator can inadvertently activate them by leaning against the panel.
Response The annunciator controls have been redesigned based on NRC finding 3.14.
Finding 4 The startup reset control (SF-HS-3) on RL003 is missing an (0) escutcheon plate.
Response An escutcheon plate will be added to SF-HS-3.
Finding 5 There is an inconsistent CH E-30 switch configuration for (0) several controls.
Response Refer to NRC finding 4.5 for the SNUPPS response.
Finding 6 The "open" and "close" positions are reversed on the follow-(0) ing controls:
Panel # Component #
( RLO14 2LDA-310lA RL014 2LDA-31018 RL014 2LDA-3101C Response This finding will be resolved through modifications to the control room.
l i
i D-5
Appendix D - Supplanentary Survey 5.0~ Disp 1ays Finding 1 The individual rod position labels (H6, H10, F8, etc.) cannot (6) be read from RL003.
Response During plant operations, one operator would normally be stationed at the rod position panel and another operator would be stationed at the control panel. The operator at the IRPI would compare bank position at the rod control panel to the IRPIS. This issue will be further addressed through training.
Finding 2 The totalizer and counter do not identify the units of measure (0), for the Boric Acid Counter and Totalizer (BG-FY-110BB) or the Combined Makeup and BA Totalizer and Counter (BG-FY-1108, BG-FY-111BB,BG-FY-1118).
Response Refer to NRC finding 5.26 for the response (see reference 10).
Finding 3 More than nine graduations separate the major numerals on (5) sixty nine displays.
Response Tolerance zones will be marked on displays where practical throughout the control room and will reduce or eliminate the potential for misreading displays.
Finding 4 Linear scales are not used on several displays.
(5)
Response Where practical, tolerance zones will be marked on displays to improve readability.
Finding 5 All Foxboro controllers, which have demand and actual status (5) do not distinguish between pointers which indicate demand /
actual status.
Response The function of some of these controllers is to allow an operator to detennine if there is any mismatch between the pointers, rather than which pointer reads demand versus l
actual status. These controllers will be reviewed and those
[
determined to fit outside the above category will be corrected.
Finding 6 All Foxboro controllers have a poor contrast between black (5) numerals and a cream colored background. The readability is j degraded by this contrast.
l Response The readability is only slightly degraded and does not warrant a scale change.
l t
j D-6
Appendix 0 - Supplanentary Survey 5.0 Displays, continued Finding 7 On all Foxboro controllers, the unit and multiplier infor-(5) mation is presented in the upper left hand corner. Due to the position, contrast, and size, this infomation is dif-ficult to read.
Response With training and repetitive use of these controllers, the information will be readily apparent to the operators.
Finding 8 Display scales for several meters do not use an optimal (5) numeral progression:
Response Although the scales are not optimal by NUREG 0700 guidelines, the operators have found that the numeral progressions are adequate and were practical and usable. Also, tolerance zones will be marked on displays to aid operators in reading the displays.
Finding 9 There is an unlabeled recorder on RL014. Neither the scale (0) nor the label provide identification infomation.
Response This is a construction related problem that should be cor-rected at turnover.
Finding 10 More than four graduations are used on 42 displays without (5) use of major and minor graduations.
Response On many of these displays, there are intemediate markings.
Vital information is mostly on the front panels where the graduations can be more easily read from the required distance. The back panel and front panel scales will have tolerance ranges marked on them as soon as these tolerances dre defined, thereby simplifying the operators reading task with an aid to easily identify if readings are within tolerance. We also have annunciators to alert the operators of conditions out of tolerance.
l l Finding 11 Graduation lengths or contrast thickness is not sufficient (5) to distinguish intemediate graduation marks on 87 displays.
Response See previous response (finding 5.10).
Finding 12 The display units for the Fuel Pool level (EC-LI-39A), Fuel (5) Pool Pump Discharge (EC-FI-17A), and Fuel Pool Pump Discharge (EC-FI-18A) on RLO22 are not appropriate for use by the operators.
Response The display units and the units provided in the procedures will be made to agree.
l l'
l D-7
Appendix D - Supplementary Survey 5.0 Displays, continued Finding 13 Legend labels for the permissive / blocked / partial trip status (6) panel (SB069) on RLO22 are not readable from the operator's console.
Response This finding was previously reported and the display has been redesigned to establish a light pattern to aid the operator with the reading of the display. Legend labels are readable from the par,el workstation.
Finding 14 The label inside the trend recorders for Steam Generator wide (5) range level and pressure ( AE-LR-501, AE-LR-503, AB-PR-514, AB-PR-535) on RLO26 are not consistent with the component labels. Tne component labels identify steam generators as A, B, C, D where as the inside recorder labels use Lpl, LP2, LP3, and LP4.
Response The labels inside the trend recorders will be changed to agree with the component labels.
Finding 15 There are no scale label indications on the Steam /Feedwater (5) flow and level trend recorders ( AE-FR-510, AE-FR-520, AE-FR-530, and AE-FR-540) on RLOO6 and the Boric Ar.id flow recorder (BG-FR-110) on RLOO2 to indicate the measured variable.
Response Colored dots will be added to the scales inside the above recorders to indicate the correct association.
Finding 16 The scale values for the Charger Header Control (BG-HC-182)
(0) on RL001 and the BTRS Demineralizer Bypass Control (BG-HC-387) on RLOO2 increase from right to left.
Response The above controls will be made to increase from left to right.
Finding 17 All Foxboro meters have pointers which overlap the scale (5) markings.
Response The overlap is minor and will have only minor, if any, consequences to the operator.
l Finding 18 The scale values for the Battery Chargers (NK22, NK12, NK13, (0) NKl4, NK24, NK23) on RL0l6 do not increase from left to right.
Response This finding has been or will be resolved through modifica-tions to the control room.
D-8
Appendix D - Supplementary Survey 5.0 Displays, continued Finding 19 The scales printed on the recorder paper for BG-FR-110 (0)- (RLOO2), BB-TR-412 (RLOO4), GN-PR-934 (RL018), EJ-TR-613 (RL018),EJ-TR-612(RL018),PR-938(RLO20),BB-PR-403 (RLO22), BB-PR-455 (RLO22), BG-FR-154 (RLO22), BG-FR-155 (RLO22), BG-FR-156 (RLO22, BG-FR-157 (RLO22), BB-TR-413 (RLO22), BB-TR-423 (RL022), BB-TR-433 (RLO22), BB-TR-443 (RLO22), AB-PR-514 (RLO26), and AB-PR-535 (RLO26) do not match the scales on the recorders.
Response All scales will be verified and correct scales . installed.
Finding 20 There is no label on the trend recorder (RJ-UR-2) located (6) on the RLOO2 panel to identify the recorded parameters.
Response The parameters displayed on this recorder are selectable by the operator from all those parameters available in the computer and will therefore vary. No corrective action will be taken.
Finding 21 The megawatt recorder (MA-JR-1) on RL024 does not have a (6) scale printed on the recorder paper.
Response The design of the recorder allows for the meter scale on the display to act as the scale for recorded data. This finding does not result in significant consequences or inconvenience to control room operttions.
l l
l
[
i D-9
Appendix D - Supplementary Survey 6.0 Labels and Location Aids ..
No findings were detected on this section.
l l
l
)
D-10
l App:ndix D - Supplementary Survey l
l 7.0 Process Computer Finding i Excess glare is reflected from the two computer CRTs on
() RLOO7.
Response The glare nn the computer CRTs will be further studied during the lighting tests.
Finding 2 The alphanmeric characters on the CRTs have 6.4 picture (5) elements per character height. Seven picture elements per character height is recomended by NUREG 0700.
Response All alphanumeric characters are easily read from all operator workstations. No corrective action is necessary.
Finding 3 The luminance, contrast, and color of the CRTs can be (5) adjusted by the control room operators.
Response This versatility is beneficial if used properly. The operators will refrain from adjusting these controls without prior approval from the Shift Supervisor.
Finding 4 The display data on the computer systems require interpolat-(5) ing and mathematical calculations. For example, data is presented in units of k lbm/hr on the computer and inust be converted to gal / min for the operator's use. Also, there is an inconsistent use of words. For example, open is used synonomously with not closed.
Response Conversions are quite simple and readily obtainable. Infor-mation on the computers is supplementary to that displayed elsewhere within the control room and therefore this change is unnecessary.
Finding 5 Indentation of subclassifications is not used in the lists j (5) generated on the CRTs.
Response The use of color as well as spacing between lines and para-graphs adequately separates the subclassifications.
l Finding 6 Numbers with and without decimal points are intermixed in l (5) columns and therefore do not line up consistently.
Response All alphanumeric characters are easily read from all of the operator workstations and operators will be made aware of this inconsistency through training.
l Finding 7 Individual data groups do not have descriptive titles.
(5) They are identified by nebers (1-10) and the operator must refer to other docmentation to detennine the corresponding title.
D-ll
Appendix 0 - Supplanentary Surycy 7.0 Process Computer, continued I- Response Data from operator logs are operator selectable and are con- ,
sidered temporary and it is the responsibility of the operator to input and retrieve their own infonnation.
Finding 8 Lists of options are not organized on the computers accord-(5) ing to any logical scheme.
Response These lists of options are not meant to guide operators.
This finding does not result in significant consequences or inconvenience to control room operations. No action will be taken.
Finding 9 When data are contained on multiple pages, the page does not (5) display the page. number or the total nunber of pages.
Response This finding is a duplicate of NRC finding 7.8 and its response will be handled as noted in reference 10.
Finding 10 Feedback messe; :s are not provided to the operators to indi-(6) cate changes in the status of the computer system functioning.
Response Once the function is completed the cursor turns purple. No further action is required.
Finding 11 Periodic feedback is not provided to the operator to indicate (5) normal system operation and the reason for any system delays.
Response The functions performed by the computer are such that the computer will respond within a few seconds therefore negating the need for a feedback function.
Finding 12 Colors. used on the CRT to convey information are not con-(6) sistent with all other color codes in the control room.
Response is being handled by the SNUPPS response to NRC This finding finding 7.7 (see reference 10). In addition, the alarm dis-plays are being made consistent with other computer CRT colors in the control room. The P&ID displays are dynamic and there-fore cannot be made consistent with control panel mimic.
Finding 13 Red and green are both used in the Primary plant graphic (BB1).
(5)
Response The colors in this graphic conform to the CRT color coding scheme. The operators report no problems associated with the use of both red ed green in this display.
Finding 14 All data relevant to a specific operator entry are not dis-(5) played on a single page.
D-12
Appendix D - Supplementary Survey 7.0 Process Computer, continued Response in some cases, there is too much information to contain on one page. Operators are aware of the use of multiple page entries.
Finding 15 There is no date or headings on the trend data.
(5)
Response Trend data is operator selectable and therefore no date or headings are used. A trend pen sunmary is available to identify points trended.
Finding 16 The printer does not have the capability of 150 lines a (6) mintte print speed.
Response This finding is being handled by the SNUPPS response to NRC finding 7.9. (Refer to reference 10).
Finding 17 There are no instructions attached to the printer for (5) reloading paper, ribbon, ink, etc.
Response An instruction sheet will be attached to the printer.
Finding 18 The printer is set up such that the last line of print is (5) obscured from the operators' view.
Response The operator has the ability to page up if he wants to read the last line of print. No further action is required.
hel
Appendix D - Supplementary Survey 8.0 Panel Layouts Finding 1 The NIs are located on the back panels. This instrunen-() tation may be needed during an emergency event.
Response All infomation required for emergency events is given on the front panels.
Finding 2 The demarcation of RC Pump groups lacks hierarchical labeling (5) of groups.
Response The arrangement of these groups precludes the need for hierarchical labels.
Finding 3 The Permissives/ Block Partial Trip Status (SB069) on RLO22 (5) are located high on the panel. The upper tiles are difficult to read due to parallax and the size of the legends.
Response The operator can adjust his position to correct for parallax.
In addition, the light patterns are used to give the operator indication of status.
Finding 4 (5)
The control Charging used Header in adjusting Flow (RC Seallocated Control BG-HC-182) Injection Flow is the on RL003 while the 6ssociated displays for setting injection flow are located on RLO22.
Response This display is only used during its initial setup. Moving the display and control close together would be unnecessary.
Finding 5 Tne RCP Bearing Temperature recorder (BB-TR-500) is located on (5) the back panel. The operator can select to have temperatures displayed on the CRT but this cuts the signal to the recorder so the trending is lost. If the recorder is selected, the CRT does not have the values for the display.
Response Normally, bearing temperatures will only be displayed on the BOP computer. The trend recorder may be used during startup l and other selected times.
l l
l D-14
l App;ndix D - Supplementary Survey 9.0 Control / Display Integration Finding 1 The Reactor Vessel level range on RLO22 is confusing to the
() operators . The range is from 0 to 120%. :
Response The range of the meter provided allows for indication error.
Operator concerns would only occur when the meter indicates below 100%. Based on the above, no further action is nec-essary.
0-15
l ARD Ccrpsrctisn Table 3. HEF Prioritization Scheme Severity Criteria
- 1. If an error occured, could plant safety be jeopardized or degraded?
e Yes - enter a "1" in Question 1 e No - enter a "0" in Question 1
- 2. If an error occured, could plant reliability be reduced?
e Yes - enter a "1" in Question 2 e No - enter a "0" in Question 2
- 3. Would the plant's response to the error both:
- a. Provice the operator sufficient time to correct it, and
- b. Provide a positive warning (e.g. alarm) that the error ha: been committed?
o Yes - enter a "1" in Question 3 o No - enter a "0" in Question 3 Prioritization Formula 1 2 3 Priority Type __
1 X 1 = 1.0 Safety Related 1 X 0 = 2.0 Safety Related l 0 1 1 = 3.0 Reliability Related l
0 1 0 = 4.0 Reliability Related 0 0 1 = 5.0 Performance Problem l
l
! Note: The following additional priorities were used in
! prioritizing the HEFs identified in this review:
Priority Type L
0 HEF will be corrected without further assessment 6 HEF meets acceptable HF criteria s
r D-16
--w a n -y -- - , - , - - - , - - , - - - ~ . -w
APPENDIX E Human Factors Review of Auxiliary Shutdown Panel 1.0 CONTROL ROOM WORKSPACE FINDING 1: RP118A and B are located less than the recommended 50 inch separation between vertical panel and opposing wall. In particular, door box TV14131 reduces the separation for RP1188 by 10 inches, providing only 30 inches available for operator movement.
Location of door box TV14131 is site unique to Callaway.
Resolution: Relocate the Callaway door box TV14131 elsewhere within the room or directly outside the room. The resulting 40 inch sep-aration between panels and wall is sufficient.
FINDING 2: There is no identified area for proc 6 dure and/or docu-ment storage within the Auxiliary Shutdown room.
Resolution: Provisions will be made for procedure / document storage and will be identified accordingly.
FINDING 3: There is no identified area for spare parts storage (bulbs, fuses, etc.) nor provision for maintaining a record of parts.
Resolu+, ion: Provisions will be made for spare parts storage (bulbs, fuses, if applicable) and will be identified accordingly. A list of parts will be ennecessary as only light bulbs are involved.
FINDING 4: Some controls are located outside the recomended height of between 34 inches and 53 inches above the floor for precise or frequent and emergency operation. All controls have been placed between 43 inches and 64 inches above the floor.
Resolution: All controls are located within the recommended height of between 341nches and 70 inches above the floor for normal oper-at ion.
l FINDING 5: Some displays are located outside the recomended height for both normal (between 41 inches and 70 inches above the floor) and frequent or precise rcadings (between 50 inches and 65 inches above the floor). All displays are located between approximately l 65 inches and 80 inches above the floor.
l l Resolution: The low probability of using the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel coupled with the high probability of the eperator being taller than the fif th percentile sufficiently reduces the impact of locating displays the 10 inches higher than that recomended for normal operation. The recomended practice of locating dis-l plays above controls is used where possible on the Auxiliary l
Shutdown Panel, l FINDING 6: There were no apparent forms of acceptable fire detec-tion / protection equipment located in the vicinity of the Remote Shutdown Panel at the time of review.
l E-1
l 1.0 CONTROL ROOM WORKSPACE, continued Resolution: The SNUPPS design provides for 4 ionization detectors to be located within Room 1413. A portable CO, extinguisher will be located immediately around the corner from the exit to Room 1413.
2.0 COMMUNICATIONS FINDING 1: A periodic check should be performed to ensure all com-munications are operating properly.
Resolution: During routine inspections of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel and room, communications equipment will be checked.
FINDING 2: Procedures should be established dealing with handling incoming and outgoing emergency messages.
Resolution: All incoming / outgoing emcrgency messages at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel will be coordinated by the Shift Supervisor, or his designee.
FINDING 3: Reliable means should exist for communicating with support facilities, on and off site, during Auxiliary Shutdown Panel use.
Resolution: A Public Address and telephone will be provided as means for communicating with support f acilities both on and off site, respectively.
3.0 ANNUNCIATOR WARNING SYSTEMS Not applicable 4.0 CONTROLS FINDING 1: Manual control stations for the auxiliary feedwater con-trol valves may be inadvertently actuated.
Resolutign: When the stations are in their normal mode of control, moving the lever will have no effect on the valve position. Any inadvertent actuation of the station during the local mode of contrct.
will only result in momentary valve movement resulting in a minor change in flow. Any significant change in flow would be apparent to the operator through the Aux. Feedwater flow indicator.
FINDING 2: The Control Room instrumentation transfer switches follow a different convention for sv: itching than that followed by the steam dump transfer switches and valve transfer switches, as follows:
Left Position Right Position Control Xfer Sw: ISO CTRL ROOM NORMAL Stm Dump Xfer Sw: REMOTE LOCAL Valve Xfer Sw: REMOTE LOCAL E-2
4.0 CONTROLS, continued Resolution: Conventions for the 3 control transfer switches will be reversed and will ir Nate " ISO CTRL ROOM" in the Right Position and " NORMAL" in the Left Position. The 12 steam dump and valve transfer switches will remain unchanged.
FINDING 3: Covers for legend pushbuttons should be keyed to prevent the possibility of interchanging the covers af ter lamp replacement.
Resolution: Due to the small number of covers and only one existing sterotype (i.e. "AUT0" on left and " MAN" on right), these covers will not be keyed, as the probability of confusing the proper loca-tion is very low.
FINDING 4: To maintain consistency with the Control Room, there should be some indication made for pushbuttons that require holding to complete a valve stroke.
Resolution: Any pushbuttons of this nature will be appropriately identified and marked.
FINDING 5: Cutler-Hammer switches are black with white lettering, which is inconsistent with those on the Main Control Board.
Resolution: Cutler-Hammer switches will be changed to agree with those on the Main Control Board.
5.0 VISUAL DISPLAYS FINDING 1: Scale range and units should be the same as those used on similar displays located in the Control Room.
Resolution: All display scales will be checked against similar scales located in the control room and any differences will be noted and dispositior.ed.
FINDING 2: The following displays contain extraneous information on their scales, such as duplication of label information or the addition of vendor trademarks:
RP 118A RP118B ABPI-5248, ABPI-544B ABPI-516X, ABPT-TJ5X AELI-501A, AELI-503A AELI-502A, AELI-504A AELI-528X, AELI-548X AELI-517X, AELI-537X Resolution: The above display scales will be checked against similar scales located in the control room and any differences will be noted and dispositioned.
FINDING 3: The units provided for tne motor driven and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge pressures (psig) are E-3
5.0 VISUAL DISPLAY _S_, continued inconsistent with the units provided for the suction pressures (psia). Displays affected are:
ALPI-15B (psig), ALPI-218 (psig), ALPI-248 (psia), ALPI-26B (psia)
Resolution: All display scales will be checked against similar scales located in the control room and any differences will be noted and dispositioned.
FINDING 4: Some displays are provided with more than the recommended 9 gradustions between numerals.
Resolution: All display scales will be checked against similar scales located in the control room and any differences will be noted and dispositioned.
FINDING 5: Values indicated by unit graduations on ABPI-516X, ABPI-524B, ABPI-535X and ABPI-544B are other tnan those recomended by paragraph 6.5.1.5.c of NUREG 0700. Values on these indicators are shown as 0 300 600 900 1200. In addition, some scales begin with an unnumbered graduation mark (e.g. BBTI-443A).
Resolution: ,01 display scales will be checked against similar scales located in the control room and any differences will be noted and dispositioned.
FINDING 6: The pointer on the RCS HOT LEG LOOP 4 indicator (BBTI-443A) is red while all other pointers are black.
Resolution: All display scales will be checked against similar scales located in the control room and any differences will be noted and dispositioned.
FINDING 7: Pointer tips on the Steam Generator Steam Dump to Atmo-sphere controls obscure the smallest graduation marks on the scale.
Resolution: The pointer tip width on ABPIC-1B, ABPIC-2B, ABPIC-38, ABPIC-4B is small enough for an operator to observe which graduation mark nas been selected as the setpoint.
FINDING 8: Zone markings should be placed on displays as necessary to provide operators with information regarding range, setpoints, etc. Zone markings should not interfere with quantitative markings.
Resolution: Tolerance zones wl11 be marked in accordance with similar displays located in the Control Room.
FINDING 9: The following indicator lights do not have bulb test capability:
ABZL-1B through ABZL-4B, FCZL-312DB, -3158, -3178, -312AD, -312AE,
-312AF.
E-4
l 5.0 VISUAL DISPLAYS, continued Resolution: Most indicator lights on the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel are in groups of 2 or 3 and will always have one light lit. If FCZL-312DB fails, sufficient information is provided by the governor valve posi-tion lights and the Auxiliary Feed Pump speed control.
FINDING 10: Provisions should be made to prevent interchanging inai-cator lenses.
Resolution: Due to the small number of indicator lenses and existing stereotyping for color coding, it is unnecessary to modify the lens to prevent interchangeability.
FINDING 11: Nomenclature and abbreviations for legend light indicators should be consistent with standard Control Room usage.
Resolution: Legend light indicators will be reviewed against the standard SNUPPS abbreviations list. Any inconsistencies will be corrected.
6.0 LABELS AND LOCATION AIDS FINDING 1: The label for RPHIS-3 should be located above the switch.
Resolution: The label position for RPHIS-3 will be relocated above the switch.
FINDING 2: The label for BGHIS-8149CB is loose.
Resolution: Loose labels will be detected and corrective actions im-plemented at system turnover.
FINDING 3: Labels should be consistent with existing abbreviations and nomenclature.
Resolution: A label study will be performed on all labels located on the Auxiliary Shutdown Panels. This study will be similar to that performed on Contro! Room labels.
FINDING 4: Blue naueplates provide insufficient contrast when com-pared to black nameplates.
Resolution: Blue nameplates will be made the same shade as those in the Confrol Room.
FINDING 5: A procedure should be in place for the periodic cleaning of labels.
Resolution: Routine inspection of the panels will indicate any re-quired cleaning.
E-5
.c - c 7.0 PROCESS COMPUTERS Not Applicable 8.0 PANEL LAYOUT FINDING 1: The arrangement of ABPI-535X, BBTI-443A and BBTI-423X on RPll88 appears to be inconsistent with the arrangement of similar displays on RP118A.
Resolution: Since the indicators are not used for control purposes but for verification of heat removal, and the indicators can be located quickly on the panels, the present arrangement is acceptable. ,
FINDING 2: Demarcation should be used to enhance recognition of '
groups 6T controls and displays.
Resolution: Demarcation will be provided as shown on the attached '
sketch.
FINDING 3: On panel RP1188, the indicators for M.D. auxiliary feed-water pump suction and discharge pressures are located one above the other, whereas the indicators for TD auxiliary feedwater pump suction and discharge pressures are located side by side. ,
Resolution: Since these indicators are used as status monitors and not for control purposes, and the indicators can be located quickly, it is acceptable to leave the indicators in there present arrange-ment.
9.0 CONTROL-DISPLAY INTEGRATION No findings were detected on this section.
4 E-6
, . g ng--- -- --_ - - - - - - , ,,
. AUXILIARY bHUTDOWN PANEL l -
l - .
.. ~ .
PANEL A
= - .
~.
~
. PANEL B ,
..~ .,. , .
. i* - - .2 ,
- Depts ft . -
. jere en zal
- r--- -i-------r----- -
c
,._ _ _ _ _:._ q -._ _ .._ ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ r - _ - _ _
j i;> = ,_ ;
, g. g.m _s; w .
, l
-4 s
t e s t .,s.
.l i ,
S- t .l ,
-l e t, ..
p
,, (' ,
- .. . e g
.r.2.w i m ag I AL M. ;
, A ewh - .a... _ __.re.J sem, . de. ' ,. ..._
_____..J a .
g }f.... G 'x Ie.
- c. . . .
t= m ;;;;;; e ;;;p
- M G;P .
- __ _ ei
- i"F' t .iW ;;;D q ;;E 8 D D [g '
l I
s
,, s, >
- . i ,
i
.i i ,
b \
s
,8
- t , / e
- - pe,c..ni
- l N E
' 4 m, l L b._{ _ __,
$a -!- .- . . ._U_r -
- **$ &A r_ .s -l e=. ).
=, (
c** 'v 8
8 ** .
.g 6, .m.i l
,e ,
. f I.,
s s s r _ .
b
~
'; bh b( . ..
+
- i.
i i
i Dg =- li. .y j.
Jh. t l
8 E
=
en )
g"~'
A 1 A 8
- 3 1 T..
-l 8 lp- -
mi 3
i
- pa _
1..; ' fj g l g a
W, n ,.,,
yi
..i'
.n , } \ - 1 e.
__. _ v :s [l ji _ j -
t._______8.'.)_____2.._i~
,w
__i=1__i_________w
__ ____t___ et_
4
- -, . , k'. d .
q, ,
=
= g.g
= -$d
~
.E-7' .
- ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
O EF PRIORITY SHEET FOR AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN PANEL FINDINGS A. Questions
- 1. If an error occurred, could plant safety be jeopardized or degraded?
o yes . enter a "1" in Question 1 0 No - enter a "0" in Question 1
- 2. If an error occurred, could plant reliability be reduced?
O Yes - enter .a "1" in Question 2 o No - enter a "0" in Question 2
- 3. Would the plant's response to the error both
- a. Provide the operator sufficient time to correct it and
- b. Provide a positive warning (e.g. alarm) that the error has been committed?
O Yes - enter a "0" in Question 3 0 No - enter a "1" in Question 3 B. Prioritization Formula 1 2 3 Priority Type 1 0 or 1 1 1.0 Safety Related 1 0 or 1 0 2.0 Safety Related 0 1 1 3.0 Reliability Related ,
0 1 0 4.0 Reliability Related 0 0 1 5.0 Performance Problem C. Priority Question Question Finding 1 2 3 Priority Finding 1 2 3 Priority 1.1 1 0 0 2.0 5.4 0 0 1 5.0 1.2 1 0 1 1.0 5.5 0 0 1 5.0 1.3 1 0 0 2.0 5.6 0 0 1 5.0 1.4 1 0 0 2.0 5.7 0 0 1 5.0 1.5 1 0 0 2.0 5.8 0 0 1 5.0 1.6 1 1 1 1.0 5.9 0 0 1 5.0 2.1 1 0 0 2.0 5.10 0 0 1 5.0 2.2 0 0 1 5.0 5.11 1 0 0 2.0 2.3 1 0 1 1.0 6.1 0 0 1 5.0 4.1 1 0 0 2.0 6.2 0 0 1 5.0
.. 4. 2 0 1 0 4.0 6.3 1 0 0 2.0 4.3 0 0 1 5.0 6.4 0 0 1 5.0 4.4 0 0 1 5.0 6.5 0 0a1 5.0 4.5 0 0 1 5.0 8.1 0 0 1 5.0 5.1 0 0 1 5.0 8.2 1 0 1 1.0 5.2 0 0 1 5.0 8.3 1 0 0 2.0 ,
5.3 0 0 1 5.0 E-8
Verification of Task Perfomance Capabilities F.1 Monitoring Tasks As described in the text of this report, only 17 sets of monitored parameters are used for tasks that depend on the value of the parameters. All of the other monitoring tasks are " digital" in that they depend on observing whether a parameter is in one of two possible states. The actions associated with each of the 17 parameters used in a non-digital way are considered to be a
" task category". For each of these "thsk categories" there are several
" subtasks", e.g., determine whether reactor coolant system pressure is less than 1405 psig. Each such " subtask" has been separately evaluated, even though there are close similarities among subtasks in a given category.
However, this similarity of subtasks has been used to compress the tabular summary of the evaluation of monitoring tasks contained in this appendix.
Most of the information in the accompanying tables is documented in plant emergency procedures, the control room inventory, the FSAR, and the specifi-cations for the individual displays. The data on precision of the displays is based to some extent on the judgement of the reviewers. The tabulated values of required precision are judgemental values based on the analyses of the task requirs ants, which considers the effects of an operator perfoming the task at a vane of the parameter different from the value specified in the emergency procedures. In general the tolerances tabulated under task requirements are in the range of 25 to 50% of the instrument uncertainties, which have been considered in development of the parameter values specified in emergency procedures. The numerical values tabulated under instrument characteristics are based on the judgement that an operator can discriminate to within + 1/4 of the smallest subdivision on the instrument scale.
F.2 Control Tasks The verification of the ability to perform control tasks was accomplished by actually performing the tasks on the Callaway simulator. These tasks are summarized in the accompanying table headed " Control Tasks".
The only finding that resulted from the Verification of Task Perfomance Capabilities deals with engravings or backlit pushbuttons for the following Auxiliary Feedwater regulator valve control switches on panel RLOO6:
AL HK-5A, -6A, -7A, -8A, -9A, -10A, -llA, -12A The backlit pushbuttons should be engraved with "0 PEN" and "CLOSE" in lieu of " MAN" and " AUT0" . It was subsequently determined that this finding is specific to the Callaway simulator.
F-1
MONITORING TASKS Range & Units Precision of Display Primary Alternative Task Regmts Task Reqmts Instr Charstics Indication Indications Evaluation Parameter Instr Charstics
- 1. Power Range 0 to 110% 0 to 120% full il%(at best) 0.5% Analog Indi- -Intermediate OK power cators NI-41B, Range Neutron Neutron Flux full power Flux
- Decreasing (RG 1.97) 42B,43B,44B 1
-SPDS
- Rapidly (RLOO4)
-B0P Computer CRTs decreasing
- 5% -Power Range Flux Recorders (4 on RLO22)
- 2. Intermediate Range 10-11 to 10-3 10-11 to t 1/10 1 1/10 decade Analog Indi- Intermediate OK 10-3 amps decade (at cators NI-35B, Range Startup Neutron Flux amps Rate Indi-
- Decreasing (RG 1.97) L10-6-200% best) 36B (RL003)
- Rapidly full power) cators decreasing -P6 Permissive
- - Below 10-10 amps Lights { actuated 7 at 10-lu amps) 3 -Intermediate Range Flux Recorder (RLOO4)
-SPDS
- 3. Containment 0.1 to 0.1 to 104 mR/hr t 1/5 decade ! 1/10 decade Computerized -Hi and Hi-Hi OK 10 4 im/hr 1 to 108 R/hr Radiation Alarms Radiation -Analog Display in
- Normal 1 to 107 R/hr Monitoring
- 1 R/hr (RG 1.97) System (Digital C.R. (PE 59 on Output)(SP056A) RL020)(1 to 108 R/hr)
-SPDS
- Setpoint for 1 x 10'4 10-7 to 10-4 11/5 decade 11/10 decade Computerized e isolating con- Ci/cc Ci/cc Process Monitor-tainment gaseous ing System (Dig-ventilation ital Output)
MONITORING TASKS Range & Units Precision of Disolay Primary Alternative Task Regmts Instr Charstics Task Regmts InstrCNarstics Indication Indications Evaluation Parameter
- 4. Containment 0 to 60 psig 0 to 70 psig il psi iO.25 psi Analog Indi- Analog Recorders. OK Pressure (RG 1.97) (normal design (analog) cators PI- PR934,938 (RL018 &
range) 934,935,936, RLO20)
- Normal
- 17 psig 937 (RL018)
- 27 psig -5 to 180 0 to 180 psig I5 psi 11.3 psi Analog Indi-
- 60 psig psig (RG (wide range) g(analog) cators PI-l 1.97) 938,939 J (RLO20)
-3 to +3 psig 10.2 psi 0.1 psi B0P Computer (normal (digital) operating range)
- 5. Containment 28 to 144 in 0 to 156 in 1 in 0.5 in Analog Indi- -Analog Recorder: OK ;
Recirculation (RG 1.97) cators LI-7, LR-6 (RLO20) q, Sump Level 8,9,10 -BOP Computer '
- Normal !RL018)
S - Increasing
- 10 ft
- 6. RCS Wide Range O to 3000psig 0 to 3000 psig 10 psi !12 psi Analog Indi- -Analog Recorder: OK (approx.) (analog) PI 403,405 PR403(RLO22) -
Pressure (RG 1.97) -80P Computer CRTs
- 2645 psig (RLO22)
- 2445 psig i0.5 psi Digital -Pressurizer Pres-
- 2335 psig (digital) Indicator on sure (1700 to Panel RLO22 2500psig)
- 2310 psig (driven by Wide Range Pres-
- 1920 psig 3 psi
- 1900 psig (analog- BOP Com- sure (0 to 700
- 1849 psig narrow range) puter) psig indicator)
PI 403A (RLOO2)
- 1536 psig -SPDS
- 1405 psig 41igh & Low Alarms
- 1000 psig Automatic Act-
- 700 psig uations (Reactor
- 405 psig
- 400 psig
- 200 psig
- 195 psig
MONITORING TASKS Range & Units Precision of Display Primary Alternative Task Regmts Instr Charstics Task Reqmts Instr Charstics Indication Indications Evaluation l Parameter l
- SG pressure Comparisons
- 50 psi below with SG SG Press. pressure
- 200 psi are above SG press. required in response to a SGTR.
These i '
actions are l y part of the
' ~e recovery sequence, and occur 30 min. or more after the event.
1
- 7. Pressurizer Pres- 1700 to 2500 1700 to 2500psig I5 psi 3 psi Analog Indi- -RCS Wide Range Pres -
OK sure psig (analog) cators PI- sure (Digital Indi-
- Normal range 455A,456,457, cator-RLO22)
- Stable or 458 (RLOO2) -B0P Computer CRTs increasing SPDS
- 1849 psig -SI Actuation at
- 2235 osig 1849 psig
- 8. RCS Hot Leg 0 to 6000F 0 to 700 0F 1.5 2 0F I2.5 0F Analog Indi- B0P Computer CRTs OK Wide Range (50 to 7500F (analog) cators TI- SPDS Temperature per RG 1.97) 10.5"F 413A,423A
- Stable (digital) (RLO21)
- Increasing /
Decreasing
- 564 F
- 5570F
- 550 0F
- 400 0F
- 3500F
- 2000F
MONITORING TASKS Range & Units Precision of Display Primary Alternative Parameter Task Regmts Instr Charstics Task Regmts, Instr Charstics Indication Indications Evaluation
- 160 0F
- Equal to Cold Leg Temp.
l Wide Range (50 to 750 0F (analog) cators TI- -SPDS per RG 1.97) 4138,423B l Temperature i 0.50F (digital) (RLO21)
J l - Stable i _ - Increasing /
T Decreasing
$ - 564 F
- 5bOOF l
- 1600F
- 500F decrease /
hr I
10.RCS Average 540 to 5900F 530 to 6300F !10F !0.50F Analog Indi- -BOP Computer CRTs OK Temperature cators TI- -Digital Indicator
- 5640F 412,422,432, on Panel RLO22
- 557 0F 442 (RLOO4) (driven by BOP Computer) 0 *10F -B0P Computer CRTs OK
- Stable RG 1.97) cation at Sub-
- Increasing / cooling Monitor (RP081)
Decrgasing -Subcooling Monitor
- 1200 F (for comparison
- 7000F
- 4000F with pzr temp.)
- 3500F
- 50 0F below pzr water 150F temperature
MONITORING TASKS Range & Units Precision of Display Primary Alternative Task Regmts Instr Charstics Task Regmts' Instr Charstics Indication Indications Evaluation Parameter 100 to 7000F 100 to 7000F 150F 12.50F Analog Indi- Subcooling Monitor OK
- 12. Pressurizer Water cator TI-453 (for con.parison Temperature with core exit TC)
(RLOO2)
- 200 F Comparison
- Equal to satur- J with SG temp.
ation temp. of involsas ruptured SG indications
- 50 F above core on 2 panels exit TC temp. and conver-sion of measured I pressure to I saturated temp. This task is assoco q iated with an h optional longe term recovery procedure from SGTR (i.e , more than 30 min -
1 hr after I 0.5% Analog Indi- SPDS "K
- 13. Pressurizer Level O to 100% of 0 to 100% of 11%
cators LI- 80P Computer CRTs
- Stable span (Bottom span 459A,460A,
- Increasing / to top per 461,462 ,
Decreasing RG 1.97)
! ! (RL002) i
- 92% of span i
- 90% of span ! ,'
- 70% of span
- 60% of span ;
- 50% of span :
- 40% of span
- 35% of span ,
- 30% of span
- 25% of span
f MONITORING TASKS Range & Units Precision of Disalay Primary Alternative Task Regmts Instr Charstics Task Regmts Instr Clarstics Indication Indications Ev aluation Parameter
- 20% of span
- 17% of span
- 10% of span 14.RCS Subcooling 2000F Sub - 2000 F Subcooling I5 F Sub- 130 F Subcooling Analog Indi- - Subcooling Panel OK fl20F Superheat cators TI- (RP018A,8)
-0F0 cooling to to 20000F Super- cooling 350F Super- heat 1250F Super- 1390A,8 (Ligital Indica-
- 50 0F (RLO22) tion) heat (RG heat
- SPOS (Digital) 1.97) , . . . . ..
0 to 100% 0 to 120% 11% 11% Analog Indi- - SPDS { Digital) OK
- 15. Reactor Vessel cation LI- - Analog Recorder Level (RG 1.97) 1311,1312, (RP080)
- Stable 1321,1322
- Increasing /
Decreasing (RLO21)
- Specific
- l q Values 4 Correspond-in; to:
o 3-1/2 ft above bottom of fuel plus uncertainties l 0 Top of core plus uncer-tainties o Full upper-head o Avg. system void fraction with RCP(s) running
- 16. Steam Generator 0 to 1300 psis 0 to 1300 psig 110 psi 17.5 psi Analog Indi- - SPOS (Digital) OR Pressure (each of (0 to 1420 psig cation PI- - B0P Computer 4 SG) per RG 1.97) 514A,515A, CRTs (Digital)
- Stable 516A,PI-52iA ,
525A,526A,
- Decreasing
MONITORING TASKS Range & Units Precision of Display Primary Alternative Task Regmts Instr Charstics Task Regmts Instr Charstics Indication Indications Evaluation Parameter PI-534A,535A, f
- 1234 psig 536A,PI-544A, j
- 1185 psig 545A,546A, !
- 985 psig 1 (RLO26)
- 800 psig
- 698 psig
- 585 psig
- 400 psig
- 250 psig
- 215 psig l - O psig
- greater than RCS pressure
- Lower in one SG than in others 0 to 100% of 0 to 100% of 11% !0.5% Analog Indi- - B0P Computer CRTs OK
- 17. Steam Generator cators LI- (Digitial)
Level-Narrow Range span span 517,518,519, - SPDS (Digital)
(each of 4 SG) LI-527,528, - Wide Range SG
- 78% of span 529 LI-537, Level (Analog) 7 - 65% of span 538,539, 3 - 59% of span LI-547,548,
- 50% of span
- 25% of span 549 (RLO26)
- 9% of span
- Increasing /
Decreasing
- In range
I CONTROL TASKS Task Control (s) Parameter Control Range Control Precision Unnecessary Dup- Type of Contro I Used Indication Sufficient Sufficient lication Avoided Sufficient
- 1. Charging Line Flow Con-trol Talve OK OK
- Tontrol Charging Flow FI-121A HC182 OK OK (RL001) (RL002)
OK OK OK
- Control Pressurizer LI-459A, OK y ( b2)
NA NA OK OK
- Place valve in auto. FK 121 NA l l
control mode (RL001) l
- 2. Charging Line Hand tontrol Valve OK OK l
-Adjust seal injection HC8357A,B FI 215A,B OK OK flow (RL001) (RL001)
OK OK OK
- 3. Low Pressure Letdown PK 131 PI 131 OK tontrol Valve (RL001) FI 132 g -Adjust letdown flow (RLOO2) 4 by adjusting set-
- point of letdown HX outlet pressure control
- 4. Control Charging Flow HC 8357A,B LI-459A,460A OK OK OK OK
-Control pzr level or HC 182* 461,462 (RL001) (RLOO2) ,
OK OK
-Control RCS pressure PI-455A,456, OK OK (Adjust charging or 457,458 letdown as required to (RLOO2) reduce pressure to less '
than 2260psig) 1
CONTROL TASKS 1
Task Control (s) Parameter Control Range Control Precision Unnecessary Dup- Type of Control Used Indication Sufficient Sufficient lication Avoided Sufficient
-Equalize charging and FI-917A,B OK OK OK OK letdown (adjust charg-(RL018) ing flow) ,
or FI-121A*
l (RL001)
NA OK OK
-Set in auto. control FK-121 NA NA mode (RL001) o Cannot use HC-182 or FI-121A if SI is in effect. l
- 5. Control Letdown Flow OK OK
-Control pzr level HIS-8153A,B LI-459A,460A, OK OK 8154A,B 461,462 HC-8157A,B (RL002).
q or PK-131* ,
l
' (RL001) 8 PI-455A,456, OK OK OK OK l
-Control RCS Pressure '
457,458 i
(RLOO2) 1 FI-138A,B OK OK OK
-Equalize charging and OK letdown (adjust let- , p (RL001) down flow) '
or FI-132*
(RLOO2) o Cannot use PL-131 or FI-132 if cont, isol. is in effect.
CONTROL TASKS Control (s) Parameter Control Range Control Precision Unnecessary Dup- Type of Task Used Indication Sufficient lication Avoided Control Suffi-cient
]
i @. Component Cooling Water FAHL-17,18 OK OK OK OK
- Establish CCW flow to HIS 61 RCP thermal barriers (RL019) 19,20 (RK022)
- 7. Steam Generator Atmos-pheric Relief Valves OK OK OK
- Decrease FCS average PIC 1A,2A, TI 412,422, OK 432,442 l temp. to 5570F 3A,4A l
(RLOO6) (RLOO4)
OK i lI - Cool RCS at a speci- OK OK OK fied rate / control RCS cooldown rate 1 [
OK OK l
- Establish / maintain TI 1390A,B OK OK RCS subcooling (RL022) or SPDS OK OK
- Rapidly cool SGs 50 F Steam line OK OK pressure *
(RLO26)
OK OK
- Decrease SG pressure PI 514A thru OK OK to a specified value 'I 546A (RLO26) or SPDS OProcedure contains table of pressures corresponding to 500F temp. reduction.
CONTROL TASKS Control (s) Parameter Centrol Range Control Precision Unnecessary Dup- Type of Control Task Used Indication Sufficient Sufficient lication Avoided Sufficient
- 8. Condenser Steam Dump _
Valves TI-412,422, OK OK OK OK
- Decrease RCS avg. PK507 temp. to 557 0F (RLOO6) 4 OK OK OK I - Cool RCS at a speci- OK fied rate /contral RCS ,
cooldown rate TI-1390A,B OK DK OK OK
- Establish / maintain RCS subcooling (RLO22) n or SPOS OK OK
- Rapidly cool SGs500F Steam pres- OK OK sure
- PI-507 (RL005)
OK OK OK
- Decrease SG pressure PI-507 OK to a specified value Y (RLOOS)
- Procedure contains table of pressures corresponding to 500F temp. reduction.
- 9. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow F I- 1A, 2A, 3A, OK OK OK
- Control AFW flow HK-5A,6A, og 7A,8A,9A, 4A (RLOO6) 10A,11A, & SG Level 12A* (RLO26)
(RLOO2)
- Isolate AFW ficw tc a SG j 'I 0.( OK OK OK
- Normal control is by throttle valves. Can stop/ start motor driven AFW pumps by HIS 22A, 23A (RL005) and turbine driven AFW pump by HIS 312A (RL005).
! 11ll1' ll l
o rt t n ne oi Cc i K ff O of u
eS p
y T
d pe ud Di o
yv rA K a O sn so ei ct ea nc ni Ul n
o i
s it cn ee ri K Pc O i
l f of ru tS n
o C
S K
S e g
A T nt an L Re O i K R l c C T oi N rf O tf C nu oS C
n ro ei )
tt ea l5 mc ai X0 X0 rd L an CR PI A(
)
(
s l )
od l 5 re X0 ts X0 nU L o CR C A(
l e
- o n o r i r t b r
k t n u s
a c o T
e c t l
E i
c k c
e l a n u b n
i a u b r rd R u
TQ .
0 1
i 9L_ t l llI l ,
APPENCIX G Validation of Control Room Functions FINDING 1: An operator initially incorrectly identified valves during letdown isolation in executing Procedure ECA-2. Upon further investigation, it was found that panel RL001 is to be modified and mimiced in order to facilitate the operator interf ace.
Resolution: The mimic reconfiguration was developed to alleviate problems of this nature. In addition, the operators, such as the one discussed above, were relatively inex-perienced with the SNUPPS panels at the time of the Veri-fication and Validation effort. Their additional. training would also help reduce or eliminate future occurances of this type.
FINDING 2: Baron injection bank (BIT) temperature was requested during RCS temperature control in executing procedure ECA-2. BIT temperature was not available on the control boards or CRT displays and had to be specially requested from the computer technician.
Resolution: Procedure ECA-2 has no requirement for BIT temperature.
If BIT temperature were required during a Loss of All AC Power, an operator could be dispatched locally to obtain BIT temperature. Any requirements for reading BIT tem-perature would be picked up during the Control Room Inventory and limited Task Analysis.
FINDING 3: (a) Procedure E-3 references pressurizer level to less than 9%. The scale on the indicator is marked in major increments of 20% and minor increments of 2%.
The operator has to interpolate to read a value of 9%.
(b) Narrow range steam generator level is soecifically
'raferenced in procedures E-0, E-1, E-2, and E-3 to determine SG level as low as 9%. The scale is marked in major increments of 20% and minor increments of 2%. Tne operator has to interpolate to read a value of 9%.
. Resolution: The actual valu? indicated in the procedures will be t rounded off to the nearest readable increment.
FINDING 4: No ESW valve positica indication was available in the simulator control roca during the loss of all AC power sequence 43). The infonnation required in executing procedure ECA-2.2 wasJo btained by requesting ESW valve
.i position from auxilinry operators who hase to verify position locally.
Resolutibn:. Curing a loss of All AC Power sequence, it would be appropriate for operators to verify veha position
~
locally since the normal position indication in the control room would be lost.
G-1 4
1x._--_.__----_----'--.--------_--------------
l FINDING 5: The steam generator pressure indicator on panel RLO26 has a scale with major graduations marked in 400 lb.
increments, and minor graduations of 200 lbs increments.
Procedure RF-C.1, Step 13, requires operators to dump steam to decrease pressure to 215 psig. Steam pressure readings as low as 15 psig are required by Step 17 of Procedure RF-C.l. The operator has to interpolate to read these values.
Resolution: The actual scales have graduations in 20 psi increments.
The value indicated in the procedures will be rounded off to the nearest readable increment.
FINDING 6: Panel RL017 required long search times for operators to locate necessary controls in performing Attachment 3 of Procedure ECA-2 in response to loss of all AC power (sequence 3).
Resolution: The mimic on panels RL017 and RL018 was reconfigured to alleviate problems of this nature. In addition, operators such as those described above, were relatively inexper-ienced with the panels. Additional training and exper-ience are expected to help in reducing search time.
G-2
w ?- u APPENDIX H Forms for Environmental Survey H-1
AIR VELOCITY SURVEY RECORD Date: Time:
Plant:
Measurements made by: Sheet i of Equipment / Instrument used:
Serial #: Calibration date: ,
Location 6 ft. 4 f t..
M h
H-2
\
HUMIDITY / TEMPERATURE RECORD l Date: Time:
Plant:
Sheet # Of Measurements made by:
Equipment / Instrument used:
Serial f: Cailbration date:
Height TemperaWe Humidity Tim
~
Floor 6 ft.
Floor e ft.
Floor b ft.
Floor 6 ft.
i l
Floor 6 ft.
Floor o ft.
l Floor 6 ft.
Floor 6 ft.
Floor .-
e ft.
Floor e ft.
H-3 e' ' - -% ,w - . - - -- - - - -
I ' * '
d e a r P a l
- G o y _
i a o _
t l / _
a p w R s i
e D e r
c n
a
/re l a
t t G c e /
e M w l
f e
. R :
s l n ed o n a i aP t P a
l u
c l
a C
_ e l r oe i n l a
t a G aP R
o
- /
ey w ca nl a p ns e i i r mD a D u l R L f G
. O o /
C E
w R
E C
N f e A o e r T c a C al E f G L r F
E u o S/
R f w D e t y
N m e A i e a E
T S
h l p
e c r e
C s a a N i f l A D rG N / u/
I r S w
. M e U t
- L : e '
e M .
- t t a d c Y d r ed E o l a V n c f P R o e e U i N R S t a
G r N : b ,
I T t e i l
H a a d G D C l - n I ek u L n c o a a r P B g l
e n
a .
P t c
ed l a f P R
e s
f e c
l d a
- enf d n a r e a u s ' S u
y t b n e
e m d u a r m t s n s n o t I i n / t ,
e t : af .
m n f ce o e e oR N
- r m l L t u p a n s i i a a u r l e q e P M E S Y#
1 ! ! ,1;j l l; ]' j :!!l l1 . !i1 !4 ;1 y 1I
LIGHTING SURVEY ILLUMINANCE RECORD Plant: Date: Time:
lerasurements made by: Sheet i of Equipment / Instrument used:
Serial #: Calibration date:
Location Other Ref. Panel Full AC Full Conditions No. I.D. No. Ambient Emergency (Specify)
H-5
l' SOUND SURVEY RECORD .
Plant: Date: Time: sheet i of ferasurements made by:
Equipment / Instrument used:
Serial f: Calibration date:
Octave Band Center Frequency Operator Work Station db(A) 260 500 1K 2K 4K Asmarks s
e H-6
> .- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _