ML20133F845

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WCGS Quadrennial Simulator Certification Rept
ML20133F845
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 01/08/1997
From:
WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20133F843 List:
References
NUDOCS 9701150038
Download: ML20133F845 (30)


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i. WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION l

4 QUADREXXIAL SIMULATOR

CERTIFICATION REPORT i

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! Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation il January,1997 a 9701150038 970108

PDR ADOCK 05000482 p PDR

AC FO.,M 474 AsPwovEDeyowe: NO 3160 013e U.S. NUCLEAa LEGULATORY ExAES: cat 31ese

, COgetSSION Estimated burden per rssoonse lo comply with this manda*ry mformation a

( & 9 51 collecten roovest.120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> This mformate is used to certify a simulate facsuiy Forward comments regardmg buroen estimete to the informehon and Records Management Branch (T4 F331. U S Nuclear Regulatory Commesse.

Wasrungton. DC 205554001, and to the Paperwors Reduction Proiect 13150 SIMULATlON FACILITY CERTIFICATION om a of u,. and m-* a sudea. washmate. DC 20503 NRC may n so a person e om ,e i,ed io respond io. a conoci,on .

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.*mmenu e, s,sess . spia,s a cu,reeny vaes controi ~mne, INSTRUCTIONS This form e to be faed for mael cert # cation, recertifcaten (if requwod), and for any change to a smulaten facdity performance tesung p;an made after maial submittal of such a plan. Provide the followmg information and check the approprote bom to edcate reason for submdtal FACILITY DOCKET NUMBER Wolf Creek Generating Station Sow:

LICENSEE DATE Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation i/A/97 The e lo certify that 1 The above named facshly licensee e usmg a smulaten facility consistmg somly of a planifeferenced simulator that menets the requerements of 10 CFR 55 45 2 Documentauon is avai!able for NRC revew m accordance with 10 CFR 55 45(b) 3 This simulaten facdaty moois the guidance contamed m ANSI /ANS 3 51985 or ANSl/ANS 3 5-1993, as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1149 If there are any EXCEPTIONS to the cerbreaten of this nom. CHECK HERE [ X ] and descnbe fully on adddenal pages as necessary NAME for otheridenfrfication) AND LOCATION OF SIMULATION FACILITY.

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 0411 X SIMULATION FACILITY PERFORMANCE TEST ABSTRACTS ATTACHED (For perforamene tests conducied m the pered ending witn the date of this certifcaton )

DESCRIPTION OF PERFORMANCE TESTING COMPLETED. (Anach adddcaal pages as necessary and identify tre som descnpfen bemg contmuod )

See attached Wolf Creek Generating SL. tion Simulator Certification Report. 1 X SIMULATION FACILITY PERFORMANCE TESTING SCHEDULE ATTACHED (For the conduct of approximate:y 25' of performance lost per year for the four-year pared commencmg with tre date of this certifcaten )

DESCRIPTION OF PERF ORMANCE TESTING TO BE CONOUCTED (Anach adddenal pages as necessary and identify the nom desenption beitsg contnued )

l See attached Wolf Creek Generating Station Simulator Certification Report.

X PERFORMANCE TESTING PLAN CHANGE. (For any modifcaten to a performance lesteg pian submeted on a preveus cert # cation )

ESCRIPTION OF PERFORMANCE TESTING PLAN CHANGE (Anach additenal pages as necessary and identify the item descnpuon bemg contoued )

See attached Wolf Creek Generating Station Simulator Certification Report.

RECERTIFICATION (Deserte correcewe actens taken, enach resulta of completed performance testeg m accordance with 10 CFR 55 45(bH5Wv)

( Attach additionat pages as necessary and idenury the nem descnpton being contmund )

Any tame statement or omeson m tne document, reludog anacnments. may be subiect to cud and crimmal sancuans a c-tdy unoer penarly inat tne informaton m this document and at achments e true and correct SIGNA RE. AUTHOR ED REPRESENTATIVE TITLE DATE

@ g C4l, p Opwr?g OMr ch //f/D in accord with 10 CF R 55 5. Communicaitons, this form shall be saDrnatted to the NRC as follows:

8Y MAIL ADDRESSED DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR BY DEUVERY <N PERSON ONE WHITE FLINT NORTH TO REGULATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N TO THE NRC OFFICE AT- 11555 ROCKVILLE PIKE WASHINGTON, KC 20555-0001 ROCKVILLE, MD NRC FORM 474 (6 95) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

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WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION QUADREXXIAL SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT

! Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation January,1997

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4 TABLE OF CONTENTS i

l. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

i  !!. DEFINITIONS i

Ill SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE AND IMPROVEMENTS SINCE THE I.AST REPORT 4

IV. SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAM i t

. A. Scope of Certified Simulation ,

B. Scope of Simulator Certification Program I C. Simulator Configuration Management

1. Simulator Fidelity Review Board (SFRB)
2. Simulator Design Database
3. Simulator Modification Request Database i 4. Simulator Modification Package Database
5. Plant Change Package Database j 6. Work Controls i 7. Records

, D. Simulator Testing Program i 1. Maintenance Testing

a. Verification Testing s b. Acceptance Testing
2. Performance Testing
a. Operability Testing
l) Steady State Testing j- 2) Transient Testing  ;

Malfunction Testing 3) i b. Functional Validation i 1) JPM Validation

! 2) Static Simulator Validation

3) Dynamic Simulator Validation 4

V. EXCEPTIONS TO ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 VI. IDENTIFICATION OF UNCORRECTED PERFORMANCE TEST FAILURES AND SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION ATTACHMENTS l A. Significant Simulator improvements Since The Last Report

B. ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 Required Normal Evolutions

. C. ANSl/ANS-3.5-1993 Required " Malfunction" Events '

D. Simulator " Malfunction" Test Schedule l E. ANSI /ANS-3.51993 Required Transient Events F. Wolf Creek Generating Station Simulator Malfunction Certification Test Status j (l993 - 1996) i G. Simulator " Malfunctions"Index i

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I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Wolf Creek Generation Station's simulation facility complies with 10 CFR 55.45 and meets the guidance contained in the standard ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.149, Revision 2 with the exceptions noted within this report. '

The Wolf Creek simulator was initially certified on January 10,1989. The last quadrennial certification report was submitted to the USNRC on December 17,1992. The four year cycle and certification resting program is based upon the anniversary date ofinitial certification. l The Wolf Creek simulator has performed very well over this certi6 cation period. Availability for training has been essentially 100%. Significant improvements have been made in simulator fidelity.  !

e in 1993, the plant power rating was re-rated from an output of 3411 MWt to 3565 MWt. This I required a substantial number of simulator modifications. How ever, after this re-rating effort was complete, the simulator once again very closely matched the plant.

  • In 1994, major simulator control room remodeling resulted in an environment that is very much like that found in the plant control room. This remodeling included installing a Shift Supervisor's office i and a simulator lighting system that nearly exactly matches that found in the plant. l In 1996, the most-significant improvements included the re-modeling of the simulator's emergency diesel generators to the ' relay-level' and the addition a radiation monitoring system simulator.

Other major enhancements which are either in-progress or planned include the addition of a fire protection system simulator, simulation re-host to a PC computer platform and, subsequently, upgrade of the core l neutronics and thermal-hydraulic models, the reactor coolant system (RCS), the steam generator models and the containment models.

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At the writing of the report, the most-significant challenges to simulator vs. plant fidelity involve:

  • RCS response to very large LOCAs (>10,000 gpm) is not supported.
  • Tcold not at Tsat for S/G pressure when on natural circulation (deviates by <10*F) and e Response to the loss of non-class IE instrument AC buses is not as complete as desired, it is important to note that in each of these cases, valid simulator training is possible. The response of the simulator, however, is not as close or complete as is desired. Due to the complex nature of these issues, plans are to work to address them after the re-host of the computer platform. The current simulator computer system does not posses the capacity to accommodate the changes that will be required.

The simulation facility is tied directly to the INPO accredited initial and requalification operator training programs. It is for this reason that the simulator testing program is to include validation of simulator training and examination scenarios.

Wolf Creek administrative instructions (Als) prescribing the Simulator Certification Program described herein will be revised by February 28,1997.

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11. DEFINITIONS A. Simulator Certi0 cation Cycle The four year cycle by w hich quadrennial simulator certifl cation reports are submitted. The beginning of each cycle is established by the anniversary of the initial simulator certincation 4

date.

B. Simulator CertiGcation Year The certiGcation testing program is based upon the anniversary date ofinitial certification. The beginning of each cycle is established by the anniversary of the initial simulator certiGcation date.

C. Initial Simulator Certification Date The Wolf Creek simulator was initially certi6ed on .lanuary 10,1989.

D. Reference Unit I i

l The Wolf Creek simulator is a plant-specific simulator. The reference unit is Wolf Creek

.' Generating Station Unit #1. {

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E. Qualitative Acceptance Criteria I l

Qualitative acceptance criteria is as follows: l

1. The same as the most-current reference criteria for the following procedure types:
a. startup test procedures.

l b. surveillance test procedures

c. plant system operating procedures
2. Observable changes in the parameters correspond in the direction to those expected for a best estimate of normal unit operation.
3. Simulator shall not fail to cause an alarm
  • or automatic action if the reference unit
would have caused and r.larm or automatic action under identical circumstances.
4. Simulator shall not cause and alarm
  • or automatic action if the reference unit would not cause an alarm or automatic action under identical circumstances
  • Such alarms include those w hich are expected to occur by design and those for which occurrence is anticipated by the procedures included in li.E.1, above.

2 F. Quantitative Acceptance Criteria in making comparisons between the simulator computed values and the plant data, an additional deviation may be allowed up to the documented value of the plant instrument error. The simulator instrument error shall be no greater than that of the comparable meter, recorder, and related instrument system of the plant.

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, s Quantitative acceptance criteria is as follows:

1. Under steady state, normal operating conditions, the following recorded and computed parameters shall match plant data within 1% of the plant unit instrument loop range:
a. RCS average temperature (T,,,)
b. RCS loop Tno,
c. RCS loop Ta
d. Generator load (MWe)

{ e. Core thermal power (MWt)

f. Nuclear instrumentation power (% of rated power)
g. RCS system pressure (psig)

. h. PZR ievel(%)

, 2. Under steady state, normal operating conditions, the following recorded and computed l parameters shall match plant data within 2% of the plant unit instrument loop range;

a. Steam generator feedwater flow
b. RCS loop flow 3
c. Steam generator level

, d. Letdown flow

e. Charging flow 4
f. Steam flow 1 g. Turbine first stage pressure i 3. Under steady state, normal operating conditions, recorded and computed parameters not i

itemized above shall match plant data within 10% of the plant unit instrument loop

, range.

G. Real Time Acceptance Criteria e

No noticeable differences that impact training shall exist between the simulator and the reference 1 l unit in the following respects: I

a. time base relationships, j
b. sequences,  ;

, c. durations, '

d. rates, and
e. accelerations.
11. Simulator Modification Request (SMR) i a

A documentation package which documents hardware and software modification requests, related analysis and implementation decision.

! 1. Simulator Modification Package (SMP)

A documentation package which documents modifications to the simulator which alter the way the simulator looks or responds.

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SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE AND IMPROVEMENTS SINCE THE LAST REPORT Simulator availability for training is essentially 100%. Improvements in simulator hardware have been successful in reducing hardware failures to a minimum. The simulator executive and models are very reliable.

Over the last four years, over 450 Simulator Modification Packages have been processed and closed.

Most of these packages have corrected or enhanced simulator models, implemented plant modifications, i improved simulator control room or panel fidelity or improved simulator reliability. l l

Attachment A details the modifications which have most-significantly improved simulator fidelity or reliability.

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IV. SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 1 A. Scope of Certified Simulation Certified simulation includes those simulator models and simulated control panels needed to provide the controls, instrumentation, alarms, and other human-system interfaces used by licensed operators in the reference unit to conduct required normal evolutions and respond to required malfunctions.

Desk top simulators are included to the extent that they are used to train licensed operators or licensed operator candidates on the required evolutions and malfunctions. Since the configuration of desktop simulators will be administratively controlled to contain only plant system models which have been tested on the main WCGS simulator, no additional testing of desk top simulator performance is necessary.

Required evolutions and malfunctions are as indicated in Attachment B and Attachment C, respectively.

The fire-protection panel (KC008) and other part-task or limited scope simulators intended for specialized training or familiarization are excluded.

B. Scope of Simulator Certification Program The Simulator Certification Program applies to those simulator modification and testing activities performed on simulator models and control panels which are within the Scope of Cenified l Simulation.

The Scope of Simulation includes aspects of the reference plant which are outside the Scope of Certified Simulation. Although simulation may be provided, the same processes and controls associated with the Simulator Certification Program need not be applied outside the Scope of i Certified Simulation.

v Reference Plant l

Jcope of Simulation Scope of Certified Simulation j Simulator capabilities required Simulator capabilities required i i to support INPO accredited by 10 CFR55.54 and ANSI / l l licensed operator training. ANS 3.1 - 1993 (w/ exceptions) )

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C. Simulator Configuration Management

1. Control of Simulator Software and Hardware Configuration The configuration of the software and hardware used for training is controlled by l administrative instructions.

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2. Simulator Fidelity Review Board The Simulator Fidelity Review Beard (SFRB) acts as a steering group for simulator l maintenance activities and provides a technical review of simulator performance tests. i Open Simulator Modification Packages are periodically reviewed to assure that training l

.; impact and priority assessments are as needed to support the INPO accredited licensed I operator initial and requalification training and examination programs. The SFRB also reviews selected Simulator Modification Packages to determine if they are relevant to

, the scope of certified simulation.

3. Simulator Design Database j

The simulator design data base is comprised of the actual data that form the baseline for the current simulator hardware and software configuration. This database includes data from which the simulator is designed. This data include:

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a. Data collected directly from the plant.
b. Plant design documents and procedures.
c. Data generated through engineering analysis with a sound theoretical basis.

l d. Data collected from plants which are similar in design and operation to the

Wolf Creek plant.
e. Data, such as subject matter expert estimates, that do not come from any of the
above sources.

Data included in this database are available many different places. When such data are used to make simulator modifications, the source is referenced by, or included in, the Simulator Modification Package.

Modifications made to the plant are reviewed for determination of the need for simulator modification within 12 months. Plant modifications determined to be relevant to the scope of certified simulation will be implemented on the simulator within 24 months of their plant in-service dates.

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4. Simulator Modification Request Database i

4 A database is maintained of all requests for simulator modifications. If the requested modification is implemented, this database also provides a reference to the implementing Simulator Modification Package.

5. Simulator Modification Package Database A database is maintained of all simulator modifications.
6. Plant Change Package Database A database is maintained of all plant modifications which have been determined to impact the scope of simulation. This database also provides references to implementing Simulator Modification Requests and Simulator Modification Packages.
7. Work Controls I All simulator modifications are made under the administrative control of the instruction which prescribes Simulator Modification Package processing.

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8. Records Records which document the modification and testing of the simulator are retained for i at least four years. Such records are not considered QA Records as defined in Wolf Creek administrative procedures.

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, D. Simulator Testing Program Simulator testing is divided into two major types: Maintenance Testing and Performance  ;

Testing. Maintenance testing is integral to the simulator modification process. Performance  ;

testing is user-based testing that confirms the maintenance of fidelity. Each is subdivided into l

two groups as shown below- l l

Simulator Testing I I I I Maintenance Performance Testing Testing I I . ,

Venfication Validation Operability .

Functional Testing Testing Testing Validation Steady State JPM l Testing Validation Malfunction Static Testing Scenario l Validation Transient Dynamic l Testing Scenario l l Validation i

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1. Maintenance Testing
a. Verification Testing Verification testing confirms that a simulator modification meets work standards and design specifications. Work standards include concerns such as program structure requirements, database content, documentation. Design specifications are as specified or referenced in the Simulator Modification Package. This testing is usually done by the individual simulator specialist or a peer and is documented as necessary in the Simulator Modification Package.
b. Validation Testing Validation testing confirms that, following a simulator modification, the simulator accurately replicates the plant. This testing is performed by a Subject ,

Matter Expert (SME) and is documented as necessary in the Simulator Modification Package.

The extent to which validation testing is required depends upon the extent to which the simulator has been modified. As a minimum, acceptance testing will l

ensure that real time, quantitative and qualitative acceptable criteria are met. l l

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2. Performance Testing I
a. Operability Testing Operability testing of the simulator is performed once every certification year.

These operability tests are intended to ensure that no noticeable differences exist between the simulator control room and simulated systems when evaluated against the control room and systems of the plant. The degree of fidelity required is as stated in this report.

1. Steady State Testing Steady state testing verifies that the steady state response of the simulator mee:s the quantitative acceptance criteria when compared to the steady state response of the plant at three different power levels for w hich plant data are available. The exact power level for these tests will depend on the availability of plant data. The intent is to cond-t these tests at power levels at which the plant is typically stabilized during power ascension; for example, a power level hold to obtain chemistry results or to perform a thermal calorimetric calculation. (e.g. 30%,50%,100%). Since initial condition (IC) snapshots are written by performing a continuous operation over the power range, existing snapshots are used to accomplish these tests.

l in addition to the above testing, stability testing is performed to verify that the parameters identified in section 4.1.3.1 of ANSI /ANS 3.5-1993 do not vary by more than 2% of the range of the instrument during a continuous 60 minute period of operation a rated power.

2. Malfunction Testing Malfunction testing verifies the simulator capability for insertion and, as appropriate, termination of the malfunction events specified in Attachment C. This testing considers all simulator features that atfect or alter the normal operation of the simulated instrumentation or components within the model as needed to produce the required malfunction events. As indicated by Attachment D, these malfunctions events are tested at least once every four years, approximately 25% per year, to ensure continued acceptability of the simulator for the planned training and examination application as required by 10 CFR 55.45 and 55.59.

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3. Transient Testing Transient testing verines that observable changes in simulator parameters correspond in the direction to those expected for a best estimate of plant response for the events and parameters speci6ed in Attachment E.
b. Functional Validation Functional validation of the simulator is performed to ensure that the features used to create simulated conditions have resulted in a simulator response that meets the applicable portions of the qualitative acceptance criteria. This validation is performed by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) that have received instruction on performing simulator functional validations. Documentation of this validation is made a part of the exercise guide documentation.

Modi 6 cations to the validated exercise guides requires appropriate revalidation and documentation.

1. Job Performance Measure (JPM) Validation
2. Static Scenario Validation
3. Dynamic Scenario Validation V. EXCEPTIONS TO ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 The following exceptions are taken to ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.149, Revision 2.

A. ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 (Section 3.1.3, Normal Evolutions) indicates that the simulator should be capable of"(7) Startup...with less thanfullreactor coolantflow" Since this evolution is not permitted by Wolf Creek operating procedures, it should not be necessary to require the simulator to support it.

B. ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 (Section 3.1.4, Malfunctions) lists malfunctions that should be included:

"(l2) Controlrodfailures, including... drifling rods.. " Since this particular control rod failure is not a characteristic of the Westinghouse control rod design, it should not be necessary to require the simulator to support it.

C. ANSI /ANS-3.5 1993 (Section 4.1.3.1) speciGes that parameters not individually listed shall be within 10% of the benchmark for Steady S: ate Tests. Since there are thousands of such parameters, a list of the most important ones is being used to focus the testing resources. The selection of these parameters considers the data available on the reference plant heat balances plus the list of parameters in another part of ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 (Appendix B)

D. ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 (Section 4.1.3, Appendix B) speciGes parameters for Steady State and Transient Tests. Some of the required parameters are " Total" Hows. In some situations,

" Individual" Dows shall be substituted because they are indicated on the control panels or the plant computer systems. Individual Dows also show more information since many transients are not symmetric on the various loops.

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I E. ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 (Section 4.1.3.3, Normal Evolutions) states that, when evaluating the ,

simulator reponse to normal evolutions, the accepance criteria shall be "(l) the same as the reference unit startup test procedure acceptance criteria " Over the years, many plant

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i modifications have been made. This reduces the applicability of the startup test procedures (most were performed over 1 I years ago). It is not appropriate to utilize criteria which may be outdated. Other acceptance criteria specified in section 4.1.3.3 is adequate to ensure the capability to perform normal evolutions is maintained.

F. ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 (Section 4.4.2) states that Operability Tests shall be conducted each calendar year. The Simulation Facility Operability Testing shall be based on the certification year. Although each " year"is twelve months, it is preferable that all time periods be based on one date, the Initial Simulator Certification Date.

G. ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 (Section 5.1.2, Simulator Design Data Base Update) states "any new data j shall be reviewed and the simulator design data base appropriately revised once per calendar {

year " Updating of the Wolf Creek simulator and its design data base is an on-going process.

H. ANSI /ANS-3.5 1993 (Section 4.1.3.2. Steady State Stability) requires that certain simulator parameters are " stable and do not vary by more than 2% ofthe inital values during a continuous 60 minuteperiod... ". This criteria presents problems as written. For example, if an initial value should be near zero, then the allowed tolerance would also be very low. To simplify and clarify )

this testing, this criteria will require that parameters be " stable and do not vary by more than 2% l of the range of the instrument."

1. ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 (Appendix B) lists the " Transient Performance Tests" and required that they be run "from an initial condition ofapproximately 100% power, steady state...(unless otherwise noted). " Test "e", Trip of any Single Reactor Coolant Pump, would cause an immediate reactor trip if performed at 100% power. Therefore, this particular test will be performed at the maximum power level which does not result in immediate reactor trip.

I VI. IDENTIFICATION OF UNCORRECTED PERFORMANCE TEST FAILURES AND SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION As required by 10CRF55.45(b)(5)(ii), the following identifies uncorrected simulator performance test failures and provides a schedule for correction.

A. Steady State Testing SMP #96-076 -- 3rd Stape Extraction /MSR Flow Values Too Hich During 54% and 75% Steady State Simulator Certification Tests, it was observed that the simulator values for 3rd stage extraction flow exceeded the recorded plant values by approximately 11% and 9%, respectively. As the simulator power level approaches 100%

power, the flow values approach those found in the plant. Also, these flows are quite turbulent in the plant and simulator. Therefore, exact values are are difficult to compare. Little, if any, training impact occurs. This item is scheduled for completion by 12/31/97.

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B. Malfunction Testing 9

Attachment F provides the results of the malfunction testing performed over the last 4 years. In the last quarter of 1993, the decision was made to test all options of all malfunctions including any ramp functions. Prior to this time, the Simulator Certification Program required only two i

options of each malfunction be tested. This increase in test program scope likely resulted in '

more malfunction deficiencies being identified. The status ' FAIL' indicates that some aspect of one or more malfunction options was not as described in the malfunction description. This status does not necessarily indicate that the malfunction is totally useless for training purposes.

Malfunction discrepancies are annotated on the malfunction description so that simulator instructors are aware of the operational status of the malfunction.

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1. SMP #96-070 -- Incomolete Resoonse to I oss of PN07/PN08/PN09/PN10 (Malf EPS-8) J This item deals with the simulator response to a loss of four non-Class IE electrical instrumentation buses. There is no off-normal (OFN) procedure which directs operator action to the loss of one of these buses. The simulator response to the loss of the safety-related NN buses is much more complete. Within the last year, the Operations and Engineering departments researched this area and published documents which described the expected plant response to the loss of these buses. The simulator response demonstrates the loss of mml of the major components pow er from these buses. The details of any known problems have been annotated in the malfunction description and so they may be accommodated by the instructors. The current simulator computer 1 system is not currently capable of supporting the changes required to the level of detail i now available. This item is scheduled to be implemented after the simulator computer is re-hosted to the PC platform. Therefore, this item is scheduled to be wrected by 12/31/98.
2. SMP #95-035 -- Aux & Turb Bldg Ootions for MALF AIR-1 Imoact Entire Air System Malf AIR-1 is used to cause instrument system failures. However, instrument air system leaks or breaks in the Turbine and Auxiliary Bldgs should be prevented from dragging down the entire instrument air system down because of installed How 3

restricting orifices. These Dow restricting orfices are not modeled. This has been annotated in the malfunction description. This item is scheduled to be corrected by 6/30/97.

3. SM2 #95-082 -- CCW Service Loon Flc , ' Always Correct for Plant Conditions When malfunction CCW-16 is activated, wxpected CCW to RCS How oscillations are observed on flow indicators. These oscillations begin when the malfunction is activated and continue even after CCW pumps are secured. This has been annotated in the malfunction description. This item is scheduled to be corrected by 12/31/97.
4. SMP #95-126 - BTRS System Resoonse to Malf CVC-7 Is Not as Excected Temperature Element BG TE-381 or BG TE-382 Failure, the simulator resoonse was not as expected and not as described by the malfunction description. The malfunction description has been annotated to reDect this condition. There is another option to this malfuction which works properly. This item is scheduled to be corrected by 12/31/98.

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5. SMP #96-087 -- Occassional Simulator Halts When Malf. CRF4. Rod Droo. Is Active The " stationery gripper" option of this malfunction routinely causes a simulator hang.

A known ' work-around' is avaih.ble to simulator instructors. If the instructors activate I this malfunction without viewing it first, it functions as designed. This has been

) annotat-d in the malfunction description. This is scheduled to be corrected by 12/31/97.

8. SMP #96-113 -- NIS Rate Response to Rod Malfs CRF-4 & CRF-12 is Too Sensitive

, input received from the Wolf Creek Fuels Group indicates that the simulator excore l

nuclear instrumentation may be too sensitive to control rod alignment perturbations.

This is being evaluated and has been annotated in the malfunction description. This is scheduled to be corrected by 12/31/97.

9. SMF #96-124 -- Malf. CVL-2. BG.PCV-131 Control Failure. Not Per Malf Descriotion This malfunction description indicates this feature is intended to represent the failure of an 1/P converter. Therefore, then the controller output should respond in the opposite direction of the valve. The contoller output goes to zero immediately when the malfuction becomes active. This has been annotated in the malfunction description.

This is scheduled to be corrected by 12/31/97.

10. SMP #96-123 -- Ramo Function for Malf NIS-4. IR Ch. Gamma Como. Fail When performing malfunction test for NIS-4, IR Channel Gamma Compensation Failure, the malfunction responded as desired except for the ramp function. Regardless of the ramp time entered, the IR indication went to the selected value immediately. This has been annotated in the malfunction description. This is scheduled to be corrected by 12/31/97.

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11. SMP #96-128 - Ramo Function ineffective for Malf NIS-8. SR Hich Voltage Failure l When performing malfunction test for NIS-8, SR High Voltage Failure, the malfunction responded as desired except for the ramp function. Basically, regardless of the ramp time entered, the SR voltage indication went to the selected value immediately. This has been annotated in the malfunction description. This is scheduled to be corrected by 12/31/97.
12. SMP #96-042 -- Ramo Function for Malf RCS-1 Takes Thot Value Low Then liigh ,

This malfunction works except when a ramp function is used to cause the RTD l indication to fail high. This has been annotated in the malfunction description. This is l scheduled to be corrected by 12/31/97. l C. Transient Testing i The results of the transient tests performed over the last four years has yielded satisfactory results. One uncorrected performance test deficiency exists related to pressurizer response to the maximum-sized LOCA coincident with the loss of off-site power. This item has minimal training impact and has been documented on SMP #96-126. This is scheduled to be corrected by 12/31/98.

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j Wolf Creek Simulator Certi0 cation Report Attachment A January,1997 I

Signficant Simulator Improvements Since The Last Report A. SigniGeant Simulation Model Improvements

1. Added CVCS letdown Dashing ,

! 2. Modeled time delays for supervisory system I

! 3. Improved emergency diesel generators modeling

4. Remodeled Auxiliary Feedwater System
5. Improved response of feedwater regulating valves controllers l 6. Added instrument channel response to bistable tripping
7. Remodeled ECCS Accumulators
8. Added Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) Simulator
9. Added fire protection system simulator (in-progress)

B. Implementation of Significant Plant ModiScations

1. Power Rerate
2. Control Room Remodeling (See item D, below.)
3. Annunciator MUX Power Supply Modi 6 cation
4. Instrument Air Compressor Replacement C. Significant Control Panel Fidelity improvements
1. Repainted Control Panels
2. Reworked ESFAS and Bistable Status Panels
3. Added Radiation Monitoring System Panel (SP010)
4. Added Fire Protection Panel (KC008)

D. Control Room Fidelity Improvements

1. Instructor booth relocation
2. Control room remodeling
3. Relocated liVAC panel
4. Relocated Nuc! ear instrumentation System (NIS) panel
5. Built Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) Room
6. Relocated ASPS
7. Relocated lift coil disconnect panel
8. Control Room Lighting Rework
9. Site Radio Console Addition
10. Added Control Room Personal Computer Stations
11. Added plant computer alarm printers E. Simulator Computer System liardware improvements
1. Replaced simulator hard drives 2 Replaced power supplies to analog chassis l

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/. Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment B January,1997 ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 Required Normal Evolutions Evolution Procedures / Comments (1) lieatup cold shutdown to hot standby.

(2) Unit startup from hot standby to rated power.

(3) Turbine / generator startup and generator synchronization.

(4) Operator conducted surveillance testing on safety related equipment or i systems.

(5) Operations at hot standby I (6) Load changes (7) Operations with less than full reactor coolant flow (a) Startup. - exception taken -

(b) Shutdown.

l (c) Power operations (8) Unit shutdown from rated power to hot standby and cooldown to cold shutdown conditions I

(9) Unit performance testing (through the use of permanently installed i

instrumentation) such as:

(a) heat balance.

(b) determination of shutdown margin. and (c) measureinent of reactivity coefficients and control rod worth, through the use of permanently installed instrumentation.

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e. Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment C January,1997 ANSI /A'NS-3.5-1993 Required " Malfunction" Events (I) Loss of Coolant:

(a) significant steam generator tube leaks. MAL RCS2, RCS5 (b){ 1) inside primary containment. MAL RCS6 (b)(2) outside primary containment. MAL RiiR4 (c)(1) large LOCAs demonstrating multi-phase flow. MAL RCS6 (c)(2) small LOCAs demonstrating multi-phase flow. MAL RCS6 l

(d)(1) failure of safety valve. MAL PRS 6 l (d)(2) failure of relief valve. MAL PRS 4, PRSlo, PRS 12 l (2) Loss of instrument air to the extent that the who system or isolable MAL AIRI portions can lose pressure and affect the plant's static or dynamic performance.

(3) Degraded electrical power to the station including: l (a) Loss of offsite power. MAL EPS; (b) Loss of emergency power. MAL EPS5, EPS6 j (c) Loss of emergency generators. MAL DGSI (d) Loss of power to the unit's electrical distribution buses. MAL LPS4 I (e) Loss of power to the individual instrumentation AC buses that MAL EPS8  !

provide power to control room instrumentation or unit control functions rffecting the unit's response.

(f) Loss of power to the individual instrumentation DC buses that MAL EPS7 provide power to control room instrumentation or unit control l functions affecting the unit's response.

(4) Loss of forced core coolant flow due to single or multiple pump MAL RCS3, RCS4 l failure.

(5) Loss of condenser vacuum, including loss of condenser level control. MAL CNDI, CND2  ;

(6) Loss of service water or cooling to individual components. MAL WAT2, WAT3 (7) Loss of shutdown cooling. MAL RilRI (8) Loss of component cooling system, or cooling to individual MAL CCW4, CCW5, CCW6, components. CCW13 (9) Loss of normal feedwater, or norrnal feedwater system failure. MAL FWMI, FWM2, FWM3, FWM8. FWM9 (10) Loss of all feedwater, both normal and emergency. MAL AFWl, AFW2, FWMI (II) Loss of a protective system channel. MAL EPS8, PCS3, PCS4, PCS8, PCS10 (12) Control rod failure, including:

(a) stuck rods. MAL CRF12 (b) uncoupled rods. - Capabihty not avadable -

(c) drifting rods. - exception taken -

(d) rod drops. MAL CRF4 (e) misaligned rods. MAL CRF4 (13) Inability to drive control rods. MAL CRFI (13) Fuel cladding failure resulting in high activity in reactor coolant or off PLP RCSI gas, and the associated high radiation alarms.

(15) Turbine trip. MALTURI (16) Generator trip. SET JGENTRX=T (17) Failure in automatic control systems that affect reactivity and core heat MAL CRF6, MSS 7, MSS 9 removal.

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<, Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment C January,1997 ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 Required " Malfunction" Events (18) Failure of reactor coolant:

(a) pressure control systems. MAL PRS t. PRS 3, PRS 7, PRS 13 (b) volume control systems. MAL CVCl, PRS 2 (19) Reactor trip. MAL PCSI (20) Line breaks.

(a)(1) main steam lines inside CTMT. MAL MSS 3 (a)(2) main steam lines outside CTMT. MAL MSS 4 (b)(1) main feedwater lines inside CTMT. MAL FWM8 (b)(2) main feedwater lines outside CTMT. MAL FWM9 (21) Nuclear instrumentation failures (a) source range. MAL NISI (b) intermediate range. MAL NIS2 (c) power range. MAL NIS3 (22) Miscellaneous process control failures (a) process instrumentation failures. MAL FWM2, FWM4, MSSI, PRS 1, PRS 2 (b) alarm failures. LOA BA14. BA15, BAT 6. BA i 7, BAT 8, BAT 9, BATio.

BATil, DAT12 BAT 13, BAT 14, BATIS, BAT 16, BAT 17 (c) control system failures. MAL FWM3, MSS 13 (23) Passive failures of components in systems, such as:

(a) engineered safety features MAL CCW8, CCW20, CVC3, ECCL, RiiR7 4

(b) emergency feedwater systems - take exceptwn .

(c) control system failures. MAL FWMl7. PRS 13 (24) Failure of automatic reactor trip system MAL PCS8, PCS9 l

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Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment D January,1997 l Simulator " Malfunction" Test Schedule l

Cycle A ANSI 3.5 Cycle B ANSI 3.5 Cycle C ANSI 3.5 Cycle D ANSI 3.5 (1997) Event (1998) Esent (1999) Event (2000) Event AFW 1, 10 CCW-6 8 AIR l 2 AFW-2 to CCU _ 8 CRF-6 17 CCW-20 23(a) CCW-4 8 I CCM13 8 EPS-4 3(d) CVC-3 23(a) CCW-8 23(a)

CN D-2 5 EPS-8 3(e) DG S-1 3(c) CND-l 5 11 CRF-1 13 FWM-3 9 EPS-1 3(a) CRF-4 12(d) 22(c) 12(e)

CVC-l 18(b) FWM-17 EPS-5 3(b) CRF12 12(a)

EPS-7 3(0 MSS-3 20(a)(1) FW M-4 22(a) LCC-1 23(a)

FW M-2 9 MSS-7 17 FWM-8 9 EPS-6 3(b) 22(a) 20(b)(1)

NIS-1 21(a) NIS-2 21(b) MSS-4 20(a)(2) FWM-1 9 10 PCS-3 11 PCS-4 11 NIS-3 21(c) FWM-9 9 20(b)(2)

PCS-10 11 PCS-8 11 PCS-l 19 M SS-1 22(a)

PRS-2 18(b) PRS-3 18(a) PCS-9 MSS-9 17 l

22(a)

PRS-6 1(d)(1) PRS-7 18(a) PRS-4 1(d)(2) MSS-13 22(c)

PRS-10 1(d)(2) RCS-3 4 PRS-12 1(d)(2) PRS-1 18(a) 22(a)

PRS-13 18(a) WAT 3 6 RilR-7 23(a) RCS-6 1(b)(1) 1(c)(1) 1(c)(2) j RCS-2 1(a) RCS-4 4 RCS-5 l(a) WAT2 6 l RifR l 7 RilR-4 1(b)(2) TUR-1 15 SET 16 i JGENTRX=T PLP RCSI 14 LOA BAT-4 22(b) LOA BAT 5 22(b) LOA IIAT-6 22(b)6 LOA BAT 7 22(b) LOA E!AT-8 22(b) LOA BAT-9 22(b) LOA BAT-10 22(b)  ;

LOA BAT Il 22(b) LOA BAT-12 22(b) LOA BAT-13 22(b) LOA BAT-14 22(b)

LOA BAT-15 22(b) LOA BAT 16 22(b) LOA BAT 17 22(b)

CYCLE A 1997 CYCLEB 1998 CYCLE C 1999 CYCLE D 2000 Note: The simulator features listed above are malfunctions unless preceeded by PLP (Plant Parameter) or LOA (Local Operator Action).

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e Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment E January,1997 ANSI /ANS-3.5-1993 Required Transient Events (I) Manual reactor trip.

(2) Simultaneous trip of all feedwater pumps.

(3) Simultaneous closure of all Main Steam isolation Valves.

(4) Simultaneous trip of all reactor coolant pumps (5) Trip of any single reactor coolant pump. Exception taken. add the follow mg:

" from maximum power level which does not result in immediate reactor trip". i (6) Main turbine trip from maximum power level which does not result in I immediate reactor trip.

(7) Maximum rate power ramp from 100% down to approximately 759'o and buck up to 100%.

(8) Maximum size reactor coolant system rupture combined with a loss of all offsite power.

(9) Maximum size unisolable main steam line rupture.

(10) Slow primary system depressurization to saturated condition using pressurizer relief or safety valve stuck open (Inhibit activation of high pressure Emergency Core Cooling System)

(11) Load rejection To be detined as: Load rejection (setback) resulting from trip of a single Circulating Water Pump.

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I Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment F January,1997

Wolf Creek Generating Station Simulator Malfunction Certification Test Status 1993

! Malf No. Tested by Date Status SMP No. Date Closed Com ments AFW 1 Guyer 5/14/93 Pass

CCW-1 Guyer 5/14/93 Pass 1 CCW-5 Falkenstein 9/10/93 Pass CCW-9 Guyer 5/14/93 Pass CCW-13 Guyer/ Moses 6/17/93 Pass i CCW-18 Guyer 5/17/93 Pass 3

CN D-2 Guyer 5/17/93 Pass

! CRF-1 Falk/Schmidt 11/11/93 Pass i CRF 5 Callaway 9/10/93 Pass

CRF-9 Callaway 9/10/93 Pass CVC-1 Callaway 9/10/93 Pass 1

CVC-5 Callaway 9/10/93 Fail 93 133 2/23/94

! CVC-9 Callaway 9/10/93 Pass

CVC-13 Callaway 9/10/93 Pass
CVC-17 Callaway 9/10/93 Pass
CVL-3 Mosebey 9/16/93 Pass

! CVM-3 Mosebey 9/16/93 Pass j ECC-2 Mosebey 9/16/93 Pass l EPS-3 Reeves 9/16/93 Fait 93-137 10/29/94

EPS-7 Falkenstein 10/18/93 Pass

, FWM-2 Reeves 9/16/93 Pass FWM-6 Piteo 9/23/93 Pass FWM-10 Pateo 9/23/93 Pass

! FWM 14 Piteo 9/23/93 Pass

{ MSS-2 Piteo 9/23/93 Pass

, MSS-6 Falkenstem 9/27/93 Pass I MSS-10 Falkenstem 9/27/93 Pass i NIS-1 Falkenstein 9/27/93 Pass l 4

NIS-5 Falkenstein 9/27/93 Fail 93-094 6/22/94 NIS-9 Falkenstein 9/27/93 Fall 93-142 2/23/94

PCS-3 Falkenstem 9/30/93 Pass PCS-7 Falkenstein 9/30/93 Pass 1 PCS-10 Falkenstein 9/27/93 Pass l PRS-2 Falkenstein 9/30/93 Pass I PRS-6 Falkenstein 9/30/93 Pass PRS-10 Falkenstem 10/4/93 Pass
PRS-13 Falkenstem 9/30/93 Pass RCS-2 Falkenstem 10/4/93 Pass RCS-7 Falkenstein 10/18/93 Fail 93-153 1/25/94 DELETED

)'

RCS-12 Callaway 10/11/93 Pass RilR-2 Falkenstein 10/18/93 Pass j RM S-1 Callaway 10/I1/93 Pass TUR 2 Callaw ay 10/11/93 Pass I UR-10 Callaw ay 10/11/93 Pass DELETED WAT-2 Falkenstein 10/18/93 Pass

. WAT-6 Falkenstein 10/18/93 Pass i

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Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment F January,1997 Wolf Creek Generating Station Simulator Malfunction Certification Test Status 1994 Malf No. Tested by Date Status SMP No. Date Closed Com ments AtW 3 FalkJEven. I/26/94 Fail 93-124 6/29/94 Options # 1 thru #8 lailed.

Passed 6/30/94.

CCW-6 Falk.iEs en. 1/26/94 Pass CCW 10 FalkJEven. 1/26/94 Pass CCW-14 FalkJEven. 2/1/94 Pass CC W-19 Falk/Even. 2/1/94 Fail 94-062 4/2/96 Option 'A' does not work.

CN D-3 FalkJEven. 2/1/94 Pass Revised malf. descnption. ( 12/7/94)

CRF-2 Falk/Even. 2/1/94 Pass94-140 RDMG status pomts on NPIS to be fixed.

CRF-6 Falk/Es en. 2/1/94 Pass CRF-10 Falk./Even. 2/1/94 Pass CVC-2 Guyer/Schmi 2/7/94 Pass CVC-6 Guyer/Schmi 2/7/94 Fail 94-019 12/18/96 No seal flow change when LO iso.

CVC-14 Guyer/Schmi 2/7/94 Pass CVC18 Guyer/Schmi 12/29/93 Fail 94-001 2/7/94 Passed 2/7/94 CVL-4 Guyer/Schms 2/7/94 Pass CVM-4 Guyer/Schmi 2/7/94 Pass ECC-3 Falkitven. 2/9/94 Pass EPS-4 Falk/Even. 2/9/94 Pass EPS-8 Schm/ Reeves 10/20/94 Fail 96-070 PN07/PN08/PN09/PN10 response FWM-3 EvenJSchmi 2/28/94 Pass FWM-Il Even/Schmi 2/28/94 Fail 94-033 11/8/95 Options 5B & 4C failed.

FWM-15 Schm/Rees es 10/20/94 Pass FWM 17 Schm> Reeves 10/20/94 Pass MSS-3 SchmdReeves 10/20/94 Pass MSS-7 Schm/ Reeves 10/20/94 Pass MSS-11 Schm/ Reeves 10/20/94 Fail 94-114 4/7/95 Ramp time function not working NIS-2 Schm/ Reeves 10/20/94 Pass NIS-6 Schm.iReeves 10/20/94 Pass PCS-4 Schm/ Reeves 10/20/94 Pass PCS-8 Schm/ Reeves 10/20/94 Pass PRS-3 Schm./ Reeves 10/20/94 Pass PRS-7 Schm./ Reeves 10/20/94 Pass PRS-11 Schm/ Reeves 10/20/94 Fail 94 146 11/1/96 Wrong RCS response to PZR ref.

leg break RCS-3 Schm.iReeves 10/20/94 Pass RCS-8 Schm/Webb 10/21/94 Pass RilR-3 Schm>Webb 10/21/94 Pass RilR-6 Callaway/Rvs 4/7/93 Pass New malfunction.

RMS2 Schm./ Reeves 10/26/94 Pass T U R-3 Schm>Webb 10/21/94 Pass TUR 7 Schm/Webb 10/21/94 Pass TURil SchmlReeves 10/26/94 Pass WAT 3 Schm/Webb 10/21/94 Pass WAT 7 Schm1Webb 10/21/94 Pass

, e. e Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment F January,1997 '

Wolf Creek Generating Station Simulator Malfunction Certification Test Status 1995 Malf No. Tested by Date Status SMP No. Date Closed Comments AIR-1 Mitch/ Reeves 3/30/95 Failed 95-035 Options I & 3 failed.

CCW 3 (deleted) n/a n/a n/a n/a CCW-7 Rees es/Knapp 12/7/95 Failed 93-061 12/19/96 Seal wtr. inj. temp. increases unexpectedly.

CCW-i l (deleted) n/a n/a n/a n/a CCW-16 Reeves /Knapp 12/7/95 Failed 95-082 Unexpected CCW to RCS flow oscillations CC W-20 Reeves /Knapp 12/8/95 Failed 95-127 1/4/96 RllR llXGR leak goes to incorrect sump.

CN D-5 Falk/ Reeves 10/30/95 Passed CRF 3 Reeves 12/5/95 Passed

  • Very u ful malfunction
  • CRF-7 Reev es/Webb 12/5/95 Passed CRF-l l Reeves 12/5/95 Passed CVC 3 Reevess Knapp 12/8/95 Passed C V C-7 Reeves 12n/95 Failed 95-126 Incorrect BTRS system response CVCli Evens /Rees es 2/13/95 Passed

Reference:

SMR# 95-014 CVC 15 Falk/ Reeves 2/16/95 Passed

Reference:

SMP# 95-020 CVL-l Reeves /Webb 12/5/95 Passed CVM1 Reeves /Webb 12/5/95 Passed DGS-1 Reeves 12/6/95 Passed EPS-1 Palmer / Reeves 3/14/95 Passed

Reference:

SMP# 95-023 EPS-5 Reeves /Webb 12/5/95 Passed EPS-9 Reeves 12/6/95 Passed F WM-4 Falk/Reeses 10/30/95 Passed FWM 8 Reeves /Knapp 12/7/95 Passed FWM-12 Reeves 12/6/95 Passed FWM 16 Reeves 12/6/95 Passed MSS-4 Reeves /Knapp 12/7/95 Passed MSS 8 Falk/ Reeves 10/30/95 Passed MSS-12 Falk/Reeses 10/30/95 Passed NIS-3 Palmer / Reeves 10/31/95 Passed

Reference:

SMP #95-118 l NIS-7 Reeves /Knapp 12/6/95 Passed '

PCS-l Reeves 12/5/95 Passed PCS-5 Reeves 12/5/95 Passed PCS-9 Reeves 12/5/95 Passed I PRS-4 Reeves /Knapp 12/6/95 Passed PRS-8 Reeves 12/6/95 Passed i PRS 12 Falk/ Reeves 10/30/95 Passed I RCS-4 Reeves t r6/95 Passed RCS-9 Falk/ Reeves 10/30/95 Passed l RCS-14 Mitch/ Reeves 3/30/95 Passed

Reference:

SMP #93-032 l

RilR-4 Reeves /Knapp 12/8/95 Passed l RilR 7 Reeves 12/8/95 Passed I R M S-3 Falk/ Rees es 10/30/95 Passed

)

T U R-4 Reeves 12/7/95 Passed

{

. T U R-8 Reeves 12/6/95 Passed IUR 12 Falk/ Reeves 10/30/95 Passed 2

RiiR-6 Reeves 12/8/95 Passed Normally in Cycle !!.

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e n o Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachrnent F January,1997 i Wolf Creek Generating Station Sirnulator Malfunction Certification Test Status l 1996

' Malf No. Tested by Date Status SMP No. Date Closed Comments AFW 2 Falkenstein 2/19/96 Passed AlR-2 Falkenstein 2/19/96 Failed 96-038 3/28/96 Passed SMP retesting.

CCW-4 Reeves 9/22/96 Passed CCW 8 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed CCW-12 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed ,

CCW-17 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed CN D-i Reeves 9/22/96 Passed CN D-6 Ray / Reeves 2/22/96 Passed CRF-4 Rees es 9/22/96 Failed 96-087 Causes simulator to

  • halt'.

CRF-8 Reeves 9/22/96 Passed Retested on 10/5/96.

CRF12 Reeves 9/22/96 Failed 96-113 Too responsive in some esses .

. CVC-4 Reeves 9/22/96 Passed

C VC-8 Reeves 9/22/96 Passed
CVC-12 Reeves 9/22/96 Passed 4

CVC-16 Reeves 9/28/96 Passed CVI-2 Heeves 9/28/96 Failed 96-124 PCV-131 response not per malf.

CVM 2 Ray / Reeves 2/22/96 Passed ECC-1 Reeves 9/28/96 Passed EPS-2 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed EPS-6 Reeves 3/18/96 Passed Ref: SMP: 94-054 FWMl Ray / Reeves 2/22/96 Passed

,F W M-5 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed FWM-9 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed i FWM-13 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed MSS-1 Reeves 6/7/96 Passed Ref: SMPs # 96-045 & 96-110 MSS-5 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed MSS-9 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed MSS-13 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed NIS-4 Reeves 9/28/96 Passed 96-123 Ramp function ineffective NIS-8 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed 96 128 Ramp function ineffective PCS 2 M. Westman 2/21/96 Passed PCS-6 M. Westman 2/21/96 Passed PRS-l Ray / Reeves 2/22/96 Passed

~

PRS-9 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed RCS-1 Reeves 9/22/96 Failed 96-042 Bad ramp function for Thot.

RCS-5 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed RCS-6 Rees es 9/29/96 Passed RilR-1 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed RilR-5 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed 1UR l Recies 9/29/96 Passed TUR-5 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed

Reference:

SMP 95-007.

TUR-9 Reeves 9/29/96 Passed WAT 8 Rees es 9/29/96 Passed

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Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment G January,1997 SIMULATOR " MALFUNCTIONS" INDEX (Required features are shown in BOLD) l MALF ID DESCRIPTION I AFW-1 Aus. F.W. pump trip A FW-2 Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Failure AFW 3 Aux. feedwater valve failure AIR-1 Loss of instrument air to specific air header AIR-2 SG air valves accumulator failure CCW-1 Letdown HX tube leak CCW-4 Loss of CCW to letdown llX CCW-5 Loss of CCW to RilR llX l CCW-6 CCW pump trip CCW-7 Seal water HX tube leak CCW-8 RilR llX tube leak CCW-9 RCP thermal barrier leak l CCW 10 CCW HX temp. control failure CCW-12 Excess letdc.vn HX tube leak CCW-13 Service kop header leak to aut bldg.

CCW-14 CCW misc. R.W. cooling header leak to R.W. bldg.

CCW-16 KCP coolers header leak to CTMT CCW-17 CCW HX leak to ESW CCW-18 Leak in CCW safety loop CCW 19 SFP cooling HX leak CCW-20 RilR llX outlet leak to RilR sump CN D-1 Loss of condenser vacuum CND-2 Ilotwell level transmitter fails CND-3 Circulating water tube leak in condenser CND-5 Vacuum pump trip CN D-6 Condensate pump trip CRF-1 Rods fail to mose CRF 2 Rod drive MG set trip CRF-3 Improper bank overlap CRF-4 Dropped rod CRF-5 Rod ejection CRF-6 Uncontrolled rod motion CRF-7 Auto rod speed controller failure CRF 8 T-REF failure (rod control)

CRF-9 DRPI loss of voltage CRF-10 DRPI open or shorted coil CRF-11 Rod position step counter failure CRF-12 Stuck rod CVC-l VCT level channel 112 & 185 failure CVC-2 Charging line break - next to FT-121 CVC-3 Charging pumps suction header break CVC-4 Charging hdr. viv. -HCV-182- 1/P controller fail.

CVC 5 Failure of PDP speed control CVC-6 RCP seal failure CVC-7 BTRS temp. element TE-381 or TE-382 failure CVC-8 BTRS chiller pump failure CVC-9 VCT level channel 149 failure CVC-l l Charging line leak inside CTMT CVC-12 BTRS failure of demin. bypass -HCV-387 CVC 13 Loss of charging pump CVC-14 BTRS temp. controller - TE-386- failure

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Wolf Creek Simulator Certi0 cation Report Attachment G i January,1997 SIMULATOR " MALFUNCTIONS" INDEX

! (Required features are shown in BOLD) 1 MALF ID DESCRIPTION 4

1 '

CVC-15 CVCS miscellaneous valve failure CVC-16 Minidow valve 8110 fails to close!open on high/ low Dow CVC-17 Miniflow valve 8111 fails to close/open on high/ low Dow I CVC-18 Excess letdown leak to PRT l CVL-1 VCT divert valve -LCVi l2A- control failure

. CVL-2 PCV 131 control failure j CVL-3 Letdown line leak inside CTMT

! CVL-4 Letdown relief valve BG 8117 failure l CVM-1 Boric acid flow transmitter - FT110. failure CVM-2 Boric acid transfer pump trip l* CVM-3 Reactor make-up water transfer pump trip CVM-4 Plugged boric acid alter

! DGS-1 Diesel generat9r failure l ECC-1 RWST leak j ECC-2 Safety injection pump trip l ECC-3 CTMT spray pump trip

! ECC-4 Containment Leak EPS-1 Loss of site power

< EPSJ, Main generator voltage regulator oscillation l EPS-3 Switchyard bus trip j EPS-4 Service bus trip EPS-5 ESF bus trip EPS-6 ESF bus fault E PS-7 Loss of a C.C. distribution bus EPS-8 Loss of a 120 VAC instrument bus I EPS 9 Load rejection i FWM-1 Main feedwater pump trip FWM-2 SG level channel failure l FWM-3 SG feedwater control valve failure FWM-4 Feedwater flow transmitter failure FWM 5 Feedwater pump turbine speed control failure FWM-6 Heater drain pump trip FWM-8 Feedwater line break inside CTMT ,

FWM-9 Feedwater line break outside CTMT l

FWM-10 Feedwater pump speed control oscillates l FWM11 Feedwater heater tube leak FWM-12 Failure of a FWlV to close FWM-13 Main feed pump loss of speed signal FWM-14 Motor driven feed pump trip FWM-15 Unstable SG level controller FWM16 Feed header pressure transmitter failure FWM-17 FRV Valve Positioner Failure MSS-1 Steam pressure detector failure MSS-2 Failure of an MSIV to close MSS-3 Steam line break inside CTMT MSS-4 Steam line break outside CTMT MSS-5 Failure of main steam safety valves MSS-6 SG steam isolation valve closes MSS-7 SG relief valve failure MSS-8 Steam dump cooldown valves control failure MSS-9 Steam dump control failure

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Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Report Attachment G January,1997 SIMULATOR "M ALFUNCTIONS" INDEX (Required features are shown in BOLD)

MALF ID DESCRIPTION MSS-10 Stuck steam dump valve MSS-I l  !

Main steam header steam leak MSS-12 Steam generator steam flow transmitter failure MSS-13 Main steam header pressure transmitter failure NIS-1 Source range channel failure l

NIS-2 Intermediate range channel failure NIS-3 Power range channel failure NIS-4 1.R. channel gamma compensation failure NIS-5 Failure of S.R. high voltage to disconnect NIS-6 Noisy source range channel NIS 7 Power range detector failure NIS-8 S.R. channel hign voltage failure NIS-9 BDMS inadvertent doubling -

PCS-1 Inadvertent Rx trip PCS-2 First stage pressure transmitter failure i PCS-3 Safeguards sequencer "A" failure PCS-4 Safeguards sequencer "B" failure PCS-5 Inadvertent Si actuation PCS-6 Inadvertent containment isolation ' Phase A' PCS-7 Failure of auctioneered low Tavg PCS-8 Protective system failure (Rx fails to trip)

PCS-9 Stuck Rx trip break PCS-10 Failure of Containment Isolation Phase A PRS-1 PZR pressure channel failure PRS-2 PZR level channel failure PRS-3 PZR spray vahe failure PRS-4 PZR PORY control system failure PRS-6 PZR safety valve failure PRS-7 PZR pressure master controller failure PRS-8 PZR level controller failure PRS-9 PZR steam space leak PRS-10 PZR PORV leak PRS-I l PZR level detector reference leg rupture PRS-12 PORV stuck open PRS-13 Pressurizer spray valve failure RCS-1 Faulty primary RTD RCS-2 SG tube leak RCS-3 RCP trip RCS-4 RCP lock rotor RCS-5 Steam generator tube leak RCS-6 RCS leak RCS-8 RCS loop flow transmitter failure RCS-9 Rx vessel flange leak RCS-12 RTD wide range cold and hot leg failure RCS14 Failure of RCS W.R. pressure transmitter RilR-1 RilR pump trip RilR-2 RilR liX flow control valve failure R11R-3 RilR HX bypass salve control failure RilR-4 R11R flX bypass line leak RilR 5 RWST level channels failure (RilR suct. fails to switch)

RiiR-6 RilR low pressure letdown header leak

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v. c. ~ 4 Wolf Creek Simulator Certification Repon Attachment G January,1997 SIMULATOR " MALFUNCTIONS"INDEX (Required features are shown in BOLD) mal _F ID DESCRIPTION RilR-7 RHR injection line break RMS1 Radiation monitor process flow failure RMS-2 Area radiation monitor actuation RMS-3 Process radiation monitor actuation TUR-1 Inadvertent turbine trip TUR-2 Turbine vibration TUR-3 EHC throttle pressure sensor failure TUR-4 Loss of EHC acceleration error signal TUR-5 EHC - Generator current failure TUR-7 Stator water cooling trouble TUR-8 Turbine trip failure TUR-9 Turbine intercept valve trip TUR-i l MSR drain tank drain valve failure TUR-12 Main turbine EHC pump trip WAT-2 Service water pump trip WAT-3 Loss of ESW pump WAT-6 Circulating water pump trip WAT-7 ESW leak inside CTMT WAT-8 Circulating water pipe leak l

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