ML20083Q523
| ML20083Q523 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1983 |
| From: | Jerome Murphy PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, NEW YORK, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20083Q370 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8302250425 | |
| Download: ML20083Q523 (93) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.) . UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPWISSION ((, , i..
.gi BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
~ ik.
' ~
~ T-
/> A ..c lC ,. .- . In . - . + - .i_.3.
In the Matter of )
~
CONSOLIDATED EDIS'ON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247 SP 50-286 SP (Indian Point Unit 2) POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FEBRUARY 21, 1983 (Indian Point Unit 3)
... ' SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY 0F JAMES MURPHY
. on Behalf of
^UCS/NYPIRG 8302250425 830222 PDR ADOCK 05000247 G PDR
- - =. .
This.-s,upplemental testi,monyfis being_ filed _Lecause at the time of the filing of my original testimony, the research
- -upon-which my-statements:are-based-was incomplete-. I am-sub= ;
mitting.the NYPIRG report, " Ready or Not II: Public Health Preparedness for ~an Accident at Indian Point," as the core 'of - - my testimony. From-April-through September of 1982 I conducted a com-prehensive research project toJdetermine the level of medical y and public health preparedness in the area around Indian Point to respond to a major reactor accident. I will relate the re-sults of this project in' terms of the. requirements set forth in NUREG-0654. NUREG-0654 Section L.--Medical and Public Health Support
~
requires hospital and medical services which have the capabil-
- ity~for the evaluation of. radiation exposure and uptake, and the treatment of contaminated individuals. It must be realized that for accreditation, all hospitals must have some type of set procedures for responding to. radiological incidents.
However, there is no requirement for the. volume of patients to be treated, i.e., a hospital which is able to treat 2 $ radiologic victims is considered as compliant as one which is able to provide treatment for dozens. I surveyed hospitals in Putnam, Orange, Rockland, and- ' Westchester counties to evaluate personnel training, equipment, and facility preparedness to respond to a radiological emergency. My re earch has shown that only three hospitals in these counties which surround. Indian Point can treat more than 10 victims of a radiological accident at any one time. Bear in mind that I surveyed for only the most basic of care for external decon- l 1
-- -, . . - - _ . _ . _ _ , . . _ _ . - , _ ~ . - - _ _ . - _ . _ . . , - - - - - . _ , , , _ . . _ _ - . - - _ _ _ - , . , _ . , _ . - . . _ . . . . . - - . .
. rs* *
~
- 3.:. v t .= ==-:-._=---_.= =. .9.*9e-2 : , ,-
L*M-~~~~nnr-~ -%t.Mtut . <smm m.n -; :.sy.cw mm- , - mw ;c-k . tamination.' I did not look at long term care for victims re-
., n._.
- ceivi6g doses in excess of~100 rems nor did I survey the - C
~ ~'
ability to assess and treat internal contamination by radio-active isotopes. These situations require'a muchthigher' level ' of medical care that.that of minor external contamination. Consequentlytheassessmen[giveninmyreportisbasedon .; quite' optimistic reporting even though the conclusion of the . report is that the area is woefully unprepared to respond to . a major radiological disaster. On this notellet me state here that present: emergency w._.a
.. planning is seriously' deficient because it is not preparing. ._.
_._ . [
~
f'or exposure levels exceeding 100 rems nor is it preparing , for.the possibility of internal contamination. - AIt is inconsistent to plan for people having radioactive isotopes settle from a plume onto their bodies yet not prepare
~
-for the simul ~tEneous inhalation or ingestion of these isotopes. =
._And - --
it is sheer folly.not to-allow for the possibility of dose ; _p
~
levels exceeding 100 rems in'the aftermath of a large-ra'dio- - I logical release. Yet from conversations with county, state, ~j
-and federal. officials throughout the past year it has become -
y clear to me that no one is expecting, and hence not planning ;
..for radiological"iccidents-which go beyon'd minor external}s 27
~
,Z1
... :. %g :
au contaminaEion:.o___'n-r exposureilevels above-approximately250; rems. x
~
This is completely irresponsible from a public health standpoint.~ J. All victims of radiological accidents have heaitl[$Ug~Ilts. , [_. They have the right to receive the best possible assessment of
-m
'W h
. - , _ . . . _ _ , . --_--------e-_ -
+ --4'-- -~
,. . )
( -
~
.page 3
.j In theiextent of their contamination and they have the right to receive thefbest possible estimate of their total exposure.
-Indeed, these crucial estimates are the basis'for triage, 1.e., determining-the types and extent of-medical-treatment needed for each individua1Evictim. Without accurate triage,
' no adequate medical and public health response is possible.
Children, the infirm, and the elderly will require extensive-medical treatment immediately at exposure-levels above 100 rems. Healthy adults will require such care at 200 rems and above.
-Such care would include immedia'te baseline' leukocyte counts and continual leukocyte monitoring for at least 6fweeks, reverse isolation because1of depressed immune systems, antibiotic therapy.to prevent infection, and transfusions to replace necessary blood components. Hospitals in the area of Indian Point can provide these services readily, but only to a very limited number of peopl'e.- Any emergency planning which does not take these vital. services-into consideration is seriously deficient. It is my considered opinion that these issues are not addressed in the' Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) for the counties surrounding Indian Point.
NUREG-0654, Section L. (3) requirestheStateko3 develop a list of hospitals.which are capable of providing treatment to victims.of radiological accidents. I spent several weeks
-in procuring this list from the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group (NYSREPG) . Of the hospitals on
'*C page 4 .
- , ~ , p p.g ~ + m ; -
- ~ y ;;.c4->,,
, }
this list, five are located in the area of Indian Point and were evaluated in my report. I refer you to pages 8-9 of the - attached report for a short synopsis of the results regarding these facilities. I would. summarize the report by saying that I' disagree with the characterization that all of these hospitals are prepared to respond in an effective manner. For example, Phelps Memorial Hospital ~in North Tarrytown,- , 12 miles from Indian Point and the first hospital to be reached as one leaves the Westchester EPZ, appears on the NYSREPG list. However, on a.0-10 scale, with "0" meaning "not at all prepared" and~"10" meaning " totally prepared", the Director of Emergency Services at this hospital rated both staff and facility pre-paredness to manage a major radiologic emergency as "0." In addition the Director of_ Emergency Services at New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center, another hospital on the NYSREPG list, rates staff preparedness as "1" and facility preparedness as "4." : A rather curious omission on this list is Peekskill Community Hospital, which, because of its contract to provide care to onsite radiation injuries at Indian Point and the . equipment and training provided by the Indian Point utilities, is perhaps the most prepared hospital in the area to respond to radiological emergencies. It is certainly the most experienced, due to several onsite accidents through the years. Perhaps this hospital does not appear on ,the list because its proximity to Indian Point, within three miles, would dictate evacuation in the event of a major accident at Indian Point.
.~
.page 5
-~
P e- - _. . . - - .- . - - _ _ - . . . _ _ x My research r_ m also, included
. .x- a look at the q ability, of x ~~special m .-
a
~
facilities ~(nursing homes, adult homes, extended care facilities, hospitals) within the 10-mile EPZ to evacuate the residents from the facility and to relocate to another facility somewhere outside the EPZ. All special facilities have building evacuation plans as required by the State but the vast majority (81% of those responding) have no ability to transport clients and many (31%) have no plan as to where they can relocate. . In trying to verify the instructions and information contained in each county RERP, I found many discrepancies. between what the plans stated and the understanding of facility . administrators as to what they are expected to do. For example, three Westchester County facilities reported thaE at least some of their clients will be transported to Phelps Memorial Hospital in North Tarrytown. Yet nowhere in the Westchester County RERP is Phelps-Memorial Hospital-mentioned as a receiving institution. In addition, I found that only one of the many-bus companies listed in the RERP.for evacuation transport was in fact willing to provide such services. The third and final part of my research examined the ability of ambulance services in the area to respond'to a radiological l . emergency. The survey looked at training, equipment, knowledge ;
~
l of' role withing the RERP, and willingness to fulfill such'a role.- These survey results showed without exception, that > l respondent ambulance services in the area of Indian Point are f untrained, ill-equipped, and unaware of their role within the RE RP .- Not suprisingly, because of this and other factors, only 19% of the membership of the respondents reported being willing
-~ r e e
_ ?-
~
n: n pago,6:- a ..,+:2 ww. . ma = - , .,um - en- u. - mn ~
~ :- n to-respond to a radiological: emergency at Indian Po(nt. This is consistent with the testimony of an ambulance service member given at the FEMA public hearing of' July 26, 1982 in Cortlandt, NY. This individual stated that, because of the unique qualities of radiological emergencies and because of his overriding concern for the safety of his family, he would not report.for duty but rather would evacuate his family from the area.
Ambulance services have a crucial role within the RERP. They are to evacuate residents of hospitals and nursing homes
-and will also evacuate citizens needing specialized transport for evacuation. Added to this, they.will also be called upon to transport injured and/or contaminated individuals to appro-priate facilities. However, at the present time they are not"in any state of readiness which would allow them to carry out their assigned tasks with any level of safety or effectiveness.
I have made several attempts to make all the above inform-ation, along with major deficiencies, known to the proper officials. I presented this information at the FEMA public
' hearing on July _26, 1982. In attendance were FEMA personnel, NYSREPG personnel, and Con Ed'and-PASNY officials. I submitted
- copies of my report to Donald Davidoff, Director of NYSREPG,
'and to Frank Petrone, Director-of FEMA, Region II. In addition, in December, 1982 I met-with Mr. Petrone and three members of his staff to discuss the findings of my report.
To date, I have received absolutely no response from Mr. Davidoff or his associates at NYSREPG. The only response 4
+
)
page 7 f
-- . ._. .- - .. - - ~.. .
that I have received from my endeavors is a letter from Mr.
,= .:
u m :v p u c e n - = r .= ~ a . .2-. . . ~: - r ~, - ' : Petrone, dated 1/5/83 stating that the New York State Department of Health did a survey of radiological treatment capability in New York State hospitals approximately one year ago and _that the Department of Health feels that there is no need for reexamination of the survey data. In addition it was stated that New York State (presumably NYSREPG) is basing its emergency planning along the lines of the ASLB San Onofre decision which concluded that "relatively few people" will be injured and/or contaminated as the result of a major reactor accident. No basis for this decision was given to me. As to our reporting of the inability of special facilities within the EPZ to evacuate and relocate in the event of radiological emergencies, the letter reported that the deficiencies "...have been identified and are in the process of being addressed by the state." Exactly what corrective actions were being taken was not made known to me. There was no mention made of the total lack of preparedness l of ambulance services to respond to a radiological accident as documented in my report. Mr. Petrone, for reasons unknown to me, chose to ignore this matter entirely. l In January of this year I repeated my concerns to Mr. Petrone in writing; to date I have received no response. I wish to-make clear my good faith efforts in trying to call . the attention of key officials to serious shortcomings in the present approach to radiological emergency planning. Officials of NYSREPG and. FEMA have consistently downplayed, misrepresented, or ignored the deficiencies in emergency planning and have - w + - *_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - - . - - _ _ _ _ . _ _
; )
% r 2 :r a. r c page 8 ~ - -
. r . .-
continually reported to the NRC that problems are small and I that progress is being made in making corrections. Much to the contrary, I.believe that the deficiencies in medical and public health support are major and in need of a serious and concerted effort in order to be resolved. Summarizing my above comments, the following problems are inherent in any radiological accident within a densely populated area and must be resolved in order to provide a reasonable degree of safety to citizens:
- 1. problems of assessing internal contamination;
- 2. problems of assessing total individual exposure;
- 3. problems of effective triage;
- 4. limited capacity for treatment of radiological injury;
~
- 5. logistical problems of evacuation and relocating
.special facilities;
- 6. lack of adequate preparation of emergency workers.
It is not at all clear to me that these issues are being addressed and in fact may well =lxa impossible to correct. As a public health professional who has been investigating emergency planning in support of radiological emergencies at Indian Point,.I have othercconcerns besidds those presented in my report. Specifically these involve the ability of'the present method of drills and exercises to accurately assess the medical and public health aspect of the RERP and also the inadequacy of radiological training that is presently being given to emergency workers.
~ ~ '
5
~
page 9 *
/
Efficacy of Radiological Exercises and Drills
- x :m
- t. ,. u., ,
The present method for testing emergency preparedness involves the mobilization of the Commissioners of emergency response agencies to each county EOC and the mobilization
- ..,. - -.. ..-a n ~ s _-
-a- = _ .
of relatively few emergency workers. In addition, certain ambulance services are alerted for stand-by, as are the special facilities within the EPZ. A few individuals are transported to reception centers to go through the motions of external decontamination. While readily acknowledging the need for practice and realizing the logistical problems of large-scale exercises, I must nevertheless emphasize that the alerting and mobilization of only a slight fraction of the total workforce has severe limitations in assessing or predicting the actual state of radiological emergency response preparedness, most certainly with regard to medical and public health capability. .I am-therefore of the opinion that the March, 1982 exercise gave no l l clear ~ indication of medical and public health preparedness, nor l will the exercise of March, 1983 provide a more definitive assessment if it mimics the approach of March, 1982, as would l seem to be the case. Rather than simply criticize, I will put forth an alter-native to assessing medical and public health capability through unrealistic exercises and drills. I sincerely suggest , that NYSREPG or FEMA produce written surveys of their own design which provide a comprehensive assessment of the ability l
s. s page 10
.- y- . . .y~. . . . . . a . . .
of,each component of medical and public health support to _ perform its' function. I recommend the following:
'l. ' design and send a' survey to ambulance services-which evaluates training, equipment, awareness of role within any, RERP, willingness to respond to radiological emergencies;
.2. design and . send .a survey to special facilities within the -.
EPZ which assesses the ability to get clients out of the building, into identified' transport vehicles with guaranteed drivers, and move clients to identified receiving institutions
~
provident the requisite care;
- 3. design and send a survey to any hospital involved in radiological emergency response to evaluate:. (a) personnel training and level of competence, (b) equipment, (c) facility preparedness, (d) overall preparedness;
~ 4'. -design and send a survey to all health departments involved in radiological emergency response to evaluate: (a) personnel
- e training and level of competence, (b) monitoring and dose assessment capabilitics, (c) communications link with reactor site, (d) decontamination capability and capacity, (e) ability to i
assess hsman contamination, both external and internal, and n (f) environmental.t-monitoring. Taking~this approach in' assessing preparedness provides-i- several advantages. First, every component.of emergency response is assessed, not just the few that are mobilized.
~
I Second, a written self-evaluation is on file from every i 4 s r v- - ~ + - , r,-,. wee-w,- --w - - ^b
- . page 11 .
component involved in-emergency response. Third, compared
~
- . e .i
'-~ withlthe cost of conducting. exercises, this method is ex--
tremely inexpensive, and very cost effective. Summarizing, this, method could:readily fill in'the many ,-
~- -
.- - . -r . . . ..:- . .
I gaps left by cumbersome. exercises.and drills. Inadequacy of the Training for Emergency Workers i Perhaps most upsetting to me as a responsible health Lprofessional is the quality of preparation being given to those-individuals who'will bear the' greatest 4 risks from a_ radiological accident--the emergency workers. These individuals, the vast. majority of whom have never worked with radiation, will ke ex-1 pected to work in a potentially . radioactive environment and inay be sxposed to life-threatening levels of ionizing radiation. Yet presentations from New- York State trainers -downplay greatly the danger. inherent in performing emergencyutasks.during'a radiological emergency. In November of~last y, ear I observed the training session given by New York State to wbrkers of the Rockland County Health Department. At no time ~was the health risk of working in a radioactive environment realistically presented. Instead, an initial statement was made that, hypothetically, a worker could still staff a position even after receiving 100 rems, due to the delayed onset of symptoms - of radiation sickness. And later in the program an overhead projector display showed that the health risk of receiving 10 millirems of ionizing radiation was equal to consuming 40 spoonsful of peanut butter or 10 charcoal-broiled steaks.
.-,.o 6 e . . - , - , . . _ , . . , - , - - . - - - - , ,, ,m.,r.-- -
m- .,-y,. - - - , - - - , - ,,b, -
. . . \
1
* *~
page 12 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ...,__- . _ - ~ _ . - l
.. 'This type of' presentation not only obfuscates the danger involved, it engenders a nonchalance that is entirely inap-propriate to the situation. Because of limited background, most emergency-workers are easily influenced by~this type of presentation.
The group that I observed in Rockland County was mostly administrators and sanitarians who deal usually with air and water quality, restaurant' inspections, and rodent control. It is nothing short of criminal to ~ prepare these people with information that deludes and is of no use to.them. In addition, it was: mentioned that'each' worker could be allowed to receive up to 25 rems of radiation before he or she would be pulled from duty. Yet no mention:was made,of the fact that this level is five times that allowed nuclear plant workers for an entire. year.. Nor were the health risks:; assoc-l iated with this exposure level ever: discussed. , I must mention that although Geiger Counters were part of the presentation, no member of the audience had an opportunity < to operate one. It is my understanding that at a follow-up !- training cession in January, 1983 there was hands-on experience ! 'with Geiger Counters. However, not everyone who attended the first session was[available to attend the secondlsession. Another example of training inadequacy took place for
.some Westchester County Health Department workers in February, 1983.
Before an audience of 50-60 workers, the instructor presented
-- - . -. - . - - - . . . . . . - .. ~. ,-- _ . . .-. . . , . . .- ..
READY OR NOT ll: Public Health Preparedness for An Accident at Indian Point
#"* b
,
- Garrison Highland PUTNAM Falls *Q
$E,S,tER 9
/ 6 Peekskill Y//" "
g/b' ' Buchanan o
+Y f . .
Stony
- Point :'-
- H OCKLAND New Citv Surveys of Hospital Emergency Departments and Ambulance Services in Orange, Putnam, Rockland and Westches'.s Counties and Residential Health-Care Facilities within the
~
10-mile Emergency Planning Zone by James L. Murphy, MPH and Joan E. Harriss, MPH NEW YORK pubhC INTEREST RESEARCb CENTER,INC. _ _ , . = . _ . _ , _ - - _ _ . _ . _ - . . -
~
. 1 e.
l
< l The, New York Public : Interest Research Group, Inc. (NYPIRG) Tis a n'ot-for-profit, e Jnon-partisan'research and advocacy organization established, directed, and
. supported.by New York State college.and university students. .NYPIRG's staff '
of lawyers,; researchers, and organizers works with students;in Albany,n
.Binghamton, Brooklyn, Buffalo, Cortland, Fredonia, Long -Island, Manhattan, New Paltz, Niagara' Falls, Queens,-Staten Island, Syracuse, and Utica. Staff and ~ students work at: learning citizenship skills and shaping public' policy.-
Consumer protection,'. energy,. fiscal responsibility,. political reform, and j social.' justice 'are NYPIRG's principal areas of concern.- t
' The' New York Publ'ic-Interest Research; Center, 'Inc. (NYPIRC)' is a not-for-profit.
c research ' organization working to develop citizenship skills in the areas of. consumer protection, energy, health, the environment, ' government.'and . corporate ' accountability, Land, economic and social: Justice.
.NYPIRG,-the state's largest consumer-advocacy organization, establish'ed the Indian Point Project inLthe fall of -1979 to ' monitor safety conditions at ' the
~
Indian Point' nuclear reactors in Buchanan, .New York, 24 miles north of New LYork" City.
..'At-the end of a long task,-the authors are grateful'to many. We begin by L thanking Jim'and Margaret Plews-Ogan for their invaluable contributions lin laying -the foundations 'for the surveys. We continue bor thanking John Gilroy and Linda Eganhauser for 'their help with research, and Bob Holt and Anne Witte-
. for their: editorial assistance.- We end'by thanking Ellen Spilka and Nancy.
' Weeks for typing ~ the ~ report,, Kathy Osborn ~ for graphics,' and' Brian Hatfield '
for,his printing services. Forbfurther information .or additional copies of this publication ($10.00/
. individual, $20.00/ institution),' write: 'NYPIRG Publications, 9 Murray Street, New York, New York, 10007..
()I 1982 Egr the'New York Public Interest Research Croup, Inc. (NYPIRG) and . the New York Public Interest Research Center, Inc. (NYPIRC)
~ , _ . . ,.w-
l - ( I I . , l l l
$ q e Garrison
..m !:g!n', pe 9 Highia jg PUTNAM
,, . 'fp:. ~
.5 .
- !l$ p gg,
?
L It*ty q. - g , f,
~~
5 EYES
,.k f NEWYORKk ><pif? 5.h s
' Ef
\ -
j
- ct iig .'
/ Peekskill ;
f
- i y :i;7a.+. jio '
lig 7fy.a m\\ gl: Buchanan
' :i;hl . "
M : ,lg 5. ;
!ijQ.
4" :
. .: g ihd
. ~
.;ffjii~ !? i gyp.%p"g:.gr g -
/
Stony
- Point
;i! AgJ.; .;7$.r- .ori: 87 pjp 1:7;!r ]
jf.;j# .Q fBeacoriff [ " (MN69-'-iO2 ' 84.;iNewburUh w .- . ~ . ROCKLAND'
. '" j'
- lif!T,41
;;.y.s; Middletown"e . .,.....,.i-s: ;
- $!POTN. .I y,, ^
' ' 2 City
- I. . .. ,. . . . ,. .
j' . I: ? Port hisNf " "~ .. . :.ise . ,.,. .,, ..
^:!As;
.p :;;. '!!
+i?R ', !!iw '!!CONNECTICUTj;
(( fV
, ,lis!'3l$;;c;aij::
3
, , (((!(
g!
' Peekskillii i:!%.y.
s ,' <
'i:::V. . . v.. . , cc: . . . .... - ::.
l U
- r. -
- g"sii i .;
WES .HESTE ., jiii ;[gj c, 1Ini4M . .,,)
. . . '~'
.i,. ).dii . . . . . . .s . .
h.i RS!!' ' - KLAND cf: ! . .;: p tj:; a.-. . .
, .f,. . ,. . . . . . - . , , . . . . ""!:g
. . . , . . . . , . .! ] White (jf.Mi Norwalk
- /j g'tarnsi[
jiji. lainsi:ne
- ;i NEW JERSEY::: :.;2, J.::
i:: i.: o .; ;
- 4. :!. :: .
- g .,} .
. . . .i: I .: ;" :!!i;;
s!!.k_
? .. .
- "5-
' .* Hunti
" ': " -if +
I:! 7 i!!N..: ' ;%. . . . . . . . . .; Morristown::- ?:;l"4 . F
- g. sf6 . l Port.Washin *' o n.!!!):f
~~
' 5M '
9...N. i: co ,E.E?. , ' i >...
. L-s Rl:;7. , . .Mrk.ii 25 if ' '
' s
[
?i:
- N_ . .
/>-
York
!! LONG l,gj
- lijjijf i
' JSLAND!:!.k;
" lll /. . .
s
~
._ ... ' 1:%, y, S .[ "
ii:
- 5
- ! Miles F ?
i'og i;g[ : ,.
~ ~
3 M Map shows region within 50 miles of the Indian Point nuclear reactors, with detail of the 10-mile zone around the plants.
-i-9
7- . TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction..................................... 1-Summary o f Main Fin din gs , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,4 - Background and Me tho d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Dis cus s ion o f Findin gs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Conclusions...................................... 12 Detailed Results and Tables Part I.- Hospital Emergency Departments...... 14 Part II. - Residential Care Facilities. . . . . . . . . 26 Part III. Ambulance Services.................. 37 Bibliography..................................... 43 t l l b'. t r l
1
-l INTRODUCTION This report is part of an ongoing attempt by the' Indian Point Project of the New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG) and Center (NYPIRC) to monitor and_ evaluate the status of emergency preparedness near the
~ Indian Point nuclear power plants in Buchanan, NY. The three-unit facility 1 is located on the bank of the Hudson River, 35 miles north of midtown l Manhattan, in the heart'of the most densely populated region of the country. ,
Within 50 miles of Indian Point live 17 million people, more than double j
.the population around any other U.S. nuclear facility.
1 In an earlier publication,* we presented a study of the state of ' public information on emergency preparedness in the part of Westchester County-within 10 miles of the nuclear ' plants operated by Consolidated ' Edison (Con Ed) and the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY). The study revealed how ineffectively those utilities have done their job of informing the endangered public of what they would need to know in the' event of a serious accident at Indian Point. . In what follows, we : present a complementary study of public health facilities and services within the four-county area around Indian Point and of their readiness to respond to a radiological emergency. Nuclear power differs from all other methods of generating elec- I
' tricity in that it subjects the people in the surrounding area to a special kind. of hazard--the biological effects of exposure to ionizing radiation. In a nuclear plant various radioactive substances are produced
' as a result of the atomic fission that heats water to drive the steam generators. Some of these fission-products are gases which accumulate inside the plant and which would reach unacceptable levels if not- , periodically purged. So the NRC permits plant owners in the course of normal operations to' routinely. discharge small quantities of these radioactive gases into the atmosphere. At present, there is controversy about the adverse effects of these , , routine, low-level. discharges from nuclear power plants -- some scientists-say low-level exposure-is harmless, others say no amount of radiation.is safe. But there is no question that large doses of ionizing radiation . can cause prompt deaths as well as delayed deaths from cancer and other diseases, plus illnesses and genetic effects in future generations. - Most concern about the-dangers of nuclear power arises from the fact th'ta there is no way_to guarantee that reactors may not undergo serious accidents, in which the complex system of safeguards built into them breaks down and large quantities of radioactive fission products are released into the environment. Despite the fact that commercial nuclear power is about 25 years old, the utilities and governments involved paid little attention to the i possibility of a scrious accident until 1979. Then, when the reactor at
.Threee Mile Island came close to a complete meltdown, the Governor of r Pennsylvania _ recommended a partial evacuation and many thousands of people from a wide area chose to evacuate their homes. i
- Ready Or Not: Public Preparedness for an Accident at Indian Point, by Richard J. Altschuler. New York: NYPIRC/NYPIRG, 1982.
. , _ - - ,._ _ . ~ . _ . .._ _ _ _ ._- _ . _ - _. _ . , _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ , , _ . .
Emergency response at Three Mile Island was so chaotic that no one l l could deny any. longer the need for advance planning. The' NRC issued . l
-directives to all-nuclear utilities to work with local .(county and state) governments, and to. draw up radiological emergency response plans. An
- j. arbitrary 10-mile circle was drawn around each nuclear plant and designated
- the " plume exposure pathway." A 50-mile circle called the " ingestion pathway" was also delineated. Evacuation plans were required only for-the
~
smaller,10-mile " Emergency Planning Zone" (EPZ). The deadline for . submission of. paper plans was January 1, 1981; they were supposed to be' bnplemented three months-later, April 1,1981. In fact, though plans for. the Indian Point region were handed in on time, they still have not been properly implemented. Responsibility for receiving and evaluating the plans rests with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which has taken a lenient -- even indulgent -- attitude toward the utilities and the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group. As long as some effort was being made and some progress
- could be pointed to, FEMA did not blow the whistle and inform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the state of planning and preparedness for an accident at Indian Point is dangerously inadequate.
l Still, at the end of July,1982, in its " Interim Findings on the ! Adequacy of Radiological Emergency Response Preparation" at Indian Point, FEMA handed in a rather' poor report card: There were serious deficiencies' l
'in five planning areas, they said, plus minor deficiencies in a number of l j others. As'a result, the NRC started their "120-day clock" -- that is, the 1 utilities were given formal notice that they had 120 days to make good the deficient aspects of the plans. If at_the end of that time (December'2, 1982), they have not done so, they might be ordered to show cause why the Indian Point. reactors should not be shut down until such time as their emergency planning and preparedness is " adequate to protect public health and safety." u One immediate consequence of this development was that the NRC Commissioners ordered 'the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board currently holding hearings on the safety of Indian Point to suspend consideration of emergency planning issues until after the 120-day period.
Meanwhile, however, Dr. Jan Beyea, senior research scientist with the National Audubon Society and an internationally recognized authority on consequences of nuclear plant accidents, had already testified that accidents of a type well recognized by the NRC as possible at Indian Point, could expose many thousands of persons to lethal and near-lethal doses of radiation. According to his extensive computer simulation, even if emergency plans work perfectly and people are evacuated as promptly as the utilities claim is possible, under certain weather conditions people would be irradiated so heavily as to cause early deaths (within six weeks) from radintion sickness, as well as many thousands of illnesses and delayed cancer fatalities. Moreover, Dr. Beyea's calculations show that lethal doses could be delivered well beyond the 10-mile EPZ, and that even New York City could be so seriously contaminated that large areas would have to be abandoned for years. j
- w. If a cloud,~ or plume, . of radioactive fission products released' O : during an accident at Indian Point passed over the region, many people could become contaminated with an invisible but partly. removable film of particl~s,.-which e would have to be washed off as soon as possible in order to reduce the total residual ~ dose. Some victims would have a chance of surviving only if they were promptly given elaborate. supportive treatment to prevent death by radiation sickness. Hospitalized patients and housebound people would have to be evacuated;by large fleets of ambulances,'many more than are needed-for any normal purpose.
. For such rea' sons as these, it. is vital' that any emergency preparedness system for 'the Indian Point region include enough' medical facilities .st'affed by well-trained. workers who are willing and able to- carry.out the specialized procedures'for coping with this unique type of medical emergency.- One would have expected therefore, that FEMA would have carefully surveyed the medical facilities of the area as part of-its effort to evaluate the adequacy.
of emergency planning and preparedness at Indian Point. Yet,-in its official role as evaluator of radiological emergency planning, FEMA has done 'no such - evaluation, largely confining itself to a study of the planning documents. produced by the utilities and their consultants, and by New York State. Consistent with the Reagan administration's general policy-of underfunding agencies that have to do with regulation of businesses, FEMA apparently does not have a large enough staff or~ budget to conduct serious field studies of its own. (In another vital area of emergency preparedness, for example, FEMA
' has not .been able to develop and execute a procedure for evaluating the effectiveness of sirens to warn the public of an accident.)
NYPIRC, skeptical of public health preparedness claims writtenTinto' the Indian _ Point emergency plans, conducted a careful and thorough survey of the radiological emergency response capability of. the region's hospitals, ambulance services, and residential health-care facilities. Once again, as in our earlier study of public information and preparedness, we have found that what exists in reality around Indian Point is very different from what exists on paper-in the State and Utilities' Radiological Emergency Response
. Plans.
-Joan Holt Director, Indian Point Proj ect i
S 1-
+
. L
SUMMARY
OF THE' MAIN FINDINGS
- l I. Hospital Emergency Departments
[Of.the 24 respondents to our survey... 1 o' only 14 have had. staff training in the treatment of radiation _ injury and the decontamination 'of patients; - e- only-16 have any protective equipment for.their workers; e 6 have no facilities for the decontamination of
- patients; e only 2 with decontamination facilities have the capability of storing the contaminated- water for proper disposal; 1
e only 3 hospitals report an ability to treat more than 10 victims of a major ~radiologica1' emergency at any given time. Of = the 11 facilities responding to a question rating preparedness on a' scale of 0 - 10 ranging from "not at all prepared" to
~
" totally prepared"...
- e. over 50% assessed facility preparedness as less than "5";
e the 1 hospital that rated i.ts preparedness as "10" is located within 2 miles of Indian roint and would be evacuated in the event of a major ' radiological emergency. 1 s [F (- *This' summary is based on data collected from May through September 1982. t ,.
?
c I t t
II. Evacuation / relocation plans for the residential health-care facilities within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) Of the 32 responding facilities... e 10 (31%) have no evacuation / relocation plan for a major radiological disaster; e 26 (81%) report that they lack sufficient vehicles for evacuating patients; e none of the facilities reporting a need for additional transportation vehicles have guarantees that such will be provided (though some report having been told by State representatives that vehicles will be made available) . Of the 6,101 patients reported residing in health-care facilities within the 10-mile EPZ, there is immediate transportation for only 1,230. s Of the 10 facilities rating preparedness on a 0 - 10 scale, 50% rated themselves as "0" or "not at all prepared."
4
- III. Ambulance services in the four counties surrounding Indian Point of the 15 ambulance services responding...
e none bas.a written protocol (a set of plans and procedures) for responding to a radiological emergency; e none has radiation detection equipment; e only 1 has personnel dosimeters to measure exposure of workers to ionizing radiation; e none rated their preparedness in response to a radiological emergency above "5" on a scale of 0 - 10. Over 50% rated themselves "0"; e 12 have had no training in the treatment of ionizing radiation injury or the decontamination of exposed individuals; L i l e only 2 stated-that all their members would respond to a radiological disaster. i l Of the 522 active ambulance service members reported... e 'only 19% are reported as willing to respond to a radiological disaster;
- e only 2% are considered competent in the treatment of radiation injury or the decontamination of individuals.
- .. _ _ _ . _ __, __ _ - ~ _ ,-_._ . _ _ L . _ . . -. - . . . ~ --- ----- --- ---
0 4 . , ( *h
' BACKGROUND AND METHOD
- . This' NYPIRG/NYPIRC. report- takes an in-depth. look at public health response capability in the -four counties that surround the Indian Point reactors in Buchanan,
- New York. . In the ~ late spring and summer of -1982, NYPIRG ~ surveyed hospital emergency
' -departments anni ambulance ' services in Orange, . Putnam, Rockland, _and Westchester .
. Counties to assess 'their ability to respond to a radiological emergency at Indian
~
- Point. LIn addition, NYPIRG surveyed residential health-care facilities within the
! ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) to determine their ability to evacuate-and -
relocate their clients-in. the event of a radiological _ emergency. 1 As a guideline for our investigation, _ NYPIRG used the regulations that have been put -forth by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~ in the document NUREG-0654/ FEMA--REP-1-Rev.1, ~" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency
~
c Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants"~ (hereinaf ter 4 freferred to as NUREG-0654). A team of four health 1 professionals
- examined three aspects of the proposed ,
Radiological- Emergency Response- Plans for the counties surrounding Indian Point as' they - relate:to public health response: (1) hospital emergency facilities in the four-county region'around Indian Point, (2) . ambulance services in the four-county region ito be'used-for the evacuation and relocation of hospitals, nursing homes, and the injured from a radiological disaster, and (3) - evacuation and relocation of patients - in' residential' health-care facilities within the ten-mile EPZ.
- The_ team first established what we considered," adequate ca'pability"** criteria
- for each type of organization to be surveyed. We then designed and mailed question-
!- naires to.all potential respondent organizations. It was necessary.also to make a i number of follow-up telephone: calls to address special problems ~and to encourage response . **
- i A complete investigation of public health response capability would have to include an evaluation of local health department capability to s'et up and operate decontamination-facilities "in the field".following an accident. NYPIRC had planned to do ' this evaluation' from' cross-examination of health department witnesses in the NRC's special investigation of the Indian Point reactors. Because the NRC hearings 4'
were suspended for.some months and emergency planning testimony postponed indefinitely, however, we are unable to include this . crucial public health preparedness issue in our i~ report. ' l
* - Team members included James L. Murphy, MPH; Joan E. Harriss, MPH; Margaret Plews-Ogan,_RN, FNP; and James Plews-Ogan, RN, FNP.
'** A bibliography of sources used in survey development is included at the end of
' this_ report.
*** Copies of the survey questionnaires are obtainable .ipon request from the NYPIRG i
Indian Point Project. i-i- L , -
+ -y, y---,-rg-w-r---4me-, y ,,-w---+wr ,.e--e-----+----,-g,,q.v.,+m - . - g ,r m m .g w , . g ..re or w , r o w - r e 19- m -c--*--= e-rwr- -,-,+---re- e-w,-ww, . , -m--<,+=w-esw,e,-
u 1 P -
. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
^
. NYPIRG's invest'igahion of public health preparedness for' an accident at
~
JIndian Point establishes -that.the emergency planning standards set forth in :
. NUREG-0654, Section L, entitled " Medical and Public . Health Support," are not met:in the area surrounding the Indian Point nuclear power; plants in Buchanan, .
~New York..
Specifically,;the following criteria are not met: A First' L. ,(1) "Each organization (licensees, state, and' county' govern-
- . ment @.shallarrange-forlocalandbackuphospital-and medical services having the capability for evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake, including assurance
.that persons providing these services are adequately pre- .
pared to handle contaminated individuals." The' NYPIRG survey reveals that. emergency facilities in the Indian Point area are not prepared-to respond to a major radiological disaster (see Detailed Results, Part I). Second L. (3) "Each State shall. develop 111sts'in'dicating the location of public, private, and military l hospitals and other emergency medical services facilities.within the State or contiguous States considered capable of.providing medical l support for any contaminated injured individual. The listing shall include the name, ' location, type: of .
- facility and capacity and any~special: radiological capabilities. These emergency medical-services should
~
be able to' radiologically monitor contamination person-nel,' and have facilities and trained ~ personnel able to care for contaminated injured persons." The list presently provided by the State contains five hospitals in the
. Indian Point area. NYPIRG received surveys from three of.these facilities and . Econducted telephone interviews.with the other two. The hospitals and their capabilites follow:
- 1. Phelps Memorial Hospital--on the 0-10 scale with "0" meaning "not at all prepared" and "10" meaning " totally prepared,"(hereinaf ter referred to as the LO-10 scale): the Director of . emergency services rates both staff and facility preparedness to respond to a major- radiological disaster as 0.
2.= New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center--on the 0-10 scale, the Director of [ emergency services-rates staff preparedness as 1 and facility preparedness as 4.
- 3. Cornwall Hospital--the Director of emergency services states that 10 victims of a radiological emergency could be effectively treated.
4
- 4. Ny ck Horpital--tha r:diology administrator states that 10-50 patients could be treated effectively, depending on the extent of injuries.
- 5. Good Samaritan Hospital--The ' Radiation Safety officer of this facility states that 5-10 patients could be treated effectively, depending on the extent of injuries.
Third L. (4) "Each organization ([ licensee,stateandcountygovern-ment @ shall arrange for transporting victims of rad-iological accidents to medical support facilities." Parts II and III of the Detailed Results. section of this report demonstrate that this criterion has not been met. In addition, NYPIRG's findings indicate that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report of July 30, 1982, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), " Interim Findings on the Adequacy of Radiological Emergency Response Preparation of State and Local Governments at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station" was erroneous in characterizing the deficiencies in " Medical and Public Health Support" as " minor" (Section L. , p. 21) . NYPIRG considers these deficiencies to be major. They require remedial action equal in priority to the other five areas of significant deficiencies identified by FEMA which caused the NRC to start the lates 120-day clock for Radiological Emergency Response Plan compliance for the Indian Point sites.* It is indeed confusing to us that FEMA chose to disregard information concerning significant deficiencies in medical and public health support capability brought to its attention at a FEMA public meeting by one of this report's authors '(Murphy) on July 26, 1982, at the Cortlandt Civic Center in Westchester County. Mr. Murphy pointed out at this meeting that several hospitals on a New York State Department of Health list of facilities having radiological- - treatment capabilities were, according to the NYPIRG survey, unable to respond adequately to a major radiological disaster. In its interim report to the NRC on medical and public health support, FEMA brushed aside this information with the statement that "The adequacy of hospitals with radiological capabilities was questioned." (See " Interim Findings. . .", page 27.) NYPIRG's findings also reveal major deficiencies with regard to " Criteria for Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness" (44 CFR 350.5) . Specifically, the federal regulation requites that:
" Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided." (8), and The areas or significant deficiency as identified by FEMA are:
- 1) Notification Methods and Procedures
- 2) Public Education and Information
- 3) Protective Response
- 4) Radiological Exposure Control
- 5) Responsibility for the Planning Effort
' " Arrangements' are made' for medical services for con-taminated injured individuale." (12)
These criteria are not met in the' region ' surrounding Indian Point. Lastly, our study reveals that areas of the proposed Radiological Emergency l Response Plans' (last revisic , August,- 1981) misrepresent public health response capability.
- 1) Evacuation of Special Facilities within the ten-mile ~ Emergency Planning Zone..
The plans state that adequate numbers of buses and other. vehicles have been assigned to transport < nursing home residents to predesignated congregate care centers and that' sources of buses, wheelchair vehicles, and ambulances, as necessary, have been identified and are= assigned to transport patients from specific hospitals to their host facilities. Responses to our survey indicate that ' the 'above is inaccurate. - In a'
~
telephone conversation, the Director of New York State's Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group stated that each nursing home and hospital licensed 'by the State Department of Health is required to have its own emergency plan for any disaster and that it.is the responsibility'of each individual facility to provide' transportation arrangements -for 'the evacuation of its clients in the event of a radiological emergency.- He also stated that any problem in procur-ing the requisite transportation' would need to be reported to the State Depart-
- ment of Health and the appropriate agency within each. county government.
The responses to the NYPIRC survey show without question that this is not the understanding of the administrators of the facilities. At present, the only facilities with' adequate transportation arrangements are those that already have enough vehicles of their own. Facilities that do not own the necessary_ vehicles for evacuation of their patients have made no arrangements to acquire transport-ation. Nor was there any indication that arrangements were going to be made in the near future. In fact, two facilities responded that it was their understand- , !- ing that the State would provide the necessary transport. i- It is obvious that there is a deplorable breakdown in communication between the State and the special facilities within the EPZ which would require evac-uation and relocation of patients in the event of a radiological emergency. The problem does not end here. The proposed Radiological Emergency Response Plan for each county lists bus companies that will provide evacuation transport for the special facilities within the Emergency Planning Zone. Tele-phone inquiries to several of these companies reveal that arrangements had not been made. These transport lists seem to be mere fabrication by the utility consultants who wrote the Radiological Emergency Response Plans in order to I ' fulfill federal requirements on paper . Furthermore, it is clear that neither FEMA nor 'the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group made any attempt to verify the accuracy of these transport lists. The unfortunate re-sult of this negligence is that thousands of residents in the special facilities within the Emergency Planning Zone will be effectively stranded during any radiological emergency while the utilities, the State, and FEMA maintain that they are being provided for. i
.g-e. - , ,_,e ,,,..9.mv. ,9,,-w,..-,,-.,,,-- .,-o-,-,m,,.,,..., .g,,,e,--, ..m.-m,-.w., --,----.-,.e,--..-,---%w - . ,.- ,,-4 + -,-w , -m,
3
q -
w. 2)iAmbulance Services.
.- lThe_plansstatethatambulancesareprepared.toprovideevacuation senices to:
(a) special facilities needing to be evacuated
'(b) homes'of handicapped persons (c) homes of: persons requesting emergency medical transportation +
-(d) injured and contaminated patients. l To provide:such services would require possible entrance:into contaminated- ;
areas and transport of radiologically contaminated or injured victims. e
, Responses to our survey indicate that ambulance _ services are'not prepared to '
- i. respond, nor are ~ theyL aware of their role in any radiological emergency -
-response.- (See Detailed Results section, Part III.)
jf 3) Facilities Providing Radiological Treatment Capabilities. 1 The proposed plans list eight facilities capable of providing radiological:
~
n 1 treatment to victims of' a radiological disaster in the Indian Point area. ' l' .NYPIRG takes exception to the claim that'all_the facilities listed can; provide
- j. radiological;t'reatment.
The Ro,cklknd County Radiological Emergency Response Plans *-list..three ] -facilities:as~having radiological treatment capabilities: Letchworth Village i Developmental- Center, Helen Hayes ' Hospital, and Rockland County Infirmary. } - Statements from the administrators of these facilities reveal that none of them have the capabilities specified in the plans. j l LThe Westchester County Radiological Emergency Response Plans list _three
- facilities as having radiological treatment capabilities. Survey responses i from_these facilities indicate'the"following:
United Hospital, Port Chester. On the 0-10 scale, the emergency
- I
- department Director. rates staff preparedness to- respond to a major radiological _-
disaster as 5. Facility preparedness is rated a 4. The Director states that
- j. the staff has, not received' training in the management of radiation injury or-patient decontamination during the past 5 years.
New Rochelle-Hospital Medical Center. On the 0-10 scale the emergency department Director rates staff preparedness to respond to a major radiological ! disaster as 1.- Facility preparedness'is rated as 4.
- Westchester County Medical Center. Valhalla. This facility is prepared to respond to a radiological di uster. One important problem, however, is a
-lack of storage capacity for proper disposal of water used to decontaminate
, -individuals. An administrator reports that the Medical Center has the capacity p to treat up to 60 patients per hour. t t The Orange County Radiological Emergency Response Plans list two facilities r as having radiological treatment facilities. NYPIRG received a survey response . from one of these and contacted the other by telephone. The facilities and their i p
~
.
- On May 18, 1982, by Resolution No. 320, the Legislature of Rockland County l formally withdrew the County from participation in the "Rockland County Radiological Emergency Response Plan" prepared by consultants for Con Edison L and the Power Authority, operators of Indian Point. The County deemed the Plan unworkable.
- capabilities are as'follows:
i-
-Horton' Memorial Hospital, Middletown. This. hospital has relatively.
good facilities for radiological treatment. The supervisor of emergency medical services reports that the hospital can~ adequately _ care for 10 victims of radiological emergencies. -Facility preparedness is given'an 8 on the 0-10 scale by the. supervisor. . Arden Hill-Hospital, Goshen. An administrator stated that he was unaware
'of the hospital's role in the Radiological Emergency Response Plan. He assumed that his facility would.take non-radiological patients from otherLarea g - hospitals so that :the latter might provide radiological treatment. Arden Hill-Hospital-is capable of providing treatment for only the most local type of.
radiological accident, such as an overturned truck carrying medical isotopes. p f 1 I' CONCLUSIONS Public health facilities and services will have a vital role in any - serious accident at -Indian Point, such as the ones described by Dr. Jan . I,. Beyea in his testimony before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in July-1982. Though'it is still not the worst that could happen, an accident i resulting in a PWR-2 release of radioactive ' substances would subject huge areas to dangerous levels .of radiation, requiring several types of public , health response to minimize the toll in human lives and illness. For 2 example: { --Bedridden, house-bound, and mobility-impaired people will have i to be transported to safety, whether they live at home or in hospitals and other residential institutions.. Yet there are , not enough ambulances and other vehicles'even to transport l; institutionalized patients, and no visible means to meet the need.
--People who are subjected to radioactive fallout will need prompt decontamination. Yet existing facilities equipped to perform j the job properly will accommodate only a very few persons, and
- even these have an inadequate staffing of properly trained workers.
--Irradiated people will need immediate supportive treatment. Yet the area's, hospitals generally lack necessary equipment and appro-priately trained staff, some do not even have agreed-on procedures for treating radiological patients, and often are not even informed that emergency plans assume their cooperation and preparedness.
In these and other respects, the public health facilities and services of the four-county region around Indian Point are woefully and scandalously. unprepared for any radiological emergency involving more than a very few patients. They could not possibly play their expected role in a total evacu-ation of even the 10-mile EPZ. 4 NYPIRO wishes-to make it clear that the deficiencies reported here are not the result of poor administration or incompetent personnel in the insti-
~
tutions surveyed. ;In our _ investigation we found that local public health
- personnel are dedicated, skilled professionals and- volunteers who are com-mitted.to_providing the best care possible for the public.
'The state of ill-preparedness is attributable, rather, to the fact-that' the planners (Con Edison, PASNY, and the State) and the regulators (NRC and FEMA) have approached the problem of emergency preparedness of Indian Point as though it were'merely a matter of putting enough words down on paper to satisfy regulations. They' have yet to confront realistically the inherent
' problems of a radiological disaster at Indian Point, with its dense popula-tion and _ inadequate road network.
We.found public health response capability to be adequate to the task of responding effectively to natural _ disasters (fires, floods, etc.) and to
- some of human origin (e.g. , chemical . spills, transit accidents) -- those involving perhaps dozens of victims. - If a handful of workers at Indian Point were exposed-to radiation'during a limited on-site accident, for example,
_ the region's facilities could probably cope adequately with the situation. But medical and public-health capability. to respond to a major radiological disaster at Indian Point is so poor as to constitute a major and serious- - deficiency of. radiological emergency planning.and preparedness. It is evident that FEMA's evaluation of this deficiency as " minor" could be based only upon ignorance of the true state of affairs, as revealed by the NYPIRG survey'.
- DETAILED RESULTS PART I HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS IN ORANGE, ROCKLAND, PUTNAM, AND WESTCHESTER COUNTIES The New York State Department of Health lists five hospitals in the four.-
counties surrounding Indian Point-having radiological treatment capabilities. In addition, the proposed. Radiological Emergency Response Plan for each county - lists other hospitals having radiological treatment capabilities. In order.to assess the actual abilities of hospitals in the four counties surrounding Indian Point, NYPIRG mailed surveys to the 26 hospitals -in this area having emergency departments. Thirteen facilities (50%) completed and returned our questionnaire. Another eleven facilities were contacted and interviewed by telephone, bringing . the response total to twenty-four (92% response rate) . .Two facilities refused to respond to our surveys or telephone calls. Our results are at variance with what is reported by the State Department of Health and what is presented in the Radiological Emergency Response Plan. l l~ i t l l
,, TABLE I-A' RESPONSES OF 13-HOSPITALS TO NYPIRG QUESTIONNAIRE 1
HOSPITAL' , 4 0 46 4 4
- g St. Agnes, White. Plains 4 no. DK .DK no 1 Westchester County T
Yonkers General 5 yes _yes no yes -7 Westchester County Doctors Sunnyside Hospital 15- no yes yes yes 3 Port Jervis,. Orange County Horton' Memorial, Middletown 10 yes yes some yes 8 Orange County
~ Phelps 11emorial, N. Tarrytown . 8 ' no yes no yes 0
-Westchester County
, New Rochelle Hospital Medical 10 DK yes some yes 4 Center, Westchester County Cornwall Hospital 10 yes yes yes yes - Orange County. s. St. Joseph's. Hospital. 8 DK yes yes. no 2 Yonkers, Westchester County St.-John's Riverside 4 yes yes yes yes 6 Yonkers, Westchester County United Hospital, Port Chester 8 no- DK DK no 4
'Westchester County f-7 Peekskill Community Hospital 9 yes yes yes yes 10 Westchester County St. Francis Hosptial 10 no DK DK no 4 ,
, Port Jervis, Orange County Westchester County Medical Cntr. 60/hr yes yes yes yes - Valhalla DK= don't know <
= no response i
TABLE I-B RESPONSES OF 11 HOSPITALS TO TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS Hospital 485 4 [ +g o Arden Hill Hospital, Goshen 3 no yes no yes Orange County Nyack Hospital 10-50 yes yes yes yes Rockland County
~
Tuxedo Memorial Hospital 3-5 yes yes yes yes Orange County St. Luke's Hospital 8-10 yes yes- yes yes Newburgh, Orange County Putnam Community Hospital 3 no no no .no Carmel, Putnam County Good Samaritan Hospital 5-10' yes yes yes yes Suffern, Rockland County -Julia Butterfield Hospital 3 no yes no no Cold Spring, Putnam County Mt. Vernon Hospital 3 yes yes yes yes Westchester County St. Anthony Community Hosp. 8-10 yes yes yes yes Orange County White Plains Medical Center 5-6 yes yes yes yes Westchester County Northern Westchester Hospital 10 yes no yes yes Mt. Kisco, Westchester County
-TABLE I-C
SUMMARY
OF 24 HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT RESPONSES Does staff of department have training.in the treatment of
' radiation injury and patient decontamination?
YES 14 (58%) NO- 8 (33%) DON'T KNOW 2 (8%) Does department have radiation survey equipment? YES 19(b%) NO 2'(8%)- DON'T KNOW --3 (13%) Does department have protective equipment? YES 16 (67%) NO 6 (25%) DON'T KNOW- 2 (8%) Does department have decontamination facilities? 4 YES 18 (75%) NO 6 (25%) DON'T KNOW 0 Respondent self-evaluation of preparedness to respond effectively to a major radiological emergency (on the 0-10 scale). Eleven responses. 0-2 3 3-4 4 5-6 1 7-8 2 9-10 1
HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTSI
'St. Agnes Hospital White' Plains,0Westchester-County,.is'approximatelyf
> 15 miles from Indian Point. It can . handle 4 major trauma victims at one -
time' in its emergency department. ; One physician staffs the department at l all times with 4_ nurses during the day, 3 on evenings and 1 at night.. None
- has had ~ in-service training' on the management of ionizing radiation injury; the Director reports that 41 physicians and 2 nurses are competent in managing ionizing radiation injury and decontamination procedures.-
There'is a written protocol for decontamination procedures but it has never been practiced. There is also a written protocol for the management of major radiological disaster but it has not been practiced. The Director has no knowledge of the department's role in response to
~
, . ran emergency at Indian Point. -There are:no' decontamination showers or 1 supplies necessary for radiation treatment and decontamination. The Direc-
- tor does not know if there are any radiation survey instruments.
On a scale of 0 to 10, the Director rated facility preparedness as 1. . 'NYPIRG is in agreement with this assessment. Yonkers General Hospital,-Yonkers, Westchester County, is approximately i : 25 miles from -Indian Point. It can treat :2 major trauma victims at one time l~ and has a total capacity of 5 patients in its emergency department. Two physicians staff'the department during the day with 1 physician in the evening and night shifts. There are 4 nurses in the day, 2 in the evening and ILat night._ r l
. The in-service training for staff on the management of radiation injury and patient decontamination consists of one 2-hour lecture held September 2, 1981 and at' tended by.2 physicians, 6 nurses and 8 support. staff. Three physi-cians and 6 nurses are reported competent in treating ' radiation' injury and decontamination procedures.
' Decontamination procedures and radiological disaster plans were practiced i
once on September 4, 1981. Three physicians, 6 nurses and 10 support staff L participated.
' The Director does not know the department's role during a radiological
[- emergency and reports that contaminated patients would probably need to be transferred to another hospital if they had contaminated wounds. The depart- [.
. ment has showers for decontamination procedures but it has no protective -
clothing for workers nor any personnel dosimeters. The department has one [. gamma / beta detector. V The Director rated facility preparedness 7 on the 0 to 10 scale. However, due to the lack of equipment, this is a generous assessment. Doctors Sunnyside Hospital, Port Jervis, Orange County, is approximately 40 miles ' rom Indian Point. It has a total patient capacity of one in its Emergency Department. It was stated that "15 patients have been treated
' during disaster drills."
t I
. - , . . . - . - . - - . - . . - , . . . ~ , ~ , _ , , - . _ . . . , ., . _ - - _ . . , , , . . - - _ . - - -.,-
O e
'One' physician and 1 nurse staff the department at all times. The staff has had no in-service training on the management of radiation injury and patient decontamination.
One physician, 2 nurses and 2 support staff have each had 12 hours of ' Civil Defense training. One X-ray technician has ongoing nuclear medicine l training. ~ 0ne physician and.1 X-ray technician are considered competent in
- radiation treatment and decontamination. Neither decontamination procedures nor radiological disaster. plans have been practiced. The department's role in a response to a radiological emergency is. unknown to the Director.
It is stated that patients with radiation injury would need to be trans-ferred to another hospital. There are no decontamination showers but hosing facilities exist immediately outside the hospital. The department does have protective clothing and personnel dosimeters for the workers. There are 4 gamma / beta survey instruments. On the O to 10 scale, facility preparedness is given a 3 by the Director. NYPIRG concurs with thic assessment. Horton Memorial Hospital. Middletown. Orange County, is approximately 30 miles from Indian Point. It has 1 physician on staff in the Emergency Department at all times with 2 between 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. There are 4 nurses on duty at all times. Radiation injury treatment and decontamination procedures were practiced in May 1979,-September 1980, and March 1982. In addition, 5 Emergency Medical Technicians have had 15 hours of training in radiological monitoring. All physicians, nurses and EMT's are considered competent in radiation treatment ~and decontamination. Decontamination procedures and radiological disaster management were practiced in June 1981 and March 1982.
.The department has decontamination showers with a holding tank and pro-
.tect ive,c lothing for workers. There are no personnel dosimeters. Radiation survey instruments'are available from the Nuclear Medicine Department (2) and from the laboratory (1).
The Director reports that the department could adequately care for.10 . i victims of radiological emergencies and on the 0 to 10 scale rates the facility I preparedness as an 8. NYPIRG would not dispute this rating lf no more than 15 patients require treatment. Greater numbers than this would tax the facility beyond its capacity. Phelps Memorial Hospital, Tarrytown, Westchester County, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. It has a capacity of 8 patients and can treat 3 major trauma patients at one time in its Emergency Department. There is one physician on staff in the Emergency Department at all times with 5 nurses during the day, 4 in the evening and 2 at night. The staff has re:eived no in-service training on the management of radia-tion injury and decontamination. No staff member is considered competent in managing radiation injury and decontamination. Decontamination procedures and radiological disaster plans have never been practiced. The department f 1
- - , . . - - , - . - - _~. ,--. , - - .
l has decontamination showers which ' drain into the' Hudson River. There is no
. protective clothing-or personneldosimeters for the workers. There are 21 radiation survey instruments in the Radiology Department.
On the-O to 10 scale, the Director assesses the facility preparedness at'O. .NYPIRG concurs with this evaluation. (Note: This hospital appears on a New York State Department of Health
~ list of facilities considered able to provide treatment for radiologically
- contaminated individuals.)
New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center, New Rochelle, Westchester County, is approximately 25 miles from Indian Point. It has 8 treatment rooms in its
- ' Emergency Department and 3 holding beds. It can treat-3 patients at one time under-standard operating procedures and 10 patients during disaster drills. -
One physician staffs the department all the time with 2 house staff as back-up. _ There are 4 nurses during the day and evening and 2 during the night. j . The Director did not know if the staff had had in-service training on the management of radiation' injury and _ decontamination. The Director stated during a phone call on June 2, 1982 that there was no one on staff who was - an " expert" on radiation injury and decontamination. Decontamination procedures and radiological disaster plans have never been practiced. The department's role in a response to'a radiological disaster at Indian Point is unknown to the Director. t There is one decontamination shower with no holding tank. The D'irector did not know of any protective clothing for workers. There are 4 personnel
~
l ( dosimeters =and~2 Geigeru/M eller counters available. The Director assesses the facility preparedness as 4 on the 0 to-10 scale. . Due to the absence of training and procedural familiarity as well as any staff competent in the treatment and decontamination of radiation victims, NYPIRG considers this hospital inadequate to the task of responding to a ' major radiological disaster at Indian : Point. (Note: This hospital is listed in the Westchester Radiological Emergency Response Plan as being a facility that is able to treat victims of a radio-logical emergency.) Cornwall Hospital, Cornwall, Orange County, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. It has a total capacity of 10 patients in its Emergency Department. Three major trauma victims can be treated at one time. One physician staffs the department at all times, with 3 nurses during
. the day, 2 in the evening and 1 at night. There is annual in-service train-ing for radiation treatment and injury which involves all staff.
The Director states that the department is " totally prepared to treat 1-3 contaminated patients." He adds "... our competence with a larger amount of patients is unknown." There have been 3 separate drills for radiological disaster response and decontanination of victims. No dates for these drills were given.
Facilities for washing down contaminated patients and holding the water i for later disposal do exist. Protective clothing and dosimeters are avail-able for workers. There are 5 radiation survey instruments. The Director l ended his statement with "My only concern is the number of patients we could
-handle efficiently. Certainly 1 to 3 patients, but more than that I don't know."
It is clear that this department is well equipped and trained to deal with victims of a major radiological disaster if only 3 victims appear at the hospital. NYPIRG accepts the Director's report that above this number, this facility could prove to be inadequate to the task. St. Joseph's Hospital, Yonkers. Westchester County, is approximately 25 miles from Indian Point. It has a total capacity of 8 patients in its
- Emergency Department and can treat 4 major trauma patients at one time.
Three physicians staff the department in the day, 2 in the evening and 1 at night. There are 3 nurses during the day and evening and 2 at night. The Director doesn't know if the staff has had in-service training on radia-tion injury and decontamination, and also' doesn't know any staff that are competent in treating radiation injury and decontaminating patients. The Director doesn't know if decontamination procedures and radiological dis-aster plans have ever been practiced. There are no decontamination showers available and all protective clothing and personnel dosimeters are in the Radiology Department. There is one Geiger /Mueller counter in Radiology. The Director rates the facility's preparedness as 2 on the 0 to 10 scale. In light- of the absence of training and lack of facilities, this evaluation of 2 is somewhat generous. r ' St. John's Riverside Hospital, Yonkers, Westchester County, is approxi-mately 25 miles from Indian Point. It has a total capacity of 4 patients in its Emergency Department. Three major trauma patients can be treated at one time. Two physicians staff the department during the day and evening; there is 1 during the night. There are 3 nurses during the day, 2 in the evening and 1 at night. Three physicians and 2 nurses received 2 hours of training in Radiation Safety Procedures in 1979. Three physicians, 15 nurses, and 5' support staff received 1 hour of training for emergency management of radiation accidents in 1981. One nurse received 7 hours of training on Mass Evacuation Proce-dures with Related Public Health Problems in 1979. Five physicians,10 nurses, and 5 support staff are considered competent in managing radiation injury and decontamination. Decontamination procedures have never been practiced; there is no written protocol for responding to a major radiological disaster. There are two decontamination showers but the holding tauk system is under construction with completion date unknown. Protective clothing and 10 personnel dosimeters are available for workers; there are 2 radiation survey. instruments.
. - - . . . , . . . - . - - _ . . , , - - . . , ,. -r - - - , . , .-- . , , ~ _ . - . . , , . , ,-+,- -
. ']
~
The Director rates facility preparedness.as a 6 on the O to 10 scale.
~
IBecause decontamination procedures have~never been practiced, NYPIRG has _ reservations about rating this department as high as 6.
~
' United Hospital Port Chester, Westchester County, is approximately.
~
25 miles from Indian Point. 'It can treat 8 major trauma . patients at one . time in its Emergency Department. One physician is on duty at all times, with 4_ nurses during the day and evening and 3 at night. The staff his had no in-service training in the management of radiation. injury or decontamination,'but the Director reports that 3 physicians and 4 nurses are competent in this area. Decontamination' procedures and a radio-logical disaster response plan have never been practiced, even though the Director is aware of the hospital's role in the proposed Indian Point: response plan. i . There are no decontamination showers, protective clothing, or personnel i dosimeters for workers and the Director does not know if radiation survey-instruments are available. -Facility preparedness is rated 4 on the O to 10 - scale by the Director. The lack of equipment' and training causes us to object to a rating as high as 4. (Note: This hospital:is listed in the Westchester Radiological Emergency Response Plan as a facility for treatment of radiological disaster victims.) _ . l t Peekskill Community Hospital, Peekskill, Westchester County, is approxi-mately 2 miles from Indian Point. It is one of the best equipped facilities in the area to deal with radiological emergency because of its agreement with the Indian Point utilities to treat radiation victims from onsite at the plants. The utilities have provided personnel and training to assist in t' preparedness over a period of'several years. The staff has training and
. practical experience in the treatment of radiation injury' and decontamination.
t-4 NYPIRG _had difficulty, however, in obtaining this information. The
- _ Emergency-Department Director refused to complete the survey. In fact, he'
_ stated that he threw the survey out upon receipt. Three weeks of persistent phone calls produced a partially-completed survey from the administration, and a phone conversation with an administrator provided information on the hospital's: preparedness. The facility rated itself at 10 on the O to 10 scale. ' for facility _ preparedness. '
- NYPIRG will not question this evaluation, but will only point out that this facility is within 2 miles of Indian Point and would be evacuated in the event of a major radiological disaster.
St. Francis Hospital of Port Jervis, Orange County, is approximately 40 miles from-Indian Point. It has a capacity of 5 beds but could treat 10 i- major trauma patients at one time in its Emergency Department. There is 1
. physician on duty throughout a 24-hour period with 3 nurses during the day, 1 - 2 in the evening and 1 through the night.
t The staff has received no in-service training on the management of radiation injury and patient decontamination although 1 physician and 2 nurses are considered competent in managing radiation injury and decon-tamination.
\
l
.The Emergency Department has no decontamination showers and the Director did not know if there were radiation survey instruments, personnel dosimeters, {
or protective clothing for. workers.- On the O to 10 scale, facility pre- ) paredness to respond to a major radiological emergency was rated 4 by the Director. Westchester County Medical. Center. Valhalla, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. It appears to be the best prepared facility in the area for responding to a major radiological disaster. . An administrator stated a capacity of,30 patients per hour in its Emergency Department, with an
= ability to double this capacity in extreme circumstances.
There are 3 physicians on duty through the 10-hour day shift and 2 physicians on duty,through the 14-hour night shift. There are 4-5 nurses on duty throughout the 24-hour period. It was stated that the staff has received training on the management of 3 radiation injury and patient decontamination. Five physicians and 21 nurses are considered competent in this area. 1 The ~ Emergency Department has radiation survey instruments, personnel dosimeters and protective clothing for the staff. There are decontamination showers, though there_ are no holding tanks for the storage and proper dis-posal of water used to decontaminate individuals. Staff preparedness to manage a major radiological disaster is rated 10 on the 0 to 10 scale. (Note: This facility is listed in' the Westchester County Radiological Emergency Response Plans as a facility for the treatment of radiological
- disaster victims.)
The following hospitals responded to telephone interviews: 1
; Arden Hill Hospital, Coshen, Orange County, is approximately 25 miles from Indian Point. It is prepared to respond only to radiological'emer-gencies of the most local type, e.g., a traffic accident involving a truck carrying medical isotopes, according to an administrator. It was his assump-tion that the hospital would accept non-radiological patients from_other hos-pitals so that those hospitals would be free to. provide radiological treatment.
(Note: This facility appears in the Orange County Radiological Emergency } Response Plan as a hospital providing radiological treatment.) Nyack Hospital. Rockland County, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. It has the staff, training, and equipment to provide treatment to 10 to 50 victims of a radiological disaster, according to the administrator of Radiology. Numbers beyond this would tax the facility's ability to ' i effectively respond. a d (Note: This facility appears on a list from the New York State Depart-ment of Health as a hospital providing radiological treatment.) l _. . . __ ._ _ _ _.. ._ _ _. _ ___ _ .__ _ __ _ _ __- . _ _ _._ . _ -
J Tuxedo Memorial Hospital.' Orange County, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. It.has,a radiological emergency response plan which was de-j veloped in conjunction with the Union Carbide Company in Sterling Forest,
- which maintains 's small nuclear reactor for the production of medical radio- , - isotopes, according to the administrator of the facility. This facility was -reported to be able' to provide effective treatment for 3 to 5 victims of a radiological accident. Numbers beyond this would tax the facility beyond its . capacity to respond effectively.
St. Luke's Hospital. Newburgh. Oranne County, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. It has the staff, training, and equipment to provide
- emergency radiological treatment to 8 to 10 patients, according to the adminis-trator of the X-ray-Department. Numbers exceeding this would tax the facility i . beyond its capacity to respond effectively.
Putnam Community Hospital. Carmel. Putnam County, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. It has no radiological emergency response plan, according to the' Director of Nursing. . An in-house Disaster Committee is presently.in the process of developing such a plan. T,t was stated that any radiological accident victim would be stabilized and transferred to the Westchester County Medical Center in Valhalla. Good Samaritan Hospital. Suffern. Rockland County, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. The Radiation Safety Officer at this facility re-ports that there is a radiological response plan for local emergencies such as highway accidents or problems at the nearby Union Carbide reactor, used
- in the manufacture of medical radioisotopes. This facility could treat 1 acutely injured and contaminated individual until transfer arrangements to another facility could be made. This facility, as reported,-could decon-taminate and treat 5 to 10 patients in less than an acutely serious condition.
(Note: This facility appears on a New York State Department of Health list of. hospitals providing radiological treatment.) i Julia Butterfield Hospital. Cold Spring. Putnam County, is approximately 12 miles from Indian Point. The chief X-ray technician states that this facility has a radiation. survey instrument and personnel dosimeters, but no. one on staff has special training in treatment of radiation injury or decon-tamination procedures. He stated that the Emergency Department has a capacity of 3 major trauma patients. Mt. Vernon Hospital. Westchester County, is appro::imately 25 miles from Indian Point. The Director of Nuclear Medicine states that this facility has the capacity to treat 3 victims of a major radiological accident. Numbers exceeding this would tax the facility beyond its capacity to respond adequately. St. Anthony Community. Warwick. Orange County, is approximately 20 miles from' Indian Point. The administrator of this facility stated that there are usually 8 to 10 beds available at any given time and that this would be the facility's capacity to respond. There is the equipment and the trained staff needed to respond according to his statements. White Plains Medical Center, Westchester County, is approximately 20 miles from Indian Point. According to the Assistant Executive Director, this facility has outside hosing facilities, and some trained staff for responding to a major radiological emergency. It was stated that this hospital has the capacity to treat 5 to 6 victims of a major radiological accident. Northern Westchester !!aspital, Mt. Kisco, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. An administrator from this facility reports that there is an all-purpose disaster plan which is presently in place and operative. There are no radiation survey instruments within the hospital but such instruments are immediately available from a " private source." This "pri-vate source" would also supply personnel dosimeters to augment those already in the Radiology Department. Members of the hospital staff have been trained in the treatment of radiation injury and patient decontamination. The admin-istrator could not quantify the capacity of emergency services, but stated, "If we had 10 major trauma patients, we'd be very busy." Dobbs Ferry Hospital Westchester County, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. An administrator from this facility refused to respond to our survey or inquiries. Keller Army Hospital, West Point Military Academy, is approximately 15 miles from Indian Point. NYPIRG was unable to obtain a response from this facility.
4 PART II EVACUATION / RELOCATION PLANS FOR'THE RESIDENTIAL HEALTH-CARE FACILITIES WIDIIN THE TEN-MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE All hospitals and extended care facilities within the ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone have been given a plan.for the evacuation and relocation of their patients in the event of a radiological emergency at Indian Point, as outlined in the Radiological Emergency Response Plan for each county. Questionnaires were sent to the 36 facilities that were listed in the proposed Radiological Emergency Response Plans to ascertain their ability to evacuate and relocate their. patients. Of 36 questionnaires mailed out, 13 (36%) were returned and one site visit was made. Telephone surveys were conducted for 18 additional facilities. These provided less extensive _information than the returned questionnaires, but are_useful for evaluation nonetheless. These additional responses brought-the total responses to 32 (88% response rate) .
i TABLE II-A RESPONSES TO NYPIRC QUESTIONNAIRE FROM 13 RESIDENTIAL' HEALTH-CARE FACILITIES WITHIN THE 10-MILE EMERCENCY PLANNING ZONE 0% Facility
%g 9 o 4* b'b
- Marrs Extended Care Facility- 120 0 yes no' 0 Mohegan Lake, Westchester. County Laurel Manor Adult Home .
35 16 yes no 9 Spring Valley, Rockland County Briar Crest Nursing Home 86 5 yes no 0 Ossining, Westchester County Tolstoy Foundation Nursing Home 96 4 yes no - Company, Inc. Valley Cottage, Rockland County Westledge Extended Care Center 100 0 yes no 'O Peekskill, Westchester County Garnerville Home 37 22 no no - Rockland County Cedar Manor Extended Nursing Care 153 4 no no - Ossining, Westchester County Julia Butterfield Hospital 36 0 no no - Cold Spring, Putnam County. Bethel Methodist Home 190 14 yes no 0 Ossining, Westchester County l Danish Home for the Aged 24 24 yes yes 10 Croton, Westchester County The Country House in Westchester 90 19 yes no 1-9* Yorktown Heights, Westchester Co-. Maryknoll Sisters Nursing Home 56 5 yes no 5 Maryknoll, Westchester County Victoria Home 35 0 yes no 4 Ossining, Westchester County i
- respondent rated the plan 1 "without improved advance warning" and 9 "with improved advanced warning."
TABLE II-B RESPONSES TO NYPIRC TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS FROM 19 RESIDENTIAL HEALTH-CARE FACILITIES WITHIN THE 10-MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE-P o e Facility q#gece # 4 gb b* # g*f , Mohegan Manor Home.for Adults 150 -30 no no O Mohegan Lake,' Westchester County Falkirk Hospital 60 ' - no 'no - Central. Valley, Orange County Friedwald House 180 - -- no 0 New City -Rockland County Nyack Manor Nursing Home 160 - yes no 6 Valley Cottage, Rockland County Venture Nerth 14 14 'no yes - Thiells, Rockland County Greer-Woodycrest Children's Service' 89' 89 yes yes - Pomona, Rockland County Rockland County Infirmary / Summit 460 - yes no O Park Hospital, Pomona, Rockland Co. . Green Hill Horae for Adults 155 0 yes no - Haverstraw, Rockland County Brandywine Nursing Home 120 8~ ye's no -
.Briarcliff Manor, Westchester County Riverside Nursing home 100
- yes * -
Haverstraw, Rockland County Sleepy Hollow Nursing Home 33 0 yes no - Briarcliff Manor, Westchester. County
- facility presently relying on staff to use their own cars for evacuation of patients
= no information given
. , . . . _ . . . . - , . - _ , ~ . . _ - - _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . - _ . - - . _ - _ - - _ . __
TABLE II-B -- Continued Facility c,* , Asthmatic Children's Foundation 36 36 yes -yes - Ossining, Westchester County Cortlandt Nursing Care Center 120 - yes no - Peekskill, Westchester County Stony Lodge Hospital 61 61 yes yes - Ossining, Westchester County St. Christopher's Inn 135 20 no no - Graymoor, Putnam County New Hope Manor 45 45 no yes - Graymoor, Putnam County Mother Lurana Home 25 0 no no - 4 Graymoor, Putnam County FDR Veterans Administration Hospital 1200 - no no - Montrose,-Westchester County Letchworth Village Developmental Center 1900 814 yes no - Theills, Rockland County
- = no information given f
- , , , -, ., v - --,.. ---,--m.,, - - - - - - , n, , . , . . . - - , , . , ,- -
..g, . - --- --,,,- , - - -
*~
TABLE II-C
SUMMARY
OF RESPONSES FROM 32 RESIDENTIAL HEALTH-CARE FACILITIES WITHIN THE 10-MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE Total number of reported patients needing evacuation / relocation 6,101 Total reported capacity of facilities' vehicles 1,230 (20% of total) Does facility have an evacuation / relocation plan? YES 21 (65%) NO 11 (34%) Does facility have the necessary transportation for evacuation? YES 6 (18%) NO 26 (82%) Number of facilities requiring additional transport vehicles for evacuation 26 (82%) Number of facilities with additional transport guaranteed 0 Respondents' self-evaluation of preparedness to evacuate and relocate in the event of a radiological emergency (on the 0-10 scale). Ten responses. 0-2 6 I 3-4 1 5-6 1 7-8 0 9-10 2 l \ l l
m , T .g ' SELF-DESCRIPTIONS OF RESIDENTIAL HEAL'lWCARE FACILITIES 2 se WITHIN THE TEN-MILE EPZ
.0 i
~ Marrs Extended Care Facility, Mohegan Lake, Westchester County. This-facility has a total of 120 patients; .5.are ambulatory, 85 require wheelchairs, and 30 require stretchers. The facility hasLa plan for,the relocation of the .
' patients in _the event of;a radiological emergency. According to .this plan,; all patients _will be_taken to the Loving Hills Care Center in Pawling, New York, !
-with whon'the facility has a. written agreement.
, ' All staff members on duty _ at _the time are designated to, remain and direct-the relocation. , If an insufficient number-of staff members remain, the facil- ;
- ity has no alternate staffing plan. No arrangements have been'made for the i
transportation of the patients _ to the Loving Hills Care _ Center.' The facility owns no vehicles. 'It-is the respondent's' understanding'that.the' state will'
- i. : provide the vehicles.
t On the 0-10 scale, the respondent rates'the adequacy of this plan for
~the relocation ~as 0.
' Laurel Manor Adult Home, Spring Valley,' Rockland County. .This facility
- hasLa_ total of 35 patients, all of whom are ambulatory.. The facility's re-i location plan provides that the patients be - . ken to Nyack Hospital, Good'
- Samaritan Hospital in Suffern, New Ycrk, and Rockland State Center, with.whom ~ ;
the facility has an oral agreement, j i . . L Five staff members are designated to remain and direct.the relocation. If an insufficient number of staff remain, the facility has no La1 ternate ' staffing plan. . Arrangements have been made for transportation of patients . f to the receiving facilities. In addition to the three vehicles owned by the ' i- facility, which have a total patient capacity of 16, four other vehicles
- will be utilized. These additional vehicles are a bus provided by Harran, a ,
i mini-bus provided by Pomona, a paramedics vehicle provided by Mohawk,.and an ambulance _provided by Spring Valley.- The facility does not have written agreements.with the providers and doesn't know who will pay for the transport- , ation. 1.
~
On the 0-10 scale, the respondent rates the adequacy of this plan as_9. , Based on the other responses in the survey, the plan is inadequate and does 4 not merit this high rating. Also, the responses contradict what is stated in ; the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for Rockland County. Accord- ;
; ing to the'RERP, the patients from this facility are to be taken to the Elmwood '
- ; Park. Memorial School in New Jersey. Clarkstown Minibus has been designated in the RERP. to provide one mini-bus to transport the patients to the school. The obvious lack of communication which caused this discrepancy is a serious prob-
. lem. Briar Crest Nursing Home, Ossining, Westchester. This facility has a total p of 86 patients; 10 are ambulatory and 76 require wheelchairs. The respondent states that the facility has a plan for the relocation of the patients in the .P event of 'an emergency resulting from a radiological release at Indian Point. According to this plan, the patients will be taken to Phelps Memorial Hospital , p in Tarrytown and Tarry Hall Nursing Home, with whom the facility has a written agreement. t 3 31-J
-.-e-ye.M,A,,..--ew.g ,-w.* .,w,- ,aem,-<.y.,.-y-w-.,vo-ee,,e-m.. ,,,%,.,ye e. m r. , % - .,ec.,.,, -..,.-y,,--y,r, ._ m w e w 3- ,. v- 9 v i--m en .c g c t --=m-e y
s. Fifteen staff members are designated to remain and direct the relocation. If an insufficient number of staff members remain, there is a list of employees to call in the Adminstrative Secretary's office. Arrangements have been made for transportation of patients to the receiving facilities. In addition to the one vehicle owned by the facility, which has a_ total patient capacity of five, an unknown number of ambulances will be provided by the 0ssining Volunteer Ambulance Corps. The facility does not have a written agreement and states that the Corps will provide the transportation at no cost. On the 0-10 scale, the respondent rates the adequacy of this plan as 0. Tolstoy Foundation Nursing Home Company, Inc. , Valley Cottage, Rockland County. This facility.has a total of 96 patients; 22 are ambulatory, 68 require wheelchairs, and 6 require stretchers. According to the facility's. relocation plan, the patients will be taken to Nyack Hospital and Elmwood Manor Nursing Home in Nanuet, New York, with whom the facility has written agreements. Eight staff members are designated to remain and direct the relocation. If an insufficient number of staff members remain, the facility has no alter-nate staffing plan. The respondent did not know if arrangements have been made for the transportation of patients to the receiving facility. The facility owns only one vehicle which can transport four patients. The respondent did not rate the adequacy of this plan but it is obviously inadequate to the task. Also, this plan contradicts the RERP for Rockland County. According to the RERP, the patients from this facility are to be taken to the Elmwood Park Memorial School. The obvious lack of communication which caused this discrepancy is of major concern. Westledge Extended Care Center, Peekskill, Westchester County. This facility has a total of 100 patients; 16 are ambulatory, 66 require wheelchairs, and 18 require stretchers. According to the relocation plan, the patients will be taken to Northern Westchester Hospital, Salem Hills . Health-related Facility in Purdys, and Kent Nursing Home in Luddingtonville, with whom the facility has written agreements. As alternate arrangements, 58 patients would be taken to a holding center for a short time. The respondent does not know how many staff members are designated to remain and direct the relocation. No arrangements have been made for the trans-portation of patients to the receiving facility. The facility owns no vehicles and would need an auto or mini-bus, ambulettes, and 9 ambulances to transport its patients. On the 0-10 scale, the respondent rates the adequacy of this plan for the relocation of patients as 0. Carnerville Home, Carnerville, Rockland County. This facility has a total of 37 patients, all of whom are ambulatory. The facility owns three vehicles with a total capacity of 22. The facility has no plan for the relocation of patients in a radiological emergency.
,,. , , ,. .. - , , r a pT ryl-e Cedar Manor Extended Nursing Care Center, Ossining, Westchester County.
This f acility has a total of 153 patients; about half are ambulatory, 42 require wheelchairs, and 26 require stretchers. There is said to be njl plan for the emergency relocation of patients in the event of a radiological emergency. Contradicting this response, it is stated that patients would be taken to Phelps Memorial Hospital, Tarrytown Hall and Tibetts in White Plains, with which the facility has a written agreement. No staff members are designated to remain and direct the relocation. The respondent didn't know if arrangements have been made for the transportation of patients to the receiving facilitJes. The facility owns one vehicle with a capacity of 4 patients. The respondent stated chat " transportation and other arrangements were by directive of New York State Department of Health arranged by another agency." Julia Butterf ield Memorial Hospital, Cold Spring, Putnam County. This facility has a tott1 of 36 patients, and has no, plan for their relocation in the event of a majc radiological release from the Indian Point reactors. The Bethel Metlodist Home, Ossining, Westchester County. This facility has a total of 190 satients. The facility's relocation plan provides that patients will be ta<en to the following places: Phelps Memorial Hospital, North Tarrytown; Miriam Osborne Home, Rye; Methodist Church Home, Bronx and Brooklyn, NY. The facility has a written agreement with these places. Those staff members on duty during the shift are designated to remain and direct the relocation. The facility can provide immediate transportation for 14 of the 190 patients. No arrangements have been made for other vehicles to transport patients to relocation centers. Local families will be asked to take their own f amily member. On the 0-10 scale, adequacy of the relocation plan was given a 0 by the respondent. Danish Home for the Aged, Inc. , Croton, Westchester County. This facility has a total of 24 patients, of which only one is presently wheelchair-bound. In the facility's plan, patients will be relocated to the Westchester County Center in White Plains, which has a written agreement with the facility. This facility has an adequate number of vehicles to relocate all patients in one trip. On the 0-10 scale, the adequacy of the relocation plan is rated as 10 by the respondent. The Country House in Westchester, Yorktown Heights, Westchester County. This facility has 100 beds and averages 90 patients in residence. The vehicles owned by this facility have a capacity of 19. The respondent states that Parsons Brinkerhoff (the consulting firm that drafted the emergency response plans) had informed the facility that patients would be relocated to the Westchester County Center in White Plains, NY. There was no written agreement bot this plan was reported to be listed on a computer printout. The respondent stated that Parsons Brinkerhoff had advised the facility that buses will be available for transport. There is no written agreement
g4 l' between this facility.and any providers of transportation. Some patients
; have family in the immediate area and could be relocated by them.
'V On'the 0-10 scale for relocation adequacy, a 1 is given by the respondent "without improved advance warning"..and a _9 is given "with improved . advance warning." Maryknoll Sisters Nursing Home, Maryknoll Westchester County. .This facility averages 56 patients at one time, with approximately 40% ambulatory and 60% non-ambulatory. The facility owns one vehicle with a capacity of five patients. The relocation plan would send patients to Phelps Memorial Hospital ~in North Tarrytown, Westchester Cdunty Medical Center in White Plains, i and St._Josephts Medical-Center.in Yonkers, New York. -There is a written i agreement with these-facilities.
. No arrangement for the transportation of patients to these facilities has F
been made. On the 0-10 scale for relocation adequacy, the plan is rated 5 by the respondent. Given the lack of planned transportation, this is a very. j generous evaluation. Victoria Home, Ossining, Westchester County.- This facility averages 35 patients in residence. There is a written agreement with the Methodist Church Home in the Bronx, New York, to provide a place Zur. relocation in the , event:of a' radiological emergency. This facility has no vehicles of its own to provide transport for relocation. The respondent rated the adequacy of the
~
relocation plan 4 on the 0-10 scale, perhaps a bit too.high for a relocation plan with no secure transport. The following responses were received through telephone interviews:
- Mohegan Manor Home for Adults, Mohegan Lake, Westchester County. This i facility has 150 residents, all of whom are ambulatory. Three vans for trans-port are owned by the facility and it was reported that three buses have been promised by state representatives. The administrator attended one meeting on this issue but was never contacted afterward. There is no knowledge of the direct providers of the promised buses, or of where patients will be relocated in a radiological emergency. Relocation adequacy was given a 0 on the 0-10 scale by the administrator.
Falkirk Hospital, Central Valley, Orange County. This facility has 60 patients, all of whom are ambulatory. An administrator states that the facility has no plan for the evacuation and relocation of its patients in the event of a radiological emergency. Friedwald House, New City, Rockland County. This facility has 180 patients, both ambulatory and wheelchair-bound. The administrator states that the facility would need to have transportation provided and assumes that the state would provide it. There is no agreement with a receiving facility. a Ny ck Manor Nursing Horm, Valley Cott*gn, Rocklrnd County. This facility has 160 patients, with approximately 30% being ambulatory. The facility does have relocation plans; its patients will go to Rockland Residence, Brookhaven, and Nyack Hospital. It was reported that transportation for the relocation would have to be provided. Sources are as yet unknown. Venture North, Thiells, Rockland County. This facility has 14 ambulatory patients. An adequate number of vehicles is owned for the evacuation of patients but a facility for relocation is presently unknown. Creer-Woodycrest Children's Service, Pomona, Rockland County. This facility has 89 ambulatory patients. The facility has.a plan for the evacuation and relocation of patients, and an adequate number of vehicles to do so. Rockland County Infirmary, Pomona, Rockland County. This facility has 400 patients in the infirmary and 60 patients in the adjoining Summit Park Hospital. An administrator stated that transportation for the relocation of patients would be provided by the state in a manner that was not known to him. He stated that there are agreements with seven facilities that would receive the relocated patients although they could not be identified at the time of the phone call. Relocation adequacy was rated 0 on the 0-10 scale by the admin-istrator. Green Hill Home for Adults, Haverstraw, Rockland County. This facility has 155 patients, all of whom are ambulatory. There is a relocation plan for this facility -- patients will go to Rockland Psychiatric Center. However, there is only an oral agreement. Furthermore, this facility does not own vehicles to transport its patients and does not know how transportation will be pravided. Brandywine Nursing Home, Briarcliff Manor, Westchester County. This facility has 120 patients, including both wheelchair-bound and ambulatory patients. It owns only one station wagon for the relocation of its patients and is consequently dependent upon New York State for the provision of trans-portation. It was not stated how the necessary transport would be provided. There is an agreement with a receiving facility (unspecified). Sleepy Hollow Nursing Home, Haverstraw, Westchester County. This facility has 100 patients; 30% are ambulatory, the remainder require wheelchairs. In the event of a radiological emergency, patients would go to Nyack Hospital and two other nursing homes. There are written agreements with each facility. The facility owns no vehicles, however, and is presently relying on cars owned by the staff to evacuate and relocate its patients. Asthmatic Children's Foundation Residential Treatment Center, Ossining, Westchester Co unty. This facility has 36 patients. The administrator of the facility states that patients will relocate to Blythedale Children's Hospital in Valhalla in the event of a radiological emergency. There is a written agreement for this plan. The facility has the vehicles needed to implement the evacuation plan which is considered totally adequate by the administrator. Cortlandt Nursing Care Center, Peekskill, Westchester County. This facility has 120 patients. There is written agreement for relocation of patients in the event of a radiological emergency. However, the facility does not have the required transport vehicles to implement this plan. The admin-istrator stated that transportation was promised to them by government officials. Without the promised transport, the plan is considered totally inadequate.
e St. : Christopher's Inn, Graymoor. Putnam County. ;This;facilityfprovides-temporary housing for homeless men. : At. any one: time there are 120-150.res-idents.. There are vehicles to relocate'20 residents. The administrator stated that there is no' evacuation / relocation plan for a radiological emergency and that-the facility has not been contacted by any officials since the March, 1982, drill of.the proposed:-Radiological Emergency Response. Plan. New Hope Manor, Graymoor, -Putnam County. This facility'provides resident-
~
ial rehabilitation to approximately 45 substance-dependent females. .The-facil-
-ity owns the vehicles necessary to relocate its clients, but the administrator does not know where the clients would go.. The facility has no-present. evac- .uation/ relocation plan in the event of a major radiological emergency.
Mother Lurana Home, Craymoor,' Putnam County. . This facility provides residential nursing care to 20-25 females. ._It has neither an evacuation /' relocation plan.in the event of a radiological emergency nor the vehicles to implement such a plan. FDR Veterans Administration Hospital, Montrose, Westchester County. This facility provides residential care to 1200 physically and mentally handicapped - Veterans.- The administration and the chief. safety engineer are unaware of any evacuation / relocation plan in the event of a radiological emergency. Letchworth Developmental Village,- Thiells, Rockland County. At the present time, the administration is in the process of developing its evacuation /reloca-tion plans. . An initial draf t has been submitted to an overseeing department within 'the State Department of Mental Health. The plan that was submitted calls for the' acquisition of vehicles from other state mental health institutions in the area. A spokesperson from ths facility refused to_ identify which institutions [- will be providing the additional vehicles or what distances the vehicles will l have to travel. She stated that approval of the plan must first be given by l' the state and further revisions may be required. No estimate of the time involved in this process was given. At the present time, this facility has the capacity to transport 814 (43%) of its 1900 patients. The evacuation and relocation of the patients of L'etchworth Village Developmental Center would be a logistical nightmare. This facility cares for only the most severely; mentally and physically handicapped individuals. It has a large clientele, 1900, which makes it the largest institution of its kind in the United States. There are many residential buildings covering an expansive l- area. These factors render it impossible .to evacuate and relocate in any reasonable length of time in the event of a radiological emergency.
.o
*D PART III
~ AMBULANCE SERVICES IN THE FOUR COUNTIES SURROUNDING INDIAN POINT The proposed Radiological Emergency Response Plans call for ambulance services to be mobilized to evacuate residents of hospitals, nursing homes, and others needing specialized transport for evacuation from within the ten-mile radius EPZ. Ambulances will no doubt also be used for the transport of the injured of a radiological disaster.
We surveyed the 96 ambulance services in Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester Counties to assess their ability to respond to a radiological disaster. We received 15 responses (16% of the total) to our questionnaire, a small number renderci significant by the fact that no respondent could be considered prepared to respond to a radiological emergency. For a complete listing of results, refer to Tables III-A and III-B.
TABLE III-A' RESPONSES OF 15 AMBULANCE SERVICES IN ORANGE, PUTNAM, ROCKLAND,'AND WESTCHESTER COUNTIES . 944 4 Ambulance Service g+ g g
* + 4 b o 4 *6 N 5 4
Mohegan Vol. Fire Ass'n. Emergency 60 16 2 no no 0 0 0 Rescue and First Aid Squad Mohegan, Westchester County Unidentified respondent
- 45 37 2 no no 0 15 1 Westchester County Horton Hospital Ambulance Service 16 16 3 yes no 3 16 4 Middletown, Orange County Hudson Valley Ambulance Service 45 17 12 no no 0 24 0 Haverstraw, Rockland County Irvington Volunteer Ambulance 24 11 2 no no 0 6 2 Corps (VAC) Westchester County Ossining VAC 74 54 2 no no 0 5 0
.Westchester County Peekskill Community VAC 40 35 4 no no 4 6 0 Westchester County Carmel VAC 30 30 1 no no o DK 0 Putnam County North Salem VAC 33 17 1- yes no -0 10 1 Westchester County Eastchester VAC 34 16 2 no yes 5 8 5 Westchester County
- questionnaire returned in envelope postmarked "Mt. Vernon" DK = don't know
o TABLE III-A -- Continued 4 et
.g
- s* p* %*
Ambulance Service Elmsford Fire Department 20 g
/ e 7
1 g /[ # di:8 no qP no 0 J 4, g DK 40 4 b 0'.4+* Westchester County Lewisboro VAC 28 18 1 no no 0 DK 0
.Westchester County Town of Harrison Police Dept. -
0 2 no no 0 all 0 Westchester County Carrison VAC 40 18 1 DK no DK - - Putnam County North Tarrytown VAC 33 10 1 'no' no 0 10 0 DK = don't know
- .= no information given I
v TABLE III-B
SUMMARY
OF RESPONSES FROM 15 AMBULANCE SERVICES Total number of active members: 522 Total number of Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT): 312 Total number of Ambulances: 37 Ambulance Services whose members have received training in radiation injury treatment and decontamination: 2 (13%) Ambulance Servic'es with radiation detection equipment: 1 (7%) Ambulance Services with written protocols (plans) for responding to a radiological emergency: 0 Ambulance Services aware of their role in the Indian Point. Emergency Response Plan: 0 Total number of ambulance service members who are considered competent in managing radiation injuries and decontamination: 12 (2% of total) Total number of reported ambulance service members who would' respond in the event of a radiological disaster (in the judgement of service leader): 100 (19% of total) Self-evaluation of preparedness to respond to a j radiological disaster (on the 0-10 scale). Fourteen responses.- l 0-2 11 (73%) I 3-4 2 (13%) 5-6 1 (6%) 7-8 0 l 9-10 0 t l t
L [ <. . ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT' AMBULANCE SERVICES Emeraancy Rescue and First Aid Squad, Mohenan Volunteer-Fire Association, Inc., Mohegan Lake, Westchester County. . The Ambulance Service states that it would ' transport victims to Peekskill. Community Hospital.- In the event of a 4 radiological ~ release, this hospital is to be' evacuated. Horton Memorial Hospital Ambulance Service,- Middleton, Oranne County. All116 members have had-some training relevant to the emergency response to 3 ionizing radiation; injury and/or decontamination procedures: two hours of l ENT/AEMT courses and one hour.of in-service training in -1981. . Two radiological. j - monitoring courses were attended by one person each and a . radiological monitor-l ing'and instructor . training course was; attended'by one person. . They'hava
-practiced decontamination procedures, with 20 people participating in 1982.
1 The respondent believed this plan to. be feasible at this time. They have been
-notified by the Civil Defense in Orange County that they are to aid in the
, treatment.. transport, and evacuation as directed by the Civil Defense. I - i They have from 20-50 of the essential items needed to. provide emergency care to radiation victims. (protective gloves, gowns,' masks, shoe coverings and 3 head covering, and blankets) but no personnel dosimeters or bags marked as radiological waste containers.' They also have no radiation survey instruments. j- All 16 members would respond to an emergency resulting from a radiological release' at Indian Point because,- according to the respondent, they are a paid' j Ambulance Service, subject to mandatory recall. l Although this is the only Ambulance Service returning the survey from which any of the members have had any relevant training and had practiced any . . procedures, only three members are competent in the evaluation and treatment of radiation injury. 1 Peekskill Community Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Peekskill, Westchester l Coun ty. The captain stated that the Corps was asked to participate in Con Edison's disaster drill .onRMarch 3,1982, and that two members were asked to ger I.D.'s for the drill. In relation to the drill, four of them attended a l "very basic briefing" at the Henry Hudson High School, and the Corps' head-l ' quarters was called on the morning of the drill and told to be on alert. They
- - were not contacted again. The headquarters remained on alert until the Verplanck Fire Department was called to report that the drill had ended.
l The captain stated that from 1-6 members would respond to an emergency i - resulting from a radiologica'l release at the Indian Point reactors. "Most [ members, not knowing the basics of radiation, would head in the opposite ). direction for safety," according to the captain. It was also pointed out that victims would be transported to Peekskill Community Hospital, which, in the event of a radiological emergency, would be evacuated. North Salem Volunteer Ambulance Corps, North Salem. Westchester County. Eighteen members participated in a two-hour Civil Defense presentation on l radiation in December,1981; seventeen participated in a drill in January,1982. l Elmsford Fire Department, Westchester County. There are no radiation , l' survey-instruments and, aside from blankets and four personnel dosimeters, the ( , department lacks all essential equipment needed to provide emergency care to ' radiation victims. The Chief said that he was unable to determine which 6 l members would respond in the case of a radiological emergency resulting from
- - an accident at Indian Point. All in all, his rating of 4 on the preparedness scale may be a bit generous.
i ~, _ _ , , _ . ~ . _ _ _ . . . _ , _ . _ _ . - . . _ _ , . . . _ . _ , - . . . ,.. _ . - .., .. ,_ -. _ ,._ _ _.~ - _ _ .-.--,-..,_
e Carrison Volunteer habulance Corps. Putnam County. - The respondent reported that during a radiological emergency, the ambulance corps would.take patients to-Peekskill Community Hospital. . In the event of a major radiological emergency,
~
however, this hospital would be evacuated as a result of its proximity to Indian Poin t . R
-BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES USED IN SURVEY DEVELOPMENT 4
Galvin, Joseph: " Hospital Makes Itself Center for Treatment of-Radiation Victims," Journal of the American Hospital Association. May, 1, 1979, pp. 33-37. Maxwell,'. Christopher: . " Hospital . Organizational Response ' to the Nuclear i Accident at Three Mile Island: Implications for Future-Oriented Disaster Planning," American Journal of Public' Health. 72:275-279 (March,.1982). MacLeod, Gordon: "A Role for Public Health in the Nuclear Age," American Journal of Public Health. 72:237-239 (March, 1982). MacLeod, Gordon: "Some Public Health Lessons from Three Mile Island: .A Case Study in Chaos," AMBIO,' a Journal of-the Human Environment. (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences); 10:18-23 (1981). Richter, Linda L.,,et. al.: "A Systems Approach to the Management of Radiological Accidents," Annals of Emergency Medicine. 9:303-309 (June,1980). Richter, Linda L., et. al.: "Immediate Care of Patients After a . Radiation Accident," EMT Journal. 4:21-25 (December, 1980). Smith, J. Stanley, and Fisher, James H.: "Three Mile Island--The Silent Disaster," Journal of the American Medical Association. 245:1656-59 (April 24, 1981). l l 1 l l . - - - . . _ - , - , .. - - . . , - . ~ . - . . - , . - - - , . - - - - ~ -
l l READY OR NOT: Public Preparedness for an : Accident at Indian Point , l N
$W l e Garrison l Highland ,Qj/PUTNAM l
Falls L h E,S,TER l '
'- 6 Pee
/ pp ~kskill
'll Buchanan
$,'ff . . i o/
f Stony *
. Point I-H OCKLAND l New
- OII" l
A SURVEY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY RESIDENTS LIVING WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE
- INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.
l by Richard J. Altschuler with an introduction by Joan Holt l NEW YORK publIC INTEREST RESEARChi CENTER,INC. ( one %. e 8 . soue. e.oo. u., n. u e... ou o.. si e i.i.ao. syr.co . uit. j
? g: 7m ;; l c
_ sg,Qg 3l: ,
*QM 3_[ p-'Aff . x
+7 ~_ &; ,
- n ,m, .
f
%%- ',M ':;q ' ,-V '
- y '
4.
!Q ;, "
j M'l '(y .. 23 p ' ' I .j 7- '
. ' 4[ .* 9 ^.. h-(.' ,
[ < un ' . e:; Q ],, l brh,-={L g .g y,,
+
,_ ;3 ' ' ,
%j,,n ~w
,9
,l f,l1K :lp,m ; .i f L s kJ f: N '
vg;;. m ,y. . ~
; ~ ~
./, ,
73 . . - :x :3 , c n ; , y
~ s, , h. ,, . - , %_
om. m:g.. .
, , . . y.; , , _.-_ , . _. _
M4 7BelNew York ~ Pnh1ic' Interest Research Grog,iInc.DOiYPIMLis aLnot-for-profit;
~.
,d 0Af , ' Vi T nwtisan swtid research by NewiYork and-advocacy State collegeiand organization university esnh14 ahedn directed, landL (students.jNYPIM's staff._ l f5 ' Ny; of; lawyers,. researchers,Vand ceganizers works;with students in Albany,
' 4 c
e , Binghamton,i ~ Brooklynf mfYmin, .Iong Island,:-Manhattan, New Paltz,1 Queens,z 5Staten Island,iSyracuse:and~Utica. iStaff and: students.; work atLlearning' y- < ' - 9 c,'* ' citizenship skills'andinhanimy pnblin policy. , @nsunar protection",; energy,, ' _fiacal f responsibility /. politinal; reform and social l justice are NYPIIWs ' f o
. principal; areas ~of concern. .
? - . . . . ~ . - . J .. ., e
..Se New York Public Interest Research: center,' Inc.6(NYPIRC)fis 'a' non-profit - h
.e raaanrch organization working to develop citizer.shipiskillslin areas;of(con-sumergvis:d. ion, energy,; health,;the enviroment, government'and: corporate'- .
_ ' accountability, and economic and annlal justice. '
~
NYPIM, the state's : largest consumer advocay organization, estahlinhed the . . j[ Indian Point Project in the fallCof 1979 to monitor ~ safety conditions at.the n Indian Point rnv lear' reactors in Buchanan,1New Yorks 24 miles' north of New ~'
$MW
~~
, yYork City.' v .
~
***- *** ~ ***. ***, #1a Richard Altschuler, born August 5, 1942,Lis a sociologist, statistician,n 4 .
teacher,iwriter and editor.. He has taught at ihmple University,1New York lw ' University and. Queens 1 College, and was chief.; data analyst-~and co-author - 1(with Prof. S.M. Miller): of Be' Prospects for the' Mani=1 Services," a study - t9 F' for the U.S7Dep=. Lucid. of Health,. Education and, Welfare. Since 1974,1he - . i
- has baarlarl Statistics Made Sinplest and Statistics for Business,- supplying n research and consultation' services to many organizations and individuals.
He is' also the ~co-author of Open Reality (Putnam,il974) and IC:' An Introductory Exposition of Infinite Capitalian .(Little Brown,11972) . : Mr. Altschuler' g is currently writing Sociology, a college textbook, .to be published next ' j+,' year by Harcourt: Brace Jovanovich.' , i. [< s-h o t c A" For further information or aMitional copies of this publication ($2.00) write: l NYPII ' Publications, 9 Murray Street, New Yorki NY 10007
- c 1982 by the New York Public Interest Pesearch Group, Inc. (NYPIM) and -
the New York Public Interest Research Center, Inc. (NYPIRC) . e f y 4 p iw, y +-. m o r -,i . , , - , , , - -,, , . . . , , .mc. -, , , , , . - , . . - . - . - . ---m - , ,
^s TABLE T CINIDFTS PAGE Introduction by Joan Holt 1
~ Sumary of Principal Findings 4 Detailed Results: 'Ihe Questions and Responses 6 Appendices: A. Methodology 18 j B. Description of the Suple 19 C. Questionnaire 21 ii -
. . - . - . - , . .. . .---., __.. . ._. . ~ . ~ - - , ..-..-4 _ . _ , - . .- - . . _ , . _ - - - - - . -
INTRODUCTION ! t When the Nuclear Regulatory camissim (NBC) appointed an Atmic - l Safety and Licensing Board to hold fact-finding hearings on the safety i of the nuclear plants generating electricity in Buchanan, New York, NYPIRG
~ fonned a loose working paae.aip with the thian of concerned Scientists i (UCS), and both were accepted as intervenors in Deomber 1981. During the i l next few months, representatives of UCS and NYPIRG laid plans and framed a series of contations - the major points we hoped to establish with the help of expert witnesses - backing up our position that the two nuclear 1 i
plants -(operated by Con Edison and the Power Authority of the State of ;
.New York) should not be allowed to operate in the heart of a thickly ,
populated area 35 miles fran New York City. The initial and major thrust I of _the UCS/NYPIRG case is a detailed and many-sided demonstration that , the emergency plans drawn up by the utilities' consultants for the four cotmties nearest the plants could not work. An essential part of those plans was a 20-page booklet, " Indian Point, ; Emergency Planning, and You," which was prepared by the licensees and i i distributed early in 1982. By this device the utilities intended to supply ' vitally inportant information to everyone within _the 10-mile " Eire _1.yancy Planning Zone" (EPZ), the arbitrarily cut-off area around the plants tar-geted for emergency planning by the NRC and the Bederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) . Only by reading and remenbering the information in this
- booklet could citizens find cat (1) how they would be notified in case of a serious accident at Indian Point, (2) what they were supposed to do and
- not do, (3) how to get further information, (4) by what routes they were supposed to leave in case an evacuation should be ordered, -(5) where they would be able to find their diildren if an accident occurred during school hours, and (6) where they were expected to go and for how long. The
- ten-mile circle was divided into 46 planning areas and a special edition
'. of the booklet containing area-specific maps and instructions was prepared I for.each one that is inhabited. A very important addendum was a apeial
- . postcard to be _ returned to the "Four County Nuclear Safety Conmittee," by
. anyone who might have difficulty in following the general guidelines - t e.g., because of sensory handicap, medical problem, old age, or transportation difficulties. l An inportant link in the chain of events between the discovery of an accident at Indian Point and public response is the network of sirens that l are intended to alert people to turn on their radios for information. Originally supposed to have been fully operational by April 1, 1981, the sirens were not installed until the following year. The first attempt to activate the whole system was made on March 3,1982 during a drill of the emergency plans for the four-county region. In that drill the sirens were the only means by which the public was to participate at all in what was j otherwise primarily a run-through of ammunication links among government l workers. There were conflicting reports about the sirens: the media l re@&d stories of widespread failure, while a survey ommissioned by the l licensees was said to have found that they were heard by a " satisfactory" number of people. PEMA is supposed to verify public notification capability j azoted all power plants in the country through official surveys conducted l r , E_ _ .. _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
shortly after full-scale sotmdings of sirens. But no such survey has been made anywhere in the nation because of a lack of fmds, according to PEMA. NYPIRG has received many canplaints frun people who live around the J plants about both the sirens and the emergency planning booklet. Many either did not hear the siren at all or heard it so faintly that if they ! had not been purposely waiting and listening for it, they would have missed it. See felt that the booklet was vague on sczne inportant points, difficult {; to read, or so falsely reassuring as to fail to conmamicate the riaarily i seriousness of the danger against which it was stpposed to be a protection. , others said that they had never received the booklet, or received the wrong i one for their area. Many were ready to testify officially about these and other problems. It seemed to us, however, that such testimony could be powerfully supplemented by an inpartial survey, conducted for the New York Public Interest Research Group by an independent social research agency. Accordingly, late in the Spring of 1982 we approaded the social researcher, - Richard Altschuler, of Statistics Pbr Business, who agreed to conduct such ! a survey. After consultations with NYPIRG representatives and some pro-. e fessional collaagues, he drew up' and pretested a questionnaire. The decision was made to limit the area sanpled to the part of Westchester Cotmty con- " tained in the EPZ. The sanple was drawn and the telephone interviews were conducted by a Westchester firm, Social Area Research, Inc. 4 On the basis of the results presented here, Mr. Altschuler prepared j written testimony that was sutmitted to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on June 7, 1982. His report begins with the substance of that testi-many, then gives full details on answers to all of .the questions. In l NYPIRG's view, this study goes a long way toward filling the gap caused by l FINA's failure to conduct its own mandated research, and constitutes a :
~
powerful indictment of the energency plans in~ general and the utilities' attenpt at public information in particular. 1 i
'! hat effort failed on virtually every count. It is of literally vital i importance that everyone in the EPZ who is capahle of Isading and under-standing the booklet should have a copy, but the distribution system is ,
shown to have been quite ineffective. Nothing about the brochure seizes the attention or annomoes that knowing its contents may save your life see day. Hence, there is little wonder that so few recipients even bothered to read it through. Many respondents said that they glanced at it and tossed it aside: "I just wasn't interested," one woman explained, making it evident that she had no idea about the life-and-death import of the contents. It is evident that the booklet failed to transmit the information it should have, even when it was read. 'Ihere was only one factual question about the contents to which a majority of the sanple could give the corract answer - that notification would be by siren, which had also been twsit.ei by the media. . Flew respondents, however, could correctly describe how to distinguish the Indian Point warning signal fran any other siren. 'Ihe re-sults strongly suggest that telephone lines would be janned in a radiological emergency, stymieing the ocmmunications on which the plans rely. In addition, substantial ntubers of people, not trusting the sources of instructions or disagreeing with their wisdom, would follow their own judgment or inpulse about getting their children from school, and about when and how to leave i: I l l
4 the area. One respondent said: "'Ihat dub plan expects us to drive to White Plains. 'Ihey just don't know our roads at all - it's just too crowded. We'd be killed on the road." We believe that these findings seriously impugn the workability of the emergency plans for Indien Point. But they have nuch nore than local significance. Wherever nuclear plants exist, they potentially threaten any people, often people who derive no benefit frm thm. The owners of those reactors are legally and norally obliged to get certain vital messages to everyone at risk, and to conduct surveys of this kind themselves to find out how well the information has been understood. NYPIRG feels that the results of this survey put the burden of proof on all nuclear utilities to demonstrate that they have stM in the difficult task at which C%n Edison and PASNY failed so badly. Joan Holt Director, Indian Point Project \ _ ._ _ ._. .- _ - -- - .
N StMRRY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS A telephone survey of 105 randely selected Westchester residents in the 10-mile aimu.gency planning zone around the Indian Point nuclear power plants revealed:
- 1. Overall, the level of understanding and information about emergency plans is very poor, despite distribution of a booklet _ (" Indian Point, Emergency Planning, and You") and despite dissemination of much of this information by the mass media.
- 2. mre than a third of the residents said that they had not received copies of the booklet: of those who thought they had gotten it, about a third said they had not read it, and another 22% said they had read only "sme of it." Thus, the message got through to only a little more than one in every four of the target population.
- 3. Among those who had the booklet, over half did not know where it was at the time. Iess than 30% of the total sanple had a copy and knew where to lay hands on it.
- 4. Sirens have been installed and tested, which are to alert people if there is a nuclear accident, but 64% of the respondents said they have never heard the siren.
- Only 21% of them said with certainty that they would be able to distinguish the Indian Point siren from others, if they did hear it.
- 5. If a siren announced an emergency, about 8 of every 10 people in the sanple did not know that their first act should be to seek more in-formation; instead, most indicated that they didn't know what they would do, or that they would flee the area at once.
- 6. Chly R knew that the plan advises residents not to use phones; another 3% thought that use would be smewhat restricted.
- 7. When informed that the plan asks them not to, nore than half said they would have a problem in refraining frun telephoning in an emergency.
- Thus, it seems highly likely that lines and switchboards would be quickly janmed in case of an accident at Indian Point.
- 8. Only 42% of the respondents who have children in school knew that they are stpposed to meet their children outside the EPZ in case of an accident during school hours.
n 5-
- 9. .70% of these parents U.id not know the location of the reception center where they are s p ed to meet their children.
- 10. Over half of the parents said they would have trouble following the instructicms of the official energency plan when it comes to meeting their children outside the danger zone.
l
- Many indicated that they would make every effort to get their children directly frm school.
- 11. Among parents of children under 16, about a quarter admitted that the child is smetimes not in the care of an adult (" latch-key children"), l and only a little nore than half of these believed that their children would be able to get out all right if there were an accident at Indian Point.
- 12. The great majority of Westchester residents - almost 70% - don't know where they would go in a radiological emergency; they have made no plans.
- 13. The most trusted source of information and advice in an emergency would be Westchester Executive Alfred DelBello and the Nuclear Begulatory &
Comnission (57% each - the only ones of the six sources mentioned to have the faith of even a majority).
- The least believed would be Con Edison, distrusted by a majority.
- Thus, very large nunbers of people would. not only be confused, uncertain, and ill-informed if there were an Indian Point accident today, but they would also not know whm to trust for accurate information and sound advice.
All in all, the evidence of the survey is that the people of Westchester County would be ill-prepared to follow the emergency plans in the event of a serious accident at Indian Point, because of the ineffectiveness of the public education effort made so far. l l
_ . . . . ___ _ _. .. . . _~_._.
-6' ~
i: IEDTTRn RESULTS: -DE QUESTIONS AND RESPCNSES
' Questlan 1. . HOW WILL HE AUmORITIES NMN PEOPLE IF MERE IS A SERIOUS
!. AmTrFNT AT INDIAN POINT?
% of Total Number Responses-Siren 60 57 I TV / Radio 3 3 other 2 2
- ' Don't know 39 38 l
The correct answer, " Siren," is presented on page 4 of the official ernergency planning booklet, " Indian Point, Eirwcy Planning, and You" (prepared and distributed by the Indian , Point utilities), and has been disseminated by the mass media. Nevertheless, almost 4 out of each 10 people (38%) did not i know how they would be warned, and another 5% gave wrong answers. l Question 2. HIE EERENCY PIAN'SAYS DIAT DE FIRST WMNING WILL BE GIVEN !^ BY A SIREN.- - BY DE NAY, HAVE YOU HEARD DE SIREN DEY'RE USING?' i i
% of Total .
l Nutber Responses , 1 Yes 21 20 No 66 64 Don't know, [- l Not sure 17 16 l 1-l As can be seen, about two-thirds.of the respakts have not heard the warning siren and another 16% weren't sure, leaving only 20% who could answer "yes" to this question. \~ "The siren malfunctioned I was told, but I thought I l heard sanething." ' I i L
, Question 2a. IF YOU HEARD A SIREN RIGff NOW, DO YOU THINK YOU OOULD 'IELL THAT IT MAS BECAUSE OF AN ACCIIENf AT INDIAN POINT, RA'IHER
'IHAN, SAY, A FIRE ENGDE, AMBULANCE, OR SOBE'IHING ErsE?
% of Total Nunber Responses No, couldn't tell 64 61 Yes, could tell 22 21 Maybe, probably could tell 12 11 Don't know, not sure 7 7 O.ly about 20t of tha rcoWts - the same percentage who said they had heard the siren - said they would be able to distinguish it frun anocher type of siren or other noise.
'Ihe great majority, 61%, said they would not be able to recognize the emergency warning siren.
Questim 2b. H0f NOULD YOU RECOCNIZE THAT A SIREN bEANT A NUCLEAR ACCIIEtif?
% of Total Nuter Respcmses E@ pieh 5 D Steady tone 11 27 Very loud 12 29 Other 8 20 Ibn't know 11 27 Note: Percentages are based on the 41 respondents who were asked this question, they add to over 100% because scxne respcndents named more than one characteristic.
Only a fifth of the total sample (21%) gave any evidence that they would be able to recognize the siren.
"If it kept going I'd knou it was a nuclear accident."
t Question 3. IN CASE YOU HEAR DE NABNING SIREN, NEIAT IS DE VERY FIRST HIING YOU ARE SUPPOSED 'ID DO?
% of Total Nunber Responses Turn on the radio or TV 13 12 Tune to channel 7/WABC 4 4 Read the instruction booklet 3 3 Get the family together 3. 3 Make phone calls 1 1 Start packing 2 2 Other 31 30 Don't know 48 45 Page 4 of the energency planning booklet prescribes " Tune to channel 7, WABC or another Dnergency BMast station,"
yet only 4% of the respondents gave this answer. Omnbining the first three answer categories, only 20% of the suple said they would seek information as their first act. Many responses in the "Other" category included evacuating the area.
" Start praying and go to the basement."
" Stay put. "
l P
"Get far away on Route 9. Everybody vill be on the road, though."
"Go to the location -- I forgot uhere it is."
L
- "First I vould panic; I would then drive to Port Chester on an l uncrowded urban artery."
f l' n
.- _9_ Question 4. A000RDING 'IO 'HE PLAN, HOW ARE YOU SUPPOSED 'IO Tr SPECIFIC INEORMATIN W NHAT 'IO DO?
% of 'Ibtal Number Ibsponses Turn on the radio or 'IV 35 33 Tune to channel 7/lRBC/EBS 9 9 Bead the instruction booklet 11 11 Other 7 7 Don't know 42 40 As can be seen, though page 4 of the booklet describes what to cb, 40% said they don't know how to get specific infomation.
"I'd call the police even though I knou that's absurd. "
"Not much you can do, is there? Just lay down and die."
Question 5. DOES 'DE PLAN SAY ANTIHING ABOUT USING OR NOT USING THE TEIEPHONE?
% of Stal Number Resp 51ses No/OK to use phcme 32 30 Only if vital /
Only special people 3 3 No one is to use phone 3 8 Other 1 1 Don't know 61 58 Pages 5 and 6 of the mergency planning booklet say not to use the phone, yet only 8% of the respondents gave this as the correct answer. Ninety-one percent of the respondents gave the wrong answer or didn't know.
10 - % Question 6. BY 'DE NAY, DO YOU HAVE ANY OIILDREN MD GO '10 SC100L IN THIS ARElA?
% of 'Ibtal Nunber Responses No 67 64 Yes 38 36 As can be seen, about 1/3 of the respondents had children in school and about 2/3 did not. The total nunber of children among the saple group was 68, with a mean age of 10.5 years. 'Ihe range was 16 years (from age 3 to 19) .
The mean number of children per respondent parent was 1.8. Questicn 6a. IF 'IHERE IS AN ACCIDENT AT INDIAN POINT DURING SCHOOL HOURS, MIAT ARE YOU SUPPOSED 'IO DO ABOUI' YOUR CHILDREN?
% of Total Number Responses Get d1ildren frta school 0 0 Wait for them to cxxne home 2 5 i
Meet them outside the danger zone 16 42 Don'c know 14 37 Other 6 16 Page 7 of the energency planning booklet instructs parents with children in school to meet them outside the danger zone in a specially designated area, depending upon where the respondent and school are located. However, 58% of the respondents with children didn't know the correct answer. Once again, as in many of the previous questions, " Don't know" was the modal category among the incorrect responses.
"It's very unclear -- I believe he goes south but I go north."
"Some guy will drive from White Plains to bus my son to Port Chester. "
l
=
,~- y .. _ _ . , - - - ,e--- ,- ,,- y .,, , , . - , , _ _ _ . - - e..
y-,- - _ y -.---
.- Questicn 6b. WEIL, ACCORDING 'IO 'ITE PLAN,- YOU AE SUPPOSED 'IO EETf 11EM OUTSIIE 'IYE DANGER ZCNE AT A SPECIAL QNIER. WIEE IS 'ITE CEN'IER WHEE YOU NOULD FIND YOUR GIILD(REN)?
% of 'Ibtal Number Responses Named a place 11 30 Don't know 26 70 Page 12 of the energency planning booklet describes the reception centers where parents are supposed to meet their children, yet only 30% of respondents with children in school could name a place, and several of these responses were vague. As can b seen frcxn the data, 70% of the respondents did not know where tley are supposed to meet their children.
"Somewhere in North Salem, Bedford, and Mt. Kisco. "
(Three children go to different schools; each would be bussed to a separate area.) Question 7. HAVE YOU ECEIVED A COPY OF 'IIE BOOKLET, " INDIAN POINT, EMERGENCY PIANNING AND YOU," NHIGI EXPIAINS NHAT 'IO DO IF 'ITERE IS A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT?
% of Total Number Responses No 36 34 Yes 61 58 Not sure, maybe 6 6 Don't know 2 2 As can be seen, about a third of the respondents have not received the booklet, and another 8% aren't sure if they have.
"I never received the booklet or any information. Can you give me some phone numbers to call? I'm new to this area and scared."
12 - % Question 7a. DO YOU IUOW WHEIE IT (DE B00KIEf) IS RIGff NOW?
% of 'Ibtal Nunber Responses Yes 30 43 No 31 45 Don't know 8 12 Among those who have received the booklet, nearly six out of ten did not know its present location. Iess than 30% of the total-sample had both received it and knew where to find it.
"In the garbage -- that booklet was a farce."
Questicn 7b. HAVE YOU READ IT?
% of Total Nunber Responses Yes 28 41 No 22 32 Don't know 3 4 Scme of it 15 22 Arong those who have received the booklet, nore have read it than not, especially when "Scne of it" is included, but about
- a third have not read it. Only about 27% of the total sanple had read through the booklet.
"Every word -- the whole plan is garbage."
"My husband read it; I'm not interested because I vent through World War II and know that planning is useless."
"No because Con Ed imported people from Iowa to do it and it's att butt. They know nothing about Routes 9 and 9A."
- Question 7c. HAVE YOU DISCUSSED TIE INEDINATICN IN IT WITH CfDER PEOPIE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD?
% of Total Ntznber Responses Yes 35 51 No 34 49 Don't know 0 0 Page 15 of the emergency planning booklet instructs residents to discuss the contents with their families, yet only about half who have received the booklet have done so - a third of the total who were intended to be reached.
"Actually the only discussion occurred whcn my 13-year-old son told us to read the booklet."
Question 8. HAVE YOU AND YOUR FAMILY DECIDED MERE YOU NOULD 00 IF YOU HAD TO LEAVE 'DE AREA BBCAUSE OF AN INDIAN POINT ACCIENT?
% of Total Number Responses Yes 34 33 No 62 60 Don't know 7 7 Page 15 of the booklet instructs readers to know where they would go in case of a nuclear accident, yet only a third of those with booklets said they knew where they would go, while two-thirds in"icated they didn't know where they would go.
"Once it goes it's too late to go anywhere."
"Nouhere -- we vould stay put. "
"Ardsley -- that's where the book told us to go. "
"Westchester Hospital and be first in line. If something happened it vould be all over and we 'd burn up."
s. Question 9. ACCORDING 'IO 'IEE PLANS, YOU. ARE NOT SLPPOSED 'IO USE THE PHOE, SO THE LINES CAN REMAIN FREE FOR OFFICIALS 'IO USE. DO YOU THINK YOU NOULD BE ABIE 'IO EDIIOf THIS INSTBUCI' ION, OR ARE
'IHERE ANY CAILS YOU EEEL YOU hDULD HAVE 'ID MAKE?
% of 'Ibtal Number Ibsponses Would follow 48 46 Would have to make calls 23 22 Depends, might have to use phone 20 19 Don't know 14 13 More people indicated that they would follow the plan than fell into any other response category, but 41% of the respmdents indicated that they would or might make calls, and when the " Don't know" responses are added to them, the data indicate that more than half of the respondents might not follow the plan.
"I'd have to call my son. "
" I'm not at all sure what I'd do in an emergency situation. "
"I don't know, but let's not get all upset about it; when it happens we'll deal with it."
.- Question 10. IF YOU HEARD 'RE NAlWING SIREN, TURNED CN 'DE 'IV OR PADIO AND NERE 'IOLD ' MAT YOU WOULD BE SAEE IF YOU JUST STAY IND00BS, NOULD YOU HAVE ANY PanRTFM WI'IH 'IHAT, OR NOr?
% of 'Ibtal Nunber Responses No problern, would do it 86 82 Would assenble family, start packing to leave 4 4 Would leave at once 5 5 Other 6 5 Don't know 4 4 The great majority of respondents, as can be seen, indicated they would have no problem following the order to remain indoors.
"Oh if the kids are at home; absolutely not if all 3 children i vere not safe in my house."
"It depends on who was talking and what kind of accident."
l l Question 11. AOJORDING TO 'IEE PIAN, YOU AFE SUPPOSED 'IO G) 'IO A PECEPTION GNIER, A SPECIAL PIACE OUISIDE THE DANGER ZCNE NIERE YOUR CHIID(REN) NOUID BE BUSSED. NOULD YOU HAVE ANY PIOELEM EOLIDWING 'IEIS INSTRUCTICN, OR WOULD IT NCRK C O
% of Total Number Responses No problea 16 42 Problen 20 53 Don't know, uncertain 2 5 As can be seen, more than half the respondents would have a prnble:n following the plan to meet their child (ren) outside the danger zone. Fran answers written in by the interviewers, it is clear that many parents would want to pick up their children fran scnool.
"It vouldn't work -- they couldn't educate people to do that.
They're just pretending to do their job. You'd have to do a media blitz and get people into neighborhoods to educate the residents. "
"I don 't trust the bus drivers. "
"It vouldn 't work -- I'd go to echool to get my 13-year-old."
"I'd be with the children. The teacher told me she wouldn't go in the bus. I'm scared!"
"According to the plan, parents are sent to Duchess County, children to another place. Hou will they ever meet?"
Question 12. (for respondents with a child under 16) ARE HERE ANY TIES AFIER SCHOOL HOURS WHEN YOUR GIILD(REN) IS (ARE) NOT IN DE CME OF SOE ADULT?
% of 'Ibtal Nunber Ibsponses No 25 74 Yes/ Occasionally 9 26 Question 12a. (for those who answered "Yes/ Occasionally" to the above)
IF TIEIE WAS AN ACCIIINT AT INDIAN POINT AND PEOPIE HAD
'IO IEAVE, WOULD YOUR OIILD GE7f OCTI ALL RIGff?
l % of Total Number Responses , Yes 5 56 1 Problem 3 33 Don't know 1 11 "I work within 2 minutes so I could get home to get them." l "There 's no guarantee that bus drivers would shou up. The National Guard should drive them."
s Question 13. YOU MIGfr HEAR STA'IEMENTS ON TIE RADIO OR 'IV BY QUITE A NUMBER OF DIFfERENT PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIWS. I'M GOING 'IO bENTION SOBE OF 'IHEM, AND AS I DO, PIEASE TELL bE FOR EAG ONE NEIHER YOU IKXED TRUST TIB1 'IO 'IELL YOU 'INE TRU1H AND GIVE YOL~ GOOD ADVICE, OR MEIHER YOU MIGIT TEND 'IO DISTRUST 'IHEM. Person / Organization Trust Distrust Don't know No. % No. % No. % IJ. fred DelBello 57 54 24 23 24 23 Hugh Carey 40 38 44 42 21 20 Con Edison 32 30 53 50 20 19 PASNY 36 34 29 28 40 38 Nuclear Regulatory Cmmission 57 54 25 24 23 22 Independent scientist or organization 46 44 14 13 45 43 As can be seen frm the above data, the nest trusted individual or organization was Alfred DelBello, the County Executive, and the NRC, which tied at 54%. The least trusted was Con Edison, at 30%. PASNY appears to have an " identity problem," with the second highest tally (38%) in the " Don't know" category. The respondents were least distrustful of an independent scientist or organizatial, but this category received the highest " Don't know" count at 43%.
"I hope they vould telt the truth."
"Never heard of them (PASNY). I would tend to trust government agencies, not politicians and private groups."
"I wouldn't knou who to trust -- you can't believe anybody any more."
v I APPENDIX A': MMODCIIXN m is report is based on a telephone survey of 105 residents 18 years of age or older in 105 different households within the 10-mile radius of p the Indian Point nuclear power plants. The interviewing firm Social Area Research, Inc., located at 44 Carman Ibad, Scarsdaie, New York, was sub-
- conuc.cted to select the sanple and conduct the interviews.
Se talephone ntmbers enployed in the study were selected through random digit dialing techniques to ensure the representativeness of the sanple, which included the following telephone exchanges and areas: Telephone Exchange Area 245- Yorktown Heights, Jefferson Valley, Amawalk 271 Croton-on-Hwknri, Croton Heights
-526 Putnam Valley, Oscawana 528 Mohegan Lake,.Putnam Valley 737 Crugers, Buchanan, Peekskill, Verplan:k, Montrose,'Cortlandt v' 739 Peekskill 762 Ossining, Teatown 962 Shrub Oak, Yorktown
%e research instrunent used to collect the data was a questionnaire which is appended to this report. % e questionnaire was pretested and revised during the week of lenday, May 17 and achtinistered to the respondents in this study on Wednesday evening, May 26, %ursday evening, May 27, and Friday afternoon and evening, May 28.
-____________m----e---
APPENDIX B: IESCRIPTICE OF 'HE SAMPLE Table 1: Sex of Satple
% of Total Nunber Responses Male 36 34' Female 69 66 Table 2:
, Age of Satple
% of 'Ibtal Nunber Responses Under 30 years 20 19
!~
30 to under 40 years 31 30 40 to under 50 years 13 12 50 to under 60 years 17 16 60 to under 70 years 8 8 Over 70 years 16 15 l l l i l l f ( 1 l l _ ,, .. . . . _ . ~_ . . . . . _ _ . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . _ _ . . __- - _ . _ _ _ . . - . _ . . - _. _ - ._ . . . _ .
Table 3: Enployment Status of Saple
% of 'Ibtal Number Responses Enployed 55 52 Not enployed or not in labor force 50 48 Table 4:
' Educational Status (Last Grade Ompleted) of Sample
% of 'Ibtal Nunber Responses Grade school 13 13' High school 44 42 Some college 22 21 College 10 10 Postgraduate- 15 14 Table 5:
Nunber of Cars Per Household of Sanple I ( Mean = 1.8 (Total number of cars = 188) l l l l _ _ . _ __ . - . _ , _ _ . __. . - ~ . - _ , . , - - - . -
'~
APPH! DIX C: QUESTIORULIRB Phone no. INDIAN POINT SURVEY Hello, my name is ; I'en with Social Area Research, Inc. We're conducting a survey about emergency plans for the area around Indian Point . May I ask you a few questions, please? (IF IN DOUBT ABOUT AGE) First, are you over 18 years old? (IF NO) Is there an adult there I might speak to? . As you may have heard, an emergency plan has been written for Westchester county in case of a serious accident at the Indian Point nuclear power plants. I'd like to ask you a few questions about that.
- 1. How will the authorities warn people if there is a serious accident at Indian Point?
(,) TV/ radio ( ,) Other (,)DK ( l ) Siren -
- 2. Right, /or:/ Welt, the emergency plan says that, the first warning will be given by a siren. By the way, have you heard the siren they're using?
( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) DK, not sure 2a. If you heard a siren right now, do you think you could tell that it.was because of an accident at Indian Point, rather than, say, a fire engine, ambulance, or some-thing else? ( ) No, couldn't tell (SKIP TO Q. 3)' ( ) Yes, could tell ( ) Maybe, probably could ( ) DK, not sure , 2b. How would you recognize that a siren meant ; nuclear accident? (CHECK AS MANY l AS APPLY) ( ) High pitch ( ) Steady tone ( ) Very loud ( ) Other ( ) DK
-3. In case you hear the warning siren, what is the very first thing you are supposed to do?
( ) turn on radio or TV ( ) tune to channel 7 or WABC (SKIP TO Q. 5) ( ) read the instruction booklet _( )get family together ( ) make phone calls- -( ) start packing ( ) Other: l ( ) DK
- 4. Accordiag to the plan, how are you supposed to get specific instructions on what to do?
( ) turn on radio or TV ( ) tune to channel 7, WABC, other EBS . station ( ) read the instruction booklet ( ) other ( ) DK 1 i l
f
- 2. [- 2 2 -] .'
- 5. Does the plan say anything about using or not using the telephone?
( ) No/ OK to use phone ( ) use phone only if vital /only special people can use ( ) no one is to use phone ( ) Other ( ) DK 3
- 6. By the way, do you have any children who go to school in this area?
~
( .) No (SKIP TO Q. 7)
. ( ) Yes: What are their ages?
6a. If there 1 san accident at ~ Indian Point during school hours, what am you - supposed to do about your' children?
~
( ) Get children from school ( ) Wait for them to come home ( ) Meet them outside danger zone
.(. ) DK .( ) Other:
6b. Well, according to the plan, you are supposed to meet them outside the danger. zone at a special cente'.r Where is the centers where you would find your child {ren)? 4 v ( ) DK
---7. Have you received a copy of the booklet, " Indian Point, Emergency Plannf ag,'and you ,
which explains what to do if there is a nuclear. accident.? - ( ) No (SKIP TO Q. 8) , , ( ) Yes- ( ) Not sure, maybe ( ) DK 7 C 7a. Do you know where it is right now? , .
~
( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) DK 7b. Have you read it? ( ) Yes (.,) No ( ,
) DK ( ) Some of it - -
t
-Why not?
7c. Have you discussed th'e info'rmation in it with oth'er people in youi household? i ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) DK
- 8. Have you and your family decided where you would go if you had to leave the area because of an Indian Point accident?
( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) DK i
. _ A_ __
I
- 3. [- 23 -] I l
- 9. According to the plans, you are not supposed to use the phone, so the lines 4
can remain free for officials to use. Do you think you would be able to follow this instruction, or are there any calls you feel you would have to make? ( ) Would follow ( ,) Depends, might have to use phone ( ) Would have to make calls ( ) DK
- 10. 'If you heardthe warning siren, turned on the TV or radio and were told that you would be safe if you just stay indoors, would-you have any problem with that', or not?
' - (. ) No probiem, would do it
( ) Would assemble family, start packing to leave ( ) Would leave at once ( ) Other ( ) DK IF R DOES NOT HAVE A CHILD IN SCHOOL: SKIP TO Q.13 (Next Page)
- 11. According to the plan, you are supposed to go to a reception center, a special place outside the danger zone where your child (ren) would be bussed. Would you have any problem following this instruction, or would it work OK?
( ) No problem; OK ( ) Problem: ( ) DK, uncertain
- 12. (IF R HAS ANY CHILD UNDER 16) Are there any times after school hours when your child (ren) is (are) not in the care of some adult?
( ) No (SKIP TO Q.13, next page) ( ) Yes/ occasionally 1 12a. If there was an accident at Indian Point and people had to leave, would your child get out all right? ( ) Yes.
) Problem
( ( ) DK
~
. UNITED STATES-0F AMERICA 3f;$lEl NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 83 FEB 24 A10 :17~ - -
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD.
. c A.41 Ah i
;uG & SERVICE BRANCH.
. In the Matter of )
)
CONSOLIDATED EDIS0N COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247 SP
- (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286 SP.
)
-POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK' )
(Indian Point Unit 3) ) 22nd February 1983 Certificate of.Servica I hereby certify that copies.of the Supplemental Testimony of Samuel
.W.' Anderson, PhD., Charles Awalt, Kai Erik'on,.
s Sonny Hall, John Roden, Alma Cormican, James Murphy and Richard Altschuler, NYPIRG's Motion for Discovery Pursuant to 10 CFR 2. 741 (a) -(2) to Permit Entry Upon Land in Control of the Licensees, NYPIRG Motion for Preservation and Production of Certain Documents relevant to the Exercise of March 9,1983, and Joan - llolt's Letter to Administrative Judges, James P. Gleason, Esq., Dr. Oscar
- 11. Paris, and Mr. Frederick J. Shon, regarding Limited Appearance llearings in New York City, have been served on the of ficial minimum service list for the abovecaptioned proceeding by depositing in the United States nail, first class, postpaid, this 22nd day of February,1983. Copies to Admini-strative Judges Cleason, Shon and Paris; James Laurenson; Ruthanne Miller; David Lewis and Janice Moore sent by Express Mail. Copies to Brent L.
Brandenburg, Esq. , David H. Pikus, Esq. , and Richard F. Czaja, Esq., hand delivered, February _22nd,.1983. Jo llolt N York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. 9 Murray Street New York,'NY 10007 E \
P James P. Gleason, Esq., Chairman Docketing and Service Branch Adainistrative Judge Office of the Secretary Atomic Sa fety and Licencing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear._ Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
' 513 Gilmoure Drive Silver Springs,.MD 20901 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
_ ~' U.S. Nuclear R~egulatory Commission Dr.' Oscar H. Paris Washington, DC 20555 Adninistrative Judge Atrmic Safety and- Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Rerulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission W=hington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Frederick J. Shon Paul F. Colarulli, Esq. Administrative Judge Joseph J. Levin, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Pamela S. Horowitz, Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Charles Morgan, Jr., Esq.
'~
Morgan Associates, Chartered Ruthanne G. Miller, Esq. 1899 L Street, NW AttiE Safety and Licensing Board - Washington, DC 20555' 't U.S. Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mayor Webster Pierce Village of Buchanan
..~'
' Jinice E. ' Moore, Esq. 236 Tate Avenue "
~
2 Donald F'.THassell,:~Esq. Buchanan, NY 10511 H:nry J. McGurren, Esq.
~
Office of..the Executive Legal Director Stanley B. Klimberg, Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission General Counsel W shington, DC 20555 New York State Energy Office _ Two Empire State Plaza Brent L. Brandenburg, Esq. Albany, NY 12223 Ac::istant General Counsel Conzolidated Edison Company of New Marc L. Parris, Esq. York, Inc. Eric Thorsen, Esq.
- 4. Irving Place County Attorney '
N:w York, NY 10003 County of-Rockland 11 New Hempstead. Road. ... ,
,, . Charles'M. Pratt, Esq. New City, NY. 710956 ,
Sttphen L. Baum, Esq. . Hon. Andrew P. O'Rourke-Pow r Authority of the State of New York Westchester County Executive - . _. 10 Columbus Circle -- Laurie Vetere, Esq. -,.~ New York, NY 148 Martine Avenue
~~
10019 White Plains, NY 10601 ,. . j _.'J;nnthon D. Feinberg -
" Q [.;.
~
NAw York State Public Service
~
. Ez ra I .',. B ialik,T Es q . T .n J.',.---- ;
C:mmission 1 - Steve Leipzig, Esi l . < gg-----~~ *c= 3
. Thrc e. Empire State Plaza
, " i 1 Environmental : Protection;BureaumF" si3
= tAlbhny;iNY- 112223 RM 9 NewiYorkiState dt'toYneyfGeEeYil'sf0ffled W 4,
' ~ ];gg : _ _ . -
~~
' "~fTwo World; Trade" Center-ETNTNSb f
~ ~
- . , Charles J; Mai_kish, Esq.
1New York,1.NYL : e*1004. 7J - .E.x O 3 m.- n, . W,.a 1 . SU .. _ Litigation Division -
-+ -c - % . -,-g- gr 4 MTh2 Port Authority of New York and -
~ " Donald Davidoff, 'Ditectortit[*7, ,3
.c_.
N;w Jersey ~ ~ #New York ' State -Rad'i 'olbgical EmergencyT i gQ OnMWorld Trade Center 'R
~
. Preparddness Group w .[
N;w York, NY 10048 - Empire State Plazar n .. T ~ , T,jZE S
. . . _ _ - - Tower Building,' Room 1750~~ " pg/ y,
_- " Albany, NY 12237- _
-.M* ^
.. v..
- f
, , . . . '?-
3, ,
7 t , David H. Pikus,. Esq. Charles A. Scheiner, Co-Chairperson Richard F. - Czaja,' Esq. Westchsster People's Action Coalition, Inc. Shen and Gould- , PO Box 488
-330 Madison' Avenue. . White Plains, NY -10602
- N:w York, NY 10017 Alan Latman, Esq.
l ' f "- Phyllis Rodriguez,-Spokesperson' 44 Sunset Drive: g
- Parznts Concerned About Indian Point Croton-on-Hudson, NY 10520 '
l~ PO Box 125 ~ f Zipporah'S. F161' sher: I Croton-on. Hudson, . NY; 10520 - l West Branch Conservation Association Richard M. Hartzman, Esq. 443 Buena Vista Road Lorna-Salzman . New City, NY 10956 Friends;of~the Earth,.Inc.
- 208 West 13th Street ~ Melvin Goldberg, Staff Attorney Joan' Holt, Project Director 'i
'Naw York, NY 10011 New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. I.
Judith Kessler, Coordinatori 9 Murray Street j Rockland Citizens;for Safe Energy. ' New York, NY 10007 1 N 300 New Hempstead Road ' New City, NY 10956 Craig Kaplan, Esq. National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee .I
- 175-Fifth Avenue 1 i
-Rente SchwartzPEsq: -
_. e Paul-Chessin, EsqP ..New York,-NY 10010' Laurens.R. Schwartz, Esq. Margaret'Oppel,'Esq. Amanda Potterfield, Esq.
.Botein, Hays, Sklar, and Hertzberg Johnston and George, Attys-at-Law 200 Park Avenue 528 Iowa Avenue -
1 New York, NY 10166 Iowa City, Iowa 52240
. David-B. Duboff. Joan Miles
-Westchester People's Action Indian' Point Coordinator
. Coalition, Inc. New York City Audubon Society 255 Crove Street 71 West 23rd Street,- Suite 1828 White Plains, NY 10601 . New York, NY 10010
' - ~ ~
Andrew S. Roffe, Esq. -Ellyn R. Weiss,'Esq.. l New York State Assembly . William S. Jordan,. III, Esq.-
-Albtny, NY 12248 Harmon and Weiss 1725 I Street NW Suite 506 ~
Hon. - Richati Brod_ sky Washington, DC 20006 _
~ ' ~ ~
M ubar of the Assembly 429 LOB Jeffrey M. Blum, Esq. Albiny, NY. 12248 . , Nek York University Law School .. . _. .~ . 423 Vanderbilt Hall _.i401 Washington Square-South-
~ ,. Sptnce W.: Perry,1Esq... .-
[ Office of General Counsel; wd.
. _,5
[ ~ \ g New.Yoric{NY.- ~ T~ ~ 10012L Federal Emergency;Mana'gement 3Ap,ency . 3. m . , ;phCf w=r"" ~ ,~ p g _ al}
-500 C_ Street _SW Z M 'r 9"-- ~~ . . : GreateriNew. York,Counci1 od Energy; Wac,hington , ;-DC - .20555_
~~
u 7e/o; Dean Corren,v Director ~~ E '
~
S ttwar t , M.~_ Glas s ,;Esq .G.'--, ._ _.,. s '26;Stuyvesant-Street -{ ^T
-Ragional Counsel .__ & .
'
- New York,' NY, =10003 ~"
. rzdsral Emergency _ Management Agency _
' Room 1349... . 102 __ ..,_._ S t'even . C ._ Sholly_. ,
~
~
26 FederaliPlazaZ_r. C Union of... Concerned Scientists-Ntw York,'NY 10278 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, - Suite 1101
"*- ~ ' +;
.:: T. Washington /DC 20036 4
.- . . _ . , . ~ i
~ _.2.-
- y. g
.an ...--
'i
~ ~ ~ *
,. __ ;- , .- - ~,.
~'
- = ~ ~
-'- . _a. _____1*~
___r__ - P ? 7 N' ~ 1
% ~ , )
.-- ., , ,...~. - - . . . . . . . , - -.
h
.H:n. Ruth Messinger Member ofitheiCouncil of-
- thm City. of New York Di::trict #4
. City Hall Ntw York,nNY 10007 ,_ . Michael D..Diederich, Jr., Esq.
Fitzgerald,-Lyn,ch, & Diederich 24 Central Drive Stony Point, NY .10980 Jonathan L. Levine, Esq. PO Box 280 New City, NY.
. . 10958 ._~
Administrative Judge James _ A'. Iaurensoii . Atanic-.S&fety & Licens,ing Board' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washingt6n, D.C. 20555 David Iewis,.Esq. Atanic Safety .& . Licensing . Board U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C. 20555 1
%. 4 e-
, m m. ,
.~ .e.- -C
,e--,
' % n ut.,L...3y-,..,;JOi
~
~- F.;; c .t:
_ ._- ^ ^' ;MJ3 . . ZE *.+ [ '.' 3 [*[
.. g ;,
-r-~ Y .'.;
- N:bYfW .
- n ; _ y- . . . - om ._ - c ; . c. . w y. .
.. w. ? -L :; ;= ;-- m : ._ ;$
. :N.s.
L 8 bi;'X- -- _ _ . ;sp. g p ,i s . .;1
....a.. '
,s: C L.T. Ci N }.' W 4 S ".~- , . L f r , '. ~p a :. _..m .; .wa s en _(.>.'&
-- .,.,.,.a -+m._.. 6-? :., - ~
., . . -' d
.~
._<-ar.m,.
.g,-,,:.--. -~
- -~ .' I i ehee- -e
, f, y
g i**$.W- .
., ,p.'
n.-... _I
. eu as. --
eg
~
e d. a. y __ - l
, - - ~ ~ -
DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. BOX 33180 GHARLOTTE, N.C. 28L42 HAL B. TUCKER TELEPHONE non r=esinewv - (704) 373-4531
====r==<m=
February 24, 1983 Mr. Harold R.~Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. J. F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Subject:
Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287
Dear Sir:
By letter dated November 12, 1982, Duke Power Company submitted a proposed
-license amendment to the Oconee Facility Operating License and revision to the Technical Specifications which concerned heatup, cooldown, and inservice test limitations for the reactor coolant systems of each Oconee unit. This submit al supplements the initial submittal and provides curves which are based on the materials properties previously provided and a revised set of operator guidance.
For several months, Duke and Babcock and Wilcox, the Oconee NSSS vendor, have been reviewing and evaluating the analytical assumptions, such as the number l of reactor coolant pumps in operation and step changes in temperature, used in establishing the curves. These assumptions were compared to actual plan i operation to assure consistency and to provide sufficient operational flex-ibility. The resultant new operator guidance ic contained in Tables 1 and 2 l and was used in the development of the new Technical Specification curves that are attached. The proposed new curves are based on the analytical tech-niques documented in BAW-10046 and material properties projected for 15 EFPY. Predicted changes in material properties were based on data contained in BAW-1511P, BAW-1697, and BAW-1699 which have been submitted previously. l These enclosed 15 EFPY curves replace those currently under review by the NRC.
-The Oconee 1 curves were revised to reflect the new operational guidance for plant cooldown and to incorporate the weld chemistry data from BAW-1511P. The Oconee 2.and Oconee 3 curves reflect the new plant cooldown operational guidance and the materials data from BAW-1697 and BAW-1699.
f Duke Power personnel have discussed this matter with the appropriate NRC reviewer. However, should there be any question concerning this submittal, please call the normal licensing contact. ())() l
~
!' 8302250371 830224 ^ ! PDR ADOS 4 05000269 P PDR
c. m Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director February 24,-1983 Page 2 Inasmuch as this submittal supplements a proposed license amendment previously submitted, no additional license fees are considered necessary.
.Very truly yours,
( db'e n Hal B. Tucker RLG/php Attachment cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory-Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. J. C. Bryant NRC Resident Inspector
-Oconee Nuclear Station Mr. E..L. Conner, Jr.
Office of Nuclear. Reactor. Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.-20555
Data for Prep ration of Pressurs-Temperature Limit Curv:s for' Duke Power Company,'Oconce Nucle:r Station - Unit 1, Applicable -' through 15 Full Power Years . I WelJment Imcation k Core incattoo Neutron Fluence Radiation-induced. Midplane
- AJlunted NT at from Weld Unirt. Copper Phosphorus end of 15 EFPY 6RTm y'at end of End of 15 N Y tt.steftlf I,dyst f(Jeation Beltline 3/4T Content (E > 1 MeV). n/cm' H.at No. _ _ Type _ Region locat ion toCl.g Weld re - Major Aans. . location RTMDT Content, 15 EFrY x1Q)
A "F _. Degrees oF (1) . I Q)_ J J2) . At 1/47 At 3/4T ALlg At 3/47 _h At_l At 3/47 Amt-54 SA508 C1 2 tower hazie Belt -- -- - (660) 5.70El? 1.33El? <50/29 <50/14 <l10/89 <llo/74
- 2197-2 . SA3025 Mod Intermed. Shell -- --' --
. (+40) 2.69EIS 6.34E17, 450/34 <50/16 <90/74 <90/56 03278-3 SA)O28, NJ Upper Shell -- ' -- --
(640) 3.58Ela 8.3E17 90 - <50/43 130' < 90/8 3 C 3265-1 SA302B, N J Upper Shell '-- -- -' 20 3.58E18 8.3El?_ 75 <50/36 95 * < 70/,56 ' C2800-1 SA3028, M.=1 lower Sewll -- -- -- (t40) 3.58El8 8.3El? 72 <50/35 112 <90/75 C2800-2 SA3028, Mod lower Simil -- -- 20 3.58E18 '8.3E17
~ 72 <50/35 92 . <70/55' SA1494 Weld Outlet haale +245 (620) 1.92E16' 4.49E15 <50/8 <50/4 <10/28 <70/24 sal 526 Weld Outlet brale +245' -
(+20) 1.92E16 4.49E15 <50/15 <50/1, <70/35' <70/27 SAll35 - Weld Intermed. Circum.' +199 -- Yes (+20) 5.70E17 1.34Eli 54 < 50/26 74 <70/46 sal 229 Weld Upper Circum. +123 - Yes (+20) 2.69E18 -- 148 -- f68 -- (l.D. 61%) WF25 Weld Upper Circum. +123 -- No (+20) 6.34El?
- ~ 86 -
106 (0,0. 391) SA1585 Weld . MidJie Circess. -61 Yes '(+20) 8.32E17
.3.58E18 126 61 146 - 81 WF-9 Weld I.ower Circum. -249 Yes (+20)
~ ~ -
1.98El6 4.65El5 <50/9 < 50/ 5 . <10/29 <70/5 SA1073 WelJ Upper I.ongit. (Roth) . -- 22 Yes (t20) 2.llE18 4.99E17 151 74 til 94 SA3498 Weld Middle 1.pngit. (Both) - 48 Yes (+20) 2.60El8 6.08E17 150 73 170 93 sal 4 )u Weld I.ower lengit. (Both) - 20 Yes (+20) 3.36E18 7.68El? 166 82 186 102 . (1) Per RAW-10046P, M. arch 1976 (2) WelJ Chemistry per BAW-15tlP, 4ktober 1980 (3) Per Regulatory Culde 1.99, Revision I t}}