ML20083Q474

Supplemental Testimony of KT Erikson Re Emergency Studies. Emergency Plans Inadequate Unless Number of People Who Will Overreact & Number of Emergency Personnel Who Will Not Rept to Duty Are Taken Into Account

ML20083Q474
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	02/21/1983
From:	Erikson K PARENTS CONCERNED ABOUT INDIAN POINT, PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, NEW YORK, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, YALE UNIV., NEW HAVEN, CT
To:
Shared Package
ML20083Q370	List: ML20083Q368 ML20083Q382 ML20083Q393 ML20083Q408 ML20083Q428 ML20083Q442 ML20083Q448 ML20083Q474 ML20083Q489 ML20083Q499 ML20083Q505 ML20083Q523
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8302250405
Download: ML20083Q474 (4)

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UNITED STATES OF APERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD T

In the Matter of

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CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247 SP (Indian Point Unit 2)-

50-286 SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point Unit 3)

February 21, 1983 SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF DR. KAI T. ERIKSON, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, YALE UNIVERSITY, ON THE EVACUATION PLAN FOR INDTAN POINT In my original statement, I testified that radiological emergencies are differe0t in kind from the ordinary run of natural disasters and human accidents.

Because that is so, I further testified, it is reasonable to assume that, in the evenc of an emergency at Indian Point involving' evacuation, (a) considerably more people will evacuate than asked to do so, seriously complicating an already difficult situation, and (b) many people now being relied upon to perform one or l

another kind of emergency work will be unavailable because they feel a compelling need to see to the safety of their own families instead.

In that testimony, I noted that two studies had been commissioned by the County of Suffolk, Long Island, of the people living in the general vicinity of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. I was instrumental in designing those studies l

and in analyzing the results as a consultant to the County and as a member of the Suffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan Steering Committee. The results of those studies are now available. They relate to many of the concerns that have been expressed in the Indian Point hearings.

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l The first study conducted in the Shoreham area dealt with the number of l

residents who might evacuate in the event of an emergency at the Shoreham plant.

The study was administered to a stratified random sample of 2,595 persons, and it indicated the following. If a minor emergency were declared at the Shoreham plant but no one in the immediate *icinity was advised to evacuate, some 215,000 families would leave anyway -- roughly 25% of the local population. If a small-scale emergency were declared and a limited evacuation was called for of those residents who live within 5 miles of the power plant, roughly 2,700 families, more than 289,000 families would leave instead -- 33% of the population.

If total evacuation were called for within a 10-mile radius of the plant, a measure that should affect 31,000 families, fully 430.000 families from all over Long Island would try to leave -- 50% of the general population.

The second study conducted in the Shoreham area dealt with volunteer firemen and school bus drivers,.two groups of people that are expected to play important roles in the local evacuation plan. In the first part of the study, 291 interviews were conducted by telephone with members of the five fire departments immediately surrounding the Shoreham plant. Approximately 60% of the members of those departments were involved. The research indicates that as many as two-thirds of the firemen would not be available on an Lamediate basis in the event of an emergency involving evacuation because they would look first to the safety of their families. In the second part of the study, 246 school bus drivers who work in the five school districts within ten miles of the Shoreham plant were also interviewed, this time by a self-administered questionnaire. Virtually all of the school bus drivers in the five-district area were contacted. The drivers were asked essentially the same question as had been posed to the firemen, and it is clear from their responses that 69% would not report to emergency du:y until they were assured that their families were safely out of the evacuation zone.

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These are striking and important findings. They indicate in the sharpest way that the number of people who can be expected to evacuate in the event of even a minor emergency is far larger than any previous estimates have allowed for, and they further-indicate that large numbers of people presently counted on to perform emergency duties of one' kind or another in the event of an emergency will simply not be available.

But can the findings from Suffolk and Nassau Counties be used to predict what might happen in the neighborhoods surrounding Indian Point? Quite obviously, the best.and most reliable procedure would be for the affected counties to commission a study along the lines of the one conducted by Suffolk County. In the absence of such studies, however, the data from Long Island form the best single indicator available anywhere of how the people living around Indian Point are likely to respond. For one thing, what people on Long Island say they are likely to do in the event of a future crisis matches almost exactly what the people living in the vicinity of Three Mile Island did in fact during a past crisis. In that emergency, some 2,500 people were advised to evacuate from neighborhoods within a 5-mile radius of the plant, but, instead 144,000 people from all over the countryside left. This suggests a more general pattern: if the neighborhoods surrounding Three Mile Island and the neighborhoods surrounding Shoreham are alike in their reactions and their fears, it is only prudent to assume that the neighborhoods surrounding Indian Point are similar -- especially since the evidence of what happened at Three Mile Island, and the. evidence available from the Suffolk County

't studies, are the only relevant sources of information to be found anywhere.

- Moreover, testimony already presented at the Indian Point hearings shows clearly that local officials are quite doubtful that emergency personnel will report to duty immediately, exactly because they will be concerned about their families. Experienced school bus drivers and volunteer firemen have testified to that effect,as well as a number of local officials, including the Commissioner 1

of the Department of Social Services of Westchester County, the Chief of Police 4

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,4, of the Village of Haverstraw, the Deputy Commissioner of Transportation of Westchester County, the Commissioner of the Department of Public Works of Westchester County, the Captain of the Ossining Volunteer Ambulance Corps, the Program Coordinator of the Putnam Association for Retarded Citizens, the Director or Lamp Rainbow at Croton, the Director of the Croton Recreation Department Day Camp, and the Senior Recreation Leader of the Town of Clarkstown.

The weight of the evidence available to date leaves no other conclusion possible: any evacuation plan that fails to take into account (a) the number of people who are likely to over-react in the event of an emergency, and (b) the number of emergency personnel who will help their families evacuate rather than report to duty, has to be regarded as sorely -- and dangerously -- inadequate.

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