ML20098D272

Comments on Commission 840905 Meeting Re Facilities,Per Sj Chilk 840911 Memo.Licensee Agrees W/Staff That Further Mitigative Features or Plant Shutdown Unnecessary Due to Low Risk.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20098D272
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	09/26/1984
From:	Brandenburg B, Levin J CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC., MORGAN ASSOCIATES, POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
References
SP, NUDOCS 8409270430
Download: ML20098D272 (15)

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00( KETEr USNnC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '84 SEP 26 P4:24 BEFORE THE COMMISSIONERS: LFilCt 0F SEGAtian Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman 00CKEit & ERv!u Thomas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal Lando W. Zech, Jr.

)

In the' Matter of )

)

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos.

NEW YORK, INC. ) 50-247 SP (Indian Point, Unit No. 2) ) 50-286 SP

)

. POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF )

NEW YORK ) September 26, 1984

_(Indian Point, Unit No. 3) )

)

LICENSEES' COMMENTS ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1984 COMMISSION MEETING REGARDING INDIAN POINT Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Con Edison)

-and-the Power Authority of the State of New York (Power Authority), licensees of Indian Point Units 2 and 3, respec-tively, hereby respond to the Nuclear Regulatory-Commission's (Commission's) invitation to submit comments on Staff's September 5, 1984 presentation to the Commission.

Memorandum from Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the 8409270430 840926 PDR ADOCK 05000247 9 PDR

- N a

r Commission, to All Parties in the Indian Point Special Proceeding (Sept. 11, 1984).1 Licensees agree with Staff that there is no need for further mitigative features or for a plant shutdown because the risks from the Indian Point plants are low and are small compared to non-nuclear risks. These conclusions are supported by sound engineering judgments and licensing practices, as well as by the thorough safety analyses conducted by Staff and licensees.

Licensees further agree with Staff that the Indian Point containments are among the best in their ability to withstand a highly unlikely core melt accident. Direct Testianony of Frank Rowsome and Roger Blond Concerning Commission Question 5 at (A) 27 (Rowsome/ Blond Testimony).

This is particularly significant because the performance of

- the containment in the unlikely event of such an accident is the critical determinant of whether there would be a release and, thus, whether public health could be affected. Staff.

noted that several features of the Indian Point containments are " unusually favorable," and found no containment features

" unfavorable." Summary of Staff Testimony on Risk at the Indian Point Special Proceeding, Sept. 5, 19 8 4, a t 4.1-4 .3

1. .Because the Commission requested comments on Staff's presentation, and enclosed a copy of the transcript as guidance, licensees have treated 10 C.F.R. S 9.103 (1984) as waived.

(Summary). In fact, Staff concluded that "the plant range of variation in the frequency ~of severe releases of radiation is probably larger . . . than the differences that could be attributed to a population site demography."

-Discussion of Indian Point Probabilistic Risk Assessment at 16 (Sept.~5, 1984) ( Discussion) .

While both licensees and~ Staff mathematically expressed their-conclusions regarding containment strength in proba-bilistic terms, these analyses are based upon standard structural engineering practices in the assessment of

-containment strength. Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study (IPPSS) Appendix 4.4.1. These analyses-demonstrate that the Indian Point containments can withstand an internal pressure of at least 141 psia before containment yielding could begin. Id. at ll. Staff reached a similar conclusion.1 Direct Testimony of James F. Meyer and W.

Trevor Pratt Concerning Commission Question 1, at III.B-19

-(Meyer/Pratt Testimony); see NUREG-0850, " Preliminary

1. The onset of yielding was conservatively assumed to be the failure pressure by both licensees and Staff.

Licensees' Testimony on Question One and Board Question 1.1 and Contention 1.1, at 77-78 (Licensees' Testimony on Question One); Direct Testimony of James F. Meyer and W.

Trevor Pratt Concering Commission Question 1, at III.B-19.

This high failure pressure is approximately 2.3 times the

' design basis accident pressure and is a result of many conservatisms in the original containment structure design due to industrial and Commission licensing-practices.

Licensees' Testimony on Commission Question One at 77-78; IPPSS Appendix 4.4.1 at 15.

Assessment of Core Melt Accidents at the Zion and Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants and Strategies for Mitigating Their Effects" at 3-2 (1981).

Staff credits the " rare basalt concrete" in the basemats of'the Indian Point containments as an important factor in the " extraordinarily good performance" of the containments. Discussion at 57. Licensees agree with Staff regarding the value of the basalt concrete. This type of concrete composition would limit the release of noncondensible gases in the unlikely event of loss of all containment cooling, thereby reducing the probability of an overpressurization failure and a subsequent atmospheric release. Meyer/Pratt Testimony at III.B-14.

Because of the high failure pressure of the contain-ments, their large volume, and the composition of the basemats, the probability of containment breach is extremely unlikely or remote. Discussion at 53-57. Staff concluded that "few" core melt accidents would " lead to substantial societal health consequences" and that "very few" would cause any early fatalities. Summary at 12.2.

In discussing the interfacing systems LOCA (the V sequence), Staff correctly points out that the special design features at Indian Point result "in substantially lower vulnerability for each of the Indian Point units than is typical of almost any other pressurized water reactor

[ PWR] '. " Discussion at 14. Thus, for the two accident sequences that dominate the risk for PWRs, slow over-pressurization accidents and the V sequence, the design of

-the Indian Point plants is superior to other PWRs.

Rowsome/ Blond Testimony at (A)l0-12, (A)25-26.

In its presentation, Staff also discussed the modeling of emergency planning for purposes of determining various lpossible accident consequences. Licensees and Staff agree that Staff's late relocation model is " extremely pessi-mistic" because it " assume [s] everybody was outdoors for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, nailed down to where they'd been when the accident happened." Discussion at 77. Because a radioactive release

-would not occur until at least 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> following a core melt accident, id. at 58, Staff's late relocation model actually assumes that no one would be evacuated for 36 to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. Licensees' Testimony of Thomas E. Potter on

-Commission Question Five at 6. This assumption clearly distorts the risk calculations. For example, 96 percent of Staff's calculated early fatality risk at Indian Point Unit 2 is due to use of this model. See Summary at 7.5. Had Staff used a more realistic evacuation model and eliminated a release category for a seismically-induced containment

'collapsel, Staff's early fatality risk calculations would be

l. While Staff's analysis includes a release category for a-seismically-induced containment collapse, Discussion

well below the Commission's Preliminary Safety Goal for early ' f.* *.alities . See Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,772, 10,774 (1983) (Quantitative Design Objectives). This margin below the Preliminary Safety Goal diminishes concerns about the' uncertainty in these calculations.

-Licensees also agree with Staff that the safety studies present " interesting implications for the effectiveness of evacuation as an emergency response tactic." Discussion at 78-79. Staff's conclusion that "[m]ost of the consequences look the same, no matter what [ emergency response] model we used," id, at 78, is supported by licensees' analyses of-alternative emergency responses. Power Authority's Proposed Findings of' Fact 235-238.1 Furthermore, Staff bases its risk estimates on the conservative source term methodology used in the Reactor at 61, licensees' witnesses-presented testimony demonstrat-u ing that this failure mode could not occur under conditions caused by any credible seismic event in the Indian Point vicinity. See Power Authority's Proposed Findings of Fact 81; Con Edison's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.1-83. Staff retained a failure mode for this accident because a detailed

. review ~of licensees' analysis had not been completed. Power Authority's Proposed Findings of Fact 82; Con Edison's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.1-84.

1. Additionally, licensees demonstrated that, using a more realistic source term, there would be no early

-fatalities, even assuming no evacuation or shelter for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following an accident. Licensees' Testimony of William R. Stratton, Walton A. Rodger, and Thomas E. Potter on Question One at 62.

Safety Study (RSS). Discussion at 4 2. Licensees and Staff agree that this methodology overstates the source term.

Licensees' Testimony of William R. Stratton, Walton A.

Rodger, and Thomas E. Potter on Question One at 9 (Stratton et al. Testimony); Testimony of Robert M. Bernero on Severe Accident Source Terms at 3. These overly conservative source. terms lead to overestimates of the consequences of various accidents, particularly early fatalities at densely populated sites. .Stratton et al. Testimony at 5.

Licensees also agree with Staff's position on relative risk: the issue of whether the Indian Point plants pose a "ditproportionate share of the risk" is a "[ moot] question" because the absolute risk is so low. Discussion at 69;

• Licensees' Testimony on'Ouestion One and Board Question 1.1

[

and Contention 1.1, at 23. Even using RSS-type source terms, the early fatality risk at Indian Point Unit 2 is p below the Commission's Preliminary Safety Goal by a factor of 70 (one part in 70,000 of the non-nuclear early fatality risk), and the comparable risk is below the Preliminary Safety Goal by a factor of 75 for Indian Point Unit 3 (one part in 75,000 of the non-nuclear early fatality risk).

. Licensees' Testimony of Dennis C. Bley, Donald F.

Paddleford, Thomas E. Potter, and Dennis C. Richardson on l Commission Question Five at 5-6, 7 (Table 1) (Bley et al.

Testimony); cf. 48 Fed. Reg. at 10,774.

i

The latent fatality risk at Indian Point Unit 2 is below the Preliminary Safety Goal by a f actor of 165 (one partein 165,000 of the non-nuclear cancer risk), and Indian Point Unit 3 is.below this Preliminary Safety Goal by a factor of 710 (one part in 710,000 of the non-nuclear cancer risk). Bley et'al. Testimony at 6, 7 (Table 1); cf. 48 Fed. Reg. at 10,774. Staff stated that, even considering uncertainties, possible errors in the risk assessment, and the combined risk from both plants, it is extremely unlikely that the Indian Point plants pose a latent fatality risk anywhere near the Commission's Preliminary Safety Goal.

Rowsome/ Blond Testimony at B-15 to B-16; Discussion at 85.

Commissioner Bernthal has requested that, at the next meeting, Staff discuss additional mitigative or preventive features. Discussion at 94-95. In licensees' view, any

' discussion of features'not examined by the parties and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board during the hearings would be inappropriate. Staff and licensees are in agreement that voluntary plant modifications implemented by licensees have significantly reduced the likelihood of a severe release.

Discussion at 81. Additionally, the use of more realistic

-,,ww,.,-w- - -1,= o ,9ms--om-- ---e- ~ ~ - " vwe ~~ wtw- '

source terms significantly reduces the value of such

. mitigative or preventive features.1 Stratton et al.

Testimony at 63-64.

In conclusion, the parties have commented fully upon the issues raised during the proceeding. Not only did all parties file extensive proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, but they have submitted comments to the Commission at its request upon the Recommendations of the Atomic Safety and Licensing-Board 2 and specifically upon

1. Licensees continue to object to the Safety Assurance Program (SAP) proposed by Staff and adopted by the Board in its Recommendations. The record of the proceeding provides no basis for requiring the implementation of such a major new program at the Indian Point units. Moreover, SAP is unnecessary to achieve compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations or with its Preliminary Safety Goals and, "[i]n fact, at Indian Point significant safety improve-ments have been made" on.a voluntary basis. Recommendations to the Commission at 40 n.19 (Oct. 24, 1983).

, 2. See, e.g, Licensee's Comments on the Recommenda-tions of the Indian Point Special Proceeding Licensing Board (Feb. 6, 1984); Intervenors' Comments on Licensing Board Recommendations on Indian Point tinits 2 and 3 (Feb. 6, 1984); NRC Staff's Comments Concerning Licensing Board

, Recommendations (Feb. 6, 1984); Parents Concerned About Indian Point's Comments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the Recommendations of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ( Fe b. 2, 1984).

Chairman Gleason's dissent.1 Staff's September 5, 1984

. presentation made clear that the risks ~from the Indian Point plants are low and that no additional mitigative features

are necessary.

f E

t'

1. See, e.g., Power Authority's Response to the Com-mission's Order of~ July 30, 1984 (Aug. 13, 1984); Con Edison's Comments on the Licensing Board Chairman's Dissent in the Recommendations of the Indian Point Special Proceeding (Aug.

13, 1984); NRC Staff Response to the Commission's, order of Jt'ly 30, 1984 (Aug. 13, 1984); Union of Concerned Scientists Comments on Judge Gleason's Dissent ( Aug. 13, 1984).

i

c Respectfully submitted, CfD b b e i

AOC nQnD . 'n_/-

- Brent L. Brandenburg Ass i stant General Cou. 1 Charleh Morgan, Jr.

Paul F. Colarulli l $(

Joseph J. Levin, J r.

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY MORGAN ASSOCIATES, CHARTERED OF NEW YORK, INC. 1899 L Street, N.W.

Licensee of Indian Point Washington, D.C. 20036

' Unit 2 (202) 466-7000 4 Irving Place New York,-New York 10003 Stephen L. Baum

_ (212) 460-4600 General Counsel Charles M. Pratt Assistant General Counsel POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Licensee of Indian Point Unit 3 10 Columbus sircle New York, New York 10019 (212) 397-6200 Bernard D. Fischman Michael Curley Richard F. Czaja David H. Pikus SHEA & GOULD 330 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10017 (2)2) 370-G000 f

ms.

CCLKQED OSNh i

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '84 9EP 26 P4 :24 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION en Before the Commissioners: h,e.-rQg;T n e$$ivi Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman 3 RANCH Thomas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal Lando W. Zech, Jr.

)

In the Matter of )

)

-CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos.

NEW YORK, INC. ) 50-247 SP (Indian Point, Unit No. 2) ) 50-286 SP

)

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF ) September 26, 1984 NEW-YORK )

(Indian Point, Unit No. 3) )

- ' )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 26th day of September, 1984, I caused a copy of Licensees' Comments on September 5, 1984 Commission Meeting Regarding Indian Point to be served tur hand on those marked with an asterisk, and by first class mail, postage prepaid, on all others:

• Nunzio J..Palladino, Chairman

• Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555

• Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts

• Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555

• Commissioner James K. Asselstine Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

James P. Gleason, Chairman Charles M. Pratt, Esq.

Administrative 1 Judge Stephen L. Baum, Esq.

' Atomic Safety'and Licensing Board Power Authority of the 513 Gilmoure-Drive State of New York

' Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019

.Mr. Frederick J. Shon Administrative Judge Janice Moore, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of the Executive Commission Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

.Dr. Oscar H. Paris

Administrative Judge Brent L. Brandenburg, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Assistant General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consolidated Edison Company

Commission of New York, Inc.

Washington, D.C. 20555_ 4 Irving Place

? _ .

New York, New York 10003

• Docketing and Service Branch Office of the Secretary Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission William S. Jordan, III, Esq.

Washir.gton, D.C. 20555 Harmon - and Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W., Suite 506 Jcan Holt, Project. Director Washington, D.C. 20006 Indian Point Project New York Public Interest Research Charles A. Scheiner, Co-Chairperson

~ Group Westchester People's Action 9 Murray Street- Coalitior., Inc.

New York, New York 10007 P.O. Box 488 White Plains, New York 10602 Jeffrey M. Blum, Esq. .

.New York University Law School Alan Latman, Esq.

423 Vanderbilt Hall 44 Sunset Drive 40 Washington Square South Croton-On-Hudson, New York 10520 New York, New York 10012 Ezra I. Bialik, Esq.

Charles J. Maikish, Esq. Steve Leipzig, Esq.

fLitigation Division Environmental Protection Bureau The Port Authority of New York New York State Attorney and New Jersey. General's Office

.One-World. Trade Center Two World Trade Center New York, New York 10048 New York, New York 10047 Andrew P. O'Rourke Westchester County Executive 148 Martine Avenue White Plains, New York 10601 Andrew S. Roffe, Esq.

New York State Assembly Albany, New York 12248

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.~

l fMarc L L. Parris,T Esq.: Atomic Safety and Licensing Eric 'Thorse n ,--_Esq . Board Panel

'CountysAttorney . U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission iCounty'of Rockland Washington, D.C.- 20555

-ll: New- Hemp stead 1 Road

NewJCity,

New 3 York 10956. Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal-Board Panel

~Phyllis Rodriguez, Spokesperson U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission

. Parents Concerned'About Indian. Washington, D.C. 20555 Point 1P.O. Box 125 .

Honorable Richard L. Brodsky Croton-on-Hudson,:New-York- 10520 Member of the County Legislature

. Westchester County

.:Renee_ Schwartz, Esq.

. County Cffice Building-

-Paul'Chessin, Esq._ White Plains, New York.'10601 Laurens.R._ Schwartz,.Esq.

-Margaret Oppel, Esq. 'ZipporahLS. Fleisher 4

"Botein, Hays,LSklar.and Hertzberg . West Branch Conservation 2200 Park-Avenue, Association New York, New York 10166- 443 Buena Vista Road New City, New York 10956 Honorable' Ruth W.JMessinger L Member of lthe Council'of the Mayor George V. Begany

.. City of New York. _ Village of Buchanan

' District #4 236-Tate Avenue City Hall- . .

Buchanan, New York 10511

=New York, New York 10007-Judith Kessler, Coordinator--

' Greater New1 York Council Rockland Citizens for Safe Energy on Energy 300 New Hemstead Road

-c/o Dean'R.'Corren, Director. New City,.New York 10956 New York University- .

126:Stuyvesant: Street David H. Pikus, Esq.

New York, New York 10003 Richard F, Czaja,-Esq.

Shea & Gould Joan Miles -330-Madison-Avenue w-Indian Point Coordinator New York,'New York 10017 New York City Audubon' Society

,? 71 West 23rd Street, Suite 1828 Amanda Potterfield, Esq.

. lNed' York, New York'10010' New York Public Intere">t Research Group, Inc.

Richard

^

M.- Hartzman, Esq. - 9 Murray Street, 3rd Floor' Lorna'Salzman New York, New' York 10007 Mid-Atlantic: Representative Friends of'the Earth, Inc. David R. Lewis, Esq.

208 West 13th Street Atomic Safety and

'New< York,LNew York-100ll Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory LStanley!B. Klimberg, Esq. .

Commission General Counsell Washington, D.C. 20555 New-York State Energy Office 2 Rockefeller' State Plaza

' Albany,fNew: York 12223--

T: ..

Mr.~ Donald Davidoff Director, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group Empire State Plaza Tower Building, Rm.1750 Albany, New York 12237 Craig Kaplan,- Esq.

National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee 175 Fifth Avenue,' Suite 712 New York, New York- 10010 Michael D. Diederich, Jr. , Esq.

Attorney-At-Law 11 South Highland Avenue (Route 9W)

Nyack, New York 1096f-Steve.t C. Sholly Union of Concerned Scientists 1346 Connecticut Aven2e, N.W.

Suite 1101 Washington, D.C. 20036 Spence W. Perry-Office of General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20472 Stewart M. Glass Regional Counsel Room 1349 -

Federal Emergency Management Agency

- 26 Federal Plaza

- New York, New York 10278

-Melvin Goldberg Staff. Attorney New York Public Interest Research Group 9.Murray_ Street New York, New York 10007 Jonathan L. Levine, Esq.

P . O'. Box 280 New City, New York 10958 f

L I E jyp Joseph J. Levin, J r. '

_,