ML20082J181

Feedwater Sparger Crack Growth Assessment

ML20082J181
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	12/31/1990
From:	Deaver G, Parker S, Pyron J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20082J180	List: ML20082J177 ML20082J181
References
DRF-#B11-00509, DRF-#B11-509, RDE-46-1290, NUDOCS 9108270225
Download: ML20082J181 (27)

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RDE 46-1290 DRP #D11-00509 DRUNSWICK DTEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1 FEEDWATER SPARGER CRACK GROWTH ASSESPMENT DECEMBER 1990 PREPARED BY 4'b J. W. PYRON,) PRINCIPAL ENGINEER REA7f0R COM[0NENT DESIGN VERIFIEDBY:(I'h2 t p /4)f2e[*O S. K. PARKER, ENGINEER REACTOR COMPONENT DESIGN REVIEWED BY: /2. N we I/I/2"M-9O A. R. SMITH, SOUTilERN REGION LICENSING SERVICES MANAGER APPROVED BY , O 4 (f_w --- - (L /2o / '[O G. A.' DEAVER, MANAGER / /

REACTOR COMPONENT DESIGN 9100270225 DR 910022 p ADOCK 0D00032S PDR

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING CONTENTS OF THIO REPORT PLEASE R2hD CAREFULLY This report was prepared by GE Nuclear Energy solely for Carolina Power & Light Company. The information contained in this report is believed by GE Nuclear Energy to be an accurato and true representation of the facts known, obtainod or provided to GE Nuclear Energy at the timo this report was preparod.

The only undertakings of GE Nuclear Energy respecting information in this document are contained in the Work Authorization ZS70020044 (Task 1) of Master Agreement ZM70020000 betwoon CP&L and GE Company. The use of this information except as defined by said proposal, or for any purpose other than that for which it is intended is not authorized and with respect to any such unauthorized use, neither GE Nuclear Energy nor any of the contributors to this document makes any representation or warranty (express or implied) as to the completeness, accuracy, or usefulness of the information contained in this document or that use of such information may not infringo privately owned rights; nor do they assumo any responsibility for liability of damage of any kind which may result from such uso of such information.

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1. INTRODUCTION & DUKKARY The currently installed feedwater spargers at the Brunswick Unit 1 plant have a singic row of sido drilled holes in the six inch diameter sparger header pipes. There are 36 side drillcd holos in each of the four feedwater spargers which have various sitou for balancing the flow distribution around the circumference of the reactor vessel. This flow distribution is important in order to maintain a uniform power distribution within the reactor core, one phenomenon which has been observed in this type of sparger is radial cracking at the side drilled flow holes. This cracking has been previously evaluated to be caused by thermal fatigue which results from the turbulent flow condition as the flow exits the sparger at a lower temperature than the reactor vessel.

During startup, the most extreme 1.umperature differentials are experienced when the reactor vousel fluid is at 5500F and the feedwater sparger flow can be as low as 100 0P. After startup, the feedwater heaters are in operation and the temperature of the feedwater flow increases to approximately 420 00. An initial assessment previously concluded that the cracking should arrest as the cracks propagate away from the edge of the hole. Actual experience has shown that propagation of the longest cracks does reduce to a very slow rate, but that it is possible to have crack lengths which are larger than originally predicted. The most plausible explanation for this behavior is that the cracks are initiated by the turbulent flow discharge transients at the flow heles and are propagated beyond the self limiting length by intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) due to the

. creviced environment created by the crack surfaces.

The foodwater sparger is not a safety related component and the cracking will not affect the safety of the plant. While the potential for loose parts is not of immediate concern, a likely concern in the future would be for small segments of pipe becoming looso around the flow holes. This and other scenarios are discussed in the safety analysis portion of the report.

A calculation was performed to ancertain the potential change in onthalpy balanco due to the loss of sogironts of pipe from the 450 sparger at 5 difforent oxit holes. The pieces were postulated based on the crack patterns observed at the current outage. The results of this calculation show that the postulated lost segments cause the enthalpy balance to redistributo slightly but still remain within General Electric's specified design limits for rated flow conditions.

Based on analysis results and the observed crackino behavior history of BWit plants with side oxit flow helo icedwater spargers, it is acceptable to operate Brunswick Unit 1 at least another cycle with the o: imting feedwater spargers without any repairs.

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2. CRACKING CAUSES Thermal stress, fatigue, and fracture mechanics analyses of the feedwater sparger flow hole region have been performed in Reference 1. Two thermal transients were studied and were found to be capable of initiating and propagating flow hole fatiguo cracks. A high cycle thermal transient caused by " unstable dischargo" (turbulent flow) at the flow holes is the nost likely cause for crack initiation and was found to be self limiting after a growth of approximately 0.2 inchen. An " infrequent startup" transient was also found capable of initiating cracks and, while not self limiting in growth behavior, is -- expected to be a primary contributor due to the limited number of c"cles likely to occur. Once cracks are initiated, another potentral cause for continued cracking would be from intorgranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) driven by oxide wedging. This behavior is further enhanced neer weld joints such as f ound at the " Tee" fitting where wold residual stresses may still exist.

The feedwater aparger circumferential cracks, which were recently found by liquid penetrant examinations adjacent to tho

• g too-to-header arm weld scam, are not directly related to flow hole cracking. Although some of the circumferential cracks link with flow hole cracks, soveral others do not connect with flow holes. Since thia weld was not post wold heat treated, residual stresses are known to be present. The most plausible explanation for the above behavior is that the circumferential cracks are primarily related to thermal f atigue of the residual stress zone with the driving mechanism being thermal cycling of stratified water in the lower half of the feodwater sparger (below the flow holes). In all cases, the cracking is located at the lower half of the sparger pipe. Cracking at the wold interface is the expected location due to the discontinuity at the weld edge and the presence of weld residual stresses. Residual stresses are known to limit the fatigue life of components from both experimental and field experience. These cracks are expected to be through wall.

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3. PREVIOUS DWR EXPERIENCE reedwater flow hole cra: king in Boiling Water Heactoru (EWR's) has boon monitored by General Electric since 1979. Prior to 1979, several instances of flow hole cracking were observed but those apargers were subsequently replaced with an itnproved top mounted nozzle design. Table 1 summarizec the crack history at the feedwater sparger flow hole region for all applicabic BWR's which currently have sido exit flow holes. The most significant cracking data is provided by the BWR-4 type plants listed.

Brunswick Units 1&2 (Plants 11 & G) have experienced flow hole cracking since 1979 and 1982 respectively. Small cracks were discovered in the outermost flow hole of the 3150 sparger at Plant I in a recent 1989 outage inspection. Iloweve r, Plants D and F huve not detected flow hele cracks after 16-18 years of operation. The other listed plants are of limited use to the data base due to either the uniqueness of the decign or limited operation time.

Flow hole cracking at the Brunswick reactors has been observed to be of two types. Most cracks emanate radially from the flow holes. The cracks observed in the sparger arms, away from the

" Tee" section holes, appear as a " sunburst" pattern as seen in Figure 1. These are consistent with the cracks predicted to occur in the Reference 1 theoretical analysis. The cracks observed at the flow holes in the welded "Teo" fitting are observed to be of two different types. In addition to the

" sunburst" pattern, cracks are also present which follow along the edge of the horizontal welded scam as shown in rigure 1.

These cracks are likely the result of weld residual stresses not fully relieved by solution heat treatment.

Circumferential feedwater sparger crack indications were noted following liquid penetrant examinations during the current outage. These cracks are located along the tec-to-header arm

circumferential weld seam as seen in Appendix A. Since previous Brunswick i feedwater exams have been visual only, the growth rate for the circumferential indications is not known; i.e., due to the location of the cracks at the edge of the weld seams and the tightness of the cracks, they have probably existed for several operating cycles. As discussed in Section 2, these cracks are likely due to thermal fatigue of the welded interface where weld residual stresses already exist and thermal cycling of stratified water in the sparger takes place.

i 4. REVIEW OF DRUNSWICK 1 INSPECTION DATA As previously mentioned, flow hole cracking of the feedwater spargers at Brunswick 1 was first observed in 1979. Since then, the spargers have been visually inspected at each refueling outage. In 1988, a detailed visual examination was performed to establish a baseline measurement of the most evident feedwater sparger flow hole cracks. A liquid penetrant oxamination was conducted for the first time during the current refueling outage to establish a more quantitative assesament of the crack propagation occurring. A comparison cf these last two inspections verifles that slow crack growth is occurring at the flow holes. Generally, the longest length flow hole cracks show little or no evidence of continuing growth. Detectable crack growth is more readily indicated on the cracks which had shorter lengths in 1988. Also, at this time there have not been any loose segments of the sparger header pipe as a result of the cracking. However, cracking on the 45 0 sparger has propagated to link several cracks thereby creating a potential for lost parts as seen in the Appendix A photographs. Possible flow hole crack linking occurs to a much lesser extent on the other 3 spargers.

Based on the photographs of the liquid penetrant exam ISI-90-SN735, Report No. R-052, potential loose parts are postulated for analysis as follows:

Component Flow Hole # Loose Part Description 45 deg sparger 14 1/2"x1/2"x1/4" triangular, 0.4" thick 45 deg sparger 16 1/4"x1/4" rectangular, 0.4" thick 45 deg sparger 21 3/4"x3/8" rectangular, 0.4" thick 45 deg sparger 30 1/4"x1/4"x1/4" triangular, 0.4" thick 45 deg sparger 32 3/8"x3/8" rectangular, 0.4" thick l

5. BAFETY EVALUATION The topics which require discusulon for the feedwater flow hole cracks are the sparger structural integrity, flow distribution and loose parts.

5.1 Structural Integrity The feedwater sparger is not a safety related component and there will be no effect on the reactor vessel pressure boundary integrity. For feedwater sparger flow hole cracking, the two potential scenarios are that small fragments of pipe material will becomo loose at flow holes or that a full circumferential crack of the sparger pipe will occur. The most likely near term event would be to lose small fragments of pipe material. In this case, the structural integrity of thq feedwater sparger header pipe will not be adversely affected. The stresses in the feedwater sparger are primarily produced by hydraulic loads, pressure differential loads, and thermal gradients. Since the sparger pressure differential is relatively low, the hydraulic and pressure stresses in the sparger header pipe are not significant. Losing a segment of material at flow holes weakens the cross section; however, this alone will not affect the structural integrity of the feedwater sparger header pipe. The thermal gradients in the feedwater sparger cause secondary stresses which will not advercely affect the structural integrity of the header pipe. Locally, in the area where a segment has become dislodged, the flow will be turbulent and may initiate new thermal fatigue cracks on these surfaces. An additional consideration is the presence of the flow hole cracks remaining at locations after losing a segment. Some of these cracks may propagate faster when the segment is missing due to hydraulic forces and could eventually cause additional loose parts. In conclusion, for the case where small segments separate from the

header pipe, the structural integrity of the feedwater header pipe will not be adversely affected.

The other scenario involving full circumferential cracking of a header pipe is not considered a probable near term event. None of the cracks oriented in the circumferential direction are long enough to expect full cracking of a header cross-section within the next operating cycle. Even in this scenario, no loose parts are likely to result within the reactor vessel because of the pinned end connections to the reactor vessel. However, flow distribution would be significantly affected and would be detected by the core instrumentation. There is a potential for flow impinging on the reactor pressure vessel wall which could result in vessel cracking.

5.2 Flow Distribution The basic functional requirement for the feodwater spargers is to distribute the feedwater uniformly within the reactor so that it will form a homogeneous mixture with the reactor recirculating coolant water. The feedwater must be distributed and mixed with the recirculating saturated water discharged from the steam separators and dryers to provide adequate net positive suction head by subcooling at the inlet to the jet pumps to prevent cavitation. The most demanding requirement for uniformity of mixing results from the need to have a uniform temperature mixture entering the reactor core to prevent asymmetrical core power distribution. The design requirement is to maintain the core inlet enthalpy uniform within plus or minus 0.2 percent from average enthalpy.

For the flow hole cracking problem, the near term condition which may occur is the loss of several small segments of material at flow holes on the sparger header sections. The additional flow area created by these lost segments will cause more flow to

exit at the affected holes. To evaluate this condition, a calculation was performed to ascertain the change in enthalpy balance due to the loss of flow hole pieces using the HEATRO2 computer program (Reference 2). This calculation simulated the loss of 5 different pieces at the 45 0 sparger exit holes 6, 14, 16, 21, 30 & 32 and compared the results with those for the existing, intact spargers. The results of these calculations show that the lost segments cause the enthalpy balance to redistribute slightly but remain within General Electric's specified design limits for both 100% and 105% rated flow conditions; the core inlet enthalpy remained uniform within plus or minus 0.2 per cent, and the maximum pressure drop across the sparger did not change appreciably.

5.3 Loose Parts As mentioned previously, the recent liquid penetrant examination of the Brunswick Unit 1 feedwater spargers has revealed numerous cracks emanating from the side drilled flow holes. Some of the resulting crack patterns cross and create a potential for loose parts formation. This evaluation addresses the safety concerns associated with the postulated event that pieces break off from the feedwater spargers during plant operation and become loose inside the reactor vessel.

The postulated loose parts were previously defined to be:

One triangular piece, 1/2" by 1/2" by 1/4".

One square piece, 1/4" by 1/4".

One rectangular piece, 3/4" by 3/8".

One triangular piece, 1/4" by 1/4" by 1/4".

One square piece, 3/8" by 3/8".

The above pieces are 0.4" thick and are made from a stainless steel material. These pieces, which could separate from the sparger, are likely to end up resting on the shroud support

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j shelf. It would also be possible, but unlikely, for small pieces

( to enter into the jet pump or the recirculation suction nozzle.

A segment passing through the pump would enter the vessel bottom head area and remain there since there is not enough lift to carry it upward to the orificed fuel support casting. Fragments entering the recirculation piping from the suction nozzle would pass through the recirculation pump and, depending on size, would either get caught in the jet pump inlet mixer nozzle or reach the vessel bottom head. Pieces which reach the shroud support shelf or the vessel bottom head will not cause a safety problem, and no significant damage to other components should occur. Although unlikely, any larger pieces which are caught in the jet pump inlet mixer would cause a change in the pressure reading on the jet pump instrumentation. The blocked inlet mixer will indicate a lower than normal flow reading and the adjacent inlet mixer on the same riser will have a higher than normal reading. Other BWR plants which have had flow blockages in an inlet mixer have been able to remove the object at the next outage and no damage to the inlet mixer has been observed. There is, however, some potential for erosion which is dependent on the size and shape of the object and the flow characteristics of the jet pump.

In order to cause fuel bundle flow blockage, the parts must be lifted by the recirculation flow from the vessel lower plenum and carried toward a fuel support casting. Since the diameter of the fuel support casting inlet orifice at Brunswick 1 ranges from 1.5" to 2.4", all the parte are capable of flowing through and would subsequently be trapped at the lower tie plate. Assuming that all the potential loose parts migrate to the same bundle (out of a total of 560 bundles in the core), the maximum flow blockage at the lower tie plate is less than 6% and significantly less than that required to initiate boiling transition in the blocked bundle (86% or more flow blockage). If properly oriented, it is possible that the loose parts can migrate past the lower tie plate openings and into the fuel bundle. The parts would then be caught at a bundle spacer. Prolonged operation may I

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rcsult in a remote chance of fuel cladding fretting wear which would be limited to the contact area of the parts and the cdjacent rod. Any such potential fuel clad waar which leads to fuel cladding perforation would be detected by off-gas emissions and mitigated by appropriate operator actions. Therefore, it is concluded that there is no potential for significant fuel bundle flow blockage and subsequent fuel damage resulting from the postulated loose pieces.

To cause a potential for interference with control rod operation, the postulated loose parts must migrate through the length of the fuel bundle, exit at the top of the core and reverse direction against the flow to fall into a control rod guide tube via the bypass region. The probability for any parts to complete this tortuous path is negligible. Therefore, there is no potential for interference with control rod operation.

5.4 Confirmation With 10CFR50.59 The feedwater sparger flow hole cracks observed in Brunswick Unit 1 do not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59. A review of the structural integrity, loose parts probability and materials confirms that: (1) the probability of the occurrence of, or the consequence of an accident are not increased; (2) the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated is not created; and (3) the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is not reduced.

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5,5 continued operation Based on the analyses performed, which are discussed in this report, and the results of the 1990 inspections of the Brunswick Unit i feedwater sparger flow hole crack region, it is considered acceptable to operate with the existing feedwater spargers for another fuel cycle.

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6. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS Baced on previous analysis and observed cracking behavior in the flow hole region of the feedwater sparger, it in concluded that the cracks will grow at a very slow rate and do not present a safoty concern. The feedwater sparger is not a safety related component and the cracking will not affect the safety of the plant. In the event that small segments of the pipe around the flow holes become loose, the change in flow distribution will not result in an unacceptable core enthalpy distribution. The circumferential cracking indications at the tec-to-header weld cOams are not of sufficient length to affect the structural integrity of the feedwater sparger; however, anather liquid p:netrant exam should be conducted at the next scheduled refueling outage to enable a quantitative assessment of the crack growth rate. An ultrasonic examir.ation of a local area is recommended in order to determine if the cracking is through wnll.

Based on the above, it is acceptable to operate Brunswick Unit 1 for another cycle with the existing feedwater spargers without any repairs. To reduce the potential of small segments of pipe around the flow holes becoming loose, a modification to limit the crack growth rate of the segment should be considered. Liquid penetrant sparger examinations and ultrasonic testing should be undertaken at future outages to insure that flow hole and/or circumferential cracking has not progressed to a stage requiring complete sparger replacements. Also, contingencies should be developed for the event where complete feedwater sparger replacement becomes necessary.

7. REFERENCES

1. S. R. Sharma and P. C. Riccardella, "Foodwater Sparger Hole Thermal Stress Analysis", RA WRSA-76-04, General Electric Internal Report, 3/12/76.

2. A. B. Burgess, "HEATRO2 Computer Program, Technical Description, Qualification, and Users Manual", NEDE-25158, December, 1979.

BVR PLANT FEEDWATER SPARGER FLOW HOLE CRACK HISTORY Plant Commercial Flow Hole Cracking

• I. D. Crack Growth History /Coments L Tspe Startup _First Reported _

Not Reported Square cross section sparger; double row flow holes.

A&B BWR-2 12/69 Carbon steel material.

Not App.. cable Has had periodic sparger changeouts which liinits data C BWR-3* 4/71 base information.

BWR-4 11/72 No cracks as of No cracks found in 1986 (extensive visual exam).

D 5/86 Inspection None Reported Spargers changed out in 1974; no cracks reported E BWR-4* 11/72 since.

No cracks as of No cracks in 1983 penetrant exam; also none noted F BWR-4 2/75 @ visual exams through 1989.

1989 Inspection Cracks noted in Cracks growing slowly; 1989 last inspection.

G BWR-4 1/76 2" maximum crack length (hole-to-hole) @ horizontal 1982 Outage Inspection Tee weld seam.

Cracks noted in Cracks growing slowly; 1990 last inspection.

H BWR-4 3/77 Circumferential indications noted @ 1990 liquid 1979 Outage Inspection penetrant exam along tee-header veld seam.

BWR-4* 8/78 Cracks noted in Three small radial cracks initiated in outermost flow I '

hole of 315 sparger.

1989 Outage Inspection None Reported Limited reactor operation time.

J BWR-5 6/84

• Denotes Foreign Reactor FIGURE I .

BWR FEEDWATER SPARGER FLOW HOLE CRACK PATTERNS TEE FLOW HOLES " SUNBURST" CRACKS fbob g dQj HEADER ARM HEADER ARM '"

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BRUNSWICK Ut:IT 1 FEEDWATER SPARGER LIQUID PENETRANT EXAMINATION PHOTOGRAPHS

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PROJECT NO: ISI-90-S'4735 WELD / COMPONENT NO. SII BElfM Procedure No. GE-PT-100 Rev. O FRR No. N/A l

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M AT E RI AL SURFACE CONDITION ITEM

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