ML20128H832
| ML20128H832 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1992 |
| From: | CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128H699 | List: |
| References | |
| DBD-37, DBD-37-R01, DBD-37-R1, NUDOCS 9302170175 | |
| Download: ML20128H832 (89) | |
Text
g CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PROJECT - UNITS 1 11D 2 DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT CONTROL BUILDING REATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM DoctMDIT NO.
DBD-37 REVISION 1
-r PreparedBy[Dato Rev. I Verified By/ Data Approved By/ Data 44,Az/d L % k s A l A & """%VctsMt i
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-9302170175 930200 PDR P.
ADOCK 05000324 PDR
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 11 Revision 1 j.
RECORD OF REVISION REVISION DATE SECTIONS REVISED
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES 1
12/19/92 All Incorporated changes implemonted by PM 91-055, included validation report e
comments, and numerous revisions to bring docum6At into compliance with the writers guide and standard format of other approved D3Ds.
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CBRVAC System DBD-37 Page iv Revision 1 l TOREWORb The Brunswick Nuclear Project Design Basis Documents (DBDs) are intended for-the primary use of the NED design engineer.
Additional personnel expected to use this document for design basis reference would include Technical Support, Licensing and Regulatory Compliance personnel, to provide consistency in the content of the BNP DBDs, a system's design basis is defined to consist oft 1.
System Functional Requirements 2.
Regulatory Requirements / Commitments Relative to System Design 3.
Original Design Codes / Standards of Record (unless clearly superseded by a regulatory commitment to a later code / standard).
To assist the user and provide clarification on certain aspects of the system, information that does not meet the definition of design basis may be included in this document.
The Brunswick DBDs are formatted, however, to-avoid confusion for the intended user, clearly differentiating the system design basis from supporting information by underlining design basis statements.
The Brunswick DBDs are written with an extensive use of references to
% supplement the document text.
Prior to changing any design information in -
this DBD, the user should review all related references to assure an understanding of the context from which the reference was extracted. The inclusion of information subject to frequent revision has been intentionally limited in this document.
Industry issues such as Appendix R and Regulatory Guide 1.97, as well as topics such as shielding and ALARA, are common to Ruitiple systems. Specific system design requirements imposed by such " generic issues" are often complex and have been addressed in separate generic issue design basis documents.. The generic issue documents are referenced, as appropriate, within this document.
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CBliVA0 Syetem -DBD-37 Page-v-Revision 1}
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Description Pago Approval Page i
Record of Revision il List of Effective Pages 11 Foreword iv Table of Contents v
0.0 INTRODUCTION
1 0.1 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION 1
0.2 SYSTEM PURPOSE 2-0.3 SYSTEM SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES 5
0.4 DEFINITIONS, ADBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS 7
0.4.1 DEFINITIONS 7
0.4.2 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 12 1.0 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 14 1.1 GENERAL SYSTEM FUNCTION 14 1.1.1 HABITABILITT 14 1.1.2 TEMPERATURE CONTROL 15 1.1.3 CONTROL OF TLAMMABLE VAPORS 15 1.2 SYSTEM INTERFACES 16 1.2.1 SUPPORTING SYSTEMS 16 1.2.2 SUPPORTED SYSTEMS 17 1.3 TRANSIENT RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 17 1.3.1 UTSAR CHAPTER 15 TRANSIENTS 17 1.3.2 CHLORINE RELEASE EVENT 16 1.3.3 TIRE PROTECTION / APPENDIX R TRANSIENTS 18 1.3.4 STATION BLACKOUT 18 2.0 REGULATORY IMPOSED DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 19 2.1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 19 2.1.1 GDC 1 19 2.1.2 GDC 2 20 2.1.3 CDC J 20 2.1.4 GDC 4 21 2.1.5 GDC 5 21 2.1.6 GDC 19
'22 2.2 ADDITIONAL REGULATORY COMMITMENTS 23 2.2.1 QUALITY ASSURANCE FROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 23 2.2.2 RABITABILITT REQUIREMENTS 23 2.2.3 MISCELLANEOUS REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 25 2.3 CODES / STANDARDS OF RECORD 27 y
2.3.1 ANS\\ ANSI \\ASME STANDARDS 27 2.3.2 ZEEE STANDARDS 28 3.0 SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 30 3.1 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 30 3.1.1 GENERAL
'30 3.1.2 SUBSYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 31 3.1.3 DETECTION AND AUTOMATIC EVENTS, CHLORINE' 32 3.1.4 DETECTION AND A01DMATIC EVENTS, RADIATION 33 3.1.5 DETECTION AND AUTOMATIC EVENTS, SMOKE / TIRE
.34 3.1.6 SINGLE TAILURE SUPPORTING INFORMATION 35 3.1.7 REGULATORT GUIDE 1.97, REVISION 2 INSTRUMENTATION 36 3.2 ELECTRICAL 36 3.3 MECHANICAL 37 3.3.1 GENERAL \\ CODES AND STANDARDS FOR SYSTEM DESIGN 37 conn
I CBHVAC System DBD-37
, Page vi'_l-Revision 1
-3.3.2 ENERQENCY AIR ' FILTRATION SUBSYSTEM ' REQUIREMENTS 38i 3.3.3 CONTROL ROOM NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS' 39 3.3.4 BATTERY ROOM VENTILATION REQUIREMENTS
'39 3.4'
. CIVIL / STRUCTURAL 40' 3.4.1 CENERAL.
40 3.4.2 SHIELDING CRITERIA 41 3.4.3 SEISMIC CRITERIA 42-3.4.4 PROTECTION FROM FLOODING AND RAIN 42 3.4.5 TORNADO PROTECTION 43 3.4.6 PROTECTION FROM INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES 43^
3.4.7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 44^
3.5 MATERIALS / CHEMISTRY 44 3.6 GENERAL' 44 3.6.1 MISCELLANEOUS
.44-3.6.2
. CONTROL ROOM NORMAL VENTILATION SUBSYSTEM 46' 3.6.3 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY TILTRATION SUBSYSTEM 46 3.6.4
. MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM 48 l
3.6.5 BATTTRY ROOMS 4 8
3.6.6 CABLE ^ SPREADING ROOMS 49 3.6.7.
SINGLE FAILURE CRITERIA 49:
3.6.8 CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR AND EQUIPMENT DOSES.
21 3.6.9 TEMPERATURE \\NUMIDITY e -
52' 3.6.10 CHLORINE TANK CAR RUPTURE ANALYSIS 53 s
4.0 COMPONENT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 55 4.1 CONTROLS COMPONENTS
-55 4.2 DUCTWORK AND ACCESSORIES 55:
4.3-FANS 57 4.4
- CHLORINE DETECTORS-58 4.5 DAMPERS-58 4.6 FILTERS
-62 4.7 AIR CONDITIONING UNITS 64-4.8 COMPRESSED. AIR SYSTEM. COMPONENTS 65 4.9 ELECTRIC HEATERS 66 5.0 DESIGN-MARGIN
-68 l
6.0 DESIGN ^ BASIS DOCUMENT' REFERENCES
-69' 6.1 GENERAL
'69 6.1.1
- LICENSE BASIS DOCUMENTS
- 69 6.1.2 CORRESPONDENCE 70' 6.1.3' VIOLATION RESPONSES / LERS /SPECIAL REPORTS
-72" 6.1.4 PROCEDURES AND-NON~ TECHNICAL MANUALS 12 6.2
- DESIGN DOCUMENTS 72-6.2.1 PLANT MODITICATIONS
'72.
6.2.2
-ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS 73' 6.2.3-CALCULATIONS.
74' 6.2.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTATION
'16-6.2.5 DESIGN BASIS-DOCUMENTS
-76 6.2. 6. DRANINGS.
16 6.2.7 SPECITICATIONS 77 6.2.8 MISCELLANEOUS TECHNICAL REFERENCES / REPORTS 78 6.3 CODES AND. STANDARDS
-78 6.4 REGULATIONS 8 0 '-
6.5 REGULATORY' GUIDES al 6.6 OTHER NRC DOCUMENTS 82-
/
6.7 TECHNICAL MANUALS 83 7.0 APPENDICES 83-l:
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CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 1 Revision 1l
0.0 INTRODUCTION
This section presents general information for users of the Design Basis Document.
This information is for background and is not design basis.
l 0.1 SYSTD4 IDENTIFICATION This section includes a brief identification of the CBKVAC System and its subsystems.
Control Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (CBHVAC) is defined in System Description SD-37.
The system file number is 8220.
Pre-operational testing was accompliehad via PO-55 (refs.:
l 6.1.4.4, 6.1.4.5).
0.1.1 SUBSYSTCMS l
The CBHVAC System is divided into the following subsystems:
0.1.1.1 Intake and Exhaust Ventilation Subsystem l
The ventilating air for the control Building is drawn in t'hrough the intake grill (located in the roof of the Mechanical Equipment Room) and the Intake Tornado Check Valves to the supply plenum (Hake-up.
g Air casing).
These components and the Intake Roll Filters are included in this subsystem.
The Exhaust Tornado Check Valves and the common ductwork at these check valves is included in this subsystem.
Controle associated with these components are included in this subsystem.
0.1.1.2 control Room Normal Ventilation Subsystem This subsystem includes a recirculation air filter, dampers, ductwork, air conditiening units, heating coils, and Control Room Supply Fans, which recirculate air from the recirculating air plenum through the Control Room and back to the recirculating air plenum.
The Control Room Normal Ventilation Subsystem also includes the-Normal Inlet Damper, the control Room Supply Fan Discharge Dampers, the Control Room Exhaust Fan and Damper, and the controle associated with these components. This system provides conditioned air at a positive static pressure during normal (non-emergency) operation.
0.1.1.3 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Subsystem.
This subsystem consists of two filtering trains (one for operation,.
one for standby). Each train consists of.an Emergency Air Filter and' Emergency Recirculation Fan, the associated ductwork, dampers, and controls.
The Emergency Recirculation Dampers-and ductwork, including the ductwork from the discharge of the Emergency Fans to the tie in at the Recirculation Air Filter Plenum are included in-this subsystem.
0.1.1.4 Battery Room Ventilation Subsystem l
The Battery Room Ventilation = Subsystem consists of the ductwork,-
supply and' exhaust dampers, fans, electric heaters, and associated controle which take air from the intake air plenum to the Battery Rooms, and then exhaust the hot air and battery-generated gases to l,
the atmosphere through the tornado-pressure check valve.
This
_3 subsystem includes the negative static pressure controls for the Battery Rooms.
j non
CBHVAC System DDD-37 Page 2 Revision 1 l 0.1.1.5 Cable spreading Room Ventilation subsystem The Cable Spreading Room Ventilation subsystem consists of the ductwork, supply and exhauet dampers, fans, and associated controls which take air from the intake air plenum to the Cable Spread Rooms, and then exhaust the hot air to the atmosphere through the tornado-pressure check valves.
0.1.1.6 Mechanical Equipment Room Ventilation Subsystem The Mechanical Equipment Room Ventilation Subsystem consists of the ductwork, supply and exhaust dampers, fans, and associated controls which take air from the intake air plenum to the Mechanical Equipment Room (located on 70' elevation), and then exhaust ti.e hot air tb the atmosphere through a tornado-preanure check valvo. This subsystem also includes the electric unit heaters for the Mechanical Equipment Room and the ductwork and fire dampers to the Elevator Machine Room.
0.1.1.7 Computer Room Air Conditioning Subsystem e
This subsyntem consists of an independent air conditioning unit that recirculates air to maintain computer Room temperature below a predetermined setpoint. The ductwork and fire dampers are included in this subsystem.
0.1.1.8 CBHVAC Instrument Air Subsystem This subsystem consists of two emergency air compressors which provide control air for the HVAC pneumatic controllers, dampers, and other pneumatic controls.
The intake filters, filter dryer, pressure regulatorn, receiver tanks, relief valves, automatic
- drains, and all other controls associated with the air compressors is included in this subsystem.
0.2 SYSTEM PURPOSE This section includes a brief statement of the purpose of the system and a brief eynopsis of the historical evolution of the CBHVAC System.
It includes only major changes and is not meant to be all-inclusive.
0.2.1 The purpose of the control Building. Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System is to maintain areas of the CD at the temperature conditions which provide optimum operation of equipment, comfort and safety of personnel, and to limit the spread of contamination during normal operations and postulated design basis accidents.
The system is designed tot Maintain the areas of the Control Room at the temperature e
conditions which provide for proper operation of equipment, Maintain occupied areas within the temperature and humidity ranges e
desired for human occupancy, Limit the introduction of outside contaminants that could present a threat to human life, and osan -
CBHVAC System DDD-37 Page 3 Revision 1 l-e Provide for the safe removal and disposal of fumes, vapore, and gases.
0.2.2 SYSTEM HISTORY 0.2.2.1 Chlorine Protection The CBHVAC System was originally designed for normal ventilation as described above and for habitability relative to radiation events.
During the licensing process, a large scale chlorine release became a concern.
The entire chlorine detection and isolation function was added to accommodate this requirement during the 1973 to 1975 time-frame.
The system was designed based on a draft of Regulatory Guide 1.95 (ref.:
6.1.2.12) and analyses performed by UE&C based on other standards (refs.: 6.2.8.1 and 6.2.8.2).
Numerous modifications have been made to ensure the system meets the required criteria for detection and isolation during a chlorine event.
As part of the response to NUREG-0737, a roanalysis of offsite hazards was performed (see Section 0.2.2.4) during the early 1980s.
0.2.2.2 Instrument Air Compressors The original Instrument Air compressors were provided by Johnson.
Controls as part of Specification 252-22 (ret.:
6.2.7.18) contract i
work.
Early in the construction phase, it was determined that the i
specified air compressors were not adequate to operate the test function of the Tornado check Valves being purchased from Techno--
check via Specification 248-57 (ref.: 6.2.7.14).
A change was implemented in 1975 and two new compressors purchased via Brown and Root Purchase order 3797 (ref.:
6.2.4.1).
The change was not documented by a specification change.
0.2.2.3 Protection From Smoke By original design, the control Room had a smoke removal mode of operation, but it was considered inadequate for the criteria of BTP APCSB 9.5-1 (ref.:
6.1.1.7).
During BNP's response to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 in the late 1970s, and the AEC's evaluation of that response, the AEC required changes to the smoke removal mode for more efficient operation (ref.a 6.2.1.6).
In addition, heat detectors were required in the Emergency Filtration Trains for detection of a charcoal fire.
Several other changes were made for compliance with BTP APCSB 9.5-1 including the addition of more fire-dampers and the addition of the cowling at the discharge of the booster fans.
0.2.2.4 NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4 In 1979 and.the early 1980s (following THI), the adequacy of operator protection from radiation events came into question.
As part of the TMI Action Plan, BNP was required to evaluate the existing habitability system against the Standard Review Plan (ref.:
I 6.5.16) Sections. 2.2.1-2.2.2, 2.2.3, 6.4, and 9.4.
The original report was submitted to the NRC in 1980.
A-revision (ref.:
6.1.1.13) was provided to the NRC in March of 1983. An SE was issued based on the 1983 revision of this document (ref.:
6.6.1.3).
As part of the 1983 revision, BNP committed to maintaining the control Room at 1/8 inch positive pressure during the radiation recirculation mode. After intensive effort directed at the ability to maintain 1/8 inch positive pressure, CP&L determined that this rean (
CBHVAC System DBD-37' Page 4.
Revision 1 I was not economically feasible.
Instead, after negotiating with the Commission, an analysis.(ref.:
6.1.1.27) was performed in 1985 to.
determine the effect of-increased unfiltered inleakage on the dose rates to the control Room operators.
This analysis was performed for LOCA conditions.
During the Commission's review of this document, questions arose on the doses during a MSLB accident. A second SE on Control Room Habitability as related to Radiation protection was issued in 1989 which addresses the HSLB and indicates it is the worst case accident for Control Room habitability. (ref.:
6.6.1.7) 0.2.2.S Positive Pressure The BNP Control Room Emergency Zone was originally designed for 1/4 in.
W.G. positive pressure.
The original analysis assumed that all electrical conduit, duct, and equipment access penetrations would be sealed to zero leakage.
No leakage was assumed through cracks in block walls or around door frames (frame to wall interface).
Doors were assumed to be tight fitted and ungasketed.
A total of 225 sefm was calculated as required to maintain the 1/4 in. W.G. ; however, 1000 acfm was provided for conservatism.
(ret.:
6.1.1.2,-Section M14.4)
Start-up testing and subsequent periodic testing verified only slightly positive pressure could be maintained.
A l
quantification of the pressure was not attempted until the
\\
NUREG 0737 requirements came into effect as discussed in Section 0.2.2.4 (this explains our current licensing requirement).
0.2.2.6 Battery Room Heating The original design of the Battery Room Ventilation Subsystem was that heating in the Battery Rooms was not required, but that Battery Room temperature could be maintained by reducing outdoor air: flow' during the winter (ref.:
6.1.2.3).
After several-years of plant operation, electric heaters were added to the supply ducting for the Battery Rooms as an economic decision to prevent entering LCon and possible subsequent plant shutdown (refs.:.6.2.1.11 and 6.2.1.12).
0,2.2.7 seismic Qualification of Ductuork The original installation of the Control Room Ductwork consisted of sheet metal and accessories provided by Bahnson Company via Specifications 226-001 (ref.:
6.2.7.9) and 226-2 (ref.:
6.2.7.10).
Seismic supports, designed by UE&C, were provided to Bahnson for installation onlaf.
As part of.the evaluation for I.E.Bulletin 79-07 (ref.:
6.6.4.2), UE&C documented a review of the-ductwork's seismic qualification (ref.:
6.1.2.21); however, they were unable to find the calculations.
These calculations were reconstituted.
In 1989, it was discovered that the isometrics that were part of the seismic package did not match the as-built condition.
NCR A-89-013 (ref.:
6.2.8.15) was initiated to document the concern.
The it.itial evaluation of the field conditionb was documented in EER 89-307 (ref.. 6.2.2.7).
The long term evaluation of the supports is being performed via calculation OVA-0020 (ref.:
6.2.3.12) and revision 1 to EER 89-307.
As of the issuance of Revision 0 of this DBD the calculation and revision 1 to the EER were notl completed.
omtat ' l-
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CBWVAC System DBD-37 Page 5 Revision 1 l 0.3 SYSTEM SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES In order to ensure consister,cy and avoid unnecessary duplication, the BNP System Description for the CBHVAC System (SD-37) has been used, as much as practical, to identify / establish the CBHVAC boundaries.
This document will define the boundaries in more detail than those provided by the System Description.
l CAUTION:
When performing modifications to this system, the capacity of the interfacing systems should be reviewed to verify the interfacing system capacity is not exceeded.
0.3.1 SCOPE The CBHVAC System consists of the fans, ductwork, dampers, and associated controls and accessories located in the control Building.
It also includes the CBHVAC Instrument Air Subsystem with the associated compressors, receiver tanks, air dryers, tubing and controls.
The air conditioning units, evaporator coils, booster fans, and heating coils are included in this boundary.
Associated control switches and indications located on the RTGB are included.
Although the Chlorine Detectors are a part of the Chlorination System (System 43.1), they will be considered in this DBD due to their bmportance in the operation of the CBHVAC System.
The Area Radiation Monitors are part of the Area and Environs Radiation Monitoring System (System 11.1); the control Building smoke and heat detectors are part of the Fire Detection and Suppression System (System 41).
0.3.2 BOUNDARIES 0.3.2.1 Air Side Boundaries The air side boundaries for CBHVAC System will start at the point of outdoor intake (grill located in the CBHVAC Mechanical Equipment Room roof) and continue through the outdoor air discharge (screen on the cowls at the booster fan discharge).
For the Computer Room Air conditioning units, which are located on the Computer Room roofs, the air side will start at the surface of the finned coils and continue through the discharge of the fan.
The boundary between the CBHVAC System and other systems located in ventilated rooms will be the air side surface of the equipment being ventilated.
The CBHVAC system will include the room air.
O.3.2.2 Annunciator System The boundary is the contacts on the swit ch in the CBHVAC. System which provides the output-to the Annunciator System.
The contacts are in the CBHVAC System.
0.3.2.3 Chlorination System Boundary - System 43.1 The boundary is the contacts on the switch (Chlorine Detector) in the chlorination System which provides the input to the CBHVAC System.
The contacts are in Chlorination System, but the detectors will be discussed in Section 4 of this DBD.
0.3.2.4 Area and Environs Radiation Monitoring System - system 11.1 The boundary is the contacts on the switch (ARM) in the Radiation Monitoring System which provides the input to the CBHVAC System.
The-contacts are in the Area and Environs Radiation Monitoring System (System 11.1).
See DBD-11 for information on the Area and Environs Radiation Monitoring System.
omon l
s CBHVAC System'DBD-37 Page 6.
Revision 1 {
0.3.2.5 Fire Detection System - System 42 The boundary is the contacts in the Fire Detection Logic Cabinet which provides the input to the CBHVAC System.
The contacts are in the Fire Detection System.
See SD-41 and 42.for additional information on the Fire Suppression and Detection Systems.
0.3.2.6 Electrical System Boundaries - Systems 50, 51, and 52 The boundary is the load side of the first protective device (circuit breaker or fuse) immediately_ upstream of the system logic circuit.
If power for the logic is from a distribution panel or subpanel, the boundary is the load side of the circuit breaker in the distribution panel.
If the power is provided from a stepdown transformer in an MCC cubicle, the boundary will be the load side of the control power fuse.
For 400 V power, the boundary for the-CBHVAC System will be the load side of the contactor, breaker, or fuse, whichever is further downstream.
Any specialty items required by the CBHVAC System that are within the boundary of the electrical distribution system will be included in the CBHVAC System.
See DBD-50 for information on the AC Electrical System.
Cables and raceway will be included in the Generic Issue DBD (DBD-112) for thbse items.
\\ 0.3.2.7 Control Building Structural Boundaries - System 58 0.3.2.7.1 EqJipment The boundary between a piece of equipment in the CBHVAC System and a concrete foundation is the equipment base (legs or plate) where it contacts the foundation. The anchor bolts are included in the structural foundation boundary, which is part of the Control Building (DBD-58).
0.3.2.7.2 Piping, Raceway, Conduit, and Ductwork Supporta Piping analysis qualifies the pipe and permanent structural attachments to the pipe (i.e., WPAs - Walded Pipe Attachments).
The boundary for piping extends to the outer surface of the piping, raceway, conduit, and ductwork supports with the independent structural supports.and supporting steel being in the structural boundary.
Therefore, the piping, raceway, conduit, and ductwork and permanent attachments are in the CBHVAC System, while the independent structural supports are in the Control Building System (DBD-58).
Seismic supports will be discussed on DBD-102 l
(ref.:
6.2.5.6).
O.3.2.8
- Floor and Equipment Drains - System 4 7 l
l Valves, automatic drain traps, drains, and vents-(including dhe l
first isolation valve or closure flange or cap on drains and vents) connected to C Snnu: System components are within the CBHVAC System boundary.
The L andary within the Floor and Equipment Drain systma l
is the downstream side of the first isolation valve, if there is such a valve, or at the drain pipe / floor drain interface for open drains.
For automatic drain traps, the trap and connecting piping are included in the CBHVAC System.
1 l
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CBHVAC System DBD-37; Page:7.
f Revision 1 1 j' 0.4 DEFINITIONS, ABDREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS 0.4.1 DEFINIT 10MS The following is a list of definitions ~for terms used in.this docunent.
0.4.1.1 Accident An accident is a single event, not reasonably expected duringi the course of plant operations, that has-been hypothesized for analysis p'trposen or postulated from unlikely but-possible situations, and that causes or threatens a rupture of a radioactive barrier.- A' pipe eupture qualifies as an accidents a fuel: cladding defect does not..
(ref.: 6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-2)
C,4.3.2 Active component A device characterized by an expected-significant-change of state or discernible mechanical' motion in response to an imposed-design basis-load demand upon the system. = Examples are switch,. relay,' valve, pressure switch, turbine, transistor, motor, damper, pump,j analog meter.
(ref.: 6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-2).
0.4.1.3 Availability-Availability is the probability that an' item will'be. operable'when-called upon to perform its specified function.
-(ref.
'6.1.1.2,"p.
1.2-2) 0.4.1.4 Class 1/1E Structures, systems, or components'that are essential to the safe:
shutdown and isolation of the reactor or whose failure:or--damage could result in.significant release of radioactive material.a _(ref.s.
6.3.23)'.When suffixed by an "E",
this refers'to electrical systems and-components.
"1" and "I"lhave been used interchangeably in-theJ past.
0.4.1.5 control Room Envelope The area of-the Control Building defined as' essential-.for -post-accident operation--by;SRP Section-6.4. (ref.3,6.5'.16, p. 6.4-3).
0.4.1.6-Control Roca Emergency Zone-The terms-Control Room Emergency Zone ~and Control Room-Envelopc are synonymous.
These. terms are used interchangeably in publishedj documents.-
~
.0.4.1.7 IDesign Basis Accident A design basis accident is a hypothesized" accident, the
-characteristics of which: are f utilizedjin.the-design of: those systems and components-pertinent to: the preservation of radioactive material a barriersJand the restriction of radioactive material releasesfrom:
the barriers.-The potential radiation _ exposures resulting from a-design basis-accident are-greater than any-similarfaccident?
' postulated 1from the same general accident assumptionst ~for example, the consequences-of a complete severance of a recirculation-loop
-line are more severe than those resulting:from any other single <
pipeline failure inside the primary ~ containment. :(ref.
-6.1.1.2, p.:.l.2-3 ) -
- usan [ b
CBHVAC System DBD-37.
Page O-Revision'1l-e 0.4.1.8 Engineered Safety Features The ESF systems for this facility are designed to' perform preventive and mitigative-functions when called on during the course of any design basis accident (DBA).
These functions are related to two general objectives:
1)
To protect the fuel barrier (maintain fuel cladding integrity, prevent cladding melt, minimize extent of fuel rod-perforations, etc) 2)
To minimize potential offsite doses (mitigate the cause and.
4 consequences of accidents, containment, filter,-control elevated release, etc)
The design philosophy is that these functions must be maintained under all DBA conditions.
(ret.:
6.1.1.1,-p. 1.5.8) 0.4.1.9 Habitable Habitable is defined as adequate protection for personnel against accidental releases of toxic and radioactive gases.
(ref.1 6.5.16,
- p. 6.4) s 0.4.1.10 Incident An incident.is an event, abnormal operating transient or accident -
not considered part of planned operation.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p.
1.2-4) 0.4.1.11 Independence Systems, structures, or components'are considered. independent when there is no common mode failure for any design basis event. '(ref.:
6.3.23) 0.4.1.12 May May denotes permission - neither s recommendation nor a requirement.
(ref.:
6.1.4.1) 0.4.1.13 Nuclear Safety System
-A nuclear safety system is a safety system, the actions of-which are essential to a safety action required in response to an abnormal operational transient.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-4) 0.4.1.14 offsite All properties or areas not' considered onsite.
(ref.:
6.1.1.4) 0.4.1.15 Onsite Any areas included within CP&L-owned property that is contiguous =
with the plant structure proper and other plant associated-facilities.
(ref.: 6.1.1.4)
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CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 9 Revision 1l 0.4.1.16 Operable - Operability A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be operable or have operability when it is capable of performing its specified function (s).
Implicit in this definition shall be the assumption that the tecessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency electric power sources, cooling or seal water, lubrication-or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its function (s) are also capable of performing their related support functions.
(ref.:
6.1.1.3) 0.4.1.17 Operating A system or component is operating when it is performing its required action in the required manner.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2,-p. 1.2-5) 0.4.1.18 operational The objective operational, along with its noun and verb forms, is used in reference to the working or functioning of the plant, in contract to the design of the plant.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2,
- p. 1.2-5) 0.4.1.19 Passive Component
\\
A device characterized by an expected negligible change of state or negligible mechanical motion in response - to an imposed design basis load demand upon the system.
Examples ares cable, piping, valve in a stationary position, resistor, capacitor, fluid filter, indicator lamp, cabinet, case, etc.
(ret.:
6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-6) 0.4.1.20 Physical Barrier Fences, walls, ceilings and floors constructed to offer resistance to penetration, the openings in which are secured by grates, doors, etc. such that the integrity of the wall is not lessened by=any opening.
(This definition is abbreviated from Reference 6.4.5, Paragraph 2.
See this reference for a more complete definition.)
0.4.1.21 Planned Operation Planned operation is normal plant operation under conditions in the ansence of significant abnormalities.
Operations subsequent to an incident (transient, accident, or special event) are not considered planned operations until the procedures being followed or_ equipment being used are identical-to those used-during any one of the defined planned operations.
'(ref.:-6.1.1.2,:p. 1.2-7) 0.4.1.22 Protective Action A protective action is an ultimate action at the system level which contributes to and-is-essential-to-the accomplishment of a safety action.
System level actions which are essential to accomplishing reactor scram, reactor vessel isolation, containment isolation, pressure relief, automatic depressurization, and standby core-cooling are some of the protective actions.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p.
1.2-10) 0.4.1.23 Protective' Function l
A protective function encompasses the monitoring of one or more plant variables or conditions and the associated initiation of intra-system actions which eventually result in a protective action.
(ref.: 6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-11) osan
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2 CDHVAC System DBD-37 Page 10 Revision 1 {
0.4.1.24 Rated Power
. Rated Power refers to operation at a reactor power of 2436 MWt; This is also termed 100 percent power. Rated steam flow, rated coolant flow, rated neutron flux, and rated nucicar system pressure refer to the values of these parameters when the reactor is at rated power.
See also " Design Power" definition.
(ref.: 6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-12) 0.4.1.25 Refuel Mode The reactor is in the refuel mode whenever the reactor modo switch is in the refuel position, the vessel head closure bolts are less than fully tensioned or the head is removed, and the reactor coolant temperature is s 212 'F.
See the Technical Specifications for allowances for other mode switch positions. ( ref.:
6.1.1.3) 0.4.1.26 Reliability Reliability is the probability that an item will perform its specified function without f ailure for a specified time period in a specified environment.
(ref.: 6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-13) 0.4.1.27 Safety The word safety, when used to modify such words as objective, design basis, action, and system, indicates that the objective, design basis, action, or system is related to concerns considered to be of safety significance, as opposed to the plant mission - to generate electrical power.
Thus, the word safety is used to identify aspects of the plant which are considered to be of primary importance with respect to safety. A safety objective or design basis does not-necessarily indicate that the system is an Engineered Safety-Feature (ESF).
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-13) 0.4.1.28 Safety Action A safety action is an ultimate action in the plant which is essential to the avoidance of.specified conditions considaced to be of primary safety significance.
The specified conditions are those that are most directly related to the ultLmate limits on the integrity of the radioactive barriers or the release of radioactive material. These are safety actions associated with planned operation, abnormal operational transients, accidents, and special events.
Safety actions include buch action as the indication to the operator of the values of certain process variables, reactor trip, core standby cooling, and reactor shutdown from outside the Control Room.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-14) 0.4.1.29 Safety objective A safety objective describes in functional terms the purpose of a system or component as it relates to conditions considered to be of primary significance to the protection of the public.
This relationship is stated in terms of radioactive material barriers or radioactive material release.
Only systems which have safety objectives are safety systems.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-15) 1 l-
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'T CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 11 Revision 1 0.4.1.30 Safety-Related A term applied to those plant features necessary to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, or the capability to prevent or. mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of NRC regulation 10 CFR 100 (ref.:
6.4.6).
(ref.:
6.1.4.2) 0.4.1.31 Safety System A safety system is a system, group of systems, components, or group of components the action of which are essential to accomplishing a safety action.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-15) 0.4.1.32 Scram Scram or reactor trip refers to the automatic rapid insertion of control rode in response to the detection of undesirable conditions.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-15) 0.4.1.33 Secondary Containment Integrity e
Secondary Containment Integrity means that the Reactor Building is closed and the following conditions are met: 1). All reactor Building ventilation system automatic isolation valves are operable or secured in the closed position.
- 2) The standby gas. treatment system is operable.
3)
At least one door at each accean opening is closed.
4)
The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration is operable.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-15,16 and 6.1.1.3, Section 1.0) 0.4.1.34 Shall or will Shall or will dsnotes a requirement.
The action will be accomplished in the manner stated.
(ref.:
6.1.4.1) 0.4.1.35 should Should denotes a recommendation. The actica will be accomplished in the maaner stated or by an equally effective alternative method.
(ref.:
6.1.4.1) 0.4.1.36 Single Failure A single failure means an occurrence whichiresults in the loss of capability of a. component to perform its intended safety functions.
Multiple failures resulting from a single occurrence are considered to be a single failure.
Fluid and electrical systems are considered to be designed against an assumed single failure if neither.(1) a single failure of any active component (assuming passive components function properly) nor (2) a single failure of a passive component (assuming active components function properly), results in a loss of the capability-of the system to perform its safety function.
(ref.:
6.4.2) 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (ref.:
6.4.2) also states (in Note 2 on the definition of single failure), ' Single failures of passive components in electrical systems should be assumed in designing against a single failure. The conditions under which a single f ailure of a passive component in a fluid system should be considered in designing the system against a single failure are under development'.
BNP's interpretation of the single failure requirements are explained in References 6.1.1.2, Section 14.2 and Dean
E CBliVAC System DBD-37 Page 12 Revision 1 l 6.1.1.1, Section 15.0.3.2.
BNP does not consider failures of passive mechanical components in designing for a single failure for this system.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, page 14.2-3 through 6 and 6.1.1.1, Section 15.0.3.2)- See DBD-110 (ref.:
6.2.5.10) for additional explanation of single failure criterion.
0.4.1.37 Test Interval The test interval is the elapsed time between initiation of identical tests.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. 1.2-17) 0.4.1.38 Toxic Gas compounds of the type listed in Reg. Guide 1.78 that produce vapors hazardous to personnel under the conditions that the chemicals will be stored.
(ref. 6.5.10) 0.4.1.39 Vital Area A Vital Area is an area which contains vital equipment within a structure, the walls, roof, and floor of which constitute physical barriers as defined by 10 CFR 73.2.
(ref.:
6.4.5) 0.4.1.40 Vital Equipment
\\
Vital Equipment is.any equipment, system, device, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Equipment of systems which could be required to function to protect public health and safety-following such failure, destruction, or release are also considered vital.
(ref.:
6.4.5) 0.4.2 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS The following is a list of abbreviations and acronyme that are used in this document.
0.4.2.1 AC - Alternating Current 0.4.2.2 AEC - Atomic Energy Commission 0.4.2.3 ALARA - As Low As Reasonably Achievable 0.4.2.4 ANSI - American National Standards Institute 0.4.2.5 AOD - Air Operated Damper 0.4.2.6 ARM - Area-Radiation Monitor 0.4.2.7 ASHRAE - American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-conditioning Engineers 0.4.2.8 ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers 0.4.2.9 ASSD - Alternate Safe Shutdown 0.4.2.10 ASTM - American Society of Testing and Materials O.4.2.11 BESU - Brunswick Engineering-Support Unit (no longer exists) 0.4.2.12 BNP - Brunswick Nuclear Project 0.4.2.13 BSEP - Brunswick Steam Electric Plant 0.4.2.14 BTP - Branch Technical Position 0.4.2.15-BTU - British Thermal Unit 0.4.2.16 CB - Control Building-0.4.2.17 CBHVAC - Control Building Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System 0.4.2.18 CFM - Cubic Feet per Minute, a volumetric measurement of air flow 0.4.2.19 CFR - Code of Federal Regulations 0.4.2.20 CL - Chlorine gas 0.4.2.21 CP&L - Carolina Power and Light 0.4.2.22 DB.- Design Basis 0.4.2.23 DBA - Design Basis Accident
.0.4.2.24 DBD - Design Basis Document oman
m..
CBRVAC Sys' tem DBD-37J
-Page'13; Revision 1 0.4.2.25 DBE - Design Basis Earthquak's 0.4.2.26 DC - Direct Current 0.4.2.27' 'C - Degrees Centigrade 0.4.2.28= *F -10egrees Fahrenheit 0.4.2.29 EDG - Emerger.cy Diesel-Generator.
0.4.2.30 EKFIS - Emergency Response Facility Information System.
Q 0.4.2.31 ESF.. Engineered Safety Feature 0.4.2.32 FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report 0.4.2.13 TPM - Feet Per Minute, an air 0.4.2.34--GDC - General Design criteria,'valocity measurement as in-10 CFR 50, Appendix A 0.4.2.35 HEPA-- High Efficiency Particulate Absorber 0.4.2.36 HP - Horsepower 0.4.2.37 He - Hour O.4.2.38-HVAC - Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning t
0.4.2.39 IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 0.4.2.40 in.
W.G.
- Inches of water column, gauce 0.4.2.41 LER - Licensee Event Report 0.4.2.42 LOCA - Loss of-Coolant Accident 0.4.2.43 MCC - Motor Control Center 0.4.2.44 MSLB.- Main Steam Line Break O.4.2.45 NEMA - National Electric Manufacturer's Association O.4.2.46 NFPA - National Fire Protection.*.asociation 0.4.2.47 NRC--.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission F
0.4.2.48 NUREG - Acronym for certain documents issued by the Office of Nuclear Regulation 40.4.2.49 Nf-Nitrogen-0.4.2.50 OBE - Operating Basis Earthquake 0.4.2.51 ; POM - Plant: Operating Manual 0.4.2.52 PSIG - Pounds per square inch Gauge 0.4.2.53 R.G. - Regulatory Guide 0.4.2.54 RPM - Revolutions per Minute' 0.4.2.55 RTGB - Reactor-Turbine-Generator Board (Main Control Board) 0.4.2.56 SCBA - Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 0.4.2.57 SCFM - Standard Cubic Feet por Minute-0.4.2.58-5D - System Description 0.4.2.59 SE - Safety Evaluation (NRC Generated) 0.4.2.60 SER -cSafety Evaluation Report ' (NRC generated) 0.4.2.61 S.G.
- Safety Guide 0.4.2.62-SMACNA - Sheet-Metal and-Air-conditioning Contractors National Association, Inc..
0.4.2.63 SOV - Solenoid Operated Valva 0.4.2.64 SRP - Standard Review Plan (ref.: 16.5.16)
O.4.2.65 UE&C - United Engineers and Constructors 0.4.2.66_ UFSAR - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
0.4.2.67' UL - Underwriter's Laboratory-0.4.2.68 VA - Ventilating Air 0.4.2.69 VAC --Alternating Current Voltage N
0.4.2.70- VDC1-Direct Current Voltage:
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CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 14 Revision 1 l 1.0 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS The information in this section is primarily design basis.
Specific quantitative information and information resulting from the outputs of calculations relating to these bases will, for the most part, be found in Section 3.0.
A hierarchical structure has been used to avoid duplication of information.
If a design basis falls into more than one of the categories, it will be listed in ths first category to appear in this document, with a reference in later sections.
(e.g., a system functional requirement that results from a Regulatory Guide will appear in Section 1.1, with a reference in Section 2.2.)
1.1 GENERAL SYSTEM FUNCTION This section includes the primary design basis functional requirements of the CBHVAC System.
It will not include static requirements such as seismicity, quality requirements, etc.
These will be included in Sections 3.0 and 4.0.
1.1.1 HABITABILITY
'1.1.1.1 General 1.1.1.1.1 The Control Buildino HVAC Svetem shall be desioned to oermit continuoup occuoancy of the Control Room Emercenev Zone under normal operatino conditions and under the costulated desian basis accidents throuchout the life of the olant.
The Emeroency zone consists of the Control Room. includino critical docutaent j
reference filer Computer Rooms and the electronic workroomer operator Wash Room and Kitchen.
Areas not requiring access are generally excluded from the emergency zone.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, Sections 7.18.3.6, M10.13, and M14.1; 6.1.1.1,- Section 6.4.1.fr 6.1.1.13, p. A-23)
This requirement is derived from GDC-19 (Section 2.1.6).
(ret.: 6.5.16, p. 6.4-1) i 1.1.1.2 Radiation Protection 1.1.1.2.1 Adecuate radiation erotection shall be orovided to cermit access and occupancy of the control Room under accident conditions without eersonnel receivino radiation exoosures in excess of 5 rem whole body, or its eauivalent to any cart of the body, f or t!12 duration of the accident.
This requirement is part of GDC 19 (See Section 2.1.6)
In addition, NUREG-75/87 (ruf.:
6.5.16), Section 6.4, p.
5, establishes the whole body equivalents as 30 rem to the thyroid and 30 rem to the skin. These doses to an individual i
shall not be exceeded for costulated desion basis accidents.
(refs.:
6.6.1.1, p. 6-21 and 6.6.1.7) 1.1.1.2.2 Upon receipt of a high radiation signal, the CBHVAC System is automatically realigned to the emergency mode of operation.
The fresh air inlets close, isolating the Control Room. At the same time, the charcoal filter unit begins operation, recirculating the control Room air to minimize contaminated build-up in the occupied areas.
In this mode of operation, 1000 sefm is supplied as filtered make-up and 1000 scfm is recirculated through the charcoal filter.
(ref.:
6.6.1.1)
See Referencee 6.2.3.7 and 6.2.3.8 for instances where automatic isolation is not required to the safety function of the CBHVAC System.
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1 CBHVAC System DBD-37L Page 15 Revision-1;[
1.1.1.3 Toxic Gas Protection 1.1.1.3.1-Control Room' operators shall be adeauntelv'orotected aoainst the effects of accidental release of toxic cases.
(refs.:
.6.5.15, 6.5.16, p. 6.4-5) 1.1.1.3.1.1 Ihgrm_sh=. 1 be no chronie effects from'exoosure te toxic cast acute effects. if any, shall be reversible within a short-Deriod of time feeveral minutes) without the benefit of any measures other than the use of self contained breathinu-apparatus.
(ret.: 6.1.1.13, p. A-10;-6.5.16, p. 6.4-5).
see section 3.6.10.5 for quantitative limits for chlorine.
1.1.1.3.1.2 Adequate protection-from an on-site chlorine release will be-achieved if provisions are included in the plant design.to-automatically isolate the control' Room M limit the potential build up of chlorine within the control Room and'if equipment and procedures are provided-to assure immediate use of breathing apparatus.by the. Control Room operators. -(ref.:.
6.6.1.1)
The chlorine Detection Subsystem should automatically!
isolate the control Room and provide an indication in the Control Room to r.lert the Control Room operators of a' chlorine release. (ref.: 6.5.11, p. 2, 4, 6.1.1.25) s 1.1.1.4 Smoke Sufficient controls shall be available to-reduce the voin== gi ng,r. gal make-uo air, and/or to olace the control Room Emercenev -
Ventilation Subssystem in service to remove smoke filled air f rom 'the Control Room. -These controls function to remove s. coke generated either within or external to the control Room. Controls also permiti complete or partial bypassing of the recirculation system and-1 exhausting control-Room air directly to atmosphere.
-(ref. '
6.1.1.2, p.-7.18-9) g 1.1.2
' TEMPERATURE CONTt0L
.The CBHVAC System shall maintain ateas of the CB ai the temoerature conditions accentable for coeration of the eouinment' located in-the.
buildino.
(ref.:
6.4.2, criterion-4 and 6.1.1.2, Section M10.13).
See sections 2.1.4 and-3.6.9 f or more information. t 1.1.3 CONTROL OF FLAMMADLE VAPORS.
1.1.3.1 Provisions shall be made for sufficient diffusion and ventilation of cases from storace-batteries to orevent the accumulation of pgolesive mixtures.. (ref.a. 6.4.7,.Section 305-(j)(7))-Hydrocen ggngentration=shall be maintained below 21'fby volumel. -:(ref. ;
6.6.1.2,'Oection 5.3.2) 1 P
=
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 16-Revision 1 l 1.2-SYSTEM INTERFACES This subsection identifies those systems which either " provide support to" (i.e., supporting systems) or "are supported by" (i.e.,
supported systems) the CBHVAC System.
The discuccion will describe the function provided by or to the interfacing system and will identify the design basis parameters associated with the interface.
CAUTION: When performing modifications to this s} stem the capacity of the interfacing systems should be reviewed to verify the interfacing system capacity is not exceeded.
1.2.1 SUPPORTING SYSTEMS 1.2.1.1 Fire Detection System - System 41 The Control Room Area Fire Detection System sends an initiation signal to the CBHVAC System when smoke or heat is detected in one of the zones of the Control Building.
The CBHVAC System receives additional signals from the heat detectors in the Emergency Filtration Train charcoal beds.
See Section 3.0 for automatic actions that occur on a Fire Detection System Signal.
1.2.1.2 Chlorination System - System 43.1 Detection of a high chlorine signal from the Control Building intake plenum detector or from the chlorir.e loading area detectors results in an isolation signal being sent to the emergency and the normal make-up damper, as well as other parts of the CBEVAC System.
See Section 3.0 for automatic actions that occur on a high chlorine signal.
1.2.1.3 480 VAC Distribution System - System 50 The 480 VAC Distribution System provides power to the CBKVAC System fans from separate divisions to ensure that a loss of power will not remove more than one supply fan from service at a time (except Appendix R and Station Blackout scenarios). The safety related portion of the 480 VAC Distribution System will be covered in DBD-50 (ref.:
6.2.5.2).
1.2.1.4 120 VAC Distribution System - System 52 The 120 VAC Distribution System provides redundant, safety related power to the CBHVAC System controls.
The control power is divisionalized and separated to ensure operation of the CBHVAC System when required. The safety related portion of the 120 VAC Distribution System will be covered in DBD-50 (ref.:
6.2.5.2).
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, page M10.13-1) 1.2.1.5 Area and Environs Radiation Monitoring System - System 11.1 The Area and Environs Radiation-Monitoring System provides an input-to the CBHVAC System on a high radiation signal in the Control Room-intake duct or in the electronic equipment room.
See 3.1 for automatic actions that occur on a high radiation signal.
1.2.1.6 Floor and Equipment Drain System - System 4 7 The Floor and Equipment Drain System provides the pressure boundary, in the form of loop seals, for floor drains within the control Room Emergency Zone.
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CDNVAC System DBD-37 Page 17 Revision 1 l 1.2.2 SUPPORTED SYSTEMS The following safety related systems are supported by the-CBHVAC System since they are located in the CB. As described in Section 1.1.2, it is part of the function of the CBHVAC System to control temperature in the range required by the equipment located in the building.
In addition to those systems listed here, systems that have controla located in the Control Room are supported by the CBHVAC.
The CBHVAC System also functions with the CD Structuro to provide protection from tornadoes and other natural events.
(ret.:
6.1.1.2, p. M10.28-1; p. 10.10-9)
See Sections 2.1.2 and 3.4 for information on protection from natural events.
1.2.2.1 460 VAC Electrical DistrLbutton System - System 50 The portions of the 480 VAC Distribution System located in the control Building are provided with an environment in which they can e
operate by the CBEVAC System.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. M7.9-1) 1.2.2.2 Plant Batteries - System $1 The Battery Rooms are supplied with ventilation by the CBifVAC in order to provide an appropriate temperature environment for proper operation.
The C8HVAC also maintains a negative static pressure in
\\
the Battery Rooms with respect to adjacent areas to prevent the exfiltration of battery-generated gases.
1.3 TRANSIENT RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 1.3.1 UTSAR CHAPTER 15 TRANSEENTS 1.3.1.1 The CBHVAC responds to Chapter 15 transients that result in the release of radiation by isolating and entering the recirculation mode on a Control Room Area or Control Room Intake High Radiation-Signal from the Area Radiation Monitoring System.
The CBHVAC System does not respond directly to.an accident signal, but to the high radiation signal. The accidents and epecial events evaluated in Chapter 15 which are listed as requiring the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System are:
- Control Rod Drop Accident.
A supporting calculation is not retrievable, but the methodology, assumptions, and results of the bounding analysis may be found in UFSAR (ref.:
6.1.1.1) Section l
15.4.6.
- Pipe Breaks Inside Primary Containment (up to and including a Design Basis LOCA).
Current analysis may be.found in NUS-4758 (ref.:
6.1.1.27)
- Fuel Handling Accident.
A supporting calculation is not retrievable, but the methodology, assumptions, and results of the bounding analysis may be found in UFSAR (ref.:
6.1.1.1) Section 15.7.10.
- Pipe Breaks Outside Primary Containment, up to and ir.cluding a i
design basis MSLB.
An analysis using all of the current design basis assumptions is not retrievable, but summaries may'be found in UFSAR, Section 15.6.3 (assuming pressurization to 1/8 in.
4 W.G.).
For information on the effects of increased unfiltered inleakage on Control Room Operator Doses following a Design Basia MSLB, see References 6.2.3.8 and 6.6.1.1.
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CDUVAC System DBD-37' Page 18 Revision 1 1.3.2 CNLORINE RELEASC EVENT The design basis chlorine release is based on a complete rupture of a 55-ton chlorine tank car. A complete supporting calculation is not retrievable, but the methodology, assumptions, and results of the bounding analysis may be found in UFSAR Section 6.4 and Reference 6.2.8.5.
A chlorine release is detected by the Chlorine Detectors (System 43.1), which signal the CBHVAC System. The CBHVAC System goes into full recirculation mode, with no outuoor air intake (except for the Battery Rooms). The Emergency Filtration trains do not start since they do not remove chlorine and may be damaged by it.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, Section M14.5; 6.1.1.13, page 4-5; and 6.2.8.5) 1.3.3 FIRE PROTECTION / APPENDIX R TRANSIENTS The Appendix R scenarios af fecting the Control Room are primarily those which occur in the Control Building.
For a fire in the Cable Spreading Rooms, Mechanical Equipment Room, or Control Room Emergency Zone, the Fire Detection System shute down selected fans to prevent fanning the fire.
See Section 3.1.5.3 for automatic actions on a fire signal.
if the fire continues to grow such that ASSD procedures are required, the entire Control Room is assumed to be inaccessible.
(ref.:
6.1.1.36)
If the fire is in one of the Battery Rooms, the operators are instructed (by procedure) to shut down the ventilation to that Battery Room.
This is to allow proper operation of the fire dampers in the ducts.
(ref.:
6.2.1.15, Field Revision 22)- If the fire causes sufficient damage, Procedures are provided for shutdown without the affected Battsry Room. (ref.:
6.1.1.36)
Fires in other areas of the plant may affect the control Room if smoke from the fire is drawn into the control Room.
For these cases, the Emergency Filtration Trains may be run to prevent excessive introduction of smoke and remove residual smoke.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, 10.10-6 and 7.18-9; 6.6.1.2, Section 4.4.1)
If excessive smoke has been introduced, the smoke removal isolation dampers on the 70' olevation may be closed and the-access doors opened. This action will allow the Control Room Normal Ventilation System to draw smoke laden air out of the Control Room and discharge it to the Mechanical Equipment Room where it may be discharged to atmosphere.
This plan will also be effective in removing smoke from a fire within the Control Room after the fire has been extinguished.
See drawing F-4207 (ref.:
6.2.6.4) for smoke removal flow paths. _See Sections 2.1.3, 2.2.3, 3.1.5, and 4.5.8 and DBD-101 for additional information on Fire Protection / Appendix R.
1.3.4 STATION BLACKOUT For a Station Blackout event, as described in Reference 6.4.1, the CBHVAC System may not be available-for the first hour, until the appropriate cross ties are made ?llowing operation of the single
-operable Emergency Diesel Generator.
In order to ensure that Control Room Temperature during-this first hour does not exceed 120*F, administrative controls have beca implemented to keep the control Room below 78* during normal operation and to impler.ent around the clock trouble shooting if the temperature exceeds 85'F.
Calculatio.to have demonstrated that with a normal temperature of 85'F, the 120*F limit will.not be exceeded. '(ref.:
6.1.1.34 and 6.6.1.13)
Ventilation equipment is then restarted.
See Calculation 8S20-E-01 (ref.:
6.2.3.23) for loads that are restarted.
(ref.:
6.6.1.10)
See DBD-111 (ref.:
6.2.5.11) and Reference 6.2.3.25 for.more information on Station Blackout.
See Section 2.2.3.1 fot design basis requirements relative to Station Blackout.
osan
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 19 Revision 1 l-2.0 REGULATORY IMPOSED DESIGN REQUIREMENTS This section identifies regulatory requirements and/or commitments that have some degree of applicability to the CBHVAC System design basis or relevance to the CBHVAC System design.
2.1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA The following is a listing of the applicable General Design Criteria from 10 CFR_50 Appendix A (ref.:
6.4.2).
T!.e " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," listed in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, were used during the licensing phase as the basis for an audit of the design features of the Brunswick Plant.
Because of their general nature, the criteria can not always be applied literally but, in some instances, must be applied with interpretation and adaptation.
In those instances, the conformance of plant design to the interpretations and adaptations are discussed here.
The wording of these GDCs is taken directly from Appendix F to the original FSAR (ref.:
6.1.1.2).
Although the introductory text to the Appendix states that the GDC's were taken from the July 7, 197J amendment, the actual wording compares to-the February 20, 1971 amendment.
In the SER (ref.:
6.6.1.1), the AEC stated that the intent g
of the May 21, 1971 version (effective date of the 2-20-71 amendment)-
was met.
The-actual wording BNP has committed to is that given in:
Appendix F to the original FSAR.
Due to the general nature of the
' compliance' provided in Appendix F, most of the ' compliance' sections here are taken from other references. as indicated in the individual criteria.
The following sections are pr'marily design basis; however, some non-design basis information is provided here for clarity. Only those portions that are underlined are design basis.
2.1.1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERZON 1 - QUALIT.' STANDARDS AND RECORDS St ru ctu re s, systems, and ecmoonents important to safety shall be desioned. fabricated, erected, and tested to cuality standard.g commensurate with the imoortance of the safety functions to be perf o rmed.
where cenerally recoonized codes and standards are used, they shall be identified and evaluated to determine their aoolicability, adgouaev and sufficiency and shall be suorlemented or modified as necessarv to assure a auality eroduct in keeoino with the recuired safety funetton.
A cuality assurance crocram shall be established and imolemented in order to orovide adequate assurance that these structures, systems, and comoonents will satisfactorily perform their saf ety functions.
Acerooriate records of the desian, fabrication. erection. and testina of s t ructu res, systems, and component s important to safety shall be maintained by or under the-control of the nuclear vower unit-licensee throuchout the life of the unit.
Compilance s The cortions of the CBHVAC System needed to meet the safety function of the system are recuired to be Durchased, installed, and maintained p
to Nuclear Ouality Standards.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Table D-1,
components.
See Section 2.3 for codes and standards of record.
l.
EDBS screen 404 provides the data base listing for BNP component level Quality Classification.
I osan{
.~
. ~. -.
. ~ ~ - - -. -. -.
CBHVAC System DBD-37 i
'Page 20 Revision 1 2.1.2 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 2 - DESIGN BASIS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST NATURAL PNENOMENA
~
Structures, systems, and componente imoortant to safety shall be desioned to withstand the effects of natural chonomena such as ea rt hcru a kes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiche without lose of cacability to perform their safety tunetions.
The d_qeion bases for these structures, svetems, and components shall reflectt (1) accrocriate consideration of the most nevere of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surroundino area, with sufficient maroin for the limited accuracy, cuantity, and reriod of time in which the historical data have been accumulated, (2) accropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the ef fects of the natural che-nomena and f3) the importance of the safety f unct ions to t1D performed.
Compliances The CBHVAC Svetem nhall be desioned, with appropriate maroin for uncertainties, to permit safe plant operation or shutdown even under conditions of the most severe natural phenomena which have been conservatively costulated to occur at the eite.
(ref.
6.111.2, Appendix F)
See Section 3.4 for additional information on structural requirements and Section 4 for seismic requirements for key g
componente.
General information on Hazards Analysis and Seismic Qualification may be found in DBD-106 (ref.:
6.2.5.7) and DBD-102 (ref.:
6.2.5.6), respectively.
2.1.3 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERZON 3 - FIRE PROTECTION Structuren, systems, and componente imoortant to safety shall be desioned and located to minimite, consistent with other safety Ipouiremente, the probability and effect of fires and explosione.
Noncombustible and heat resistant materials shall be used wherever Dractical throuchout the unit, particularly in locations such as the containment and Control Room.
Fire detection and fichtino evstema of accropriate caoacity and cacability shall be provided and desioned to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures, systems, and comoonente imoortant to safety.
Fire-fichtino evntemy shall be desioned to assure that t heir rupture or-inadvertent coeration does not nionificantiv imoair the safety capability of these structures, pystems, and componente.
Comp 11ancet The CBHVAC Svetem shall succort the coeration of the Fire Sucoreesion Svetem and correspondino crocrams, as outlined in our responees to those procrams.
These responses are contained in References 6.1.1.8, 6.1.1.9, 6.1.1.7, 6.1.1.18, and 6.1.1.36.
The CBHVAC Svetem is desioned to isolate the various comoartmente in case of a fire and to remove carticulates from the air in the coeratino area which consists of the Control Room and Electronic Ecuipment Rooms.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 14.3-9)
No combustibles are located in close proximity to the Control Building Emergency Ventilation System Charccal filters.
Portable fire extinguishers and a carbon dioxido hose reel are located nearby.
Detectors shall be provided in the filter banks and water hone racks shall be orovided in the area.
(ret.:
6.1.1.7,
- p. IV.C.3.d.4-5 and 6.6.1.2, Section 4.4.2, page 4-7) vaan l
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 21 Revision 1(
The CBHVAC System shall have the caoability for smoke removal from the control Poom.
To exhaust smoke, dampers and doorways will be manipulated manually by personnel responding to a fire.-
(ref.:
6.1.1.7, p. IV.C.2.a-34 and 6.6.1.2, Section 4.4.1, p.
4-7)
The Fire Detection System in the Control Building should be designed to minimize spurious starts of the CBEAF subsystem.
(refs.:
6.1.3.2, 6.1.3.3, 6.1.3.4)
See Sections 1.3.3, 2.2.3.2, and 3.1.5 for other fire-protection related information.
See Section 4.5.8 for information on fire dampers.
General information on BNP's-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R (ref.:
6.4.4) may be found in DBD-101 (ref.:
6.2.5.5).
2.1.4 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 4 - ENVIRONMENTAL AND MISSILE DESIGN BASES Structures. systems. and componente imoortant to safety shall be desioned to accommodate the ef fects of and to be compatible with the gavironmental conditions associated with normal oDeration.
maintenance. testino, and costulated accidents. includina loss-of-poolant accidents. These structures. systems, and comoot.ents shall be aooropriately orotected aoainst dynamic effects, includino the gffects of minulles, eine whiocino, and discharoino fluids, that may -
result from eauipment failures and from Ovents and conditions outside the nuclear oower unit.
Compliance:
Ihe CBHVAC System shall be desioned to maintain an environment in the-2D acceptable for coeration of the cautoment located in the buildino.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. M7.9-1)
The safety function of the CBHVhQ System shall not be defeated by dynamic ef fects listed in this CDC.
(ret.:
6.1.1.2, Appendix F). All tanks outside prLmary containment containing gas under pressure have been reviewed for effects of a potential tank rupture.
Failure of these tanks shall not effect Seismic Catenorv I feafety related) couiement.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section M10.24) 2.1.5 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 5 - SNARING OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS St ru ctu res, systems, and components imoortant to safety shall not be shared between nuclear power units unless it is shown that their.
3p111tv to nerform their safety functions is not sionificantiv impai r ed by the charino.
Compliance:
The Control Building and associated equipment are shared between the two units. This sharino chall not imcair the ability to safelv shutdown one unit while miticatino an accident in the other unit.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. B-7)
An emergency air supply system controls intaraction with any atmospheric radioactivity outside of the Control Building._ Supply air passing through this system is treated by HEPA filters. The building is held at a slightly positive pressure to limit infiltration.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. B-14)
Smoke or dust generated inside the building are controlled ey filtration of recirculated air.
Battery rooms are divided t1 physically separate the facilities for Unit No. I and Unit Nt. 2.
These provisions significantly reduce possible interactions a1 the Control Building.
Control Room access and occupancy are not prevented by an accident in either reactor, up to and including the most severe pontulated accidents.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. B-14) non
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 22 l
Revision 1 2.1.6 GENERAL DESIGN CRITEREON 19 - CONTROL ROOM A Control Room shall be provided from which actions can be taken to
- operate the nuclear power unit safelv under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions, includino loss-of-coolant accidents.
Adecuate radiation protection shall be provided to cermit access and occupancy of the Control Room under accident conditions without eersonnel receivino radiation exoosures in excess of 5 rem whole body, or its ecuivalent to any part of the kpdy, for the duration of the accident.
Eculoment at anorcoriate locations outside the control Room shall be provided (1) with a desion cacability for promet hot ohutdown of the reactor. includino necessary instrumentation and Controls to maintain the unit in a safe condition durino hot shutdown, and (2) with a potential capability for subsecuent cold shutdown of the reactog throuch the use of suitable procedures.
Compliance:
The Brunswick Plant is provided with one common Control Room for the two units. The Control Room has been designed for continuous occupation under a " fortress" concept; i.e.,
it is located in a-building which is designed to functionally survive the design basis earthquake, it is adequately shielded to reduce loss-of-coolant accident doses to its occupants to less than 5 rems to the whole body for the duration of the accident, and it shall have redundant ventilation and air conditionino oculocent to assure continuous habitability durino all conditions.
The level of safety desired by Critorien 19 shall be maintained and shall not be compromised.
(ref.:
6.1.1.1, Section 3.0; 6.1.1.2 Appendix F; 6.6.1.1,
- p. 6-21; 6.6.1.1,
- p. 6-21; and 6.6.1.7)
The results of Reference 6.1.1.26, Table 1, demonstrate that the doses would not exceed General Design Criteria 19 limits.
The Brunswick Plant Control Room shall be desioned to succort habitation durino all adverse conditions.
These conditions includes hurricanes and subsecuent tidal actions. tornadoes, e a rt heu a ke s, and a radiation cloud over the site.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 14.3-9)
The control Building Mechanical Equipment Room is not required to be habitable for mitigation of any accidents nor for safe shutdown of the plant.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section M10.50) i i
sICU r
CBRVAC System DDD-37 Page 23 Revision 1 l
2.2 ADDITIOllAL REGULATORY COMMITMEllTS This section identifies regulatory commitments that establish requirements, in addition to the GDCs listed above for the CDRVAC System design basis. These are typically Regulatory Guides, Regulations, Generic Letters, etc., to which DNP is committed.
Specific information may be found in Sections 3.0 and 4.0.
2.2.1 QUALZtY ASSURANCE PROGRAN FEQUIREMENTS The specific provisions of the Corporate Program arn contained in Reference 6.1.4.2.
2.2.1.1 10 CTR $0, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (ret.:
6.4.3 DNP's Ouality Assurance Procram s,hg11 meet the reaul ghonts q{
t 10 CPR to Ann. n (ret.:
6.4 3). (ret.:
6.1.1.2, p. 13.4-2)
Ihg portionn of the CBHVAC System that meet the criteria of 1Q,g7,g_iq A?o. B shall be included in the Ouality Assurance Procram.(ret.:
6.1.1.2, p. KD.6-1 & 2) See Section 4.0 of this DDD for key components subject to the requirements of this regulation.
EDBS screen 404 contains the data base for BNP quality classifi$ations.
2.2.1.2 Regulatory Culde 1.33, Rev. O, Quality Assurance Program
\\
Requirements (ret.s 6.5.5)
BNP comolles with the vrovielons of R.O.
1.33. Rev.
O. includino the l recuirements and recommendagiens for adninistrative controle described in AN_SI N18.7 (refel 6.3.5) with the exceptiong_gtg,ted_in Egggipn 1.8 of Peference 6.1.1.1.
(refs.: J6 1 1.2, pp. 13.4-3 and i
13.4-VA; 6.1.1.1, sect. 1.8; and 6.1.1.12) l 2.2.1.3 R.O. 1.64, Revision 0, Quality Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants (ret.s 6.5.8 )
gomolience with-the orovisions of R.C.
1.64, Rev. O.
f or those aren,g.
of t he OA Procram acollgable to the desion and modification of the plant shall be met by comolvine with the aco11 cable nuidance of ANf.I 45.2.11-1974. with the exceotions listed in Reference 6.1.1.1.
Section 1.8.
(rets.:
6.A.1.1, Sect. 1.8 and 6.1.1.12) 2.2,1.4 R?quintory Guide 1.74, Rev. 0, Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions (ret.s 6,5.9) l BNP shall comolv with the orovisions of R.O.
1.74. Rev.
O. (refs.
6.1.1.1, sect. 1.8 and 6 1.1.12)
Please note this document is the l
name as ANSI-N45.2.10.
2Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI-N45.2.10.</br></br>2" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process..2.2 HABETABILZTY REQUIREMENTS 2.2.2.1 Regulatory Guide 1.3, 'Rev.1, Assumpticns for Evaluating the -
Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident.
for Boiling Vater Reactors (ref.s 6.5.1)-
The assumotions of Reculatorv Guide 1.3. Revision 1.
1973.'shall be j
used in evaluatino the radiolooical imoact of a Loss of Coolant Accident.
(refs.:
6 1.1.2, Page 14.4-27; 6.1.1.13, Appendix E and; 6.1.1.1, Sectiona 2.3.4.1, 15.6.4.3.3 and 15.6.4.4)
The breathino rates civen in R.C.
1.3. Rev. I shall be used in gygiuatino the imoact of a control Rod Droo Accident or an MSLB Accident. (ref.:
6.1.1.2, Sections 14.4.2.6 and 14.4.5.2 and 6.1.1.1,. Se-t ions 15.6.3.3, 15.4.6.6)
Dean '
CDl!VAC System DBD-37 Page 24 Revision 1 l
2.2.2.2 Safety Guide 1.3, Assumptions for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Steam Line Break for Boiling Water Reactors (ref.s 6.5.2)
The assumptions of Safety Guido 1.5 should be used in evaluating the radiological effects of a steam line break on Control Room Habitability.
The NRC has used S.G.
1.5 in evaluating the BSEP HSLD Accident for compliance with NUREG-0737, Item 111.D.3.4.
(ref.:
6.6.1.7)
NOTE:
This is not in conflict with the reference in Section 2.2.2.1 to using the breathing rates provided in Regulatory Guide 1.3.
The breathing rates provided in both guidos are the name; both were taken from TID-14844 (ret.:
6.6.4.5) 2.2.2.3 Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 1, Design, Testing and Maintenance criteria for Engineered Safety Feature Atmosphere clean-Lp System Air Piltration and Adsorption Units of Light-water-cooled Nuclear Power Plants (ret.:
6.5.6)
Ibn carbon filtern includgd with the emeroency fillration t rains shall be able t o eatis f y the in-Diace testina_accentanes criteria of Peculatory Gylde 1.52. Revtelon 1,. dated July 1976 as appcified by 5
Insh_1pec. 3/4.7.2.
This requirement is imposed by ref erence in NUREG-75/OB7, Sections 6.4 and 9.5.1.
2.2.2.4 Regulatory Guide 1.78, June 1974, Assumptions for EvalustLng the Habitability of a Nucient Power Plant Control Room During a Postuinted Hazardous Chemical Release (ret.s 6.5.10)
Although DNP does not have a specific commitment to R.G.
1.78, the scoping analysis for texto gas hatarda was performed in accordance with this Regulatory Guide.
Chemicals with concentrations at the control Room air intake less than the toxic limit were eliminated from further stucf.
See Reference 6.1.1.13, Section 2, and 6.1.1.1, Section 6.4.4 (Amendments 3 & 4) for details.
BNP is committed to remaining aware of offsite hazards and protecting operators as required.
Toxie substances ntored or t ransport ed in the vicinity of the site that may nose a thrent_12 the plant operators upon a nostulated release chall be reviewed and anoropriate erotection imnlemented.
Also oes NURIG-0737 and NUREG-75/007 requirements.
(refs.: 6.5.15, 6.5.16, p.
6.4-12, and 6.6.1.1, supp. 1) 2.2.2.5 Regulatory Guide 1.y5, Rev. 1, Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room operators Against an Accidental Chemical Release.
(ret.s 6.5.11)
Ihe intent of R.G.
1.95. Rev.
1.
shall be met by the desion of the chlorine detection and isolation system.
The BNP control Room does agt conform to any of the six typen listed in the Beaulatory Guider h2 wever, nrotection of the control Room operatorn from accidental chlortno rulgtee is accomolished by the habitability evetem.
The guidance of R.G. 1.95 has been used.
See Reference 6.1.1.13 for details.
1 D8Dn.
i CBifVAC System DBD-37 Page 25 i
Revision 1 2.2.2.6 NUREG-15/001, Revision 1, Standard Review Plan Ihe anolicable cortions of the standard review plan are Sectiong I
2.2.1-2.2.2
_2.2.3.
6.4, 6.5.1 and 9.4.1.
HEP._ _ shall meet the intent gf t hese sections of the SRP as described in References 6.1.1.13 ang 6.6.1.3.
These are met in Antent, though not in detail.
Point-by-point evaluations are provided for Sections 6.4, 6.5.1, and 9.4.1.
See also Sections 3 and 4 for compliance.
2.2.2.1 T10-14044, Calculation of Distance factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites (ref.
6.6.4.5)
Control Room Doce calculations shall be based on TID-14d44 releases.
(ret.:
6.1.1.13, Appendix E) i 2.2.2.8 MUREG-0737, Clattfication of THE Action Plan Requirements, Item III.D.3.4 (ref.t 6.5.13)
P The control Room Ventilation System shall meat the recuirements for Control Room Habitability outlined in. NUREG-0 7 3 7, Item III.D.3.4.
(refs.:
6.6.1.3 and 6.6.1.7) e This item requires that licensees submit a detailed report on compliance with SRP Sections 2.2.1-2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 6.4.
References 6.5.10, 6.5.11, and 6.6.2.1 are used for guidance.
SRP 6.4 invokes the applicable requirements of SRPs 6.5.1 and 9.4.1.
BNPs submittal in response to this requirement may be found in References 6.1.1.13 and 6.1.1.27.
The essence of this document is to make the referenced SRPs part of BNPs design basie.
See Section 0.2.2.4 for historical evolution of compliance to thin item.
2.2.3 MISCELLANEOUS REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 2.2.3.1 10 CTR $0.63, Loss of All Alternating Current Power (ret.:
6,4.1)
Ihe CBHVAC System shall meet the recuiremente of 10 CFR 50.63 as defined in itNP'n submittale (refs.:
6.1.1.33, 6.1.1.34, 6.6.1.10, 6.6.1.12, and 6.6.1.13).
See Section 1.3.4 for additional information rotative to this regulation.
2.2.3.2 10 CTR 50; App. R, fire Protection Program for Nuclear facilities Operating Prior to January 1,1979 The CBRVAC SvJtem shall meet the reauirements of 10 CFR 50, ADoendix R fref.t 6.4.4) as outlined in Reference 6.1.1.36.
See sections 1.1.1.4, 1.1.3.1, 1.3.3, 2.1.3, 3.2, anc 4.5.8 for additional information on Fire Protection related requirements.
2.2.3,3 NLS-8 7-101, Appendix R Safety Evaluation Report comments (ref. t l
6.1.2.30)
Ihe Control Room shall be maintained at a nonitive cressure relative to the Cable Scread Rooms to ereclude or minimite smoke infiltration and ereclude or retard fire croonoption.
(ref.:
6.1.1.30, page 7)
See Reference 6.6.1.9 for NRC acceptance of this exemption.
+
14 tat
. ~
i l
l CBHVAC System DBD-37 Pa e 26 Revis on 1 I 2.2.3.4 10 CTR 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials (ref.t i
6.4.5)
EEDtilation openince into vital areas from non-vital areas shall be orotected from unauthorized intrusten and versonnel access to vital eautoment.
(ret.:
6.4.5)
See sections 2.3.1.1 and 3.4.7 for i
additional information on security requirements-Vit al. enulpment in the CBHVAC System shall be located eniv within a vital area which shall be located within a erotected area (ret.:
6.4.5, Section 46(c)). This requirement must be considered whenever i
relocating or installing vital equipment.
Vital /non-vital classification of equipment may be found in the Physical Security Plan (ref.:
6.1.1.35) or by contacting the DNP Secucity Manager.
2.2.3.5 29 cra 1910, occupationni Safety and Health Act (ref.:
6.4.7)
Comerceped air tanke shall be in necordance with 29 CFR 1910 Subcart M Parnaraoh 169.
(tet.:
6.1.1.2, Section H10.24)
This requirement is applicable to the CBHVAC Air Receiver ' tanks.
Also see Paragraph 1.1.3.1 for 29 CFR 1910 requirements.
s 2.2.3.6 Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2, Instrumentation for Light-Vater =
Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and rollowing an Accident (ref.t 6.5.12)
IDetrumentation shall be orovided to raeet ths intent of the reuuiremgnts of ReGJlatorv Guide 1.97. Rev. 2 at defined in the BSEP eubmittale. throuch Fevision 2 (rets:
6.1.1.16, 6.1.1.17, 6.1.1.19, 6.1.1.21 and 6.1.1.21) and as accepted in the SE dated 05/14/85 (ref.:
6.6.1.5).
Section 3.1.7 lists the instruments required by R.G.
1.97.
See D00-107 (ref.:
6.2.5.8) for additional information on R.G.
1.97.
In response to the requirement for Emergency Ventilation Damper Position, Brunswick interprete this variable (D24) to be damners which could release radiation to the curroundino clant environment or expose control Poom versonnel to radiation (ref.s.
6.1.1.17, p.
29) 2.2.3.7 Generic Letter 82-33, Requirements for Emergency Reaponse Capability (ret.:
6.6.5.1)
Demian c f CBHVAC Svetem componente on the CoDirol board shall comolv with the human f actors _reouirements of GL 82-33. (ref.:
6.6.5.1, 6.6.1.4, 6.1.1.14, and 6.1.1.15)
See Section 3.1.1.9 for additional information on designing for Human Factors.
2.2.3.8 Generic Letter 88-14, Instrument Air Quality (ret.:
6.6.5.4)
Instrument air used for safety related inetruments and control componente shall be of a cuality compatible with the devices usino the air.
Safetv-related air operated componente shall function as intended on a loss of normal i nst rument air, includino failina to the safe oosition on a loss of instrument air. or be eucolied with a safety.orade air sucolv.
(ref.:
6.1.1.32 and 6.6.1.8) teon
l l
CDl!VAC System DDD-37 Page 27 l
Revision 1 1
2.3 CODES / STANDARDS OF RECORD The following is a listing of codes and standards which are applicable, in part or entirely, to the CDifVAC System and which are tied to actual commitments.
In cases where only a certain section of the standard is design basis, that section is specified. A reference to one section of a standard does not indicata commitment with the entire standard.
Codes and standards which are utilized for good engineering practice, but are not required to meet the design basis may be found in sections 3 and 4 I
or in the component specifications.
2.3.1 ANS/ ANSI /ASME STANDAADS See Section 2.2.1 for references to QA codes and standards of record.
2.3.1.1 ANS 3.3-1982, 2ndustrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants (supersedes ANSI N18.17-1973 (ANS 3.3= 1973)) (ret.
6.3.3)
DNP's Physical Security Program meets the requirements of ANS 3.3-1982.
(ref.:
6.1.1.35)
The requirements as related to ventilation systems are as follows: Oreninas in ohysical barriers fother than doors. antes. hatches. ete.1 should not exceed 96 anuare inches if the smaller dimension exceeds six inches.
Where this is not i
achievable. comD2H1.a to ry measures.should be imolemented to ensure g
that the intearity of the barrier is not compromisedt (ref.:
6.3.3, Section 5.2.1 ) See Paragraph 3.4.7 for additional information on those requiremento.
2.3.1.2 ANSI B31.1.0 - 1967, Power Piping (ref. t 6.3.4)
Ploina in the CBHVAC System shall be.degioned in accordance with ANSI B31.1.0 *1967, (ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section A.2, Table A-4 6.2.7.18; and 6.2.7.2) 2.3.1.3 ANSI N509-1976, Nuclear Power' Plant Air Cleaning Units and '
i components.
(ref.
6.3.10) 1he HEPA filters. filter and adsorbor mountina f rames. filter housina. fan, mountino, ductwork, and dampers shall meet the recommendations of ANSI N509-1976.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13,_ Appendix A)
For instrumentation provided to meet the intent of ANSI N509, see section 3.1.2.4.
2.3.1,4 ANSI N510-1975,_ Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems.
(ref.s h
6.3.11)
Provisions for visual insoections and'in-place testino in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 shall be provigg(x (ref.
6.1.1.13, p. A-36, f
A-37 and 6.1.1.3, Section 4.7.2) 2.3.1.5 ASME Section VIZZ - 1971, Boiler and Pr.nssure Vessel Code The control Room HVAC Air Compressor receiver tanks phall bg j
desianed in accordance with ASME Section VIII.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section A.2, Table A-4 and 6.2.7.18)
This criteria is also a
[
requirement.of 29 CTR 1910 (See section 2.2.3.5) r l
DROM
.__,,_,_,.-,-,~,-..a.._._,-
.m.
CDRVAC System DDD-37 Page 28 Revision 1 l
2.3.2 IEEE STANDARDS l
2.3.2.1 ZEEE 279-1971, criterta for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power l
Generating Systems, (ret.s 6.3.22)
The CBRVAC System shall meet the sinalp failure criteria an described in IEEE 279-1971._ (ref.:
6.1.1.2, Sect. M8.8) Gee Section 3.1.6 for additional information.
IEEE 279 was withdrawn in 1985, but still applies to DNP.
See DBD-110 (ref.:
6.2.5.10) for additional information on single failure criterion.
I 2.3.2.2 IEEE 308-1971, Clans JE Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stationy
?ref,s 6.3.23) glass 1E ecuipment gjfil,gf et the recuirements of IEEE 300-1971 (ret.:
6.1.1.2,
- p..w.ls:)
Class 1E ecuipment chall be able tp_,rerf orm its function under no rmal and desion basio events.
The CBHVAC System shall maintain the environnnnt in the CD ouch that equipment in the CB can nerform its function. (ret.:
6.1.1.2, section M10,5) 2.3.2.3 ZEEE 323-1971, IEEE Standard for QualityLng Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (ref.t 6.3.24, 6.3.25)
QLage 1E eouipment shall meet the renuiremente of IEEE 323-1971.
(r61.s 6.1.1.2, p. H8.1-3)
Clans It eauipment shall be cualified to nerform in the environment in which it will be oDeratino both durino normal operation and post-Lecident.
The CDHVAC System shall maintain the environmgnt in the CD such that enuipment will perform f or it's cualified life.
(ret.:
6.1.1.2, p. M7.9-1)
This requirement applies to equipment supplied for original construction through 09/30/83.
2.3.2.4 IEEE 323-1974, IEEE standard for qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (ref.t,6.3.25)
Eeolacements for Class 1E eeuipment needed to meet the recuirements of Reculato ry Guide 1.97. shall be cualified to IEEE-323-1974. ggE will cualify by testina only CQmoonente located _in harsh environments.
(refs.:
6.1.1.16, 6.1.1.17, 6.1.1.19, and 6.1.1.21)
This requirement applies to equipment replaced af ter our R.G.
1.97 Submittal (09/30/83).
2.3.2.5 ZEEE 344-1971, Guide for Seismic Q'salification of Clann 15 Electrical Equipment (ref.t 6.3.26, 6.3.21)
Class lE eauiDment in the CBHVAC Svetem shall meet the recuirements of.IKEE 344-1971.
(ret.:
6.1.1.2, M7.8, M7.16, and M8.1-3)
This requirement applies to equipment supplied for original construction through 09/30/83.
1 l-Mon
CURVAC System DBD-37 Page 29 Revision 1 1 2,3.2.6 ZEEE 346-1975, Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class JE l
Electrical Equipment (ret.
6.3.27)
Eeolacemente f or chge IE e2yireent needed to meet the _ reauir.ggtents of Peculatory Guide 1.97. shall be _ qua lif ied t o IEIE *3 4 4-197 5.
(refa.:
6.1.1.16, 6.1.1.17, 6.1.1.19, and 6.1.1.21)
This requirement applies to equipment replaced after our R.O.
1.97 submittai (09/30/83).
2.3.2.7 ZEEE 279-1972, IEEE Trial-use Guide for the Appilcation of the l
Single railure critorion to Nuclear Power GeneratLng Station Protection Systems (ret.t 6.3.28)
The CDifVAC Sveirm shall matt the ninale failurs__renuiremente of
~
Section 6.5 of IEEE 379-1972.
This criteria, as applied to the CBHVAC System, is for prevention of common modo failure of safety i
related equipment due to temperature concerns.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section HB.8)
See Sections 3.1.6 and 3.6.7 for additional information.
k e
Dt!B1 1
i CDHVAC system DBD-37 Page J0 Revision 1 l 3.0 SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS The information in this section will represent calculation outputs, methoda used, and design parameters that support the design basis.
This information is considered useful both to the designer and the plant engineer, but is not design basin unless it is underlined.
3.1 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 3.1.1 GENERAL 3.1.1.1 The arrangement of the controls and distribution system for the CHHVAC System has been divisionalized providing separation and redundancy to ensure equipment operation.
(ret.:
6.1.1.2, Section MB.8-1) 3.1.1.2 Controla drawings provided via Specification 252-22 (ret.:
6.2.7.18) should be in accordance with ISA-SS.1 (ref.:
6.3.32).
3.1.1.3 The instrument air for the CBRVAC control system should be,of a quality compatible for use with ventilation control componente.
(ref.:
6.1.1.32) s 3.1.1.4 Complete manual and automatic controls for ventilation, temperatura, and pressure control should be provided.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 1.10.3.6.f) 3.1.1.5 Additional monitoring instrumentation includes the Battery Room tamperatures and differential pressure, outside air temperature, air conditioning temperatures for Unit 1 and Unit 2, instrument air compressor pressure (upstream and downstream of reducer) and the normal and emergency makeup air damper position indication.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-26) 3.1.1.6 When the system is placed into operation, either in the emergency mode or the normal mode, system malfunction would be indicated in the control Room either by air flow switches to show that a fan is not running and limit switches to indicate the associated damper position, or, as in the case of the emergency recirculation system, by the starting of the standby filter train and associated damper positions.
The normal and emergency damper positions are also indicated in the Control Room.
(ret.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-27) 3.1.1.7 Meteorological data, for use in habitability evaluations,'is available on ERFIS via a connection from the Heteorological tower.
3.1.1.0 Annunciators 3.1.1.8.1 The following f ans are equipped with alarms to notify operators of a fan trip. This is in accordance with good engineering practice.
e Battery Room Fans (one alarm per Battery Room actuated by either a supply or exhaust-fan trip) (ref.:
6.6.3.2) e cable Spread Room Fans (one alarm per Cable Spread Room actuated by either a supply or exhaust fan trip)
- Control Building Emergency Recirculation Fans (one fail to run alarm per fan and one inoperable alarm actuated by either fan)
- Control Room Supply Air Fans (one alarm per fan) e Control Room Exhaust Fan l
num
CBIfVAC System DBD-37 Page 31 Revision 1 l
- Control Building Hochenical Equipment Room Fans (actuated by either a supply or exhaust fan trip) e Condenser Area Booster Fan (one alarm per fan)
The Batterv Room Vent Fan _ Trio Annunciators are also reauired by-l DI1ginal commitment s t o the AEC.
(refs.:
6 1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6; 6.1.2.17; 6.1.2.18; 6.6.1.2, Section 5.3.2; 6.6.3.1; and 6.6.3.2) 3.1.1.8.2 control Room alarms are actuated for control Room intake air high chlorine, low instrument air preneure, low Hochanical Room temperature and various fire alarms including the charcoal filter high temperature alarm.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-26)
A Control Room annunciator is actuated by any one of three Control Room Area Radiation Monitors.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-4)
Also see poH procedure for UA-3.
3.1.1.9 HUMAN TACTORS REQUIREMENTS Human f actors design basis requirements for Control Board instrumentation may be found in Section 2.2.3.7.
To meet these requirements, UNP uses the guidelines of NUREG-0700 (ref.I' 6.5.14) and the acceptance criteria provided in NUREG-0801 (ref. :
6.5.17).
See Reference 6.1.1.31 for BNP's response to the human factors g
review requirements of this Generic Letter.
The guidelines and acceptance critoria required by this Generic Letter have been translated into Design Guides DG-VIII.53 (ref.:
6.2.8.18) and DG-VIII.58 (ref.:
6.2.8.19) for use in design.
See DBD-109 (ref.:
6.2.5.9) for additional information on Human Factors Requirements.
3.1.2 SUBSYSTEN INSTRUMENTATION 3.1.2.1 Control Building HVAC Air Compressors Instrumentation 3.1.2.1.1 The control Building RVAC Air Compressors are automatically started and stopped by pressure switches.
A low instrument air pressure condition is alarmed in the Control Room.
Relief valves are provided on each air receiver to protect the receivers and downstream components. Local gauges are provided both before and after the pressure regulating valves for monitoring and verification of alarm conditions.
3.1.2.2 Battery Room Subsystem Instrumentation 3.1.2.2.1 The Battery Room t,nply and-Exhaust dampers close to allow the fire dampers to.1vas to prevent the spread of fire. This is accomplished by manual action of the operators from the control Room.
(ref.:
6.2.1.15, FR 22, P. A10 and A13A)
This is to support the design basis requiremento of Section 2.1.3.
3.1.2.2.2 The controls for the Battery Room Ventilation Subsystem are arranged for remote manual operation from the control Room.
The loss of the ventilation system in any of the Battery rooms is indicated by an alarm in the Control Room.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6.g) 3.1.2.3 Control Room Normal Ventilation subsystem Instrumentation 3.1.2.3.1 A thermostatic controller-cycles the electrical heating coils located in the air duct.-as well as the refrigerant compressors and associated thermostatic expansion valves to regulate the control Room air temperature to maintain 75 'F.
teost
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 32 Revision 1 l 3.1.2.3.2 See sections 3.1.3. 3.1.4, and 3.1.5 for automatic events associated with the control Room Normal Ventilation System 3.1.2.4 Control Room Emergency ventilation subsystem Znstrumentation 3.1.2.4.1 The emergency air filtering trains may be operated in the automatic or manual mode.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-7) 3.1.2.4.2 Each system should be provided with instrumentation to signal, alarm, and record pressure drop and flow rate in the control Room.
(ref.: 6.6.1.1, Section 6.5.1)
The following instrumentation is provided (ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-25, 26):
e Differential pressure gauges are furnished across the following elements:
HEPA filters, calibrated flow elements, and charcoal absorbers
- Thermometers are installed before and after overy filter bank.
- A local relative humidity indicator (direct reading type) is installed between the HEPA filter bank and the charcoal filters.
e tach emergency filter train contains a calibrated flow measuring device fitted with a pressure drop gauge.
3.1.2.4.3 In the fully open position, each emergency air filtering train damper actuates a limit switch to initiate the start of the filtering train recirculation fan.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-8) 3.1.2.4.4 See sections 3.1.3, 3.1.4, and 3.1.5 for automatic events associated with the control Room Emergency Ventilation System.
3.1.3 DETECTION AND AUTOMAT!C EYENTS, CllLORINE 3.1.3.1 The control Room should be isolated 10 seconds after detectors are exposed to a high chlorine concentration.
(5 ppm or greater) (ret.:
6.1.1.1, p. 6.4.1-2 and 6.5.11)
Our original commitment was for detection in 3 seconds and isolation in 7 seconds (refs.:
6.1.1.2, Section H14.5 and 6.6.1.1 Tage 6.22, 23).
Installation of the new Chlorine Detectors redistributed the 10 seconds to. five seconda for the detectors and five seconds for the dampers (ref.:
6.2.1.14).
3.1.3.2 Chlorine isolation consists of closing the outside air make-up-damper, automatic termination of ventilation to both the Mechanical Equipment Room and Cable Spreading Room and stopping the Control Building Exhaust Fan.
If running, the Emergency Air Filtration Fans are also stopped to prevent degradation,of the charcoal filters by chlorine.
This occurs during each mode of operation.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, pp. 4-5, 4-6, 4-8, 4-9)
The normai intake damper resets to its normal mode of operation automatically when the high chlorine condition is removed.
3.1.3.3 The Cable Spreading Room supply and exhaust fans may be operated during an emergency by the use of a key operated bypass switch.
See Section 3.6.6.5 for additional information on this feature.; (refs.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6 and 6.1.1.13, p. 4-10) 3.1.3.4 The ventilation systems for the Battery Rooms continue to operate during a chlorine event.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-6)
This is to prevent hydrogen from accumulating to the explosive limit.
1 vaan
(......
I CDifVAC System DDD-37 Page 33 Revision 1 l
3.1.3.5 Detection of high rhlorine concentration in the Chlorination Building alarms in the Control Room and at the sensor location.
Detection of high chlorine concentration at the tank car or in the Control Room intake will alarm in and automatically isolate the control Room.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section M14.5 and 6.1.1.13, p. 4-5) 3.1.4 DETECTION AND AUTOMATIC CVENTS, RADIATION 3.1.4.1 Operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Suboystem is automatically initiated by abnormally high radiatien levels detected by the Control Building Area Radiation Honitoro.
(refs:
6.1.1.13,
- p. 4-3 and 6.6.1.1 p.
6-21)
Two redundant radiation monitors located in the Control Building air inlet plenum are provided to protect against the intake of contaminated outside air.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.17.3.7 and '.1.1.13, p. 4-3)
The control action (high radiation trip) is initiated by either a single upccale or two downscale trips.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.17.3.7)
An additional radiation monitor is provided for the control room general area.
A high radiation signal from this AAH also isolates the Control Room.
3.1.4.2 The monitor trip points should be set at 2.5 times the average background radiation level.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section H10.13-2 and 6.1.2.16, # 42)
This trip setting applies to the control room area monitorn.
It has been determined by calculation that acceptable operator doses will result from having the Control Room Intake Monitors set higher than 2.5 times background, since the control Room background radiation level is extremely low.
(ref.:
6.2.3.1$)
3.1.4.3 Should any of the monitors detect high radiation, the control Room annunciator is actuated and the following control actions occur automatica11ys (ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-4, 4-10 and 6.1.1.1, Section 6.4.2.2) e The Normal Fresh Air Intake Damper for the Control Room in closed.
{
(Also ref.:
6.1.1.2, section 7.18.3.7) e The Control Room Emergency ventilation Subsystem is placed in service, with the Emergency Recirculation Damper open.
(hloo l
ret.:
6.1.1.2, section 7.10.3.7) e The Cable Spreading Room Ventilation subsystems are shut down.
Fans may be operated by the use of a key operated bypass switch.
See Section 3.6.6.5 for additional information on this feature.
l (refs.: 6.1.1.2, Sections 7.18.3.6,
.7 and 6.1.1.13, p. 4-9)
I
- The Mechanical Equipment Room Ventilation f ans are shut down.
- The control Duilding exhaust fan is shut down and the exhaust damper is closed.
(Also ref.:
6.1.1.2, section 7.18.3.7) l e The Battery Room Ventilation Subsystem continues to operato during a Radiation Event.
l 3.1.4.4 The radiation shutdown described in 3.1.4.3 can be accomplished i
manually by the operator when deemed necessary.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, j
section H10.13 -)
This is provided when a high Chlorine signal is not present.
l 3.1.4.5 If the dedicated fan associated with the preferred omergency filter train f ails to start or trips, the standby filter train and dedicated fan receive an automatic start signal within 10 seconds of the fail-to-operate condition.
Failure of the filter unit fan is annunciated in the control Room.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-8) l nm-
}
l CDHVAC System DDD-37 Page 34 Revision 1 l 3.1.4.6 On loss of power to the radiation monitora, the trip circuits are set to cause an alarm and fail to the safe position (alarm). (ref.:
6.1.1.2, cection 7.13.3) l 3.1.4.7 On resetting of the high radiation signal, the Normal Intake and Emergency Recirculation Dampers automatically reposition and the Emergency Filtration train shute down.
3.1.5 DETECTION AND AUTohATIC EVENTS, SMOKE / TERE 3.1.5.1 A emoko and beat detection system is provided in the Control Room to alert the operator of an abnormal condition which could require Control Room loolation. (ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section H10.13, item (2))
3.1.5.2 Should smoke-filled air be drawn into the Control Room, smoke detoctors within the Control Room and Mechanical Equipment Room a l a rm.
Controls are available to reduce the volume of normal makeup air, and/or to place the bypass ventilation system filter trains in service.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, Sections 7.18.4 and 6.1,1.13, p. 4-5)
Controls also permit complete or partial bypassing of the recirculation system and exhausting direct to atmosphoro.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.4) 3.1.5.3 On detectien of omoke and/or heat the following automatic actions occurs e The control Room Emergency Ventilation Subsystem is initiated.
(ref.: 6.1.1.13, p. 4-3)
This includos closing the Normal Intake Damper and opening the Emergency Recirculation Damper.
- The Control Duildilig Exhaust fan is tripped.
e The Cable Spreading Room supply and exhaust fans are automatically tripped.
Fans may be operated by the use of a key operated bypass switch.
500 Section 3.6.6.5 for additional information on this feature.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6 and 6.1.1.13, p. 4-10) e The supply and oxhaust fans for the Mechanical Equipment Room automatically trip.
3.1.5.4 A review was conducted to evaluate and document tho adequacy of the present location of the smoke detectora for introduction of smoke from the outside.
This review was condu0ted to determine the necessity of adding a emoke detector in the Control Room Normal Intake Duct.
The review concluded that installation of an additional smoke detector was not warranted.
Fire detection equipment is installed in the Hochanical Equipment Room and receives the same air as that of the makeup air duct.
A signal from these detectors will also isolate the Control Room.
This provides sufficient indication and protection from emoke intrusion.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-19 and 6.1.2.21) 3.1.5.5 On detection of excessive heat inside an Emergency Filtration Train, the train automatically shuts down (ref.:
6.1.1.13,
- p. 4-8) and the inlet and outlet dampera clone.
This one of the justifications for not providing automatic suppression in the traine.
Other factora justifying omission of automatic suppression are that the radiation 2oading following an accident is low and that the units are normally isolated.
(ref.:
6.6.1.2, Section 4.4.2) 0 3.1.5.6 On resetting of the Fire Detection System, the Normal Intake and Emergency Recirculation Dampers automatically reposition and the Emergency Filtration Train shuts down.
I.
l retro l
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 35 l
Revision 1 3.1.6 SINGLE TAILURE SUPPORTING INFORMATION 3.1.6.1 Electrical power required by the Control Room Normal Ventilation System is powered from separate divisionalized McCs.
Ho sinals l
f ailure chall cagge loco of power to two of the three McCo.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section M10.13-1) 3.1.6.2 Ela21R_activo failure criterien is natisfied exccot for 2L-D-CB. 2J-D-CD.
2H-D-CD. and SV-916.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, A-11)
See Section 4.5.2 for damper failure position critoria.
This is acceptable because
([
- On loss of power or damper controller f ailure the 2H and 2J dampers are spring loaded to fail safe (closed).
(ref.:
3.1.1.13, A-11)
- 2H-D-CB can be shut manually by disconnecting the actuator, shifting the damper blado and locking the damper in place.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, A-13; 6.6.1.3, p.
3)
- Failure of 2H-D-CD solenoid or loss of air would cause the damper to fail-safe to the shut position.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-13).
- Failure of the ventilation exhaust fan would not cause loss of critical ventilation since operating either one of the two emergency recirculation fans associated with the emergency air filters will provide necessary ventilation.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section M10.13-1)
(ref.
6.1.1.13, p. A-11)
- Failure of SV-916 to function during a chlorine release event does not affect either damper 2J-D-CB or 2L-D-CB.
This to because 2J-D-CD is already closed and SV-916 does not control 2L-D-CD during this casualty.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-13)
If an EAF train is running, 2J-D-CD would be open and would require operation of SV-916 to close.
Failure of the SOV during this event would still be acceptable since This failure would be less severe than the failure of 2L-D-CB, which has previously been evaluated as acceptable.
(ref.:
6.1.3.6)
- Failure of SV-916-1 causes 2L-D-CD to close.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, A-13)
- Failure of Solenoid Valve SV-916 to properly function after radiation or smoke detection would cause Damper 2L-D-CD to remain open and Damper 2J-D-CB (emergency recirculation damper) to remain shut.
This was determined to be the worst case degradation of the CBHVAC following a sing.e failure of an active component during a casualty.
(ref.: 6.1.1.13, p. A-12)
- The whole body and thyroid radiation limits of GDC 19 are not exceeded upon failure of SV-916 during a LOCA, therefore this instance does not result in a threat to Control Room personnel.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-12)
- Failure of the Solenoid Valve SV-916 during smoke detection would allow smoke to enter the control Room, if the origin of the smoke was from outside the Control Building.
Filtration of recirculated air would not occur.
In this case, the operators would have access to emergency air breathing apparatus, if needed, until personnel were able to manually close the inlet air damper and open the recirculation damper.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-13) t) stat l
i CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 36 i Revision 1 1
- Failure of the Control Building Exhaust Damper (2H-u-CB) is not a concern for smoke or radiation emergencies because the exhaust fan is stopped during these events and the control Room remains pressurized.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-13) 3.1.6.3 Fo sinole f ailure in the Chlorine Detection Sveten chall prevent automatie isolation of the control Room ventilation system in the event of an accident which causes the chlorine detectors to__alagg.
(rets.:
6.1.1.2, Section H14.5 and 6.1.1.1, Table 6.4.4+2) 3.1.7 REGUL,ATORY GUIDE 1.97 REVISION 2 INSTRUMENTATION 1
3.1.7.1 The following instruments / indications in the CBifVAC System are provided for conformance with R.G.
1.97, Revision 2, Type D variable
- Emergency ventilation Damper Positions
- Emergency Recirculation Damper position (open-closed)
- Normal Hake-up Damper position (open-closed)
- Cable Spreading Room Supply Fan - Unit 1 and 2 (on-off)
- Cable Spread Room Exhaust Fan - Unit I and 2 (on-off)
- Hechanical Equipment Room Supply Fan (on-of f)
- Hechanical Equipment Room Exhaust Fan (on-of f)
- Emergency Recirculation Fans - A and B (on-off)
- Control Room Exhaust ran (on-off)
- Mechanical Equipment Room Exhaust Damper position (open-closed)
- Hechanical Equipment Room Supply Damper position (open-closed)
- Cable Spreading Room Exhaust Damper position - Unit 1 and 2 (open-i closed)
- Cable spreading Room Supply Damper position - Unit 1 and 2 (open-closed)
- Control Room Exhaust Damper position' (open-closed)
- Emergency Recirculation Fans - A and D Supply Damper position -
(open-closed)
- Emergency Recirculation Fans - A and B Exhaust Damper position -
(open-closed) 3.2 ELECTRICAL 3.2.1 Electrical equipment should be capable of direct connection to the Electrical Distribution System.
Refer to DBD-50 (ret.:
6.2.5.2) for-requirements of the electrical systems.
3.2.2 Refer to DBD-112 (ref.:
6.2.5.12) for general requirements for cable and raceway.
3.2.3 Motors in the CBNVAC System are provided with space heaters to maintain the internal equipment temperatures above the dewpoint when the motor is not in service.
The heaters are connected to energize when the motors are not in service.
(ref.:
6.2.7.8) 3.2.4 The system is powered from the emergency Electrical Distribution System for reliability during all operating conditions.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.0) osanl g-p-
CDRVAC System DBD-37 Pago 37 Revision 1 3.3 MEClu\\NICAL 3.3.1 GENERAL / CODES AND STANDARDS tor SYSTEM DESIGN 3.3.1.1 The Cable Spreading Room, Hechanical Equipment Rooms, Control Room, and Battery Rooms are independently ventilated to minimize the potential for the spreading of smoke throughout the building.
Fire dampers are provided for penetrations through firewalls.
(ref.
6.1.1.13, p. A-18) 3.3.1.2 Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCDA) for control Room personnel should be on hand. A six hour bottled air supply should be available onsite with unlimited offsito replenishment capability.
(ref.: 6.5.16, p.6.4-6; 6.5.11, p. 4)
See Sections 3.6.1.7 and 3.6.7.1 for additional information on SCBAs.
3.3.1.3 NED Design Guide IV.8, 'HVAC System Design * (ref.:
6.2.8.17) contains useful information for the design of HVAC Systems.
It should be noted that the design guide is a generic document written for use in multiple applications and whero deviations arise between this document and the design guide, this document shall prevail.
3.3.1.4 SMACNA Standards 3.3.1.4.1 The CBHVAC System was originally designed and constructed to g
SKACMA's 'High Velocity Duct construction Manual', Second Ed.,
dated 1969 (ref.:
6.3.34).
This standard shouad be used wherever available for ductwork changes, except as listed in Paragraph 3.3.1.4.2.
3.3.1.4.2 As part of the resolution to NCR-89-013 (ref.:
6.2 8.15), a comparison was done between existing HVAC supports and ductwork and installations known to have withstood' seismic events.
In analyzing ductwork the allowable stresses were used from SMACNA's
' Rectangular Industrial Duct Construction Standards * (ref.
6.3.36) and 'Round Industrial Duct Construction Standards * (ref.:
6.3.37), as appropriate.
Changes to ductwork should consider the allowable stresses listed in these standards.
See Sections 0.2.2.7 and 3.4.3.6 for additional information on the referenced NCR and seismic concerns.
3.3.1.4.3 other SKACNA standards appropriate for use for design changes to the CBHVAC System are 3.3.1.4.3.1 SKACHA, HVAC Duct System Design Tables and Charts (ref.
6.3.38) 3.3.1.4.3.2
$KACNA, Accepted Practice for Industrial Duct Construction (ref.:
6.3.39) 3.3.1.4.3.3 SMACHA, HVAC Duct Construction Standards, Metal and Flexible (ref.:
6.3.35) 3.3.1.5 ASHRAE Standards 3.3.1.5.1 The CBKVAC System should be balanced using the techniques outlined in the AS'IRAE Standards (ref.:
6.3.13).
3.3.1.5.2 The original design of the CBHVAC System was in accordance with the 1972 version of ASHRAE's Fundamentals Handbook (ref.:
6.3.13).
This was used for testing, balancing, minimum required make-up aje rates, and contamination concentrations (from gases such as CO ). This version should be used for modifications where 3
available.
L i
l
-Dean l
~
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Pa e 38 l
Revis on 1 3.3.1.5.3 Other ASHRAE Standards appropriate for use with the CDHVAC System are 3.3.1.5.3.1 ASHRAE Equipment Handbook (ref.:
6.3.12) 3.3.1.5.3.2 ASHRAE Tundamentain Handbook (1-P or SI Edition)
(ref.:
6.3.14) 3.3.1.5.3.3 ASHRAE HVAC Systems and Applications Handbook (ref.:
6.3.15) 3.3.1.5.3.4 ASHRAE 41.1, Standard Hethod for Temperature Measurement (ref.:
6.3.16) 3.3.1.5.3.5 ASHRAE 41.3, Standard Method for Pressure Hessurement (ref.:
6.3.17) 3.3.1.5.3.6 ASHRAE 41.7, Standard Hethod for Heasurement of Flow of Gas (ref.:
6.3.18) 3.3.1.5.3.7 ASHRAE 111, Practices for Haasurement, Testing, Adjusting and Balancing of Building Heating, Ventilation, Air-conditiching, and Refrigeration Systems (ref.:
6.3.19)
\\ 3.3.2 CONTROL ROOH EMERGENCY VENTILATION SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 3.3.2.1 The control Room Emergency Ventilation Subsystem consists of two filtering trains, one filtering train la required for system operation with the other serving as the standby train.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-3) 3.3.2.2 The control Room Emergency Ventilation Subsystem provides the additional filtering necessary to maintain habitable conditions within the Control Room area during emergency situations.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-18)
These emergency situations are those related to introduction of smoke or radiation into the Control Room.
3.3.2.3 Expected conditions for the filter system, including maximum pressure and pressure differential, radiation done rate received by the componento, relative humidity, and maximum and minimum-temperature should be based on the conditions in a postulated' design-basis accident, (ref.:
6.5.16, Section 6.5.1-3)
The maximum differential pressure on the system would be expected during a tornado; however, tornado check valves are installed to ensure the KVAC System integrity during this event. The combined normal pressure drop across the HEPA filters and adsorber banks is less than 8.5 in. W.G.
A sudden pressuro drop across the filters would be indicated on the differential pressure gauges.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13,
- p. A-28) 3.3.2.4 An emergency bypass filter system is provided to protect the occupants of the Control Room complex from airborne radioactive particles and to provide some outside air of suitable purity. for breathing during omergency situations. The emergency bypass'aystem is sized for the normal minimum outside air requiremente for adequate personnel and health requirements in accordance with the latest published ASHRAE standards (ref.:
6.3.13).
This system includes high efficiency particulate adsorbers (HEPAs) and carbon filters.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6.e) i 3.3.2.5 Provisions should be made for in-place testisig of the filter units initially and routinely thereafter.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p.'A-37) l osan
CBHVAC System DDD-37 Page 39 Revision 1 3.3.2.6 Individual filter systems should be limited to a flow rate of 30,000 cfm (ref.:
6.5.16, Section 6.6.1-3)
The volumetric flow rate of the emergency system is less than 30,000 cim.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p.
A-25). Design flow rate of 2000 scfm 1 0% is verified by testing.
1 (ret.:
6.1.1.3) 3.3.2.7 There are no instrument air tube lines from the Control Room to any part of the plant including the drywell or suppression chamber of either reactor, thus eliminating the possibility of direct transfer of radioactive material to the Control Room through pneumatic tubes.
No oil, high pressure steam or other process lines directly communicate between the control Room and the process systems. (ref.:
6.1.1.2, p. 7.18-2) 3.3.2.8 The multi-room area (i.e., Control Room, Computer Room, Electronic Equipment Room) is maintained at a positive ntatic pressure relative to surrounding areas to prevent the inadvertent inflow of toxic gases, radioactive airborne contamination, and smoke.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, 7.)B.3.f.a 6.1.1.13, p. 4-2) 3.3.3 CONTROL ROOM NORMAL VENTILATION SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 3.3.3.1 The Control Room Normal Ventilation Subsystem makeup air and recirculated air are constantly filtered by the recirculation air filter to remove dust, smoke, and other particulates that may be.
present in the air.
(ret.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-18) 3.3.3.2 The Control Room Normal Venti.lation Subsystem is equipped.with three air conditioning units (one serving as a common spare) capable of handling the largs concentrated heat gains from the computers and electronic equipment as well as the variable heat gains from personnel and lighting.
(refs.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-16, 6,1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6) 3.3.3.3 The control Room cooling coils (evaporator coils) are protected from vertical stratification and resultant coil icing and efficiency loss by eli.mination of the square corner in the plenum prior to the coil 4
and by turning vanes to direct and distribute the air into the coil.
(ref.:
6.1.2.2) 3.3.3.4 Heating coils are provided for the Control Room Area for initial plant start-up and extended winter outagen.
During other times the heat load in the Control Room area is larger than the anticipated heat loss.
(refs.:
6.1.2.2 and 6.1.2.4) -See Section 4.9.2 for additional information on the Control Room heating coils.
3.3.4 BATTERY ROOK VENTILATION SUBSYSTEN REQUIREMENTS 3.3.4.1 The requirements for ventilation in IEEE-484-1975 should be met.
BNp in not' committed to this standard, however, its use la good engineering practice. These requirements ares-
- Ensure the battery area is ventilated during charging.
(ref.:
6.3.30, Section 3.2 (a))
- The area selected for battery installation should be clean, dry, and well ventilated. (ref.:
6.3.30, Section 4.1 (3))
.J.
i CBHVAC System DBD-37 l
Page 40 Revision 1.l e The optimum cell electrolyte temperature, 77'F(25'C) is the basis
(
for rated performance.
A location where this temperature can be maintained will contribute to optimum battery life, < performance, and cost of operation.
Extreme ambient temperatures should be avoided because low temperatures decrease battery capacity while -
prolonged high temperatures shorten battery life.
(ref.
6.3.30, section 4.1 (4))
e The 1
'on or arrangement should result in no greater than a 5'F (3*C) erature difference between cells at a given time.
o
- Local, a heat sources such as direct sunlight, radiators, steam pipes, and space heaters should be avoided.
(ref.
6.3.30, section 4.1 (5))
e The battery area should be ventilated either by natural or induced ventilation to prevent accumulation of hydrogen and to maintain design temperature.
i*ha ventilation system should limit hydrogen accumulation to less than 2% of the total volume of the Battery Room.
(ref.:
6.3.30, section 4.1.4) e 3.3.4.2 The Battery Rooms are provided with 15 air changes per hour.' There is no possibility of air stagnation since both a supply and exhaust t
fan have been provided.
Should one of these fans fail, the number of air changes would be 6 per hour, which would still not allow build-up of hydrogen.
(ref.
6.1.2.20) 3.3.4.3 Battery Rooms are held at a negative pressure with respect to the rest of the Control Building to ensure hydrogen fumes do not enter other areas.
(ref.: 6.1.1.2, section 7.18.3.6.q; 6.1.1.1, Section 6.4.2.2; and 6.1.1.13, p.4-2) 3.4 CIVIL / STRUCTURAL 3.4.1 GENERAL 3.4.1.1 The Control Room Ventilation inlets should.Tenera11y be separated from major potential release points by at least 100 feet laterally and 50 feet vertically.
Actual minimum distances shal) be based on the dose analysis.
(ref.:
6.5.16, p. 6.4-4) 3.4.1.1.1 The Control Room air intake is approximately 25 metnes (82 feet) above grade, located on the roof of the Control Building.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-7) 3.4.1.1.2 The plant stack, the major potential: release point, is located approximately 180 meters (594 feet) awsy from the control Room air
-inlet and in 100 meters (330 feet) above grade.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13,-p. A-7) 3.4.1.1.3 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor-Buildings are located approximately.
L 40 meters (132 feet) away.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-7)
The Reactor Buildings are treated-as a diffuse source (ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 3-l 2).
The vertical distance to the Control Room intake is not; greater than 50 feet for all points on the Reactor Buildings, but the dose analysis determined this to be acceptable.
toast
-. _. -. -. ~.. -
. - ~ -
i CDRVAC System DDD-37 Page 41 Revision 1 3.4.1.2 The Hattery Room Fans are located outside the Battery Rooms to 6
further reduce the possibility of an explosion caused by battery generated gases and electrical equipment.
(refs.:
6.1.2.1 and 6.1.2.2)
The exhaust fans are located in the Mechanical Equipment Room near the exhaust valves to place the entire run of ductwork under a negative pressure to prevent dispersion of hydrogen to the rest of the building (ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 10.10.5.4) 3.4.1.3 The area containing the control Room Area condensing Units is divided and baffled to prevent recirculation and short cycling of the intake and exhaust air.
(ref.:
6.1.2.2) 3.4.1.4 The minimum distance between toxic gas sources and the Control Room is dependent upon the whetnt and type of the gas in question, the container site, and the uvallablo control Room protection provisions.
See Regulatory guides 1.70 (ref.:
6 5.10) and 1.95 (ref.:
6.5.11) for specific acceptance criteria.
(ref.:
6.5.16,
- p. 6.4-4) 3.4.1.5 The CBHVAC System is not equipped with dual inlets.
This deviation from the Standard Review Plan (ref.:
6.5.16) is acceptable due to the shape, size and location of the inlet.
Due these factors, it in improbable that a single event would cause blockage or contamination of the inlet.
(refs.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-14 and 6.6.1.3) b.4.1.6 struccural Codes and Standards The following codes and standards are applicable for design of CBHVAC System supports.
See DDD-56 and 102 for design basis requirements for supports.
e Ameriesi Institute of Steel construction (AISC),
Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings'. Original construction is per the 1963 (6th)
Ed.-
(ref.:
6.3.1).
Work performed after November 1, 1978 should be per the 8th Ed (ref.:
6.3.2).
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, page MC.22-2 and 6.1.1.1, Section 3.8.1) e American Welding Society D.1.1,
' Structural Welding Code - Steel' Revision to be used is per CP&L Corporate Welding Manual (ref.:
6.3.21)
- CP&L Corporate Welding Manual (ref.:
6.2.8.20) 3.4.2 SHIELDING CRITERIA 3.4.2.1 The following should be considered in evaluating the adequacy of protection from radiation cources (ref.:
6.5.16, p. 6.4-13):
e-The wall, ceiling, and floor thicknesses and materials Potential for radiation streaming through-penetrations e
Sources internal to the Control Building (such as filtor trains) 3.4.2.1.1 Control Building wail and roof concrete thickness in 2.0 feet.
(ref.:
6.1.1.1, Section 6.4.2.5 and 6.1.1.13, pago 5-3) 3.4.2.1.2 A detailed analysis and description of the shielding is described in a response to NUREG-0578 (ref.:
6.1.1.10, Section 2.1.6.b) 3.4.2.2 The Control Building equipment is subjected only to a mild radiological environment and therefore does not need special qualifications in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B (ref.:
6.6.4.1).
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-29) esan
CBHVAC System DDD-37 Page 42 Revision 1 3.4.3 SEZ5 HIC CRITERIA 3.4.3.1 Design basis seismic criteria are provided in DDD-102 and will not be repeated here to avoid duplication.
Current response spectra are in Specification 005-011 (ref.:
6.2.7.1).
This specification should be used after 05/27/87.
3.4.3.2 The CBHVAc System is located within the Control Building, which is a Seismic category I Building.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, section c.1.2) 3.4.3.3 Detection systems, isolation equipment, recirculating systems, and air supply apparatus should be designated beismic category I.
(ret.: 6.5.11, p. 4) The ducting should be seismic category 1 and protected against tornado missiles.
(ref.:
6.5.16, p. 6.4-11)
HVAc equipment, controls, and duct supports are designed to seismic category I requirements. (refs.:
6.2.2.7, 6.2.3.31, 6.1.1.13, p. A-15, A-21, 6.2.B.11) See section 4 of thig iBD for seismic classification of Key components.
3.4.3.4 Eailure of non-eeismic couinment will not have an adverse affect on
{'
cesential control Room HVAC coulement.
(ref.:
6.5.16, Section 9.4.1) BNP has committed to peetina thin er,iteria.
( refs.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-16 and 6.6.1.3)
' 3.4.3.5 Reanalysis concluded that the duct supports were seismically analyzed in accordance with the prevailing criteria at that time and that the analysis conformed with the requirements of Bulletin 79-07.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-21) 3.4.3.6 NCR A-89-013 (ref.:
6.2.8.15) identified discrepancies between isometrics used for the seismic reanalysis referenced in 3.4.3.5 and the as-built condition. EER 89-307 (ref.:
6.2.2.7) provided short-term qualification for the ductwork, and made provisions for long term qualification. Long term qualification and resolution of the NCR are to be provided via calculation OVA-0020 (ref.:
6.2.3.12,-
note this calculation is not currently approved).
See Section 0.2.2.7 for a historical evolution of the seismic criteria.
See Section 3.4.3.6 for a explanation of SHACNA standards used as part of this evaluation.
3.4.4 PROTECTION FROM TLOODING AND RAIN 3.4.4.1 CBHVAC inlets / outlets are protected against still water flooding to elevation 22'-0 and against wave runup to higher elevations.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section M2.37.a) 3.4.4.2 The control Building roof drains are designed so that no buildup of rain is possible, given a peak rainfall rate.of 6.5-inches /hr for 5 minutes or 5.3 inches /hr for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
(ref.:
-6.1.1.2, Section M2.37.b)
The CBHVAc intake is curbed; the combination of these two prevents flooding of water into the CBHVAC inlets.
3.4.4.3 CBHVAc. intake and exhaust openings are located in the roof of the Mechanical Equipment room.
The floor of the concrete compartment below the openings is sloped to scuppers (drains), which eliminates rain from entering the building.- (ref.:
6.1.1.2, M2.37.c)
The CBHVAC Intake Plenum (sheet metal enclosure) is provided with drains to prevent build-up of rain in the plenum.
(ref.:
6.1.2.26) t Dtur?
r
h CBRVAC System DDD-37 Page 43 Revision 1 3.4.5 TORNADO PROTECON 3.4.5.1 Design parame-re for tornado protection are provided in DBD-106,
' Hazards Analysis' (ret.:
6.2.5.7).
The design basis consists of a pressure drop of 3 pet in 3 seconds.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section C.2.4) 3.4.5.2 The C8HVAC System is designed to withstand the effects of a tornado.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, section 10.10.5.4, 6.2.3.35, 6.1.1.13, p. A-22)
It is enclosed in a tornado proof, non-vented structure.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, Sections 10.10.5.4, c.1.2, and c.2.5; 6.1.1.13, pp. A-15 and A-22) 3.4.5.3 Outside air is taken into the control Building through two tornado pressure-check valves which are designed to prevent flow reverse due to a sudden drop in outside air pressure.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-1, A-21, and A-22) 3.4.5.4 Tornado check valves are provided in the common exhaust duct which will close due to excess flew from a sudden pressure drop outside.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-21 and A-22) 3.4.5.5 Roof openings are provided in lieu of wall louvers for the Control Room area air cooled condensera for case of protection during tornados.
The condensers are located outside the area that in 5
isolated during a tornado and will be subject to low barometric pressure, which will not damage them, but they will not be subject to horizontal wind forces.
(ref.:
6.1.2.2) 3.4.6 PROTECTION FROM INTERNALLY GENERATED HISSILES 3.4.6.1 The CBHVAC System is protected from missiles generated from breaks in high-and moderate-energy piping (pipe whip, jet impingement, etc.), turbine missiles, or tornado-generated missiles.
Adequate protection against internally generated missiles is obtained either by massile barriers or separation or has been shown by analysis not to be of concern.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-22)
There is no high energy piping close to CBHVAC equipment that could cause damage due to pipe whip.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p.
A-15) 3.4.6.2 Rotating equipment in the Mechanical Equipment Room that is subject to producing internally generated missiles are the three Control Room Normal Ventilation fans and the two Emergency Filtration fans.
These are protected from the hazards of each other.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-15) 3.4.6.2.1 The redundant emergency filter trains are separated by a barrier so that damage to one system will not cause damage to the other system.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-24) 3.4.6.2.2 The emergency filter fans are separated but have only a partial protective barrier between them; however, analysis has shown that these fano pose no missile hazard to each other.
(ref. =
6.1.1.13,p. A-25 and 6.2.3.10) 3.4.6.2.3 Calculation OVA-0013 (ref.:
6.2.3.10) was developed'for the Emergency Filtration fans.
The conclusions were that although a missile could penetrate adjacent ducting, it would not penetrate an adjacent fan housing. This to only the case for.a missile that escapes without penetrating the ' fan-housing ( missile escapes through duct)
This.analysio did not take credit for the block walls between the fans or the sheet metal roof on the fans rooms.
l osan
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 44 Revision 1 l
3.4.6.3 Within the Mechanical Equipment Room of the control Building at the 70'-0" elevation, the two tanks associated with the two instrument air compressors could generate missiles that would affect Seismic Category I ventilating equipment and ducts.
Protection of the equipment is provided by a reinforced-concreto missile barrier around the tanks.
In addition to this barrier, each emergency filtration unit is separated from other equipment by a concrete masonry wall.
(ref.:
6.1.2.11) 3.4.6.4 No bulk gas storage is allowed inside structures housing safety-related equipment with the following exceptions: two air receivers in the Reactor Building, starting air receiver in each Diesel Generator Room, and the liquid nitrogen storage tank in the AOG
- building, (ref.:
6.1.1.7, page IV.C.3.d.2-3)
High pressure gas storage containers, when located in safety related buildings, are stored with their long axis parallel to the wallo.
(ref.:
6.1.1.7,
- p. IV.C.3.d.2-3) 3.4.7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 3.4.7.1 The Physical Security Plan at BNP tases the guidance provided in Reference 6.5.18.
Detailed information on the Security Plan is contained in Reference 6.1.1.35 (NOTEt This is a SAFEGUARDS document.)
If impact to the Security Plan is possible, or if any of the below listed criteria are impacted, contact the Security Supervisor.
3.4.7.2 For openings in vital area physical barriers, as described in 2.3.1.1, if conditions such as height above grade or existing barriers in the opening (even if these barriers do not meet the definition given in 0.4.1.20) cause uncertainty as to the requirement for additional protection, consult the Project Security Manager.
See Sections 2.2.3.4 and 2.3.1.1 for design basis statements.
3.5 MATERIALS / CHEMISTRY 3.5.1 All components should be designed for a useful life of 40 years, accounting for corrosion, erosion, and material fatigue based on 100 percent use.
In cases where material cannot be designed for 40 years, these items chould be identified and periodically replaced.
(See specification in Reference Section 6.2.7)
Materials exposed to the outside atmosphere should be selected with consideration to the salt air.
Although this was not an original requirement of the system, it is good engineering practico.
3.6 GENERAL 3.6.1 MISCELLANEOUS 3.6.1.1 Wind dispersion criteria used for the analyses of a chlorine release or a radiological event may be found in References 6.1.1.1, Tables 6.4.4-4 and 6.4.4-5, 6.1.1.13, and 6.1.1.2, Section M14.5.
3.6.1.2 Storage locations of CO and other gases should be such as to 3
eliminate the possibility of significant quantities of gases entering the emergency zone. All pressurized equipment and piping that could cause significant pressure gradients when failed inside buildings should be isolated by multiple pressure barriers such as multiple door vestibules.
(ref.:
6.5.16, p. 6.4-13) am,
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 45 Revision 1 !
3.6.1.3 An analysin has been perf ormed on the ef fects of discharging all CO fire extinguisher cylindero.
The analysia concludes that the CO, concentration will not exceed 3% by volume in the Control Room.
The concentration in the Mechanical Equipment room may exceed 3%, but habitability of that
'a is not required.
Per ASHRAE guidelines, at concentration of JS nd above, performance deteriorates and basic physiological functions are affected.
(ret.:
6.1.3.2, Section M10.50-1) 3.6.1.4 The capacity of the Control Room in terms of the number of people it can accommodate f or an extended period of time should be maintained relative to adequacy of self-contained breathing apparatus SCDA and Co, be. idup.
( ref.:
6.5.16 and 6.1.1.13, p. 4-12)
Makeup air (1000 cfm) is provided to ensure that carbon dioxide levela do not become excessive indefinitely.
The emergency food atockpile is currently stored in the cable accean way.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p.
4-12) 3.6.1.5 The CBHVAC system services an emergency tone consisting of all critical areas. such as the Control Room, kitchen, annitary facility, the computer Rooms, and the electronica room.
Areas not requiring access are excluded from the zone by administrat,,1vely closed doors.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-11, A-1) 3.6.1.6 Food, water. and redical eunn11ee shall be sufficient to maintain g
the emercency team fat least five people) for five davet (refs.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-2 and 6.5.16, p. 6.4-2) 3.6.1.7 Breathing Apparatus 3.6.1.7.1 Self-contained Breathing Apparatus (SCDA) should be provided for the Emergency Team (at least 5 people). (ref.:
6.5.16, Section 6.4) For BNP's dual unit control room, the requirements apply to both units.
See Technical Specifications (ret.:
6.1.1.3, Section 6 for minimum required shift complement.
3.6.1.7.2 The Brunswick Control Room maintains 12 self-contained breathing apparatun' for use by control Room personnel during emergencies.
An additional 19 air packo are located in an accessible location outside the control building.
This in for operator protection.
(ret.: 6.1.1.13, p.
4-12, A-6, D-3; 6.6.1.2, Section 4.4.3)
Additional information/ original commitments may be found in References 6.1.1.1, p. 6.4.1-1 and 6.1.1.2, Sections 14.3-9 (smoke) and M14.5-4a (chlorine).
3.6.1.7.3 Adequate air capacity for the breathing apparatus (at least six hours) should be available onsite to ensure that sufficient time is available to transport additional bottled air from offsite l
locations.
(ref.:
6.5.11, p. 4) 3.6.1.7.4 See Sections 3.3.1.2 and 3.6.7.1 for additional information on SCBAs.
3.6.1.8 Applicable technical specifications are:
Chlorine detection - 3/4.3.5.5 Control Building emergency filtration - 3/4.7.2 DCDM
CDHVAC System DBD-37 Page 46 Revision 1 3.6.2 CONTROL ROOM NORMAL YENTILATION SUBSYSTEM 3.6.2.1 The subaystem includes three HVAC trains in parallel, each sized to supply 50% of the ventilation, heating and cooling requirements under design conditions.
Normally, one HVAC train is dedicated for the Unit 1 area of the rooms and the second train is for the Unit 2 areas.
The third is a redundant train which can be utilized as a backup to either unit by reposl uioning the dampers.
(ref.s 6.1.1.2, Sections 10.10.$.4 and H8.8) 3.6.2.2 The control Room Normal Ventilation subsystem is sized to maintain the air space temperature at 75 'T (ref.:
6.1.1.2, section 10.10.5.4) 3.6.2.2.1 The two active air-conditioning systems circulate conditioned air to their respective areas in Unita 1 and 2, while receiving 1000 scfm of filtered outaide make-up air.
The recirculated air, plus filtered make-up air, is refiltered by the return air filter before entering the cooling coils.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 10.10.5.4) 3.6.2.2.2 In addition to the cooling provided by the control Room Normal ventilation Subsystem, each computer Room is equipped with an air g
conditioning unit designed to remove 60,000 BTU /hr.
These units are designed to lower the temperature in the computer Rooms to between 65 'F and 70 'F to minimize the possibility of the computers overheating.
(ref.s 6.1.2.14 and 6.1.2.15) 3.6.2.3 The Control Room Normal Ventilation Subsystem maintains the control Room area at a slichtly nositive eretoure relative to surroundina grgas to minimite infiltration.
(refa.>
6.1.1.1, Sections 6.4.2.4 and 9.4.1.2; 6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6; 6.1.1.3, Section 3.7.3; 6.1.1.26 and 6.1.1.27) 3.6.2.4 The make-up fresh air and the recirculated air are constantly-filtered to remove dust, smoke and other particles that may be present in the air.
The volume of normal make-up fresh air is sufficient to compensate for the normal exhaust.
(ret.:
6.1 5. 2, Section 7.18.3.6c) 3.6.2.5 The make-up air for the Control Room Normal Ventilation Subsystem is designed to automatically transfer from the normal make-up mode to the emergency make-up mode after receiving a high radiation signal, 3.6.3 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SUBSYSTEM 3.6.3.1 The control Room Emergency Ventilation Subsystem filters smoke, odors, and airborne radioactivity from the emergency make-up air.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 10.10.5.4) 3.6.3.2 This filter system includes hi-efficiency (HIPA) and carbon filters.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6e)
In addition, as defined in Section 0.1.1, the Emergency Recirculation fan, inlet and outlet damper, and associated ductwork are part of this subsystem.
3.6.3.3 only one flow train is operating at a time.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 10.10.5.4)
(
men
l i
CBl!VAC System DBD-37 Page 47 Revision 1 l 3.6.3.4 The Centrol Room Rmergenev Ventilation Subsvetem maintains the Control Poem area at a sli2htiv Dositive treneure relative to surroundino areau to minimire infiltration.
(refs.:
6.1.1.1, Sections 6.4.2.4 and 9.4.1.2; 6.1.1.2, Section 7.10.3.6; 6.1.1.3, Section 3.7.3; and 6.1.1.27) 1.6.3.5 During the emergency make-up mode, 2000 scfm of outside air is combined with 2000 setm of recirculated air.
this air is drawn through one of two redundant filter trains.
The filtering of the 1000 scfm of recirculated air through this filter train wl11 act as clean-up for the conditioned spaces. (refs.:
6.1.1.2, Sections 10.10.5.4, M14.1 and 6.6.1.1, p.
6-21) 3.6.3.6 1000 scfm of recirculated air is adequate to limit background radiation within the Control Room to a safe level.
The 1000 actm of make-up air is more than adequate for approximately 35 people during emergency operation.
(ref.:
6.1.2.2)
Reference 6.1.2.27 provides a discussion of an actual example of Control Room oxygen concentration with no make-up air.
3.6.3.7 Control Room Envelope Leakags Values
'3.6.3.7.1 There are several routes by which potentially contaminated outside
.f air could enter the control Room, including the followings (ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 4-13) e Leakage through the normal outside air makeup damper.
- Leakage into the control Reem air ducts in the Mechanical Equipment Room.
e Leakage into the control Building elevator shaft, into the control Building stairwells, and through the control Room doors.
e Leakage into the Unit 2 cable access way via openings in the cable penetration cutout to the rattle space between the control and Reactor Buildings.
3.6.3.7.2 The control Room was determined to have an unfiltered leak rate of 3000 scfm using the methodology outlined in R.G.
1.95.
For un-pressurized Control Rooms, the gross leakage characteristic of the control Room should be determined by pressurizing the Control Room to 1/8 inch water gage and determining the pressurization flow rate.
(ref.:
6.5.11, p. 4)
Although BNP's Control Room is maintained at a slightly positive pressure, BNP was required to use the unfiltered inleakage determined by this method.
(ref.:
6.6.1.3)
This leak rate is used to analyze radiation events.
3.6.3.7.3 Doore into the control Room envelope are low-leakage type.
Calculated leakage is 20 SCFM per door.
(ref.:
6.2.3.42) 3.6.3.7.4 Doors will be kept administratively closed when not in use.
(refs.: 6.5.11, p. 4; 6.1.1.13,.p. 4-12, 6.1.2.16, # 45, 6.6.1.1,.
- p. 6-23)
This is to minimize leakage into the Control Room in the event of an accident.
3.6.3.7.5 Cable Spreading Room cable penetrations into the Control Room.are calculated to leak a total of-2000 SCFM at 1/8 in, w.g. This leakage is accounted for in the radiological habitability analysis.
(ref.:
6.2.3.42) osan.
f CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 48 Revision 1 3.6.3.7.6 Tor radiation events with the Emergency Ventilation Subsystem in operation, unfiltered inleakage is 3000 cfm.
(ref.:
6.1.1.27, 6.1.1.26, and 6.6.1.7) 3.6.3.7.7 During a chlorine event, control Room infiltration rate is calculated to be 1250 CrH.
Leakage into the ductwork is 124 scfm.
(ref.: 6.1.1.13, p. 4-13, rig 4.2).
3.6.4 MECHANICA!s l'QUZPMENT ROOM 3.6.4.1 The Hechanical Equipment Room is designed to receive 7500 scfm (ref.:
6.2.7.3) of air to remove the 86,000 DTU/hr heat load ger. orated under summer design conditions (ref.:
6.2.3.36).
3.6.4.2 During the winter months, two 15 r,W unit heaters are provided to supplement the heat generated by the equipment to maintain the roon above 50 'F.
(ref.:
6.2.3.36) 3.6.4.3 Elevator Machine Room The Elevator Machine Room is designed to be supplied 850 defm (ref.:
6.2.6.1) of outside air to remove the 10,000 BTU /hr (ref.:
L 6.2.3.36) heat load generated.
This limits the bulk average air temperature rise to 11 'T to maintain the temperature below 104 'T during summer design conditions.
3,6.5 BATTERY ROON5 3.6.5.1 Temperature Control 3.6.5.1.1 The Battery Rooms may attain a maximum temperature of 315 'T when the outside summer air is 93 'r.
(ret.:
6.1.1.2, Fig. H7.9-1) 3.6.5.1.2 Winter ventilating air to the Battery Room is controlled no that the space is maintained at not less than 65 'F.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, Section 10.10.5.4 and 6.1.1.1, Section 9.4.1.2) 3.6.5.1.3 The minimum battery cell temperature is 60 degrees F.
(ref.:
6.1.1.3, Section 3.8.2.3)
The analyses on battery cell temperatures may be found in References 6.2.3.2 and 6.0.3.19.
3.6.5.1.4 Vortex dampers at the supply fans are used to control air flows to
~
the Battery Rooms based on room air tamperature.
3.6.5.1.5 Each Battery Room is supplied 3350 scfm-(ref.:
6.2.7.3 and 6.2.6) of outside air to.romove the 105,000 BTU /hr (ref.:
6.2.3.36) heat load generated during summer design conditions.
This limits the bulk average air temperature rise to 32 'r to maintain the room temperature below 125 'T during summer design conditions. During g
L winter the exhauet air flow is reduced to a minimum of 1680 scfm by the automatic temperature control system.-
3.6.5.1.6 During the winter months', the supply air flow rate is reduced to l
1580 ocfm to utilire the approximate 30 KW of heat being released by the batteries and equipment in each room.
(ref.:
6.1.2.3) 3.6.5.1.7 Heating for the Battery Rooma is provided by duct _ heaters located in the supply duct of each room (IA, 1B, 2A, 28), and are rated for connection to the 480V HCC's.
(ref.:
6.2.1.11 and 6.2.1.12)-
non.
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 49 l
Revision 1 3.6.5.2 Negative Pressure Control 3.6.5.2.1 Vortex dampers at the exhaust fans are used to maintain a negative pressure in the Battery Room relative to the adjacent areas.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 10.10.5.4) 3.6.5.2.2 Each Battery Room is maintained at a negative pressure by exhausting 3450 scfm of air which includes the supply air and 100 scfm of infiltrated air from the adjacent Cable Spread Room.
(ref.:
6.1.2.2) 3.6.5.2.3 The Battery Rooms are designed to be ventilated continuously to maintain the hydrogen concentration below safe, acceptable levels.
The theoretical quantity of air required under the most severe mode (near the end of the charging period with the room temperature at 125 'F) is 110 scfm per Battery Room.
(ref.:
6.2.3.37) 3.6.6 CABLE SPREADING ROOMS e
3.6.6.1 Each cable Spreading Room is independently ventilated by supply and exhaust fans through a distribution duct.
(ret.:
6.1.1.2, Section S
7 17.3.6) 3.6.6.2 The controls for this system are arranged for remote manual operation from the control Room.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.17.3.6) 3.6.6.3 The supply and exhaust for the cable Spreading Room are provided with tight shutoff dampers for isolation during emergencies.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.17.3.6) 3.6.6.4 Each cable Spreading Room is supplied with 15,500 sefm (ref.:
6.2.7.3 and 6.2.6) of outside air to remove the 185,000 BTU /hr (ref.:
6.2.3.36) of heat generated by the cable and the equipment-during full load accident conditions.
This limits the bulk average air temperature rise to 11 'F to maintain the room temperature below 104 'F during summer design conditions.
3.6.6.5 After isolation from a high chlorine or high radiation signal, if the temperature in the cable Spreading Rooms approaches the design ilmit temperature of 104
'F, the control Room operator can restore the ventilation, while maintaining Control Room integrity by use of a key-locked bypass switch.. (ret.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6)
While it is desirable to minimize the contamination levels in the Cable spreading Room, for the purposes of the habitability analyses, no credit for dilution of chlorine or radioactive contaminants in the cable Spread Room is taken.
Paraphrasing, the cable Spread Room air is assumed to be at the same conditions as the outdoor air.
(refs.:
6.2.3.7, 6.2.3.8, 6.1.1.27, and 6.2.8.5)
For a radiation-event, the doses to equipment in the cable Spread are assumed to be i
low.. For thin reason, the key-locked bypass switch should not bo i
used following a radiation event unless required to maintain equipment operability.
3.6.7 SINGLE TAZUJRE CRITERIA A einole active failure shall not result in the loss of system functionai cacability (ref.:
6.5.11, p. 4 and 6.5.16, p. 6.4-3).
This criterion has been modifi d as described in Section 3.1.6.
3 (ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-11 to 13).
mmn
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Pa e 50 Revis on 1 l
3.6.7.1 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus single failure criteria requirements can be met for SCBA's by providing one extra unit for every three units required. (ter.:
6.5.11, p.4)
See sections 3.3.1.2 and 3.6.1.7 for additional information on SC3As.
3.6.7.2 Control Room Normal Ventilation Subsystem 3.6.7 1.1 The control Room Normal Ventilation subsystem is provided with three HVAC trains.
Normally, one of the HVAC trains is dedicated to the Unit 1 areas of these rooms and the second is dedicated to the Unit 2 areas and the third one is a common spare.
Each train contains one 100% capacity-(for one Unit, 30% for dual Unit control Room) fan, cooling coil, 15 KW heating element and compressor condenser unit.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, section 10.10.5.4) 3.6.7.2.2 Redundant fans, cooling equipment and other devices to ensure reliable operation of the system are provided.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 7.18.3.6.g)
See Section 4.7.1.2 for additional "
information on equipment operability requirements.
s 3.6.1.3 Control Room Emergency Yentilation Subsystem 3.6.7.3.1 The Emergency Ventilation Subsystem is provided with two - 100%
redundant filter units, fans and inlet and outlet dampers to ensure operation given a single active failure.
(refs.:
6.1.1.2, Paragraphs M10.13 and H14.1; 6.1.1.13, page 4-3) 3.6.7.3.2 In an assumed worst-case failure of the CBHVAC systam (see Section 3.1.6.2) radiation ilmits are not exceeded.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13,-p.
A-13) 3.6.7.3.3 Two single failure modes-to the Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System were evaluated in Reference 6.2.2.10.
One single failure mode is loss of power to the CBEAF Train A Logic which prevents starting either train of CBEAF manually or automatically. The second single failure mode is loss of power to CBEAT Train B (A) Logic with Train B (A) in Preferred a.id Train A (B) in standby, which prevents automatic starting of the standby Train.
Corrective actions to resolve these single failure modes will be implemented by Plant Modification 92-108.
(ref.:
6.2.1.22) 3.6.7.3.4 In the event of a Hain Steam Line Break with automatic Control Building Isolation, Control Room doses do not exceed the limits of GDC-19 (i.e., 30 REM) with the Emergency Air Filtration (EA7) system unavailable.
(ref.:
6.1.2.28 and 6.2.3.13) l-3.6.7.4 Rattery Rooms l
Each Battery Room is ventilated by an individual supply fan and an individual exhaust fan that' operate in Maries.
The single. failure criterion is achieved by having redundant Battery Rooms as compared to having redundant virntilation equipment.
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CBRVAC System DDD-37 Page 51 Revision 1 3.6.8 CONTROL POOH OPERATOR AVD EQUIPMENT DOSES 3.6.8.1 The dose to the control room operators following a DBA is required to be less than 5 rem to th whole bocy, 30 rem to the skin and 30 rem to the thyroid (See Sections 1.1.1.2 and 2.1.6).
3.6.8.2 Accidents evaluated for operator doses are (ref.:
6.1.1.2, Sections 14, M14.1, and M14.4):
e Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Accident e
Refueling Accident Control Rod Drop Accident 3.6.8.3 The calculated doses are based on the following assumptions:
3.6.8.3.1 LOCA The 30-day integrated post-LOCA doses for ventilation flow rates of 3000 ocfm unfiltered inleakage, 1000 sefm filtered inleakage, and 1000 scfm recirculated flow, are (in rem):
(ref.: F.1.1.26, 1-10)
Whole cody:
airborne 0.003, other 0.413, total 0.416 Thyroia:
airborne 1.72 e
Beta skins airborne 0.044 3.6.8.3.1.1 A calculation was run to determine the pensitivity of total operator doses due to increasing the unfiltered unleakgo to an amount great than that referenced above.
For unfiltered inlaakage of 100,030 sefm or greater the done does not increase significantly. (ref.: 6.1.1.26, 1-9) 3.6,0.3.1.2 A calculacion was performed uo determine the effect of delayed isolation of the control Room following a LOCA.
The results are that for a delay of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the calculated Control Room operator doses are still well below the GOC 19 limits.
(ref.:
6.2.3.7) 3.6.8.3.2 hSLB Accident The calet.ted MSLB Accident doses to a control room operator ares e
28.1 rem to the thyroid for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time period and 30 day time period.(ref.:
6.2.3.8)
Whole body and skin doses are considered negligible for a MSLB Accicant -(ref.:
6.6.1.1)
The assumptions used in the MSLB calculation ares e Control Room fails te isolate automatically, manual isolation takes place after 10 minutes, initial unfiltered in?.eakage is 5000 scfm.
e After isolation, unfiltered inleakage is 3000 scfm.
l-osan
l CBHVAC System DDD-37 Page S2 Revision 1l 3.6.8.3.3 Refueling Accident The calculated doses received by the Control Room operators from a Refueling Accident ares (ref.:
6.1.1.2, Sections M14.1 and M14.4) whole body 2.95 x 10 rem 4
beta skin 7.24 x 10 rem d
4 o
thyroid:
5.6 x 10 rem These analyses assume 25 scfm unfiltered inleakage, since the control room was to be maintained at 1/4 in w.g. positive pressure.
3.6.8.3.4 control Rod Drop Accident The calculated doses received by the Control Room operators from a Control Rod Drop Accident ares (ref.:
6.1.1.2, Esctions M14.1 and M14.4) thyroid:
8.64 x 10 rem 4
whole boof ind skin doses have not been retrieved for this accident s
These analyses assume 25 sefm unfiltered inleakage, since the control room was to be maintained at 1/4 in w.g. positive pressure.
3.6.8.4 The largest expected doses to equipment would occur from a release of fission products during a design-basis accident.
The release would produce a mild radiation environment and no equipment functional degradation is expected.
(ref.: - 6.1.1.13, p. A-28) 3.6.9 TEMPERATURE \\ HUMIDITY n
F 3.6.9.1 The outdoor design temperature range for BSEP is 15 *F to 93
'F.
Outdoor design humidity in 10 to 100t (ref.:
6.1.1.2, Fig. M 7.9-1) 3.6.9.1.1 The 93 degree summer design temperature is consistent with the ASHRAE 99% summer design temperature for Wilmington (see Reference 6.3.14 for cLrrent standard).
The 99% temperature coincides with the temperature that will be reached or exceeded for 11 of the hours in the summer months (June through September),
or approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> per year.
Elevated temperatures are typically used for aging calculations anu assume that the components are at the design temperature for their entire life.
Actual temperatures are below this limit 99% of the time, balancing the 11 of a typical year in which the components are at or above the design temperature.
The 99% sunner wet bulb temperature listed in ASHRAE is 81 *F.
This number was adjusted upward to 82 *F for BNP based on actual data.
3.6.9.1.2 The 99% winter temperature is based on the hours in December, January and February. Temperature will be at or below this limit for only 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> in a typical year (1% ol the hours in Deccmber, January and February). ASHRAE lists a 99% winter design tempc ature of 23
'F.
BNP design temperature in 15 *F for most applications, including the CBHVAC System.
The additional 8 'F is for conservatism.
l sman s
+-_ - - - - - - _ _ - - -
_.---_---___a
. _ - - - - _ - _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ - - -
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 53 Revision 1 3.6.9.2 The design temperature of the Control Room is 75'F at 50 percent relative humidity with only two air conditioning units in operation.
If one unit should fail, the identical spare unit would be placed I
into service.
These units are powered from emergency buses and will function on loss of offsite power when the Emergency Diesel Generators are supplying power to the emergency buses.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-17) 3.6.10 CHLORINE TANK CAR RUPTURE ANALYSIS 3.6.10.1 An analysis of the severity of a postulated rupture of the 55-ton chlorine rail car was cor. ducted using the assumptions listed in Reference 6.1.1.1, Table 6.4.4-2 and Reference 6.1.1.2 Section i
M14.5.
The results may also be found in References 6.1.1.2 Sections M14.5, 6.1.1.1 Section 6.4.4.2, and 6.2.8.5.
This analysis demonstrates that a rupture of the chlorine tank car will not impair
=
control Room habitability. (ref.: 6.1.1.13, p. A-8, 6.1.1.1, p.
6.4.4-1) 3.6.10.2 Analysis Assumptions
- Normal air exchange rate is O.46 air volume exchanges per hour.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. 6-7) e Chlorine Isolation mode air exchange rate is 0.28 air volume exchanges per hour. (ref.: 6.1.1.13, p. 6-7)
- Tank car is located 450 feet (137.2 meters) from the Control Room intake on grace.
The Control Room intake is 82 feet (25 meters) above grade.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p.
6-1, A-7)
- Chlorine is the only hazardous material stored on-site in significant quantities.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. B-4)
- The volume of the Control Room in 298,650 cubic feet.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p.
B-1) 3.6.10.3 Toxic gas levela shall be kept below the toxicity limit for two minutes after alarm.
(ref.: 6.5.16, p. 6.4-5; 6.5.11) 3.6.10.4 Two minutes is considered sufficient time for a trained operator to put a self-contained breathing apparatus in operation.
(ref.:
6.5.11, p. 2) 3.6.10.5 Allcwable limits of toxic gas concentration should be established on the basis that the operators should be capable of carrying out their duties with a minimum of interference caused by the gas and subsequent protective measures.
The limits for chlorine gas for the three categories are:
- Long term limit (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or greater): the limit assigned for occupational exposure (40 Hour week) 1 ppm by volume
- Short-term Limit (2 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />):
A limit that will assure that the operator will not suffer incapacitating effects after a 1-hour exposure - 4 ppm l
l wwn
l CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 54 Revision 1.
- Protectivt Action Limit (2 minutes os less): A limit that will' assure that the operator will quickly recover after breathing apparatus is in place.
7.n determining this limit, it should be assumed that the concentration increases linearly with time from zero to-two minutes and that the limit is attained at two minutes
- 15 ppm ( 45mg/m'). This limit is also termed the protective action limit in reference 6.5.10.
Reference:
6.5.16, p. 6.4-4,5 These limits are found in NUREG-75/087 (ref.:
6.5.16), Section 6.4, page 6.
3.6.10.6 An additional analysis has been porformed using more state of the-art modeling techniques.
This analysis is not the basis for our SER, but does provide additional insight into the affect of changing certain parameters on Control Room habitability.
This analysis is contained in Reference 6.2.3.22.
\\
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CDEVAC System D8D-37 Page 55~
Revision 1 l 4.0 COMPONENT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS This section describes the design requirements for key components within the CBHVAC.
The information in this section represents calculation outputs, methods used, and design parameters.that support the design basis on the key component level. This information is considered useful both to the designer and the plant engineer, but should not be considered design basis unless it is underlined.
)
4.1 CONTROLS COMPONENTS 4.1.1 Automatic controls components should be in accordance with Specification 252-22 (ref.:
6.2.7.18).
This specification governs the pneumatic portier. of the control system, as well as the electronic thermostats.
4.1.2 Air piping for automatic controls should be ASTM B88 type K copper per Specificatione 252-22, (ref.:
6.2.7.18) and 248-51 (ref.:
6.2.7.12). Installation should be per Specification 248-53 (yef.:
6.2.7.13). (ref.: 6.2.7.18).
54.1.3 controls components required to ensure operability of critical equipment (see following Sections 4.2, 4.3) are included in the Quality Assurance Program.
See EDBS ccreen 404 for specific instruments.
4.1.4 The seismic test report for various HVAC instruments may-be found-in Reference 6.2.8.8.
I 4.2 DUCTWORK AND ACCESSORIES Ductwork and accessories should be provided_and installed in accordance with the requirements of Specifications 226-001 (ref.: 6.2.7.9) for the 1
Computer Room Duct work and 226-002 (ref.:
6.2.7.10) for the balance of the system.
These components are included in the Quality Assurance program if they are required to operate to ensure that the function of -
the CBHVAC as defined in Section 1.1 is met.
See EDES screen 404 for information on specific components.
4.2.1 SHEET HETAL 4.2.1.1 Sixteen (16) gauge and lighter sheet metal should conform to ASTM A527.
Fourteen (14) gaugefand heavier sheet metal should conform-to ASTM A526.
(ref.:
6.2.7.9)
This is in accordance with standard' engineering practice.
j 4.2.1.2 Sheet metal should have a galvanized coating with a total weight of 2.5 on per ft' (total both sides).
(ref.:
6.2.7.9)
Angles and reinforcing steel should be hot-dipped galvanized. (ref.:
6.2.7.9)
This is to minimize corrosion and maximize equipment life.
4.2.1.3 Ductwork should be airtight.
Ducts should be leak tested for=
audible leakage to 4 in. W.G.
(ref.:
6.2.7.9).
This guideline is to ensure that adequate air quantities are delivered to the spaces i
and equipment requiring the ventilation.
In addition, duct leakage i
is factored into the unfiltered inleakage for habitability analyses.
See Section 3.6.3.7 for specific values used.
- ostm j
e
~1
. ~
CBHVAC System DDD-37 Page 56 Revision 1 4.2.1.4 Duetwork for the Batterv Room Supolv and Exhaust. Cable Sorcedino Room Supolv and Exhaust. Control Room Emeroency Ventilation, and Mechanical Ecuipment Room shall be Seismic Catecory I and chall meet the recuiremente of 10 CFR 50 Accendix B to meet the recuiremente of Sectione 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
4.2.1.5 Ductwork for the control Room Normal Ventilation Sucolv and Exhaust installed outside the Control Room Emercenev Zone shall be seismic Catecory I and Shall meet the recuiremente of 10 CFR 50 Aeoendix B to meet the recuiremente of Sectione 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
4.2.1.6 Ductwork for the control Room Supolv and Exhaust installed inside
$hp Control Room Emeroency Zone shall be Seismiq_Catecorv I to the extent that its failure shall not damace safety related ecuipment to meet the recuiremente of Section 3.4.3.4.
4.2.1.7 Ductwork for the Control Buildino Sucolv and Exhaust ventilation Subevetem inside the Mechanical Eouipment Room shall be Seismic Catecorv I and shall meet the reeviremente of 10 CFR 50 Accendix Q to meet t he recuiremente of Sectione 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
4.2.1.8 Ductwork for the Computer Room Supolv and Exhaust installed inside the Control Room Emercenev Zone shall be Seismically Suncorted to the extent that its f ailure shall not damace safety related couipment to meet the recuirements of Section 3.4.3.4.
The g
requirements of 10 CTR 50 Appendix B (ref.:
6.4.J) do not apply to the Computer Room Ductwork.
4.2.2 MISCELLANEOUS ACCESSORIES 4.2.2.1 Turning Vanes 4.2.2.1.1 Turning vanes are provided to minimize the pressure drop through the ductwork.
This is in accordance with good engineering practice.
4.2.2.1.2 Turning vanes should be provided in elbows whose centerline radius is less than 150% of duct width._ Turning vanes _should be in accordance with Specification 226-02, III.C.1.b. (ref.:
6.2.7.10) 4.2.2.1.3 Turnino vanes, where orovided. shall not comoromise the recuiremente of Sectione 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 as acclies to the ductwork in which they are installed.
(See Section 4.2.1.4 for ductwork requirements.)
4.2.2.2 Access Doors 4.2.2.2.1 Access doors should be provided in ducts for access to automatic controle, a utomatic dampers, backdraf t dampers, and fire dampers.
(ref.:
6.2.7.9)
The accese doors were originally provided for-ease of maintenance, but are now used for access to fire dampers in order to perform the required surveillance. (ref.:
6.1.1.3, Section 4.7.8) 4.2.2.2.2 Accena doore, where provided, shall not comrromise the recuiremente of Sectione 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 as anolied to the ductwork in which they are installed.
(See Sectiona4.2.1.4 for ductwork requirements.)
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 57 Revision 1 4.2.2.3 Flex 1ble Connectora 4.2.2.3.1 Flexible connectors are non-asbestos rubberized cloth or glass fabric double coated with neoprene.
It should be noncombustible and able to withstand 250 'F (ref.:
6.2.7.9).
This requirement minimizes the fixed combustible load in each fire area and allows a standardization of components thereby minimizing the different types of flex to be stocked.
4.2.2.3.2 Flexib_le connectors chall meet the reauiremente of Sectione 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 and are subiect to the recuirements of 10 CPR 50 Ano.
B.
(ref.:
6.4.3) if the ductwork ovetem and fan they are associated with are reauired to meet these re2uirements._ (See Section 4.2.?.4 for ductwork requirements and Section 4.3 for fan requtrements.)
4.3 FANS 4.3.1 GENERAL Fans in the CD (excluding Condenser Area Boonter Fans) were purchased g
per Specification 45-8.
The following are requirements of that specification:
4.3.1.1 Fan motors are in accordance with Specification 128-1, 1970.-(ref.:
6.2.7.8 )
4.3.1.2 Fans are qualified to operate in a service environment having a normal ambient temperature of 148 *F.
(ref.: 6.2.7.3)
This requirement is otandard for the fan motora provided via Specification 45-8, and does not imply that ambient temperatures in the CB will reach 148
'F.
4.3.1.3 Fan motorn are heavy-duty, totally enclosed air over construction, designed and built to move air to paso directly over the motor frame (ref.: 6.2.7.3) 4.3.1.4 Fan housings were tested in accordance with ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section V, 1971.
(ref.:
- 6. 2. 7. 3 )
4.3.1.5 Fans are manufactured in accordance with the quality standards and special requirement of Specification 9527-01-4224.
4.3.1.6 The emergency filter fans are seismir. ally mounted and located in a tornado proof Seismic category I structure.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p.
A-25) 4.3.1.7 The fans and motors are designed to permit easy removal from the duct system for maintenance.
4.3.1.8 The followino fans in the CBHVAC Svetem shall be seismic Cateoorv I and shall meet the recuiremente of 10 CFR 50 Accendix B fref.:
6.4.31 to meet the recuirements of Sectione 2.1.1 and 2.1.2:
Control Room Sunolv Pane f3 fans). Batterv Room Supply and Exhaust Fane (total of 8 f ans for the two unite), Cable Scread Sucolv and Exhaust Fans ftetal of 4 for the two units). Mechanical Ecutomeg Room Sucolv and Exhauet fans (two fans). Control Room Emercency Ventilation Fans (2 fand), and Control Room (washroom) Exhaust fan fone fani.
cean
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page-58 Revision 1;l 4.3.1.9 The followinc fans are recuired to be seismic Cateoorv I to meet the recuirements of Section 2.1.2, but not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B: Condenser Area Dooster Fans and the Air Cooled Condenser fans.,
(See Reference 6.2.8.14-for quality class information.)
4.3.1.10 rans in the Computer Room Air Conditioning _ Units are not required to -
be safety related or Seismic Category I.
4.4 CHLORINE DETECTORS 4.4.1 Chlorine Protection is provided by six chlorine detectors:
two detectors are mounted at the control Room air intakes, two detectors-are attached to tha wall of the service water intake structure, and two are located inside the Chlorination Building.
(refs.:
6.1.1.13, p.
4-5, B-3; 6.1.1.1, Section 6.4.4.27 and 6.1.1.2, Section M14.5) 4.4.2 The first locations (air intake and service water intake) are inside, or on the outer wall of, Class I structures and are therefore seismically prctected.
(ret.:
6-1.1.2, Section M14.5) chlorine detectors in the Control Buildino and the service Water Intake Buildino shall be Seismic Cateoorv I,_but not safety related.
The caismic classification-is in accordance with R.C.
1.95, Reference 6.1.1.2, page M14.5-4, and Reference 6.6.1.1, page 6-3.
The-detectors are not classified as Safety Related in accordance with the definition in 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (ref.:
6.4.3) since they do-not prevent or mitigate the consequences of a postulated accident that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public. See Reference 6.2.2.2 for determination of safety classification.
4.4.3 Detectors should be able to detect and signal a chlorine concentration of 5 ppm. (ref.: 6.5.11, p. 3) 4.4.4 The detectors have a sensitivity of 1 part per million or better and a response time of less than five seconds.
(ref.:
6.2.1.~17;and 6.1.1.1, Section M14.5).
4.5 D70iPERS 4.5.1 Ventilation dampers in the C8HVAC Svetem shall' be seismic Catenorv I and shall meet the recuirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B to meet ttg recuirementu pf Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
Fire dampers installed in.
ductwori DL_the C8HVAC System shall be seismically aualified to the extent _th31.1 LAY ehall not compromise the coeration of the System -
durino ot_Af,ter a seismic event to meet the recuirements of Section 3.4.3.4.
4.5.2 Safety related dampers shall fail to their safe position.
( re f. 's 6.2.2.9)
All motor operated dampers and piston type air-operators can be manually operated.
Diaphragm type operators fail-safe in the proper orientation. All valves requiring manual manipulation for safe shutdown are accessible via presently installed ladders and platforms.
(ref.:
6.1.1.9, request #27) osan
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 59 Revision 1 4.5.2.1 Failure positions for control Building dampers may be found in EER-91-0091 (ref.: 6.2.2.9).
Selected damper failure positions will be listed here due to their importance to system operation.
Failure on=
loss of air is not considered since safet)-related compressed air is provided from the control Room HVAC Air compressors.
4.5.2.1.1 The normal intake damper (2L-D-CB) fails closed on loss of power to prevent introduction of cor.taminants (smoke, radiation or chlorine) to the control Room.
This failure position is taken credit for in the single failure analysis.
See Section 3.1.6.
If the damper should f ail closed during normal operation, the CO:
concentration in the Control Room would not exceed acceptable levels for several days and, if necessary the Emergency Ventilation Subsystem could be operated to introduce fresh air.
4.5.2.1.2 The Emergency Recirculation Damper (2J-D-CB) fails closed on loss of power to prevent introduction of chlorine to the control room.
During a radiation or smoke event, the desirable position is open.
However, failure of the damper in the closed position for a radiation event has been analyzed and found to be acceptable (ref.:
6.2.3.16).
Failure of the damper in the closed position during a smoke event may be mitigated by alternate procedure for the removal of smoke (ref.:
6.2.6.4).
'4.5.2.1.3 The Control Room (Washroom) Exhaust Damper (2H-D-CD) fails closed on loss of power to prevent the introduction of-contaminants (smoke, radiation, or chlorine) into the control room. -See Section 3.1.6 for additional information on failure requirements.
4.5.2.1.4 The Emergency Air Filtration Train isolation dampers (2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D-EAD-CB) fail closed on loss of power to prevent introduction of chlorine into the Control Room.
During smoke and radiation events, it is preferable for these dampers to be open.
However, failure of one set (the inlet and outlet dampers associated with one train) of dampers during a - smoke or-radiation event is acceptable since the other train would be available.-
4.5.2.1.5 The Battery Room Inlet and Outlet _ dampers fail closed on loss of power or air to allow the Fire dampers to-function.
During normal-operation, the preferred position-is open to cool and ventilate-the Battery Rooms.
However, since the batteries are redundant, f ailure of a damper or pair of dampers (inlet and outlet for one room) in the closed position will not cause a loss of a safety function.
4.5.3 Isolation dampers should be leak tight.
(ref.: 6.5.16, p. 6.4-3)
The isolation dampers for habitability purposes are the CBEAF inlet and outlet dampers, the Normal Inlet Damper, the Emergency Recirculation Damper, and the Control Room (washroom) Exhaust Damper.
4.5.4 Dampers may be manually operated or repaired following an accident / event as allowed by-NUREG-75/87 (ref.:
6.5.16), Section-
- 6. 4, Appendix A.
See Section 2.2.2.6 for commitment to NUREG-75/087.
Briefly, the requirements are (see the reference for a more detailed explanation):
Internal components should not require repair.
Component design e
details should be such that internal components are of a-simplicity, ruggedness, and suspectibility to failure mechanisms as to render them reliable.
Welded or keyed shafts are considered reliable.
Multi-element linkages or pneumatic components internal to the ducts are viewed as subject to failure, oatm
CBUVAC System DBD-37 Page 60 Revision 1 l External valve components must be designed to ensure that the failed component may be bypassed easily and safely and that the valve can be manipulated to an acceptable position.
The location and positioning of the valves or damper must permit easy access from the Control Room, especially under DBA conditions.
Appropriate Control Room instrumentation should be provided for a clear indication and annunciation of valve or damper malfunction.
Periodic manipulation of the valve or damper by operators should be performed for training purposes.
The need for manual manipulation should not occur more than once during the accident.
The time for repair used in the computation of Control Room exposures should be taken as the time necessary to repair the valve plus a one-half hour margin.
4.5.5 INTAKE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION DAMPERS h.5.5.1 Intake and exhaust isolation dampers are of standard HVAC design and quality.
Leakags requirements are 1% of full-flow, which is 2000 wcfm.
(ref.: 6.1.1.13, A-4, A-14) 4.5.5.2 Failure of various dampers to operate due to mechanical f ailure of some internal component of the valve is remote because of the design of these dampers.
In addition, periodic testing requires functional testing of the system every 31 days.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-12) 4.5.5.3 Dampers can be manually operated by disconnecting the actuator and shifting the damper blade manually, then locking it in place.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-12) 4.5.5.4 The normal ventilation intake dampers will close within five seconds.
This prevents the introduction of radioactive contaminants and smoke to the central Control Room area without first being filtered by the Emergency Filtration Subsystem.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section M14.5; 6.1.1.1, Section 6.4.4.2: 6.5.10, p. 6.4.1; and 6.2.1.14) 4.5.5.5 Damper operators for the normal air intake and exhaust for the Control Room HVAC Subsystem are sized, by design, to shut the dampers within three seconds.
(ref.:
6.2.7.18) 4.5.6 OPPOSED BLADE DAMPERS Opposed blade dampers in the CBUVAC System are provided for general air control on the Supply Fan discharge.
The dampers are in accordance with Specification 226-002 (ref.:
6.2.7.10).
4.5.7 EMERGENCY AIR FILTRATION TRAIN ISOLATION DAMPERS 4.5.7.1 The emergency filter isolation valves are heavy-duty, low-leakage, single-blade dampers which have provisions for hand operation. The valve seals are designed for no leakage. (ref.: 6.1.1.13, p. A-3 and 6.2.7.11) 1 DSO37
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page61l
. Revision 1 4.5.7.2 The dampers are designed for open/ close operation and f ail as-is -
upon loss of air.
(ref.: 6.1,1,13, p. A-3 and 6.2.7.11)
The dampers fail close on loss of power.
(ref.:
6.2.1.21) 4.5.7.3 The dampers are rated for 10 in, w.g. differential pressure at a 2000 fpm maximum face velocity.
(ref.: 6.1.1.13 A-4 and 6.2.7.11) 4.5.8 Firs dampers 4.5.8.1 Fire dampers should be U.L. labeled and meet the requirements of NFPA Standard 90A.
For dampers which are exceptions to NFPA 90A see Reference 6.2.3.18.
Selection and-installation should be in' accordance with Specification 118-003 (ref.:
6.2.7.7).
4.5.8.2 Fire doors and fire dampers installed in ventilation ducts penetrating fire barriers in vital areas are.3-hour fire rated.
(ref.:
6.1.1.36) 4.5.8.3 Ventilation ducts nenetratina fire barriere shall have fire dampggg installed.
(ref.:
6.1.1.9, 6.1.1.7,Section IV.C.2.a.29 & 30, IV.C.2.d.14 & 17, 6.1.3.8, 6.1.3.9) e
'4.5.9 TORNADO CHECK DAMPERS 4.5.9.1 Tornado check dampers are designed to close against a pressure drop of 3 pai in 3 seconos for 20 seconds.
(ref.:
6.1.2.6) 4.5.9.2 Tornado check valves shall meet the reeutrements of Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
They shall be Seismic Catecorv 1 and are subiect to the recuiremente of 10 CFR 50 Anoendix B (ref.:
6.4.3).
4.5.9.3 The seismic analysis report for the tornado check valves may be found in Reference 6.2.8.4.
4.5.9.4 The tornado check valves were designed in accordance with ASME Boiler ~and Pressuro vessel code,Section VIII.
4.5.9.5 The inlet tornado check valves are installed in the norma'l flow
~
~
direction.
They are designed to close during a tornado and to restore following a tornado-with no operator intervention.
(ref.:
6.2.8.4 and 6.7.7) 4.5.9.6 The discharge tornado check valves are installed with flow opposito to the tormal direction and are provided with a counter weight system to-hold them open during normal operation.- The discharge checks are equipped with pneumatic cylinders to allow remsval of the counter weight for testing of the valves.
(ref.:
6.7.7) 4.5.9.7 The discharge tornado check valves are designed to close during a tornado without operator intervention. Restoring the valves after a tornado is accomplished by shutting down the exhaust fans and allowing the counter weight to operate. (ref.:
6.2.8.4) 4.5.10 VORTEX TYPE FLOW CONTROL DAMPERS 4.5.10.1 Vortex type flow control dampers are used to control the quantity of l
air supplied to and exhausted from each Battery Room. -The supply i
i vortex dampers are used to control temperature, while the exhaust vortex dampers are used.to control negative pressure.
taan
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Pa e 62 Revison1h 4.5.10.2 Vortex type flow control dampers are necessary for control of temperature and negative pressure, therefore, they shall meet the requirements of Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
Ih.e damners shall be Seismic Catecory I and be subiect to the recuirements of 10 CFR 50 ADDendix H (ref.:
6.4.3) to meet the reautrements of Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
4.6 FILTERS 4.6.1 HEPA AND CHARCOAL FILTER TRAINS (EMERGENCY FILTERS) 4.6.1.1 General 4.6.1.1.1 Each emergency filter train contains a charcoal filter bank and'a HEPA filter upstream of the charcoal. (ref.:
6.1.1.13, pp. A-24 and A-30).
4.6.1.1.2 The redundant emeroency filter trains shall be constructed to Setemic Cateoorv I reautremente. (ret.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-24)
These filter trains shall be in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Aerendix B to meet the recuirements of Section 2.1.1.
'4.6.1.1.3 For the radiological analyses of the Control Room, the following ventilation system filter efficiencies for iodine were assumed (refs.:
6.1.1.2, Section 9.4.1.2; 6.1.1.13, p. 5-5; 6.1.1.27,-p.
1-5, and 6.1.1.1, Section 9.4.1.2)
- Elemental 95 percent
=
e Organic 90 percent
=
- Particulate = 95 percent 4.6.1.1.4 The combined pressure drop across the HEPA filters and adsorber banks is less than 8.5 inches water gauge.
( re f.'s
-6.1.1.13, p.
A-28) i 4.6.1.1.5 There are no water drains used in the emergency recirculation filtration system. -(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-32)
W_ ater_ drains are not required since build-up of moisture is not.a concern.
See Section 4.6.1.3.5 for additional discussion of entrained moisture.
4.6.1.1.6 The filter efficiencies for iodine meet ANSI N509-1976 guidelines for iodine removal efficiency.
(ref..
6.1.1.13, p. A-32) 4.6.1.1.7 The filter system is designed to withstand the anticipated fission product heat loading from a TID-14844 release without reaching the desorption temperature of the charcoal filters.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13,
- p. A-33)
- 4. 6. J.1. 0 Components should be provided 'lAh a minimum of 3 linear feet from mounting frame to mounting framt between banks of components.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-35) 4.6.1.1.9 Conformance to design parameters is demonstrated by verifying a system' flow rate of 2000 sefm +/- 10 % during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.
(refs.:
6.1.1.13,
- p. A-36 and 6.1.1.3, 4.7.2.b.3) 4.6.1.1.10 Each emergency filter unit housing is provided with access doore (approximately 20 x 50 inches in size) to give complete accessibility to components for servicing.
(ref.:
6.2.7.11) l non l-
l CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 63 Revision 1 4.6.1.1.11 The housing for each filter train in designed to withstand a pressure differential range from minus 15 inches of water to 1.5 poi positive, applied to the inside, with no permanent deformation or damage.
(ref.:
6.2.7.11, p. 16) 4.6.1.1.12 The seismic evaluation of the Emergency Filters may be found in reference 6.2.8.6.
4.6.1.2 HEPA Filters 4.6.1.2.1 HEPA filters, filter and adsorber mounting frames, and filter housings meet the recommendations of ANSI N509-1976.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-31,32) 4.6.1.2.2 HEPA filters are tested for an efficiency of 991 for particulate iodine.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13,
- p. B-1)
Specified HEPA filter efficiency is 99.971 at 0.3 g particulate size.
(ref.:
6.2.7.11)
This is also in accordance with the definition of a HEPA provided in Beforence 6.2.8.3.
'4.6.1.2.3 HEPA filter pressure drops are as follows:
e clean filter 1.0 in.
W.G.
e dirty filter pressure drop (normal change-out point): 3.0 in.
W.G.
e Emergency operation allowable pressure drop:
8.0 in. W.G.
(ref.:
6.2.7.11) 4.6.1.2.4 HEPA Filters should be in accordance with UL-586 (ref.;
6.3.41)
(ref '
6.2.7.11) 4.6.1.2.5 The HEPA filters included with the filter train should have an efficiency of not less than 99.97% through the complete filter (medium, frame, and gasket) when operated at rated capacity and tested with thermally generated Dioctylphthalate (DOP) of uniform 0.3 micron droplet size in accordance with the Edgewood Arsenal Manual.
(ref.:
6.2.7.11, p. 8) 4.6.1.3 Charcoal Adsorbers 4.6.1.3.1 If a high temperature condition is detected, the filtering train automatically shuts down to limit desorption of the charcoal.
The desorption temperature of the charcoal is greater than 302*F.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-33) 4.6.1.3.2 Provisions should be made for obtaining representative adsorbent samples in order to estbmate the amount of penetration of the system.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-38) 4.6.1.3.3 Adoorbent samples are obtained after every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of operation.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-39) 4.6.1.3.4 The practical ILmit of the testing system and instrumentation for charcoal bed leakage is 0.01% (99.99% efficient).
This is the lLmiting factor for charcoal beds, since the charcoal is tested to 99.999% efficiency.
(ref.:
6.1.2.7)
]
oannl
1 CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 64 Revision 1 4.6.1.3.5 Under dry conditions, charcoal removes iodine materials well; but under 100% humidity conditions the efficiency drops sharply.
Efficiency for methyl iodine form is satisfactory at relative humidities less than 70%, but at over 80% humidity is significantly reduced. Heaters are recommended for installations encountering over 70 % humidity air.
(ref.: 6.1.2.5)
The filter trains do not require a moisture separator because of the mixing of 50 percent outdoor air and recirculation air ensures that the relative humidity will be maintained below the critical conditions.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, pp. A-24 and A-30) 4.6.1.3.6 Charcoal ignition temperature should not be less than 340 'F.
(ref.:
6.2.7.11) 4.6.2 ROLL-TYPE FILTERS 4.6.2.1 Analysis has shown that without the use of the recirculation roll filter, radiological limits inside the Control Room area will not be exceeded due to charcoal dust from the emergency filter system.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-24 and 6.2.3.17)
Therefore, the recirculation roll filters are not required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix 8.
These filtero are roeuired to be
\\
selpmically cualified to the extent that their failure shall not comoromise the creration of the CBHVAC Svetem durino or after a ceiemic event to meet the recuirements of Section 3.4.3.4.
4.6.2.2 The supply roll filters are provided for increased reliability and reduced maintenance for components inside the CB, however, they are not lequired for any of the criteria listed in Section 2.1.2 or Reference 6.4.3.
Therefore, the supply roll filters are not required to be Safety Related. These filters are reauired to be seismically cualified to the extent that their failure shall not comoromise the eneration of the CBHVAC System durino or after a seismic event to meet the recuirements of Section 3.4.3.4.
4.6.2.3 The filters for the intake plenum and the Control Room Normal Ventilation subsystem (recirculation plenum) have an efficiency of 80 to 85% when tested by the Air Filter Institute weight method.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 10.10.5.4) 4.7 AIR CONDITIONING UNITS 4.7.1 CONTPOL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING UNITS 4.7.1.1 The air cooled condensing units were specified in accordance with UE&C Specification 45-6 (ref.:
6.2.7.2) and UL Standard 465 (ref.:
6.3.40).
4.7.1.2 Under the worst anticipated degraded CBHVAC performance (see Section 3.1.6.2), the administratively ontrolled doors for the affected areas of the Control Room could be opened to help keep those Rooms cooler.
No equipment failures are expected if two of the three air-conditioning units fail.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13, p. A-21) 4.7.1.3 Humidity of the Control Room area is maintained by the air conditioning equipment and use of cooling coils.
Incoming air is mixed with recirculated air to ensure the incoming atmosphere is maintained at a nominal 50 percent relative humidity.
(ref.:
6.1.1.13,
- p. A-30) osan j
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 65 Revision 1 4.7.1.4 Cooling coils are direct expansion evaporator coils and are each connected to its compressor-condenser unit with a closed refrigerant piping system.
The condenser coils are cooled by fans utilizing outside air.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section 10.10.5.4) 4.7.1.5 The Control Room Air Conditioning Units are not required to be operable to meet the requirements of Section 1.1.2 and therefore are not required to meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.
These units are reeuired to be sfismic Cateoorv I.
(ref.:
6.2.2.3) 4.7.1.6 Motors in the Control Room Air Conditioning Units should be in accordance with Reference 6.3.40 (UL 465). (ref.:
6.2.7.2) 4.7.2 COMPUTER ROOM AIR CONDITIONING UNITS 4.7.2.1 The Computer Room Air Conditioning Units are not required to meet the requirements of Sections 2.1.1 or 2.1.2.
These units are not designated as Safety related nor are they required to be seismically qualified.
4 e
4.8 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENTS
'4.8.1 RECEIVER TANKS 4.8.1.1 For-all tanks outside primary containment the stored energy and plant arrangement with respect to potential missiles and possible missile trajectory have been evaluated using the Modified Petry Formula. Where required, missile barriers were installed..These analyses and corrective actions are adequate for providing protection from a tank rupture.
(ref.:
6.1.1.2, Section M10.24 and 6.6.1.1 pp. 3-3 and 3-8 and 6.1.2.16, # 46) 4.8.1.2 The control Room HVAC Air receivers shall meet the reautrements of Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 The receivers shall be Seismic Cateoorv-I and be cubiect to the roeuirements of 10 CFR 50 Accendix B (ref.:
6.4.3).
4.8.1.3 The seismic test report for these tanks may be found in Reference 6.2.8.7.
4.8.2 AIR COMPRESSORS 4.8.2.1 The control Room Air Compressors are the sole source of air for the
{
CBHVAC System.
Comoressed air is recuired for coeration of the j
QBHVAC system.
These units and suonortino components foressure reculators, etc.) shall be seismically cualified and shall meet the reevirements of 10 CFR 50. Accendix B.
4.8.2.2 Two 100% redundant' air compressors are provided.
Each air-I compressor, driven by a 2 hp motor, discharges to a dedicated 60 -
l qallon air receiver. (refs.:
6.2.4.1 and 6.2.7.18)
The air t
compressors are automatically controlled to maintain, within instrument tolerances,'each air receiver pressurized between 78 psig and 92 peig.
(ref.:
6.2.4.1) l.
4.8.2.3 The seismic test report for these compressors may be found in i
Reference 6.2.8.9.
- men
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 60 Revision 1l:
4.8.3 AIR DRYER 4.8.3.1 The Control Room HVAC Air Drver shall meet the reauirements of Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 The dryer shall_be Seismic Cateoorv I and be subiect to the recu irement o _,p f 10 CFR 50 Anoendix B (ref.:
6.4.3).
4.8.3.2 The compressed air is dried and cooled by a refrigerant type air dryer.
The air dryer is designed to maintain a dowpoint less than 0 *r at 20 psig.
(ref.:
6.2.7.18) 4.8.3.3 The seismic test report for the air dryer and accessories may be found in Reference 6.2.8.10.
4.8.4 AIR PRESSURE REDUCING VALVES 4.8.4.1 The Air Pressure Reducina Valvea shall meet the recitirements of Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 The valves shall be ~91smic Cateoorv I and be subiect to the recuirements of 10 CPR 50 Anoendix B (ref.:
6.4.3).
4.8.4.2 Pressure reducers are provided to maintain a constant pressure of 20-psig on the control system (ref.:
6.2.7.18) and 60 to 90 peig-for operation of the exhaust tornado valve tost function.
(refs.:-
6.1.2.10 and 6.7.7) 4.8.4.3 Tho seismic test report for the air pressure reducing valves may be found in Reference 6.2.8.8.
4.8.5 AUTOMATIC DRAIN VALVES 4.8.5.1 Automatic drain traps are provided in the C8HVAC Instrument Air Subsystem to prevent the buildup on condensation in the air receivers and to allow drainage of condensation from the air dryer.
4.8.5.2 The automatic drain traos in the CBHVAC Instrument Air Subsystem shall meet the recuirements of Sections 2.1.1 and-2.1.2 The trans shall be Seismic Cateoorv I and be subiect to the recuirements -
of 10 CFR 50 Anoendix B (ret.:
6.4.3).
4.8.5.3 The seismic test report for the automatic drain valves may be found in Reference 6.2.8.8.
4.9 ELECTRIC HEATERS 4.9.1 BATTERY ROOH DUCT HEATERS 4.9.1.1 The Battery Room Duct heaters are provided for reliability and availability of the batteries.
TP v are provided based on the econom.
advantage of avoiding of ing LCO's and possible subsequent plant shutdown, but ars.;ot required to function during or after an accident, nor are they required to prevent an accident.
Therefore, the Battery Room Duct Heaters are not required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (ref.:
6.4.3).
Since the heaters are mounted inside the duct, the Batterv Room Heaters are reauired to be seismically Oualified to the extent that theig.
failure durino or after a seismic event shall not affect the functioninc of the Batterv Room Ventilation System to meet the-reautrements of Section 3.4.3.4.
Dernt f
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 67 Revision 1 4.9.1.2 The Battery Room Duct Heaters are sized to maintain a temperature of at leact 77 *F ascuming a 0 *F_ outdoor air temperature with flow reduced to the winter minimum.
(ref.: 6.2.3.26)
See Section 3.6.5.1 for minimum air flow rates.
4.9.2 CONTROL ROOH DUCT HEATERS 4.9.2.1 The Control Room Duct Heaters are provided for personnel comfort during original plant start-up and extended dual unit outages during the winter, but are not required to function during or after an
~
accident, nor are they required to prevent an accident.
Therefore, the Control Room Duct Heaters are not required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (ref.:
6.4.3).
4.9.2.2 The heaters are mounted inside the duct, the Control Poom Duct Heaters are recuired to be seismically Oualified to the extent that their failure durina or after a solemic event shall not affect the functioninc of the Control Room Normal Ventilation System to meeg.
the recuirements of Section 3.4.3.4.
4.9.2.3 The heaters were sized to conservatively account for the minimum expected heat load of a dual unit ohutdown.- The assumptions were 30% of equipment heat load, 50% of the lights and 2000 scfm of make-up air.
Without the make-up air, the listed equipment and lighting load is adequate to maintain the Control Room above 65 *F on a 15 'F day.
(refs.:
6.1.2.2, 6.2.3.36, and 6.2.3.38) 4.9.3 NECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM HEATERS 4.9.3.1 The Mechanical Equipment Room Heaters (2 15 KW each) are provided to maintain the Mechanical Equipment Room above 55'T based on an outdoor air temperature of 15*F.
_Per calculation 9527-6-VAC-4-F (ref.:
6.2.3.38), only 21 KW is required to meet these listed criteria.
4.9.3.2 The Mechanical Equipment Room heaters are not required to. function during or after an accident, nor are they required to prevent an accident.
Therefore, the Mechanical Equipment Room Electric Heaters are not required to meet -the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (ref.:
6.4.3).
The Mechanical Eeuipment Room heaters are reouired to be seismically cualified to the extent that their failure shall not comoromice the operation of the CBRVAC System as reauired by Section 3.4.3.4.
CBffVAC System DDD Page 68 Revision 1 5.0
. DESIGN MARGIN This section discussen and identifies known margin in the CBHVAC design, assuring the system *n ability to fulfill its-safety function. Design Margin is the difference between the minimum acceptable criteria and the system capability.
This should not be confused with the Margin of Safety, which is the area above the acceptance limit (i.e., minimum acceptable criteria) that is in the control of the NRC.
Refer to the.
Corporate 10 CFR 50.59 Program Manual for further clarification.-
Quantifying margin with a view to reducing it is a-complex and regulatory sensitive task that should be approached with caution.
5.1 LOCA AND MSLB DOSES NRC acceptance limits; 5 rem whole body, 30 rem thyroid, 30 rem skin See Section 3.6.8 for results of analyzed conditions.
5.2 BATTERY HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION The Battery Rocme are supplied with at least 1580 scfm of air.' The minimum required air flow to maintain hydrogen concentrations below the explosive limit is 110 scfm.
(ref.:
6.2.3.37)
This does not account for pockets of hydrogen.
5.3 DATTERY ROOM TEMPERATURES l
The Batteries are adequately sized to provide the required current'at a t
j temperature of 65 'F with a 10% design margin (ref.: '6.2.3.19).
At a cell temperature of 60
'F, the design margin is 7% (ref. - 6.2.3.2) Note that this calculation has not received final approval. The Battery Room Heaters are sized to maintain the rooms at a-temperature of 77 'F on a 0 *F day (outdoor ambient)
(refs.4-6.2.1.11~and 6.2.1.12).
5.4 CHLORINE CONCENTRATION Per R.G. 1.95, the two minute concentration limit for-chlorine is 15 pga (45mg/ml).
The calculated worst case chlorine concentratione in the control room are 10 ppm at 156 minutes (ref.:
6.2.8.5).
l l
L.
DSEB7
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 69 Revision 1-l 6.0 DESIGN DABIS DOCUMENT REFERENCES This section provides a listing of documents used as references in this DBD and other major documents important to system design.
These listings are not intended to be all encompassing in order to minimize.
the revisions to the DBD.
EDBS and NRCS can be utilized for detailed listings of the design output documents.
The references have been categorized by type.
Not all reference documents were originally issued with a unique number.
In such cases a " MISC" number has been assigned to identify the document in NED's DBD Reconstitution System Files.
6.1 GENERAL 6.1.1 LICENSE BASIS DOCJHENTS l'
6.1.1.1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant 6.1.1.2 Final Safety Analysis Report, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Through Amendment 31 (date: 11/26/75) 6.1.1.3 Appendix A to License No's. DPR-62 & 71, BSEP Technical g
Specifications, Unit 1 and Unit 2 6.1.1.4 Appendix B to License No's. DPR-62 & 71, BSEP Environmental Technical Specifications, Unit 1 and Unit 2 6.1.1.5 NG-75-300, 02/27/75, Quality Assurance Program (contains original commitments to QA Reg. Guides, etc.)
6.1.1.6 NG-75-1278, 08/26/75, Quality Assurance Program (revisions and clarification to NG-75-300) 6.1.1.7 BTP APCSD 9.5-1, 1/1/77, Fire Protection Program Review 6.1.1.8 NG-77-705, 6/23/77, Administrative Controls for Firo Protection 6.1.1.9 NG-77-706,.6/23/77, Fire-Protection Program Evaluation _
6.1.1.10 GD-79-3307, 12/31/79, Lesso.to Learned Short Term Requirements 6.1.1.11 MISC-055GS, 03/02/83, NUREG-0737 Item III.D 3.4, Control Room Habitability (From CP&L to NRC Transmitting NUS-3697, Rev 2) 6.1.1.12 OQA-81-026, 03/18/81, Quality Assurance Program 6.1.1.13 NUS-3697, Rev 2, 3/2/83, Control Room Habitability Evaluation 6.1.1.14 LAP-83-128, 04/15/83, Generic Letter 82-33 Response 6.1.1.15 LAP-83-434, 10/14/83, Supplement to-Generic Letter 82-33 Response 6.1.1.16 LAP-83-408, 09/30/83, Emergency Response Capability - Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Submits Revision 0 of position paper ano supp) 6.1.1.17 NLS-84-025, 02/01/84, BSEP Emergency Response-Capability -,
i Regulatory Guide l'.97 - Revision l' (Submits Revision 1 of position paper and supp)
(
6.1.1.18 ASCA, April 1984, Alternative Shutdown capability Assessment Report, i BSEP Units 1&2 osan
CBHVAC System DBD-37
-Page 70 Revision 1 - l 6.1.1.19 NLS-84-202, 05/08/84, Response to Generic Letter 82-33, Supplement 1 l to NUREG-0737, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability -
Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Submits Revision 2 of position paper-and supp) 6.1.1.20 NLS-84-345, 10/03/84, Control Room Habitability - Inability to I
Maintain 1/8th' inch positive pressure 6.1.1.21 NLS-85-009, 01/22/85, BSEP - Emergency Response Capability -
1 Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 6.1.1.22 NLS-85-054, 2/21/85, control Room Habitability I
6.1.1.23 NLS-85-125, 4/15/85, Control Room Habitability (commits to making I
transport time greater than isolation time for chlorine events) 6.1.1.24 NLS-85-365, 6/07/85, Control Room Habitability (reiterates prior-It commitments on installation of hold-up line) 6.1.1.25 NLS-85-275, 8/5/85, Control Room Habitability 6.1.1.26 NLS-85-311, 8/30/85, Control Room Habitability (transmittal, letter U
for NUS-4758) 6.1.1.27 NUS-4758, 8/85, Control Room Radiological Roanalysis Brunswick Steam Clactric Plant 6.1.1.28 NLS 86-015, 3/5/86, Request for License Amendment, Chlorine i
Detection System 6.1.1.29 NLS-86-094, 3/28/86, Supplement Request for License Amendment,-
I Chlorine Detection System 6.1.1.30 NLS-87-101, 05/19/87, Appendix R Safety Evaluation Report Comments I
6.1.1.31 NLS-87-123, Control Room Design 1 Review-Final St.nmary Report,'
Revision 1, June.23, 1987.
6.1.1.32 NLS-89-020, 02/03/89, Response to NRC Generic Letter 88-14, 4
Instrument Air. Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-related Equipment 6.1.1.33 NLS-90-231, 11/15/90, Response to NRC Station' Blackout Safety Evaluation 6.1.1.34 NLS-91-323, 12/18/91, Response to FRC Supplemental Safety Evaluation of CP&L Response to Station Elackouu Rule 6.1.1.35 Brunswick Physical Security Plan, current amendment 6.1.1.36 SSAR, Rev. O, 10/01/90, 10CFR50 APP. R Safe Shutdown Analysis Report,~ Brunswick Nuclear Project 6.1.2 CORRESPONDENCE 6.1.2.1 MISC-00223, 09/30/71, Control Building HVAC (comments on drawings) 6.1.2.2 MISC-00229, 11/17/71, Control Building HVAC (resolutions to comments) 6.1.2.3 MISC-00230, 01/20/72, Control Building-HVAC - Heating for the:
Battery Rooms
= mmn j d
CBHVAC System DBD-37' Page 71 Revision 1 6.1.2.4 MISC-00224, 01/26/72, control Building HVAC - Control Room Heating 6.1.2.5 MISC-00293, 02/14/72, Standby Gas Treatment System - Charcoal bed Heaters 6.1.2.6 MISC-0231, 03/13/72, control Building HVAC - Drawings 6.1.2.7 MISC-00296, 09/20/72, Charcoal Bed Depth versus Efficiency - Farr company 6.1.2.8 UC-07712, 04/23/73, Air Conditioning Equipment for the Control Building 6.1.2.9 UC-09818, 07/17/73, Plant Batteries 6.1.2.10 UC-11087, 09/17/73, Control Building Ventilation Check Valve Solenoid operation 6.1.2.11 UC-11173, 9/20/73, Instrument Air compressorst Missiles due to tank rupture 6.1.2.12 CU-04071, 9/24/73, Proposed Regulatory Guide (Chlorine Detection -
draft of R.G. 1.95 is attached) 6.1.2.13 CU-04090, 9/28/73, Compressor Tank Rupture g
6.1.2.14 UC-14334, 03/15/74, DSEP Computer Room A.C.
System (recommends addition of a package A/C unit) 6.1.2.15 CU-05355, 04/24/74, Computer Room Air Conditioning (accepts recommendation of package A/C unit 6.1.2.16 MISC-00489, 08/02/74, commitments Made Concerning Brunswick Steam Electric Plant 6.1.2.17 B-3513, 12/03/74, Telephone Conversation Memorandum on outstanding AEC Concerns, between R.G. Black (CP&L).and Ray Powell (AEC) 6.1.2.18 MISC-04912, 01/24/75, Trip Report for' Brunswick Site Visit January 21 through January 22, 1975 6.1.2.19 BSEP/75-373, 04/30/75, Additional Railcar Storage on the BSEP Site
-l 6.1.2.20 UC-24285, 08/11/76, Battery Chargers 6.1.2.21 UC-30556, 4/24/81, Control Room Ductwork - Seismic Qualification-6.1.2.22 NLS-84-054, 02/02/84, Battery capacity Testing-6.1.2.23 NSSS-85-316, 04/16/85,- BSEP Control Room Positive Pressurization Analysis and Action Plan 6.1.2.24 UC-35292, 01/27/87, control-Room Habitability - Comparison of FSAR 4
and UFSAR Analyses for an MSLB i
6.1.2.25 BSEP/87-1051, 09/18/87, HPCI, RHR, and Battery Room. Temperature _-
l Limits 6.1.2.26 MISC-04948, 11/23/91, Rain Build-up in CBHVAC Intakes 1
6.1.2.27 MISC-5404, 12/04/91, oxygen Concentrations in the Control RoomL l
4 6.1.2.28 UC-35669, 09/17/92, Control Room Doses Following A Main Steam.Line ( --
Break
- mmu l b
CBRVAC System DBD-37 Pace 72 3
Revision 1 1
6.1.3 VIOLATION RESPONSES / LERS / SPECIAL REPORTS 6.1.3.1 LER 1-84-33, 12/19/84, Failure of Units 1 and 2 common CL Detection.
System to meet FSAR/T.S. Design Criteria 6.1.3.2 LER 1-85-040, 08/22/85, Automatic Starting of Control Buildiag Emergency Air Filtration trains 2A and 2B 6.1.3.3 LER 1-85-048, 10/02/85, Automatic Start Signals to control Building Emergency Air Filtration System 6.1.3.4 LER 1-86-007, 03/21/86, Automatic Starting of Control Building Emergency Air Filtration Train 2A 6.1.3.5 LER 1-90-007, Rev 1, 8/10/90, Failure of CBEAF System to meet Design Basis for Toxic Gases (Chlorine) 6.1.3.6 LER 1-91-003, Rev. 2, 09/30/91, Fall as-is Position of CBEAF System Inlet and Outlet Dampers not Evaluated with Respect to a Chlorine Event e
6.1.3.7 BSEP/82-819, 01/15/82, Special Report per Technical Specification H
3.7.8a 6.1.3.8 BSEP/82-2259, 10/15/82, Special Report per Technical Specification 3.7.8a 6.1.3.9 BSEP/82-1073, 05/18/82, Special Report per Technical Specification 3.7.8a j
6.1.3.10 BSEP/85-0143, 1/30/85, Response to Infractions of NRC requirements 6.1.4 PROCEDURES-AND NON-TECHNICAL MANUALS 6.1.4.1 PAM, current revision, Carolina Power and Light Company, Nuclear Generation, Procedures Administration Manual 6.1.4.2 CQAM, current revision, Carolina Power and Light Company, Corporate Quality Assurance Manual 6.1.4.3 SD-37, Rev.
5, 1/31/89, System
Description:
Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System 6.1.4.4 PO-55, 03/18/75, Unit 2 Preoperational Test Procedure for control i
Suilding Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning-System 6.1.4.5 PO-55, 08/07/76, Unit 1 Preoperational Test Procedure for Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System 1
6.2 DESIGN DOCUMENTS 6.2.1 PLANT MODIFICATIONS 6.2.1.1 PM 75-096, 02/14/75, CB Air Intake FECP-1066 - Separated CB. Intake From Condenser Area 6.2.1.2 PM 75-321, 05/16/75, CB HVAC ECP 0133 - CB Exhaust fans.
Added
. Condenser. Area Booster Fans and Switches to Enhance condenser Performance mmn : ' l
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 73 Revision 1 l 6.2.1.3 PM-75-385, 06/12/75, CB HVAC FECP 1138 - Chlorine Isol Stopped 2A &
2B-ERF-CB on Receipt of a Chlorine Signal & Closed Normal Make-up 6.2.1.4 PM 76-019, 01/22/76, Wiring For CR Air Intake High CL to Annunciator 6.2.1.5 PM 77-215, 08/17/77, CR Area High Radiation Alarm - Reconnection of Auto Isolation Relays From CR Radiation Monitors that were disconnected via an earlier mod 6.2.1.6 PM 77-358, 8/2/78, Replace Existing Fire Dampers with 3 Hr Rated Ones, Add Cowl on CB Exhaust Air Outlets, Add Ventilation and Smoke Removal Fane for Diesel Generator Oil Storage Tank Roome 6.2.1.7 PM 79-308, 12/18/79, CB Charcoal Filter - Adds Detectors and E
Ioolation Circuit 6.2.1.8 PM 81-181, 6/19/81, Installation of Temporary Boiler Package 6.2.1.9 PM 81-266, 11/18/81, Aux Boiler Removal 6.2.1.10 PM 81-272A, 2/26/82, Aux Steam System Upgrade 6.2.1.11 PM 84-336, 9/20/84, KVAC - Battery Room, Unit 1 6.2.1.12 PM 84-337, 9/21/84, HVAC - Battery Room, Unit 2 6.2.1.13 PM 85-042, 10/07/85, Automatic Actuation of CD EAFS 6.2.1.14 PM 85-057, 08/01/85, Control Room Habitability / Chlorine Detection System 6.2.1.15 PM 85-124, 09/15/86, Fire Seal Damper Modifications 6.2.1.16 PM 86-016, 04/23/86, CBEAFS Input Control Logic Chango 6.2.1.17 PM 86-072, 12/01/86, Chlorine Detector Replacement 6.2.1.18 PM 87-125, 08/06/90, CR HVAC Upgrade 6.2.1.19 PM 87-269, 12/31/87, Replace / Modify 2L-D-CB Logic Upgrade 6.2.1.20 PM 90-036, 06/05/90, Damper 2L-D-CD Logic Upgrade 6.2.1.21 PM 91-055, 04/13/92, Correction of Control Room Emergency Air Damper Fail Safe Position 6.2.1.22 PM 92-108, In Progress, Control Building EAF Improvements 6.2.2 ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS 6.2.2.1 EER 84-0663, Rev. O, 12/12/84, Document Identified Deficiencies in CR Mabitability 6.2.2.2 EER 85-0208, Rev. O, 8/29/85, Quality Class Determination for Chlorine Detection System 6.2.2.3 QLE 87-34, Rev.
O, 06/12/87, Q-list Evaluation for control Building Air conditioning 6.2.2.4 EER 87-0448, Rev. O, 10/15/87, Repair of Vibration Isolation Assembly for 2A-ERF-CB 6.2.2.5 EER 87-0553, Rev. O, 12/21/87, Evaluate Procurement of Rubber Seal for Control Room MVAC Damper 2-VA-2L-D-CB as OTS-Q l
mmn {
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 74 Revision 1
_I 6.2.2.6 EER 88-0343, Rev. O, 07/25/88, CB HVAC Air Compressor Relief Valve' Setpoint 6.2.2.7 EER 89-0307, Rev. O, 11/30/89, Short Term Evaluation for HVAC Supports (plant wide) 6.2.2.8 EER 91-0041, Rev. O, 02/08/91, control Building Emergency Filtration System Single Failures 6.2.2.9 EER 91-0091, Rev. O, 05/30/91, Evaluation of Safety-related Damper Failure Positions 6.2.2.10 EER 92-0352, Rev. O, 10/07/92, CBEAF Single Failure Operability Assessment 6.2.3 CALCULATIONS 6.2.3.1 BNP-E-6.004, Rev. O, 08/15/89, Fault Current Calculation for 125/250 VDC Switchboards IA, 18, 2 A, 2B and their Downstream MCCs and Distribution Panels 6.2.3.2 BNP-E-6.073, NOT APPROVED, Calculation for Sizing 125/2506/ DC Lead-Acid Storage Batteries
% 6.2.3.3 BPE-2547, 02/17/84, Battery-Room Heat.ers - Hydrogen Generation 6.2.3.4 C0077A-01, 10/17/89, Brunswick Contral Room Emergency ?ilter System (CREFS) Differential Pressure _ Analysis 6.2.3.5 M-2635, Rev. O, 11/24/87, Control Room Damper Isol Mode Leak Rate in Meeting Necessary criteria During Hypothetical Chlorine Spill (transmittal in UC-35378) 6.2.3.6 M-90-0CB-0001, Rev. O, 10/26/90,- Flow velocity for Compressible-Fluids that Results from a Small Pressure Dif feren+.ial 6.2.3.7 OVA-0008, Rev. O, 02/01/91, Brunswick Control Roem LOCA Integrated Dose Reanalysis with Damper Isolation at 24-hra Post-L3CA 6.2.3.8 OVA-0009, Rev. O, 02/07/91, Provide an Analysis of Inhalation (Thyroid) Doses to Control Room-for a Steam Line Break Accident (assuming Failure of the control-Room to isolate for 10 minutes.-
this is UEEC calculation No. -9527-8-SS-112-F) 6.2.3.9 OVA-0010. Rev. O, Validation Report on-Chlorine Detection / Isolation system Functional Design Basis 6.2.3.10 OVA-0013, Rev. O, 02/01/83, Prediction of Damage caused by Fan Blade-6.2.3.11 OVA-0018-87125, Rev. 1, 10/28/91, Installation' Tolerances for HVAC ~
Control Panel 2-VA-M1-CB 6.2.3.12 OVA-0020, Rev.-0,-Seismic Qualification of HVAC Systems Notes. As of' issuance of revision 0 of this DBD, this calculation was not approved.
6.2.3.13 OVA-0041, Rev. O, 10/07/92, Main Steam Line Break Doses in theE Control Room 6.2.3.14 0FP-0001, Rev. O, 06/12/89, Battery Room Hydrogen Generation 6.2.3.15 01534A-248, Rev.
O, 08/21/90, Control Room Radiation Monitor i
Setpoint Evaluation.(NUS calc.-# 3F74-M-01) l
.. toon
CBHVAC System'DBD '
Page 75
. Revision 1-1 t
6.2.3.16
.4019-RD-A1, Rev. O, 02/10/S3, control Room Dome due to a LOCA, Considering Failure of Charcoal Filter and Clean-up; System.
6.2.3.17 4019-RD-A2, Rev. O, 02/10/83, Control Room Thyroid Dose Due to Charcoal Filter Failure 6.2.3.18 704U-M-05/S3, Rev. O, 08/20/87, Adequacy of Control Building HVAC I
Fire Dampers I
6.2.3.19 7579-139-S-E-003, Rev. 2, 02/28/90, Battery Loading Study for Design Basis Accidents (includes cale. set 7537-139-3-EDOO-05-F) 6.2.3.20 7579-199-6-VAC-8-F, Rev 0, 6/29/84, control Room Pressurization to T1 1/8th in.
W.G.
6.2.3.21 7579-199-6-VAC-10-F, Rev 0, 5/30/85, Control Room Normal Make-up I
Damper 2L-D-CB Inlet / outlet Pressures 6.2.3.22 7866.014-S-N-019, Rev 0, 5/21/85, Chlorine Spill Study Report 6.2.3.23 8S20-E-01, Rev. 1, 03/30/89, BSEP S80 Coping Study EDG Loads I
6.2.3.24 8542-M-08, Rev. 2, 12/05/91, Station Blackout - Control Room Loss of HVAC h.2.3.25 8542-P-101, Rev. 4, Station Blackout Coping Analysis Report 6.2.3.26 S4-071-0-01-F, Rev. O, 11/19/85, Analysis for= Battery Room Heat-Load I
6.2.3.27 86-072-01, Rev. O, 01/26/87, Seismic Qualification of Instrument and ~ l Electrical Equipment For Chlorine Detector Monitoring Mounting for 1/2X-AT-2977 and 1/2X-AT-2979 6.2.3.28 87-125-11, Rev. O, 05/17/90, Brunswick Control Poom HVAC Ducting Pressure Drop Calculation 6.2.3.29 87-125-20, Rev. 1, 02/20/91, Brunswick Control Room HVAC Upgrade-
- I Modification 87-125, Dynamic Analysis-and Anchor Bolt Evaluation for Pneumatic Control Panel 2-VA-M1-CB-6.2.3.30 9527-0-C-lCLOR-1-0, Rev 0, 4/1/74, Seismic Analysis of Chlorine Gas
-l Monitoring 6.2.3.31 9527-1-CB-DS-01-F, Rev O, 5/1/84, AC and Vent Ducts in Control' Building-Duct Supports 6.2.3.32 9527-1-CB-DS-02-F, Rev 0, 5/1/84, AC and Vent Ducts in Controi Building-Duct Supports I
6.2.3.33 9527-1-CB-DS-03-F, Rev 0, 10/29/84, control Building HVAC - Air supply to the Battery Roome 6.2.3.34 9527-1-CB-SC-01, Rev. O, 02/09/81, Control Building - Structural' Calculation 6.2.3.35 9527-6-VAC-1-F,-Rev 0, 6/1/71, Control Building Ventilation -
'I-Ventilation Requirements During a Tornado =
6.2.3.36 9527-6-VAC-2-F, Rev 0, 4/20/71,1 Control Building ventilation -
I Ventilation / Air Conditioning Requirements 6.2.3.37 9527-6-VAC-3-F, Rev 0, 1/18/72, Control Building Ventilation -
1 Ventilation Requirements for Safe H: Levels in Battery Rooms.
- oenn : [
l
{
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 76 Revision 1 l 6.2.3.38 9527-6-VAC-4-F, Rev 0, 5/26/71, Control Building Ventilation -
Heating Requirements for the Winter Monthe 6.2.3.39 9527-6-VAC-5-F, Rev 0, 2/07/72, control Building Ventilation -
Static Pressure Losses for KVAC Ductwork 6.2.3.40 9527-6-VAC-6-F, Rev 0, S/15/73, Control Building Ventilation -
1 Analysis of Refrigerant Suction Piping 6.2.3.41 9527-6-VAC-7-F, Rev 0, 5/15/73, Control Building Ventilation -
Analysis of Refrigerant Discharge Piping 6.2.3.42 9527-6-VAC-9-F, Rev 0, 5/22/85, Control Room Complex HVAC System Infiltration Analysis 6.2.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTATION 6.2.4.1 P.O.
35-1:58-3797, Brown & Root Purchase Order to Johnson Controls for two Sin?le stage Air Compreesore 6.2.5 DESIGN B ASIS DOCOMENTS r
6.2.5.1 DBD-11, current revision, Design Basis Document for Tsadiation Monitoring System g
6.2.5.2 DBD-50, current revision, Design Basis Docurent for AC Electrical System 6.2.5.3 DBD-51, current revision, Design Basis Document for DC Electrical System 6.2.5.4 DBD-58, current revision, Design Basis Document for Structures and Cranes System 6.2.5.5 DBD-101, current revision, Design Basis Document for Appendix R 6.2.5.6 DBD-102, current revision, Design Basis Document for Seismic Qualification 4.2.5.7 DBD-106, current revision, Design Basis Document for Hazards Analysis 6.2.5.8 DBD-107, current revision, Design Basis Document for Regulatory Guide 1.97 l
6.2.5.9 DBD-109, current revision, Design Basia Document for Human Factors 6.2.5.10 DBD-110, current revision, Design Basis Document for Single Failure Criteria 6.2.5.11 DBD-111, current revision, Design Basis Document for Station l
Blackout 6.2.5.12 DBD-112, current revision, Design Basis Document for Cable and i
Raceway 6.2.6 DRAWINGS 6.2.6.1 F-4080, current revision, Control Building Air Flow Diagram Units 1
&2 6.2.6.2 FP-4321, shts 1 through 6, current revision, Control Building Units 1&2 l
[
men
CBKVAC System DBD-37 Page 77 Revision 1 1 6.2.6.3 F-4127, current revision, Control Building - Computer Room Air Conditioning System 6.2.6.4 F-04207, current revision, Fire Protection - Control Building, Diesel Generator 011 Tank Room Ventilation and Smoke Removal 6.2.7 SPECITICATIONS Specifications listed in this section are listed both with and without revision levels.
For modifications or purchases, the current revision of the specification should be used (See NRCS for latest specification revisions).
For information on existing equipment, the revision of the Specification in effect.at the time of purchase of the particular component of interest must be used.
6.2.7.1 005-011, specification for seismic Design Criteria 6.2.7.2 45-6, Specification for Air Conditioning Equipment fer the Control Building 6.2.7.3 45-8, Specification for In-Line Fans e
6.2.7.4 45-10, Specification.for Heating System Accessories
'6.2.7.5 45-12, Specification for Coil Modules for the Control Building 6.2.7.6 45-019, Specification for Subcooling Refrigeration for the Control Room HVAC 6.2.7.7 118-003, Selection and Installation of Fire Barrier Penetration Sealu 6.2.7.8 128-001, Specification for Non-special Alternating Current ~ Induction Motors Less Than;100 HP 6.2.7.9 226-001, Specification for Sheet Metal and Accessories 6.2.7.10 226-002, Specification for Sheet Metal Work 6.2.7.11 236-11, Specification for Control Building Emergency? Filters 6.2.7.12 248-051, Revision 13, Specification for Instrument Tubing and Tubing Fittings 6.2.7.13 248-053,-Specification for Installation of Instruments for Piping Systems Classified as IB, II, IIA,-IIB' 6.2.7.14 248-57, Specification for Ventilation check Valves for the Control Building 6.2.7.15 248-107,. Specification for Seismic. Pipe' Supports and HVAC Supports and Miscellaneous' Structural Steel 6.2.7.16 248-121, Specification.for Non-safety Related Fire' Protection and Radwaste Pipe 6.2.7.17 248-133, Specificationifor Q-list (safety-related) Instrument Tubing:
and Tube Fittings I:
6.2.7.18 252-22, Specification for Automatic Controls for Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning Systems 6.2.7.19 252-091, Specification for Pressure Switches men:
CBHVAC System DBD-37 Page 78 -
Revision 11--l 6.2.8 MISCELLANEOUS TECHNICAL REFERENCES / REPORTS 6.2.8.1 Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimate, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 6.2.8.2 PMSRC Report No. S-4158, Hazard of Harine Transport of Liquid Chlorino, Department of Transportation - U.S. Coast Guard - Office of R & D 6.2.8.3 ORNL-NSIC-65, Jan. 1970, Design, Construction, & Testing of High Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear Applications 6.2.8.4 MISC-00682, 02/05/73, Seismic Design Calculations for control Building Ventilation Check Valves 6.2.8.5 UC-07582, 4/2/73, Study of Accidental Chlorine Release 6.2.8.6 D-51843, 06/20/73, Seiomic Evaluation of CB Emergency Filters 6.2.8.7 MISC-04990, 07/18/73, Seismic Vibration Test of one (1) Tank Outfit
- 371-60-T 6.2.8.8 TLP-774-468, 10/01/73, Johnoon Service Company Test Report Seismic Testing of Miscellaneous HVAC Instruments 6.2.8.9 MISC-01221, 03/17/75, Seismic Vibration Test on one Motor-Compressor Assembly,-Gaynes Laboratories Job No. 75188 6.2.8.10 MISC-01223, 08/21/75, Seismic Vibration' Test.on Ono Refrigerated Aftercooler and Dryer for Compressed Air 6.2.8.11 UC-30556, 4/24/81, control Room Ductwork-- Seismic QualificLtion 6.2.8.12 NO-80-1924, 12/30/80, control Room Habitability Requirements (transmittal of Rev. O of NUS'3697) l-6.2.8.13 BPE-3346, 01/21/85, Chlorine Dispersion Calculations (reft FSAR i
comment M14.5) 6.2.8.14 Q-list Evaluation 87-34, Control Building-Air Conditioning, 6/12/87 6.2.8.15 NCR A-89-013, 03/01/89, KVAC Supports differ from as-built used for-l Seismic Calculations 6.2.8.16 27873-91N, 04/29/91, Test Report For Seismic Qualification of l
. Johnson Controls Pneumatic Components for. Johnson.Yokogawa i
6.2.8.17 Design Guide IV.8, latest revision, HVAC System Design 6.2.8.18 DG-VIII.53, current revision, BNP Human Factors Engineering 6.2.8.19 DG-VIII.58, current revision, Human' Factors Evaluation of Plant Modifications 6.2.8.20 CP&L Corporate Welding Manual, latest revision 6.3 CODES AND STANDARDS 6.3.1-AISC 1963, Specification for Design Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings 6.3.2 AISC, 8th Ed., Specification for Design Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings
- osan - [
CElfVAC System DBD-37 Page 79 Revision 1 I
6.3.3 ANS-1.3-1982, security Por Nuclear Power Plants i
6.3.4 ANSI D31.1.0-1967, Power Piping 6.3.5 ANSI N18.7-1976, Admini.trative Controls and Quallt/ Assurance for the Operational Phace of FNelear Power Plants
]
6.3.6 ANSI N45.2.4-1972, 1.ista11ation, Inspection, and Testing Requirements for Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment During the Construction i
of Nucinar Generating Stations 6.3.7 ANSI N45.2.3-1975, supplementary Quality Assurance Requirements for Installation, Inspections, and Testing of Hochanical Equipment and Systems for the Co.istruction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants 6.3.8 ANSI N45.2.10-1973, Quality Assurance Terms and Deff.nitione 6.3.9 ANSI N46.2.11-1914, Quality Assurance ReqJirements for the Design of Nuclear Pownr Plants 6.3.10 ANSI /ASHE N-509, 1976, Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units and Components 6.3.11 ANSI /ASHE H-510, 1975, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems M.J.12 ASHRAE Equipment flandbook, 1908 6.3.13 ASHRAE rundamentale Handbook, 1972 6.3.14 ASHRAE Fundamentale Handbook (I-P or SI Edition), 19S9 6.
ASHRAE HVAC Systems and Applications Handbook, 1987 6.3, ASHRAE 41.1-1986, Standard Hethod for Temperature Heasurement 6.3.17 ASHRAE 41.3-1989, Standard Method for Pressure Measurement 6.3.18 ASHRAE 41.7-1984, Standard Hethod for Hessurement of Flow of Gas 6.3.19 ASHRAE 111-1988, Practices for Haasurement, Testing, Adjusting and Balancing of Building Heating, Ventilation, Air-Conditioning, and R6frigeraticn Systems 6.3.20 ASHE Section VIII -1971, Doller Pressure vessel Code 6.3.21 AWS-D.1.1, revision le specified in Corporate Welding Hanual (ret.:
6.2.8.20), Structural Welding Code - Steel 6.3.22 IEEE-279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power.
Generating Systems 6.3.23 IEEE-308-1971, Class 1E Electrical Systems for Nucioar Power Generating Stations 6.3.24 IEEE 323-1971, IEEE standard for qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 6.3.25 IEEE 323-1974, IEEE standard f?e qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Statior.s 6.3.26 IEEE 344-1971, Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment
\\
man-
i CBHVAC System DBD-37 Pa e 80 Revis$on1 I
6.3.27 IEEE 344-1975, Guide for Seismic Qualificacion of Class 1E Electrical Equipment 6.2.28 IEEE 379-1972, IEEE Trial-use Guide for the Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems 6.3.29 I EE E-4 5 0~.5,9 8 0, Recommended Practice for Haintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Load Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations 6.3.30 IEEE-4$4-1975, IEEE recommended Practica for Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Station and Substations 6.3.31 IEEE-485-1983, Recommended Practice for Siring Large Lead Storage Batterine for Generating Stations and Substations 6.3.32 ISA-55.1-1973, Instrumentation Symbols and Identif16. tion 6.3.33 HIL-F-51068C, 06/08/70, Filter, Particulate, High Efficiency, Fire l
Resistant e
6.3.34 SKACHA, 2nd Ed., 19f4, High Velocity Duct Construction Manual
'6.3.35 SKACNA, 1st Ed., 1985, HVAC Duct Construction Standards, Hetal and Flexible
+
6.3.36 SKACNA, 1930, Rectesquise Industrial Duct Construction Standards 6.3.37 SKACNA, 1977, Round Industrial Duct Construction Standards.
6.3.38 SKACNA, 1981, KVhe Duct System design Tables and Charts 6.3.39 SKACNA, 1975, Accepted Practice for Industrial Duct Construction 6.3.40 UL-465, 4th Ed., July 1971, Standard f or Cor. tral Cooling Air Conditioners 6.3.41 UL-586, 3rd Ed., 1971, Star.dard for Safety For High Efficiency, Particulate, Air Filter Units 6.4 REGULATIONS 6.4.1 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.63, 1989, Loss of All Alternating Current Power, 6.4.2 code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, AppendLx A, (10CFR50, App. A), Amended through July 20, 1971, General Design criteria 6.4.3 Code of Fuderal Regulations,. Title 10, Part'50, Appendix B, (10 CPR 50, App. 8), Jan. 20, 1975, Quality Assurance Critoria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants 6.4.4 Code of Federal. Regulations, Title 10, Part 50,-Appendix R, (10 CFR 50, App. R), 1982, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979 6.4.0 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 73, (10 CPR 73), 1990, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials 6.4.6 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 100, (10 CPR 100), 1989, Reactor Site criteria
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non
CBHVAC System DDD-37 Page 81 Revistor 1 1
6.4.7 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1930, (29 CFR 1910),
1990, Occupational Safety and Health Act 6.5 REGULATORY GUIDI:S 6.5.1 R.G. 1.3, Revision 1, 1973, Assumptions for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors 6.5.2 S.
G. 5, Revision 0, 03/10/71, Assumptions for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a steam Line Dreak for Boiling Water Reactore 6.5.3 R.C.
1.30, Revision 0, 1972, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Installation, Inspections, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment 6.5.4 S.G. 32, August 11, 1972, Use of IEEE STD 308-1971, Criteria for Class 1E Electric systems for Nuclear Power aenerating stations 6.5.5 R.G.
1.33, Revision 0, 1972, Quality Assurance Program Requirements
'6.5.6 R.G. 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976, Design, Testing and Haintenance critoria for Engineered safety Feature Atmosphere Clean-up system Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-water-cooled Nuclear Power Plante 6.5.7 R.G. 1.53, June, 1974, Application of Singlo Failure criteria to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems 6.5.8 R.C. 1.64, Revision 0, 1973, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plante 6.5.9 R.G.
1.74, Revision 0, 1974, Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions 6.5.10 R.G. 1.78, June, 1974, Assumptions for evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control room During a postulated nazardous chemical release 6.5.11 R.G. 1.95, February, 1975, Revision 1, Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Contrc' Room Operators Against an Accidental Chemical Release 6.5.12 R.O. 1.97, Revision 2, December 1980, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident 6.5.13 NUREG-0660, May 1980, TMI Action Plan Requiremente 6.5.14 NUREG-0700, September 1981, Guidelines for control Room Design Reviews 6.5.1C NUREG-0737, Item'III.D.3.4, November, 1980, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements - Control Room Habitability Requirements 6.5.16 NUREG-75/087, Revision.1, USNRC Standard Review Plan 6.5.17 NUREG-0801, October 1981, Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Reviews 6.5.18 NUREG-0908, August 1982, Acceptance Criteria for the Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor Security Plans tetasl
l CDHVAC System DBD-37 Page 82 Revision 1 l 6.6 OTi!ER liRC DOCUMEllTS 6.6.1 NRC
- Ci ALUATIONS AND SERS 6.6.1.1 H1
.6678, safety Evaluation Report of BSEP 1&2 - License Application with Appendices Through 7/26/76 - Pages 7-10, 9-12 & 9-13, 1/01/73 6.6.1.2 NLU-77-28, November 22, 1977, Fire Protection SER 6.6.1.3 NLU-83-673, 10/18/83, Resolution of THI Action Item III.D.J.4 Control Room Habitability (SER) 6.6.1.4 NLU-84-137, 02/22/84, confirming Order for Generic Letter 82-33 6.6.1.5 NLS-85-297, 04/14/05, Emergency Response capability - Conformance to i Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 - BSEP, Units 1 & 2 6.6.1.f NLS-86-483, 8/12/86, BSEP - Amendment Hos. 99 and 128 (CL det Amend) 1 6.6.1.7 NRC-89-103, 2/16/89, BSEP - Control Room Habitability (Figal SER) i 6.6.1.8 NRC-89-503, 08/19/89, Review of Carolina Power & Light Company's t
g Response to Generic Letter 88-14, Instrument Air System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment - BSEP, Unita 1 and 2 6.6.1.9 NRC-89-812, 12/06/89, Appendix R Safety Evaluation Clarification and i Revision - BSEP 6.6.1.10 NRC 90-609, 10/04/90, Station Blackout Evaluation - Brunswick Steam i
Electric Plant Unita 1 and 2 6.6.1.11 NRC-91-378, 07/03/91, Electrical Dintribution System Functional I
Inspection, Brunswick Unita 1 & 2, Inspection Report NO's. 50-325/91-09 & 50-324/91-09 6.6.1.12 NRC-91-581, 10/02/91, Supplemental Safety Evaluation Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unita 1 and 2, Response to the Station Blackout Rule 6.6.1.13 NRC-92-108, 03/02/92, Supplemental Safety Evaluation of Station Blackout 6.6.2 CONTERENCES AND MEETING NINUTES 6.6.2.1 13" AEC Air cleaning Conference, August 1974, Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Ventilation System Design for Heating General Criterion 19 6.6.2.2 NLS-86-297, 5/15/86, Enforcement Conference Summary Regarding Chlorine Detection 6.6.2.3 18* DOE Nuclear Airbor.se Waste Management and Air Cleaning conference, NRC Study cf Control Room Habitability 6.6.3 ZE INSPECTION REPORTS 6.6.3.1 IE Inspection Report No. 50-324/75-1, 02/04/75 6.6.3.2 IE Inspection report No. 50-324/75-2, 02/13/75 6.6.3.3 NLU-85-1, 12/31/84, BSEP-IE Inspection Report 50-324/325/84-31 6.6.3.4 NLU-82-177, 3/31/82, Report No.*n 50-324/82-05 & 50-325/82-05 tnan l
c a
C8HVAC System DDD Page 83 Revision 1 l 6.6.4 M2SCELLANE005 6.6.4.1 I.E. Mulletin 79-01B, 01/17/80, Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment 6.6.4.2 I.E.Bulletin 79-07, 04/14/79, seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping 6.6.4.3 NLU-85-41, 1/16/85, 8SEP Tech spec 3/4.3.3.5 6.6.4.4 NLU-86-034, 1/22/86, Investigation of BSEPs Chlorine Monitoring system 6.6.4.5 TID-14844, 03/23/62, Calculation of Distance Factors For Power and Test Reactor Sites 6.6.5 USNRC GENERIC LETTERS 6.6.5.1 GL 82-33, 12/17/82, Supplement No. 1 to NUREG-0737 - Requirements for Emergency Response Capability 6.6.5.2 GL 83-13, 3/2/83, Clarification of Surveillance Requirements for REPA Pilters and Charcoal Adsorber Units in Standard Technical Specifications on ESF Cleanup Systems 4.6.5.3 GL-84-01, 01/05/84, NRC Use of Terms Important to Safety and Safety Related.
CP&L reference NLU-84-31 6.6.5.4 GL-88-14, 08/08/88, Instrument Air System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equip.Jnt 6.6.6 USNRC INFORMATION NOTICES 6.6.6.1 IE Information Notice No. 86-76:
Problems Noted in Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems, 08/28/86 6.6.6.2 IE Information Notice No. 88-61:
Control Room Habitability - Recent Reviews of Operating Experience, 08/11/88 6.7 TECHNICAL MANUALS 6.7.1 FP-83976, Current reviaton, Air Compressors, Control Building HVAC 6.7.2 FP-4465, current revision, Filter System, Control Building Emergency Air, Farr Company 6.7.3 FP-4317, current revision, Cooling coil and Heating Element Modules, H. K.
Porter 6.7.4 FP-4347, current revision, Condensing Units, Air Cooled 6.7.5 FP-4366, current revision, Fans, Axivane, Series 800, 1000, and 2000, Joy Manufacturing Co.
6.7.6 FPe4417, current revision, Filters, Roll Type, Continental Air Filtern L
6.7.7 FP-4370, current revision, Valves, Ventilation check, Techno-check l
7.0 APPENDICES None l
Nun A