ML20198P743

Partially Withheld Engineering Service Request,Rev 0 to ESR 97-00087, EQ-Type Jco for Improperly Configured Conduit Seals

ML20198P743
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	03/03/1997
From:	CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20198P464	List: ML20198P462 ML20198P477 ML20198P529 ML20198P619 ML20198P664 ML20198P712 ML20198P728 ML20198P743
References
FOIA-99-32 ESR-97-00087, ESR-97-00087-R00, ESR-97-87, ESR-97-87-R, NUDOCS 9901070123
Download: ML20198P743 (13)

Text

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EQ. Type JC0 for Zugreperly' Ctafigured Omenait Seals W

Deve14 an BQ-type 300 for the AaCO Trippint, Pressure Switches fourd with the c wMIuit seal located at the terminal box and of the flex conduit. This 400 should also eedress any other SQ equipment that are required to be seales and may else have been improperly configured.

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t An EQ-Type CCO addressing the flex conduit and seal eenfiguration for the A300 Tripoint Pressure stritches and other similar compenanta requirine conduit seals is actashed.

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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGEE EMiEJEL ABI.

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TABLEOFCONTENTS M

DESCRIPTION Ffg5 UST OF EFFECTTVE PAGES / TABLE OF CONTENTS................. I 1.0 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION..................................... 2 ;

2.0 ESR DESIGN SPECMCATION.................................... 3 2.1 -

ESR Mmerianal Rartninements.................................. S

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2.2 Design Inputs............................................

Aasmaptions.............................................

2.3 References..................................

2A Evaluation.................................

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.5 3.0 DOCUMEV. T UPDATE FORM (DE............................... I 1 4.0 SEG ASSESSMENT RECORDS.................................. 11 ATTACHMENT A (Unit 1 &~2 Equipment List)...................... A-1 ATTACHMENT B (REF. 2A.18)................................... ! l l

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ESit 97 00087 PAGE 2. Rev.0 1.0 Problem Identifkation During a walkdown of EQ devices it was determined that prussise switches 1-E21 PS-N0085,1.E21-PS H009B 2-E21-PS-N008B, and 2 B21.PS-N009B had been instaued with unqualified Osaltdo conduh between tbs conduit scal and the swish. This oeanguradon s, r....Jses the lategrity of the conduit sealinstalled to meet the configuradon mquirements specified in the (pP.

I Costain types of Mamt wars quellfled wkh oceduh scels to peuvent moistum' latrusion into the devlees daring the DBA traumient sondidens (high temperatute, high pressus,100% hn=idity) which were simulated during the DBA testing. Tns QDP the each typa of BQ egnipment specifles the type of seal (if any) requited to ptevent moistuu j

intrusion and maintain the qualification of the equipment evaluated in the QDP. The seal requirements for EQ equipment are also displayed on the 408 Soteen in EDBS.

Moisture intrusion for equipment located in the Reactor Budding is a concern do!!owlag a High Energy une Break (HELB) outside of primary contab=ngr. Since the aandMan identified in CR 9740508 could exist for other plant equipment. an EQ equipment in i e i

ReactorBuilding which requhes a conduit seal has been evaluated to descrimine the

=*aa*I*1 Impact from improper installation of conduit seals. 81ase abs bamb enviscomental conditions resuhing from a HELB could affect msltiple atens thsoughout the Rcessor Building, the postuimend failures could potentially ingest sedundant compocasts performing the same function. '!he EQ equipment located in tbs Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Buikhngs which has a conduit seal installed is listed in Aff4-t A with the i

following,excepdoes Equipment loosted in the drywo!!s and MSN pits was exotuded since the

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Instauntion requirements for flexible conduit (Referenos 2.4.19) allow cair stainicss steel pressure tight costugated hoes to be used in these arnea.

Damamaunt transininers with Rosamount conduit seals wars exchaded slaos ths eoadult seals 8er these devises art deelgood to be mounted dhoodyon the transmitsar and should not havs flexible condnit between the seal and tbs tr=-in=r. Addidonally, all other Rosemount transminars were inspected and i

verified to be conootly sealed (transmittars 2 031-FT412,2431 PT436, and 2 G31-FT446 engaired to work, see CR 97-00436)

This ESR is an "EQ" type Justificadon for Continued Operation (per POM Procedmes 1

i CPIE 02, OENP-34.1 A OENF-M.3), and as such wiu demonstrate that there is a i

reasonable level of assurance that the r. abject equipment will perform the requimd safety j

function during the worst case evironmental conditions associated with a HELB outside i

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This ESR is a Justi$ cation for Continued Openulon (XX)) performed in respon 9700805. 'I1ds JCO will provide a rossbnable level of assurance that improper installatica of tbs cetWluit seals will not prevent the suhlact argulpment fro the requhed sa9 sty fenotica during the worst caso envirnamanal conditions assoc I

with a HELB outside of primary consalament.

2.2 DesianHannes lhe design inputs sued to support this RER ano listed as references tander Secdon 2A.

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2.4.1 CR 97 00508 2.4.2 DDD 100, Rev. O, *15quipment Quall5 cation" 2.4.3 UPSAR Secdon 3.11," Environmental Design of Active Mechanical and Flectrical W ! r '"

POM Procedure OFLP 02, Rev. 4 " Program Dooimment for $="~ ^ with 10CFR50A9 2.4A (ibJ' sstal pu% don of Safety-Ralated Electrical 4M

2.4.5 POMProcedure OENP 34.1, Rev. 4C " Design Control ofEnvi-a=HyQualiN W

2.4.6 POM Procedure OENP-34.3, Rev. 6 Wi6 cation Data Package (QDP) Control Procedure" 2.4.7 QDP.30, ASCO solenoid Valves NP-1 Series with EPDM Elastomees (Except Bulletins NP8316, NP8321, and NP8344). Rev. 4 gd 684STCEPC' I 01 m

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2.4.8 QDP 305, ASCO Solanoid Valves NP-1 Series Bulletin NP8316, NP8321, and NP8344 with EPDM orViton Elastomers,Rev. 3 2.4.9 QDP 34. Valcar Direct Oposating Solenoid Valves ( Model 526 Series), Rev. 2 2.4.10 QDP 34A, Valcor Excess Plow Check Valves (Model V520-50-1), Rev,1 2.4.11 QDP 345,Valcor Moduladng Solcooid valves V5264540-1, V5264540 2 and v526 6500 3 (Nonnally De-Eneghed),Rev.1 i

l 2.4.12 QDP-36, Pasanwmt Model 1153 "B" Series Transmitters, Rev. I 2,4.13. QDP-38, ITT Barton Model 288A and 289A Pressum Switches 2.4.14 QDP 48, NAMCO Limit Switch EA 740 Series,Rev.1 j

2.4.15 QDP 49 NAMCO EA 180 Series 1.imit Switches. Rev. 3 2.4.16 QDP-77, ASCO Tri Peint Pressuno Switches, Rev.1 l

2.4.17 UB&C Report No. 9327-038 3-M5-001, Rev. 5."Raactor Bu11 ding Environmental Report" l

24.18 Wyle Laboratories Test Report No. 54078 dated 9/29/89. " Test Report For High Energy Line Break Stearn Tesdag of NAMCO EAlso Series Lirnit $ witches For Southern California Edison"(See Anachment B) l l

24.19 $7"=?-E 048 001, Rev.18, " Specification for instaHation of the Electrical W l

System for CP&L Company Bruaswick Steam %a Plan Units 1 & 2" i

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Attachment A prwides a list of d= BQ aquipment located in the Unit 1 and Unh 2 Raaetor Buildlags whleh have conduit seals installed and which oculd have instauados discrepancies almilar to the probA' nt identi6ed in CR 97@508. The equipement listed Anactanent A lachmies the following equipeneet types:

A8CO Trl.PoinePressee Switches i

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ASCO Solanoid Valves VALCOR Direct Opetating Solmar# Valves (Model $26 Series)

VALCOR Excess Flow Check Valves (Model VS20 50-1) l i

l VALCOR Modulating Solenoid Valves (526 Sedes, Nonnally Dew 4,.0)

BARTON Pressute Switches NAMCO Limit Switches

. HERION Solenoid Valves a

As ladiosted by tbs locados data in Attaciunant A, this equipment is located CE@

ths Raestor Busding. ' Itis evaluation addresses all Reactor Building areas with the exceptice of the MSIV Pit. the RWCU Pusep Rooms, and the RWCU Nast Exchanger Rooms and Penetration Areas. 'The HELB transloot conditions for thess asesis hav significandy higher peak pressures that other areas of the Reascot Building. As stated In Soodon 1.0, equipment locesed in tbs M31V pits was excluded since the installation requirements for flexible conduit suow only stataloss steel ptessues tight cotmgated hose to be used in this area. A review of tbs location data in EDBS indiosess that none of t equipment listed in Arwh=t A is beated in the RWCU Pump Roosas, the RWCU Hear Exchanger Rooms or Pelaa Areas.

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2.5 Evaluation (connaued)

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i Raa~or Buildina Imf R Peak Tersi_:., & Pi==-* co' nan'=.:

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f The following table summarizes the peak temperatums and possures given in Reference 2.4.17 ibr the pasada*1 MELBs in each of the Reactor Btuldug areas listed:

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Hadd2 Raastor Buildine Arm 4 18R3E33g3 Pressime j

1 RB Bl.17 (HPCIRoom)

-300'F 1,7psig 243 RB EL 17 (RHR Rooms)

-290'F 1.1psig i

4 RB El.20' ( Pips Chass)

-293*P 1.5paig 5

RB El.20' (Tunnel)

-3007 2.7psis 6

RB El.20' (General Ama)

-268'F OJ psig 7

RB El.50' (General Area)

-232 7 0.8psig 8

RB El.80' (All Amas)

-190'F 0.8 psig 9

RB El.117(All Asses)

-138'F 0.8 pois 11,12 RB E1.20f (Com SprayRooms)

-17t'F 0.3peig

(*) Node numbers from the Reactor Building Environmental Report (n@- 2.4.17).

An evaluation of each equipment type (manufactundmodel) was performed to address the HELB condidoes in the speeltic areas what that type of equipraant is located.

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2.5 Evalenden(condnued)

ASCOTri-Point Presmirnawitches ASCO Tri-Point Pressure Switches as used for numerous costal functices at BNP and are loomed in various areas through the Reactor Building. QDP-77 (Reflarence 2.4.16) i speci8es that conduit seals em inquired for these devices to lindt moiseme intrusion during HEIE transient aaadiriaan If the conduk snais fbr theos devices are instausd in the conRparation described in CR 97-00508, the flexible conduit will net provide a qualified seal to prevent moisturu lamasion between the conduit seal and the pressere l

swiuh massably. However, Anachment B documepa HELB sostag peribemedihr l

NAMCo lindt switches which were instaued using flexible conduit without a conduit j

seal. During this testing, the limit swisches and attached conduit configuration were i

exposed to a 250*F steam test at 8 psig (22.7 psia) for one hour. The inspeedon l

perforrned fouowing the HEIA testing found no evidence of moisente leside the lindt switsbas. The worst cass HELB pruswe transients in the BNP reassar building moes of coecern last epnimately 60 seconds and result in peak pressures ofless than 17.4 psia (2.7 psig).

De BNP worst <ase HELB cor4tions are much less severe than the test conditions a--e In N=d==aar B. The anost nevere HEL3 conditlan in the areas where the l

ASCO Tri-Point Pressure Switches are located is the HPCIlins break la the HPCI toom.

Tbc only ASCO pressurs swtrches locued in the HPCI tootn are tbs MFCI mtDine otheast diaphragm high pressuas switches. Dese switches att not tequired to fitection following a HPCI steem line break. Therefore, the most sovete HEIA envimuneet in which the ASCO '1% Point h Switches would be requimd to Amedan is tha South RHR room following a 10 inch HPCI steam line break in the HPCI room. The peak tempanture and pressro la the South RHR room are 2S0*F sad 1.1 psig. Tno pressors natutna to normal following the HELB in %?'=9y 60 seconds which is much less then the one boar test duration documented la Refersnen 2.4.18. 81 ace the diebrantial posesses between the inside and ourside of tha flamlhas condde is small and lasts ihr a sbost period of time, no signi6 cant moisters intmalon would be expecW during this period. The tsaperature and pressure transients in other areas wbsss the ASCO Td-Point Pmesure 5 witches are located are less severn than the South RHR room conscions described etme. *thetsfore, thers is a high level of confidew that the conHgnesion idmarified in CR 9700$0g would prevent any significant amount of moisture intrusion into the pressuts switch anaemm following the HELB events for which the ptessure es swisches aus required to Anaction.

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wrm rax:4043315789 Feb 4 '97 9:59 P.;1(14 ESR 97 00087 PAGE 8. Rev. O ASCO Soleneed Vahms Several models of ASCO solenoid valves are laeawd in the BNP Ranctor Buildings and used in applicadons which requits environmental qualificasion fbr HELB ca=Maa=

QDP 30 and QDP-300 (Refonnees 2.4.7 and 2.4.s resposthely) specify abat sendsk seals are not requised in the Reacsor Building unless the terminal box la mounted above the nakaaid and the maer configurauon would allow moisture to condanes in the tartninal box and drala through the conduit system inio the solenoid. In those cases where the potential asists for condensate to drain imm the earninal b:st to the solenoid, a conduit sealis required to prevent a si==8h* amount ofinoistuso intrusion due to ma===

M in the conduit system during HEul conditions. If the conduit seals ihr these devious are installed la the con 6gurettera dese 1 bod in CR 97 00508, the ocedult seal would still prevent a significant amount of maistes intruslos thun the tertainal box or conduit system isto the solenoid assembly. 'the path for moisture intmsion through the Aerihla conduit installed turween the conduit seal and the solenoid valve sesembly would allow caly a limited amanar of moisture to seter the solenold naam=hly. 'herefors, these i

is a high desres ofcon$donLe that the condait osal configurados descdbed in CR 97-1 00508 is not a concern for environmental qualification of ASCO salanalda toemed in the l

Itonctor Building outside of the MSIV pit and RWCU equipment asses.

VALCOR Direes Omerggpa Selmaaid Valves (Model 324 Sedaal '

Valcor Model 526 solenoid valves are located'in various areas of the BNP Reactor

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Buildings and used in =pahdaa* which require environmental arialiftnerian fbr HEIR j

oceditions. QDP 34 (Reference 2.4.9) specifles that conduit seals are required to be i

lastalled ibe the Valcor solenoids located la the Reactor Buildag. Howner, QDP 34

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addresses the quell 5 cation of these solenoids for all Reeceor Building areas laeloding I

l small enclosed areas sash as tbs MSIV pit and RWCU equipment asses widch have j

P h aiy higher peessure transients than the issaalning assas of the Reacear Buildlag-3 The locados dass in Attachment A ladicates that noas of thess Valcar matanaida me 1

lacaded in areas with sisniSeant pressure transients following a lBla. The weret HELB i

1 envimament in the Reecear Building areas whose these solenoids are located is in the l

j aan pomp roosn whom the peak vm is 290m and eh. peak pressere is 1.1 pais.

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secoeds. If the conduit seals for theen devlees are lastalled in the conSamstion desersbed i

in CR 974(1508, the path forinoisture intmsion thronsh the fissible conduit lastalled between the conduit seel and the solenoid valve assembly would allow only a lhnited i

amonet of moisant to enter tbc molenoid assesnbly. Ms, thors is a high destee of i

confidence that the conduit seal configuration described in CR 97 0050s would not prevent thses Valcor solenoid valves from perfortning the required safety functions following a HELE in the Reactor Building.

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'lhase VALCOR excess Sow check valves close mechanically to provide isolation i

ibliowing an instrument line break. De solenoids for these valves am normally do -

energized and are enetsized to reset the check valve. The only fauuss modes ofocacern reganting the solenoids for theac valves would be falhues which canned inadvenoot emergiastion to men (i.e.. open) the cheek valve when isolation is required. As Radiented by the testing documented la Menahment B, the path for moistare inence timengh the i

fissibic condait configursiva betwesu the conduit seal and the solenold. valve amounddy would allow only allmited amount of moisture to enter the solenoid assembly. Simon the circuits to these solenoids are normally de. energized, thnie is no credible failure due to moisnue intrusion which would cause the solenoid to spuriously emersise and open the check valve when imlarian is required.

Sinos these exce'es flew check valves perform a primary contslament isolation function, position ladication (as required t>y Rag. Outos 1.97, yanaels 510) is psovided fkom the internal!!mit switches. De position indicadon function is tequired to be operable only for thoes events for which the pdmary containment isolation fboodon is required (14., a LOCA or HE!2 laside primary containment). Although a sheet atrouit seauldag in a kas of position indication due to moisture intrusion is highly unlikely, this is not a concern since the position indicadon funodon for these valves is not s g :. 4 dbr a 121.2 ousalde of primary <=talamant when moiseurs inuusion would be WM to occur.

VALCOR Modulatism:AalsmahLEnhas (Modsh V52645461. V5264542. and V52645E? NormaDv D>enernimalD There su fbur Valcor maMattar solenoid valves in each usit which are associeged with the CAD nitrogen injection lines. These valves are normally 6c -

4 and are 2

required to remain closed for primary contMn==t isolation fo!!owing aIACA, Hans valves are also required to open if CAD nitrogen 1% is required fouowing a LOCA.

These valves are not required to perfbra any safety funedon following a HB12 in the '

Reactor Buidas. Thetsfore, installation of a condait ses! Is not required for environmental quaEfication of the CAD injecxion line solenoid valves.

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RARTONPrussure Swtsches Dere are two Barton pressures in tbs Unk 1 Reactor Building which have conduit seals lasrallat (1 CAC-PDS-4222 and 1 CAC-PDS 4223). These pressure switches control the supptession pool to Reneser Building vacuum breakers. These vacuum breakers are sequhed to open to prevent =Miag tbs external design preemme of the pdmary eestalement semesure. "Ihis fumetion is not required foBowing a IER in ab Reester

%Iwa* since as HELB outside of primary containsment wi!! not resuk la depressurization of the primary cosminment. hu., the conduit seat configuradon described in CR 97 00508 is not a concem for envimammatal quallfleation of Barton Istasure switches which have conduit seals instaHed.

NAMCOIJantSnDches There are NAMCO limit switches with conduit sesis installed in the RHR rooms and eseeral floor areas of the Unit I and 2 Reactor Building. However, the pressors tunsients fo!!owing a HELB in these amas are extresnely small (0.8 1.1 psig). QDP 48 and QDP-49 (Raferences 2.4.14 and 2.4.15 respectively) specify that conduit seals are not regidred for NAMCO limk switches located la the Reactor Bididing. Therefore, the conduit asal e =ation desaibed in CR 97 005081s not 4.cnnaam ibt environmemal n

qualification of the NAMCO limit altches located in the UMt i and 2 Reestor Buildings.

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Ders are Sve Marion solenoid valves located in the nit i RaastorBuilding which have conduit seals installed (1 B32-SV-F20,1-G16-SV-F003,1-016-SV-F004,1-016-M19, and 10164V-M20). Pour of thaas valves art the pilot solenoids for ths prianary contaimnent isolation valves in the Reactor Building Equipment Drain Sunny and the Emacear Building Floor Drain Surnp di@=ryn lines. Dese valves are reguleed to fimation to establish pdmary containromat following a l.0CA inside of yd ;ri raatainmaat. Since the primary containment isolation function is required following a IACA inside of primary aawaiament, rootstwo latrualon is not & conoorn for theos solenoids. The other Herion solenoid valve locanid in the Reactor Building is the outbosni contalament laolation valves for ths Reactor Coolant sample line which is also a prknery containtnent isolation valve. Moisture, intrusion for this valve wotild not be a ocecern when primary contalement isolation is required followhg & LOCA inside of primary containenent. However, this valve is also required to close to maintala the Reactor Coolant Pressure h=Aa'y latagrity if the reactor coolant sample line abould break outside of priciary eaarminment. However, there would not be any signi6 cans increase in the pressure on the 20 ft. elevation of tbs Remotor Building fo!!owing a break is the remotor coolant sample line, and no ei*aiftet moisture intrusion through ste flarthl* conduit would be expected to occur. '!herefore, the conduit seal configuration described la m 97 00506 is not a conectn for environmental qualification of the Ave Herios solenoid valves located in the Unit' 1 Reactor Building.

CONCLUSION TEE ABOVE RESEARCH PROVIDES A IIIGH W OF COMEDENCE TRAT TWIR DEVI Wmtfrenn RAFETY FtMCTIONS Fnr_r^ WING A v ^cA OR RELB IF TW JNSTALLED IN A CONMGURATION SDELAR TO CONFI TIONIDIDmFIED Di217 00f05 l

3.o DOCUhMMT UPDATE FORM (DUM nere am no plant t-:-:=E=ets (e.g. POM, drawings, calMations, etc) requiring updata as ansak of this ESR.

4.0 SELF ASSES $h2NT RECORDS Nons.

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