ML20080E060

Overcooling Transient Failure Mode & Effects Analysis & Rejected Sys Justification Rept, Preliminary Rept

ML20080E060
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	05/31/1983
From:	Baxter D, Bruske S EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
References
CON-FIN-A-6477, REF-GTECI-A-47, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-A-47, TASK-OR EGG-EA-6297-DRF, EGG-EA-6297-DRFT, NUDOCS 8402090324
Download: ML20080E060 (45)

Text

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EGG-EA-6297 MAY 1983 H. B. ROBINSON OVERC00 LING TRANSIENT FAILURE MODE AND

. EFFECTS ANALYSIS AND REJECTED SYSTEMS JUSTIFICATION REPORT D. E. Baxter S. J. Bruske 1

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Ocerated by tne U.S. Cesarte ent of Energy Y'.. .; - ;{h'

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This is an informal recort intended for use as a oreliminary or working cocument Prepared for the U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION U l Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 Q E E E O ldano i FIN No. A6477 8402090324 830531 PDR ADOCK 05000261

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EGG-EA-6297 H. 8. ROBINSON OVERC00 LING TRANSIENT FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AND REJECTED SYSTEMS JUSTIFICATION REPORT 4

0. E. Baxter S. J. Bruske Published May 1983 l

EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. OE-AC07-76ID01570 .

FIN No. A6477 2

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. . e ABSTRACT Recently concerns dealing with the possibility that certain accidents or transients cculd be made more severe by control system failures or malfunctions have been raised. These concerns have been cocumented under Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-47, Safety Implications of Control Systems. This EG&G Idaho, Inc. , report represents the first phase of a detailed stucy being performed to evaluate the effects of control system failures on anticioatec transients and accidents. This first phase consists of the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the H. B. Recinson Overcooling transient.

The FMEA has been performed on all the major control grade systems identified in the H. 8. Robinson Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This report.also contains the postulated transient scenarios for the systems that have been selected for further in-depth reviews and the justification report for those systems selected as not being capable of creating or contributing to this transient.

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SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to determine which system or sys':ms at commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) units could cause or co- ibute to an overcooling transient. The overcooling transient was defined as a cooling transient which exceeds the limitations established by the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50. Appendix G.

A study of the Nuclear Power Experiences and Licensee Event Reports for the years of 1980 to 1982 was performed in an attempt to identify all overcooling transients that have actually occurred. An independent nonmechanistic Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was performed on the. major control systems utilized at PWRs to determine which system failures or normal operations could result in an overcooling transient.

The results of these reviews hava indicated a need to perform in-depth detailed reviews of 18 of the 54 major control systems to determine the total extent to which they can cause or contribute to an overcooling transient. The postulated basic scenarios of system failures or operations are included in this report to better define why a system has been selected for the in-depth reviews. The in-depth reviews will determine which systems will require computer modeling and the specific transient scenarios of concern and will be documented in a later report.

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FOREWORD This report is supplied as part of the " Safety Implications of Control System Failures A-47" stucy being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Safety Technology by EG&G Idaho, Inc., NRC Licensing Support Section.

3 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio.1 funded the work under the authorization B&R 20-19-50-51-5, FIN No. A6477.

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l CONTENTS AESTRACT .... ......................................................... 11

SUMMARY

............................................................... 111

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FOREWORD .............................................................. iv

1. INTRODUCTION ..........,.......................................... 1

2. M ETHO D O F A NA LY S I S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

3. ASSUMPTIONS ...................................................... 2 4 SYSTEM DESCRIPTICN .......... .................................... 3

5. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................... 3 APPEN0!X A--CRITERIA FOR SELEC~ING SYSTEMS AND/OR COMPONENTS FOR FU RTH ER R EV I EW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 APPENDIX 9--0VERC00 LING TRANSIENTS FAILURE MODE A:0 EFFECTS AN A LY S I S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 APPENDIX C--0VERC00 LING TRANS* ENT SCENARIOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 APPENDIX 0--H. B. ROBINSON OViRCCOLING TRANSIENT STUDY REJECTED SYSTEMS JUSTIFICATION ....................................... .... 31 4

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H. B. ROBINSON OVERCCOLING TRANSIENT FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ANC REJECTED SYSTEMS JUSTIFICATION' rep 0RT

1. INTROCUCTION EG&G Idaho, Inc., is technically supporting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in their efforts to resolve the generic issue on the Safety Implications of Control System Failures A-47. The concern of the A-47 study is to determine if any accidents or transients can be initiated or made more severe than previously analyzed as a result of control system failures or malfunctions. This report addresses the analysis performed to determine if nonmechanistic system failures have the potential to cause or contribute to the severity of an overcooling transient. By use of a Failure Moce and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and postulated scenarios, the systems are processed and placed in a further review status or rejected from further review. Systems identified as requiring further review will be subjected to a detailed study to determine if any mechanistic failure potential exists to cause the undesired failure. These systems will be evaluatec and if necessary will be ' computer modeled. Transients of significant concern will be analyzed and the results evaluated to provide recommendations for the resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-47, Safety Implications of Control System Failures.

2. METHOD OF ANALYSIS A Failure Mode and Effects Analysis was performed to determine which systems would require more detailed analysis.

The FMEA is a qualitative analysis which icentifies possible nonmechanistic system failure modes and evaluates the effect of the failures on plant performance relating to overcooling transients; the FMEA tables are contained in Appendix B.

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3. ASSUMPTICNS The following assumptions were utili:ed in this FMEA. A complete listing of the A-47 selection criteria is included as Appencix A.

Any system failures which could be postulated to meet the following criteria were recommended for further review.

1. Any control grace system or component failure, either initiating or aggravating, which results in an undesired reactor vessel water temperature decrease beyond the bounds of the present Final Safety Analysis Report will be recommended for further review.

2. Any contrni grade system or component failures which are projecteo to cause transients identified as incidents of moderate frecuency to occur at a rate significantly more frequent than once per year, or failures which are projected to cause transients identified as infrequent incidents to occur more than once during the lifetime of a plant, or failures which are projected to cause limiting faults will be recommended for further res'ew.

3. Any control grade system or component failures which would adversely affect any assumed or anticipated operator action during tne course of a particular transient will be recommended for further review. .

4. Any control grade system or component failures which result in manual or automatic actuation of engineered safety features, including tha reactor protection system, will be recommerdad for further in-depth review.

Any failures which could cause a decrease in main steam pressure were included as well as decreases in primary system pressure.

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i Pressure decreases were included due to possible increased flow rates from centrifugal pumps.

Operator error was not considered as a failure made with respect to system operation. However, system failures which could affect correct or timely operator action were identified and recommended for further review.

4 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The systems which were evaluated in the FMEA tables were extracted from the systems as identified in the H. B. Robinson Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The systems wnich were evaluated represent the major control grade (nonsafety) systems which are used for reactor plant control. Many systems have~ several subsystems or support systems associated with them which were not specifically listed in the FMEA.

However failures of these systems were factored into the analysis by considering a support or subsystem failure to result in a nonmechanistic failure of the major control system.

5. CONCLUSIONS Utilizing the nonmechanistic, qualitative FMEA format,18 of the 54 major control systems indicated a need for further, more detailed review. These systems, with a brief discussion indicating failure mode of concern, plant conditions at which the failures would be most limiting and the postulated effects of the failures are listed in Appendix C. ~

The remaining systems and the justification for rejection are contained in Appendix 0.

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I APPENDIX A CRITERIA FOR SELECTING SYSTEMS AND/OR CCMPCNENTS FOR FURTHER REVIEW 9

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l APPENDIX A CRITERIA FOR SELECTING SYSTEMS AN0/0R COMPONENTS FOR FURTHER REVIEW

l. Any control grade system or component failure, either initiating or aggravating, which results in an undesired increase in reactor coolant inventory beyond the bounds of the present Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) analysis will be recommended for further review. (The Robinson bounding analysis presented in the FSAR for increase in reactor coolant inventory is an inadvertent start of a Safety Injection (SI) pump with the plant in a cold shutdown condition.)

2. Any control grade system or comoonent failure, either initiating or aggravating, which results in an undesired reactor vessel water temcerature decrease beyond the bounds of the cresent FSAR analysis will be recommended for further review. (The limiting event for this transient in the Robinson FSAR analysis is the large steam line break outside of containment with offsite power available.)

3. Any control grade system or component failure, either initiating or aggravating, which results in an undesired nuclear system pressure increase beyond the bounds of the present Final Safety Analysis Report

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(FSAR) analysis results will be recommended for further review. [The limiting event for this transient in the Robinson FSAR analysis is an

" instantaneous loss of steam load (turbine trip) without automatic steamdumporadirectreactortrip."] -

4. Any control grade system or component failure, either initiating or aggravating, which results in an undesired positive reactivity 4

increase beyond the bounds of the present FSAR analysis results will be recommended for further review. (Thelimitingeventforthis transient in the Robinson FSAR analysis is an " uncontrolled Rod Control Cluster Assembly (RCCA) bank withdrawal from full power with minimum reactivity feedback (80 per/s withdrawal rate).]

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5. Any control grade system or component failure, either initiating or aggravating, which results in an undesired reactor vessel inventory decrease beyond the bounds of tne present FSAR analysis results will be recommended for further review. [The limiting event for this transient presented in tne Robinson FSAR is a " Double Ended Cold Leg Guillotine (DECLG)"pipebreak.]

6. Any centrol grade system or component failure, either initiating or aggravating, which results in an uncesired reactor core coolant flow decrease beyond the bounos of the present FSAR analysis results will be recommended for further review. (The limiting event for this transient in the Robinson FSAR analysis is a " Simultaneous loss of power to all reactor coolant pumps at full power.")

7. Any control grade system or commonent failure, either initiating or aggravating, which results in an undesired increase in steam generator level to the point of overf111. The point of overfill is defined as, that level, which if exceeded, could cause carryover into the Main Steam System (>707. of indicated level).

8. Any control grade system or component failures which are projected to cause transients identified as incidents of moderate frequency to occur at a rate significantly more frequent than once per year, or failures which are projected to cause transients identified as infrequent incidents to occur more than once during the lifetime of a plant, or failures which are projected to cause limiting faults will ~

be recommended for further review.

9. Any control grade system or component failures which would adversely affect any assumed or anticipated operator action during the course of a particular transient will be recommended for further review.

10. Any control grade system or component failures which result in manual or autcmatic actuation of engineered safety features, including the reactor protection system, will be recommended for further in-depth review.

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11. Any control grade system or component failures wnich result in exceecing any T2chnical Specification safety limit will'be reco m. ended for furtner review.

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l APPENDIX B OVERC00 LING TRANSIENTS FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS f

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APPENDIX B. OVERC00 LING TRANSIENTS FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS Applicable A 47 Se let t ten te e t es'la System System functlen Systen Failure Itode iflect of f allere _ japp._AL

1. Reacter Coolant Systee and Provides coolant flew to the Nigh flew rate. these f ailures appear to Favs the poten- F Pumps reacter vessel for core cooling. tial to cause er centrlhete le an uver-

, cooling transient.

tow flew rate. lhese f ailures should not have the poten- kne llel to cause er centriista te an over.

caeling transient.

2. Pressurlier Overpressere Provides reacter coolant systen laadvertent opening of a power These failures appear to havs the poten. 2 Protectlen Systaa overpressure protectles. eperated er safety relief valve llal to cause er centribute to an over-cooling translent.

• Fallere of a power operated these failures should not have the poten- kne er safety relief valve to open llel to cause er centribute t1 en nuer.

uhen roepstred. cooling transient.

--* 3. High stead Safety Injectlen Provides reacter coolant Inadvertent tattlating edien met these failures appear to have the potte. 2 W Systen leventory makeup during a required, tial to cause or centribute in an ever-small led, uhlle system cooling transient, pressure is high.

Falbre to leltlate then these f ailures shuuld not have the poten- shme required. tlal to cause ser centribute to an ever.

cooling translent.  !

4. Desbleal sleat genovel Systen Provides a long tore decay tirat :ligh fleu er inadvertent these f ailures appear to have the poten- 2 renoval system and a les head. Isillation edies not reepstred. tlal to cause er contrlhute to an over-high volume Inventory makeup cooling transicat.

systen for a large reacter coolant system pipe break. Low flew rate. These failures should ant have the poten- none llel to cause er contrlhete to an ever-cooling translent.

5. Cheetcal and Volume Centrol Provides a means of malateining Bligh odeep flew rate er low These f ailures appear to have the poten- le,ene i System reacter coolant chemistry and letdemn flew rate, tial to cause er contribute to an ever-normal reacter coolant leventary cooling transient but the centributies is adeep. Insignificant f or this study, law adeep flew rate er high these failures should not ha n Llie poten. Ihne

' letdeun flew rate. Blal to cause er centrlhete to an over-cooling transient.

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Applicable

' A-ti ielection (riterla System System f unction Systes.t allwe 8bse Ef fect of f allwe . (aw. Al ll. Pressurlaer Level Control Provides level Indicatten and level is higher than ladicated these f ailures should not have the puten- stone System control signals for the chemical or is controlling high. tial to cause or contribute to en over-and volume control system. coollag transient.

tesel is louer than indicated these f ailures should not have the poten- leone oe' 15 controlling leu. Llal to cause or contribute to an over-coollag transient.

12. Engineered Safety feature Provides engineered safety inadvertent E57 Initiation. these failures appear to have the poten- 16une Actuati m System feature (t hf) acaustion of 1841 to cause or contribute to an over-specific systems or components cuellag transient but should not as the to allig4te the consequences of system is safety grade and redundant.

postuisted accident.

f alls to inillate the i.han Ibese failures should not have the poten- mune resentred. Llal to cause or contribute to an over-cooling transient as the system is safety grade and redundant.

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13. Racere lastrumentation System Provides core power distribution Provides higher than actual Ibete f allwes should not have the poten- nune and cure temperetare condition Indications. 4141 to cause or contribute to an over-Indications. cooling transient.

Provides louer than actual Ibese f ailures should not have the poten- None conditten Indications. tial to cause or contribute to an over-cooling transient.

' 14. Entere lastrumentation System Provides reactor power trovides higher than act at these failures should not have tne poten- none indication and protection trips a.ondition indications. Llat to cause or contribute to an over-for power levels from the coollag transient.

source range to 1205 of full rated pumer. Provides lower than actual Ihese failures should not have the poten- acne condition, indicatios.s. tial to cause or contribute to an over-coollag transient. *

55. heactor Contalanrat Provides reacter core and f alls to malatein the required these failures should not have the poten. hune g Structure and Contalement reactor coolant isulation free isoletten. teal to cause or contribute to an over-Isolation System the environment. coollag transient.

Inadvertent contaluneet these f ailures should not have the poten- None Isolation when not re:eguired. tlat to cause or contribute to an over-cooling transient.

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i APPENDIX C CVERC00 LING TRAhSIENT SCENARIOS 2

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APPENCIX C '

OVERCCOLING TRANSIENT SCENARIOS

1. Reactor Coolant System and Pumps:

Failure Mode: High flow rate Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: Inadvertent startup of an idle reactor coolant pump could cause excessive heat transfer from the reactor coolant, which could lead to an overcooling transient.

2. Pressurizer Overpressure Protaction System:

Failure Mode: Inadvertent opening of a relief or safety valve Plant Conditions: Any pow'er level Discussion: Inadvertent opening of a pressurizer power operated relief or safety valve could result in an overcooling transient as the discharged fluid is replaced by relatively cold makeup fluid.

3. Safety Injection System:

Failure Mode: Inadvertent initiation Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: Inadvertent initiation of the safety injection system would cause a decrease in reactor coolant temperature from the cooler injection water and l could result in an overcooling transient.

25 M e WWW

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4. Residual Heat Removal System:

Failure Mode: Hign flow or inadvertent initiation Plant Conditions: Shutdown Discussion: Inadvertent' initiation or high flow rate could cause the reactor coolant temperature to be lowered at a rate in excess of the allowable rate. This overcooling transient could be in excess of the previously analyzed transient.

5. Reactor Control Rod Drive System:

Failure Mode: Inadvertent insertion or rod drop Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: Inadvertent insertion of the control rods or several cropped rocs would cause a reactor trip and core power to decrease. This will cause the -

temperature of the primary coolant to decrease and result in an overcooling transient.

6. Process Computer:

Failure Mode: Gives a higher than actual indication l

i Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: If the operator is using the process computer outouts as an indication for maintaining reactor coolant system parameters, the erroneous j indication (s) could cause the operator to create or contribute to an overcooling transient.

26 i

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7. Feedwater and Condensate System: -

Failure Mode: Feecwater/concensate flow fails high or feedwater/ condensate heating fails low Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: Failures that could cause the feed or condensate system flow to increase acove normal would cause excessive cool water to be placed in the steam generators, which could cause an overcooling transient on the reactor coolant system.

Loss of feedwater/ condensate steam heating could result in introduction of cooler feedwater to the steam generator and may result in an overcooling transient.

8. Steam Generator Water Level Control System:

Failure Mode: High feedwater flow rate Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: If the feedwater control valve fails open either from control signal failure or a control valve -

failure, an increased feedwater flow and an overcooling transient to the reactor coolant system could result.

9. Steam Line Overpressure Protection System:

Failure Mode: Inadvertent operation of a power operated or safety relief valve i

l l

Plant Conditions:

Any power level t

27

Discussion: An inaevertent opening of a relief or, safety valve would cause increased steam flow. This in turn would cause a cooling of the steam generator water; a reactor coolant overcooling transient could be initiated.

10. Main Steam System:

Failure Mode: High steam flow rate or inadvertent main steam isolation valve opening Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: Ir..reased steam flow will cause reactor coolant system temperature to decrease and may cause an overcooling transient.

11. Turbine Electronydraulic Control System (EHC):

-Failure Mode: Inadvertent opening of the turbine governor valve (s) or failure to trip when required Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: Failure of the' EHC to trip the turbine when i

required or to increase the turbine governor valve ~

opening could cause an overcooling transient to

, the reactor coolant system.

(

12. Auxiliary Feecwater System:

Failure Mode: High feedwater flow rate or inadvertent operation i

Plant Conditions: Any power level 28

Discussion: Inadvertent initiation of auxiliacy feedwater would cause a cooling of the steam' generator .ater which could cause an overcooling transient on the reactor coolant system.

13. Steam Generator Blowdown System:

Failure Mode: High blowdown flow rate Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: An excessive blowdown flow would cause an increased feedwater flow which would cool the steam generator water and thus the reactor ,olant faster than the core is adding heat. This could cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

14. Auxiliary Steam System:

Failure Mode: High steam flow rate Plant Conditions: Any power level .

Discussion: An increased steam flow through the auxiliary steam system could cause an overcooling transient to the reactor coolant system. -

15. Steam Dump System:

Failure Mode: Inadvertent steam dump operation or steam dump valve (s) fail (s) open Plant Conditions: Any power level 29-

Discussion: Inadvertent operation of the steam dump system could create an overcooling transient to the reactor coolant system.

e

16. Annunciator System:

Failure Mode: Inadvertent alarms or failure to alarm when required Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: These failures could cause the operator to take improper actions or result in a failure to act and an overcooling transient could result.

18. Steam Generator System:

Failure Mode: Inadvertent tube rupture Plant Conditions: Any power level Discussion: The loss of reactor coolant system inventory and subsequent safety injection of cooler water could cause an overcooling transient.

30

l APPENDIX 0 H. B. ROBINSON OVERC00 LING TRANSIENT STUDY REJECTED SYSTEMS JUSTIFICATION e

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[

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APPENDIX D H. B. ROBINSON OVERC00 LING TRANSIENT STUDY REJECTED SYSTEMS JUSTIFICATION

1. INTRODUCTION During this phase of the study the Licensee Event Reports (LER) and the Nuclear Power Experiences (NPE) for the years 1980-1982 were reviewed and a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA; Appendix B) was completed.

These were performed independently to ensure all possible system failures leading to. overcooling transient situations were identified. The LERs and NPEs reviewed produced several cases of overcooling transients of concern.

The FMEA also identified the same systems as well as other systems as potential problems. The remaining systems were subsequently rejected from this study and the reason or reasons are documented within this section of this report.

2. ASSUMPTIONS The following assumptions were used to justify system rejection frem further review.

2.1 Noncapable System Any system which through normal operation or failure has no apparent -

capability to create or contribute to an overcooling transient was rejected, e.g., Radiation Monitoring System.

2.2 Safety Grace System Any safety grade system which would require multiple failures to e eate or contribute to an overcooling transient was rejected, e.g.,

Peactor Protection System.

L I

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~ ~ - ~ ~

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i 2.3 Insionificant Contribution System Any system wnich through normal operation or fatiare could contribute j an insignificant amount of cooling to an overcooling transient was rejected, e.g., Condenser Circulating Water System.

3. SYSTEM OISCUSSICNS

{ 3.1 Chemical and Volume Control System This system was rejected even though it has the capability to contribute to an overcooling transient by addition of relatively cool

, makeup water its contribution is insignificant.

3.2 Coolant Samoline System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.3 Pressurizer Pressure Control System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.4 Accumulator Tank System 1

This system was rejected because it is safety grade, redundant and would require multiple failures to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.5 Reactor Protection System l This system was rejected because it is safety grade, reduncant and would require multiple failures to result in a failure to scram which could contribute to an overcooling transient.

34

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3.6 Pressurizer Level Centrol System This system was rejectec even thougn it has the espability to contribute to an overcooling transient by addition of relatively cool makeup water, its contribution is insignificant.

3.7 Engineered Safety Features Systems These systems were rejected even though several have the capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient. They are safety grade, redundant and it would require multiple failures to initiate Safety Injection, Containment Spray System or Containment Air Recirculation Coolers.

3.8 Incore Instrumentation System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.9 Excore Instrumentation System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.10 Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.11 Steam Generator Sampling System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

35 I

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3.12 Turbine Generator Succort Systems These systems, which supply the required cooling and lubrication for generator oceration, were rejected because they have no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.13 Main Condenser and Evacuation Systems These systems were rejected, even thougn they could effect steam flow, because their contribution to an overcooling transient is insignificant.

3.14 Service Water Svstem This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or ccatribute to an overcooling transient and the system is safety grade.

• I 3.15 Component Cooline Water System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient and the system is safety grade.

3.16 Condenser Circulating Water System This system was rejected, even though it could effect steam flow, because it's contribution to an overcooling transient is insignificant.

3.17 Primary and Demineralized Water Makeuo System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.18 Station and Instrument Air Systems These systems were rejected because failure of these systems are covered within the individual systems that contain the pneumatic valves and controls that are affected by failures of these systems.

36

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3.19 Communications System l

This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.20 Fire Protection System

! This system was rejected because the possible failures attributed to this system that could cause or contribute to an overcooling transient are evaluated curing the indivicual component system reviews.

3.21 Nitrogen Supoly System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.22 Diesel Generator and Support Systems These systems were rejected because they have no capability to cause -

or contribute to an overcooling transient ar.d they are safety grade and redundant.

3.23 Heating. Ventila:fon and Air Conditioning Systems These systems were rejected because their capability to contribute to an overcooling transient is insignificant and the possible failures -

attributed to this system are evaluated during the individual component system reviews.

3.24 125 Volt OC Busses: 125 Volt Batteries and Battery Chargers These systems were rejected because they are safety grade, redundant and would require multiple failures to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient and failures of components supplied by this system are evaluated during individual system reviews.

1 37 a.

3.25 120 Volt AC Instrument System ,

This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient and failures of components supplied by this system are evaluated during tne individual system reviews.

3.26 Lighting System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.27 Station Normal Auxiliary Power This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient and failure of components supplied by this system are evaluated during the individual system reviews.

3.28 Station Emergency Auxiliary Power This system was rejected because it is safety grade, redundant and has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient and failure of components supplied by this system are evaluated during the-individual system reviews.

. 3.29 New Fuel Storage This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or J contribute to an overcooling transient.

i 3.30 Spent Fuel Storace This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

38

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3.31 Soent pool Coolino and Cleanup System L

This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or l contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.32 Fuel Handling System i

This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contr . cute to an overcooling transient.

3.33 Radioactive Waste Management Systems 1

These systems were rejected because they have no cacability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.34 Radiation Monitoring System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.35 Backue Control System This system was rejected because it is safety grade, redundant and would require multiple failures to cause or contribute to an overcooling transient.

3.36 Ecuipment and Floor Orain System This system was rejected because it has no capability to cause or cuntribute to an overcooling transient.

4.

SUMMARY

In utilizing the nonmechanistic qualitative FMEA Format, 36 systems were rejected from further review. Any additions or deletions of systems will be justified and documer.ced in future amendments to this report, t

39 M e mMW

i b a cnoau 33s ' ' " '" " " " " " * '

...,, u.s. NUCLEAR MEGULATORY COMM8SSACN BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-EA-6297

4. TITLE AND SusTITLE 2. rLaare esanaf H. B. Rooinson Overcooling Transient Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Rejected Systems Justification s. RECIPIENT S ACCESSieN NO.

Report

7. AUTHORiS1 S. DATE REPORT COMPLETED l l

0. E. Baxter, S. J. Bruske May I"1983 l 9 PERFORMING CAGANIZATION NAME ANO MAILING AOORE317 "w/ OATE REPORT ISSUED

• ~'" I"

May 1983 EG&G Idaho, Inc, e ,t,. .,, , ,

Idaho Falls, ID 83415

s. rLom a-no

32. SPONSCRING QRGANIZATION NAME AND M AILING AOORESS t/actuas I,a Codel ,, ,

7 Division of Safety Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i s nN No.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission A6477 Washington, DC 20555 13 TYPE CF REPORT et nico COva aso Itac'es.ve asest 15 SUPPLEVENTARY NOTES 14. ILeave cra'al

16. ASSTR ACT C00 noces or essi This is an interim report which contains the failure mode and effects analysis for the H. B. Robinson overcooling transients, the postulated transient scenarios and the rejected systems justification report.

1 4

n

- 17 (EY WOROS ANO DOCUMENT ANALYS13 17a OESCRIPTORS i 7tL ICE N TI FIE RS.' OPE N E N OE O TE R MS

18. Ava LA8:LITY STATEMENT 19 SECUReTV CLASS <TA s resom 21 NO CE PAGES Limited distribution because report is subject Unclassified to change with final report issue. 2a ggiv cylS ra.so.w, :2 ,aR.CE

• ac ca u ::s oi..

s . . .

,, ., .