ML20072J118
| ML20072J118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1981 |
| From: | Dunn B BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-01, TASK-02, TASK-1, TASK-2, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290938 | |
| Download: ML20072J118 (133) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ==
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-- --- - - -- - ----------x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, dF METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and :
P'ENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, a
Plaintiffs,
-against- 80 Civil 1683
- (R.O.)
THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC., a Defendants. , a b
--- --------------- - -x 1
Deposition of The Babcock & Wilcox l O\
Company, by BERT MERRIT DUNN, taken by . .
Plaintiffs, pursuant to Notice, at the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
l Handler, Esqs., 425 Park Avenue, New York, New York, on Wednesday, March 11, 1981, at 9:50 o' clock in the forenoon, before Charles Shapiro, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for Die State
- i l
(I of New York.
DOYLE RE.=ORTING. INC.
p(j CERT!FIE3 S?tN OMPE REPORTERS 36? LaxtNoros AvgNur 8306290938 810311 PDR ADOCK 05000289 -
T PDR 781 KPMQ N E 212 " Se7*d220
2 1
O 2 Appe arance et 3 KAYE, Sch0LER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
Attornays for Plaintiffs 4 425 Park Avenue New York, New York
( 5 By: RICHARD C. SELTZER, ESQ.,
6 ANDREW MacDONALD, ESQ.,
-and-7 PATRICIA HENNESSEY, ESQ., (PM Session) 8 of Counsel 9
10 DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.',
Attorneys for Defendants 11 One Chase Manhattan Plaza "
,/~' By: ROBERT B. FISKE, ESQ.
13 . -and-RODMAN W. BENEDIC'T, ESQ.,
14 of Counsel 15 16 l,
J 17 Also Present:
l-18 PATRICIA VAUGHAN '
. 19 SHIGERU TAZAWA 20 KERSTEN OSCHMAN
! 21 LOU LANESE 22 DAVID TAYLOR 23 25 l
. . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . __ = _
1 3
O 2 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREUD by 3 and among the attorneys fo'r the respective 4
parties hereto that the sealing, filing and
( 5 certification of the within deposition be, 6 and the same hereby are, waived; and that the 7 transcript may be signed before any Notary 8
Public with the same force and effect as if 9' signed before the Court.
10 IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED ,
11 that all objections, except as to the form 12 of the question, are reserved to the time of 13 trial.
14 15 16 17 18 BE RT MERRI T D UNN, having 19 been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, 20 was examined and testified as follows:
21 EXAMINATION BY MR. SELTZER:
22 Q State your full name, please.
23 A Bert Merrit Dunn 24
( Q By whom are you presently employed?
25 A Babcock & Wilcox.
_,.___..._,...__.m- , , . . _ ~ , ._ _._-- . ..,_,,y . , _ , , . . , _ . ~ . _ . . _ , ~ . _ _ - , , _ . _ ,
I 1 Dunn 4 A
k ,)
s 2 Q What is your office address?
3 A Post Office Box 1260, Lynchberg, Virginia, 4 24505, I think.
( 5 Q What is your title at B&W today?
6 A Manager, Emergency Core Cooling System I 7 Analysis.
8 Q To whom do you report?
9 A Mr. Doug Lee.
10 Q What is his title?
11 A Manager, Plant Engineering Section.
12 MR. SELTZER: I would like to mark as
(~l k- '
13 GPU Exhibit 75 a memorandum from T. E. Geer 14 to L. P. Williams dated August 18, 1980, i
15 subject " Engineering Capability Inventory" 16 with an attached description for the 17 ECCS unit.
f 18 (Memorandum from T. E. Geer to L. P.
I i
19 Williams dated August 18, 1980, subject 20 " Engineering Capability Inventory" with 21 attachment for ECCS unit marked GPU Exhibit 22 No. 75 for identification as of this date.)
23 Q Could you take a look at GPU Exhibit
( 24 75 and tell me if you are familiar with its contents?
25 A To some level.
i
. . . - - -. . . , ~ .- , , . . __ . - - , . . . _ . . - . _ _ - . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ , ,_.-
1 Dunn -
5 (3
V 2 Q Which, if any, parts of GPU Exhibit 75 3 did you prepare?
4 A I prepared the section in the memo which
( 5 is entitled " Resume of Bert M. Dunn."
6 Q Did you supervise or review the 7 preparation of any other parts of GPU Exhibit 757 8 A The exhibit was developed within my unit in 9 the fashion that I am the Manager of that unit.
10 I was aware that -- or caused in some fashion for .
11 the exhibit to be generated.
4
- 12 Q You caused the exhibit to be generated, 13 is that what you said?
- 14 A I was contacted at the time that 15 such an exhibit was asked for and gave instructions 16 to people to generate such an exhibit.
17 Q Who contacted -- I'm s o r ry. , I didn't 18 mean to interrupt.
19 A No, that's all right.
20 Q Who contacted you to request the 21 preparation of materials which are in this exhibit?
22 A I am not sure.
23 Q Who is Geer?
24 A I believe this refers to -- weil, it's i 25 almost a certainty that this is Tom Geer. He is t
?
1 Dunn 6
\'
2 a Senior Engineer within the unit.
3 Q Within your unit?
4 A Yes.
(' 5 Q Whom did you ask to prepare the materials 6 in GPU Exhibit 75 marked for: identification?
7 A I requested that such material be prepared 8 by the unit through one of my Supervisors, Mr. W. L.
9 Bloomfield.
10 Q Did Bloomfield show you',draf ts of these 11 materials before they were submitted to others at 12 asW7
\
13 MR. SELTZER: Let me revise that.
14 I will withdraw that.
15 Q Before GPU Exhibit 75 was sent on 16 from your unit to others at B&W, did you review 17 it?
18 A I don't believe so.
19 Q Did you review parts of it other 20 than your resume?
21 A I don't believe so.
22 Q When is the first time that you saw 23 a complete copy of GPU Exhibit 757 24 MR. FISKE: I take it that question 25 excludes preparation for this deposition?
1 Dunn 7 O 2 MR. SELTZER: No. If that was the 3 first time that he saw it, I think that is 4 relevant.
( 5 MR. FIS KE : Well, I will let it go.
6 A I don't think I can give a definite answer 7 to that.
8 Q Do you believe that you saw a copy 9 of this document prior to your preparation for 10 your deposition today? ",
11 A Yes, I believe I would have se6a a copy 12 of this document. .
13 Q As the Unit Manager, is this the 14 kind of thing which you would receive?
15 A Not necessarily.
16 Q What is your understanding of the 17 reason why you were asked to have this prepared?
18 A I don't think I can give a definite answer 19 to that question either.
20 Q What is your understanding of what 21 you were being asked to prepare?
22 A A short synopsis of unit capabilities, areas 23 of technical and engineering expertise with backup
( 24 resumes for key personnel.
25 d Is it your understanding that other
., .,- --y- - __ y____,___.,.-,,,..,..-,._-_w __,---y yw-,3 , - - - , , - - , - , , , , ,
i 1 Dunn ~8 f-s (l 2 Unit Managers were heing asked to prepare similar 3 documents?
4 A Again, I don't think I can give a definite
() 5 answer to that question. .
6 Q can you give a general answer to the l 7 question?
8 A For lack of cover information on this 9 exhibit, I believe this relates to a work prepared 10 in support of a foreign contract. Howes?r, it l
11 may relate to work prepared in support of some 12 other contracts and without being able to 13 identify which, I 'couldn't give you a response 14 to that question.
15 Q Has your unit prepared material such as 16 this on other occasions?
17 A In general, materials such as this, has been 18 prepared from time to time.
19 Q In.what way does material such as 20 this support a contract?
21 A I think that could be very difficult. This 22 material seems to be associated with qualifying 23 for a contract more than supporting it directly.
T 24 Q How does it qualify for a contract?
J 25 A It's a stater.ent of capabilities, what we
i i 1 Dunn 9 I
1 2 envision we can do, and a statement of the 3 qualifications of the key personnel within the 4 unit describing their experience and capabilities 5 to either supervise or perform the work.
, 6 Q Is it your understanding that this 7 document or documents like this are submitted 8 to prospective customers of B&W7 i
9 A I think that would generally be true.
10 Q So this is a selling piece to advise 11 a prospective customer of the capabilities of 12 a unit at B&W,. is that right?
(~'
\~s A Articles and documents like this 13 have 14 a use in the sales area.
15 Q And I take it from time to time you have 16 been aware that other units at B&W have prepared 17 similar documents for use in the sales function j 18 .a t B&W, is that right?
19 A Aware? In a definite sense, no.
l 20 In a general sense, yes.
. 21 Q You have used this distinction between L 22 aware in a definite sense and aware in a general 23 sense at least three times this morning.
() 24 What is the distinction that you are 25 drawing in your mind between those two concepts?
1 Dunn 10 n
V 2 A Well, I believe I would fully expect other 3 units and organizations within B&W to be preparing 4 these types of documents. Any specific knowledge 5 that one unit or another unit had done so is not 6 something that I recall at this time or would 7 even have chosen to recall.
8 Q In other words, you are saying it 9 would be consistent with B&W's practice as you are 10 aware of it to ask other units to prepare similar 11 documents?
~
12 A You have used the term "B&W's practice."
^
($) 13 I,would rather say that if my unit was asked to 14 generate such a document, it is likely that 15 other units were as well.
16 Q Are you ever called upon to make a 17 presentation as part of a BsW sales effort?
18 A On occasion.
19 Q In your presence are other Managers 20 also called upon to participate in a sales
/ 21 presentation?
k 22 A They have been.
23 Q on any of those occasions have 24 they had materials such as GPU Exhibit 75 with 25 them?
t
I J
1 Dunn '11 2 A I don't know.
3 Q Do you maintain a chronological file 4 of correspondence and memos which you have
( 5 created?
6 A Yes.
7 Q For how many years have you kept 8 chronological copies of such correspondence 9 and memos?
10 A Approximately five years.
11 Q Is that roughly the period that 12 you have been the Manager of the ECCS Unit?
()
% 13 A That is correct.
14 g Where is that file maintained?
15 A My secretary maintains that file in a file 16 cabinet associated with her work station.
17 Q Do you know whether your chronological 18 file has been produced in this litigation?
19 A No. I do not know whether it has been 20 produce'd. I believe production refers to an 21 interaction between the law firms involved.
22 Q Do you kno' ther you turned over j l
M your chronological f any lawyer working
(} 24 for B&W for the purpot its review and 25 possible production in this lawsuit?
, - .-e- .
1 Dunn 12 O(~h 2 A Yes, I believe I did.
3 Q In the chronological file do you 4 just have everything that you have written and 5 had typed up in date sequence without any 6 other logical subdivisions?
7 A That would be correct, the date 8 sequence would be approximate.
9 Q What types of reports do you prepare 10 on a periodic basis? ".
11 A Administrative reports.
12 Q Is that a statement or a question?
\./
13 A That's a statement.
14 Pay reports, time-charging reports, 15 and progress reports.
16 Q could you identify, please, each 17 type of administrative report which you periodically 18 prepare?
19 A well, I think I did identify that. That 20 should have been a -- the pay reports and the
( 21 time charging reports are a subdivision of the 22 word " administrative report."
23 Q Are those the only types of 24 administrative reports which you prepare 25 periodically?
1 Dunn 13 f~%
2 A On a periodic basis, yes.
3 Q could you describe by title or other 4 specific description each of the types of
\
5 progress reports which you prepared periodically?
6 A We prepara one progress report, and its title 7 is Progress Report for ECCS Analysis for the Month.
8 of, whatever, whatever month is appropriate.
9 Q Do you prepara one every month?
o 10 A Yes. -
11 Q Have you been preparing a monthly 12 progress report for the full time that you 13 have been the Manager of the ECCS Analysis Unit?
~
14 A I have either prepared the report or 15 assigned the report to other individuals in my unit.
16 Q On occasions when you assign it to i
17 others in your. unit to preparo, do you' review it 18 before it is submitted? Do you generally review 19 it before it is submitted?
20 A If possible, i
21 Q In other words, if you are out
(
22 of the country when the report is prepared and has 1
23 to be submitted, you would not review it before it
, 24 is submitted?
i 25 A That is correct.
_+
a 1
Dunn 14 f%
b 2 Q Have you recently been out of the 3 country?
4 A Yes.
( 5 Q How recently?
6 A A week before last.
7 Q Where were you?
8 A Germany.
9 Q Where?
10 A The Mannheim area. F 11 Q Is that a trip that you took in 12 connection with B&W's participation in t'he 13 design of the Mannheim Kaerlich plan,t?
14 A The word would be Muelheim-Kaerlich.
15 Q I stand corrected.
16 A No.
17 Q What was the purpose of your trip?
18 A Participation in a design effort associated l 19 with the Neupots plant.
l 20 Q Is that a plant being designed by B&W7 g 21 A No.
i
(
22 Q What, if any, involvement does B&W have 23 in the design of the Neupot: plant?
24 A We provide certain services to the designer i
I)i 25 on a contract basis.
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1 Dunn 15 2 Q Who is the designer?
3 A Brown Boveri Reactorate.
4 Q Is B&W's participation in the design 5 of the Neupotz plant different from B&W's 6 participation in the design of the M-K plant?
7 A Yes.
8 Q How would you distinguish the two?
9 A In either case B&W -- B&W's participation 10 was by contract from Brown Boveri Rbactorate and 11 the degree of participation was decided by Brown Bover i 12 Reactorate and differs point to point.
O .
13 Q To the best of your knowledge, in 14 which plant was B&W's participation in the design 15 more extensive?
16 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, let me 17 interrupt for a minute. I am not sure 18 that Mr. Dunn should be required to i
19 testify ahout what is an ongoing B&W project 20 in 1981.
l 21 I think this is obviously involving 22 ongoing business at B&W literally two years l 23 after the accident and I at least have 24 some question as to whether this is 25 appropriate.
1 Dunn 16
/T.
b MR. SELTZER:
2 I don't think that I am
(
3 9 i"9
- 9*" ***Y 1"Y 1**d # **#Y 4 interested in the 1981 German plant. I am
( 5 m re interested in finding out Mr. Dunn's 6 familiarity with work done on the M-K plant.
7 I just wanted to get a scale factor by 8 comparison with the Neupotz plant.
9 MR. FISKE: Your basic question is 10 what does Mr. Dunn know about',B&W's work on gg the M-K plant?
12 MR. SELTZER: And I think I was asking 13 whether it was his understanding that B&W g4 was involved more extensively in the design of 15 the M-K plant than it is in the Neupotz plant.
16 MR. FISKE: You may answer that i
! 17 general question. .
I gg THE WITNESS: Which one?
gg MR. FISKE: The one he asked.
L 20 THE WITNESS: The last one?
l 21 Q Yes, please.
l l
l 22 A Y ur question was is it my understanding l
23 that B&W was more extensively involved in the ID k,_/ 24 design of the M-K plant than it is in the design 25 f the Neupotz plant, and I don't think I am I
t
a 1
Dunn 17 O 2 qualified to answer your question.
3 Q Do you have any impressions on 4 the subject?
\
5 A Yes.
6 Q What is your impression?
7 MR. FISKE: I think I am going to 8 object to the form of the question, Mr. Seltzer.
9 I don't object if you ask Mr. Dunn what he i 10 knows about the B&W participation in the M-K 11 plant.
12 MR. SELTZER: He has interjected that (1) 13 he doesn't think he is qualified. I don't i 14 think that his sense of whether he is qualified 15 or not is dispositive.
16 I want to know whether he has a l 17 mental impression of whether B&W is doing 18 more design work for the Neupots plant than 19 it did for the M-K plant, and if he has 20 such a mental impression, I would like it.
(. 21 MR. FISKE: You can't just ask him 22 what he knows about B&W's work on the M-K !
23 plant, and we can get on to something else.
. ,) 24 I mean --
25 MR. SELTZER: I would rather ask my
_ ..--. ._. _ _ . _ ._ _ _ _ . . _ , , . _ . . . . _ _ _ . ~ _ . . . . - . , _ _ , . - - -
/
1 Dunn 18 2 question than yours.
3 MR. FISKE: Go ahead.
4 A Excuse me. Can I have the question again?
5 Q Is it your understanding or mental 6 impression that B&W is doing more design 7 work, that B&W did more design work for the M-K 8 plant than it is envisioned they will do for the 9- Neupotz plant?
10 A In response to that particula'z question 11 and treating it as my mental impression, the
,-~ 12 answer is that'we would -- we will have 13 participated more in the M-K situation than 14 in the -- we will in the Neupotz situation.
15 Q To what extent, if any, were you 16 involved in any aspects cf design or analysis 17 'for the M-K plant? -
I 18 A As I mentioned, B&W participates as l 19 a subcontractor to Brown Boveri Reactorate. Thus 20 I hhve a question as to whether that can be called 21 direct participation in the design of the plant.
22 Q Let me clarify something. I am not here 23 to split hairs with you.
/m (v) 24 If B&W makes a contribution to the 25 design of a plant - .that is what I am concerned
1 Dunn 19 O
2 with; I don't care whether it is through a joint 3 venture with BBR as a subcontract with BBR -- if 4 the purpose of BEW's work is to contribute to the 1
5 design of the M-K plant, that is what I am seeking.
6 A Well, let me continue with my previous answer.
7 We participated in counseling BBR personne l 8 on the performance of licensing evaluations for 9 the emergency core cooling systems; we provided 10 personnel for the performance of th$se calculations i
11 from time to time; we performed calculations to 12 determine hydraulic loadings which result from a g3 loss of coolant acgident.
14 We performed stress evaluations of 15 certain components. I do not know exactly which 1
16 components.
17 Q Were they components in the reactor i
18 coolant system?
19 A I would believe so.
i 20 We may have participated in stress 21 evaluations of components outside the reactor 22 coolant system or attached to it as well.
l l 23 And- in general under a licensing agreement, the 24 Muelheim-Kaerlich plant is an adaption of -
I 25 'the Babcock 205 plant.
i
I 1 Dunn '20 0 2 Q As an adaption of the B&W 205 plant, 3
are many f the generic analyses performed for 4 the 205 series of plants applicable to the
(* 5 Muelheim-Kaarlich plant?
6 A I really can't answer that question.
7 Q What does the term " topical report" 8 mean to you?
9 A A topical report is basically a stand-alone 10 document describing a . design or an> analysis or a 11 verification of a design and most frequently has 12 generic implications.
O 13 Q It's a fact, isn't it, that B&W has 14 prepared topical reports which have generic 15 application to the 205 FA plants, isn't that right?
16 A That is correct.
17 Q It's also correct, isn't it, that 18 some of those topical reports which have generic
( 19 application to the 205 FA plants would have 20 applicability to the Muelheim-Kaerlich plant?
o
~g A .I don't think I can answer that.
L Do you have any reason as you sit here 22 Q 23 today to believe that none of the 205 topical 24 reports would be applicable to the M-K plant?
25 A No.
1 Dunn 21 0 2 Q As you sit here today, are you aware 3 that there are generic analyses done by your unit 4 for the 205 plant that are applicable to the 5 .
Muelheim-Kaarlich plant?
6 A I don't think there are any.
7 Q To what extent is the Muelheim-Kaerlich 8 plant an adaptation of B&W's 205 plant?
9 A The basic system configuration, that 10 is, the main components of the RCS,,are similar 11 in orientation and design. The specific differences 12 would not be something I would have in my memory.
O 13 Q Have you ever reviewed any of the 14 specific differences in emergency core cooling 15 of the Muelheim-Kaerlich plant as contrasted with 16 205 FA plants built by B&W in the United States?
17 A Yes. '
18 Q What are the principal differences?
19 A The principal differences in the ECCS systems 20 are the number of systems employed and their 21 injection capabilities for emergency water and
( ,
22 the injection locations.
l 23 Q In what way are the number of f) 24 emergency core cooling systems different?
25 A The Babcock 205 plant has two levels of l
[_
1 Du'iin 22 0 2 redundancy, generally for the emergency 3 core cooling system, whereas the Muelheim-Kaarlich 4 Plant has four levels of redundancy generally.
5 Q When you talk of two levels of 6 redundancy, do you mean that there are two loops 7 or trains that serve an identical function?
8 A Yes. The term " level" may have been wrongly 9 applied.
10 I would mean two trainsLof systems.
11 Q The fact that the Muelheim-Kaerlich 12 plant has four trains for some ECCSs compared
() -
13 to two trains in your United S ta t'e s 205 plants 14 does not mean that they have four times the injection 15 capability, isn't that correct?
16 I'm sorry, it doesn't mean that l 17 they have twice the injection capability, does it?
18 A Well, to answer the question, we would 19 have to have the specific flow rates for the 20 trains, and I don't remember the specific values 21 for Muelheim-Kaerlich.
(
I 22 Q How many trains of high-pressure 23 injection do you have on the standard 205 plant O
() 24 in the United States?
25 A Two.
I Dunn 23 2 Q How many are there in the M-K plant?
3 A Four.
4 Q Are you aware that the gallons per minute 5 pumped by each of the four high-pressure injection 6 pumps at the M-K plant is less than the GPM capacity 7 of the high-pressure injection pumps on your 205 8 plants in the United States?
9 A Excuse me?
10 THE WITNESS:
Could we -
11 MR. FISKE: Just read the question 12 back again, please.
13 (Question read by the reporter.)
- 14 MR. FISKE: The first part of the 15 question you talked about GPM pumps, and 16 the second half you talked about capacity.
17 Do you mean those as the s'ame thing?
18 MR. SELTZER: Yes.
19 A There is no unique answer to the question.
20 Q Is that because some of the 205 plants 21
( in the United States have capacities that are 22 different from other plants?
23 A No.
) 24 Q Why is there no unique answer?
25 A Because the head capacity service for the
1 Dunn 24 O 2 two systems is different in head range to the extent 3 where the answer would vary.
4 Q What do you mean by that?
i 5 A Depending on system pressure, there may be 6 more capacity for injection in the Babcock plant 7 per train or less capacity per train.
8 Q So you are saying, to your knowledge, 9 the pressure that exists in the reactor coolant 10 system will make a difference in whhther the M-K 11 plant's high-pressure injection pump capacity is
! 12 greater or less than the high-pressure injection 13 pumps on the domestic 205 plants?
14 A In terms of the number of GPM of water 15 injected, yes, per train.
16 Q Is the head different-in the M-K 17 design versus domestic 205 design?
18 A The shut-off head is different.
l 19 Q Which has a higher head?
20 A Well, the term " h'e ad " is a measurement of what 21 the pump is doing in any given flow condition, so 22 it's not a unique number. The shut-off head 23 was higher for the domestic or Babcock 205
() 24 than the shut-off head for the Muelheim-Kaerlich 25 plant. ,
, _ ~.
1 Dunn 25 2 Q You said that thc. injection locations .
3 were different in the domestic 205 design 4 compared to the Muelheim-Kaarlich plant.
5 could you explain"that?
6 A Yes.
7 The injection locations for high-8 pressure injection in the domestic 205 plant are 9 in each of the cold legs between the pump discharge, 10 the reactor coolant pump discharge, and the 11 reactor vessel.
s 12 For the Muelheim-Kaerlich plant, the 13 injection locations are in two of the four cold 14 legs between the reactor coolant pump discharge 15 and the reactor vessel, and two locat' ions directly 1
16 into the reactor vessel at a location somewhat
~
17 above the nozzle belt area -- or rather somewhat 18 to the top side of the nozzle belt area.
19 Q Are there any other differences 20 in location of injection systems?
I
(, 21 A Yes. For the core flood systems and the i 22 low-pressure injection systens, the Muelheim-Kaerlich
- 23 injection locations are the same as for the i 24 high-pressure injection systems locations.
l 25 For the domestic Babcock 205, the
_ . . , . . _ -_. -. - _ ,_,. - _ . _ .. _ _ _ . _ , . . . , . _ . ~ - - ~ _-_ . . _
A
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~
1 Dunn 26 i
L) 2
~
core flood tanks and low-pressure injection, 3 pump injection logations are directly to the 2
4 reactor vessel in the' upper-region of the nozzle
( 5 belt area.
6 Q Is it correct that the locations 7 of safety injection in the domastic 205 plants 8 are similar to the location of the safety injection 9 nozzles in B&W's 177 plants?
10 A Yes, that's correct.
11 You did use the word "similar," didn't 12 you?
{'3 s 13 _ _ _ Q Yes.
14 In the U.S. plants of 177 design, is 15 it correct that tide high-pressure injection is into 16 the cold legs between the reactor coolant pump 17' discharge and the vessel?
le! A Yes. '
q r y
19 Q Has your unit been involved in the
, 20 design or the review of the desiga for the control
'l
~
21 of safety i{tjection systems' on the It-K plant?
22 A No ,. ,
j, ~
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o 'T <
l
_ . 23 /[Q ~ ' Are you .ffmi13 Ar with the modes under
-/] . 4 wkJ eh J t.he a'f e ty 'in j e c tio n s G'
- ~i, 1 ', / / '
,'ysjems,are~
c actuated in
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Dunn 27 O 2 A To an extent.
3 Q To what extent does lagh-pressure 4 injection automatically get reset if it has been 5 manually terminated on the M-K plant?
6 A I am not sure of that. As a matter of 7 fact, I don't think I know whether it 8 does or does not.
9 Q Are you familiar with the extent, if 10 any, to which domestic B&W plants have provisions 1
11 for automatic resetting of high-pressure injection 12 actuation?
,13 A No, I am not.
14 Q Do you know of any domestic B&W plant 15 that has provision for automatic, resetting of the 16 high-pressure injection?
17 A Not.one way or another. I think'the answer i 18 would require some knowledge about the conditions l
l 19 under which an automatic reset would be called for.
20 I don't think you are being unique in your question.
( 21 I
22 Q I'm sorry, I didn't understand what you i 23 just said. What did you mean?
[)\
(, 24 A Well, I don't think it's unique to just say 25 " automatic resetting."
1 Dunn 28
/)
V 2 Q I am talking about automatic resetting
'3 after there has been a manual bypassing of 4 high-pressure injection.
5 Are you familiar with any U.S. plant 6 supplied by asW that has such a feature?
7 MR. FISKE: I guess by " automatic" 8 you mean in all cases?
9 MR. SELTZER: Not in all cases; in 10 any case. '.-
11 A I don't know whether it automatically resets
' 12 or not.
13 Q Which plant are you thinking about?
14 A The general plant, the generic 177, for 15 example.
16 Q In contrasting the number of safety 17 injection systems on the 205 plants in'the United 18 States with the M-K plant in Germany, you said that 19 the 205 plants in the United States had two redundant i
l 20 trains whereas the M-K plant had four, is that 21 right?
{
22 A Yes, I believe that's correct.
23 Q It's also correct that the 177 plants 24 have two redundant trains, isn't that right?
25 A That is correct.
- - - - - ,- ,- ,-,,,,.w- , , - . - - - . , . -- - .va, , , - - - - - - , .
1 Dunn 29 2 Q Are you familiar with the fact, do you 3 know that the M-K plant has a design which 4 automatically closes the block valve if the pilot-5 operated relief valve sticks open?
6 A No, I am not familiar with that fact.
7 Q Have you ever heard that?
8 A I am not sure.
9 Q Have you ever read a report that compares 10 the design and performance of the M K plant with 11 Three Mile Island Unit 27 12 A No.
J 1: Q Are you aware that such a report was 14 prepared shortly after the Three Mile Island 15 accident?
16 A I may be.
17 Q You don't know that the M-K plant 18 has a provision for automatically closing the 19 block valve?
20 A That's correct.
Does a feature such as that
( 21 Q 22 automatic closing of a block valve enter into the 23 type of ECCS analysis that your unit does? i
- i
(,), 24 A Not normally. l 25 g When would it?
J 1 Dunn 30 2 A If we were asked to do a specific evaluation 3 of some aspect or event which involved those 4 systems, then there is a possibility that (l 5 we would have to simulate such a function.
6 Q When you perform-ECCS analyses on the 7 177 plants -- and I take it you and your unit 8 have done such analyses, have you not? --
9 A We have.
p 10 g -- isn't it a fact that you have to 11 make some assumption about whether the pilot-operated 12 relief valve is opened or closed? For some of
~~
13 those analyses?
14 A It would have to make some sort of assumption 15 as to whether it was opened or closed for all 16 such analyses.
l 17 Q In some of those analyses do you have l
18 to make an assumption about whether the valve i
19 has functioned correctly in opening and then 20 closing and reseating?
t
( 21 A Within the ECCS analysis performed generally, 22 that is,in the support of the license for the plant, 1 23 the answer would be no.
l p 24 Q Why did you answer my previous i
l 25 question and say yes, you do have to make an I
(
1 Dunn 31 2 assumption about whether it is open or closed?
3 MR. FISKE: Well --
4 MR. SELTZER: I am confused.
5 MR. FISKE: Your first question was 6 whether they had to make an analysis as to 7 whether it was opened or closed. The second 8 one was whether it functioned properly 9 in opening and closing.
o 10 Aren't those two differeht questions?
11 Q Is your counsel focusing on what has
()
\,_/ -
12 made the difference between your answer to the 13 first question and your answer to this last 14 question?
15 A I don't know. You will have to ask him.
l 16 Q You are the one who answered. He 17 is suggesting a reason why the answers are 18' different.
19 MR. FISKE: I am suggesting why the 20 two questions are different.
( 21 MR. SELTZER: The question is whether 22 what you have fastened on, Mr. Fiske, is what 23 has made the difference for the witness in
'- 24 giving the two different answers.
25 MR. FISKE: Do you understand where n . , . , + . - - - -'w-w $7 - '- ' ' " ' " ' "
I 1 Dunn 32 2 you are?
3 THE WITNESS: No,'but let me try 4 something.
(l 5 The licensing spectrum for support of 6 the plant does not normally involve accidents 7 in the area of the PORV and the assumption is 8 typically made that the PORV is closed.
9 BY MR. SELTZER:
10 Q Are you saying that in kost analyses il you don't concern yourself with the possibility of 12 a loss of coolant accident in the area of the
. )
\#
13 pilot-operated relief valve?
14 MR. FISKE: I think it would be 15 helpful, Mr. Seltzer, at this point to 16 clarify for Mr. Dunn whether you are talking 17 about analyses they are making now or whether l
18 you are talking about analyses that they made 19 before the Three Mile Island accident.
20 g Let's talk up to the day of the 21 Three Mile Island accident.
{
22 A O.K.
23 THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that,
,) 24 please.
25 MR. SELTZER: I will restate it.
(
1 Dunn 33 2 Q In the analyses that you were doing 3 prior to the Three Mile Island accident, did you 4 analyze breaks occurring in the steam space at
() 5 the top of the pressurizer?
6 A The analysis performed for support of the 7 license up to the time, for example , of the g accident at Three Mile Island considered such 9 events as being bounded in results by accidents 10 in other locations of the system. ',
11 Q Did you have any analyses that were not 12 done for licensing purposes that specifically (m
(.-)
13 studied breaks at the top of the pressurizer?
y A Yes.
l 15 Q Did you have any analyses that i
16 studied a pilot-operated relief valve failing open?
17 A Specific analysis?
18 Q No, general. I don't care.
19 A As I mentioned, we considered it from the 1
20 standpoint of satisfying --
21 Q I am n t talking about bounded
! 22 analysis. I am talking about a specific analysis 23 that would be of a break the size of a stuck-open 24 pilot-operated relief valve in the location at 25 the top of the pressurizer.
. _ . - _ _ _ ._ __ ~-___ ___ __
I r Dunn _ 34 I
(
2 A I am not sure.
3 Q Before the Three Mile Island 4
accident, did you study a break involving a stuck-open 5 code safety valve?
6 A I believe so.
7 Q What, if any, records could you 8
check to determine whether, prior to the Three Mile 9
Island accident, there had been ECCS analysis 10 work done on a stuck-open pilot-operated relief 11 valve?
12 A
~
We would have to check the company fi, ling 13 system.
14 Q How would you do that? In other words, i
15 where in the company file would you look to l
16 determine whether there had been analysis of a 17 stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve?.
18 A I would have to check almost the entire 19 filing system for ECCS analysis, and I would do that 20 within my own copies of the files for the time
( 21 period. covering between now and approximately five 22 years ago.
23 For the early time period, I would have 24 to check the -- probably the entire filing system, 1
25 and I would do that probably by talking to individuals l
i i
1 Dunn 35 O 2 to attempt to get some recollection as to where 3 such a record might be.
4 Q How extensive are the files that you 5 would look through for the past five years?
6 A Approximately two full lateral files, about 7 four foot wide and five shelves high.
8 q Are the reports that are filed there 9 maintained in any subject order?
10 A No.
- 11 Q Are they filed by customer?
12 A No.
~
13 Q How are they filed?
14 A They are filed by number, a number, an 15 arbitrary number assigned by Document control, the 16 same number which would appear in the company filing 17 records.
18 Q Do you keep an index to these
! 19 materials?
20 A The procedure that my unit uses is to have,
( 21 in general, a lead package for a given overall 22 subject which would contain references to the 23 supporting documentation.
, 24 Q Where is the lead package kept?
25 A In the same file cabinets, and in the company
1 Dunn 36
<1
\m '
2 records.
l 3 Q would it be practical to review the lead l 4 packages to try to find this analysis or possible 5 analysis of a pilot-operated relief valve sticking 6 open rather than reviewing all of the file drawers?
7 A Such a review would eliminate some of the 8 supporting calculations.
9 Q I take it your unit has done analyses 10 of loss of coolant accidents in which part of the 11 sequence of events is the opening of the 12 pilot-operated relief-valve, is that right?
O_
s
. 13 MR. FISKE: Could we again just clarify 14 whether you are asking about before or --
15 MR. SELTZER: Let's talk about before 16 the accident.
17 MR. FISKE: 0.K. _
18 A The question was --
19 MR. FISKE: Let him read it back.
20 MR. SELTZER: I will restate it.
21
( Q Prior to the Three Mile Island 22 accident, it's correct, is it not, that your unit 23 has done loss of coolant analyses for transients 24 in which one of the sequence of events, one of the 25 events in the sequence was the opening of the
e 1
Dunn 37 g-V) 2 pilot-operated relief valve?
3 A I don't believe so.
4 Q Are you saying that you have never
(,' 5 done a loss of coolant analysis of a transient 6 in which one element of the transient would be 7 the normal opening of the pilot-operated relief 8 valve when it was tripped by the pressure set 9 point for the pilot-operated relief valve?
P 10 A Yes, I think that's true. Other than the 11 bounding nature of the evaluations I mentioned 12 e arlie r.-
("]
\_)
13 MR. FISKE: I think we better make 14 clear what that "true" means. It's true that 15 you have not?
16 THE WITNESS: I believe it is true 17 that we have not performed a specific 18 evaluation of an event which included the 19 operation of the PORV.
20 Q Your unit analyzes loss of coolant accidents, is that right?
( 21 22 A That is correct.
23 Q Were there any other units at B&W, 24 prior to the Three Mile Island accident, that had 25 responsibility for analyzing loss of coolant
.-e- -,c. , .
i 1 Dunn 38 n
V 2 accidents?
A If by analyzing loss of coolant accidents 3
4 we mean verification of the capability of the ECCS 5 system to mitigate the consequences of the 6 accident, we are the prime organization. There are y some supporting calculations provided to us or 8 to licensing by other people.
9 Q It is correct, is it not, that the 10 pilot-operated relief valve, prior $o the Three it Mile Island accident, had a pressure set point that 12 was below the pressure set point for reactor (v~h .
13 scram, isn't that right?
14 A The pressure set point was below one of the i 15 pressure set points for reactor scram.
16 Q It is correct, is it not, that one 17 of the design purposes of the pilot-operated 18 relief valve was to relieve pressure in sufficient j 19 . time to keep the reactor on line or critical, isn't 20 that right?
s g A For certain situations, that is correct.
22 Q F r any f the loss of coolant 23 accidents which you studied before the Three Mile b
\_ ' 24 Island accident, was it a possibility that the 1
25 pilot-operated relief valve would have been called
1 Dunn 39 O
v 2 upon to open prior to the occurrence of the loss 3 of coolant accident?
4 MR. FISKE: I am sorry. I don't think 5 I understand that question.
6 MR. SELTZER: What part of it don't 7 you understand?
8 MR. FISKE: I don't understand the 9 part about the possibility. In other words, 10 are you asking him did he analyze a 11 situation which assumed that that was going 12 to happen? I mean, anything I gue'ss is a
' CE)- -
13 possibility.
14 MR. SELTZER: I don't know whether 15 anything is a possibility. I wouldn't go that ,
I i 16 far.
17 I am talking'about the discrete loss of 18 coolant accidents that Mr. Dunn or his unit 19 were analyzing and asking him whether, in that 20 limited universe, there were accidents which I
L 21 were such that there could have been a 22 preceding rise in reactor coolant system i
23 pressure sufficient to actuate the pilot-24 operated relief valva.
25 MR. FISKE: Well, I guess if you just
1 Dunn 40
(~h V
2 change "could have been" to "was," I 3 wouldn't have any problem.
4 ,
MR. SELTZZR: We have established 5 that the pilot-operated relief valve is a 6 pressure-tripped valve.
7 MR. FISKE: Right.
8 MR. SELTZER: I am now asking whether, 9 in any of the loss of coolant accidents that P
10 Mr. Dunn and his unit s tudied , ' was there any 11 event in which the pressure would rise to the l
12 point of tripping the pilot-operated relief 13 valve. -
14 A Within the spectrum of evaluating 15 licensing purposes, in four of our plants up to 16 the time of Three Mile Island, the accident at
- 17 Three Mile Island, the LOCAs studied were all 18 depressurization events, other than the decision 19 on bounding.
i 20 Q Did you ever analyze any loss of coolant
( 21 accident which was preceeded by a rise in pressure?
99 A I am not sure.
23 Q Now, you limited your next to last O
(_/ 24 answer by saying that in the analyses done for ,
25 licensing purposes.
l
l 1 Dunn 41
('Y N- l 2 My question wasn't limited to analyses 3 done for licensing purposes, so let me ask you, for 4 the rest of the universe, in any analyses done, 5 whether for licensing purposes or other, 6 did you study any event in which there would have 7 been a prior rise in pressure before the 8 depressurization loss of coolant accident?
9 A Yes.
10 -
Q When was that analysis done?
11 A That was an evaluation of the events that 12 occurred at Davis-Besse on September 24th,.I believe, t
b 13 1977- -
14 Q Who performed that evaluation?
l 15 A The evaluation was more in the form of a I
16 review, and I was at least one participant.
17 I can't tell you accurately the remaining people.
, 18 Q What is your best recollection 19 of who the other people were who were involved 20 in that revie'w or evaluation?
21 A I would have to use the word " probable."
22 Q Please do.
23 MR. FISKS: Well, I think --
24 MR. SELTZER: Bob, let me suggest that 25 this is a discovery deposition. If there l
l .
._ _ . _ , , , _ _ . . , _ _ _ - . _ _ _, _ _ _ . _ _ __ __. _ _ _ _ . . _ _ ~ _ - _ _ . _ . - -
1 Dunn 42 2 were other people that were probably 3 involved, I could ask them. If they said 4 they weren't involved, we are not going to 5 say that impeaches Mr. Dunn's credibility.
6 MR. FISKE: I will let this go.
7 A Mr. Bob Jones and Mr. Ed Anderson.
8 Q Both of them are in your ECCS Analysis 9 Unit?
10 A That's correct.. ',
11 Q How soon after the September 24, 1977 12 transient was this review or evaluation done?
C) -
13 - A Within a few weeks.
14 Q What was the purpose of the review or 15 evaluation?
16 A To' determine cr satisfy ourselves that 17 our techniques for evaluating loss of coolant 18 accidents would have predicted the events of that 19 day.
20 Q Predict what particular events?
21 A Well, the events important to the codes' 22 predicted capability such as the force of the 23 pressure history, the movement of fluid within the
(~j\.
(_ 24 system.
25 Q The occurrence of saturation?
- - - - - -- , .- e e -,e - , w, e-n--. , .- - - - -----w
1 Dunn 4
,g A
3 A Yes.
3 Q The rise in pressurizer water level?
4 A Yes.
5 Q Did any of the participants in that 6 review or evaluation prepara any writing 7 which documented the review?
8 A I don't believe we prepared any writing.
9 Q Was any hand, pencil or typewriter put 10 to paper during any of that review or evaluation?
11 A Not that I can recall.
12 Q Was this all done cerebrally?
CJ 13 A Oh. No, I would not expect it to have been 14 done cerebrally, but I was thinking in terms of 15 reports or something.
16 MR. FISKE: Maybe we can just take five 17 minutes. ,
18 MR. SELTZER: Sure.
19 (Recess taken.)
20 BY MR. SELTZER:
( 21 Q I think that either I wasn't as articulate 22 as I was trying to be or there was a failure of 23 communication. I had asked you whether anybody had b(_/ 24 done anything with paper as part of this review or 25 evaluation you had.
1 Dunn 44 O
2 I meant issue a final report, and I 3 meant to include any work, any writing, calculating 4 that was done as part of the review or evaluation, 5 and I think before the messenger came in, you were 6 about to say that there was some writing that was done 7 as part of this review, is that correct?
8 A Well, I think it would be very hard to do 9 it all in ycur head, so I suspect there must be 10 some back-of-the-envelope at least or notepad work.
11 Q Did you do any scratching or writing
~
12 as part of that review?
rS U .
13 A I believe I can give the same type of answer -
14 I gave before, that I don't think I could have 15 reduced the information entirely in my head and 16 and I must have.
17 Q Did you do any computer analysis?
18 A No.
19 Q You didn't run any codes?
l 20 A Not at that time.
( 21 Q Have you subsequently run codes on the l 22 Davis-Besse September 24 transient?
I
, 23 A No.
l /~
l k,_N) 24 Have you subsequently modeled any 1
Q 25 variation of the September 24 transient?
i
I Dunn 45 n ,
2 A After Three Mile Island, in support of the 3 operating B&W plants, there were evaluations performed 4
of stuck-open PORV accidents; some of those would 5 he considered, I believe, possible variations of 6 the situation on September 24th.
7 Who was the catalyst for the review or Q
8 evaluation that was done by your unit shortly 9 after the Se'ptember 24 Davis-Besse transient?
10 A "
I believe I was.
11 Why did you believe that such a review Q
12 or evaluation should be performed?
13 A As we became aware of the particulara of the 14 accident, the events were such that it appeared they 15 could provide us wich some insight or measurement of 16 our LOCA evaluation techniques in that the plant 17 had in a fashion undergone a loss of coolant accident j 18 for some period of time and that fluid was being 19 ejected from the system through the PORV.
4 20 Q I see.
( 21 Are you saying that the opportunities 22 for empirical comparison of observed results 23 or predicted results isn't that frequently available?
[')T
\_ 24 A In a full-scale commercial power plant that's l 25 true, the opportunities are extremely limited.
_, . , _ _ _ . - - . - . _ . _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ m. . -. _ _ - _ _ . - - . _ _ . . _ _
1 Dunn 46 f3 N
2 I think I can recall three such opportunities.
3 Q what were the other opportunities?
4 A A pump seal failure -- this was a long time 5 ago -- at the Oconee plant, and the Three Mile 6
Island accident itself.
7 Q what did you conclude about the 8
predictability of your codes in light of the review 9 and evaluation done of the September 24th transient?
10 A That the codes would have pred cted the 11 trends and the results of that day very well.
12 How had you first heard of the Davis-Besse Q
13 September 24 transient?
14 A At this time I do not recall.
15 Q How do you know that the results 16 . empirically observed agreed with what your codes 17 would have predicted without running the codes?
i
( 18 A we applied our experience and knowledge of 19 how the codes worked to determine for ourselves that 20 the codes involved the necessary simulations
( 21 of physical phenomena to predict those results.
22 Q Are you saying that you did not actually 23 run the code to determine whether the quantity of
\_- 24 fluid that would escape was the same as the quantity 25 of fluid that actually escaped at Davis-Besse?
I I
Dunn 47 O 2 A That is correct.
3 Q Are you also saying that you didn't run i
4 the code to see if the changes in temperature and 5 pressure that were actually observed would have 6 been the same as the changes actually observed at 7 Davis-Besse?
8 A That is correct.
9 Q How difficult would it have been to 10 run the codes to check for those benchmarks?
11 A It would have probably required about 12 two manmonths of engineering time and on the
. 13 order of two to three computer hours in terms of 14 expense.
15 Q Did you give any consideration at the 16 time to running the codes to see whether the predicted 17 results would agree with the empirica1'results?
18 A I don't recall whether I considered that or not.
19 Did you run the codes on the Oconee event Q
20 that you referred to earlier?
21 A No.
{
22 Q Did you run the codes on the Three 23 Mile Island event?
O k_) 24 A Yes.
25 Q Many times?
I l
l _ _ _ . . _ . -_
1 Dunn 48 O
2 A Within the Three Mile Island situation 3 data became available of varying degrees of 4 accuracy at different times and the analysis 5 involved some minor iteration but basically we 6 ran the codes one time.
7 Q In 1977 how would you charactarize 8 your relationship with Joe Kelly 9 A well, Joe is a member of the sabcock & Wilcox e
10 staff -- -
11 Q I had heard that.
12 A -- who we worked with on occasion; we knew
~
13 who he was. I suppose that's about it.
14 Q He was in Plant Integration, is that 15 correct?
16 A That's correct.
17 Q Where was his office in relation to 18 your office? In the same building?
19 A Yes.
20 Q How close?
A
( 21 I would guess within 50 yards.
22 Q on the same floor?
23 A Yes.
.( O) 24 Q Joe Kelly testified before the President's 25 Commission, I believe, and Mr. Fiske can correct me
1 Dunn 49 2 if I am wrong, that you were at a meeting which 3 he addressed shortly after the Davis-Besse 4 transient; there was a meeting attended by k, 5 approximately 30 B&W employees; Kelly described to 6 that meeting some of the parameters of the September
'7 24, 1977 transient.
8 Do you recall attending such a meeting?
9 A Yes.
10 Q Do you recall hearing ab.that meeting a 11 description of the September 24 transient?
12 A Ies. '
h
(~2
\-
13 Q I asked you earlier if you could recall 14 when you first heard of the sequence of events 15 that occurred at Davis-Besse I on September 24, 16 1977, and you said you couldn't recall.
i 17 Do I understand your testimony to be 18 that you believe you may have heard of the Davis-Besse 19 transient prior to the meeting with some 30 B&W 20 employees in attendance?
21 A Yes.
(_
22 Q From whom do you believe you first i
! 23 learned of the September 24 transient?
i 94 A I cannot recall.
l %
i 25 Q Do you have any probablies in your
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1 Dunn 50
[
2 mind as to who it probably was?
3 A No.
I 4 Q Why does it stick in your mind that (I 5 you heard of the September 24 transient and 6 what had occurred prior to the meeting of 7 approximately 30 B&W employees?
8 MR. FISKE: I think he said he may have 9 heard.
10 Q Well, do you believe thay you did hear 11 of it before the large meeting was convened?
12 A Yes.
\/ 13 MR. SELTZER: Could you read back 14 the-question that I had pending.
15 (Question read by the reporter.)
16 A I don't know.
17 Q What do you-recall hearing.about the 18 September 24 transient prior to the meeting 19 attended by some 30 employees of B&W?
20 A I believe I knew or heard, rather, a general 21 description of the events that the PORV had stuck 22 open, that the operators had at some time diagnosed 23 that or closed the blocked valve for other than a
[(.)h 24 diagnostic reason, and that the plant had been l
l 25 managed to acceptable conditions; I suppose I l
l
[
1 Dunn 51 2 would describe them as a cold shutdown thereafter.
3 Q Do you believe that you heard before 4 the meeting attended by some 30 employees that 5 there had been a manual termination of high-pres,sure 6 injection between the time when the PORV, as you 7 called it, stuck open, and the block valve was 8 stuck shut?
9 A I can't be very positive on that but I believe n
10 I heard that before. '
11 Q When did it first occur to you that that 12 was a seriously wrong thing for the operators to have 13 done, namely, terminate high-pressure injeqtion 14 while the pilot-operated relief valve was stuck open?
i 15 A Well, I have described my feelings on that i
)
16 as being that I felt the action was inappropriate.
17 Q I will accept that.
18 A And your question was when did I first 19 start feeling that way?
20 Q Yes.
(, 21 A I would have to say it was within the same 22 general time frame. We are talking about a few days.
l l 23 Q In other words, at or about the same 24 time that you were first informed that they had ,
25 terminated high-pressure injection in response to l
1 Dunn 52 0
2 a rising pressurizer level with the pilot-operated 3 relief valve failed open, you formed a belief that 4
that was an inappropriate operator action, is that 5 true?
6 MR. FISKE: You added one ingredient 7 in that question, Mr. Seltzer, that Mr. Dunn 8
hasn't testified to before.
9 MR. SELTZER: What, the rise in v
10 pressurizer level? '
11 MR. FISKE: Yes.
12 Q Is the fact of rising pressuri'zer level
(-
13 something that you learned at or about ,the same point 4
14 in time?
15 A Well, certainly I was presented with that 16 in the meeting in Training Room B.
17 Q Is it correct that at or about the 18 time you learned that the operators had terminated 19 the high-pressure injection with the pilot-operated 20 relief valve failed open, you formed the belief
(, 21 that that was an inappropriate operator action?
22 A Very early in hearing about the Davis-Besse 23 incident, and in becoming cognizant of the
(~\
(I 24 system conditions and the sequence of events, I 25 formed an opinion that, based on that sequence of 1
I Dunn 53 O 2 events and the plant conditions that occurred, 3 because of that sequence of events, the termination 4
- of high-pressure injection was in my view
( 5 inappropriate. . -
6 Since that period a few days a'f t e r .
Q 7 the September 24 Davis-Besse transient, you have 8 discussed the operator response during that 9 transient, namely, the termination of high-press'ure 10 injection with others at B&W, have y'ou not?
11 A That is correct.
12 Q Have you found anybody at 3&W who 13 believed that the operator response in terminating 14 high-pressure injection was an appropriate response?
15 A I assume we are talking about at that time?
16 No, ever; from September '77 until Q
17 March 11, 1981. Have you ever talked with anybody 18 at B&W about the operator's terminatio. of 19 high-pressure injection and learned that that B&W 20 employee thought that that was the appropriate 21 operator response? ,
22 A I don't think I did. I couldn't testify 23 positively to that question.
24 Can you recall any B&W employee who Q
25 thought that was the appropriate operator response?
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. < #JL '. FISKE: Can I hear that again, 3
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2 3, , t ,
i i i 11 '/ - " , , " , . (Record read,by the reporter.)
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12 MR. FISKE: I will object to thet form of f I
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make a statetent to th? dth,'e f f e ct ?
er
- 22 '
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'. 23 .A Bared on thasc-p[;nople making statements
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- , f
- '/ ,
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- 24 to how)close theygere to that effect. They
\ s -f s[;. ', , 25 , generaccad' jthat impression in my mind, but I cannot
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i
! 1 Dunn 55 2 remember the specific words.
3 Q o.K. so the substance of what 4 they were saying conveyed to you the meaning that 5 they believed the Davis-Besse operators had made 6 an appropriate response in terminating high-pressure 7 injection while the PORV was still releasing 8 fluid, is that correct?
9 A Previous to this particular question you have l
i 10 not qualified it as to the time during which the 11 PORV was opened. The answer to your question is 12 still yes.
. 13 Q The PORV was opened and unblocked for -
14 approximately 21 minutes on September 24, 1977, 15 right?
16 A That's my understanding.
17 Q During part of that time it was 18 relieving steam and during part of that time 19 it was relieving a two-phase mixture of steam and 20 water, right?
(, 21 A I believe that's correct.
22 Q What is your understanding as to 23 whY the people who were expressing the view that 24 it was appropriate to terminate high-pressure 25 injection held the view that it was appropriate
..e,- m. _ . , _ , . _y-,, g__, .,,_m .w--,,-,,_,,9 y 9, , , --y___._,,-9
I Dunn 56 O
2 to have terminated high-pressure injection?
3 MR. FISKE: Well, I will object to 4 that, Mr. Seltzer, unless it is based on
(,
5 something they said.
6 MR. SELTZER: That's all I want, 7 what they said.
8 Q And what your understanding is of 9 what they were saying.
10 A I don't know the answer to your question.
i 11 Q Did you ever discuss with any of those
(~N 12 individuals why they believed it was appropriate 13 to have terminated high-pressure injection with 14 the pilot-operated relief valve open and unblocked?
15 A I don't believe so.
16 MR. FISKE: Off the record.
17 (Discussion off the r e c o rd .' )
18 (Whereupon, at 11:55 o' clock a.m. a 19 lunch recess was taken.)
20 21 k.
22 23 24 25
- - , , , - - , - , - - - - , , - r
-- - - - - ,-- ,, -. , ------r,,-e-- , .,,m,-,,pv--
57 2 AFTERNOON SESSION 3 (2 : 3 0 p.m. )
4 BERT M E R P.I T D UNN, resumed.
5 EXAMINATION (Continued)
- i 6 BY MR. SELTZER:
7 Q Mr. Dunn, I am sure you are aware 8 that your testimony this afternoon continues to be 9 under oath, are you not?
e 10 A Yes. '
11 Q How were you advised that there was
~} 12 going to be a meeting in Training Room B at which
-(G 13 the September 24, 1977 Davis-Besse transient would 14 be discussed?
15 A I don't recall.
16 Q How many people do you recall by name 17 spoke at the meeting?
18 A How many people do I recall by name?
l l
l 19 Q Yes.
20 A That spoke at the meeting?
l
(, 21 MR. SELTZER: Let me rephrase that i
22 more felicitously.
M Q Can you identify the people who spoke e-( 24 at that meeting, please?
25 A I can identify one person who spoke at that
1 Dunn 58 2 meeting.
3 Q other than Joe Kelly, can you identify 4 anyone else?
5 A No.
6 Q Kelly spoke at the meeting?
7 A Kelly spoke at the meeting.
8 Q How long was the meeting?
9 A I can't say I can remember. I expect it to 10 have been about one hour, maybe an h'our and a half.
11 Q What time of the day, approximately, was 12 the meeting held?
C^) .
13 ,
A I believe it was in the morning, but 14 I am not sure of that.
15 Q Without recalling specifically the name 16 of anyone else who spoke, do you recall whether 17 anybody other than Kelly spoke at the meeting?
18 A Yes.
i 19 Q How many other than Kelly addressed 20 the meeting?
21 A Other than in an introductory fashion, two 22 people, I believe. .
23 Q Had the other two people been at D.
')
\m 24 Davis-Besse?
25 A Excuse me. I gave you the wrong answer before.
--e-. - , -+ - + , ,, - , * -- --c- ---
1 Dunn 59 O 2 In addition to Kelly, other than 3 introductory, one person.
4 Q Had the other person who gave 5 remarks that were not introductory been at 6 Davis-Besse since the 9/24 transient?
7 A That was my understanding.
8 Q Who, if you recall, gave the 9 introductory remarks?
10 A I don't recall. I am not even sure there 11 was one, but there might have been.
12 Do you'have a "probably" recollection O
s_ - .
Q 13 of who the other person besides Kelly was who 14 gave remarks that were not introductory?
15 A Yes.
16 Q Who was that?
17 A Fred Faist.
18 Q And is it correct that Fred Faist 19 was the B&W Site Representative assigned to 20 Davis-Besse Unit I at that time?
21 A I don't know whether that's correct or not.
22 That was I think my understanding of the 23 person that spoke in addition to Joe.
A
(_) 24 Q Who else, as best you can recall, 25 do you believe attended the Training Room B session
1 Dunn 60 2 that we have been talking about?
3 A well, there were I guess in my opinion on 4 the order of 40 or 50 people in the meeting.
5 I think I could recall a few of them.
6 Q Could you tell me those, please?
7 A I think the only person I can remember 8 that was there for suro was Bob Jones, who was on my 9 staff. I think I would have to say of other P
10 individuals who I might name that I could well 11 expect them to have been there, and that might r~s 12 be the reason I would identify them as opposed to 13 bothering to remember any faces at the meeting.
14 Q Do you remember that John MacMillan was 15 there?
16 A Not for sure, but it occurred to me as a 17 possibility that I remember him being there.
18 Q Rather than asking you right now to recall 19 specific people, how would you describe generally 20 the composition of the 40 to 50 people who were
(, 21 in attendance?
22 A They were generally Lead Engineers in various 23 functional areas or Unit Managers or section Managers.
r8 s 24 Q From what sections or departments at B&W 25 were these Lead Engineers, Unit Managers, and Section
1 Dunn 61 2 Managers?
3 A As a characterization, they were from the 4 sections responsible for more or less overall
(! 5 plant activities such as there was a -- or I remember 6 there being a concentration of my comrades in the 7 Plant Design Section, Nuclear Service Representatives.
8 Were there people from other sections Q
9 in the Engineering Department?
P 10 A I would expect so. I don't kn5w.
11 What other sections are there in Q
'{'}
r/
12 the Engineering Department other than the Plant 13 Design Section at that time in 19777 I4 A To give you a total answer, I would have i
15 to look up an organization chart.
16 There was the Plant Design Section, 17 the Fuels Section, Auxiliary Equipment, Licensing 18 and Component Engineering and -- we'1, what I called l
I l 19 Auxiliary Systems may have in fact had a different 20 title and might be more than one section.
1 (, 21 Q Among the 40 to 50 people who were l
22 in Training Room B that day, were there people 23 from among the other sections of Engineering?
, 24 A Well, being, as I said, I don't remember 25 individuals that I think I would have to say I don't
1 Dunn 62 2 know.
3 Q You said that there were people from 4 Nuclear Service.
5 were they generally people of the 6 Section Manager and Unit Manager level?
7 A That was my impression, and in response 8 to your question, you asked me to characterize 9 the type of people --
10 Q Yes.
11 A -- that were there, not who was there.
7-] 12 Q Do you know Norm Elliott?
U '
13 A Y'e s .
14 Q What is his title?
15 A I don't know.
16 Q Do you know what he does?
17 A Yes.
18 Q What do you think he does?
19 A He is responsible for the training 20 operation at B&W.
( 21 .
Q Did you think he is the Manager of 22 Training?
23 A He is a Manager. I don't know whether it's N
24 called Training or something else.
25 Q Do you remember if Norm was at the
F I
Dunn 63 O 2 Training Room B meeting?
3 A No, I do not.
4 Q If I referred to this as an ad hoc 5 meeting, would you understand what I meant?
6 A Well, I have a definition of ad hoc meeting 7 that I use.
8 Q How many other times can you recall 3 in your tenure at B&W an ad hoc meeting such as 10 this Training Room B session for 40 r 50 people 11 being convened?
12 "
gg MR. FISKE: Without trying to be b 13 technical, I am not sure Mr. Dunn has ,
14 yet characterized this as an ad hoc meeting.
15 Q Would you agree with the characterization 16 that this meeting to discuss the Davis-Besse l
17 transient on September 24, 1977 was an'ad hoc 18 meeting?
19 A No.
20 Q. How " auld you characterize it?
21 A
( I would use the term meeting just by itself.
22 Q Was it convened for any purpose other 23 than to discuss the Davis-Besse transient?
rN
'(,) 24 - A Not to my recollection.
25 Q Was it a meeting that had been
1 Dunn 64 2
previously called to discuss anything else and 3 the meeting was rearranged to discuss just 4 Davis-Besse?
5 A I don't know the answer to that. I don't 6 think so.
7 Q Can you recall any other occasion 8
on which B&W assembled 40 to 50 Lead Engineers, 9 Unit Managers, and section Managers to discuss a 10 transient that had just occurred at a B&W plant?
11 A I can't r'ecall.
12 Q Did you take any notes at that meetiny?
13 A I don't believe so.
14 Q Do you recall observing other people 15 taking notes?
16 A Not one way or the other.
17 As best you can recall, could you Q
a 18 state what information was imparted by the speakers 19 at the Training Room B meeting?
20 A As best I recall, there was an l Yes.
21 introduction to the sequence of events which would
{
22 go something like at this time this occurred and 23 at this following tino this other function d 24 occurred,. et cetera, et cetera, like that.
i 25 There was also a presantation of plot l _ _ _ .
1 1
Dunn 65 2 or graphical data relative to the evolution of 3 the system parameters such as pressure, perhaps 4 pressurizer level, hot and cold leg temperatures,
^
5 and that's all I could fairly characterize at this 6 time.
7 Q You recall an introduction to the 8 sequence of events and a presentation of plot 9 or graphical data.
10 A well,.more or less a statement",of the sequence 11 of events than the word " introduction."
12 Q O.K.
O 13 _.
What, to the best of your recollection, 14 did Mr. Fred Faist present?
15 A I am not sure I can recall what difference 16 there was in the presentation between Faist --
if l
l 17 in fact he was the other presentor -- and Mr. Kelly.
18 I believe you testified this morning Q
19 that at this meeting one of the speakers described l
i 1
20 the termination of high-pressure injection, is l
21 that right? Is it right that o n e. of the speakers 22 described the termination of high-pressure inj e c tion ?
i 23 A well, I don't think I testified to that this
() 24 morning, and I don't believe I could testify now ,
25 whether that particular issue was presented at l
l
1 Dunn 66 g
C/
2 the meeting in Training Room B.
3 Q You testified this morning that you 4
believe you learned hafore the Training Room B
. . 5 meeting that there had been an inappropriate 6
termination of high-pressure injection during 7 the Davis-Besse transient, right?
O A Subject to the exact words we had this 9 morning, I think'that's correct (indicating).
10 Q Was there any conversati6n or discussion 11 from the floor at the Training Room B meeting?
- 12 A There were questions and answers.
(_)g -
13 Q I am not asking you to speculate 14 but I am trying to refresh your recollection.
15 Since you have testified that you 16 believe you learned prior to the Training Room B t
17 meeting that the high-pressure injection had been l
l 18 terminated, don't you agree that if the speakers at 19 the Training Room B session had not brought out the l
20 fact that high-pressure injection had been terminated, 21
{ you are a forthcoming-enough individual that 22 you would have raised it from the floor at the 23 Training Room B meeting?
24 MR. FISKE: I am going to object 25 to that question, Mr. Seltzer.
h
~
1 Dunn 67 2 I don't think you should answer that, 3 Mr. Dunn. That's totally hypothetical.
4 I don't care if you ask him did he ask the C'i 5 question, if you want to put that question to 6 him.
7 MR. SELTZER: My associate, Mr. MacDonald, 8 says his notes indicate that Mr. Dunn testified 9 this morning that he did hear at the Training
. 10 Room B meeting that the high-pressure injection 11 had been terminated so we will stand on that
, 12 sworn testimony.
13 'M R . FISKE: Well, I don't know whether 14 we stand on it or not.
15 MR. SELTZER: We will see when the 16 reporter gives it back to us.
17 MR. FISKE: Fine, whatever is in the 18 record is in the record.
19 Q You said Jones from your section was at 20 the Training Room B meeting, right?
(,
t 21 A Yes.
22 Q From your unit, I should say.
23 A From my unit.
24 Q Als.o your section.
25 A That's true.
1 e
Dunn 68 O
2 Q At that time Dr. Roy was the head of the "
3 Plant Design Section, right?
4 A Yes, I believe that's correct; that is 5 correct.
6 Q In fact, Roy continued to be head of
- 7 that section until August '78 when he was 8 succeeded by Al Womack, right?
9 A Yes.
10 I don't know that I reme"mber the 11 date particularly, but about -- in that time '
12 frame Dr. Roy was replaced by Allen Womack.
3 (a 13 ,Q What is the first action that you recall 14 you took in response to the information that the 15 operators had terminated high-pressure injection 16 at Davis-Besse at a time that you believed was i
l 17 inappropriate for them to have terminated high-pressure l
18 injection?
19 A The first action that I took was to 20 announce to a few individuals that I felt that 21 the termination had been inappropriate and to have i
(
22 a discussion with them to see if they could give l
23 me an answer.
l
() 24 Q An answer to what?
25 A Perhaps as to why it might have been
__ _ _ - . _ . _ . . . _ _. , _ . - _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ . , _ ~ _ . __
1 Dunn 69 O
2 appropriate or a reason for the termination.
3 Q You began your answer by saying you 4
announced to a few individuals that you believed 5 the termination had been inappropriate.
6 Who, to the best of your recollection, 7 were the individuals?
8 , A Well, you asked for my first action and 9 I am not sure I can give you an exact sequence, s-10 but it would have been Joe Kelly and'Eric Swanson 11 and probably Bob Jones.
12 Q What did you perceive was Kelly's 4
13 reaction to your statement that the termination 14 was inappropriate?
15 A I think at this first stage I can't 16 characterize what I perceived about the -- those 17 reactions.
18 Q Did you have to do any convincing 19 of Kelly, Swanson, and Bob Jones before they 20 agreed -- if they ever agreed -- that the operator i
.( 21 action was inappropriate?
22 A As per Mr. Jones I would say no.
23 As per Mr. Kelly I believe I had 24 to outline my reasoning.
l 25 And for Eric, about tha same.
^
i 1
Dunn 70 n)
's.
2 Q You had to outline your reasoning to 3 Eric Swanson?
4 A Yes.
5 Q, What was your reasoning?
6 A Primarily that successful mitigation of 7 small break loss'of coolant accidents involves, 8 in general, the activation of the emergency core 9 cooling systems early in the transient and, 10 particularly under licensing assumpt" ions, the 11 maintenance of the high-pressure injection system 12 in the on. status throughout the' transient, 13 and I did not feel that,at the time that high-pressure 14 injection had been interrupted at Davis-Besse, 15 the fluid conditions within the primary system 16 were sufficiently -- excuse me -- warranted the 17 termination of the high-pressure injection.
18 Q Are you saying that the temperature and 19 pressure parameters didn't warrant high-pressure 20 injection termination?
21 A Yes. Very close to that.
{
22 Q What have I left out?
23 A Well, my view at that time,I was feeling
^
, '(fy) 24 that the termination should be based on 25 liquid inventory wh!.ch would be then, and is today
~
1 Dunn 71 0 2 measured by pressure and temperature sensors.
i 3 Q Am I coming close to paraphrasing 4 you if I say that maintenance of a sufficient 5 liquid inventory is the key to effective core 6 cooling?
7 A For certain small breaks, the maintenance of an 8 effective inventory is crucial to the mitigation 9 of the accident without unacceptable clad 10 temperature excursions. '
11 Q For larger breakdowns, you have g~ 12 to maintain an effective inventory of water also?
13 A For at least a certain break size range
, 14 within the what we generally call the large 15 break spectrum an inventory of water other than a 16 few hundred cubic feet cannot be maintained 17 throughout the transient.
1 18 Q Before you outlined your reasoning 19 to Eric Swanson, was it your belief that Swanson 20 was not immediately of the impression that
(, 21 terminating high-pressure injection at Davis-Besse l
l 22 had been inappropriate?
23 MR. FISKE: I am going to object to O
' (,/
l 24 the questions about Mr. Dunn's belief, Mr.
25 Seltzer.
( a
1 Dunn - 72 2 I am asking, just to make it clear, Q
3 for the impression that you drew from your 4
conversation with Eric Swanson. I am not asking
(! 5 for a Freudian psychoanalysis of Eric Swanson. .
6 MR. FISKE: I think you ought to ask 7 him what the conversation was, what was said 8
between them, and see where we go from there.
9 Did Swanson say things to you which Q
a 10 led you to believe or made you understand that 11 Swanson didn't share your immediate reaction that 12 terminating high-pressure injection had been 13 inappropriate? -
14 Well, I will object to the MR. FISKE:
15 form of that question.
16 MR. SELTZER: All right, I will press 17 it. .
18 Q You may answer.
, 19 MR, FISKE: I think you ought to ask 20 him what the conversation was, Mr. Seltzer.
( 21 MR. SELTZER: First I want to find oute 22 focus in on a particular part of the 23 conversation, and by asking whether Swanson 24 by his words imparted that-meaning, and then 25 I will ask can he tell me in words or substance
I Dunn 73 (h
d 2
what Eric swanson said.
3 MR. FISKE: I think you ought to ask 4
him what the conversation was about the 5
termination of HPI.
6 Q I'm sorry, I believe I am entitled to 7 ask whether Swanson said things to you which you 8
understood meant that Swanson believed the action 9 in termination might have been appropriate; that's 10 my question. -
11 MR. FISKE: I don't think there is a 12 basis for that question unless you identify 13 what it is that was said. Otherwise, you 14 are just asking Mr. Dunn for an impression.
15 MR. SELTZER: I am asking if Swanson 16 said things which -- from which he drew that 17 meaning --
- l 18 MR. FISKE: I understand what you are 19 asking.
20 MR. SELTZER: I press it.
21
_{ MR. FISKE: I think you should ask 22 him what Swanson said.
23 '
MR. SELTZER: You stated an objection Os C/ 24 to my' form and you could be right, Bob 25 Fiske, I won't quibble with you on whether l .
1 Dunn 74
~
/i
(_)
2 you are a better lawyer than I am.
3 MR. FISKE: That is not the question.
i I
4 MR. SELTZER: I am entitled under the 5 Federal Rules to press the question until
- 6 you think you want to go to Judge Owen on a 7 direction not to answer. I am just not going 8 to get into a long debate with you on that 9 anymore.
10 MR. FISKE: I think the proper pr'ocedure 11 in questions like this is to ask him whether f- 12 or not he had a conversation, what was said 13 in the conversation, and you have to do that 14 before you can start asking him about a lot 15 of impressions and beliefs.
16 I don't know why you don't ask him the 17 direct question. You haven't done that since 18 the beginning of the deposition. You are 19 asking him about his belief, what he thinks 20 probably happened. You asked him about this
(, 21 impression or that impression, and it seems 22 to me there is a very simple way to ask these 23 . questions and get the direct evidence.
s 24 I think I am-going to insist on that 25 procedure.
1 Dunn 75 O
2 BY MR. SELTZER:
3 Q What section was Swanson in in the fall 4 of '777 5 A Plant Design Section.
,6 Q In which unit?
7 A Integration.
8 Q So both he and Kelly reported to 9 Karrasch at that time?
o 10 A Yes. '
11 Q Did you have more than one conversation 12 with Swanson in which you and he discussed whether s_)-
13 the operator action had been appropriate at 14 Davis-Besse? __
15 A I don't recall whether we had more than one 16 discussion of whether the operator action had 17 been inappropriate at Davis-Besse.
18 Q What were the circumstances under l 19 which you met with Eric Swanson to discuss 20 the operator action taken at Davis-Besse?
(, 21 A I am not sure I know what you mean by 22 " circumstances."
23 Q Did you walk into his office, did he i
l 24 come into your office, something like that; did you l
25 make an appointment with him and said "Eric, I think l
1 Dunn 7G
%./
2 there is something important that we ought to 3 .:it down and discuss"? That's what I mean by what 4 were the circumstances that led to your meeting 5 with him.
6 A well, Eric Swanson and myself are very 7 good friends, and I expect there was no particular 8 telephone conversation setting up a meeting, but 9 it would have been in either his or my office 10 with a statement very much probably to the extent 11 that you have just iterated.
12 MR. F IS KE : I will object to any 7s c) 13 testimony by Mr. Dunn as to what probably 14 was said. I think if we are talking about 15 a conversation, I think we ought 16 to have a recollection of the conversation, 17 not speculation as to what was probably said.
18 MR. SELTZER: Well, I would 11xe 19 whatever your best recollection is. I don't l 20 want you to be scared into a Watergate-don't-I
(, 21 recall kind of a posture by your attorney.
22 MR. FISKE: I am --
23 MR. SELTZER: Let me finish what I have
/O k_) 24 to say.
25 MR. FISKE: Not when you make a comment
(
L
.= -- .. _ -
I Dunn 77 2
like that.
3 MR. SELTZER: I'm sorry.
4 MR. FISKE: I said I would allow him 5 to testify as to his recollection. That's 6
what I urged you to ask him from the 7 beginning. I don't want you to ask him, and 0
I don't think he should have to testify as to
- 9 what somebody probably said at a meeting.
10 MR. SELTZER: If as he is sitting here 11 today he has a belief that somebody, to the 12 r3 .
best of his recollection, said something and D
13 he is not 110 percent sure, I am still 14 entitled to his best recollection.
15 MR. FISKE: Absolutely.
16 MR. SELTZER: And probably --
1 17 MR. FISKE: And -- _
18 MR. SELTZER: Please, let me finish.
19 You insist on interrupting me.
20 This man is an engineer. He understands
(, 21 the notion of probability. I think there 22 are very few things in this world that people
, 23 can recall happening with a one hundred percent 24 assurance that it happened exactly as they l 25 sit here and recall it, and when an engineer
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1 Dunn 78 O 2 says he believes something probably 3 happened, he might be thinking it was 99 4 percent probable that it happened, and if his 5 recollection is that something probably 6 happened in a way that he can recall it and 7 testify to it, I want that probable recollection 8 and I don't think it means that it is 9 speculation that he believes it probably 10 happened this way. -
11 I think that when a man is under oath
-- 12 and is testifying to what he believes s .
13 probably happened, he means that there is a i
14 high likelihood that what he is recalling 15 is what is his best recollection of what 16 happened that day, and I am entitled to his 17 best recollection of what happened that day.
18 MR. FISKE: There is no point of getting 19 into a long semantics discussion about what 20 you mean by " probability" and whether Mr. Dunn
(, 21 as an engineer is any more likely to have a 22 better definition of probability than anybody 23 else is. -
O),
(_ 24 The simple 2estion is what does 25 he remember about the cv. ersation, and I
1 i
Dunn 79
("%
\
2 have said it from the beginning and will 3 continue to say that he should tell you and 4 tell everybody what he remembers about the 5 conversations, but not to speculate as
~
6 to whether something might have happened, 7 possibly happened, probably happened or not.
8 If he remembers he should testify 9 about it.
10 MR. SELTZER: I will agree with you, 11 if it is just pure speculation, I don't want
~
g- 12 that. If he thinks it might have happened, O ,
13 in most cases'a "might" is too speculative, ~
' 14 but if he believes it probably happened and 15 has a high degree of probability so that 16 his best recollection is that it did happen, 17 I want to know that, and I am entitled to his 18 best recolle.ction, and I think that it is not 19 right and I believe that people went to 20 jail for instructing witnesses that you
(, 21 should say you don't recall when in fact 22 witnesses do have a best recollection of an 23 event.
O 24 MR. FISKE: I will start where --
I come 25 back where I started.
1 Dunn 80 0 2 I think that's a highly inappropriate 3 comment. No one has told Mr. Dunn not to a
4 say he doesn't recall if he does recall.
(I 5 A,11 that I am saying is that if he 6 doesn't recall, he should say so and not make 7 a guess or speculate as to what the 8 percentage of probability is that it may or 9 may not have happened.
10 I think you and I are saying exactly 11 the same thing except you are mischaracterizing 12 it.
- O 13 MR. SELTZER: I hope that I am 14 mischaracterizing you.
15 MR. FISKE: I feel you are. I think 16 you may know you are.
J 17 BY MR. SELTZER:
18 The issue, if we can return to it, was Q
19 your conversation with your good friend, your very 20 good friend, Eric Swanson, that took place either 21 in his office or your office. It is a conversation 22 that you testified took place after the Davis-Besse 23 transient at which you discussed the appropriateness
) 24 of the operator action in terminating high-pressure 25 injection.
'~
~
l l
1 -
1 Dunn --
81 O
V 2 Can you recall apprdxidately when, 3 in relation to the September 24 transient, you i 4 and Eric Swanson first had that. discussion?
( 5 A within a few days.
l s 1
\
6 Q Is it your best recollection that you l
7 had that conversation after the Training Room a
' w 8 meeting?
9 A I don't recall whether it was before or after.
v 10 Q Was it after you had heard Mhat the 11 operators had terminated high-pressure injection A 12 -at Davis-Besse? a .
U '
, 13 A Yes, sir.
14 Q You had testified that youbolle ed
~ '
15 you had probably said something like what I 'had 16 said, namely, that this is something serious that
\
17 we ought to discuss. -
18 Is that your best recollection, 19 that you said words in substance or effect like 20 that to Eric?
(, 21 A I believe I would rather say that I raised 22 the issue.
23 Q what issue?
(/
s- 24 A Of termination of high-press re injection 25 with Mr. Swanson.
F ,.W ,9< ,+
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r
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i J t Dunn 82 0*
v 2 Q What, as best you can recall, did you 3 say to him and did he say to you in words or
. ., ) *
,( 4 substance?
, ,{ hl.t:
gg 5 A~ In substance I said that I felt that the
'%' termination of high-pressure injection under the 4
3 s
7 conditions /present at Davis-Besse was inappropriate.
a
'( 8
)
In subs, tan,ce , at this time, I do not recall what 1
v,'.
^
9 Eric's.\re>sp'lonse was.
l 10 Q.
5 Did there come a time ei$ther that 11 day or subsequently when Eric Swanson agreed with 12 you that the operator action at Davis-Besse had 13 -
been inappropriate?
14 A I don't know.
15 You mean to this day you have no Q
16 knowledge whether Eric Swanson has ever agreed a
17 that the operator action at Davis-Besse was 18 inappropriate?
19 A That is correct.
20 Q How many times would you say you have
( 21 talked with Eric Swanson since September 19777 22 Hundreds of times?
23 MR. FISKE: You mean about anything?
24 MR., SELTZER: Yes.
25 A I would expect -- excuse me. I would say well
a 1
Dunn 83 0 2 over a thousand.
3 Q Do you talk with him frequently about 4 subjects that relate to each of your business at 5 B&W7 6 A Not frequently.
7 Q You have testified earlier that 8 Swanson was one of the people who gave you a 9 suggestion as to whom you should circulate your n
10 February 1978 memoranda regarding the 11 suggestion on when it would be appropriate to
,g 12 terminate high-pressure injection.
')
t -
13 MR. FISKE: Just a minute. Where was 14 that testimony?
15 MR. SELTZER: In the Rogovin Commission.
16 MR. FISKE: Yes. I will make a 17 suggestions in fact, a request, that if you 18 refer to prior testimony of Mr. Dunn's, 19 that you either read it to him or show it to 20 him so we know what you are talking about.
(, 21 Q Isn't it.a fact that you asked 22 Eric Swanson for a suggestion as to whom in Nuclear 23 Service it would be appropriate for you to send O
\s j 24 copies of your February memoranda?
25 A It may be.
~1 Dunn 84 2 Q Your February 9 and February 16 3 mem randa addressed what you called the serious 4 concern over the termination of high-pressure 5 injection following the initial stage of a 6 loss of coolant accident, isn't that right?
7 A That's correct.
8 Q At the time that Eric Swanson was giving l
9 you a suggestion on to whom to send your February M
10 memoranda, hadn't Swanson indicated to you in 11 words or substance that he agreed by that time 12 that the operator action in terminating high-pressure O 13 injection following the initial stage of a loss
.14 of coolant accident was inappropriate?
15 A To answer your question, we would have to 16 agree that it is a fact that he provided me the 17 lis't of people to send it to and participated in th'at.
18 Q At page 71 in your President's 19 Commission testimony, line 6, you said, "I think 20 what I did here was to ask advice from either
( 21 Mr. Kelly or'Mr. Swanson about what people in Nuclear 22 Service I should try and kick in the tail, so to 23 speak."
24 . Do you have any firmer recollection 25 today whether it was either Mr. Kelly or Mr. Swanson
1 Dunn 85
~
~)
2 whom you got advice from regarding whom to kick 3 in the tail?
4 MR. FISKE: I think before you 5 answer that question -- Mr. Seltzer, this 6 incident illustrates the desirability of 7 following a procedure where you do in fact 8 show Mr. Dunn the testimony rather than 9 just paraphrasing it to him because I believe 10 he stated previously that he h}d testified 11 before Mr. Rogovin that he had consulted 12 Mr. Swanson and I think it's apparent now 13 ,
that he didn't give that testimony before 14 Mr. Rogovin or Kemeny.
15 What he said was he asked advice of 16 either Mr. Kelly or Mr. Swanson so I think 17 that just sort of inadvertent mistake indicates 18 that it's a desirable procedure to refer to 19 the actual testimony at the time. But I am 20 certain you can answer the question now, 21 Mr. Dunn.
22 A Well, I am lost.
23 MR. FISKE: Would you like to have 24 it read back?
25 Q The question is today do you recall
1 Dunn 86 0 2 whether you asked Joe Kelly or Eric Swanson 3 or both of them who deserved your advice on 4 sending out information to customers on proper
{! 5 use of high-pressure injection?
6 A I recall asking one of them.
7 Q Do you recall which one?
8 A No.
9 Q Subsequent to your initial conversation 10 with Eric Swanson on the question o/, appropriateness 11 of tarminating high-pressure inj ection at 12 Davis-Besse, do you think that you had subsequent 13 conversations with Mr. Swanson regarding when it is 14 appropriate to terminate high-pressure injection?
15 A Yes, I think I had subsequent conversations.
16 -
Q In any of those subsequent conversations 17 did Mr. Swanson say anything which indicated 18 that he had agreed with you that the termination 19 of high-pressure injection at Davis-Besse had 20 been inappropriate?
21 A Not to my present recollection.
22 Q Did he say anything which indicated 23 that he believed the termination was appropriate?
( 24 A Not to my present recollection.
25 g were any of your subsequent conversations e
. . _ . . _ , _ _ . _ _ , . . _ - _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ . , . . . , , , _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . , - ~ . . . . _ . , , _ _ _ _ . _ _ , . . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . , _ _ . _ _ _ , _
1 Dunn 87 O
V 2 with Swancon regarding termination of high-pressure 3 injection conversations which took place prior to 4 your sending out your now famous February 1978 5 -
memoranda?
6 MR. FISKE: I will object to the form.
7 i Do you know which memoranda I am 8 referring to?
9 MR. FISKE: You may answer.
10 'A Excuse me, would you give me t e date on 11 the memorandum again?
12 Q The famous memoranda that I am O 13 referring to are February 9, 1978, Mr. Dunn to 14 Mr. Taylor; and February 16, 1978, Bert Dunn to 15 Jim Taylor.
16 MR. FISKE: The questions are just 17 as good without the adjectives.
18 A As I understand your question, it is were 19 some of the discussions that I held with Mr. Swanson 20 prior to the issuance of my February 9th and, I 4
( 21 believe, February 16th memoranda. The answer is yes. .
22 Q That wasn't the question, thought.
23 You told me that you had had one
( 24 conversation that was within a few days after the 25 Davis-Besse transient.
m -
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1 Dunn --
88 b
G 2 Now I am asking you whether you had 3 additional conversations regarding the 4 appropriateness of terminating high-pressure
.- 5 injection with Eric Swanson prior to your writing 6 the February memoranda.
7 A Yes.
8 Q Where were those conversations held?
9 A Somewhere on our operating floor.
10 Q To the best of your recollection, 11 how many additional conversations do you believe 12 you had with Eric Swanson between the first one w
13 and the date that you sent your February memoranda?
14 MR. FISKE: You mean on the subject 15 that we have been talking about?
16 MR. SELTZER: Yes.
17 Thanks.
18 A I am not sure.
19 Q Is it a subject that you recall 20 discussing from time to time with him, in other
/ 21 words, not just one additional time but several L
22 additional times?
23 A I would place it in two or three.
) 24 Q Two or three additional after the first 25 one? You have to say something so he gets it on
1 Dunn 89 p
\- 2 the record.
3 A Oh.
4 Yes.
( 5 Q was there an evolution in your 6 discussions, in other words, did the ideas that 7 you were discussing mature at all during your 8 successive conversations with Eric Swanson 9 between the first one in September that you 10 have already described and the succeeding ones 11 prior to the February memoranda?
12 A I don't believe so.
( .
\ 13 Q What do you recall, telling Swanson 14 in the subsequent conversations?
15 A In substance I was requesting that 16 Integration take on a review of my concerns or 17 cause to be formed a forum for the review of my 18 concerns.
19 Q Did you make that same recommendation 20 to Joe Kelly who was also in the Integration 21 Unit?
22 A I believe so.
23 Q Did you make that same recommendation 24 to'anyone else in the Integration Unit during the 25 period between September 1977 and February 19787
1 Dunn 95
)
(~N O 2 A Not to my present knowledge.
i 3 Q What was Eric Swanson's response to i 4 your suggestion that Integration proceed with your 5 idea and create a forum for its further discussion?
6 A I don't recall Eric Swanson's response.
7 Q What was Joe Kelly's response to that 8 same suggestion?
9 A In substance it is my belief that Joe 10 agreed with me. ",
11 Q He agreed that a Plant Integration 12 Unit ought to create a forum for the wider 13 discussion of your position, is that right?
14 A Or pursue the direct resolution.
e 15 Q Resolution of what?
16 A My concerns.
17 Q What needed to be resolved.regarding 18 your concerns?
19 A In the process of any form of concern 20 for design work, there are several steps, one step being identification.
( 21 22 Q Is that the first step?
23 A Usually.
() 24 Q Identification of what?
l 25 A Whatever you are dealing with.
e . - - , c- -r . - , . _ _ _ , , -. y
r 1
Dunn 91 0 2 Q I don't understand.
3 You say this is a design process.
4 Let's talk specifically about your concern 5 following the Davis-Besse transient. The'first 6 step is identification of what?
7 A Of the concern.
8 Q So that the first step is identifying 9 that there is a basis for concern over whether o
10 operator termination of high-pressure injection 11 following the onset of a loss of coolant o
12 accident is an appropriate response, is that 13 right?
14 A I think the first step is identifying 15 that there is a concern. The second step is 16 identifying that there is a basis for it.
i 17 Q What are the next steps?
18 A Establishing what must be done to eliminate 19 the concern and finally doing it.
20 (Recess taken.)
BY MR. SELTZER:
( 21 22 Q I think you were describing to me that 23 Joe Kelly had agreed with you on both need 24 for a forum and the need to resolve your concerns, 25 and when I asked you what you meant by " resolve
ie 1
Dunn 92
,,v 2
your concerns," you said there were four steps.
3 Do you recall that testimony?
4 A Yes.
5 Q What, if anything, did Joe Kelly say 6 he would do to attempt to get Integration 7 to resolve your concerns?
8 A I don't recall specifically what he 9 said he would do.
10 Q Generally what was the s'ubstance 11 of what he said.
12 A I'was left with the impression that Joe O 13 would pursue the process.
14 Q The process of getting Integration 15 to resolve your concerns, is that right?
16 A Getting Integration to resolve them or getting 17 a larger forum of people to resolve them if that 18 turned out to be necessary.
19 Q You said you were left with that 20 impression.
21
{ Is that an impression that was created 22 by what Joe Kelly had said to you?
23 A In part.
I) 24 Q In addition to what he said, what 25 else was done to create that impression?
1 Dunn 93 0 2 A I believe Mr. Swanson said something to that 3 effect, or to that substance to me as well.
4 Q Namely, Eric Swanson said to you in
( 5 words or substance that he would take steps 6
to get Integration to resolve your concerns or 7
to create a wider forum if that was necessary to 8 resolve your concerns?
9 A No.
10 Q What, what did he say? .
11 A That Joe Kelly would do that.
12 Q You mean Eric Swanson said Joe Kelly O
k- 13 would do it? Is that what you are telling me?
I4 A In substnace Eric said that. Or rather 15 I believe Eric said that to me in substance.
16 What is your best recollection about Q
17 what either Eric or Joe said; Joe would'do to 18 resolve the concerns within Integration?
19 A I think you already asked me questions i
l 20 very similar to that.
21 MR. FIS KE : Off the record.
22 (Discussion off the re co rd. ) {
23 A I responded with that it was my impression
() 24 that they would pursue the issue.
25 All right.
Q I didn't mean to be redundant
1 Dunn 94 O 2 even though Bob gives me credit for intending to 3 he redundant.
4 What did you understand was the
(( 5 process that they were going to try to instigate 1
6 within Integration to get your concerns 7 resolved?
8 A I did not understand the process.
9 Q Did they tell you anything that they 10 were going to do, any of the specifi'es of what 11 they were going to do?
~
12 A No.
/
(s 13 Q Did either' Joe Kelly or Eric Swanson -
14 say that they would take' the matter up with 15 Mr. Karrasch?
16 A Not to my knowledge.
17 I don't know whether they did or did 18 not say that.
19 Q Prior to February 1978, did you have 20 any discussions with Bruce Karrasch about 21 your concerns over premature termination of 22 high-pressure injection?
23 A I can't recall now whether I did or didn't.
l /~}
(_-
24 I don't think so.
25 Q Did Swanson or Kelly indicate that
. _ . , _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . . ___.n.~.___-..._____ . _ . _ __ _._ ,-
-- I Dunn 95 rm 2 either of them would present your concerns to 3 Mr. Karrasch?
4 A I don't recall.
{j 5 Q Is Karrasch somebody that you 6 felt some distance from, some difficulty in 7 talking to?
8 A No.
9 Q In the fall of 19777 10 A No. ",
11 Q During the fall of '77 do you believe 12 that you had conv'ersations on any subject of
\~-) 13 technical interest with Mr. Karrasch?
14 A Excuse me, was the question do I believe 15 that I had conversations with Mr. Kelly on any 16 subject of technical origin?
17 Q Technical interest.
18 Between September of 1977 and February of 19 '78.
20 MR. FISKE: How about does he recall?
21 MR. SELTZER: Fine.
22 A No, I do not recall.
23 Q Karrasch was the Unit Manager of
( 24 Integration at the same time that you were the 25 Unit Manager of EccS Analysis, right?
I
1 Dunn 96 d 2 A Yes.
3 Q During the fall of '77 did you and 4 he attend meetings together?
( 5 A Yes.
6 Q Did you attend meetings of the Plant 7 Design Section between September ' 77 and 8 February of '78?
9 A Not that I recall.
10 Q Did Dr. Roy convene peri' odic meetings 11 of the Plant Design Section in or about the
! 12 period between September '77 and February of '
787
(~)
(_/ 13 A Not that I recall.
14 Q What types of meetings do you recall 15 attending with Bruce Karrasch between September 16 ' 77 and February of '78?
17 A At least staff meetings.
18 Q whose staff?
19 A Don Roy's.
20 Q How frequently did Don Roy convene staff 21 meetings?
22 A Approximately once a month.
23 Q Did all of the Unit Managers in the 24 Plant Design Section attend those staff meetings?
}
25 A Generally.
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I Dunn 97
. ,O _
U 2 Q Who else was invited to attend?
3 A Staff meetings would also be attended by 4 Don's secretary.
5 Q So these were mustings of the Managers 6 in the Plant Design Section and the secretary of the 7 Plant Design Section?
8 A And Don Roy's secretary.
9 Q And Roy was the head of the Plant 10 Design Section, right? '.
11 A That is correct.
12 Q And'these were monthly meetings, right?
O O 13 A Approximately.
14 Q A moment ago when I asked you did you 15 attend periodic meetings of the Plant 16 Design Section, you said you didn't recall.
17 A I said I didn't recall meetings with the 18 Plant Design Section.
19 Q Does this refresh your recollection 20 that there were monthly staff meetings of the 21 Plant Design Section during the period between k'm 22 September '77 and February of '78?
23 A No.
(A) v 24 Q Why,just so I can understand -- .
25 A The Plant Design Section is composed of
1 Dunn 98 O 2 approximately 100 people.
3 You asked for the section meetings.
4 Q Was an agenda usually circulated before 1 5 .
or at Dr. Roy's monthly staff meetings?
6 A Usually. It varied.
7 i' Q From whom did you get that agenda?
8 A My secretary.
9 Q From whom do you believe, to the best 10 - of your knowledge, those agenda orig"inally 11 emanated?
12 A That would vary.
, k 13 Q From whom to whom?
14 A It could be Don himself or quite frequently 15 Unit Managers would place items on the agenda.
16 Q Did you ever place items on the a7enda?
i 17 A I am sure I have.
18 Q Did you ever place your concern over 19 when operators terminate high-pressure injection 20 on the agenda?
21 A No.
22 Q Was the subject of termination of 4
23 high-pressure injection ever on the agenda of Don
[) 24 Roy's monthly staff meeting?
s-25 A subject to my memory, no.
1 Dun n -- 9'9 O 2 Q It's a fact, isn't it, that Don Roy 3 shared your concern over operator termination 4 of high-pressure injection, isn't that a fact?
( 5 A You should ask Don Roy.
6 Q It's a fact, isn't it, that you 7 understood from conversations with Don Roy 8 that he shared your concern, isn't that correct?
9 MR. FISKE: I think, Mr. Seltzer, 10 we are back where we were before on that, 11 on conversations.
12 MR. SELTZER: I press the question.
13 MR. FISKE: Well, I press my procedural 14 point.
15 MR. SELTZER: Are you going to instruct 16 him not to answer the question?
17 MR. FISKE: At least not until you have 18 asked him to describe what was said in the 19 conversations.
20 Q You discussed with Don Roy your 21 concern over premature termination of high-pressure 22 injection, didn't you?
23 A Yes.
] 24 Q It's a fact, is it-not, that Don Roy J
25 said to you in words or substance that he agreed
1 Dunn 100 2 that the operator termination of high-pressure 3 injection at Davis-Bessa had been inappropriate, 4 isn't that correct?
( 5 A Yes.
6 Q Did you ever discuss with Don Roy 7 the appropriateness of putting this subject on the 8 agenda of one of his monthly staff meetings?
9 A Not that I recall.
10 Q Did you ever discuss with Don Roy getting 11 the Integration Unit to proceed with the resolution 12 of your concern?
(~)
\_/
13 A I am not sure. .
s 14 C Bruce Karrasch, the head cf the 15 Integration Section, reported to Don Roy, right?
I j 16 A That is correct.
l i 17 Q As you understand how things work 18 at B&W, is it your understanding that Roy could l 19 have asked Karrasch to proceed with the resolution i
20 of your concern over premature termination of 21 high-pressure injection?
22 A Yes. I believe Don could have asked Bruce 23 to proceed with that issue.
( 24 Q Did Bruce Kurrasch ever come 25 to you and indicate that he had been asked to
_ . . - _ _ . _ - _ _ _ . _ - . - _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ ___. . _ . _ . _ __ . - ~ . _ ,
1 Dunn 101
()
2 proceed with a resolution of your concern over 3 high-pressure injection prior to February 19787 4 A Not to my knowledge.
() 5 Q Did he ever come to you after February 6 1978 or during February of 1978 and indicate 7 that he had been asked to proceed with a resolution 8 of your concern over the premature termination of 9 high-pressure injection?
10 A yes. ",
11 Q When?
1 1
12 A During or just before the Kemeny commission O> 13 depositions.
14 Q That's the first time that Bruce 15 Karrasch came to you and said he had been directed 16 to proceed with the resolution of your concern?
I 17 A I don't believe that Bruce Karrasch ever l
18 came to me and said to me that he had been 19 directed to proceed.
20 g what in words or substance did 21 Bruce say to you just before the Kemeny depositions?
22 A Subject to the inaccuracy of just before or 23 during, Bruce indicated that Don Hallman had
() 24 issued him a memo requesting that he resolve certain 25 points.
v.-
1 Dunn 102
(~^
~
2 Q When had he received that direction from 3 Hallman?
4 A I don't know.
l 5 Q Was it before or after the Three Mile 6 Island accident?
7 A Before.
8 Q Did Bruce tell you how long before 9 the Three Mile Island accident he had been 10 directed by Don Hallman to resolve y'hur concern?
11 MR. FISKE: I am not sure that is what 12 Mr. Dunn testified to.
AJ 13 MR. SELTZER: Let's clear it up.
14 Q I thought you had said Karrasch got a 15 memo from Hallman telling him to resolve your 16 concern over the premature termination of 17 high-pressure injection, isn't that right?
18 A No.
19 Q What did Bruce tell you he had gotten 20 from Don Hallman?
21 A A memo requesting that he resolve certain
-22 issues relative to my requests.
23 Q Hallman is in what unit or section?
( 24 A Don Hallman is a member of Nuclear Service 25 and I can't give you the specific title of the
1 Dunn 103 2 section. !
3 0 Hallman was concerned that going l 4 solid might do some damage to the equipment, 5 is that right?
6 MR. FISKE: Well, are you asking him 7 now about what Karrasch told him before 8 the Kemeny Commission?
4 9 Are we still on that conversation?
10 MR. SELTZER: I am trying to get 11 at what Bert Dunn's understanding is 12 o
'f Hallman's request to Bruce Karrasch.
' CE) 13 --- Q And I am asking you, isn't it correct 14 that it is your understanding that Hallman had 15 voiced a concern to Bruce Karrasch about the 16 dangers of going solid?
17 A I believe the issues raised in that 18 communication relate to concerns over going solid 19 but I couldn't testify to it without seeing the 20 communique.
21 Q Between the date that Bruce Karrasch 22 received that communication from Don Hallman --
23 which I think the record will reflect was in r~
( 24 August 1978 -- and the date of the Three Mile 25 Island accident, did Bruce Karrasch ever come I
, ,- r . , , - , - - - - , , , . - . - , , - - , - , .,y-..c., ..---_.._.-.,,y
1 Dunn 104 (3
2 to you to discuss either the resolution of your 3 concern or the concern that Don Hallman had 4 raised?
A Not to my recollection.
( 5 6 Q Have you ever discussed with Bruce 7 Karrasch what, if anything, he did between August 8 1978 and the March 1979 accident at Three Mile 9 Island to resolve either your concern or 10 Don Hallman's? *~
11 A Yes.
12 -
Q What, if anything, did Mr. Karrasch 13 say he had done between August '78 and the 14 Three Mile Island accident to resolve your concern?
15 MR. FISKE: You mean as opposed to 16 Hallman's?
17 MR. SELTZER: Yes, I will take them 18 separately rather than as a compound subject.
19 MR. FISKE: Do you understand that?
20 THE WITNESS: No, I don't think I 21 appreciate the difference.
22 Q Let me ask it in reverse order.
23 What, if anything, did Bruce Karrasch 24 indicate he had done between August '78 and the f~}/
\_
25 -Three Mile Island accident in March of 1979
{
l 1 Dunn 105 Q 2 to resolve Don Hallman's concern?
3 A I believe he indicated to me that he
, 4 communicated to Don that I was right and he should 5 do what I wanted.
6 Q Did he indicate to you whether that 7
communication between Karrasch and Hallman was oral I
8 or written?
9 A I was left with the impression that it was i
10 oral. '
11 Q Did Bruce Karrasch tell you when in the 12 period between August '78 and the Three Mile O 13 Island accident in March of 1979 he communicated 14 to Hallman his resolution that Mr. Dunn was right 15 and Hallman's concern was not valid?
16 MR. FISKE: Wait a second. You are 17 changing what --
18 MR. SELTZER: Let me ask it again.
19 Q Did Bruce Karrasch indicate to you 20 that he believed that- you were right in your l 21
( concern and that your prescription should be 22 conveyed to customers?
23 A During the -- after the accident at Three 24 Mile Island, Bruce indicated to me that he had l
25 communicated to that extent, that I was correct on
1 Dunn 106 gd 2 the issue and that Hallman should do what I wanted.
3 Now, I don't think that's totally 4 responsive to your question. If you would give it 5 to me again.
6 Q When you say Bruce had communicated 7 to Hallman that Hallman should do what Bert Dunn 8 wanted, is what you wanted what you had expressed 9 to Jim Taylor in your February 9 and February 10 16, 1978 memoranda? ",
11 A I believe so. We are talking about the 12 16th memoranda.
'~' 13 Yes. Specifically, you wanted B&W Q
14 to communicate to customers the two criteria which 15 operators should have in mind in determining when 16 it is appropriate to terminate high-pressure 17 injection, is that right?
18 A That's what I felt was wise or necessary.
19 Q Did Bruce Karrasch tell you that he had 20 told Don Hallman that Hallman's concerns about 21 going solid were not a sufficient obstacle to
{
22 sending out the advice to customers that you had 23 proposed in your February 16,.1978 memorandum?
[a 24 A No, he did not tell me that.
25 Q When between August '78 and March 28,
1 Dunn 107 A
'U
~
2 1979 did Bruce tell you he had given this 3 communication to Don Hallman?
4 A He told me after March 28th, 1979.
1
( 5 Q In other words, Bruce Karrasch did 6 not tell Don Hallman until after the Three Mile 7 Island accident?
8 A No, Mr. Karrasch did not tell me he had 9 told Don Hallman anything until after.
10 Q Right. ",
11 What I am trying to place in the time 12 spectrum is when Bruce Karrasch told Don
(~h . =
k- 13 Hallman that you were right and that your-14 prescription should be sent to customers.
15 MR. FISKE: In other words, when Karrasch 16 told you he had done that. Did he tell you 17 when he had done that?
18 THE WITNESS: No.
19 A He did not indicate to me when he had taken 20 that action.
21 Q Have you ever come to know at what
, 22 point Bruce Karrasch took that action?
23 A I have not come to know that he took the f}-
s.
24 action, 25 g I beg your pardon? I thought you
4 1
Dunn 108
'(./ 2 testified that Bruce Karrasch told you he told 3 Don Hallman that you were right and that the 4 prescription should go out.
(. 5 MR. FISKE: The problem is the word 6 "know," Mr. Seltzer.
7 MR. SELTZER: All I am trying to find 8 out -- we are just looking at the shadows 9 on the wall here.
I 10 MR. FISKE: I don't know who is looking 11 at what shadows. There is a valid-basis for 12 Mr. Dunn's point.
l
) 13 You asked him when did he know that this 14 happen,ed, and he said he doesn't know.
15 MR. SELTZER: Fine.
16 MR. FISKE: Mr. Karrasch said something i
17 to him. He is not equating that.with 18 knowledge.
19 Q Did you ever get indication of when 20 Bruce Karrasch communicated to Don Hallman that og you were correct and that your prescription should t 22 be sent to customers?
23 A No very good indication.
24 Q Did you ever get any indication that 25 the communication had taken place prior to the
1 Dunn 109
'- 2 Three Mile Island accident?
3 A Yes.
4 Q What is the indication that you got?
- l. 5 A Somewhere in between August 10th and the events 6 of Three Mile Island.
7 Q The famous events at Three Mile 8 Island?
9 A The accident at Three Mile Is1'and.
10 Q Who gave you that indication?
11" A I'm not sure now.
12 Q Have you ever skoken to Don Hallman (A_) 13 regarding his communications with Bruce Karrasch 14 on this specific subject of your concerns over 15 premature termination of high-pressure injection 16 and Hallman's concerns about going solid?
17 A I spoke to Don Hallman about my concerns 18 on termination of high-pressure injection.
l 19 l Q Have you ever spoken to Don Hallman 20
. about his communications with Karrasch or his -
21 interactions with Karrasch?
22 A Yes.
23 Q Did Hallman ever confirm in words or 24 substance that Karrasch had responded to Hallman l
{~}/
x~ '
25 telling him that Karrasch believed that Bert Dunn
vs 1 .
Dunn 110 O
\- 2 was correct and that the Bert Dunn prescription 3 of February 16, 1978 should be sent out to 4 customers?
(( , 5 A Not to me.
6 Q Did you ever hear indirectly that 7 Hallman had stated that he had received such 8
advice from Bruce Karrasch?
'9 MR. FISKE: What do you mean 10 " indirectly"? ';
11 MR. SELTZER: When he said Hallman 12 didn't say it to me, I am wondering if he 13 knows that Hallman has said that to someone 14 else and that somebody else repeated it to 15 Mr. Dunn.
16 A I don't believe so.
l 17 When for the first time did you Q
i 18 discuss with Hallman your concern over premature 19 termination of high-pressure injection?
20 A I am not sure.
21 Q Do you have any recollection of having 22 such a conversation before the Three-Mile j 23 Island accident?
Q k./
24 A Yes.
25 Q In what context or forum do you recall l
1 Dunn 111 s
2' having a, conversation with Don Hallman 3 regarding your concern over premature termination?
4 A I believe that shortly after the events at i
(( ', 5 Davis-Besse on September 24th, 1977 I s t o p p e d ...
C by Don's office and indicated to him that I thought 7 that the HPI had been vrongly terminated or 8 inappropriately terminated.
9 Q Was anybody else present when you 10 were discussing this with Don Hallman on that 11 occasion?
12 A I don't think*so.
-f .
( 13 Q Approximately how long a conversation 14 did you have with Don Hallman on that occasion?
15 A A few minutes.
16 .Q Is there anything else that you 17 recall in words or substance saying to. Don Hallman I 18 on that occasion?
i l 19 A No.
20 Q What in words or substance did Don
> 21 Hallman say to you in response?
22 A At this time I can't characterize his response.
23 Q What was Hallman's position or function l
24 in or about late September 19777 J
25 A Don Hallman was in Nuclear Service.
_ _ , ,,_--------y- -cr-- , ,__im,a++m- w vs'-r---e---- --r-'---- te---e ~ - " - * ' " ' ' ' ~ - * * - ~ ^ * - ' ' ' ' - -
1
-- Dunn 112
/'N V 2 Q Was there anything that distinguished 3 his area of responsibility from anybody else's 4 in Nuclear Service at that point in time?
l 5 A I am sure there was.
6 Q Is there anything that you can recall 7 that distinguishes Don Hallman's area of 8 responsibility? -
9 A It was my perception at the time that Don 10 was cor.>ected with support of plant ' operations.
11 Q What does that mean? Let's start with i _
12 the semantic question.
'I 13 When you refer to " plant operations,"
14 is there a capital P and a capital O on those 15 two words?
16 A No, I don't think so.
17 When I do say " plant operations," I do 18 mean our nuclear plants in the field.
19 Q What does it mean to be in Nuclear 20 Service working in support of plant operations?
21 A I will have to respond to the question in terms 22 of my perception and the limited facets about 23 it that were important to me, and this means to me
[)
v 24 that Don would have a connection with or be 25 responsible for providing technical information,
1 Dunn 113 2 or B&W information to the plants for their 3 operations i'n general or operational problems or 4 difficulties.
() 5 Q To whom did Don Hallman report in the 6 fall of 19797 7 A I believe it was'Mr. Andy Olds but I'm not 8 sure.
9 Q- What is your understanding of the 10 relationship between the support function of Nuclear 11 Service in the fall of 1977 And the role of 12 Plant Integration at that same time?
. 13 A Excuse me? Would you repeat the first part?
14 Q What do you understand is the relationship 15 between the responsibilities of Nuclear Service 16 in supporting plant operations and the role of 17 the Plant Integration Unit in the fall _of 19777 18 A Integration was a unit within the' 19 Engineering Department responsible for coordinating 20 to some extent design work or detailed engineering 21 work.
22 Nuclear Service was responsible for i
23 dealing with the customers in that -- well, " customer" is a wrong word. The operation of plants. And
()/
q, 24 25 again that's my perception.
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i 1 Dunn 114
['T 2 .Q Was Hallman a Unit Manager?
3 A I am not sure.
4 Q Are you familiar with a unit called
(; 5 Plant Performance Services?
6 A No. But I may be. I am not familiar 7 with the name.
8 Q Was it your understanding in 9 the fall of 1977 that Hallman's group was an 10 appropriate group to communicate to y&W nuclear 11 plants in the field your concern over when and when 12 not to terminate high-pressure injection
(~)
\_/ 13 A Yes, I believe that was my impression 14 at that time, that that was an appropriate 15 group to perform that function.
16 Q Is that why you felt it was appropriate l
I7 for you to stop in to Don Hallman's office shortly 18 after the Davis-Besse event to discuss your concern 19 with him?
20 A No.
21 Q Why did you stop into his office to have 22 that conversation?
I 23 A I think just to let him know what I thought.
24 Q Why did you pick Don Hallman?
25 A I am not sure I know now.
l- , . . . , , _ _ - - - - . . . ,- . -
- - ------ - --- - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
i 1 Dunn 115
(~)
\- 2 Q Approximately how many other people 3 did y u discuss your concern over premature
- 4 termination of high-pressure injection with shortly l -
5 after the Davis-Besse event?
6 A I believe we have covered them all.
7 Q Swanson, Kelly, Jones, and Hallman?
g A Yes. And Roy.
9 Q Thank you.
l 10 After the conversation you had 11 with Don Hallman shortly after the Davis-Besse
~
12 event, did you have any other discussions with him O)
(_ 13 prior to the Three Mile Island accident on the 14 subject of your concern regarding premature
- 15 termination of high-pressure injection?
16 A After the first conversation and prior to 17 March 28th, 19797 18 Q Yes.
19 A I don't believe so, i
20 Q Prior to the Three Mile Island 21 accident, did Don Hallman cver discuss with you i 22 his concern -- and this is a subset of the last 23 question -- his concern that your prescriptions
, (~h 24 would lead to taking the plant solid?
%J'
! 25 A I don't believe he did.
~~
1 Dunn 116 rN 2 Q Since the Three-Mile Island 3 accident, have you discussed either of those two 4 subjects with Don Hallman?
A Not explicitly.
( 5 6 Q Have you discussed them any way other ,
7 than explicitly?
8 A The issue of solid is connected to the 9 requirements to maintain high-pressure injection, 10 and both Don and I participated in the team which 11 generated the small break operating guidelines.
12 Q Did you ever say to Don Hallman at any 13 time since the Three Mile" Island accident in 14 words or in substance, "Why didn't you come 15 talk to me, Don, if you had this concern regarding
- 16. my prescription?"
17 A No, I didn't. I haven't.
18 Q Have you ever voiced to anybody any 19 disappointment that Don Hallman hadn't come 20 to you to discuss his reservations between August 21 1978 when he formulated them in writing and the 22 Three Mile Island accident in March of 1979?
23 A Yes.
24 Q To whom have you. expressed that?
25 A To Don.
1 Dunn 11h
/D.
2 Q When?
3 A I don't know.
4 Q Where did you have that conversation?
( 5 A I don't think I can even recall that.
6 Q What did you say to him and what did he 7 say to you as best you can recall in words or 8 substance?
9 Q In substance I said "I wish you had 10 given me a call or told me verbally 'about the 11 August 10th memorandum."
12 ,
MR. FISKE: I don't think it's August 13 10th. .
14 MR. SELTZER: What is the date?
15 MR. MacDONALD: The 3rd.
16 Q August 3rd.
17 A Excuse me.
18 Q Is there anything else you said to him 19 in words or substance?
20 A I am sure there is.
- 21 Q on that particular subject?
22 A No.
23 Q Why did you tell him you wished that he had spoken to you about his concern voiced
( 24 ,
25 in the August 3rd memorandum?
1 Dunn 118
,o -
(_) 2 A Because at that time -- which is after the 3 accident --
I knew that I had been on copy for the 4 memorandum sent to Karrasch and had not done
( 5 anything.after August 3rd,to re-emphasize my 6 concerns.
7 Q What, in words or substance, did Don 8 Hallman say to you?
9 A I don't recall.
10 Q Have you ever had any co'nversation 11 in which you discussed with anybody what, if any, 12 action Don Hallman took after Bruce Karrasch ~got
13 back to him and told Don Hallman that Bert,Dunn is 14 correct and that Bert Dunn's prescription should 15 be sent to customers?
16 MR. FISKE: I'm sorry, I would like l
17 to hear that question again, please.
18 (Question read by the reporter.)
19 MR. FISKE: I will object to the form 20 of that question.
21 Q You may answer.
22 A First of all, I don't think we are on the 23 record is my saying Bruce told me that he had told
() 24 Don to send the information to the customers.
25 Past that I have had such conversations.
l -
1 Dunn 119
(
N_') 2 Q With whom have you had such 3 conversations?
e A 4 At least with Mr. George Edgar.
( 5 Q Do you believe you had such conversations 6 with anyone else?
7 A Yes, I believe I had such conversations 8 with other people.
9 Q Do you have any recollection as to who 10 those other people are?- n 11 A No.
12 Q What was George Edgar's position at
(~s. -
'N ) 13 the time you had the conversation with him?
14 A Counsel.
15 Q Counsel to whom?
16 A B&W, I guess.
17 Q You recall, am I correct, having 18 conversations with people other than George Edgar 19 _but you can't recall their names on this same 20 subject?
og A That's correct.
22 Q What did the other people whose names
, 23 you don't recall tell you they understood Don
/~ 24 Hallman did after Karrasch had advised Don Hallman C
25 that your prescriptions in your February memoranda
- v7 1 Dunn 12b' i
r s v i
's_/
2 to Jim Taylor were correct?
3 MR. FISKE: I am going to again 4 object to the fodm of the question, and 5 also, just ask Mr. Dunn, before he answers 6 that question, to not answer it with 7 respect to any individual who he may have 8 known to be a lawyer even though. he didn't 9 know his name, if there is such a person.
10 A I don't think I can give the a'nswer then.
11 I don't believe I can separate the lawyers from 12 the non-lawyers.
e *
( l 13 Q This is going to be stretching; ,
14 Upjohn pretty far.
15 MR. FISKE: May I just suggest, in the 16 interest of expedition, that if it is a 17 lawyer, we are not going to let him answer 18 the question, whatever you may think of
' 19 Upjohn, and if he can't remember the name j 20 of the person who said it, I can't see how it 1
21 can be much use in discovery.
(
22 MR. SELTZER: We have our ways, Mr. Fiske.
23 We will find out who he is and if he has a m
(j 24 recollection of a conversation with somebody, 25 just because he can't remember the man's name,
f 1 Dunn 121 0 2 doesn't mean that it won't come to him in the 3 middle of a Broadway show tonight or something 4 else.
() 5 MR. FISKE: In any event, if he can't 6 sort out the lawyers from the non-lawyers 7 at the moment, I think there is no point 8 in pursuing it. If he is able to do that 9 at any later time, fine.
10 BY MR. SELTZER: .
11 Q Have you at any point, independent
,_ 12 of what lawyers have told you, corroborated what
.N 13 lawyers told you Hallman did?
14 MR. FISKE: I think you are going to 15 have to explain to Mr. Dunn what you mean by 16 " corroborated."
i 17 Q Just because a lawyer tells you 18 something doesn't forever cloak that fact in privilege 19 if you later learn the fact again from some other 20 source that is not a lawyer.
I 21 A O.K.
{
22 Q So now I am asking whether you ever 23 learned or confirmed the fact about what Hallman
, 24 did from a source who wasn't a lawyer.
I 25 MR. FISKE: I guess the question, if
. ~ , , . . - . _ - - _ - . . - -
1 Dunn 122 r
4 (
2 it helps any, is did anybody that you knew 3 not to be a lawyer tell you what Hallman did.
4 A I believe that I had conversations which
(, 5 touched on the subject of what happened in that 6 time frame with people that were not 1awyers.
7 Q what did the non-lawyers tell you Don 8 Hallman did, if anything, after Bruce Karrasch had 9 told him that your February prescriptions were 10 correct? '.
11 MR. FISKE: The same objection to the 12 form of the question.
13 Q You may answer, however.
14 A I don't think that anybody told me any 15 exact information about what Don did but rather 16 an impression was generated that confusion remained 17 and Don was going to continue to pursue the issue.
18 Q Did you ever learn that Don Hallman had 19 done anything to pursue the issue before the Three 20 Mile Island accident?
21 A Maybe.
22 Q Are you just speculating?
23 A well, you asked me a question about him
[)
\./
24 doing something.
25 Q Hallman writes a memo on August 3rd to e
I 1 Dunn 123 f
b- 2 Bruce Karrasch. Some time after August 3rd, 3 1978 Karrasch communicates back to Don Hallman 4 saying notwithstanding your concerns, Don Hallman,
( 5 I think that Bert Dunn is correct in his 6 Prescriptions; is that right?
7 MR. FISKE: That's what Mr. Dunn 8 testified Mr. Karrasch told him.
9 MR. SELTZER: Right.
10 Q You have added just now'from someone 11 you got the impression that Hallman still had 12 lingering concerns about whether it would be n/
13 safe to take the reactor coolant system solid, 14 is that right?
15 A I added that I was given the impression that 16 Don felt there was still some confusion on the 17 issue. -
18 Q Confusion in whose mind? As you 19 understand it?
20 MR. FISKE: As he understands it.
21 A I don't know.
{
22 MR. FISKE: Isn't this an impression 23 from anonymous people?
[a\ 24 Q Where is the confusion that you just 25 testified to existing?
b
f 1
Dunn ,
124 V-2 MR. FISKE: I just want to make sure I 3 understand the question.
4 You are asking Mr. Dunn what his
-\
5 impression was as to where the confusion -- in 6
whose mind the confusion was between 7
Hallman and Karrasch as a result of these 8
conversations with people he can't remember, 9 is that it?
10 MR. SELTZER: No, you are adding that 11 the confusion is between Hallman and Karrasch.
12 I am not limiting it to that.
O 13 -
The witness just te'stified that it is 14 his impression that there was confusion still.
15 I want to find out where the confusion was 16 unlimited as to any two particular people.
17 . MR. FISKE: I guess you are entitled 18 to ask the question.
19 MR. SELTZER: Thanks.
20 MR. FISKE: But it seems that this is 21 a little silly.
{
22 Q Where was the confusion that you had 23 the impression existed somewhere?
24 A The impression is that the confusion is 25 over the issue, not necessarily in anybody's mind.
1 Dunn 125 Os v 2 Q And who was it that perceived such 3 confusion? Who thought there was confusion 4 as it was related to you?
5 A Don.
6 Q Don Hallman?
- 7 A Don Hallman.
8 Q What, if anything, have you ever 9
been told Hallman did to resolve that sense of 10 confusion prior to the Three Mile Island accident?
11 A What about the issue of lawyers?
12 MR. FISKE: All these questions I am
, (~T - ,
\- 13 sure Mr. Seltzer agrees exclude any 14 conversation with anyone that you knew 15 to be a lawyer.
16 THE WITNESS: And I am to answer even 17 thought I can't distinguish? } ,
18 MR. FISKE: No.
19 Q No.
20 I want you to tell me things that you i
( 21 know or believe came from non-lawyers.
22 A O.K. I don't think I was necessarily 23 told that he did anything after that.
() 24 Q So to the best of your recollection, 25 you have never heard that he did anything after
1 Dunn _
126 p.
(-) 2 receiving the communication from Bruce Karrasch, 3 is that right?
4 MR. FISKE: From anyone other than a
~
5 lawyer.
6 Q Well, if you say you heard something 7 from a lawyer, I want you to tell ne that, and I won't 8 ask you the substance of the communication.
9 A The answer is maybe.
10 Q Maybe what? -
t 11 A Just maybe.
12 Q Maybe you heard it from whom?
O 13 A Maybe I heard that he did something after 14 the time when I was told by Bruce Karrasch that 15 Bruce talked to him, and maybe I didn't'.
i f
l 16 g o.K.
l 17 Have you ever discussed with Don 18 Hallman whether he did anything, or what, l 19 if anything, he did after his communication 1
20 back from Bruce Karrasch?
21 A No, not that I recall now.
(
I 22 Q You have had conversations with Don 23 Hallman since the Three Mile Island accident, have 24 you not?
, 25 A Yes.
l e
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1 Dunn 127 O
t I N/ 2 Q But you don't recall asking him whether 3 he did anything between the Bruce Karrasch 4 communication back and the Three Mile Island k 5 accident, is that right?
6 A That's true.
7 Q Since the Three Mile Island ~ accident, 8 have you ever written down or attempted to write 9 down a description of what you trie'd to do to 10 resolve your concern over premature germination of 11 high-pressure injection?
12 A Not outside of prepared for the Kemeny
\
(-~ . .
s 13 Commission.
14 Q You have prepared such a description 15 for coun sel?
16 A I have written down in the testimony for 17 the Kemeny Commission and the testimony for the 18 Rogovin Commission investigation.
19 Q I'm sorry.
20 You testified orally under oath, and 21 that's a matter that you testified to?
l 22 A Yes.
4 23 Q Have you ever written anything which 24 is a description of your actions and thoughts 25 in trying to resolve your concern over premature
1 Dunn 128' O
k/ 2 termination of high.-pressure injection?
3 Have you ever done such writing 4 since the Three Mile Island accident?
)
I 5 A Other than the depositions, no.
6 Q When for the first time did you discuss 7 with Don Roy your concern over premature termination 8 of high-pressure injection?
9 A Very shortly after the Davis-Besse incident.
10 Q Had Don Roy attended the", colloquium 11 in Training Room B shortly after the Davis-Besse 12 incident? -
(~ ' *
(_))
13 A I am not sure. ,
~
, g4 .
Q Where did you have your conversation i 15 with Don Roy?
i 16 A In Don's office.
17 Q How close is his office to.yours?
18 How close was it then?
19 A 100 feet.
20 Q How long was your conversation with him 21 on that occasion?
('- ,
22 A I think approximately 15 minutes.
23 Q Was that quarter of an hour devoted 24 entirely or substantially to discussing the 25 Davis-Besse event?
l _
1 Dunn 129 O
V 2 A Substantially.
3 Q What in words or substance did you 4 say to Don Roy?
( 5 A. I described my concern over the termination 6 of the high-pressure injection. I described why
, 7 it was concern and that I felt we should do 8 something.
9 Q What did you indicate B&W should do?
10 A The end of what we should do at that time would 11 have been unclear. The thing we should do then 12 would be to measure my concern.
(~ . -
k '
13 Q What do you mean, " measure"? .
14 A Determine its validity.
15 Q What did Don Roy say to you in words 16 or substance at that meeting?
17 A I can't recall very much of it. 'In substance 18 the answer was do it.
10 Q Don Roy was your immediate superior t
l 20 at that time, right?
'21 A That's correct.
22 Q So at that meeting you had authorization i
23 from your boss to take steps to resolve your
(
) . 24 concern, is that right?
25 A Well, I think the word " authorization" has 4
1
1 Dunn 1 3 0' 2 a particular meaning. .
3 Q I didn't mean to cloak it with 4 excessive majesty.
( 5 You had approval from your immediate 6 superior to take steps to resolve your concerns 7 over premature termination of high-pressure 8 injection, is that right? -
9 A We had an agreement between us that I would 10 take steps to resolve my concern or'cause those 11 steps to be taken..
12 Q Am I correct that the meeting you had -
(~h
,s ) 13 with Don Roy was shortly after the Davis-Besse
=
14 event?
15 A Yes, September 24th, '77.
16 Q- In taking steps to resolve your concern, 17 what did you do other than speaking with Swanson 18 and Kelly?
19 A Those were the steps I took.
20 I also received verification of my 21 opinion concerning the inappropriateness of 22 terminating high-pressure injection from a ECCS 23 viewpoint from Mr. Bob Jones.
24 Q What is the next thing that you became 25 aware of that took place with respect to resolving
1 Dunn 131 i
V 2 your concern over premature termination of 3 high-pressure injection?
4 A The next thing I recall is the issuance of the
., (- 5 Kelly memorandum.
6 Q That's Kelly to whom?
7 A I don't recall who he wrote it to at this 8 time.
9 Q That is the November 1, 1977 memo to 10 seven individuals including KarraschI, Swanson, 11 Finnin, LaBelle, Elliott, Hallman, and 12 .somebody named B. M. Dunn?
e k--
13 A Is there any reason to bother to look at 14 it to verify it?
15 Q Here, I will show it to you (indicating).
16 A Yes, I believe that's the one I am talking i 17 about.
18 MR. F[SKE: Could I make a suggestion, 19 if we are about to get into this memorandum,
+
20 which I assume is not going to be a five-minute 21 discussion, we resume tomorrow at 9:307 22 MR. SELTZER: Well, you must know 23 more about that memo than I do. I wasn't going 24 to ask anything about it.
25 MR. FISKE: 0.K., that's a deal.
I *
. 1 Dunn 132 0 2 MR. SELTZER: Since it is 5:00 o' clock, 3 why don't we resume until tomorrow at 9:30.
4 (Time noted: 5:05 o' clock p.m.)
(' S fW BERT MERRIT DUNN 6
7 Subscribed and sworn to 8 before me this -7 7 day 9 of b , 198 W 10 -
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22 1
23 24 25
I 132-A (D
G) 2 CERTIFICATE 3
STATE OF NEW YORK )
4 ) SS.
C,0UNTY OF NEW YORK )
C' 5 I, CHARLES SHAPIRo, CSR, , a Notary 6
Public within and for the State of New York, do hereby 7
certify that the foregoing deposition of 8
'BERT MERRIT DUNN Was taken before me 9
on March 11, 1981 ; ,
10 . -
That the said witness was duly sworn before 11 the commencement of his testimony and that the 12
('T within transcript is a true record of said testimony; 13 That I am not connected by blood or marriage 14 with any of the parties herein nor interested directly 15 or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor am I 16 in the employ of any of the counsel.
- 17 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 18 1
my hand this Ab_(tday of OW6LH , '1981.
19 20
([,
21 22 Pb /
CHARLES SHAPIRO,NCSR 23
%-)\ 24 >
l 25 l
l-
333 ..
O I NDEX WITNESS PAGE (a* Bert Merrit Dunn 3 EXH I B I TS GPU FOR IDENT.
75 Memorandum from T. E. Geer to L. P. Williams dated August 18, 1980, subject "Engincering Capability Inventory" with attachmedt for ECCS Unit O - - - -
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