ML20071G267

/03L-0 on 781204:during Inspec of Discharged Fuel Assemblies,A Single Fuel Pin Was Observed to Have Failed, Assoc W/Manufacture & Exposure of Present Day Nuc Fuel

ML20071G267
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	12/22/1978
From:	Dugger L OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20071G264	List: ML20071G260 ML20071G267
References
LER-78-043-03L, LER-78-43-3L, NUDOCS 7812270262
Download: ML20071G267 (3)

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O ATE EVENT CESCAPTICN AND PRCBABLE CONSECUENCES h Ioi:i ! 7 nile inspecting discharged fuel asse=blies as recuired by Technical Specification 3.2.!

mer that Ic42# 1 Table 3-5, Ite= 12, a single fuel pin was observed to have failed in a  !

,o,,,; vould allow fission frag =ent release to the reactor coolant. This instance was the l

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CAusE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

3 ,a,jClad failure is corrosive in nature. This singular event is indicative of a rand = l

, ,. ,  ; failure associatad with =anufacture and exposure of present day nuclear fuel and has t been docu=ented as such in the experience of other WR's. An additional inspecti:n of ,

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, y this failure vill be scheduled in search of additional infer =ation. The Reae:cr vill continue to be operated within radicchemistry and axial shape li=itations.  ;

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1I?. 75-ch3 O=aha Public Power District For, Calhoun Station Unit No.1 Docket No. 050002c5 Attach =ent No. 1 Safety A.alysis The health and safety of the public were not jeopardized by this cladding incident nor did it constitute an unreviewed safety question. Preventing fuel cladding failures are basic to the FSAR and appropriate designs and operating li=its were devised.

During Cycle h the reactor coolant syste= vas operated within radioche=ist:y li=its. The vaste handling syste= and shielding at Fort Calhoun are designed to acco=odate 1", failed fuel. Typical reactor coolant syste= activities seen during

( Cycle h vere well belov limits and thereby indicate that the clad failure encountered is a rando= occurrence.

Failures of this type are si=ilar to those at other facilities (see references listed in cause description) and therefore are not a unique =echanis=.

No failures were observed on any of the eight fuel asse=blies inspected before reloa'd. "hese bundles included 5 of 17 "D" asse=blies that vill be used for Cycle 5 nothing has been indicated that would adversely affect fuel perfor=ance.

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lER 78-ch3 C=aha Public Pcver District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Docket No. 05000285

. Attach =ent No. 2 Cause Descrim ion / Corrective Action The clad failure is typical of hydriding and could possibly be due to

=aterials defect. Both nu=ber of failures (1 pin), the location (upper third of fuel asse=bly h pins in frc= corner) of the failure and the lack of other da= age in the innediate area tend to rule cut handling danage. Further ecmcent vill be reserve' until an additional visual exa= is =ade.

The constant axial offset control technique was used successfully during f' Cycles 3 and h; it vill be used during Cycle 5 t

The failure =echanis= is not unique to the Fort Calhoun Station. The following are provided by the fuel vendor as further bachround for the fuel pin degradation observed at the Fort Calhoun Station Unit ho. 1.

1. A report " Fuel Failures in the Dodevard Boiling Water Reactor" by D. Cordall et. al. Nuclear Technolore, Vol. 3k, August, 1977, pp. h38 hk8 (in Holland).

2. CEHFD-221, dated Dece=ber, 1975 "CF. EPRI Fuel Performance Evaluation Program Task "C" Evaluation of Fuel Rod Perfc=ance in Maine b '<ee Core I."

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