ML20069N889
| ML20069N889 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1982 |
| From: | Longenecker J ENERGY, DEPT. OF, CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLANT |
| To: | Check P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HQ:S:82:136, NUDOCS 8212070226 | |
| Download: ML20069N889 (320) | |
Text
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Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 Docket No. 50-537 HQ:S:82:136 DEC 06 130%
Mr. Paul S. Check, Director CRBR Program Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Check:
REVISED RESPONSES TO 430 SERIES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
QUESTIONS References : (1) HQ:S:82:036, J. R. Longenecker to P. S. Check, Sub. ject:
Responses to Requests for Additional Information -
Power Systems, dated June 1,1982 (2) HQ:S:82:050, J. R. Longenecker to P. S. Check,
Subject:
Responses to Requests for Additional Information, dated June 18, 1982
- (3) HQ
- S:82:lli, J. R. Longenecker to P. S. Check,
Subject:
Meeting Summary for the Electrical Power Working Meeting, dated October 19, 1982 (4) HQ:S:82:119, J. R. Longenecker to P. S. Check,
Subject:
Electrical Power Working Meeting, October 19, 1982 -
Additional Information, dated November 2,1982 Enclosed are revised responses to NRC Questions CS430.1 through 104, originally submitted in the referenced letters (1), (2), and (4). These revised responses incorporate the agreed to modifications discussed t
between the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant (CRBRP) project and the l NRC staff in subsequent meetings on the CRBRP Electric Power and l
Mechanical Systems. Additionally, Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) 1 Sections 8.3.1.2.14 (pg. 8.3-31) and 8.3.1.4 (pg. 8.3-36a) have been revised in response to item 12e of Reference (3). This, together with Wc7 \
11 8212070226 821206 PDR ADOCK 05000537 A PDR
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s' Reference (4) completes all identified actions from Reference (3).
The enclosed responses will be incorporated into the PSAR in Amendment 74, scheduled for December 1982.
Sincerely, l . 'It Pt JRe JodpR.Longenec r i Acting Director, ffice of i Breeder Demonstration Projects Office of fluclear Energy
- 1 Enclosure cc
- Service List Standard Distribution Licensing Distribution i
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ENCLOSURE P
Ouestion CS430.1 (8.2)
Provide physical layout drawings and/or additional description in the PSAR of the physical independence to be provided between the of fsite power circuits in proximity of the pl ant to the switchyards and f rom the switchyard to the Class I E onsite pow er sy stem. Al so provide description of physical independence between Cl ass 1E and the of f site circuits prctoctive rel ayIng.
Resoonse:
K-31 ani Fort Loudoun-2161KV transmission i Ines (both connected to the reserve sw itchyard of the CRBRP) provide the two physically Independent of f site power sources to CRBRP; detail s of their routing and construction in the proximity of the pl ant have been described in Section 8.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.3 of the PS AR.
The CRBRP will be connected to the TV A 161KV grid using f our separate connections between the switchyards and the TVA grid as described in Section 8.1 of the PS AR. All four transmission lines are kept continuously energized.
The CR3RP design incl udes two physically separate and electrically independent sw itchyards, generating sw itchyard and reserve sw itchyard. Each of these two switchyards is connected to the TV A grid by two separate 161KY transmission l ine s. The two connections to the reserve switchyard, from the Oak Ridge Gaseous Dif f usion Pl ant (ORGDP) switchyard of DOE, designated as the K-31 line, and the other to the Fort Loudoun Hydroelectric Pl ant, designated as Fort Loudoun-2 !!ne, are considered the two physically In'ependent and immediate access circuits. These circuits are located so as to minimize 1he l ikel ihood of their simultaneous f ail ure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. The physical separation of the four (4) transmission l Ine connections f rca the TV A 161KV grid to the CRBRP switchyards is shown in Figure 8.2-12. The K-31 "ransmission l Ine connection crosses over the two connections (Roane and Fort L oudoun 1) to the Generating sw itchy ard. As such, f ail ure of any of the two 1(31KV line connections to the Generating sw itchyard w ill not result in f ail ure of the K-31 or Fort Loudoun-2 lines.
Further, between the 093RP and the destination substations (K-31 and Fort Loudoun 2):
- 1. at any one location no transmission line crosses over the two transmission lines to the Reserve Switchyard simultaneously;
- 2. transmission l ines are spaced suf ficiently apart such that f ail ure of one i Ine doas not af fect the other l ine. (See Figures 8.2-11 and 8.2-12).
The 4.16KV medium voltage (MV) winding of the Reserve Station Service Transf ormer (RSST) 11 AAX005A will be connected to the Medlun Voltage sw itchgear of Cl ass 1E, Division I through a non-segregated phase bus duct and to the Hedlun Voltage Switchgear of Class IE, Division 3 through a non-segregated phase bus duct and MV cables. The 4.16KV MV winding of the RSST 11 AAX005B will be connected to the Medium Voltage Switchgear of Class IE Division 2 through non-segregated phase bus duct. Simil arly, the 4.16KV windings of the Unit Station Service Transf ormers (USSTs) 11 AAX006A and B are Q CS430.1 -1 Amend. 73 Nov.,1982
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al so connected to the Cl ass 1E, Olvision 1, 2 and 3 Medium Voltage Switchgear through non-segregated phase bus ducts.
Non-segregated phase bus ducts f rom the RSSTs 11 AAX005A and B and USSTs 11 AAX006A and B to the Meditsn Voltage Switchgear of Class 1E, Division I, 2 and 3 wIlI be physically separated such that f all ure of any one bus duct w flI minimize the I ikel Ihood of f ail ure of the other bus ducts.
Control and protection circuits for the Reserve Switchyard have been arranged to receive 125V DC power f ran two independent Divisions A and B DC power distribution systems (see Figure 8.2-13).
The DC equipment of the two divisions are physically separatte and electrically Independent of each other. The control cables of Divisions A and B are routed in separate trays and conduits.
QCS430.1 -l a Anend. 73 Nov. 1982 A7-71857
Ouestion CS430.2 (8.2) ( 3.1. 3.1 )
Section 3.1.3.1 of the PS AR Indicates that each of the roserve transf ormers is capable of supply ing f ull power required f or the aux!l lary AC power distribution system to supply one redundant class IE division load groups.
Figure 8.3.1 of the PSAR in contradiction, shows reserve transformers supplying two Class 1E division loads as well as nunerous non-Class IE loads.
Correct the contradiction and describe the capabil Ity and capacity of the offsite circuits, incl uding the unit station service and reserve transformers, to supply all connected loads (Class 1E and Non-Class 1E) f or all modes of pl ant operation.
Resoonse:
The two reserve station service transf ormers located in the reserve switchyard have been designed wIth the capability to provide power to all plant connected loads (Cl ass 1E and Non-Class 1E) under all modes of plant operation incl uding startup, normal operation, and to f acil itate and maintain a saf e plant sh utdow n. One of the two reserve station service transf ncmers al so suppl les 100 percent power to Class 1E loads of Divisions 1 and 3 and the other reserve station service transf ormer provides 100 percent power to Cl ass IE l oads of Division 2 as indicated in Figure 8.3.1. Section 3.1.3.1 of the PS AR has been revised to f urther describe the capability and capacity of reserve unit station service transf ormers.
The CRBRP is connected to the TV A 161kV grid using two separate and physically independent sw itchyards - the pl ant generating switchyard and the pl ant reserve sw itchyard. The pl ant generating switchyard is connected to the TVA 161kV power grid by two 161kV transmission I ines. The pl ant reserve switchyard is connected to the TV A 161kV grid by two physically separate and electrically independent 161kV transmission l Ines. Each of the four transmission lines is capable of providing power to all connected loads (Class 1E and Non-Cl ass IE) required f or pl ant startup, normal operation and to f acil Itate and maintain a saf e pl ant shutdown.
The two unit station service transformers have been designed with the capabil ity to provide power to all pl ant connected l oads (Cl ass 1E and Non-Cl ass 1E) under all modes of pl ant operation incl uding startup, normal operation and to f acilItate and maintain a safe plant shutdown. One of the two unit station service transf ormers al so suppl ies 100 percent power to Cl ass IE loads of Division I and 3 and the other unit station service transformers provides 100 percent power to Class IE loads of Division 2.
QCS430.2-1 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
pags 3 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.3 (8.1)
Section 8.3.1.1 of the PSAR Indicates that three independent load groups are provided w ith l oad group 1 redundant to l oad group 2. No description as to redundancy of load group 3 has been provided in Chapter 8 of the PSAR.
Conversely, Section 3.1.3.1 of the PSAR under criterion 26 response Indicates that the power supplles servicing the heat transfer system are f ully redundant. Clarify Chapter 8 of the PSAR to Indicato redundancy of the 3 d iv i si ons.
Resoonse: -
The Cl ass IE electrical distribution system consists of three Class 1E divisions (Division 1, 2 and 3). Each of these divisions is separated physically and electrically from the other two divisions as described in Section 8.3.1.4 and 8.3.1.2.1 of the PS AR. Each of These divisions is provided with an onsite (standoy) diesel generator and has the capabil Ity to shutdown the pl ant saf ety. How ever, from the consideration of connected loads, Class 1E Divisions 1 and 2 provide power to redundant load groups and as such are described as redundant divisions in the PSAR. Class IE Division 3 provides Class 1E power to Loop 3 of the Heat Transport System (HTS) and to certain-pl ant Non-Cl ass 1 E l oads. The Non-Cl ass 1E l oads are connected through an i sol ation subsystem. S ince not al l th e l oa ds pow ered f rom Div i s i on 3 are identical or simil ar to those p>vered by Division 1 or 2, this division has not been identified as redundant to Division 1 or 2 in the PSAR. How ever, as f ar as the HTS is concerned, the Divisions 1, 2 and 3 power supplier, are f ully redundant serving the Loops 1, 2 and 3 Cl ass 1E loads, respectively.
Sections 8.1.2 and 8.3.1.1 of the PSAR have been revised to add the above cl ari f ication.
. QCS430.3-1 82-0307
pags 4 Woz-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.5 (8.3.1)
You state in Section 3.3.1.2.1 that "the standby onsite power supply network has provisions to manually cross-connect the 4.16kV buses of the Division 1 and 2 power suppl ies in case of extreme emergency". Enumerate and def ine each case of extreme emergency that would necessitate the use of the interconnections. For each case l Isted just! fy its noncompl iance wIth the Independence requirement of criterion 15 listed in Section 3.1 of the PSAR.
Resoonse:
Manual cross-connection of 4.16kV Class 1E Division 1 and Division 2 Standby Onsite Power Supplies will be initiated if all of the following extreme emergency conditions occur:
a) Loss of Plant, Pref erred, and Reserve Power to 4.16kV Cl ass 1E buses 12NIE003A and 12N1E003B; b) Diesel 12N1E022A or 12NIE022B fail ed to start and is determined to be inoperabl e, and c) Celtical safety-related loads associated with the operative diesel generator have f ailed and become unavail abl e.
The manual cross-connection will be disconnected as soon as one of the above conditions cease to exist.
PSAR Section 3.1, Criterion 15, Electric Power Systems, states that "the two diesel generator units will be physically and electrically independent of each other and the of f site AC power suppl ies".
The Class 1E Division 1 and Division 2 Standby Onsite AC Power Supplies, with a provision f or manual cross-connection, meet the criteria for independence of Regul atory Guide 1.6 as f ollows:
- 1) No prov isions exi st f or automatically connecting one Class IE load group to another Cl ass IE l oad group;
- 2) No provisions exist f or automatically transf errring l oads between redundant Cl ass IE po~er sources; 1
Q CS430.5-1 82-03 07
p:gv 5 W82-0298 (8,23) #10
- 3) Mechanical and el ectrical Interlocks have been provided to prevent an operator error that would result in par alleling of standby power sources;
- 4) The circuit breakers used for the cross-connection will normally be stored in separate locked dummy compartments. Opening of the doors of these compartments shalI be al anned in the Control Room.
- 5) The Insertion of breakers in the operating compartments used for the cross-connection will be annunciated to the Control roon operator.
Theref ore, there is no non-compl iance w ith the Regul atory Requirements. PSAR Section 3.1 will be revised to include the following paragraph:
Provision has been made in the refety-related AC distribution system design, for manual cross-connection between the 4.16kV sw itchgear buses of Cl ass 1E Divisions 1 and 2. Manual cross-connection detail s are as described in Section 8.2.1.2.1 of the PS AR.
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page 6 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.6 (8.2) (8.3.11 (8.3.2)
The response to Criterion 16 in Section 3.1 of the PSAR Indicates that periodic tests of the transfer of power between onsite and of fsite sources and between the normal of fsite supply and the preferred (reserve) supply are perf ormed only during prolonged plant shutdown periods. The response to Criterion 16 Implies that the power. transfer has not been designed to be testable during operation of the nuclear plant as recommended by IEEE Standard 336-1977 and Regul atory Guide 1.118. In addition it has been Implied that the onsite AC and DC systems have all not been designed to be testable during operation of the nuclear plant. Describe compliance with IEEE Standard 338-1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.118 and justify areas of noncompliance.
Resoonse The design of the power transfer schemes of CRBRP f or transfer of pcwer between the normal of fsite supply and the preferred (reserve) supply and the onsite AC and CC systems are in f ull compliance with Criterion 16, IEEE Standard 338-1977 and Regul atory Guide 1.118.
Section 3.1 of the PSAR has been revised to further clarify the confermance of CRBRP design with Criterion 16, IEEE Standard 338-1977 and Regul atory Guide 1.118.
QCS430.6-1 82-0307
page 7 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.7 (8.3.11 (8.3.2)
You state in Section 8.3.1.1.2 of the PSAR under the subheading " Testing and Inspection", that "In the case an emergency signal is generated during the testing, the circuit breaker cannot be closed immediately." Describe how the design implied by this statement meets the recommencations of IEEE Standard 338-1977.
Rescense
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The periodic testing procedure f cr the saf ety-related electrical distribution system meets the recommendations of IEEE Standard 338-1977. The PSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2 subheading " Testing and Inspection" has been revised to reflect the recommendati ons.
QCS43 0.7-1 82-0307
page 8 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.8 (8.3.1 ) (8.3.2)
Section 8.3.1.2.11 of the PSAR indicates that conductors of the penetration are designed to withstand the maximum shcrt-circuit currents based on the interrupting capability of the protection device associated with the penetration assembly conductors. Position C.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.63, on the other hand, states that the electric penetration asembly versus the conductor should be designed to withstand the maximum shcrt-circuit condition.
Justify noncompliance to Position C.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.63.
Resoonse The electrical penetration conductors and the assembly will be designed to withstand the maximum short-circuit current versus time conditions that could occur given single randem f ailures of circuit overload protection devices in accordance with Position C.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.63. PSAR Section 8.3.1.2.11 has been revised.
QCS430.8-1 82-0307
page 9 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.9 (8.3.1 ) (8.3.2)
You state in Section 8.3.1.4 of the PSAR that environmental type test will be perf ormed on cables and terminations that are required to f unerlon in a hosti l e env ironment. This statement implies that cables or terminations that are not required to f unction in a hostile environment, will not be environmentally qualified and may not be in compliance with IEEE Standard 323-1974. Justify noncompliance.
Resoonse All cabling and terminations will be designed, qualified and tested in accordance with IEEE Standard 323-1974 supplemented by Regul atory Guice 1.131.
PSAR Section 8.3.1.4, Part 8, has been revised to reflect the above.
1 QCS430.9-1 82-0307
paga 10 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouest ion CS430.10 (8.3.1 )( 8.3. 2)
Section 8.3.1.2.14 of the PSAR Indicates that physical separation of circuits and equipment comprising or associated with %e Class IE power system, Cl ass 1E protection systems and Class IE equipment, will be in accordance with criteria set f orth in paragraph 8.3.1.4 of the PSAR. Separation criteria described in Sections 8.3.1.2.14 and 8.3.1.4 of the PS AR is not cl ear and does i not meet the guidelines of IEEE Standard 384 and Regulatory Guide 1.75. For exampl e, the PSAR Indicates that non-Cl ass IE cabl es in panel s w il l be separated from Cl ass IE cabl es so that they will not provide a combustion path between dif f erent divisions. Section 5.6.5 of IEEE Standard 384-1974 states that non-Cl ass IE cabl es shall be separated by six inches or a barrier. In general no criteria 'has been described f or separation of Cl ass 1E and non-Cl ass IE cabl es. Other examples incl ude: (1) no criteria f or separation between cabl es trays and conduits of another division, (2) conf using criteria f or the separation of the third division (the design indicates there are three divisions but only two redundant divisions. Separation criteria refers to only two redundant divisions in many cases versus the three divisions), (3) conf using def inition f or associated cabl es, (4) no criteria f or separation between associated cabl es and non-Cl ass 1E cables, and (5) no criteria bef ore and af ter an i sol atoin device. Revise your PSAR description of physical separation of circuits to comply with the recommendations of IEEE Standard 384-1974 and guidance of R.G.1.75 or justify noncompl iance.
Resoonse:
The CRBRP physical separation design criteria is t .d ly consistent wIth the guidel ines set f orth in IEEE Standard 384-1974 and Regul atory Guide 1.75.
The PS AR Section 8.3.1.4 has been revised to f urther cl arify consistency with IEEE Standard 384-1974 and Regul atory Guide 1.75 for the following items:
- 1. Separation of Class 1E and non-Class IE cables within control board and other panel s.
- 3. Separation between cable trays and condults of another division.
4 Criteria for the separation of third division.
l 5. Criteria f or separation between associated cables and non-Cl ass 1E cabl es.
l 6. Separation criteria bef ore and af ter an isolation device.
l QCS430.10-1 n?-ntxa
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Question CS430.11 (8.3.1) (8.3.2) I 1
You state in section 8.3.1.4.E of the PSAR that only one safety division is routed in a fire hazard zone and that this one division is suitably protected so that a fire in the zone will not ef fect the safety functions of the other saf ety ~ ups. This statement does not meet current regulatory guidelines.
Current v uldelines require that the one division be suitably protected so that fire in the zone will not af fect the saf ety function of the one division located in the zone. The other saf ety groups must be separated by a three-hour f ire rated barrier f rom the zone.
in addition to current guidel ines, it is proposed that if the one division cannot be protected from the ef fects of fire in the zone (such as la areas of potential sodium fires) there must be a minimum of two remaining safety divisions outside the fire zone and separated by a barrler suf ficient to contain the f ire. The renalning saf ety divisions must be capable of safely shutting down the reactor in compliance with the single f ailure criteria.
Indicate compliance with the above current and proposed guidelines in the PSAR or describe and justify an acceptable alternative.
Reseense CRBRP equipment arrangements and fire suppression system design has been developed in a manner as to preclude the likellbood of a fire in an area reach ing saf ety-rel ated equi pment. Spacial separation and/or walls are provided between f ire hazard and saf ety-related equipment, and general area sprinkler coverage has been provided wherever feasible to protect saf ety related equipment from potential exposure to f ires, in the event of a fire in a fire zone containing a saf ety division, which af fects that division, there will be two remaining saf ety divisions outside the fire zone, separated by three-hour fire rated barriers and capable of saf ely shutring down the reactor. This will be in compliance with the proposed NRC guidel ines. Furthermore, the CRBRP design will comply with BTP CMEB 9.5-1 position C.5.d governing the control of ccmbustibics.
QCS430.11-1 82-0307 ,
page 12 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion OCS430.12 (8.3.1) (8.3.2)
Fire hazard zones have been defined in the PSAR as areas in which a potential fire hazard could exist as a consequence of the credible accumulation of a signi f icant quantity of fl anmabl e material . Current regulatory guidel ines define areas of credibla accumulation as any open areas of thu plant where transient combustables can be placed. This def inition encompasses most areas of the plant including switchgear arid cable spreading rooms. Rev ise the PS AR to incorporate the above definition or describe an alternative definition with j usti f icati ons.
Resoonse Those areas of the plant where transient combustibles can be placed; will be considered in the fire hazard analysis and will be considered in the selection of fire suppression systems and arrangement of the f ire barriers. The definition of Fire Hazard Zones is contained in updated sections 8.3.1.4 and 9.13.1.
A Fire Hazard Zone is " Areas in which a potential fire hazard could exist as a consequence of the credible accumulation of a significant quantity of fixed or transient combustible material."
The specific areas where transient combustibles are considered will be identified in the Fire Hazard Analysis. Our review of the plant layout Indicated that neither the cable spreading room nor the Class im switchgear rooms need to be considered f or placement of traaslent combustibles since they are not part of a pathway of any combustible traf fic.
Furthermore, administrative controls governing the handling of transient fire loads w il l be impl emented in accordance w ith BTP CMEB 9.5-1 position C.2c.
QCS43 0.12-1 82-0321
page 13 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.13 Separation of Class 1E raceways f rom high energy pipelines as defined in the PSAR is to be greater than 15 feet or less than 15 feet if the pipe is suitably restrained so as not to whip and strike the raceway. Current regulatory guidelines require that the Class IE raceway be protected by a barrier so that pipe whip missiles, Jet Impingement or environmental ef fects of the pipe break will not cause f ailure of the Class 1E raceway. Fifteen f eet of space is not considered adequate protection. Indicate compliance with the above guidel ines in the PS AR or propose, describe, and justi fy an acceptable al ternative.
Rescense CRERP has three (3) Class IE Divisions with canplete physical separation between divisions. Any damage to cable trays caused by pipe whip missiles, jet Impingement, or environmental ef fect wil l be l imited to the same saf ety division to which the pipe belongs, and the two other divisions capable of safely shutting down the plant will renain unaf fected.
Additional protection will be provided against any single Class IE Division cable tray damage due to high energy pipe whip missiles by restraint of high energy pipe lines in the vicinity of Class IE raceways. The design of restraints and/or barriers will be determined by analysis to meet BTP APCSB 3-1, rather than the arbitrary 15 foot distance.
Protection against single Division damage due to high energy Jet Impingement er environmental ef fect is considered impractical and unnecessary since two additional safe shutdown Divisions will be available as noted above.
QCS430.13-1 82-0307
pags 14 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.14 Separation between redundant raceways as def ined in the PSAR takes into consideration the presence of rotating equipment, monorail s, and equipment removal paths and the possibil Ity that heavy equipment could be l if ted and dropped and possibly cause f ail ure of two raceway channel s. Minimum separation between the two raceway channel s is to be such as to precl ude f ail ure of both channel s. Current regul atory guidelines, however, requires protection of each raceway as well as separation so that the dropped equipment w il l not cause f ail ure of either raceway. An alternative to protection would be a design that provides an additional two independent systems each capable of chutting down the reactor and separated such that neither will be af fected by the " dropped equipment" or f ail urs of rotating equipment. Indicate compliance with the above guidelines Ic the PSAR or describe and justify an acceptabl e al ternative.
Resoonse The routing of the saf ety-rel ated raceways of CRBRP is such that any " dropped equipment" w ill not resul t in a f ail ure of any of these raceways.
The CRBRP raceway design is in f ull compliance with IEEE Standard 384-1974 as suppl emented by Regul atory Guide 1.75.
In addition, the safety systems design f or CRBRP includes three physically and electrically independent divisions, each capable of shutting down the reactor.
Equipment of each of thera divisions, are located and cables are routed in
. separate plant areas sucn that f ail ure of rotating equipment will not cause f ail ure of more than one safety division.
The PSAR Section 8.3.1.4 has been revised.
QCS430.14-1
page 15 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.15 (8.3.1 ) (8.3.2)
Section 8.3.1.2.14 of the PSAR Indicates that Non-Class 1E loads wil l be connected to one division of the Class IE system through an isolation device.
a) The proposed design fcr the isolation device addresses primarily protection of the Class IE system due to worst case f aults in the Non-Class IE system. Justi fy why other f ail ures of the Non-Cl ass 1E system such as hot shorts are not considered in the design of the isolation dev ices.
b) The Isolation device is to be designed as indicated in the PSAR so that voltage on the Class 1E system buses vill not drop below 70 or 80 percent cf nominal given a worst case f ault in the Non-Class 1E system. With most Class IE equipment designed to operate at not less than 90 percent cf nominal, justify your design that allcws lower voltage, c) Describe the methods to be used to demonstrate the design capability of the isol ation dev ice.
Pesconse Faults and f ailure modes other than the worst case three phase f ault have also been addressed in the design of the isolation system. However, the analysis provided in the PSAR Includes the worst case ccndition only in order to demonstrate that even under this extreme condition the degradation of the Class 1E system will be within the acceptable limits. Protective devices have been provided in the cesign to clear any f ault en the Non-Class IE system such
- as phase to ground, phase to phase, and three phase f aults, within a
( reasonable time such that there is no degradation to the Class IE system.
l a) A phase to ground f ault (which is the most likely mode of f ailure) on a Non-Class IE circuit will have no ef fect on the Class 1E system since the Isol ation system incl udes a 4.16kV/480V del ta-wye connected transf ormer w i th the high resistance grounded neutral. The neutral is grounded through a 55.4 ohm resistor which will limit the phase to ground f ault current to approximately 5 amperes. The Class 1E 480V and 4.16kV circuit breakers will be tripped to clear a ground f ault in the case that the af fected Non-Class IE breaker f alls to trip.
Any phase to phase or three phase f ault on the Non-Class 1E circuits will be Isolated by instantaneous operation of the af fected branch feeder circuit breaker. Back-up protection is provided by f ast operation of the 480V supply circuit breaker (0.2-0.3 see clearing time) cr by the 4.16kV unit substation transformer feeder circuit breaker (0.6-0.7 sec clearing time). In addition undervoltage senscrs are provided at the input terminals of the 480V supply circuit breaker. These undervoltage sensors will Initiate tripping of the 480V and 4.16kV circuit breakers within five (5) seconds upon sensing the undervoltage caused by less of pcwer or f ailure of the circuit breakers to clear a f ault.
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QCS430.15-1 82-0307 l
p:ga 16 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 b 's The isolation system is designed so that Impedance of the system is high enough that the worst possible f ault (three phaso bolted f ault) on the 480V Non-Cl ass 1E bus will not degrade the voltage at 4.16kV Cl ass IE bus bel ow the f ollowing level s:
(1) When the 4.16kV Class IE bus is being supplied from of f site power supply, the voltage at the bus will not drop below 80 percent of nom i nal .
( 2) When the 4.16kV Class 1E bus is being supplied from onsite (standby) power supply the voltage at the bus will not drop below 75 percent.
The minimum voltage levels of 75 and 80 percent of nominal are chosen to be the same as the allowable minimum voltage levels during the sequential loading of the 4.16kV Class 1E bus or during starting of the Isrgest motor af ter the bus has been f ully loaded.
As discussed in a) above, any fault on 480V Non-Cl ass IE system will be cl eared w ith in f ive (5) seconds. Af ter the f ault has been cl ear ed the voltage at the 4.16kV bus will be restored to a minimum of 90 percent of nominal within two (2) seconds, which will allow all connected loads to operated continuously.
c) The high In.pedance transf ormer used as an isolation device will be subjected to a short-circuit withstand test as part of the shop testing program at the manuf acturer's f acil.ity. Af ter the transf ormer has been energized a three phase f ault wIll be applled at the secondwary windings f or the maximum duration of the f ault. The pt pose of this test is to danonstrate the mechanical and thermal capabil Ity of the transf ormer to withstand short-circuit stresses which the transf ormer could experience and to verify the transf ormer current l imiting capabil ity.
Section 8.3.1.2.14 of the PSAR has been revised to add the above discussion.
t QCS430.15-2 a,.n, n,
r.o. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Question CS430.16 (8.3.1) (8.3.2)
Section 8.3.1.2.14 of the PSAR Indicates that analyses and testing of associated circuits will be performed in accordance with paragraphs 4.5(3),
4.6.2 and 5.1.1.2 of IEEE Standard 384-1974. Describe in the PSAR and in detail the analyses and testing that will be performed. The description should include the minimum separation distance between associated and Non-Class 1E cables that will be demonstrated by the proposed er .syses and testing.
Pescon,ig:
i All associated circuits as defined in IEEE Standard 384-1974, paragraph 3, will be treated and routed as Class IE circuits of the same division. The criteria governing routing of Class IE circuits are given in Section 8.3.1.4 as supplemented by the response to NRC Question CS430.10.
Based upon the above considerations, analysis and testing of associated circuits will not be required, per paragraph 4.5(1) of IEEE Stendard 384-1974.
i At the present time there are no exceptions to the above criteria; however, if in the future any exceptions are known and the need of an analysis is identified, the details of the analysis and any testing that has been performed to demonstrate that Class 1E circuits are not degraded below an acceptable level will be included in the FSAR.
Revised PSAR Section 8.3.1.2.14 reflects the above.
QCS430.16-1 82-0307
page 18 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.17 (8.3.1 ) (8.3.2)
Section 8.3.1.2.22 of the PSAR indicates that the Class IE system will be designed to assure that a design basis event will not cause loss of electric power to mere than one Class IE load group at one time. This proposed design does not meet IEEE Standard 308-1974, justi fy noncompl iance. Also provide the results of a f ailure mode and ef fects analysis in accordance with Section 4.8 of IEEE Standard 308-1974 for a design basis event that causes f ailure of one load group and a single f ailure in another load group.
Resoonse CRBRP electrical power distribution system design is in f ull compliance with IEEE Standard 308-1974 as described below:
- 1. All Class IE electrical equipment will be specified and qualified such that the environmental conditions resulting from any design basis event will not cause loss of electric power to any Cicss 1E loads related to saf ety, surveil lance or protection, thereby maintaining the safety of the plant at all times.
- 2. Loss of electric power to any Class 1E equipment or to any Class 1E division will not cause damage to the f uel or to the reactor coolant system.
- 3. In addition, Class IE AC and DC Power Supplies and distribution systems have been designed as three physically and electrically independent safety divisions, each capable to safely shutdown the plant and conform to the requirenents of Class 1E electrical system.
An analysis of the f ailure modes of Class IE power systems and the ef fect of these f ailures on the electric power available to Class 1E loads will be perf ormed in accordance with IEEE Standard 308-1974, to danonstrate thet a single component f ailure will not prevent satisf actory perf ormance of the i
minimum Class IE loads required f or safe shutdown and maintenance of post-shutdown or post-accident pl ant security. The results of this analysis will be included in the FSAR.
l The Section 8.3.1.2.22 of the PSAR has been revised to reflect the above discussion.
QCS430.17-1 82-0307 l . _ .
page 19 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestien CS430.18 (8.3.1) (8.3.2)
Section 8.3.1.2.22b of the PS AR states that "A loss of electric power to equipment that could result in a reactor power transient capable of causing signi ficant damage to the f uel or to the plant operation." (See Section 15.1.2.) The last words of the aoove statement "to the pl ant cperation" are not clear and are inconsistent with Section 4.1 (2) of IEEE Standard 309-1974 Provide clarification and justify noncompilance to IEEE Standard 308-1974.
Pescense See the Response to Question CS430.17.
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l 82-03C9
page 20 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestien CS430.19 (8.3.1 ) (8.3.2)
You state in Section 8.3.1.2.22 of the PSAR that Indicators and controls will be provided outside the control room in compliance with Section 4.4 of IEEE Standard 308-1974 Provide a description of the design provisions that assure el ectrical isolation between controls and Indicators located in the control room and remett l ocati ons. The current staf f position requires that no single f ailure in the control rcom shall cause f ailure ct the remote locations.
Resoonse Controls and Indicaters located in the control room ere elecn Ically separated f rom control s and Indicators at renote locations. Separation is by independent overcurrent protection f or each source, so that overcurrent in the power source for control and indication at the control roam does not af fect operation of the power source f or renote control and indication. Both control circuits (control room and remote) Interf ace in the common control logic in the solid State Programmable Logic System Cabinet where they are electrically isolated. This design satisfies the staf f position that no single f ailure in the control and Indication at the control room shall cause f ailure in the control and Indication at the remote location.
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QCS430.19-1 82-0307
page 21 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.20 (8.3.1 ) (8.3.2)
Describe the source of control power to Division 3 AC switchgear and diesel generator.
1 Rescense Control power to Division 3 AC switchgear and Division 3 diesel generator unit is provided from Division 3 DC power supply described in the PSAR Section 8.3.2.
Table 8.3-2C, " Class 1E Division 3 125V DC Load List", of the PSAR has been revised to include all CC loads required to support operation of Division 3 AC switchgear and Division 3 diesel generator unit.
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1 QCS430.20-1 82-0307
page 22 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.21 (8.3.1)
Operating experience at certain nuclear power plants which have two cycle tubocharged diesel engines manuf actured by the Electromotive Division (EMD) of General Motors driving emergency generators have experienced a significant number of turbocharger mechanical gear drive f ail ures. The f ailures have occurred as the result of running the emergency diesel generators at no load or light load conditions for extended periods. No load or light load operation could occur during periodic equipment testing or during accident conditions with avail abil ity of of fsite power. When th is equipment is operated under no load conditions insuf ficient exhaust gas volume is generated to operate the turbocharger. As a result the turbocharger is driven mechanically from a gear drive in order to supply enough combustion air to the engine to maintain rated speed. The turbocharger and mechanical drive gear normally supplied with these engines are not designed for standby service encountered in nuclear power plant application where the equipment may be called upon to operate at no load or light lead condition and f ull rated speed for a prolonged period. The EMD equipment was originally designed for locanotive service where no load speeds f or the engine and generator are much l ower th an f ul l load speeds. The locomotive turbocharged diesel hardly ever runs at f ul l speed except at f ul l load. The EMD has strongly recommended to users of this diesel engine design against operation at no load or light load conditions at f ull rated speed f or extended periods because of tne short life expectancy of the turbocharger mechanical gear drive unit normally furnished.
No load or light load operation also causes general deterioration in any diesel engine.
To cope with the severe service the equipment is normally subject to and in the Interest of reducing f ailures and increasing the availability of their equipment EMD has developed a heavy duty turbocharger drive gear unit that can replace existing equipment. This is available as a replacement kit, or engines can be ordered with the heavy duty turbocharger drive gear assembly.
To assure optimum avail abil ity of emergency diesel generators on demand,
[
applicant's who have in place an order or intend to order emergency generators I drive by two cycle diesel engines manuf actured by EMD, should be provided with the heavy duty turbocharger mechanical drive gear assembly as recommended by EMD f or the cl ass of service encountered in nuclear power pl ants. Discuss your pl ans to incorporate th is improvement.
Reseense The onsite (standby) AC power supplies f or CRSRP consist of three diesel generator units. Two of these diesel generators, usea f or Class 1E l
l QCS430.21-1 82-0307
page 23 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Divisions 1 and 2 have been procured from Delaval Turbine Inc., Engine and
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Compressor Division; Oakland, Cal ifornia and do not have the turbocharger related design problems as identified in the NRC concern. The final vendor information regarding the diesel generator for Class 1E Division 3 is presently not available pending completion of the procurement process.
Howev er, if the engine of this diesel generator unit (Class IE Division 3) is manuf acturea by the Electromotive Division (EMD) of General Motors, the f ol lowing action wil l be taken:
a) The unit will be specified with a heavy duty turbocharger gear unit suitable for no load or light load operation of the diesel generator unit for a prolonged time, or b) If the diesel generator is already manuf actured without a heavy duty turbocharger gear unit, the turbocharger gear unit will be replaced with a heavy duty turbocharger gear assembly using the replacement kit from the Electromotive Division of General Motors.
c) The required modifications as discussed under a) and b) above will be com71eted p lor to pl ant startup.
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QCS430.21-2 82-0307 f
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page 24 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.22 (8.3.1)
I Provide a detailed discussion (or plan) of the level of training proposed f or i your operators, maintenance crew, quality assurance, ana supervisory personnel responsible for the operation and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators. Identify the number and type of personnel that will be dedicated to the operations and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators and the number and type that will be assigned from your general plant operations and maintenance groups to assist when needed.
In your discussion, identity the anount and kind of training that will be received by each of the above categories and the type of ongoing training program planned to assure optimum availabil ity of the emergency generators.
Also discuss the level of education and minimum experience requirements for the various categories of operations and maintenance personnel associated with the emergency diesel generators.
Reseense There are currently no plans f or personnel to be dedicated only to the above l isted tasks. The level of training, including the snount and kind of training, that wil l be received by each of the above categories, the type of training program planned, and the level of education and minimum experience requirements f or the various categories of operations and maintenance personnel have not been determined. When these are f inal ized, Inf ormation w il l be i ncl uded i n the PS AR. It is anticipated that the above plans will be very simil ar to those used by TVA and that manuf acturer's recanmendations and requirements will be utilized in developing these plans.
s QCS430.22-1 82-0307
page 25 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.23 (8.3 ;1 )
Periodic testing and test loading of an emergency diesel generator in a nuclear power plant is a ne essary function to denonstrate the operability, capabil ity and avail abil ity of the unit on demand. Periodic testing coupled with good preventive maintenance practices will assure optimum equipment readiness and availability on demand. This is the desired goal.
To achieve this optimum equipment readiness status the following requirements should be met:
- 1. The equipment should be tested with a minimum loading of 25 percent of rated load. No load or light load operation will cause incomplete combustion of fuel resulting in the formation of gum and varnish deposits on the cylinder walls, intake and exhaust valves, pistons and piston rings, etc., and accumulation of unburned f uel in the turbocharger and exhaust system. The consequences of no load or light load operation are potential equipment f ailure due to the gum and varnish deposits and fire in the engine exhaust system.
- 2. Periodic surveil lance testing should be perf ormed in accordance with the applicable NRC guidel ines (R.G.1.108), and with the recommendations of the engine manufacturer. Conflicts between any such recommendations and the NRC guidellnes, particularly with respect to test frequency loading and duration, shoul d be !donti f ied and justi f ied.
- 3. Preventive maintenance should go beyond the normal routine adjustments, servicing and repair of ecmponents when a mal function occurs. Preventive maintenance should encompass investigative testing of components which t have a history of repeated mal functioning and require constant attention l and repair. In such cases consideration should be given to replacement of those components with other products which have a record of demonstrated rel iability, rather than repetitive repair and maintenance of the existing
- components. Terting of the unit af ter adjustments or repairs have been l made only conflims that the equipment is operable and does not necessarily mean that the root cause of the problem has been el iminated or al leviated.
1 4 Upon completion of repairs or maintenance and prier to an actual start, run, and load test, a final equipment check should be made to assure that al l electrical circuits are f unctional, i.e., fuses are in place, switches s and circuit breakers are in their proper position, no loose wires, all test leads have been removed, and all valves are in the proper position to permit a manual start of the equipment. After the unit has been satisf actoril fy started and load tested, return the unit to ready automatic standby service and under the control of the control room operator.
Provide a discussion of how the above requirements have been implemenied in l the emergency diesel generator system design and how they will be considered l when the plant is in commercial operation, i.e., by what means wil l the above requirements be enforced.
QCS430.23-1 82-0307 l
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page 26 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Resoonse
- 1. During periodic testing and test loading, each diesel generator unit will be tested at load in excess of the minimum 25 percent of the unit rated load, as described in Section 8.3.1.1.1 of the PSAR.
- 2. Diesel engine surveillance testing will be perf ormed in accordance with NRC Regul atory Guide 1.108 (Rev.1, 8/77) as described in Section 8.3.1.1.1 of the PSAR and in accordance with recommendations of the diesel engine manuf acturer. Any conflicts between the manuf acturer's recommendations and the NRC guidelines will be Identified and discussed af ter receipt of the manuf acturer's surveil lance testing recommendations.
- 3. The Plant Maintenance Group, through the review of Work Requests, Licensee Event Reports and Survel(lance Test Reports, wil l maintain awareness of problems associated with the diesel generator units. Repeated problems with any equipment or component important to safety will become a subject for a plant investigation to determine if the cause of the problem is related to improper maintenance, improper operation, poor design, or manufacturing deficiencies, if the problem is determined to be caused by improper maintenance or operation, preventative measures such as proper training or procedure changes will be implemented. if the problem IL determined to be caused by design or manuf acture, a request wil l be made to engineering f or an evaluation and/or sol ution.
4 Admini strative Procedure wil l speci fy for al l systems, including the diesel generator units, that shift supervision shall " require a checklist to be perf ormed on the af fected system and on portions of other systems
, located in the areas in which significant maintenance was perf ormed".
l Based on the activities perf ormed, this checklist wil l include such items l
as valves, electrical and instrument alignments, tests to ensure that electrical circuits are f unctional, wiring check f or loose connections, visual checks to ensure that proper f uses are in place and that the circuit breakers and disconnect switches are in proper position, etc.
QCS430.23-2 82-0307
p:gs 27 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 I
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l Question Cs430.24 (8.3.1)
The avail abfl Ity on demand of an emergency diesel generator is dependent upen, snong other things, the proper functioning of its controls and monitoring Instr umentati on. This equipment is generally panel mounted and in some instances the panels are mounted directly on the diesel generator skid. Major diesel engine damage has occurred at some operating plants from vibration induced wear on skid mounted control and monitoring instrumentation. This sensitive Instrumentation is not made to withstand and f unction accurately for prolonged periods under continuous v!brational stresses normally encountered wIth Internal combustion engines. Operation of sensitive instrumentation under this environment rapidly deteriorates calibration, accuracy and control signal output.
Theref ore, except f or sensors and other equipment that must be directly mounted on the engine or associated piping, the controls and monitoring Instrumentation should be installed on a free standing floor mounted panel separate from the engine skids, and l ocated on a vibration f ree floor area.
If the floor is not vibration free, the panel shall be equipped with vibration mounts.
Confirm your compliance with the above requirements or provide justification f or noncompl iance.
Resoonse Except f or sensors and other equipment that must be directly mounted on the engine or associated piping, the controls and monitoring Instrumentation f or each diesel generator unit are installed on two (2) free standing floor mounted panel s separate from the diesel generator unit skids. The control panels will be equivalent to NEMA Type 12 in order to protect the control devices and components f rom dust and other environment.
The diesel generator units are located in a Seismic Category I building l
separate f rom all other pl ant buil dings. The diesel generator units will be l
Installed on their own foundations which are Isolated from the main building i slab and are designed to eliminate any vibration to control panel s. The l control panels are located on the main building slab and will not be subjected to engine vibration, and as such, no vibration mounts are required.
Section 8.3.1.1.1 of the PS AR has been revised to incl ude the above cl ari f ication.
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l QCS430.24-1
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1 page 28 WB2-0298 (8,23) #10 -l Question 430.25 (8.3.2) in Chapter 8 of the PSAR, you discuss three (3) emergency diesel generators.
In Chapter 9, however, the discussion of emergency diesel generator auxiliary systems includes only two (2) diesel generators. Revise your PSAR so Chapters 8 and 9 are in agreement. The PSAR revisions should cover the text material, as well as applicable P&l0's and General Arrangement Drawings showing plan, elevation, and section views. Questions asked in Chapter 9 are applicable to al l emergency diesel generators.
Resoonse Chapter 9.14 of the PSAR has been updatred to include the description of the three (3) emergency diesel generator s, The updated PSAR Chapter 9.14 is prov ided herew ith. The revised PSAR Chapter 9.14 includes the design basis for the Diesel Generator auxil iary r,ystem. The generic description of the system is al so provided. The P&lr'ss and General Arrangements are under developmer.t and will be provided in later revisions of the PSAR.
QCS43 0.25-1 82-0307
n page 29 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.26 (8.3.1 )
In Section 8.3.1.1.2 of the PSAR, under the heading Circuit Protection, you list the emergency diesel generator protective trips. However, there is no discussion of protection in the event of excessive Jacket water temperature of turbo-charger mal functions. Expand your PSAR to discuss these protective features, or explain why such protection is not required.
Pesconse The diesel generator units will be provided with surveil lance systens permitting Main Control Room and local survelllance and to Indicate the occurrence of abnormal, pretrip or trip conditions.
Adequate Instrumentation wil l be provided to monitor the variables for successf ul operation and to generate the abnormal, pretrip and trip signals required for alarm of the folicwing conditions:
Starting Air Systen Lubricating Oil System Fuel Oil Systen Jacket Water Cooling System Combustion Air intake System Exhaust System Generator Generator FieId Generator Excitation System The alarms and Indicating devices provided at the Diesel Generator Local Control Panel and the engine mounted control panel (as indicated by an *)
are as f ol icws:
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QCS430.26-1 82-0298
psgn 30 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Diesel Generator Unit Functions Indicatine Devices Alarms
- Start Pil ot Light
- Stop Pil ot Light
- Unit in Standby Mode Pil ot Light X
- Unit in Test Mode Pliot Light X
- Unit in Maintenance Pil ot Light X
- Unit Ready to Start Pil ot Light X
- Unit Fall to Start Pil ot Light X
- Engire VIbratica X
- Unit Di sabl ed X
- Generator V lbration X
- Unit Running Time Meter
- Generator Dif ferential Current Relay Target X
- Generator Overcurrent Rel ay Target X
- Generator Reverse Power Rel ay Target X
- Generator Loss of Fiel d Rel ay Target
- Generator Fiel d Ground Rel ay Target X
- Generator Ground Rel ay Target X
- Sequence Starting Pil ot Light
- Generator Fiel d Vol ts Meter
- Generator Fiel d Amps Meter
- Generator Kil owatts Meter
- Generator Kil ovars Meter
- Generator Amps Meter
- Generator Vol ts Meter
- Generator Frequency Meter
- Generator Output Circuit Pilot Lights B reaker
- Generator Space Heater Pilot Lights Q CS430.26-2
page 31 W82-0298 (8,23) #10
- Generator Lockout Pilot Light X
- Unit Loss of DC Control Pilot Light X
- Voltage Unbalance (due to X blown PT f uses)
- Generator Stator Temperature Peter Phase "A" Winding Hi Phase B" Winding Hi Phase "C" W inding HI
- Each Generator Bearing Meter Hi Temperature Engine Starting System Functions:
- Air Receiver #1 - Pressure
- Hl/LO
- Air Receiver #2 - Pressure
- Hl/LO
- Air Compressor #1 Pilot Lights
- Air Compressor #2 Pilot Ligi.rs
- Air Dryer #1 Pilot Lights
- Air Dryer #2 Pilot Lights i
- Molsture @ A!r Receiver #1 Hi
- Molsture @ Air Receiver #2 HI
- Fuel Oil Day Tank Level Meter Hl/LO
+
- Fuel injector Header Pressure
- Main Engine-driven Pump Suction
- Hi Filter Dif ferential Pressure
- Main Engine-driven Pump Dis-
- HI charge Filter Dif ferential Pressure
- AC Pump Suction Fil ter
- Hi Dif ferential Pressure
- AC Pump Discharge Fil ter
- HI Dif ferential Pressure
- Fuel Oil Day Tank Conduct- Meter Hi Iv ity
- AC Fuel Pump Pilot Lights H1 i
QCS430.26-3
page 32 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 F.O. Transfer Pump #1 Pilot Lights F.O. Transf er Pump #2 Pilot Lights
- F.O. Transf er Pump #1 Meter Hi Suction Strainer Dif ferential Pressure
- F.O. Transf er Pump #2 Meter HI Suction Strainer Dif ferential Pressure
- F.O. Storage Tank Level Meter LO
- F.O. Storage Tank Conductivity Meter HI
- Turbo Aftercooler Water inlet Meter Temperature
- Turbo Aftercooler Water Meter Outlet Temperature
- Turbo Af ter Cooler Water Meter Outlet Temperature Engine Cooling System Functions:
- Jacket Water Expansion Tank LO Level
- Jacket Water Header Pressure LO
- Jacket Water Temperature
- Hl/LO
- Jacket Water Heater Pilot Lights
- Jacket Water Heater Pump Pilot Lights
- Flow Service Water Meter -
- Lubricating Oil Sump Level Meter LO
- Lubricating Oil Header Pressure
- - Lubricating 011 Temperature
- Hl/LO
- Crankcase Pressure
- Hi
- Lubricating Oil Heater Pilot Lights
- Lubricating Oil Heater Pump Pilot Lights
- Lubricating Oil Discharge
- HI Filter Dif ferential Pressure QCS430.26-4
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page 33 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Engine Speed and Load Control System Functions:
- Governor
- Unit Speet Tachometer HI Excitation System Functions:
- Static Exciter Diode Fail ure Pilot Lights X
- Generator Voltage Regul ator
- Generator Voltage Regulator
- denotes that indicating devices are provided on the engine-mounted control panel.
The alarms and Indicating devices provided in the Main Control Room are as follcws:
CIESEL GENERATOR UNIT FUNCTION INDICATING DEVICES ALARMS Engine Trouble X Crankcase Pressure HI Unit in Standby Mode Pilot Light Unit not available Pilot Light X Synchronization Synchroscope Power Output Wattmeter Generater Output Ammeter Generator Frequency Frequence Meter air Receiver Pressure LO Diesel Generator Trip X Engine overspeed X Generator Dif ferential Protection X Lube oil Pressure LO Jacket Water Temperature Hl/LO Generator Field Ground X Bearing Temperature HI Engine Vibration HI QCS430.26-5
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The following protections are provided to trip the Diesel Generator unit during the testing mode:
Engine overspeed Low Lubricating Oil Pressure Generator Dif f erential Overcurrent Generator Overcurrent Reverse Power Flow to Generator Generator Loss of Field Generator Ground Generator Field Ground High Jacket Water Temperature Excessive Engine Vlbration Af ter an automatic start of the Diesel Generator under a plant emergency condition, all protective functions will be bypassed except for the following as described in Section 8.3.1.1.2 of the PSAR:
Generator Dif ferential Overcurrent Engine Overspeed The emergency Diesel Generator will be provided with protection against excessive Jacket water temperature, such that the operator will be alarmed if the temperature exceeds 190 F and the unit will be tripped on temperature in excess of 200 F during the unit testing. This protective trip feature will be bypassed when the unit is running in an emergency mode.
The turbo-charger will be provided with alarms for low lube oil pressure, excessive vibration and high Jacket water temperature to alert the operator of potential turbo-charger malfunction. '
The perf ormance of the turbo-charger will be periodically observed during the testing of the unit. Should a f ailure of scme part of the turbo-charger prevent its operation, the engine can be operated as a normally aspirated engine until repairs can be made to the turbo-charger.
The mal function of the turbo-charger will result in some loss of power output, however, since there is substantial margin in the load capability of the units, the ability of these units to perf orm their intended f unction during an emergency will not be af fected. This will be confirmed with the vendor at a later date.
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QCS430.26-6 i
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page 35 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.27 i The PSAR Section covering onsite communications should be expanded to include the foi lowing inf ormation:
a) Identify all areas f rom which it will be necessary for plant personnel to communicate with the control room or the energency shutdown panel during and following tratislents and/or accidents (including loss of of fsite power) In order to mitigate the consequences of the emergency and to attain a safe, cold plant shutdown.
b) Indicate the types of communications that will 63 available in each of the above areas to provide an acequate communicaticos under all normal operations and design basis accident conditions, including the safe shutdown earthquake.
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Pesconse a) Tabl e QCS430.27-1 Identifies the vital areas by buil ding, cel l and cel l designation f rom which it will be necessary for plant personnel to communicate with the control room or the emergency shutdown panels during the full spectrum of accident er incident conditions (including loss of offsite power).
b) Table QCS430.27-1 also identifies the types of communications that will be available in each of the above areas to communicate with the control ream or the emergency shutdown panel during normal operation and accidest conditions.
The com'munication system is designed f or high reliabil ity during ncrmal and emergency operation of the plant within the plant and between the plant and other TVA feeli ttles.
The communication system is not required to perf orm any saf ety function.
Therefore, the operation of the communication system, except the portable radio system, cannot bv ensured during and af ter a saf e shutdown earthquake.
The system is designed to provide ef fective and diversified means of communication in all vital areas of the plant during the full spectrum of accident er incident conditions under the maximum potential noise levels.
The various means of ccmmunications as described in PSAR Sectica 9.11 compl ement one another. Should for some reasci one or more communication means be unavail able, diverse means should continue to be available.
OCS430.27-1
page 36 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 The portable radio units which will be handcarried by plant personnel will provide them with the capability to communicate anong themsel ves on an alternate frequency in case of loss of base station, antenna, satellite receiver and transmitter of portable radio system.
The communication equipment located in Seismic Category I structures will be mounted on seismically qualIfled supports.
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t QCS430,27 2 82-0307 L
page 37 h82-0298 (8,23) #10 LEGEND PA-lC =
Publ ic Address intra-pl ant Communications System
=
PAX Private Autcmatic Exchange (Telephone System)
=
MCJ Maintenance Communication Jacking Syste, (Sound Powsred Conmunication System)
PRS = Portable Radio System C8 =
Control Building 4
RSB = Reactor Service Building
=
RCB Reactor Containment But I ding SGB =
Steam Generater Building DGB =
Diesel Generator Buil ding ECT =
Emergency Cooling Towers FPH = Fire Prcts: tion Pump House m = Control Room RSP =
Remote Shutdown Panel HVAC =
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning USS = 480V AC Unit Substation MCC =
Motor Control Center AFW = Auxiliary Feedwater SWGR = Medium Voltage Switchgear SSPLS = Solid State Programmable Logic System EILC = Electrical instrumentation & Centrol EVST = Ex-vessel Storage Tank EVSS = Ex-vessel Storage Subsystem j
ABHX = Air Blast Heat Exchanger i
l QCS430.27-3 82-0307
page - 1 (0.23) 032 LADLE I GCS42O_RL-1 X = AVAILABLE
}
1 TYPE DF COMMUNICATIDN FRDN
}
AREA CR & RSP TO AREA CELL DESICNATION EA-li E&X DEd PRb8 BL DG . (LLL .
Control Room HVAC Cell X X X CC 480A Control Room Filter Cell X X X 4808 X X X 4tlA Control Room HVAC Cell Control Room Filter Cell X X X 4tlB Air Hand!1ng Unit Area X X X X 412 Return Fan Area X X X X 483 Security Room (Reservedt X X X 421 X X X X 438 Nain Control Room Computer Room X X X X 432 446 USS and MCC Area X X X X 125V Division 1 Batterg Room X X X 458 250V Davision 3 Battery Room X X X 453 Division 1 AC/DC Equipment Room X X X 454 Secondary Rod Control Room X X X 455 Prim Rod Control MC Set Cell X X X 456 457 Prim Rod Control Room X X X 458 125V Davision 3 AC/DC Equipment Room X X X 459 Diviston 3 AC/DC Equipment Room X X X X 460 Division 2 AC/DC Equipment Room X X X X sPortable radios will be hand carried by plant personnel GCS430 27-4
- o. ..
pags - 2 [C.231 C32 TeBLt_1 (cont'd!
X = AVAILADLC TYPE OF COtiffJNICATION FROM ARCA CR & RSP TO AREA GR( [Q Q ESICNATION P_A,15 {_' A A,X_ tLL PRS
- BLDC Ausiliary Day Loop i X X X X SCB 202 Turbane AFW Pump X X 202A AFP Cooler Room X X 202B 204 Auxiliary Bag Loop 2 X X X X AFW Puay A X X 204A AFW Pump D X X 204B Ausiliary Bag Loop 3 X X X X 206 Steam Cen. Cell Loop 1 X N X 207 200 Steam Cen. Cell Loop 2 X X X 209 Steam Cen. Cell Loop 3 X X X 21S SCAHRS PWST Room Aux iliary Day X X X 216 Emer. Chiller Room Int. Dag X X X 217 Emer. Chiller Room Int. Bag X X X Ausiliary Day Loop 1 X X X X 221 222 Austliary Bay Loop 2 X X X 223 Ausiliary Day Loop 3 X X X X Ausiliary Day Luoy 1 X X X X 248 242 Ausiliary Dag Loop 2 X X X X Ausitaary Bay Loop 3 X X X X 243 Steam Cen. Cell Loop 1 X X X 244 245 Steam Cen. Cell Loop 2 X X X 246 Steam Cen Cell Loop 3 X X X 247 Intermediate Bag West X X X X GCS430.27-5
- u. .ssa page - 3 (C.233 C32 LABL E [
(c ont 'd. )
X = AVAILABLE TYPE OF COMMUNICATION FROM AREA CR & RSP TO AREA PA-I_q [AX DEQ PRSe
) BL DG. CLLL CCLL DESICNATIDN J
Intermediate Dag East X X X SCB 233 Intermediate Dag Floor El. 016*-O" X X X X 262 Intermediate Bag Floor El. 836*-O" X X X X 271 j
X X X X 272A Remote Shutdown Cell A
]
X X X X
! 272B Remote Shutdown Cell B X X X X 272C Remote Shutdown Cell C X X X 273 Motor Control Center Division 3 Cell X X X X i 291 Auxiliary Bag Loop 1 l X X Ausiliary Bay Loop 2 X 282 X X X X 283 Ausiliary Day Loop 3 l
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X = AVAILABLE TYPE DF COMMUNICATION FROM J CR Se RSP TO AREA AREA PA-IG Phi DGd PRSe BL DG CELL GELL DESIGNATION X X X X DCB Diesel Cenerator A and Ausiliaries X X X X Diesel Cenerator B and Ausiliaries X X X X Diesel Generator C and Ausiliaries
! X X DC A HVAC Equipment Room X X X X X X l DC B HVAC Equipment Room X X X X DB C HVAC Equipment Room l
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t GCS430 27-0
page 38 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 -
Questf o_n CS430.28 (9.11)
The final design of the onsite communications systems will be reviewed with regard to f unctional capability of all normal operating and accident conditions. Therefore, the PSAR should be expanded, to the extent practicabl e, to incl ude the fol icwing:
a) A list of all working stations including locations and the type of communication system (s) provided at each location.
b) The maximum sound levels that will exist at each of the abcve Identified working stations f or al l transient accident conditions, c) The maximum background noise level that will exist at each working station during normal operation and accident condition and yet reliably expect ef fective communication with the control ream using the communication system (s) available at that station.
d) Conmunication systems perf ormance requirements and test procedures (including frequency) which will be imposed to ensure that ef fective communication with the control room or emergency shutdown panel is possible under all conditions.
e) A discussion of protective measures to be taken to ensure f unctional onsite communication systems, including considerations for component failure, loss of pcwer, and severing of a communication line or trunk as a result of an accident or fire.
Pesconse a) The response to question CS430.27 provides a list of ccmmunications system l ocati ons.
b) The maximum sound l evel (noise) that will exist at each of the working stations identified in item (a) above for all transient accident conditions will be within the sound levels as shown under item (c) below.
The sound levels of the PA-lC speakers will be adjusted 5 db above the maximum background noise level .
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QCS430.28-1
! 82-0307
page 39 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 c) The maximum background noise levels that will exist at each working station during normal operation and accident conditions is not determined at this time and will be included in FSAR. However, the maximum expected noise level in each area is given below.
Maximum Expected Building Area Noise Level (db)
Reactor Service Building General Areas 90 ASHX Unit Cooler Cell 95 Containment Cleanup Scrubber and Washer Cell 95 Steam Generator Building General Areas 90 Emer. Chil ler Room 95 Auxiliary Bays 95 Control Building General Areas 85 HV AC Cel 1 100 Equipment Rooms 90 Diesel Generator General Areas 90 Building Turbine Generator General Areas 90 Building & Other Balance of Plant Buildings The working stations for communication systems will be located to provide voice communication between two or more locations in the plant, even in areas of extreme noise levels. In the areas of high ambient noise
(> 90 dbA) supplementary red flashing Indicating lights are provided at a visible location above the working station to draw the attention of 1he operating personnel for an incoming call. The handsets will be located in sound absorbing booths in high noise areas. Headsets are provided for use at the maintenance communication Jacking stations throughout the plant.
Tests will be made to determine anblent noise levels in all plant areas in order to verify the communication system design and to make any system adjustments, if required.
d) Communication systems perf ormance requirenents and test procecures (including frequency of testing) which will be imposed to ensure that ef fective communication with the control room cr emergency shutdown panels is possible under all conditions will be included in the Plant Communication System test procedures and in the FSAR.
OCS430.28-2 82-0307
page 40 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 e) The following protective measures are taken to ensure functional onsite communication systems:
- 1. Diverse and redundant means of ocmmunicaticn systems are used to ensure reliable and ef fective means of ocmmunication both intr a-pl ant and external to the plant for all modes of plant operation including emergency conditions.
- 2. The communication subsystems are designed such that the f ailure of the power supply cr the component of a subsystem or a communication locp, will not impair the operation of other subsystems or other communication loops of the subsystem. The power supplies are designed such that the ccmplete Public Address intra-plant Communication system is not lost in any area of the plant due to a single f ailure of the equipment er the power supply circuit.
- 3. The communication subsystems (except the maintenance communication Jacking (MCJ System)) are powered f rom the non-Cl ass 1E uninterruptible >ower supplies (UPS) . The MCJ system is sound powered and requires no power for its operation.
4 Conmunication equipment location in the Reactor Containment Building are connected to their communications subsystem through a number of Independent electrical containment penetrations. The failure of a penetration due to a single localized accident will not cause f ailure of the remaining communication subsystem (s) In the Reactor Contai nment Building.
- 5. The maintenance communication Jacking (MCJ) sound powered system prevides six Independent and separate sound-powered telephone communication loops with three circuits each for communications between the ControlRoom and the dif ferent plant buildings. All of the five Nuclear Island Building sound powered loops are available f or communication use between the remote shutdown panel and the Nuclear Isl and Buil dings f or supporting renote pl ant shutdown.
l 6. The communication equipment located in Seismic Category I structures wil l be mounted on sei smical ly qual if ied supports.
QCS430.28-3 82-0307
page 41 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.29 (9.12)
Provide a tabulation of vital areas where energency lighting is required for safe shutdown of the reactor and evacuation of personnel in the event of an accident.
Rescense Emergency lighting for GBRP is provided by the Standby Lighting System and the Emergency Lighting System as described in Sections 9.12.2 and 9.12.3 of the PSAR.
Tabl e 430.29-1 tabulates areas of the plant where energency iIghting is utilized.
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e QCS430.29-1 82-0307
page 42 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 TABLE 430.29-1 LEGEND ABHX Air Blast Heat Exchanger.
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater G Control Sullding CGB Diesel Generater Building ECT Emergency Cooling Tower EES Electrical Equipment ButIding EVSS Exvessel Storage Subsystm EVST Ex-vessel Storage Tank 1B Intermediate Bay rG Motor Generator PWST Protected Water Sterage Tank RCB Resctor Containment bull ding RSB R3 actor Service Building SGhiRS Stt".sn Generater Auxil iary Heat Removal Systm SGB Steam Generator Building QCS430.29-2
psga 43 W87-0298 (8,23) #10 1
TABLE 430.29-1 CELL E & CELL DESIGNATION REMARKS RG 105A Corridor Access to 105F, G RG 1050 Corridor Access to 105F RG ICSE Personnel & Equipmeat Access Access to 105F RG 105F Makeup Pump & Valve Ceil RG 105G Personnel & Equipment Access RG 105H Corridor & Valve GalIery RG 105L Cable Tray & Access Corridor RG 105M Corri dor Access to 105Z RG 105T Corridor Access to 105Z I
RG 105Z Makeup Planp Cooler Celi RG 109 Stai rwel l Access to 105G,H,M l RG 151 Head Access Area RG 161A RG Main Operating FIoor RG 161C PHTS Pump Motor Cavity RG 161D PHTS Ptrnp Motor Cavity RG 161E FHTS Pump Motor Cavity RG 163 1&C Cubicle RG 165 IAC Cubicle RG 167 I&C Cubicle SGB 201 Stai rwel l Access to 202,241,281 l SGB 202 Aux!! !ary Bay Loop 1 SGB 202A Turbine AFW Pump SGB 202B AFW Pump Cooler Room SGB 204A AFW Ptsnp A SGB 2048 AFW Pump B SGB 206 Auxil lary Bay Loop 3 SGB 207 Steam Generator Celi Loop 1 SGB 208 Stearn Generator Celi Loop 2 SGB 209 Steam Generator Celi Loop 3 SGB 21 0 Intamolate Bay Access to 216,217 l
QCS430.29-3 .
en. . , _. - , . - - - - , . , _ _ _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . , _ _ ,
pig'3 44 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 CELL CELL DESIGNATION REMARKS BLDG. &
21 2 Stal rwel i Access to SGB 210,271 21 4 Stal rwel I Access to SGB 253,262,271 SGB 21 5 SGAHRS Rf ST Room SGB 21 6 Emergency Chiller Room SGB 217 Emergency Chiller Room SGB 221 Auxil iary Bay Loop 1 SGB 222 Auxil lary Bay Loop 2 SGB 223 Auxil lary Bay Loop 3 233 Stai rwel i Access to SGB 247,262,271 SGB 241 Auxil iary Bay Loop 1 SGB 242 Auxil iary Bay Loop 2 SGB 243 Auxil iary Bay Loop 3 SGB 244 Steam Generator Cell Loop 1 SGB 245 Steam Generator Celi Loop 2 SGB 246 Steam Generator Celi Loop 3 l IntermeClate Bay West l SGB 247 SGB 253 Intermediate Bay East l
SGB 26 2 IB Cell SGB 263 Protected Corridor SGB 271 IB Celi SGB - 272A Remote Sh'stdown Celi A SGB 2728 Remote Shutdown Celi B SGB 272C Remote Shutdown Cell C SGB 273 Motor Control Center SGB 2 81 Auxilla y Bay Loop 1 SGB 282 Auxil lary Bay Loop 2 SGB 283 Auxil lary Bay Loop 3 301 Stalrwell Access to RSB 306,306 A 303 Stal rwel I Access to RSB 311 304 Stalrwel i Access to RSB 30, 347, 349, 350, 359, 360 305A El. 733' Access Area Access to RSB 305B l
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paga 45 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 CELL CFI L DESIGNATION REMARKS E &
RSB 305B El. 733' Access Area RSB 305E Unit Substation Cell RSB 305F Unit Substation Cell RSB 305G Heat Exchanger Cell RSE HV AC Equipment Room Access to RSB 305H 305G, I RSB 3051 Heat Exchanger Cell RSB 306A El. 755' Access Area RSB 306B El . 755' Access Area El. 765' Access Area Access to RSB 306D 350 El . 788' Access Area Access to RSB 307H 353A RSB Operating Fl oor Access to RSB 308A 301,309, 324,326, 392 RSB 309 Motor Control Center RSB 311 Ref uel ing Communication Center Instrumentation Area Access to RSB 314 341,349 RSB 325 EV S Pump & Pi peways Cool er CeI i RSB 326 EHX Cei I Unit Cool er Cel I RSB 3 27 MHX CeiI Unit Cooler CeiI Stai rwel l Access to RSB 333 350,357 RSB 3 47 Containment Cleanup Filter Cell RSB 247A Radiation Monitor Cell RSB 348 RGB Cleanup Chase RSB 349 ROB Cleanup Chase RSB 352A EVST MHX Loop A Cell RSB 353A EVST MHX Loop B Celi RSB 357 EVS Cool ing Loop B Cel l RSB 359 RQ3 Cleanup Scrubber & Washer Cell RSB 360 EVS Cooling Loop A Cell El. 755' Access Area Access to RSB 3 84 359 RSB 391 ROB Cleanup Filter Cell Access Area & Leydown Space Access to RSB 392 304,325, 327,391, 395,398 RSB 395 Annulus Filter Unit Cell RSB 398 Annulus Filter Unit Cell QCS430.29-5
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pags 46 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 CELL REMARKS M & CELL DESIGNATION CB 410A Control Room HV AC Cell CB 410B Control Room Fil ter Cell CB 411 A Controf Room HVAC Cell CB 411B Control Room f li ter Cel l CB 41 2 Air Handl ing Unit Area CB 413 Return Fan Area CB 416 A Airl ock Access to 410B CB 416B Airl ock Access to 410A CB 417 A Airl ock Access to 4118 CB 417B Airl ock Access to 411A CB 421 Industrial Security System Cell CB 422 Technical Support Center G 423 Tech. Support Center Conf erence Room CB 424 Stai rwel l Access to 413, 446, 450,467, 524 CB 431 Control Room G 43 2 Computer Room CB 440 Corri dor Access to 442, 443,4 CB 441 Corri dor Access to 440,513 l CB 442 Corridor Access to 431,440 CB 443 Stai rwel l Access to 429,440 CB 446 Unit Substation Area CB 448 Corridor Access to 424,431, 440 CB 450 Corri dor Access to l 421,422, l 424 l
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QCS430. 29-6
p:ga 47 #82-0298 (8,23) #10 CELL CELL DESIGNATION REMARKS B LDG. 1EL.
CB 451 Division 1 Battery Room CB 453 Division 3 Battery Room CB 454 Division 1 AC/DC Equipment Room CB 455 Secondary Rod Control Reem CB 456 primary Rod Control MG Set Room CB 457 Primary Rod Control Room CB 458 Div ision 2 Battery Roan CB 459 Division 3 AC/DC Equipment Room CB 460 Division 2 AC/DC Equipment room CB 467 Corri dor Access to 424,451, 453,454, 455,456, 457,458, 459,460 EEB 513 Equipment Removal Hatch Area Acces- to
& Corridor 441,2t.3 EEB 5 21 Switchgear Bus & USS Cell EEB 524 Switchgear Bus & USS Cell EEB 525 Equipent Renoval Hatch Area EEB 540 Switchgear Bus Area Access to 541 EEB 5 41 Equipment Removal Hatch Area EEB 542 Primary Sodium Pump MG Set Room Access to 543 EEB 543 Intermediate Sodium Pump MG Access to Set Room 540 i
! DGB Diesel Generator A and Auxiliaries DGB Diesel Generator B and Auxil iaries DGB Diesel Generator DGB DG A HV AC Equipment Room DGB DG B HV AC Equipment Room DGB DG C HV AC Equipment Room DGB DG A Filter Bank
- DGB DG B Filter Bank l
DGB DG C Filter Bank DGB Passagewey to DG A HV AC Equipment DGB Passageway to DG B HV AC Equipment DGB Passageway to DG C HV AC Equipment ECT Emergency Cooling Tower Pumphouse A i
ECT Emergency Cooling Tower Pumphouse B l
Q CS430.29-7
Question CS430.30 (9.12)
Identify the types of lighting that will be provided in the above tabulated v ital areas. Show that lighting will be available in the event of a design basis accident, including the safe shutdown earthquake.
Rescense: ,
The CRBRP Lighting System provides normal, standby and emergency lighting as described in Section 9.12 of the PSAR. The Normal Lighting System provides illumination under all normal plant operating conditions with power available from the Plant, Pref erred, or Reserve power supply systems. The Standby Lighting System provides adequate illumination under all normal and emergency plant operating conditions with power available from the Plant, Preferred, Reserve or Class 1E Onsite AC Power System. Under an emergency condition, resulting in loss of all of fsite power sources, the standby lighting system will be powered from the Class 1E onsite AC power system (Emergency Diesel Generators). Both Normal and Standby Lighting Systems utilize high pressure sodium and fluorescent light fixtures. The Emergency Lighting System provides adequate illumination at points of egress, in the Control Room, at remote shutdown locations and at all locations required for access to saf ety-related equipment. The Emergency Lighting System utilizes sel f-contained Individual eight (8) hour rated battery powered units with sealed beam lamps and setf-contained eight (8) hour rated battery powered exit signs.
AlI iighting fixtures in Nuclear ist and butIdings are seismically qualifled to maintain structural integrity in accordance with IEEE Std. 344-1975. The lighting fixtures and raceways are supported to meet Seismic Category I requirements as described in Sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 of the PSAR.
The Standby Lighting System is classified as IE up to and including the lighting panel. The circuits to the Standby Lighting System light fixtures are also 1E and are routed to maintain required separation from non-Class IE or Class 1E cables of other Divisions as described in Section 8.3.1.2 of the PSAR. However, the ilghting fixtures are non-Class IE and as such these circuits from the lighting panels to the lighting fixtures of the standby lighting system are considered associated 1E.
PSAR Section 9.12 has been revised to reflect the above.
QCS430.30-1 82-0307
psgs 49 E82-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.31 (9.12)
For al l vital areas identif ied, Indicate that illunination l evel s during accident conditions will be adequate f or perf ormance of any tasks associated with safe shutdown of the reactor, and f or maintaining the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. Denonstrate that suf ficient l ighting w Ill be avail abl e in the vital areas in the event of a prolonged loss of of fsite power Illunination level s should be in conf ormance with applicable sections of the Illumination Engineering Society (lES) LI hting O Handbook.
Resoonse:
The Normal Lighting System provides illumination to the level recommended by the IES Handbook. Where Illumination is required f or operation or maintenance of saf ety-related equipment, the Standby Lighting System receives power from the Emergency Diesel Generator and provides an average illumination of twenty
( 20) foot candl es. During loss of of fsite power, access routes to areas containing safety-related equipment are illuminated by the Standby Lighting System to a level of three (3) f oot candl es. The Emergency Lighting System provides one f oot candl e illumination, per NFPA 101, Section 5-8, and IES recommendati on, in all egress routes and where access is required f or fire fighting in areas containing safety related equipment. The emergency lighting system util izes sel f-contained Individual eight (8) hour rated battery powered i units w ith seal ed beam l amps and sel f-contai ned eight(8) hour rated battery powered exit signs f or a period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, per Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, paragraph 5g. Lighting in the Control Roan at all operator work stations w Il l be powered f rom the pl ant Cl ass IE uninterruptibl e power supply (UPS) system and will provide an Illumination of minimum 10 foot candles in accordance wIth the requirements of Section 6.1.5.4 of NUREG 0700 during loss of al l of f site power.
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QCS43 0.31 -1
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page 50 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 QCS430.32 (9.14.1)
Provide a general arrangement, drawing f or the Emergency Olesei Generator Fuel O!! Storage and Transfer System. Show storage tank locations and piping runs in relation to the diesel generator building and any other structures in the v ici n i ty. Include section views, as necessary, for clarity.
Resoonse The general arrangement and piping drawings will be developed on the basis of the design bases and system description provided with the responses to Question 430.25. The development of the general arrangement and piping drawings is in process and will be provided in a later revision of the PSAR.
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page 51 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestien CS430.33 (9.14.1 )
Describe the Instruments, controls, sensors and al arms provided for mor.itoring the diesel engine f uel oil storage and transf er syste, and describe their f unction. Identify the temperature, pressure, and level sensors which alert the operator when these permeters are exceeded, and state where the alarms are annunciated. Discuss the system interlocks provided, to the extent practical.
Provide a discussion -of the testing and maintenance progrm which wil I be impimented to ensure a highly rellable Instrumentation, controls, sensors, and al arm system.
Resoonse The emergency diesel engine f uel oil storage and transf er systen wil I provide sensors and alarms to monitcr and control the f uel oil paraneters f or al l three diesel generators. Monitoring and control of the Diesel Generator 7-day storage tank assembl ies wil l be provided by the fol lowing sensors:
- 1. Low-low storage tank level .
- 2. High-high storage tank level .
- 3. High/ low storage tank level .
4 Storage tank level transmitter.
The low / low and high/high tank l evel switches wil l annunciate al arms local ly at the diesel eng'Ine control panel and actuate the diesel generatcr troubl e al arm in the control recm. The high/ low level switches wil l prov ide interlocks to autcmatical ly start and stop the f uel oil transf er pum p s. The storage tank level transmitter will provide level indication locally.
l A Seismic Category I truck f Il I connecti on, condensate sump, and l Inspection-dipstick gauge manholes will be provided f or each embedded 7-day storage tank assembly.
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QCS430.33-1
pago 52 t:82-0298 (8,23) #10 For the Diesel Generators electric motor driven fuel oil transf er pumps w il l be provided to transfer f uel fra the embedded 7-day storage tank assembly to the day tank. Each of these pumps wIlI be independently capable of supplying f uel to the day tank.
The f ol l ow ing l evel Instrumentation and controls will be provided for each day tank and associated transfer pumps:
- 1. High/high Ievel al arm.
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- 2. High l evel switch to autmatically stop the f uel oil transfer pum p.
- 3. Low l evel sw itch to automatically start the primary fuel oil transf er pump.
4 Low / low level switch to autmatically start the standby fuel oil transfer pump and f cr al arm.
A selector switch will be provided on the engine control cabinet which will al l ow the operator to administratively select the primary pump. The hIgh/high and Iow/ low alarms w!!I annunciate both Iocally and actuate the Diesel Generator troubl e al arm in the Control Room. A l ocal level meter will be provided to Indicate day tank level.
Frm the day tank f uel will be supplied to the diesel injectors by a shaf t driven pump. An electric motor-driven fuel pump will be provided as a backup f or the engine driven f uel pump. Separate suction and discharge l
l l ines will serve each pump. Each pump will have a suction duplex strainer and discharges to a dupl ex filter downstream frcm the discharge junction.
Pressure indication will be prowided on the suction and discharge of each fuel pump and a high fuel oil filter dif ferential pressure alarm is prov Ided I ocal ly and actuates a Diesel Generator troubie alarm in the Control Room.
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Fuel oil pressure wIlI be monitored just upstream of engine injectors. Lew fuel oil pressure wIlI be indicated on the diesel engine control panel.
Periodic testing will be perf ormed on the Diesel Generators to demonstrate that the units are operational as described in Section 8.3.1.1.1 of the PSAR. Pertions of these survellIance requirements include:
- Verify the proper fuel oil levels in the day tank
- Verify the proper f uel oil level in the 7-day storage tanks Q CS430.33-2
page 53 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Verify the f uel oil transfer pump can be started and that it can transfer fuel from the storage systen to the day tank Verify the diesel starts and accelerates from standby condition to rated speed in 10 seconds in addition, testing and maintenance of alI fuel oil instruments w!l I be performed in accordance with the scheduled maintenance and calibration program for the Cl inen River Pl ant.
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page 54 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.34 (9.14.1)
Provide a discussion of ,e design provisions which will be used to protect the f uel oil storage tank f il l and vent l ines f rom damage by tornado missiles.
Resoonse The Fuel O!! Storage and Transfer System storage tank vent and fill lines will be protected from tornado damage by the application of:
o appropriate thickness earth cover or o concrete tornado missile shielding or o tno combination of the two methods described above.
The tornado missile protection will be in accordance with the requirements of SRP 3.3.2 " Tornado loading and SRP 3.5.3 " Barrier Design Procedures".
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QCS430.34-1 82-0298
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page 55 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestien CS430.35 (9.14.1 )
Expand the PSAR to include a discussion of the f uel oil storage tank and how your design will conform to the requirements of ANSI N-195 and R.G.
1.137. Provide specific information on:
- 1. The method to be used in calculating the capacity of the f uel oil storage tanks.
- 2. The types of coatings or coating systems to be used to prevent Internal and external corrosion of the f uel oil storage tanks and underground piping.
- 3. A discussion of the cathodic protection system which will be applied to the f uel oII storage Tanks, or the rationale of why cathodic protection will not be used.
Resoonse The calculation of the storage tank capacity is based on the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.137, utilizing the continuous seven (7) day cperating method at f ull loaded capacity of the diesel engines.
The internal and external coating system for the storage tanks will meet the ANSI N-195 requirements.
The cathodic protection system design is pending completion of the site
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survey for cathodic protection. The f inal cathodic protection design f or the storage tanks will be in accordance with ANSI N-195.
The next update of Chapter 9.14 of the PSAR wil l include the applicable description of how the fuel oil storage tank design meets the requirements of ANSI N-195 and Regul atory guide 1.137.
E QCS430.35-1 82-0298
page 56 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.36 (9.14.1 )
Expand the PSAR to include a discussion of the following:
- 1. The means f or detecting or preventing growth of algae in the diesel fuel oil storage tanks. If it were detected, describe the methods which will be employed f or cleaning the ef fected tank (s).
- 2. The method (s) to be employed for renoval of water from the diesel fuel oil storage tanks and the day tanks, should water accumulate in either tank.
- 3. The provisions to be made to prevent the entrance of deliterious material into the diesel fuel oil storage tanks during f il ling, and as a consequence of adverse environmental conditions. ,
Resoonse The procedures f or the maintenance of the diesel fuel oil quality will be in accordance with Regulatory guide 1.137 and ANSI N195, specifically:
- 1. The fuel oil storage tank will be sampled and tested monthly. The test will include check f or biological growth. If biological growth is found, a blocide will be used to controllt, based on the recommendation of the feel supplier and diesel manuf acturer.
- 2. The monthly fuel oil storage tank sample will be checked for presence of water. If water accumulation is detected, it wil l be pumped out.
l The tanks will be slightly sloped toward the pump out connection to f acil itate the water renoval .
- 3. A procedure will be established to sample and test all new fuel oil del iveries prior to entering the f uel oil into the storage tank. The same procedure wil l provide instructions how to avoid entrance of l deliterious material into the fuel oil storage tank during f iliing and i it will speci fy the uso of f ilters during f il ling operations, l
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page 57 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.37 (9.14.1)
Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation of a diesel generator for a prolonged period that would require replenishment of fuel oil without interrupting operation of the diesel generatx. What provision will be .cade in the design of the f uel oil storage fill system to minimize the creatico of turbulence of the sediment in the botton of the storage tank. Stirr tog of this sediment during addition of new fuel has the potential of causing the overall quality of the f uel to become undcceptable and could potentially lead to the degradation or f ailure of the diesel generator.
Rescense A f Il ter w 11 I be provided on the fili IInes to the diesel ofI storage tanks. The filters wlll be rated 5 micron, 98% removal .
Minimization of turbulence in the tanks will be accomplished by providing a flow distributor inside each tank on the fill line. This flow distributor will consist of a section of pipe capped at the end, projecting approximately 12 inches into the tank, and containing a multiple number of holes. The fIow distributor wIi1 act to minimize turbulence by distributing the fIow of new fueI ofI over a Iarge surf ace area in the tank.
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l QCS430.37-1 l
psga 58 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 luestion CS430.38 (9.14.1)
In the PSAR, you state that f uel can be delivered to the site within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Expand your PSAR to include a discussion of how the f uel will be del Ivered, both in normal operations and in the event of extremely unf avorabl e environmental conditions. In your discussion, incl ude the sources where qual ity diesel fuel is available and the distances to be traveled fran the source to the site, to the extent practical.
Resoonse:
The principle fuel oil distributor util Ized by 1V A has many local outlets w Ithin 100 mil es of the site. Fuel oil w11I be purchased and alIocated one year in advance of delivery, however, fuel oil is avail abl e on an emergency basis f rom numerous other suppl lers. The I ist of suppl lers is attached h erew Ith.
Access to the site under extremely unf avorable environmental conditions, such as flooding, is avail abl e by several al ternate paths.
Other extremely unf avorable environmental conditions, such as tornados, would not be long lasting and any necessary access routes could be opened in a short period of time. Onsite diesel oil storage is suf ficient to alicw ope.-ation of each diesel generator for a week. This is more than adequate time to replenish the diesel oil supply under the most unf avorable environmental conditions.
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QCS430.38-1
page 59 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 FUEL OIL SUPPLIERS Ashl and Chemical Co. Benton Oil Service, Inc.
P.O. Box 2271 4831 Bonny Oaks Drive Knoxvil le, TN 37901 Chattanooga, TN 37416 Express Marketing Int'l. (ENI) General Oil Company 4420 Bonny Oaks Drive P.O. Box 68 Chattanooga, TN 37416 Chattanooga, TN 37401 Tri County Oil Company Kelso Oil Company P.O. Box 12237 641 Atlanta Avenue Knoxville, TN 37912 Knoxville, TN 37917 Morton Oil Company Harriman Oil Company P.O. Box 1130 P.O. Box 262 Maryvil le, TN 37801 Harriman, TN 37748 Midtcwn Oil Company Pettway Oil Company P.O. Box 205 3324 Alton Park Blvd.
Kingston, TN 37763 Chattanooga, TN 37410 Prater Oil Company Ace Oil Company P.O. Box 1334 P.O. Box 5253 Morristcwn, TN 37814 Chattanooga, TN 37406 Southern Oil Service P.O. Box 1104 Chattanooga, TN 37404 l
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QCS43 0.38-2 l
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prega 60 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 ,
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l Question Cs430.39 (9.1a.1 ) l l
Discuss the design considerations that will determine the physical location ;
of the diesel engine f uel oil day tank (s) at your f acil Ity. Assure that the proposed physical location of the f uel oil day tank (s) meet (s) the requirements of the diesel engine manuf acturers.
i Eft 19'1Ditt:
The diesel engine fuel oil day tanks w il l be located in the Diesel Generator Bu!l ding. For each diesel generater roan, a separate day tank rocra wIlI be provided with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire enclosures, in accordance w Ith the BTP CSE 9.5-1 req uirements. The elevation of the day tanks wilI assure si Ight positive pressure at the engine driven f uel oil pumps. The actual elevation of the day tanks will be established on the basis of the diesel engine manuf acturers' recommendation.
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QCS430.39-1
O page 61 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestien CS430.40 (9.14.1)
What is the purpose of the standby moter driven f uel oil pump shown of Figure 9.14.7? Expand the PS/R to include a description of this pump, Its f unction, the pump control scheme, and the source of electrical power for the motor.
Resoonse The standby motor driven f uel oil pump shown on Figure 9.14.7 is indicated to provide f uel oil supply during the engine starting cycle. This pump will be provided with a battery power supply and will be arranged to operate when the engine receives a start signal and it wilI operate until the systen f uel oil pressure is established by the engine driven f uel oil pump. The actual use for this booster pump is dependent en the design of the selected vender. The PS AR w il l be revised upon the receipt of the actual vendor design.
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l QCS430.40-1 82-0298 l
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page 62 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestien CS430.41 (9.14.1)
What is the source of electrical power for the diecol fuel oil transf er pumps? Also, provide the salient pump characteristics; i.e., capacity, discharge head, NPSH requirements, and motor HP; to the extent possible.
Resconse The electrical power for each diesel fuel oil transf er pump is provided from the same diesel generator for which the f uel oil transf er pump prov ides serv ice. The transfer pump wil l be designed to provide f uel supply in excess of the maximum diesel engine consumption by a f acter of 3 or more. The specific pump characterlestics are not available at this time and will be provided in the FSAR.
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QCS430.4 g -t 62-029s
page 63 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestien CS430.42 (9.14.1)
Discuss the precautionary measures that will be taken to assure the quality and reliability of the f uel oil supply for emergency diesel generator operation. include the type of fuel oII, impurity and quality limitation as well as diesel index number or its equivalent, cloud point, entrained moisture, sulfur, particulates and other deliterious insoluble substances; procedure for testing newly delivered f uel, periodic sampling and testing of on-site f uel oil (including Interval between tests), interval of time between periodic removal of condensate from fuel tanks and pericdic systen i nspecti on. in your discussion include reference to industry (or other) standard which will be followed to assure a reliable fuel oil supply to the emergency generators.
Pescense The procedure fer assurance of the quality and reliability of the f uel oil supply has not been finalized. The procedure will be completed in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.137, ANSI N195 and SRP 9.5.4. Chapter 9.14 of PS AR w il l be extended to include the procedural requirements relating to assurance of the f uel oil quality and reliability following the completion of the operating procedures.
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l QCS430.42-1 82-0298 l
pags 64 082-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouest ion CS430.43 (9.14.1 )
Discuss what precautions have been taken in the design of the fuel oil system in l ocating the f uel oil day tank and connecting f uel oil piping in the diesel generator room with regard to possible exposure to ignition sources such as open flames and hot surf aces.
Resoonse:
The diesel generator day tanks wi!! be enclosed in rooms with 3-hour fire barriers separate from the diesel generators. Each day tank room will be served by a sprinkler system that is automatically actuated in the event of fire. A curb will be provided under the tanks to contain any o!! spillage.
Except where the fuel oil piping connects to the tanks and diesels, all fuel oil supply lines wIll be embedded in the floor surrounding the diesel generator. There are no ignition sources or hot surf aces, which can af fect the fuel oil piping.
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QCS430.43-1 82-0298
page, 55 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Questien CS430.44 (9.14.1)
What is the purpose of the piping run ident! fled as 3-HBDW-06B on Figure 9.14.17 Also, what is the actual location of I Ine 2-HBCW-04 on Figure 9.14.1; i.e., inside or outside the diesel generator buil ding?
Resoonse The pipe iInes 6A and 6B are connected to the f uel oil transf er pump discharge line and they transfer f uel oil fran the storage tank to an outdoor ho:,e connection for the purpose of the storage tank cleaning. The pipe line 04 and the f uel oil transfer pumps will be located inside the Diesel Generator ButIding.
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QCS430.44.g 82-0298
psgo 66 W82-0298 (8,23, #10 Ouestion CS430.45 (9.14)
Diesel generator auxil iary systems shoul d be designed to Seismic Category 2, ASE Section ill, Cl ass 3, or Qual ity Group C requirement in conformance w ith Regul atory Guides 1.26 and 1.29. Expand your PSAR to incl ude a discussion of the engine mounted f uel oil piping and components, and provide the industry standards that were used in the design, manuf acturing, and Inspection of the piping and components. Al so, show on the appropriate drawings where the Qual ity Group Cl assification changes f rom Quality Group C.
Provide similar discussions and drawings for the other diesel generator auxil iary systems, i . e. , lubricating oil, cooling water, air starting, and combustion air intake and exhaust systems, to the extent practical.
Resoonse:
The diesel engine and alI casted diesel vendor suppl led components, inct uding the f uel oil filters, wIlI be destgr.ed in accordance wIth ANSl N-195 and B31.1 req uirements. All other piping and components will be designed to ASE Section Ill, Class 3, Quality Group C requirements per the requirements of Regul atory Guides 1.26 and 1.29. The spect f Ic interf ace bounderles between the various code and qual ity components will be Identifled in future PalD revisions.
i QCS430.45-1
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pige 67 t!82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.46 (9.141 I dentI fy al I high and moderate energy Iines and systems that w11I be Installed in the diesel generator room. Discuss the measures that wIlI be taken in the Jesign of the diesel ger.erator f acil Ity to protect the saf ety rel ated syM ems, piping and components f rm the ef fects of high and moderate energy iIne f all ure to assure avail abil Ity of the diesel generators when needed.
Resoonse:
The only high energy iIne in the diesel generator room wIlI be the diesel exhaust pipe, which is seismically quellfled and provided with expansion The i Ine w ill be provided joints to accommodate thermal growth to 950 F.
w Ith 8-inch thick, ceramic, fibrous bl anket type insul ation. The blenkets w ill be 1-Inch thick and have staggered joints. Stainless steel Jacketing w il l be provided.
The moderate energy lines w ill be the emergency service water l ines, which provide cool Ing water to the diesel engine, the stsrting air (250 psig) piping between the accumul ators and the engine / generator skid and the diesel oil iInes connected to the diesel engine. These moderate energy I ines are al so seismical ly qual if led.
The diesel generator roms wilI be provIded wIth a drainage system to prevent accumul ation of water in case of a pipe break. Al l high and moderate energy piping will be analyzed in accordance with BTP ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1. If needed, spray shleids will be provided to prevent direct water impingement on the diesel generator or on any electrical components.
CS430.46-1
! piga 68 tf82-0298 (8,23) #10 NRC Ouestion C5430.47 (9.14)
The diesel generator structures are designed to seismic and tornado criteria and are isolated from one another by a reinforced concrete wall barrier. Describe the barrier (including openings) in more detail and, Its capabil ity to withstand the ef fects of Internal ly generated missiles resul ting f ran a crankcase explosion, f ail ure of supports f or one or all of the starting air receivers, or f ail ure of any high or roderate energy line and initial flooding f r:rn the cooling system so that the assumed ef fects wIlI not result in ioss of an additional generator.
Resoonse:
The three emergency diesel generators will be located in separate diesel generator rooms of a seismic Category I buil ding. This building is being designed as discussed below.
The assumed ef fects f ran the events described will not result in loss of an additional generator due to the design as described below. The Diesel Generator Buil ding is designed to provide complete separation between the independent divisions. This is accompl ished by providing completely separate bays for housing the redundant diesel generators, diesel auxillarles, and celi cool ing equi pment. Each bay is separateo by a concrete wall barrier with no openings. Separate outside access is provided to each bay.
The separation walls are sized to withstand the worst case internally generated missile within each bay without resulting in concrete spalling.
These evaluations are performed using criteria such as the modified Petry, the modif ied NDRS formul as and the equivalent static load f ormul a f rom the l
paper by R. A. Will iamson and R. R. Alvy, November,1973 (Reference 7, PS AR Section 3.5) . See PSAR Section 3.5.4 for additional detail s on the cal cul ation methods outl ined above.
Fall ure of the structural supports for the starting air receivers is precl uded by designing as Seismic Category I supports.
Equipment housed in each of the diesel generator bays are mounted on concrete pads to prevent f ailure of essential equipment in the event of the worst case internal flooding condition. Since no openings are provided between independent bays, propagation of internal flooding accidents to an l
adjacent bay is prevented.
i QCS430.47-1
pngs 69 !!82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.48 (9.14)
Expand the PSAR to incl ude a discussion of non-seismic systems or structures in the diesel generator bullding or near the f uel oil storage tanks and piping. Show that the f ail ure of any dion-seismic system or structures w Il I not result in damage to any of the diesel generator auxil lary sy stem wIth the attendant Ioss of its respective diesel generator.
Resoonse:
The Diesel Generator Building will be located f ar away from the non-seismic category structures, such that f ail ure of the non-seismic structures w il l not result in damage to any of the diesel generator auxil iary systems. The non-sei smic category components l ocated in the diesel rooms w il l be supported and/or restrainted in such way that their f ailure will not af fect the safety rei ated components.
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QCS430.48-1 l
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pag 3 70 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.49 (9.14.2)
Expand your PSAR to incl ude a section on how the diesel generator cool Ing water system design conforms to the design criteria and bases detailed in SRP 9.5.5 (MJREG-0800) . Provide justification for non-conformance, as applIcabie.
Resoonse:
The updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.2 " Diesel Generator Cool ing Water System" provides the description of the design basis demonstrating that the system design criteria are in accordance with SRP 9.5.5.
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QCS430.49-1 l n2-n?on
I pigs 71 t!82-0290 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.50 (9.14.2)
Describe the instrumentation, control s, and sensors and al arms provided f or 1 monitoring of the diesel engine cool Ing water system and describe their j f unct ion. Discuss the testing necessary to maintain and assure a highly rel iabl e Instrtsnentation, control s, sensors, and al arm system, and where the al arms are annunciated. Identify the temperature, pressure, level, and fim (where appl Icable) sensors which alert the operator when these parameters exceed the ranges recommended by the engine manuf acturer and describe what operator actions are required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful ef fects to the diesel engine. Discuss the systems Interlocks provided, to the extent practical.
R_esconse The emergency diesel engine cooling (Jacket) water sensors and alarms for al l three diesel generators w ill be provided f or control of the diesel engine Jacket cool Ing water parameters during normal operation and standby mode. These sensor s and al arms w Il I cons i st of th e f ol I ow ing :
- 1. High Jacket water temperature.
- 2. La jacket water temperature.
- 3. Low Jacket water pressure.
- 4. La jacket water expansion tank level.
- 'AlI of the above Jacket water sensors wIlI actuate an alarm Iocally on the l diesel (ngine control panel. High Jacket water temperature will actuate an individual al arm in the control room. AlI other sensors wIlI actuate the diesel generator trouble al arm in the control rocm. The high Jacket water temperature will ef fect a trip of the diesel engine in the test mode.
Ha ever, if the diesel engine is operating in the emergency mode the trip f unction will be bypassed. Refer to Question / Response 430.26.
A thermostatically controlled jacket water immersion heater and an electric motor drive keepwarm pump will be provided for ea:h engine to maintain the recommended Jacket water standby temperature to allow Immediate starting at the minimum ambient temperature.
Perlodically, durIng shutdown, a simul ated Ioss of of f site power test wil I be conducted. .\ portion of th is test w il l be to verify the Diesel Generator Jacket cool Ing water system trips are bypassed dt; ring the emergency mode of ooeration. In addition, the testing and maintenance of al I the Jacket cool ing wator instrtsnentation w111 be perfarmed in accordance with the scheduled maintenance and cal Ibration program for the Clinch River Piant.
QCS430.50-1
psg2 72 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestfon cs430.51 (9.14.2)
Provide a more complete description of how the diesel generator cooling water system f unctions. Include a description of all components that make up, or Show interf ace with the cooling water system, and describe their function.
how cooling water temperature is maintained at a predetermined level during operation in any condition f rom no load to maximtsn load. Include seismic and qual Ity grcup ci assif Ications.
Resoonse:
The updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.2 " Diesel Generator Cool ing Water System" incl udes the avail able inf ormation f or the diesel generators.
QCS430.51 -1
paga 73 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 l
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Ouestion CS430.52 (9.14.2) in PSAR sections 9.14.2.2 d and e, you discuss the diesel engine jacket water "keepwarm" system for use when the engine is not running. The information presented in these PSAR sections and on Figure 9.14-2 is not suf fIcient for a comprehensive review of the system design and f unction.
Therefore, expand your PS AR to include a complete description of the cool Ing water system design and f unctions with respect to the " key.; arm" or standby mode of opration. Show that the entire cooling water system sis maintained at 125 F. Incl ude detail s of the circul ating pump, electric heater, source of power, fIow path, and controfs scheme. Revise Figure 9.14-2, as required. In the event of a f ailure in this system, describe how the f ailure will be detected, and what actions must be taken by the ,
operator (s) to insure that diesel engine standby temperatures f are maintained. Provide seismic and quality group classifications for this ,
sy stem.
s Resoonse:
The updated PS AR Chapter 9.14.2 " Diesel Generator Cool ing Water System" i ncl udes the avai l abl e i nf ormati on f or the J acket w ater keep w arm sy stem of the diesel generators.
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QCS430.52-1 o,_nyn,- -- --- -
p;ga 74 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 i Ouestion CS430.53 (9.14.2)
A three-way, air operated temperature control valve is shcr on Figure 9.14-8. Provide more detall on this valve and how it operates. Describe the control air system, including the air supply, how the pressure is regul ated, consequences of a mal function resulting in either too high or too l ow pressure, provisions for manual override, i f any , al arms and Indictices, and any other pertinent data, to the extent practical.
Resnonse:
, The air op9 rated temperature control valve shown on Figure 9.14-8 was based on arother engine manuf acturer. For OBRP design, there shall be no
- control air system for controlling diesel auxil lary systems.
The updated PS AR Chapter 9.14.2 " Diesel Generator Cool ing Water System" provIdes the design of the three-way control valve.
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- s. QCS 430.53-1 i
82-03071 -
p:gn 75 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.54 (9.14.2)
Indicate the measures to preclude long-term corrosion and organic fouling in the diesel engine cool ing water system that would degrade system cool Ing perf ormance, and the compatibil Ity of any corrosion inhibitors or antif reeze compounds used w ith the material s of the system. Indicate if the water chemistry is in conformance with the engine manuf acturer's recommendations, or the pl an to verify conformance.
Eesconse:
The updated PS AR chapter 9.14. 2 " Diesel Generator Cool ing Water System" provides the available information for the diesel generators.
The Jacket water will be sampled and analyzed periodically in accordance w ith the diesel engir.e maintenance s::hedul e. Based on the result of the sampi Ing analysis, a corrosion inhibitor will be added to the Jacket water.
The appl ied corrosion inhibitor will be selected on the basis of the diesel Manufacturers' recommendation. Provisions are existing in the design of the diesel engine Jacket water systems to permit the addition of the chemical treatment material .
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QCS430.54-1 l o,_nin,
p gs 76 M82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouest ion CS430.55 (9.14.H-Describe the provisions made in the design of the diesel engine cool ing water system to assure that all components and piping are filled with water.
Resoonse:
The updated PS AR Chapter 9.14.2 " Diesel Generator Cool Ing Water System" incl udes the avail able inf ormation for the diesel generators. For al l three diesel engines, the highest point of the system will be vented to '
atmosphere to assure that all system components and piping are filled with water.
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l QCS430.55-1 a, nona
pags 77 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 l
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Question Cs430.56 (9.14.2)
In the PS AR, you state that the expansion tank has suf ficient capacity to replace water evaporated in the Jacket water system. The final design of the cool ing water sy stem w il l be reviewed w ith regard to the system capacity for makeup due to minor system leaks at pump shaf t seals, valve stems, and other components, and to maintain required NPSH on the system circul ating pump. Therefore, to the maximum extent possible, expand your PSAR to provide the size of the expansion tank size will be adequate to maintain required pump NPSH and makeup water for seven days continuous operation of the diesel engi ne at f ul I rated Ioad wIthout makeup, or provide a seismic Category 1, saf ety Cl ass 3 makeup water supply to the expansion tank.
Resoonse:
The updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.2 " Diesel Generator Cool ing Water System" incl udes the avail abl e inf ormation for the diesel generators.
For Divisions 1 and 2 engines, the standpipe is sized to provide reserve ,
capacity to of fset the system water losses due to minor leakages through the pump shaf t seal s and valve steams, and evaporation through vents for seven days at rated i oad w Ithout make-up. The avail able reserve water capacity in the standpipe wilI be def ined as water containsd f rcm the water level above the system circulating pump suction needed to maintain required NPSH of the circul ating pump, to the operating water l evel of the stan dp i pe. For Division 3 engine, the expansion tark is sized similarly to '
the stancpipes f or Division 1 and 2 engines. The, expansion tank for the Division 3 diesel engine will be designed to ASE Section lil, Class 3 Seismic Category I requirements (and the tank will be prov ideo w ith a io-1evel alarm). The actual Ieakage f rom the Jacket water system w 11l be determined during station perf ormance testing, if the leakage observed exceeds the required capacity of the standpipe or expansion tank f or the 7 days of operation, a backup supply f rce the Category I emergency plant service water systam wIlI be added.
QCS430.56-1
p99e 78 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 The normal makeup water is suppl led f rom the Category ill domineral Ized water supply. Water can al so be added manually shout d the Category iIl domineral Ized water supply be unavail able. Adequate NPSH will be available to the Jacket water pump at all times.
A sight glass and l ow level al arm .are provided on the standpipe or expansion tank.
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1 QCS430.56-2
pega 19 t!82-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.57 (9.14.2)
Provide a tabulation show ing the Individual and total heat removal rates for each major component and subsystem of the diesel generator cool ing w ater sy stem. Discuss the design margin (excess heat removal capabil Ity) incl uded in the design of major components and subsystems.
Resoonse:
The updated PSNL Chapter 9.14.2 " Diesel Generator Cool ing Water System" incl udes the avail able inf ormation for the diesel generators.
Each engine cool Ing water system and system components shall be designed to provice adequate heat removal capabil ity for the engine it serves at rated load and heat transfer capabil ity to the Emergency Pl ant Service Water Sy stem. The detailed tabelatton of the Individual heat removal rates wlll be prov i ded i n a l ater rev i si on of the PS AR.
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! R7-0298
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p:gs 80 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 ouestion CS430.58 (8.14.21 Recent i Icensee event reports have shown that tube leaks are being experienced in the heat exchangers of diesel engine Jacket cooling water systems. Provide a discussion on the provisions which will be made to detect tube leakage, and the corrective actions that will be taken. Incl ude Jacket water leakage into the lube oil system (standby mode), lube oil leakage into the Jacket water (operating mode), Jacket water leakage into the engine combustion air intake and governor oil systems (operating or standby modes). Prov ide the permissable inleakage or outleakage in each of the above conditions which can be tol erated w Ithout degrading engine perf ormance or causing engine f ail ure.
The discussion should al so incl ude the ef fects of Jacket water / service water systems leakage, to the extent practical.
Response
The updated PS AR Chapter 9.14.2 " Diesel Generator Cool ing Water System" incl udes the avail able inf ormation f or the diesel generators.
l QCS430.58-1
l page 81 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.59 (9.14.2)
The diesel generators are required to start automatically on loss of all of fsite power and in the event of a DBA. The diesel generator sets should be capable of operation of less than f ulI load for extended periods without degradation of perf ormance or rel iabil ity. Should a DBA occur with avail abil ity of of fsite power, discuss the design provisions and other paraneters that have been considered in the selection of the diesel generators to enable them to run unloaded (on standby) for extended periods
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w ithout degradation of engine perf ormance or rel iabil ity. Expand your PSAR to include and explicitly define the capability of your design with regard to these requirenents.
Resconse The diesel generator sets f or CRBRP will be designed to have the capability to operate at less than f ull load for extended periods without degradation of performance or rel labil Ity.
The manuf acturer of the diesel generators for Class IE Divisions 1 and 2 (DeLaval Turbine Inc., Engine and Compressor Division in Oakland, Cal i f orni a) has conducted no-load endurance tests on a diesel generator set essential ly identical to those intended f or use on CRBRP. The objective of this test was to establish that the diesel generator set could successfully pick up and carry the designated loads af ter operating at a PO-Icad and synchronous speed for an extended period of time.
The engine was run in a no-load rated speed condition fer 168 hcurs and perfccmed without developing abnormal engine responses, noise cr vibration.
The engine successfully perf ormed with a lord of 4000KW e'ter the no-loaa run.
The diesel generatcr set of Division 3 will also be tested to ensure its capability to operate at less than full load f or extended periods.
Upon receipt of an emergency signal (as a resalt of a DBA), the diesel '
generator sets wil l automatical ly start and wil l run on no-load (on a standby mode) If the of f si te power i s sti l l avai l abl e. Adm ini strative controls will be used to shutdown the units within a reasonable time af ter ensuring the stability of the of fsite power. The operation of the units at no-Icad during this time will not result in any degradation of engine perf ormance or rel iabil ity as demonstrated by the no-load test described above.
QCS43 0.5 9-1
p:gs 82 W82-0298 (8,23) #10
' In order to eliminate the problems of carbon build up due to prolonged diesel generator operation un der Iight l oad or no load conditions, requirements will be included in the periodic testing procedure to run the diesel generators on load. This periodic loading of the diesel generators w il l resul t in bi or out of built in carbon deposits and prevent any possible degradation of the engine performance.
The testing of the diesel generators is described in Section 8.3.1.1.1 of the PS AR.
Periodic testing of the diesel generator units during the pl ant preoperational test program and at least once every 18 months (during ref uel ing or prolonged pl ant shutdown) will be perf ormed to demonstrate f ul l load carrying capabil Ity for an interval of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of which 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> will be at a load equivalent to the continuous rating of the diesel generator unit and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at a load equivalent to the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rating of the diesel generator units.
Provisions have been made in the system design to synchronize the diesel generator with the of fsite power sources in order to achieve the rated loading as discussed above during this testing.
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QCS 430.59-2
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paga 83 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouest ion CS430.60 (9.14.2)
Provide the source of power for the diesel engine motor driven Jacket water keepwarm pump and electric Jacket water heater. Provide the motor and electric heater ch aracteristics, i . e. , motor hp., operating vol tage, ph ase (s ), frequency and kw output as appl icabl e. Al so incl ude the pump capacity and dischargi 1ead, if avail abl e.
Resoonse:
The updated PS AR Chapter 9.14.2 " Diesel Generator Cool ing Water System" incl udes the avail able inf ormation for the diesel generators.
The motor and electric heater characteristics as well as pump capacity and discharge head shall be provided in the FSAR.
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I QCS430.60-1 a? noom i
p:ga 84 !!82-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.61 (9.14.3)
Expand your PSAR to include a section on how the emergency diesel engine air startng system will conform to the design criteria and bases detailed in SRD 9.5.6 (MJREG-0800). Provide justification for non-conformance, as applicable.
Resoonse:
The updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.3 " Diesel Generator Starting Systema provides the description. of the design basis demonstrating that the system design criteria are in.acccedance w ith SRP 9.5.6.
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QCS430.61-1 an nona
p gs 85 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.62 (9.14.3)
Expand your PSAR to include a detailed descriptio, of the diesel engine mounting portion of the air start system. Incl ude such things as the f unction of the air I ine to the f uel rack, acti"ation of the air start solenoid and air rel ay val ves, type and number of air start motors, and any other pertinent data, if avail abl e.
Resoonse:
The updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.3 " Diesel Generator Starting System" includes the available information for the diesel generators.
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f QC3430.62-1 I A?-0?os
_ - - - - - -_ 'Y
p:ga 86 t:62-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.63 (9.14.3)
Descr!be the operation of the energency diesel engine air start system. Begin -
w ith an engine start signal and continue through engine running. Include all components in the system and the f unction of each. Show how a component f allure wIlI not result in total f allure of an engine air start system. Also, state whether the air start system, once activated, wil I continue to operate until all compressed air is exhausted, or will it shut down af ter a specified period of time to allow successive starting attempts. Ref er to Figure 9.14-3, as applicable.
Resoonse:
The description of the operation of the emergency diesel engine air start system and the safety analysis of the system is provided in the updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.3.
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QCS430.63-1 A7 070A
p ga 87 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.64 (9.14.3)
Describe the air dryers in the air start system. State whether they are refrigerant or dessicant type, and the air qual ity level s they will maintain. Provide a discussion of how the compressd air quality will be mon i tored, and the provisions that will be made in your operation and maintenance programs to ensure consistently high quality compressed air to the receivers.
Easoonse:
The design basis for air dryers f or all three divisions is included in the rev ised PS AR mapter 9.14.3. The description of the air dryers for the diesel engines is provided in the updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.3.
QCS430.64-1
a p:gi 881182-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.65 (9.14.3)
Describe the Instrumentation, control s, sensors and al arms provided f or monitoring the diesel engine air starting system and describe their f unct ion. Describe the testing necessary to maintain a highly rel table instrumentation, control, sensors and al arm system and where the alarms are annunciated. Identify the temperature, pressure and level sensors which alert the operator when these parameters exceed the ranges recommended by the engine manuf acturer and describe any operator actions required during alarm conditions to prevent harmf ul ef fects to the diesel engine. Discuss system interlocks provided, to the extent practical.
Resoonse The emergency diesel engine air starting system sensors and alarms for all three diesel generators will be provided for c antrol and monitoring of the starting air parameters during normal and standby operation. These sensors w ilI const st of the f ol Iow ing:
- 1. High/ low air receiver pressure
- 2. High-high/lcw-low air receiver pressure
- 3. High air receiver moisture items 2. and 3. above will actuate local alarms on the diesel engine control panel and al so will be an input to a diesel engine trouble alarm in the Control Roan. Control switches for the air compressors and the air dryers w il l be located on the l ocal control cabinet. When the air
! compressor control sw itch is in " Automatic", the high/ low air receiver I pressure sw itches w 11I automatically start and stop the air compressors.
Pressure gages will be provided with each air receiver.
The testing and maintenance of all starting air Instrumentation will be perf ormed in accordance w ith the scheduled maintenance and cal ibration j program for the Cl Inch River Pl ant.
I QCS430.65-1
p:g3 89 t'82-0298 (8,23) #10 1
Question CS430.66 (9.14.4)
Expand your PSAR to include a section on hov the emergency diesel engine lubricating oil system will conform to the design criteria and bases detailed in SRP 9.5.7 (MJREG-0800). Provide justif ication for non-compl iance.
Response
The updated PSAR 0) apter 9.14.4 " Diesel Generator Lubrication System" provides the description of the design basis demonstrating that the system design criteria are in accordance wIth SRP 9.5.7.
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QCS430.66-1
pugs 90 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.67 (9.14.4)
Expand your description of the emergency diesel engine l ubricating oil sy stem. The PSAR text should include a detailed system description of what is shown on Figure 9.14-4. The PSAR text shoul d al so describe: 1) components and their f unction, 2) instrumentation, control s, sensors and al arms, and 3) a diesel generator starting sequence for a normal start and an emergency start. Al so Figure 9.14-4 shoul d show the diesel engine l ubrication circuits, to the extent practical.
Resconse:
The updated PS AR Chapter 9.14.4 " Diesel Generator Lubrication System" incl udes the avail able information f or the diesel generators.
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I QCS430.67-1 es nmo
page 91 452-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.68 (9.14.4) j An emergency diesel generator unit in a nucl ear power plant is normally in the ready standby mode unl ess there is a loss of of f site power, an ,
accident, or the diesel generator is under test. Long periods on standby have a tendency to drain or nearly empty the engine t ube oil piping system.
On an emergency start of the engine as much as 5 to 14 or more seconds may el apse f rom the start of cranking until f ul l lube oil pressure is attained even though full engine speed is generally reached in about five seconds.
With an essentially dry engine, the momentary lack of lubrication at the various moving parts may bearing surf aces producing incipient or actual component f all ure w Ith resul tant equipment unavall abil Ity.
The emergency condition of readiness requires this equipment to attain full rated speed and enabl e automatic sequencing of el ectric l oad with in ten seconds. For this reason, and to improve upon the availability of this equipment on demand, it is necessary to estabt Ish as quickly as possible an oil film in the wearing parts of the diesel engine. Lubricating oil is normally del Ivered to the engine wearing parts by one or more engine driven pump (s). During the starting cycl e, the pump (s) accel erate sl owly with the engine and may not supply the required quantity of lubricating oil where needed f ast enough. To remedy th is condition, as a minimum, an el ectrically driven l ubricating oil p um p, powered f rom a rel iabl e CC power supply, should be Installed in the lube oil system to operate in parallel w ith the engins driven main lube pump. The electric driven prelube pump should operate only during the engine cranking cycle or until satisf actory t ube oll ' pressure is establ ished in the engine main l ube distribution header. The installation of this prelube pwnp should be coordinated with the respective engine manuf acturer. Sane diesel engines include a t ube oil circul ating pump as an integral part of the lube oil preheating system which is in use while the diesel engine is in the standby mode. In th is case an additional prelube oil pump may not be needed.
Confirm your compl iance with the above requirement or provide your justif ication f or not install ing an electric prel ube oil p um p.
Resoonse:
1 1
The Divisions I and 2 diesels use a four-stroke engine design and are designed with a continuous prelube system to enhance starting capability af ter diesel shutdown periods. The design incorporates a circul ating oil pump and heater which operates to circul ate warm oil through the engine when not in operation. The circul ating oil pump operates whenever the engine is running bel ow 280 rpn. The heater operates when the oil 1emperature drops below 120 F. The Divisions 1 and 2 diesel engines have Transamerica Delaval serial numbers 77034 and 77035 and are included in item 12 of the enclosed Transamerica Delaval notification. These engines were originally to be used by Tennessee Valley Authority at the Phipps Bend Nucl ear Pl ant near Rogersville, Tennessee. The Divisions 1 and 2 diesel engines will be altered to correct the potential problems with lubrication of the turbocharger thrust bearings reported by Transamerica Del aval under the 10CFR21 provisions.
Q CS430.68-1
p:ge 92 !!82-0298 (8,23) #10 The Division 3 diesel engine is provided with a continuous lubrication sy stem. In addition to the engine driven t ube oil pump, two motor driven pumps are provided for standby tubrication; one pump for the turbocharger and one pump for the other engine component s. The motor driven turbocharger pump al so operates when the engine is running. During the pre-lube period, the oil l evel is maintained below the camshaf t level to prevent oil entering into the exhaust manifoi d. The lube oil cooler is acting as a heater during the pre-lube period utilizing the heat f rom the jacket wator keep war 1n system.
00S430.68-2
c .
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY KNOXVILLE. TENNESSEE 379o2 W7C126, 400 West Summit Hill .Dr17e. : .
August 4, 1982 .
Mr. P. Brewington /
Deputy Manager for Projects .
CRBRP Project Pest Office Box U Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Attention: Mr. D. Hicks Gentlemen:
CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PROJECT DIESEL-DRIVEN GENERATOR LWITS .
CONTRACT TV-38624A, SUPPLEMENT NO. 3 -
LETTER NO. CR-4 10 CFR 21 NOTIFICATION Per telecon of July 26, 1982, between your Jim Krass and our Tom Hogan, -
attached is all information concerning a 10 CFR 21 notification to the NRC by Transanerica Delaval Incorporated on the lubrication of the thrust bearings of the turbochargers. ,
Very truly yours,'
7"!NESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
/
T-t~ -
C. . Chan ey, C' Mechanical Engine'. Ing Branch Enclosures t
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. December 2'2, 1980 m .5..
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Tennessee Valley Authority K g .-
W10 D224-400 Cceserce Avenue -
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Y.n c,: . ille ," *ni 37 9 0 2
- M Attention: C. A. Chandley k
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Chief, Mechanical' Engineering Branch A!
Subject:
10 CFR 21 Notification -1
, S/N 77'024/35 (TVA, Stride) 77///M Gentie=en:
R &'0lI/- ,I 3 .
Enclosed please find a copy of a 10 CFR 21 Notification b era % 6 s ~
dated December 16, 1980. ' - [#'f'
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- A solution to the problem tailored to your particular facility 8N". h
'4 is under development and vilf be f orwarded shortly.
M O'N "
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-< .- D g Very truly yours,
/
- N ,
h TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL INC.
Engine and Cc= pressor Division -
, D * * !
h *: () :, f. Y.
y -f ,. ohn Wilder .
y 'y ( /Engt .eer, Custo:cer Service c -
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Enclosure .
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TO ADD ATTAC:-2OsIS 2e 28 -
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150 25th Ave we , ,
P.o. Box 216.1 .
oaktand. Cal.tstrua 94621
%C (4*5) 577 7400 g;,i Id -
~
Cacember 16, 1980 '
RECE(VED
. DEC 181980. .
I' ~> Cc6 D:pt.
Director Office of Inspection and Enforcerrent '
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornission .
Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Sir:
In accordance with the requirerents of Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regu1ations, Part 21, Transamerica Delaval hereby notifies
~
the Cornission of a potential defect in a component of DSR and
, DSRV Standby Diesel Generators. There exists a potential problem with lubrication of the thrust bearings of t'2 turbochargers which -
- could result in engine non-availability.
Transarerica Delaval has supplied the DSR and DSRV series engines with th2 potential defect to the fcilowing sites: ,
- 1. Long Island Lighting Ce.', Sherham Nuclear Power Staticn
- SN 74010/12 DSR S ,
- 2. Middle South Energy, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station -
SN 74033/3E DSRV 16
- 3. Duke Power, Catawba Station SN 75017/20 DSRV 16
- 4. Southern California Edison, San Onofre SN 75041/42 DSRV 20
- 5. Cleveland Electric, Perry Nuclear SH 75051/54 DSRV 16 Station
- 6. Tennessee Valley Authority, Belleic. e SN 75080/S3 DSRV 16 Station . .
- 7. Washington Public Power Supply System SH 75084/85 DSRV 16 WPPSS #1
- 8. Texas Utilities Services Incorporation, Corr.anche Peak 1 and 2 SN 76001/4 DSRV 16
- 9. Washington Publi: Power Supply System, SN 76031/32 DSRY 16 WPPSS #4 i,,.
- i C i, U . . u i i v .s
. CO$UUSI sp.a
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission .
December 16, 1980 ,
Page 2 SN 77001/04 OSRV 12 Consumers Power, Midland 1 and 2 SN 77024/31 DSRV It 10.
Tennessee Valley Authority, '
- 11 Hartsville Station SN 77032/35 DSRV 16
/ -
Tennessee Valley Authority, . .
12.
Rogersville Station l nits that have The units at Southern California Edison are the on y u been placed in connercial operation. Company of Jeannette, l and These Pa.
turbochargers are manufactured d tions. by ElliottT lubricated in accordance with Elliott il systemCo. that recomen a
- The po'tential defect exists in the lubricating l when oThethe enginedesign of this sy supplies oil to the turbocharger bearings. the engine is in permits lubricating oil to flow is running.to the Becausebearing the standby mode. harger is at rest -
b seal and is only effective when the turbocharge h
i ,(engine standby' mode) the turboc arg this time. because of~the Turbocharger thrust bearings may Prematurely experience wornrapid wear if unique operations of nuclear standby engines.f ilability could the be turbochargers.
thrust bearings can be found by inspection o the system defect is not corrected,thrust engine bearing avaThe probl affected.
charger lube oil system so that the turbochargerThe modification to lbd l
receives adequate oil during pre-lubing. system l;
!5 Tecnsamerica Delaval has dasigned the system m -
_, se problem. ica LeianiAen labeEpyoilcf2.,syste i
5'
. , sary to modify the tcrcocharger i idual contract.'
I y reovest and :a accordance with each i ind v it nparty cf th; listed turbc- in Para
'd tTis~ietter is beino sent to each cogn un
^
Detailed instructicns for perfcmin'g the inscect oodification w L'
charger thrust31, bearing 1980.
and for performing the m .
sent by December
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Q.C U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comissio[
~~
tecember 16, 1980 .
Page 3 We estirrate that the inspection and piping modificati~on will be completed by January 20, 1981 at the Southern California ~ Edison -
San Onofre site. ,
- This report confir:ns an initial telephone report on December 16, 1950 to Mr. Robert Dodds, Region 5, Chief Engineering Section. .
Our evaluation of this matter was concluded on December 15, 1980.
Sincerely, ,. ,
c'$EbO' Clinton S. Mathews Assistant General Manager
~
- CSM:pt -
cc: Mr. Robert Dodds, NRC,1990 N. California Blvo. , Walnut Creek, CA 94596 DPT Group '
l' /7* i ' '
bec:
. Alan Barich V. Dilworth ,
Note to all bec's: Dick Boyer will coordinate customer /A.E. notification.
with Dilworth and Durie.
I CSM:pt l
4 . .
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'p:gs 93 W82-0298 -( 0,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.69 (9.14.4)
Several fires have occurred at some operating plants in the area of the diesel engine exhast manifold and inside the turbocharger housing which have resul ted in equipment unavail abil ity. The fires were started f ran tube oli leaking and accumulating on the engine exhaust manifold and accumulating and igniting inside the turbocharger housing. Accumul ation of t ube oil in these areas, on some engines, is apparently caused fran an excessively long prelube period, generally longer than f ive minutes, prior to manual starting of a diesel generator. This condition does not occur on an emergency start since the prelube is minimal.
When manually starting the diesel generators for any reason, to minimize the potential fire hazard and to improve equipment avail abil ity, the prel ube period should be limited to a maximtsn of three to five minutes unl ess otherw ise recommended by the diesel engine manufacturer. Conf irm your compliance with this requirement or provide your justification for requiring a longer prelube time Interval prior to manual starting of the diesel generator s. Provide tne prelube time Interval your diesel engine w Il I be exposed to prf or to manual start.
Resoonse:
The Division 1 and 2 Diesel engine turbochargers are not continuously prel ubricated at any magnitude with the exception of the turbocharger thrust bearings. Therefore, no accumulation of oil will occur thus preci uding any fire hazard.
l For the Division 3 diesel engine, see response to Question 430.68.
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l QCS430.69-1
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page 94 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestien CS430.70 (9.14.4)
A three-way, air operated, temperature control val ve in the t ube oil discharge circuit is shown on Figure 9.14-4. Provide more detall on this val ve and how it operates. Describe the control air system and how it is usea to regulate lube oil temperature. Indicate the source of the control air, and shcw how the pressure is regulated, the consequences of a mal function resulting in either too high or too low pressure, any provision for manual override, all alarms and Indications, and any other pertinent data, to the extent practical .
Reseense The air operated temperature control valve shown on Figure 9.14-4 was based on another engine manufacturer. Fce CRBRP design, there wil l be no control air system for control ling the diesel auxil lary system.
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l CCS430.70-1 82-0298 l
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p:ga 95 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 ,
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M Ouestion CS430.71 (9.14.4) ,
Describe the instrumentation, controls, sensors ena al arms provided f or monitoring the emergency diese!' engine l ubricating oil sy stem, and describe their f unction. Describe the testing necessary to maintain a hig5ly rel tabl e instrumentation, control, sensors and al arrt, system and whers the
~
j al arms are annunciated. Identify the temperature, pressure and Aeyal l sensors whicle alert the operator when these parameters exceed tre ranges .
recommended by the engine ennuf acturer and describe any operator actions required during al arm conditions to prevent hariiful ef fects to the diesel engine. Discuss system Interl ocks,provided. Cordinate the text material w ith the Instrumentation 'and controis shown on Figure 9.14-4, to the extent practical. ,
Resconse: i The emergency diesel engine lusricating oil pressure and temperature-sensor s and al arm s f or al l thr se di e.,e f generator s w il l be prov ided f or a control and monitoring of the diesel engine t ubricating oil paraenters during normal operation and stbndoy mode. The sensors and alarms will consi st of the f ol l ow ing: /
~
)
- 1. High lubricating oil temperatur(
- 2. Lcw lubricating oil temperature ,
- 3. Low lubricating oil header pressure "
- 4. High luaricating oil filter discharge pressure
- 5. Low lubicatt rig oil reservoir level
- 6. H!sh crer.kcase of h pressure
- 7. High go..erstor bearing oil temperature AlI of the above J ubricating oil sensers wIlI ac+uate an Indivlouel alarm both locally at Me diesel eng!ne control panol an' h the Control Room, except low Iube oil temperature and high oil fI!ter cisch,tx ge which wilI actuate the s y' '
diesst generator Trouble alann in the Control Room, The low lubricating oil H,,
header pressure and high generator bearing' oil temperature will ef fect a trip kl' of the diesel engine in the test mode. Hewever, if the diesel engine is Ref er to
'y operating in the emergency mode the tr ip' f unction w il l be bypassed.
Questicn/ Response 430.26. --
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paga 96 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 -
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The oil will be heated by either an AC motor driven lubricating oil pep or an ,
immersion heater in the lube oil sep tank to insure rapid starting.
l At least once every 18 months, during shutdown, a simulated loss of of fsite power test w ill be conducted. A portion of this test will be to verify the diesel generator lubricating system trips are bypassed during the emergency mode of operation. In addition, testing and maintenance of all the l ubricating instruents will be performed in accordance with the scheduled maintenance and cal Ibration program for the Cl inch River Pl ant. ;
h 1
t QCS430.71-2 O*1. A1 A*F
5 v \
page 97 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 1
Ouestien CS430.72 (c.14.4)
~
A luce oil storage tank in the diesel generator room is shown on Figures 1.2-77 and 9.14-4. Explain the purpose of this tank, and state whether the stored t ube oil will be used to replenish the emergency diesel engine sump during normal operation and prolonged emergency (seven days) operation. If this is the case, then the storage tank and Interconnecting piping must meet Seismic Category 1 and ASME Section lli Class 3 requirements. Revise your PSAR accordingly.
Response :
The purpose of the lube oil storage tank is f or convenience only. The emergency diesel engine sump will contain a suf ficient amount of oli to mal.itain the engine during normal operation and prolcnged emergency (seven days) operation without the need f or additional oil. The tank wil l be designed to ASME Section Vlil and seismically supported. The tank piping to the engine will be provided with two isolation valves designed to the ASNE Section f il Class 3 requirenents so that the f ailure of this tank will not cause any damage to any saf ety related systems.
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k l , QCS470(72-1 Fr l 82-0298
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page so ..o. vasc 'w,*se a.w Ouestion CS430.73 (9.14.4)
What measures have been taken to prevent entry of dellterious materials into the engine lubrication oil system due to operator error during recharging of lubricating oil or normal operation? What provisions have been made to prevent corrosion of the storage tank Interior surf aces with resulting centamination of the stored t ube oll ?
Resconse:
The updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.4 " Diesel Generator Lubrication System" includes the avallaole information for the diesel generators.
l QCS430.73-1
- 82-0307 l
l
p:g2 99 WS2-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.74 (9.14.4)
For the diesel engine l ubrication sysicm in Section 9.5.7 provide the following inf ormation: 1) define the temperature dif ferential flow rate, and heat removal rate of the interf ace cool ing system external to the engine and verify that these are in accordance wIth recommendations of the engine manuf acturer; 2) discuss the measures that w fil be taken to maintain the required qual Ity of the oil, incl uding the inspection and replacement when oil qual ity is degraded; 3) describe the protective features (such as blowout panel s) provided to prevent unacceptable crankcase explosion and to mitigate the consequences of such an event; and 4) describe the capability for ^
detection and control of system leakage, to the extent practical.
ih m m t:
The updated PS AR Chapter 9.14.4 " Diesel Generator Lubrication Sy stem" incl udes the avail abl e inf ormation f or the diesel generators.
The specific Inf ormation requested above will be provided in a later revision of the PS AR.
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l QCS430.74-1 1
ao.nnoa l
p ge 100 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.75 (9.14.5)
Provide a description of the emergency diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system complete with test material and P&lDs. This dec 'rlption shoul d conform to RG 1.70 and SRP 9.5.8 (MJREG-0800). Revise your PSAR accordingly.
Response
The updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.5 " Diesel Generator Combustion Air intake and Exhaust Systema provides the description of the design basis demonstrating that the system design criteria are in accordance with SRP 9.5.8.
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QCS430.75-1
pig 2101 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.76 (9.14.5)
Describe the instrumentation, control s, sensors and al arms provided in the design of the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system which alert the operator when parameters exceed ranges recommended by the engine manuf acturer and describe any operator action required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful ef fects to the diesel engine. Discuss systems interlocks prov ided, to the extent practical .
Resnonse The description of the instrisnentation, sensors, and alarms provided in the design of the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system is provided in the updated PSAR Chapter 9.14.5. There are no control s or Interlocks associated w Ith the combustion air system.
QCS430.76-1 av_ noon
" " ' - " ^ _ , _ _
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p2ge 102 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Question CS430.77 (9.14.5)
Provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that the f unction of your diesel engine air intake and exhaust system design will not be degraded to an extent which prevents developing f ull engine rated power er cause engine shutdown as a consequence of any meteorological or accident condition.
Include in your discussion the potential and ef fect of fire extinguishing (gaseous) medlun, recirculation of diesel combustion products, or other gases that may Intentionally or accidentally be released on site, on the performance of the diesel generator, to the extent practical.
Reseense The design for the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system is included in the revised PSAR Chapter 9.14.5. The description demonst'f tes that the function of the system will not be degraded as a consequence of any meteorological or accident condition.
l QCS430.77-1 a,_ noon l
' pIge 103 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 l
cuestion CS430.78 (9.14.5) i Discuss the provisions made in your design of the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system to prevent possible clogging, during standby and in operation, from abnormal cl imatic conditions (heavy rain, freezing rain, dust storms, ice and snow) that could prevent operation of the diesel generator on demand.
Resconse The design basis f or the diosal engine combustion air intake and exhaust system is incl uded in the revised PS AR Chapter 9.14.5. The provisions made in the design to prevent possible clogging from abnormal cilmatic conditions are al so incl uded.
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l QCS430.78-1 o, n ,n o
p2ge 104 W82-0298 (8,23) #10
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Ouestion CS430.79 (9.f 4.5)
Show that a potentiel fire in the diesel generator building together with a single f ailure of the fire protection system will not degrade the quality of the diesel combustion air so that the remaining diesel will be able to provide f ull rated power.
Resoonse:
The design basis f or the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhausst system is included in the revised PSAR Chapter 9.14.5. The description denonstrates that a potential fire in the diesel generator building will not degrade the qual ity of the diesel combustion air.
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I QCS430.79-1 no n ion
page 105 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.80 (9.14.5)
Experience at some operating pl ants has shown that diesel engines have f ailed to start due to accumulation of dust and other dellterious material on el ectrical equipment associated w ith starting of the diesel generators (e.g.,
auxil iary rel ay contacts, control sw itches - etc. ). Describe the provisions that have been made in your diesel generator building design, electrical starting 'ystem, and combustion air and ventilation air intake design (s) to precl ude is condition to assure availabil Ity of the diesel generator on demand.
Al so describe under normal plant operation what procedure (s) will be used to minimize accumulation of dust in the diesel generator room; specifically address concrete dust control to the extent practical.
Reseense The design basis f or the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system is incl uded in the revised PS AR Chapter 9.14.5. The description Indicates the provisions that have been made in the design to prevent the accumulation of dust and other del iterious material, incl uding concrete dust.
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QCS430.80-1
pags 106 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.81 (10.2)
Expana your discussion of the turbine speed control and overspeed protection sy stem. Provide additional explanation of the generator electrical load f ollow ing capabil ity for the turbine speed control sy stem w ith the ai d of system schematics (including turbine control and extraction steam valves to the heaters). Tabulate the Individual speed control protection devices (normal, emergency and backup), the design speed (or range of speed) at which each device begins operation to perform its protective function (in terms of percent of normal turbine operating speed). In order to evaluate the adequacy of the control and overspeed protection system, provide schematics and include Identifying numbers to valves and mechanisms (mechanical and electrical) on the schematics. Describe in detail, with reference to the Identifying numbers, the sequence of events in a turbine trip incl uding response times, and show that the turbine stabil Izes. Provide the results of a f ailure mode and ef f ects analysis f or the overspeed protection system. Show that a single steam valve f ailure cannot disable the turbine overspeed trip from f unctioning. (SRP 10.2, Part lli, items 1, 2, 3 and 4.)
Resoonse:
The discussion of the turbine speed control and overspeed protection systems in the PS AR has been expanded (see update to PS AR Section 10.2.2.6).
Specifically, the turbine load following capability is discussed in Section 10.2.2.6 and 10.2.2.8, while the response of the extraction system to a transient is discussed in Section 10.2.2.7. The turbine speed control and emergency trip systems are explained in Section 10.2.2.6. Attached f or Informa^ Ion gaLg purposes Is a flow diagram of the Emergency Trip System. The system arrangemen.t to prevent a turbine overspeed due to the f ailure of a single main steam valve is discussed in Sections 10.2.2.6. A description of the possible f ailures in the turbine generator system and the ef fects on the turbine control system is al so incl uded in Section 10.2.2.6.
QCS430.81 -1
page 107 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.82 (10.2) ,
The turbine speed control and overspeed protection system does not incorporate stop and intercept valves between the high pressure and low pressure elements of the main turbine. Provide a discussion why such valves are not required, and show that the turbine stabilizes following a trip without the aid of stop and Intercept val ves. Revise your PSAR accordingly.
Resoonse See revised PSAR Section 10.2.2.7 for the requested inf ormation.
QCS430.82-1
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page 108 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion' CS430.83 (10.2) in the turbine generator section discuss: 1) the valve closure times and the arrangement for the main steam stop and control valves in relation to the ef fect of a f ailure of a single valve on the overspeed control functions;
- 2) the valve closure times and extractioin steam valve arrangements in relation to stable turbine operation af ter a turbine generator system trip;
- 3) ef fects of missiles from a possible turbine generator f ailure on saf ety-rel ated systems or components. (SRP 10.2, Part lil, items 3 and 4.)
Resoonse
- 1. See PSAR Sections 10.2.2.1 and 10.2.2.6 for the requested inf ormation.
- 2. See PSAR Section 10.2.2.7 for the requested Inf ormation.
- 3. The turbine generator is located in a non-safety-related building which does not contain saf ety-related systems or components. PSAR Section 10.2.3 presents the results of an evaluation of the potential for turbine missiles to impact safety-related equipment in adjacent buil dings.
i QCS43 0.83-1 82-0307 l
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l page 109 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 l
QuestIen OCS430.84 (10.2)
Expand your PSAR to include a discussion of the steam extraction valves design ,
and operation. Provide the closure times for the extraction stean valves installed in the extraction steam iInes to the feedwater heaters. Show that stable turbine operation will result af ter a turbine trip. (SRP 10.2, Part lli, item 4)
Resnonse See revised PSAR Section 10.2.2.7 for ths requested information.
QCS430.84-1 82-0321
p2gs 110 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 1
Ouestion CS430.85 Provide a discussion of the inservice Inspection program for throttle stop and control steam valves and the capabil it; for testing essential components )
during turbine generator system operation. l Resconse: j The turbine stop and control valves are not saf ety-ral ated items: th eref or e, the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Coce,Section XI, Division 1
- Inservice inspection are not appl icable.
However, the turbine stop and control valves will be subject to a surveillance testing program. These requirements, though not f ully developed at this time, are expected to include periodic cycling of each stop and control valve and appl Icabl e requirements of the Standard Review Pl an 10.2.
These activities will be in addition to the planned maintenance for this eq ui pment. The details of the complete surveillance program will be discussed in the FS AR.
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l QCS430.85-1
p:ga 111 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestf on OCS430.86 (10.2)
Discuss the ef fects of a high and moderate energy piping f ailure or f ailure of the connection f ran the low pressure turbine to condenser on nearby safety related equipment or systems. Discuss what protection will be provided the turbine overspeed control system equipment, electrical wiring and hydraul Ic l Ines f rom the ef f ects of a high or moderate energy pipe f ail ure so that the turbine overspeed protection system w11l not be, damaged to preci ude its saf ety f un ct ion. (SRP 10.2, Part lli, item 8)
Resoonse:
As stated in PS AR Sections 10.3.3 and 10.3.1, f ail ure of the main steam (or any high or moderate energy piping) line cannot jeopardize any saf ety rel ated equipment since there is no safety related equipment in the turbine generator building. The possibil Ity of a turbine missile being generated as a result of overspeed is discussed in 10.2.3.
Even though the turbine is a non-saf ety rel ated system, it does incorporate redundant overspeed protection systems as described in Section 10.2.2.6. A high or moderate energy pipe break would have to do the following to disable the overspeed trip protection system. The electrical and mechanical trip valves would have to be disabled in such a way as to prevent them from operating to their denergized states and dumping high pressure hydraul Ic fluid f rom the stop and control val ves. At the same time, the pressure Integrity of the hydraulic fluid system would have to be maintained following the steam iIne break so that high pressure hydraul Ic fluid can continue to be appl led to the stop and control valves keeping them open. It is extremely unl ikely that any high or moderate energy pipe break would lead to this situation thereby causing the overspeed protection system to f all. Fail ure of the connection f rom the low pressure turbine to the condenser wIll result in loss of condenser vacuum, thereby initiating a turbine trip.
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QCS430.86-1
paga 112 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion OCS430.87 in the PSAR, you do not discuss the in-service inspection, testing and exercising of the extraction steam valves. Provide a detailed description of:
- 1. The extraction steam val ves.
- 2. Your in-service Inspection and testing program for these valves. Al so provide the time interval between periodic valve exercising to assure the extraction steam valves wIlI closa on turbine trip.
Resoonse:
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See revised PSAR Section 10.2.2.7 for the requested information.
The Extraction Steam System is classified as a Non-Saf ety Related item and as such the requirements of the ASPE Boller and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Division 1 - Inservice Inspection are not applicable.
However, the Extraction Stem Check valves will be subject to a survelliance testing progrm which has not yet been f ully developed. This testing will incl ude periodic mechanical operation of the extraction check val ve (incl uding sol enoids, operating cyl inders, etc.).
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I p:ga 113 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 l
l l Ouestion GCS430.88 (10.2)
Provide P&lDs f or the generator hydrogen control and bulk storage system.
' identify all cmponents in the system, and revise the PSAR text to include a l description of the components and their f unction in the systems. Show the bulk hydrogen rtorage system in relation to other buildings on the site.
Resoonse:
The design of the Turbine Generator Hydrogen Control and Storage System is still under development at this time; however, design basis and criteria are as f ollows:
- 1. The storage system is located outdoors, southeast of the maintenance bay (see PS AR Fig. 2.1-5a) away from saf ety rel ated equipment.
- 2. The control system maintains essentially pure hydrogen (97% - 985) in the
! generator casing.
- 3. Hydrogen is only distributed to the non-safety related TGB and distribution piping in the TGB is guard-piped.
4 The generator housing is designed wIth a minimtsn number of gas tight joints to minimize leakage of hydrogen. . In addition, the generator housing is designed to withstand the ef fects of the pressure generated by an internal explosion of a mixture of hydrogen and air.
- 5. The hydrogen control panel contains a gas tight partition separating electrical equipment f rm hydrogen tubing and explosion proof instruments are used throughout.
- 6. The bulk storage unit consists of 2 sets of hydrogen bottles, one in reserve and one on l ine. The reserve bottles autmatically come on line at a predetermined low pressure. In addition, there is a header Isolation valve which shuts at a predetermined maximtsn flow in the event of a l hydrogen pipe break.
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- 7. A carbon-dioxide system is provided to purge the generator when changing f rom hydrogen to air er air to hydrogen to precl ude a hydrogen / air mixture frm occuring.
Attached are P&lDs BM562 AND GE13303568 for information.Qn12 QCS430.88-1
ytg2 i not-vJoz (o,43s 731 Ouestion CS430.89 (10.3) As expl ained in issue No.1 of NUREG-0133, credit it taken f or all valves downstream of the Main Steam isolation Valve (MSIV) to limit blowdcwn of a second steam generator in the event of a steam IIne break upstream of the MSlV. In order to confinn satisfactory perf ormance following such a steam line break provide a tabulation and descriptive text (as appropriate) In the PS AR of al l fl ow path s that branch of f the main steam lines between the MSIVs and the turbine stop val ves. For each flow path originating at the main steam lines, prov ide the f ol l ow ing inf ormation:
a) System Identification b) Maximum steam flow in pounds per hour c) Type of shut-of f val ve(s) d) Size of valvs(s) e) Quality of the valve (s) f) Design code of the valve (s) g) Closure time of the valve (s) h) Actuation mechanism of the valve (s) (i.e., Solenoid operated motor operated, air operated diagram valve, etc.)
- 1) Motive or power source for the valve actuating mechanism in the event of the postulated accident, termination of steam flow from all systems identified above, except those that can be used f or mitigation of the accident, is required to bring the reactor to a safe col d shutdown. For these systems describe what design f eatures have been incorporeted to assure closure of the steam shut-of f valve (s).
j Descr!be what operator actions (If any) are required.
if the systems that can be used for mitigation of the accident are not available or decision is made to use other means to shut down the reactor describe how these systems are secured to assure positive steam shut-of f. Describe what operator actions (if any) are required.
If any of the requested information is presently included in the PSAR text, provide only the ref erences where the information may be found.
Resoonse:
Section 15.3.3 of the PSAR, as revised, addresses steam or feed l Ine pipe break event. Section 5.5 of the PSAR describes the design of the steam generator system. An updated steam generator system val ve data l ist is provided in the revised Section 5.5.3.4 and Table 5.5-8a.
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l QCS430.89-1 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 l
82-2154 l __ -.
page 114 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion OCS430.90 (10.4.1 )
Provide a tabulation in your PSAR showing the physical characteristics and perf ormance requirements of the main condensers, in your tabulation include such items, as: 1) the number of condenser tubes, material and total heat transf er surf ace, 2) overal l dimensions of the condenser, 3) number of passees
- 4) hot wel l capacity, 5) special de' sign f eatures, 6) minimum heat transfer, 7) normal and maximum steam flows, 8) normal and maximum cooling water temperature, 9) normal and maximum exhaust steam tanperature with no turbine by-pass flew and with maximum turbine by-pass flow, 10) limiting oxygen content in the condensate in cc per liter, and 11) other pertinent data. (SRP 10.4.1, Part 111, item 1) .
Pesconse
- 1) See rev ised PSAR Tabl e 10.4-1
- 2) See rev ised PSAR Tabl e 10.4-1
- 3) See revised PSAR Table 10.4-1
- 4) See rev ised PSAR Table 10.4-1
- 5) None
- 6) No minimum heat transf er.
- 7) See PS AR /Igure 10.1-2 and 10.1-3
- 8) See revised PSAR Table 10.4-1
- 9) See revised PSAR Table 10.4-1
- 10) See revised PSAR Table 10.4-1
- 11) None I
QCS430.90-1 82-0321
page 115 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Questf on CS430.91 (10.4.1)
Discuss the ef fect of main condenser degradation (leakage, vacuum loss) on reactor operation. (SRP 10.4.1, Part il, itmo 1.)
Reseense Main condenser degradation f alls essentially into two categories.
- 1. Circulating water inleakage will contaninate the condensate. See revised PSAR Section 10.4.6.1 for design basis f or the Condensate Cleanup System.
Should the circulating water inleakage be excessive, suf ficient monitoring / sampling is provided to assess the ef fects on continued operation and technical specification limits will be established in the FSAR to address operation above design limits.
- 2. Loss of condenser vacuum is discussed in revised PSAR Section 10.4.2.
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QCS430.91-1 82-0307
page 116 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion OCS430.92 (10.4.1)
Discuss the measures taken; 1) to prevent loss of vacuum, and 2) to prevent corrosion / erosion of condenser tubes and components (SRP 10.4.1, Part lil, item 1).
Reseense See revised PSAR Section 10.1 for the requested Information.
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QCS430.92-1 82-0321
page 117 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.93 (10.4.1)
Indicate and describe the means of detecting and controlling radioactive leakage into and out of the condenser and the means for processing excessive amounts. (SRP 10.4.1, Part lli, item 2.)
Resoonse See revised PSAR paragraph 11.3.6.2 for tritium production and disposal.
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l CCS430.93-1 62-0307
page 118 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.94 (10.4.1)
Discuss the measures taken f or detecting, controlling and correcting condenser cooling water leakage into the condensate stream. (SRP 10.4.1, Part lit, item 2.)
Resconse PSAR Section 5.5.3.11.4 presents monitoring and alarms for the condensate stream. A condenser leak within the design parameters wil be controlled by the condensate cleanup system (see revised PSAR Section 10.4.6.1). See revised PSAR Section 10.4.1.2 for provisions to correct a condenser cooling water int eakage problem.
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QCS430.94-1 82-0307
i page 119 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 OuestIon CS430.95 Provide the permissible cooling water inleakage and time of operation with inleakage to assure that condensate /feedwater quality can be maintained within safe Iimits.
4 Reseense See revised PSAR Section 10.4.6.1 for the requested information.
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l QCS430.95-1
page 120 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Questien OCI430.96 in section 10.4.1.4 you have discussed tests and initial field inspection but not the frequercy and extent of inservice Inspection of the main condenser.
Provide this Information in the PSAR.
Resnonse The Main Condenser is classified as a non-safety related item and as such it does not f all under the requirements of the ASE Boller and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Olvision 1 - Inservice Inspection.
However, the Main Condenser will be subject to a surveillance program. These requirements are not f ully developed at this time.
This activity will be in addition to the planned maintenance for this eq u i pment. The detail s of the compiete surveliIance program w!!I be discussed in the FS AR.
l OCS430.96-1
page 121 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion OCS 430.97 (10.4.11 Indicate what design provisions have been made to preclude f ailures of condenser tubes or components from turbine by-pass blowdown or other high temperature drains into the condenser shell. ( SRP 10.4.1, Part l i l, item 3)
Resnonse See revised PSAR Section 10.1 for the requested Information.
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QCS430.97-1 82-0321
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pige 122 W82-0299 (0,23) #10 OuestionOCS430.'U8(10.4.1) / . '* 6 e,, ,, A g Discuss the effect'of' loss offain condenser vacuum on the operation of the main steam isolatton valvas (SRP 10.4.11 Part iII, item 3).
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v Loss of condenser vacuum has ne direct ef fect on the main steam isolation ' <*
valves (superheater outlet Isolition 1.3f ves). '
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l page 123 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion CS430.99 (10.4.4)
Provide additional description (with the aid of drawings) of the turbine bypass system (condenser dump valves and atmosphere dump valves) and' associated instruments and controls. In your discussion include:
- 1. The size, principle of operation, construction and set points of the v al ves.
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- 2. The mal functions and/or modes of failure considered in the design of the sy stem.
- 3. The maximum electric load step change the reactor is designed to acccmmodate without reactor control rod motion or steam bypassing.
( SRP 10.4.4, Part 111, items 1 and 2).
Resoonse See rev ised PSAR Figure 10.3-1 for the drawing of tne turbine bypass system.
See PSAR Figure 5.1-4 for drawings shcwing the location of pressure relief cev ices.
See revised PSAR Section 10.3.2 for details of the pegging steam control val ve, condenser dump valves and desuperheaters. '
The saf ety/ power rel ief val ves are discussed in revised Section 5.5.2.4 of the PS AR.
The maximum electric load step change the reactor is desir: lied to accommodate without reactor control rod motion or steam bypassing is plus or minus two percent reactor power. See PSAR Section 7.7.1.2 and 7.7.1.8 for additional Inf ormati on.
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QCS430.99-1 82-0307
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F page 124 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 '
Questlen CCS430.100 (10.4.4 ) ,
Provide a P&lD f or the turbine by-pass system showing system components and all Instr umentati on. (SRP 10.4.4, part lil, item 1) s Resoonse See Figure 10.3-1 of the PSAR for a basic ficw diagram of the turbine bypass sy stem. P&l0 BM502 and instrument Loop Diagram BE4t07 have been transmitted f or your inf ormation by separate transmittal . -
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page 125 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion OCS430.101 (10.4.4)
Provide the maximun electric load step change that the condenser dump system and atmospheric cump system will permit without reactor trip.
Resnonse:
CRBR is designed to take a ten percent step reduction in electric load without a reactor trip or acticn by the condenser dump system. Greater reductions in load will cause action by the condenser dump and/or atmospheric dump systems and a possible reactor trip initiated by the Steam to Feedwater Flow Mismatch subsy stems. The exact Iosd step which wIlI result in a trip wlii depend on instrument uncertainties with a trip always occurring at values over thirty percent.
Additional Information regarding these systems is located in PSAR Sections 10.3, 5.7.2, and 7.4.2.
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psgs 126 t'82-0298 (8,23) #10 Ouestion OCS430.102 In Section 10.4.4.4 you have discussed tests and initial field inspection but not the f requency and extent of inservice testing and inspection of the turbine bypass system. Prov i de th i s I nf ormati on i n th e FS AR.
Resoonse:
The Turbine Bypass System is not a safety related system and as such the requirements of ASE Boller and Pressure Code,Section XI, Division 1-Inservice inspection are not appl Icable.
However, the Turbine Bypass System will be subject to a surveillance test program. These requirements, are not developed at this time; however, they will include periodic cycling of the bypass valves and periodic testing of the control system using simulated inputs.
These activities will be in addition to the planned maintenance for this eq u i pment. The details of the compiete survellIance program w flI be discussed in the FS AR.
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OCS430.102-1
page 127 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 ouestion 0C5430.103 (10.4.4>
Provide the results of an analysis indicating that f ailure of the turbine by-pass system high energy line will not have an adverse ef fect or preclude operation of the turbine speed control system or any safety related components or systems Iocated close to the turbine bypass systom. (SRP 10.4.4, Part ilI, item 4)
Response
The bypass steam iIne is basically an extension of the main steam header; therefore, the response to Question 430.86 regarding a high or moderate energy pipe break of a main steam line is also appl icable.
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OCS430.103-1
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1 page 128 W82-0298 (8,23) #10 Questien CS430.104 Provide the results of a f ailure mcde and ef fects analysis to determine the ef fect of mal function of the turbine bypass system on the operation of the reactor and main turbine generator unit (SRP 10.4.4, Part lil).
Resoonse A f ailure mode and ef fects analysis addressing the ef fect of this mal function is not avail able at this time and will ce provided as input to the FSAR.
These events are discussed in revised PSAR Section 10.4.4 and revised PSAR Section 15.3.2.4.
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82-0307 l
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ATTACHENT T .
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PSAR CHANGE PAGES ASSOCIATED WITH QCS430.1 THROUGH 104 l
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Pass - 1 [8,03] 5 8 Upon loss of all 161kV power sources, the diesel generators start automatically and are capable of accepting the required safety loads. Any of these diesel generators or any of the 161kV power sources are capable of providing suf ficient power to safely shutdown the plant during the anticipated operational occurrences and to power the necessary engineered safety features in the event of postuiated accidents.
The three diesel generators are Independent including the distribution nystems which they supply as described in Section 8.3.1.1. Automatic starting and loading of each diesel generator to perform the safety function of the distribution systems they supply can be tested by simulating loss of AC power supply to each 4.16kV ESF distribution bus that is supplled by a diesel generator. Each diesel wil l start automatical ly and, if required, af ter 10 seconds the diesel generator on the disrupted distribution system will be automatically loaded with engineered safety features equipment in a timed sequence. The battery systems are redundant and independent including the
! distribution systems whIch they supply as deserIbed In SectIon 8.3.2.
In addition to the features detailed in Sections 8.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2 and 8.2.1.3, compliance with Criterion 15 is f urther demonstrated by the following:
- a. The plant is provided with two separate and independent cwitchyards -
the generating switchyard and the reserve switchyard. The generating switchyard is connected to the power grid by two 161kV transmission lines. The reserve switchyard is connected to the grid by two separate and physically independent 161kV transmission lines. Each of the four transmission Iines and each of the two switchyards are designed to be capable of providing power to the Non-Class IE and Class IE auxiliary loads required for plant startup, normal operation and to f acilitate and maintain a safe plant Outdown.
The generating switchyard provides power To the plant auxiliary loads through the main power transformer and the two (2) unit station service transformers. Each unit station service transformer is sized to supply 50 percent of the plant auxiliary loads required during the plant startup and the maximum power plant generation. (When the main generator is operating the plant auxiliary loads receive power from l the main generator via the generator circuit breaker and the unit station service transf ormers). One of two unit station service transformers also supplies 100 percent power to Class 1E loads of Divisions 1 and 3 and the other unit station service transformar provides 100 percent power to Cla:;s IE loads of Division 2.
The plant reserve switchyard provides power to the plant auxillary loads through two (2) reserve station service transformers. Each reserve station service transformer is sized to supply 50 percent of the plant auxiliary loads required during the plant startup and the maximum power plant generation. One of the two reserve station service transformers also supplies 100 percent power to Class 1E loads of Division 1 and 3 and the other reserve station service transformer provides 100 percent power to Class 1E loads of Division 2.
3.1-30
e Paga - 2 [8,03] #68
- b. The 161 kV transmission lines are protected f rom lightning by overhead shiel d l ines.
- c. The switchyards are provided with two independent DC supplies. Each supply system consists of a separate 125V DC battery, two battery chargers and a distribution system. A single f ail ure caused by a mal function of either of the two 125V DC systems will not af fect the perf ormance of the other system. The ability of the switchyard to supply of f site power to the pl ant w Il l not be af fected by the loss of one of the two 125V DC systems. The surveillance of battery charger operation and battery voltage for each system is provided by Individual alarms monitored in the control room.
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p2g31 c82-0307 L8,3J 74 ATTAOMNT I Page 1 of 2 Criterion 16 - Insoection and Testino of Electric Power Systems Electric power systems important to safety shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important areas and features, such as wiring, insul ation, connections, and switchboards, to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components. The systems shall be designed with a capability to test periodically (1) the operabiltiy and f unctional .perf ormance of the components of the systems, such as onsite power sources, rel ays, switches, and buses, and (2) the operabil Ity of the systems as a whole and, under conditions as close to design as practical, the f ull operational sequence that brings the systems into operation, incl udi ng operation of applicable portions of the protection system, and the transfer of power anong the nucl ear power unit, the of f site power system, and the onsite power sy stem.
Resconse The f ollow Ing transf ers are testable during operation of the nuclear pl ant.
- 1. Automatic transf er from the normal power source (nuclear power unit) to the reserve power source (pref erred of f site power system) Initiated by fault sensing relays in the normal power supply. Testing is accompl ished by inserting simul ated signals in rel ay inputs which initiates the transfer.
- 2. Manual transf er f rom normal to reserve power source and vice versa.
- 3. Automatic transf er of Cl ass IE Bus f rom normal or reserve power source to the diesel generator (onsite power supply) on degraded voltage at the Class IE Bus.
3.1 Prolonged degraded voltage between 70% and 85% of nominal voltages is j simul ated at input to undervoltage rel ays.
3.2 Instantaneous degraded voltage below 70% of nominal voltage is simulated by tripping of the normal Incoming breaker.
Operation of the sequencer logic is also tested by simulating inputs and monitoring the sequencer outputs to actuators (such as breakers) without actuating them. The load sequencer has intrinsic automatic testing of its circuitry which works continuously when the sequencer is not actuated by protective or testing input signals.
- 4. Manual transf er of Cl ass 1E Bus f ra normal or reserve power source to the diesel generator.
4.1 Testing of the diesel with the Class IE Bus disconnected from the of f site source is perf ormed by starting the diesel, decaergizing the Class 1E Bus by tripping the incoming breaker, closing the diesel generator breaker and closing the load breakers.
l 3.1-32 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
pags 2 W82-0307 [8,33 74 4.2 Testing of the diesel with the Class IE Bus energized by the of fsite source is performed by starting the diesel, synchronizing it with the Class 1E Bus and loading it in steps ccnsistent with actual loading requirements.
The AC and DC systems wIlI be designed to be tes*able during operation of the plant in accordance with IEEE Standard 338-1977 and Regul atory Guide 1.118.
Periodic Inspections and testing of Important features, such as wiring, insulation, and connections, to assess the continuity of systems and the condition of their components wilI be performed during equipment shutdown.
Initial operational system tests wIlI be performed wIth components installed and connected to demonstrate that the system operates within design Iimits and meets the performance specification, and to verify the independence between redundant AC powor sources and Iosd groups.
Af ter being placed in service, the standby diesel generators and their respective associated supply systems will be inspected and tested periodically to detect any degradation of the system. (See Section 8.3.1.1.1)
Initial pre-operational tests w11I be performed wIth equtpment and components installed and connected to demonstrate that the equipment is within design I imits and the system meets perf crmance spectf Ications. This test w flI al so demonstrate that loss of the Pl ant Power Supply and of f site AC power suppl les can be detected.
Periodic equipment tests wilI be performed to detect any degradation of the system and to demonstrate the capability of equipment which is normally de-energ ized. The test methods utilized are detailed in Section 8.3.1.1.2.
Periodic tests of the transfer of power between the Piant Power Supply and of fsite AC power supplles wIlI be perfcrmed to demonstrate that:
- a. Sensors can properly detect Ioss of the Piant Power Supply and the of fsite l
i AC power suppl les.
- b. Components required to accompiIsh the transfer from the Plant Power Supply to the Preferred AC Power Supply are operable.
- c. Components required to accompt Ish the transfer fran the Normal AC Power Supply to the Reserve AC Power Supply are operable.
- d. Components required to accomplish the transfer fran the Reserve AC Power Supply to the Standby AC Power Supply are operable.
- e. Components required to accompiIsh the transfer from the Plant Power Supply (simulating the unavailabil ity of the of fsite AC power supplies) to the Standby AC Power Supply are operable.
- f. Instrtsnents and protective relays are properly set and operating correctly.
3.1-33 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 l- - - - - - - - - - _ , _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
p:g? 3 W82-0307 [8,3] 74 The 161kV circuit breakers connecting the generating and reserve switchyard to the power grid will be inspected and tested on a routine basis with the generators in service, since either of the two breakers, each f ully rated, is capable of connecting the generator to the two buses of the generating sw itchyard.
Criterf on 17 - Control Room A control room shall be provided from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions (incl uding those conditions addressed in NRC Criterion 4 - Protection Against Sodium Reactions). Adequate radiation protection shall be provided to permit access and occupancy of the control rom under accident conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem whole body, or its equivalent to any part of the body, for the duration of the accident.
Equipment at appropriate locations outside the control rom shall be provided with a design capability for prompt hot shutdown of the reactor, incl udt rg neccssary instrumentation and controls to maintain the unit in a saf e condition during hot shutdown, and wIth a design capability for subsequent control of the reactor at any coolant temperature lower than the hot shutdown conditions.
Resoonse The control rom design is based on proven power plant design philosophy. All control situations, switches, controllers, and Indicators necessary to operate and shutdown the plant and to maintain safe control of the reactor will be located in the control rom.
The design of the control room will permit safe occupancy during abnormal conditions. The doses to personnel during accident conditions f rom containment building shine, radioactive clouds and Ingress / egress to the exclusion boundary are less than 5 rem whole body, or its equivalent to any part of the body. These doses and criteria are detalled in Section 6.3.
3.1-34 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 ;
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Paga 1 (82-2150) [8,03] #76 [
Criterion 26 - HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM DESIGN The heat transport system shall be designed to rol tably remove heat from the reactor and transport the heat to the turbine-generator or ultimate heat sinks under all pl ant conditions including normal operation, anticipated operational !
occurrences and postui ated accidents. Consideration shalI be given to provision of Independence and diversity to provide adequate protection against common mode f alI ures. The system safety functions shalI be to:
(1) Provide suf f telent cooling to prevent exceeding spectfled acceptabie f uel design Iimits during normal operation and f ollowing anticipated operational occurrences, and (2) Provide suf fIclent cool Ing to prevent exceeding specifled acceptabl e f uel damage Iimits and to maintain Integrity of the reactor coolant boundary following postul ated accidents.
FoiicvIng the Ioss of a fIa path, the heat transport system shall Inciude at l east two independent flow paths, each capable of perf orming the saf ety f unctions f ollowing shutdown. (1)
The system shall incl ude suitabl e interconnections, leak detections, isol ation and containment capabil Ity to assur e that f cr onsite electric power system operation (assuming of f site power is not avail able) and f or of f site electric power system operation (assuming onsite power is not available) the safety f unction can be accompi Ished, assuming a single f ail ure.
IIIThis requirement is not intended to preclude two-loop operation provided the system saf ety functions can be appropriately met.
Resconse:
The primary heat transport system (PHTS) is being designed to accommodate the thermal transients resulting f rom the normal, upset, emergency (anticipated operational occurrences), and f aulted conditions (postul ated accidents) described in Appendix B.
1 The system will be designed such that a normal or upset event does not adversely af f ect the usef ul lif e of any HTS components.
Following an emergency condition, resumption of operation will be possible follming repair and re-Inspection of the components, except that the primary coolant pumps (damaged or undamaged) will maintain capability to provide pony motor flow folicwing all emergency conditions except in the af fected loop f or i
pump mechanical f all ure.
3.1 -45 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982
r Foiiowing a f aulted condition (postuiated accidont), the heat transport system will remain suf ficiently intact to be capable of performing its decay heat removal function, including maintenance of primary coolant pump pony motor f l ow.
! The Heat Transport and Connected Systems include those systems and boundaries which provide the necessary functions to safely remove and transport reactor heat to the steam generators under all plant operating conditions. At rated power, the cworail cool ing requirement of the Heat Transport System is 975 Wt equally divided among three paraliel, essentially identical cooling circuits.
j The general configuration of the Heat Transport and Steam Generation Systems is li l ustrated in Figure 5.1-1. The major Heat Transport and Steam Generator System components have been sized on the basis of the Heat Transport System Thermal Hydraul Ic Design Conditions given in Table 5.1-1.
In the event of loss of one flow path during three loop operation, the remaining two loops are capable of safely removing the shutdown heat either w ith pony motor flow or natural circul ation. In the event of loss of one loop during two loop operation, the remaining loop is capable of removing the shutdown heat either with pony motor flow or natural circulation. Further an additional flow path is provided through the Direct Heat Removal Service (DHRS), which is designed to have f ull capability for decay heat removal following shutdown even from a three-loop f ull power operation. Detail s on the DHRS design are provided in Section 5.6.2 of this PSAR.
The overall heat transport system encompasses the PHTS, the Intermediate Heat Transport System (IHTS), the Steam Generator System (SGS), and the Residual Heat Removal systems which comprises the Steam Generator Auxil f ary Heat Removal System (SGAHRS) and the DHRS. The IHTS design is described in Section 5.4, the SGS In Section 5.5, and the SGAHRS in Section 5.6.1. Consideration of design bases relating to safety functions is discussed in Response to Criterion 31 for the IHTS and in Response to Criterion 35 for the Residual Heat Removal Systems.
The three parallel loops of the PHTS will be housed In three isolated, Inerted l col I s. To timely detect even smali Ieaks, rol table redundant, diversif fed leak detection systems will be provided. Details of these systems are provided in Section 5.1 of Reference 2 IIsted in Section 1.6.2 of this PSAR.
The PHTS is physically confined in Inerted cells in the lower portion inside the GERP Reactor Containment Bull ding. Functional ly, It Is I sol ated by the IHTS f ran the SGS which is located outside the Containment. Therefore, the FHTS Is contained in total inside the Reactor Containment.
3.1-46 Arnend. 32 Dec. 1976
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Power operators shall be sized to operate successf ully under the maximum dif ferential pressure determined in the design specification.
The main steam isolation valves (superheater outlet isolation valves) are capable of being closed to stop the venting of steam into the steam generator or turbine buildings in case of a steam line pipe break downstream of the i sol ation val ves. The maximum steam flow rate is expected f rom a steam line break immediately downstream of the Isolation valve. The disc and stem will be designed to withstand the forces produced when closing the valve under choke flow conditions.
Figure 5.5-2A shows a main steam isolation val ve. It is a conventional gate valve to provide a minimum resistance flow path when the valve is wide open.
A closed system hydraul ic-pneumatic operator, shown in Figuro 5.5-29, is provided f or opening and closing the valve during normal operation or during val ve exercising. Upon loss of electrical power, the pneumatic and hydraulic solenoids are opened by springs, which causes pneumatic pressure to shuttle the valve operating cylinder. The oil below the valve operating cylinder returns to the reservoir through the pilot check valves, which are piloted open by pressure acting through the hydraulic solenoid valves. The gate val ve is accelerated during the initial period of the blowdown and is decelerated at the end of the closing stroke by a hydraulic damper which enables soft seating of the gate while providing f ast closing of the valve. A pressure compensated flow regulator ensures uniform closing times over variations in load.
Position switches are provided to Indicate gate position remotely. The valve is repositioned by energizing the motor and solenoids.
A superheater bypass valve is Installed in parallel with the main superheater outlet isolation valve and check valve for use during plant startup for preheating the BOP steam licas and following plant shutdown to maintain the BOP pressurized. This is an active valv',e designed to f all closed.
Each valve used in the SGS will be evaluated as to its performance relative to pl ant saf ety and mode of operation in the event of f ailure (f all open, f all closed, etc. ). As part of these evaluations, the need f or a pneumatic accumulator adjacent to a valve and solenoid requirements for emergency operation w il l be determined.
Tests and insoections Line valves will be shop tested by the manuf acturer for performance according to the design specifications for leakage past seating surf aces and for integrity of the pressure retaining parts. Selected l ine val ves wil l be manually operated during loop shutdown periods to assure operability.
5.5.2.3.2 Recirculation Pumos The recirculation pwnp will be a single stage, centrif ugal type, driven by a constant speed, 4.0 KY,100g HP motor, it will take suction f rom the steam drum, and provide 2.22 x 10 pounds of water per hour to the evaporators.
The pump and its support will be designed and f abricated per ASME Section Ill, Class 3 as shown in Table 5.5-6.
5.5-7 no ntoi
Pass - 1 #61 [8,05]
Functional ly, the drum receives a saturated water /steani mixture f rom the evaporators and subcooled feedwater and produces saturated steam of low moisture content for the superheater and subcooled water of low steam content f or the recirculation pump. The water / steam mixture f ra the evapor'ators enters the drum through the water / steam nozzles and flows into an annular volume along the sides of the inner drum wall created by a girth baf fl0 volume l along the sides of the Inner drum wall created by a girth baf fle extending l along the side of the drum for the length of the cyiInder. Centrif ugal steam i separators mounted along the length of the drum draw fra this annular volume, ,
separate the mixture into phases, and direct the steam upward and the water i downward into the inner vol ume of the drum. The main feedwater enters the drum through a single nozzle which feeds two distribution pipes through a "Y" connection inside the drum. The feedwater is distributed along the length of the drum by rows of orifice holes in the two pipes which are located along i each side of the drum beneath the steam separators. The auxiliary feedwater enters through a separate nozzle and is distributed along the length of the drum by two rows of spray nozzles in a single distribution pipe located above the water level in the drum. Feedwater mixes with the water from the i
separators and is drar lownward and out through the water outlet nozzles by the recirculation pump. The steam passes upward through chevron type dryers in the upper portion ot rhe drum and out through the steam outlet nozzles to the superheater. The dryers remove ali but the Iast fractional percent of the moisture f rm the steam and drain this moisture back to mix with the resident drum water. Drum drain piping, located along either side of the drum in the region where the water f rom the separators enters the drum inner vol ume, draws water of hIgh inpurity concentration f rom the drum.
! 5.5.2.4 Overeressure Protection Location of Pressure Rellef Devices Safety / power relief valves are located in the steam generation system to:
- 1. Prevent a sustained pressure rise of more than 10 percent above system design pressure at the design temperature within the pressure boundary l
of the system protected by the valve under any pressure transients l anticipated; and
! 2. Provide steam gene ator module blowdown capab!Ilty.
InstalIatton of the valves wIlI comply wIth the requirements as spectfled in Section 3.9.2.5. Safety / power rellef valves are Installed on the outlet Iines f rm each evaporator to provide venting capability and a portion of the required saf ety/rellef capability. Safety valves are installed on the steam drum to provide the remainder of the safety capability for the recirculation loop. Additional safety / power relief valves are installed on the steam exit iIne fra the superheater because the steam Iines to and f rom the superheater have isol ation val ves. The P&lD for the Steam Generation System, Figure 5.1-4 shows the locations of these safety / power relief valves. The power operation f eature of the relief valves is f all closed to assure continued Integrity of the system. In addition, an acoustic sensor is located on the outlet of each valve to inform the operator that the valves are not opening or not closing.
Additional detail s of sizes and pressure rating are given in Table 5.5-8.
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) 5.5-12
5 rago - i s)/ Lo,vaj l
I Safety / power relief valves are installed on the outlet line of the evaporetor units, on the steam drum and on the outlet line from the superheater. These i valves all meet the requirements of Section lll of the ASME Boller and Pressure vessel Code for protection against overpressure. Tabl e 5.5-8 Indicated design pressures and valve settings for the steam generator saf ety/rel ief val ves. Additional valve data is provided in Table 5.5-8A.
5.5.3.5 steam Generator Module characteristics 6
Each evaporator module will produce 1.11 x 10 lb/hr of 50% qualfty steam from subcool ed water. Each superheater module will produce 1.11 x 10 lb/hr of superheated steam from saturated steam. The thermal hydraulic normal design operating conditions are given in Table 5.5-9.
The steam generator modules will supply the turbine with steam at design conditions over a 405 to 1005 thermal power operating range for both clean and f oul ed conditions. The steam generetor modules are also capable of removing reactor decay heat with the natural convection in both the Intennediate sodium loop and the recirculaton water loop.
This hockey stick unit is of the same basic design as that of the Atomics International-Modul ar Steam Generator ( Al-NEG) unit which was tested in a test program carried out at the Sodium Component Test Installation. The Al-NSG anployed a ISS-tube module with an overall length of 66 feet, as compared to the 757-tube CRBRP Steam Generator which has an overall length of 65 feet.
The Al-f.GG heat exchanger was operated for a total of 4,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> including operation both as an evaporator (slightly superheated steam out) and as a once through evaporator-suptcheater (from sub-cooled liquid to completely superheated steam).
The Al-NSG served as a proof test of the Al prototype hockey-stick steam generator design. The unit was operated for 4,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> under steaming conditions; all of these 4,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />, the unit was at the same temperature level at which the prototype will operate, with a steam pressure equal to or greater than prototype conditions. Table 5.5-9A compares various design operating conditions for the CRBRP Units to the Al-MSG, and lists the number of hours which the Al-MSG operated under respective conditions. The Al-MSG operated at steam pressures equal to or greater than the CRBRP Units for essentially the whole 4,000 hrs., and at CRBRP superheater inlet temperature f or 750 hrs.
Since the Al-NSG unit was operated in the once-through mod, simultaneous simulation of both inlet and outlet CRBRP conditions for the separate CR3RP evaporator and superheater units was not achieved, but operation over the CRBRP temperature and pressure range was achieved on both the sodium and steam conditions f or significant portions of the test.
5 .5 - 23 o,_ni m
O TM3LE 5.5-8A YALyE DATA StDeM[{y (a) (b) (c) (d) (e.f) (g) (h) (l)
V ALVE IDENTIFICATION MAX ASME FLOW SIZE SECTION 111 CLOSURE TIME ACTUATOR POWER STEAM GENERATOR lb/hr TYPE INOHES OlVISION SEC NECH ANISM SOURCE SYSTEM Superheater 6 Outlet (53SGV012) 1.11x10 Gate 16 Class 3 3 max. El ectro-Rydraul le IE Electric * ,
Superheater Flow Dypass (53SGV016) 3.4tx10 4 Control 4 Class 3 3 max. El ectro-Hydraul le IE Electric
- Superheater 6 Inlet (535GV011) 1.11x10 Gate 12 Class 3 3 max. Electro-Hy draul le IE Electric
- Evaporator 6 Inlet (535GV008) 1.11x10 Gate 10 Class 3 3 max. El ectro-Hydraul le IE Electric Steam Generator Bldg.
Feedwater inlet 6 Isolation (535GV001) 1.22x 10 Gate 10 Class 3 3 El ectro-Hydraul le it Electric e Main Feed Water Fl ow 6 Class 3 Air Diaphram Instrument Air Inlet (535GV002) 1.22x10 Control 10 5 Start-up Feedwater 5 II "
Inlet (535GV003) 2.44x10 Dontrol 4 Class 3 5 Air Diaphram instrument Air Steam Drum Drain 5 Valves (539GV014,15) 1.1x10 Gate 6 Class 3 3 El ectro-Hydraul le IE Electric
- aActive Function (Saf e Position) is IE Electric 5.5-50a
I Figure 5.5-2A Main Steaml Ine isolation Valve (Superheater isol ation Yalve !
Outtet) i l
See Figure 5.5-2B for valve operator schematic
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-LEAX OFF CONNECTION
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FLOW ---
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5.5-56 I
F igure 5.5-28 Operator Hydraul Ic-Schematic (Shown in Blcvdown Model) qAS sarreg Pressure Trans ducer ho Ve=t Valves y y 2 Places 1 Sol enoid 2 ri . C__a h 2 ? "
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. Cylinder
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R elief I, , Re s ervoir valve Q 's '
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Flow Pilot Check Re gulator Valve IAI " o d a
' p - -d N l 'P, Pressure l Switch o
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l Solenoid h, l Valve
- g 2 Places q l
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l______.._________ f 5.5-56a
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af fecting the three steam supply systems and is provided If needed on a per l oop basis. By definition, this zone of protection will incl ude the high pressure steam supply system downstream from the Individual loop check val ves.
7 . 4 . 2.1. 2 Ectioment Deslan A high steam flow-to-feedwater flow ratio is Indicative of a main steam supply leak down stream from the flow meter or insuf ficient feedwater flow. The superheater steam outlet valves shall be closed with the appropriate signal suppl ied by the heat transport instrumentation system (Section 7.5). This action will assure the isolation of any steam system leak common to all three loops and also provide protection against a major steam condenser leak during a steam bypass heat removal operation.
7.4.2.1.3 initiatinc Circuits The OSIS is initiated by the SGAHRS Initiation signal described in Section 7.4.1.1.3. This initiation signal closes the superheater outlet Isolation val ves In al l 3 loops when a High Steam-to-Feedwater Fl ow Ratio or a Low Steam Drum Water level occurs in any loop. In each Steam Generator System loop, the trip signals for High Steam-to-Feedwater Flow Ratio and the Low Steam Drum Water level are input to a two of three Igic network. If two of three trip signal s occur in any of the 3 loops, SGAHRS is initiated, and all 3 loops are isolated from the main superheated steam system by closure of the superheater outl et i sol ation val ves.
7.4.2.1.4 Bvoasses and interlocks Control Interlocks and operator overrides associated with the operation of the superneater outlet isolation valves have not been completely defined.
Bypass of OSIS may be required to allow use of the main steam bypass and condenser f or reactor heat removal. In case the OSIS is initiated by a leak in the feedwater supply system, the operator may decide to override the closure of certain superheater outlet Isolation valves.
7.4.2.1.5 Redundancy and Diversity Redundancy is provided within the initiating circuits of OSIS. The primary trip f unction takes place when a high steam-to-feedwater flow ratio is sensed by two of three redundant subsystems on any one level sensed by two of three l
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l 7.4-7 l
a?-nx m
Paga -2 7c0 Ld,07; redundant channels in any cne loop provides a backup trip f unction.
Additional redundance is provided by three independnt SGS sieam supply loops serving one common turbine header. Any major break in the high pressure steam system external from the Individual loop check valves will be sensed as a steam feedwater flow ratio trip signal in al l three l oops.
7.4.2.1.6 Actuated Device The superheater outlet isolation and superheater bypass valves utilize a high rel labil ity el ectro-hydraul ic actuator. These valves are designed to f all closed upon loss of electrical supply to the control solenold.
7 . 4 . 2.1.7 Seoaration The OSIS Instrumentation and Control System, as part of the Decay Heat Removal System is designed to maintain required Isolation and separation between redundant channel s (see Section 7.1.2).
7 . 4 . 2.1. 8 coerator Information Indication of the superheater outlet Isolation valve position is supplied to the control room. Indicator lanps are used for open-close position Indication to the pl ant operator.
7.4.2.2 Deslan Analvsts To provide a high degree of assurance that the OSIS will operate when necessary, and in time to provide adequate isolation, the power for the system -
is taken f rom energy sources of high reliability which are readily available.
I As a saf ety related system, the instrumentation and controls critical to OSIS operation are subject to the saf ety criteria identified in Section 7.1.2.
Redundant monitoring and control equipment will be provided to ensure that a
, single f ailure will not impair the capability of the OSIS Instrumentation and Control System to perf orm its intended saf ety function. The sy stem w il l be designed for f all safe operation and control equipment, where practical, will assure a f ailed position consistent with its Intended safety function.
7.4.3 Re-ote Shutdown System A Remote Shutdown System is provided. It consists of the fo!!owing provisions:
7.4-8 o , _ n s ,.
pags 1 t 82-0298 (8,08) # 23
- 4) The Standby (on-site) AC Power Supply
- consists of three physically separate and electrically independent diesel generators. Two of these diesel generators which supply power to safety-related (Class 1E)
Division I and 2 loeds are redundant to each other. Either one of these three standby diesel generators can provide suf ficient power to f acil Itate and maintain a saf e pl ant shutdown. However, from the consideration of connected l'oeds, Class 1E Divisions 1 and 2 provide power to redundant load groups and as such are referred to as redundant div isions. Class 1E Division 3 provides Class 1E power to Loop 3 of the Heat Transport System (HTS) and to certain pl snt Non-Cl ass 1E loads. (The Non-Cl ass IE leeds are connected through an i sol ation subsystan). Since not all the loads powered frem Division 3 are Identical er similar to those powered by Divisions 1 or 2, this division is not identified as redundant to Division 1 or 2. However, as f ar as the HTS is concerned, the Divisions 1, 2 and 3 power suppl ies are fully redundant serving the Loops 1, 2 and 3 Cl ass 1E loads, resp 4ctively.
- 5) The DC Power Supply *, for Division 1, 2 or 3, consists of one Independent 125 volt DC battery with its associated active and spare battery chargers and an inverter for 120/208 volt AC uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Each battery is capable of supplying power to DC loads and UPS loads of its associated safety division. Cl ass 1E UPS is al so referred to as vital AC power supply.
l
- 6) The 120/208 volt vital AC Power Supply *, for each Division 1, 2 or 3, consists of one independent inverter supplled by an independent DC sy stem. Each inverter will supply power to vital AC loads of its associated saf ety Division. Division 1 and 2 vital AC loads are redundant to each other.
- 7) The Non-Cl ass IE DC Power Supply consists of two systems (Divisions A and B) each having one 125 voit DC battery dedicated for plant instrunentation and control. Two separate 125 volt DC batteries are dedicated for switchyard control and Instrumentation and two 48 volt l DC batteries are provided for the plant communication systems.
Division A also has one 250 volt battery to provide power for DC motor l
loeds. Each battery system is equipped with its own active and spare battery chargers, switchgear and distribution panels. 125 volt DC and 250 volt DC battery systems have inverters f or 120/208 volt uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Non-Cl ass 1E UPS is al so ref erred to as Non-Cl ass 1E essential power supply.
- 8) Two Non-Class IE 125 volt DC Power Supplles (one for Division A and the other for Division B) will be provided complete with associated active and spare battery chargers for security systems, and the associated Inverters for 480 volt AC UPS fer security and lIghting l oads.
- This equipment is Class 1E as defined by lEEE Standard 308.
8.1 -2 knend. 73 Nov. 1982 f
p:g] 2 %82-0298 (8,08) #23 l
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Distribution Systems The Pl ant electrical power distribution system can be f ed by the Pl ant. *.-
CBBRP Preferred and the Reserve Power suppl ies and provides power To al l Non-Cl ass 1E and Cl ass 1E loads. The Pl ant distribution system has been divided into two systems; the normal distribution (Non-Class 1E) system and the saf ety-rel ated distribution (Cl ass 1E) system. The saf ety-rel ated di str i but i on sy stem can be f ed by the Pl ant.
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8.1 -2a Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
_ . _ _ _ _ ~~.-~~~ -- - - - - - - .. _-
Pags 1 '(82-2261) [8,08] #21 )
I The CRBRP Preferred AC Power Supply r.onsists of two 161KV transmission iines in the generating sw itchyard connec+ed to the main power transf ormer. In the event of a turbine trip when no electrical fault is present, the generator ;
circuit breaker will open automatically and disconnect the Plant Power Supply.
The Pl ant AC power distribution system will than be provided with power by the CRBRP Pref erred AC Power Supply through the main power transf ormer without interruption.
In the event of non-avail abil Ity of both the Pl ant and the CRBRP Pref erred AC Power Suppl los, the Piant AC distribution system wilI be transferred to the Reserve AC Power Supply. This transfer is perf ormed within a period of 6 cycl es by a f ast dead bus transf er scheme as described in Section 8.3.1.1.
Both reserve station service transformers are kept energized at all times during pl ant operation and are avail abl e to the Pl ant AC distribution system w ithin a f ew cycl es. This assures that the specified acceptable design limits are maintained.
Recut atorv Guide 1.93, Rev. 0 (12/74)
The availabl e of f-site AC power sources consist of the CRBRP Preferred AC Power Supply and the Reserve AC Power Supply. Each of these two suppl les provides two connections to the TVA 161KV grid. The two 161KV grid connections to the reserve station service transf ormers corstitute the required independent of f-site power sources. In addition, two 161KY grid connections to the generating switchyard provide an added reliabil ity to of f-site power, available through the main power and the unit srction service transformers.
On-site AC' power sources and on-site DC power' sources compiy wIth the requirements of (FBRP GCC15 for the availability of electric power sources.
Should an LCX) condition be present on these power sources, the pl ant's continued operation will be restricted in accordance with the Regulatory Guide 1.93 recommendations.
IFFE Standeed 308-1974 The Reserve AC Power Supply provides the two independent circuits of the IEEE Std. 308-1974 " pref erred power supply." It connects the TVA 161KY grid to each of the two 4.16KV Cl ass 1E switchgear buses through the reserva station serv ice transf ormers. Hence, the saf ety-related AC distribution system has two physically separate and eloctrIcally independent sources avalIabt e f rem the TV A grid.
The CFBRP Preferred and the Reserve AC Power Suppl les, each has suf fIclent capacity to operate the Iceds applied during a design basis accident. Both the CABRP Pref erred and the Reserve AC Power Suppl ies are available during normal operation (see Section 16.3.9).
The availability of of f-site power supplles to Class 1E buses is monitored on the Electrical Control Panel in the control room. In the event the incoming of f-site power source has an undervoltage condition or any one of the protective rolays Is net reset, the condition wilI be alamed on the Electrical Control Panel to alert the operator.
8.2-5 hnend. 73 Nov. 1982
~
Page 2 (82-2261) [8,08] #21 In addition, an amber iIght on the Electrical Control Panel in the control rocm w !! l Indicate that the of f-site power supply iIne and its breaker are avail able f or transf er of power f rom the other source if required.
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8-j.-s Figure 8.2-13 CR3RP Power Transmissics Systems, Protection & Control
page 1 W82-2078 [8,8] 31 8.3 ON-SITE POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.1 AC ~cwsr Systems t
i 8.3.1.1 DescrIntion ,
The on-site power system consists of the following a) Non-Class IE power distribution system which consists of two general:y Independent load groups (Division A and B). Each division is provided with its own:
- power supoI Ies (13.8KY, 4.16KV, 480 volts, 277 vol ts, 208 volts end 120 voits AC)
- transf ormers
- cables and receways
- 125 volts DC control and instrisnentat;on power
- multiplexer system for control, alarm and indication
- 126/208 volts uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) for essential Fm-Cl ass IE loads b) Clas's 1E power distribution system which consists of three independent load groups (Division i, 2 and 3). Class 1E Divisions 1 I
and 2 provide the two redundant safety related load groups. Each of the three load groups consists of its own:
- power suppl ies (4.16KY, 480 volts, 277 volts, 208 volts and 120 vo!ts AC)
- standby (on-site) diesel generator l x -
transformers
- cables and raceways
- 125 volts DC control and instrumentation power
- 120/208 volts uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) for essential Class 1E loads l - sol Id state programmabi e IogIc system for contrel, diesel generator load sequencing, periodic testing, and alarm indications Class 1E Division 3 provides power for Loop 3 decay heat removal sy stem.
i
' 8.3-1 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982 i>
..- -- .... _.o._ .
l i
Each of these divis!ons is separated physically and electrically from the other two divisions as described in Section 8.3.1.4, and has the capability to shutdown the plant safely. However, from the consideration of connected loads, Class 1E Divisions 1 and 2 provide power to redundant load groups and as such are referred to es redundant divisions. Class IE Division 3 provides Class 1E power to Loop 3 of the Heat Transport System (HTS) and to certain plant Non-Class 1E loads. (The Non-Class 1E loads are connected through an isolation subsystem). Since not all loads powered from Division 3 are identical or similar to those powered by Divisons 1 or 2, this division is not Idontiffsd as redundant to Division 1 or 2. However, as f ar as the HTS is concerned, the Divisions 1, 2 and 3 power supplies are fully redundant serving the Loops ;, 2 and 3 Class 1E loads, respectively. Each of these three Divisions is capable of shutting down the plant safely.
- 3.8KV and 4.16KV Distribution Svstem During normal operation, plant auxiliary power is provided by two (2) 50 percent capacity (50 percent capacity of total plant electrical loads, but 100 percent of loads for one safety division) unit station service transformers (USSTs) fed from the main generator through the 22KY isolated phase bus and the generator circuit breaker.
NRC Regulatorv Guldanca The folicwing pages provide discussion of design features which address the guidance of NRC Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.9, 1.22, 1.32, 1.40, 1.41, 1.47,
- 1. 53, 1.63, 1.68, 1.75, 1.93, 1.100, 1.106, 1.118, 1.128, 1.129, 1.131 and 1.137. Regulatory Guides are further discussed in Appendix I of the PSAR.
I 1
r l
8.3-la Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 i
82-2078
Paga - 1 [8,00] #22 8.3.1.1.1 Standbv AC Power Suoolv The Standby AC Power Supply is a Class IE system which supplies AC power to l
the Class 1E and certain essential Non-Class 1E loads when the Plant AC Power Supply, CRBRP Preferred Power Supply, and Reserve AC Power Supply are not avai l abl e.
The Standby AC Power Supply consists of three Class IE diesel generators, each sus plying power to its own saf ety group loads. Safety Division 1 and 2 are re undant to each other. The diesel generators are physically and e' actrically indeoendent of each other. The Divisions I and 2 diesel f nerators supf, power to redundant load groups. The diesel generators are J, zed in accordance with IEEE Standard 387-1977, supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 2. The total demand during an emergency condition when of f-site AC power supplies are unavailable is within the continuous rating of each diesel generator as indicated in Tables 8.3-1 A, 8.3-1B, and 8.3-1C.
Each ciesel generator is installed in a separate and independent diesel generator room. These rooms are located in a Seismic Category 1 structure and are capable of withstanding missiles as described in Section 3.8.4.1.4.
Auxil lary equipment, local control boards and excitation cubicles associated with each diesel generator are located in the same room with the diesel generator. Except for sensors and other equipment that must be directly mounted on the engine or associated piping, the controls and monitoring Instrumentation for the diesel generator unit are Installed on two (2) free standing floor mounted panels separate frm diesel generator unit skids.
The Diesel Generator sets are installed on their own foundations which are l
isolated fra the main building slab. The control panels are located on the floor area which is considered to be vibration f ree.
Cables for Standby AC Power Supplies will be Installed in their own separate division of the Class 1E raceway system. Cables and raceways of the Standby AC Power Supply will be marked in a distinctive manner as described in Section l
8.3.1.4 The fof Iowing support systems are those essential auxIIIary systems or j components required to start and operate the diesel generators,
- a. The Saf etv-Pel ated 125V DC Power System j Each diesel generator is f urnished with an Independent DC supply from the Saf ety-Rel ated 125V DC Power System. (Section 8.3.2 describes the 125V l
i Cl ass 1 E DC sy stem) .
- b. The Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storace and Transfer Svstem Fuel is provided for starting during initial operation using a shaf t driven pump teking suction f rom a day tank. Fuel is provided f or continuous operation using AC powered f uel transf er ptanps taking suction f rom the underground storage tanks to replenish the day tank f uel supply.
Each diesel generator is f urnished with an Independent f uel storage and transf er system. For detail s ref er to Section 9.14.1.
l 8.3-3
Pags - 2 [8,083122 i
C. Diesel Generator CoolIna Water System i
Each diesel generator is f urnished with an Independent cooling water j l support system. For detail s ref er to Section 9.14.2. i i
l i
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8.3-3 a 1
Page I (82-2263) [8,08] #27 Testina and Insoection The equipment will be tested and inspected at the vendor's f acility prior to delIvory. The system w11I also be Inspected durIng instalIation to conf f rm that design requirements have been met.
Initial operational system tests will be perf ormed with components Installed and connected to demonstrate that the system operates within design limits and meets the perf crmance specification, and to verify the independence between redundant AC power sources and Iced groups.
Af ter being placed in service, the standby diesel generators and their respective associated supply systems will be inspected and tested periodically to detect any degradation of the system.
The preoperational tests and periodic testing af ter the diesel generator units are pl aced in service will be perf ormed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Rev.1, d/77) . Detailed step-by-step procedures will os provided for each test. The procedures will Identify those special arrangements or changes in normal system configuration that must be made to put the diesel generator unit under test. Jumpers and other nonstandard configurations or arrangements will not be used subsequent to initial equipment startup 16 sting. During periodic testing, the diesel generator units will be operated at a load in excess of a minimum of 25% of rated Iced.
The folIoring tests wllI be perf crmed as a minimum:
A. Testing of diesel generator units during the plant preoperational test progran and at least once every 18 months (during ref ueling or prolonged pl ant shutdown) will be perf ormed to:
(1) Demonstrate proper startup operation by simulating loss of all AC voltage and demonstrate that the diesel generator unit can start autanatically and attain the rated speed (450 RPM) within 10 seconds. Verify that the generator voltage and frequency are at i
their rated values within 10 seconds af ter the start signal.
(2) Demonstrate proper operation f or design-accident-Iceding sequence to design-loed requirements in Tables 8.3-1 A, 8.3-1S, and 8.3-IC.
Verify that at no time during the Iceding seqwnce wit I the fre l
75%quency of nominal,and voltage decrease respectively. Verify that to theless than 9$%
frequency is of nominal a restored to 98% of nominal and the voltage is restored to 90% of nominal within 4 seccads f or each load sequence time interval.
(3) Demonstrate full-Iced-carrying capabil Ity for ar. Interval of not less than 24 .urs, of which 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> will be at a Iced equivalent to the continuous rating of the diesel generator unit and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at a Iced equivalent to the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rating of the diesel generator unit. Verify that voltage and frequency are maintained at rated val ues. The test wil I al so verify that the cooling system functions within design limits.
8.3-5 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
I Pag) - 3 [8,08] #22 installation is complete, pre-operational equipment tests and Inspections will be performed.
Initial pre-operational tests will be perf ormed with equipment and components installed and connected to demonstrate that the equipment is within the design limits and the system meets perf ormance specifications. Thi s test w il l al so demonstrate that loss of the Plant Power Supply and Of f site (CRBRP Preferred and Reserve Power) AC power supplies can be detected.
Periodic equipment tests will be perf ormed to detect any degradation of the system and to demonstrate the capability of equipment which is normally de-energiz ed.
Periodic tests on the Class IE 4.16KV switchgear and 480 volt switchgear circuit breakers will be performed by utilizing the following test methods:
- a. The operability of circuit breakers carrying current under normal plant operation will be demonstrated by their performance in supplying power, in addition, the circuit breakers will be tested in " Test" position at regular Intervals. During this test, the proper operation of the circuit breakers and the control circuits will be verified.
- b. Testing of circuit breakers of the standby equipment will be performed by racking the circuit breakers in the " Test" position. In the " Test" position, the main contact of the circuit breaker are disconnected, but the auxiliary and the control circuits are maintained. This f acilitates f unctional tests of the circuit breaker and its control circuit.
- c. The operability of safety-related circuit breakers will be demonstrated by their perf ormance in supplying power to saf ety-rel ated loads during scheduled load perf ormance tests, in addition, functional tests of the circuit breaker and its control circuit will be performed during plant refueling or prolonged plant shutdown.
Periodic tests of the transf er of power between the CRBRP Preferred Power Supply and Reserve AC Power Supplies will be perf ormed during prolonged plant shutdown or during ref ueling to danonstrate that:
- a. Sensors can properly detect loss of the CRBRP Preferred Power Supply and the Reserve AC Power Supplies,
- b. Components required to accompi ish the transf er f ran the CRBRP Preferred Power Supply to the Reserve AC Power Supply are operable.
8.3-15 l
Pcg3 - 1 (82-2148) [8,8] #33 l
t I
and provide uninterrupted powor to the Pi ant AC Distribution' System through 1 the main power transformer and the unit station service transformers. An c
electrical fault downstream of the generator circuit breaker will cause tripping of the 161KV circuit breakers in the generating switchyard. This w!!I result in the ioss of the power supply from the unit station service l
! transformers. Simil arly, an event which trips the turbine er reactor concurrent with the loss of OBRP Preferred Off site Power from the generating switchyard w11I also result in the Ioss of the power supply fran the unit i station service transf ormers.
f Fault sensing relays provided in the normal power supply and undervoltage sensors at each 13.8KV and 4.16KV sultchgear bus will Initiate the following l
' upon detecting a f ault or ioss of bus voltage:
A. Trip the supply circuit breakers f rom the unit station service transfcrmers.
B. Close the Reserve AC Power Supply circuit breakers from the two 50 percent capacity reserve station service transformers by means of a f ast dead bus transfer scheme.
Primary and backup f ault sensing relays have been provided in the normal power supply (Generator, generating switchyard, main step-up transf ormer and the Unit Station Service Transformers) and the reserve switchyard to perform the required protection of the electrical distribution system.
I Each f ault sensing relay provided In the normal power supply w!il actuate its respective lockout relay on sensing a f ault in the normal' power supply. The lockout relay will trip the normal generating switchyard (or OBRP generator) power supply incoming circuit breakers on the medium voltage switchgear, including the 4.16KV Class 1E switchgear. The tripping of these circult breakers will automatically initiate closing of the reserve of fsite power supply (preferred power) incoming circuit breakers on the medlun voltage switchgear using the early "b" contact of the normal power supply incoming circuit breakers.
The medium voltage switchgear busses are also provided with undervoltage sensors, which will also initiate tripping of the normal power supply circuit breaker and close the reserve power supply circuit breakers on sensing an t undervoltage condition on the bus. In the case of Class 1E, 4.16KV medium voltage switchgear busses, the detection of an undervof tage condition wIlI al so result in an automatic start signal to the energency diesel generator.
However, if the automatic bus transfer to the reserve power supply restores the voltage to the medlun voltage Class IE switchgear busses, the circuit breaker connecting the diesel generator to the W switchgear bus will remain open and the safety related Iceds will be powered from the reserve power supply.
A back-up breaker f ailure protection scheme is also provided in the event of the f ail ure of the above protection scheme. On f ailure of the f ault sensing rolay(s), the f ault sensing rolay In the generating switchyard roleyIng scheme w11I actuate another Iockout roley which w11I trip the 161KV circuit breakers in the generating switchyard, thereby isolating the medlun voltage switchgear fran the normal power supply and will Initiate the closing of reserve of fsite 8.3-19 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
I Pags - 2 ( 82-2148) L8,8J #33 power supply incoming circuit breakers as described above. Additionally, in the event that a f ast bus transfer is unsuccessf ul, a time delayed automatic bus transf er w Ill be accompi ished.
if this automatic closure of the reserve of fsite power supply incoming circuit breaker (s) is not accompt ished, the operator can manually close the reserve of fsite power supply incoming circuit breaker (s).
The CRBRP design includes capabil ity to test the transfer of power suppl ies among the plant power supply, the normal AC supply throtgh the generating sw itchyard, the reserve AC supply through the reserve switchyard and the onsite standby diesel generator power suppl les.
The sensors that detect the loss of power will be tested during plant operation or plant shutdown.
8.3.1.1.5 120/208 voit vital (Uninterruotible) AC Power System The 120/208 volt Vital (Uninterruptible) AC Power system is a Class IE system which is required to supply AC power to the Plant Protection System (PPS) ccntrol s, alarm and Indication and other Class 1E loads f or safe shutdown of the pl ant. The Plant Protection System (PPS), described in Chapter 7.,
generates signal s to actuate reactor trip, and perf orms other supporting f unctions in the event of an emergency condition.
The system is divided into three separate and independent load groups (Divisions 1, 2 and 3), each receiving AC power from a separate inverter through a static transf er sw itch. - Connections f or the 120/208 volt V Ital AC Power System are shown in Figure 8.3-2.
The normal source of power for the V ital AC Power Distribution buses are the inverters which are suppl led f rom their associated division DC power supplies described in Section 8.3.2.
Each 120/208 voit Vital AC Power System Distribution bus can al so recieve power from a Class 1E 480 volt motor control center which serves as a backup power source. Each of the distribution busos is connected to this motor control center through a static transfer switch and 480-120/208V AC regul ating tran sf ormer. Failure of an Inverter or its DC power source is sensed and the associated distribution bus is transferred automatically by the static transf er sw itch to the backup transf ormer suppl ied by the Cl ass 1E 480 voit meter control center. The transfer is accomplished at high speed and does not degrade the perf ormance of control and instrumentation loads.
8.3-19a
Pzgo - 3 (82-2148) [8,8] #33 i
l 8.3.1.2.1 NRC Raoul atorv Guide 1.6. Rev. 0 (3/71)
The Class 1E saf ety-related loads are physically and electrically separated i into three f unctionally redundant shutdown load groups (Divisions 1,2 and 3) such that Ioss of any two groups, incl uding a singie f all ure condif f on, w!! l f not prevent saf e shutdown of the pl ant. Only one load group is required to l '
l shut down the pl ant saf ely.
l Each AC Iced group will have connections to the CRBRP Pref erred Power Supply, l Reserve Power Supply and a Standby On-site AC Power Source. The Standby l
On-site AC Power source will have no automatic connection to any other
- redundant Iced group.
I l When operating fran the Standby On-site sources, redundant load groups and the redundant Standby On-site sources will be independent of each other as f ol l ow s:
- a. The Standby On-site source of one Cl ass 1E load group will not be automatically paralied wIth the Standby On-site source of another Cl ass IE load group under normal or emergency conditions.
- b. No provisions exist for automatically connecting one Class IE load group to another Class 1E load group.
- c. No provisions exist for automatically transferring loeds between redundant Class 1E power sources.
- d. Menually conneeting redundont Iced groups together w!!I require at least one interlock to prevent an operator error that would parallel such Stendby On-site power sources.
Each Diesel Generator unit consists of one diesel engine, one generator and required accessories.
The Standby On-Site Power Supply network has a provision to manually l
cross-connect the 4.16KV buses of the Division 1 and 2 power supplles in case of an extreme emergency. This connection will be put into service through l
strict adninistrative controls and must satisfy the following prerequisites:
a) There shalI be a total Ioss of of f-sIto power.
l I
b) One of the two redundant diesel generators f ailed to start and it is l determined to be Inoperable.
c) Critical safety-related f eeds associated with the operative diesel i generator have f ailed and become unavailable.
8.3-25 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
, -_m ..
Pags - 4 (82-2148) [8,8J #33
- If the above prerequisites are met, loads of either redundant Division 1 or 2 can be connected to the diesel generator of the other division for safe shutdown of the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.
Key and electrical interiocks and admintstratIve controls w11I be provided to
, ensure:
i i
8.3-23 a ee m+ + e
' ~ - - ' - , - - . , _ _ __
8.3.1.2.4 NRC Regul aterv Guide 1.29. Rev. 3 (9/78)
The Cl, ass 1E Electric Systems, including the auxiliary systems for the Onsite Electric Power Supplies, that provide the Class IE electric power needed for functioning of nuclear safety related equipment are designated as Seismic Category 1.
All electric devices and circuitry involved in generating signals that initiate protective action are designed as Class 1E.
All Class 1E equipment including the diesel generatcrs, 4.16KV Switchgear, Unit Substations, Motor Control Centers, Control Roan Panels, etc. are located inside Seismic Category I buildings and are designed as Seismic Category 1.
All non-safety-related equipment located in Seismic Category I buildings are designed to maintain structural integrity under a Seismic event and will not become missiles.
Those portions of structures, systems or components whose continued f unction is not required but whose failure could reduce the functioning of any nuclear safety related equipment to an unacceptable safety level will be designed and constructed so that the SSE would not cause such a f ailure.
Seismic Category I design requirements will extend to the first seismic rest.aint beyond the defined boundar.'es. Those portions of structures, systems, or components which form interf aces between Selsmic Category I and non-Seismic Category I features will be designed to Seismic Category I requi rements.
For seismic design classifications, refer to Section 3.2.1.
8.3.1.2.5 NRC Regulaterv Guide 1.30. Rev. 0 (8/72)
The Quality Assurance requirements for the installation, inspection and testing of instrumentation and electrical equipment during the plant construction, are those included in ANSI N45.2.4 supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.30 as foilows:
ANSI N45.2.4 will be used in conjunction with ANSI N45.2-1977.
ANSI N45.2.4 requirenents will be considered applicable for the I_nstallation, inspection and testing of instrumentation and electric equipment during the plant cperation.
8.3.1.2.6 NRC Regulaterv Guide 1.32. Rev. 2 (2/77)
The electrical separation and independence of redundant (Divisions 1 and 2) and Olvision 3 Standby AC Power Supplies conform to IEEE Standard 308-1974 supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.32 as follows:
8.3-26 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
~
82-2148
r'ag1s - 6 ( 82-2148) Ld,dJ #33 El ectrIcal independence between redundant Standby AC Power Suppl les wilI be in accordance wIth Regulatory Guide 1.6 as described in Section 8.3.1.2.1.
Phy sical independence between redundant Standby AC Power Supplles wlll be in accordar.ce w ith IEEE Standard 384-1974 suppl emented by Regul atory Guide 1.75 as described in Section 8.3.1.2.14.
8.3-26 a AM m. 4A
Pcga - 4 [0,08] #22
- c. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 of IEEE Std. 379-1972 are interpreted as not permitting separate f ailure mode analyses for the protection system logic and the actuator system. The collective protection system logic-actuator system as applicable f or the Class 1E electrical power systems is analyzed for singl e-f all ure modes which, though not negating the f unctional capability of either portion, act to disable the conpl ete protective f unction.
8.3.1.2.11 NRC Recul aterv Guide 1.63. Rev. 2 (7/78)
The electrical penetration assemblies in the containment vessel will be designed, constructed, qual if ied, installed and tested in accordance with IEEE Std. 317-1976, supplemented by Regulatory guide 1.63 positions as discussed
! herein.
The conductors and the electrical penetration assembly will be designed to f withstand the maximum short-circuit currents versus time conditions that could f
occur given single random f ailures of circuit overload protective devices.
l The duration of rated short circuit current is based on the operating time of I the secondary (backup) protective device or apparatus. The electrical penetration assemblies will be designed to maintain their mechanical and electrical Integrity in accordance with IEEE Std. 317-1976, IEEE Std. 279-1971 and Regul atory Gui de 1.63.
The dielectric-strength test qualification for medium voltage power conductors is in accordance with IEEE Std. 317-1976 supplemented by the impul se voltage test as described in Regulatory Guide 1.63.
Regulatory positions, C1, C2, C3, and C4 place additional restrictions on maximum shcrt-circuit current, x/r ratios, maximum short-circuit current duration and impulse voltage qualification testing on the electrical penetration assemblies in addition to the requirements of IEEE Std. 317-1976.
The project will comply fully with the requirements as set f orth in IEEE Std.
317-1976 and as modified by Regulatory Guide 1.63.
I 8.3.1.2.12 NRC Reculatory cuide 1.68. Rev. 2 (8/78)
Written procedures f or preoperational and startup testing f or the Plant AC Power Distribution System, Class 1E AC Power Distribution System, Standby AC Power Supplies and DC System will be developed. Format and content of these procedures will conf orm to the guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.68. For test program description, see Chapter 14.
8.3.1.2.13 NRC Reculatorv Guide 1.73. Rpv. 0 (1/74)
All Cl ass IE el ectric val ve operator assembl ies, for installation inside the contai nment vessel, wil l be designed, constructed, qual if ted, installed and tested in accordance with IEEE Std. 382-1972 supplemented by Regulatory guide 1.73 requirements.
Eech electric valve operator assembly will be designed and constructed to withstand the worst local environmental requirements (during normal or accident conditions) such as temperature, humidity, radiation, and sodium aerosol condition.
8.3 -29
Pogo - 5 [8,08] #22 8.3.1.2.14 NRC Reaulatorv Guide 1.75. Rev. 2 (9/78)
The electrical equipment and circuits comprising or associated with the Class 1E power system, Class 1E protection systems and Cl ass 1E equipment will be designed, qualifled and tested in accordance wIth IEEE Std. 384-1975, suppl emented by Regul atory Guide 1.75, " Physical independence of Electric Systems," positions as discussed herein.
The system will be designed so that the redundant equipment and circuits are separated in accordance with the criteria set f wth in paragraph 8.3.1.4.
The AC loads which are not Class 1E but are required f or plant availabil ity will not be connected to the redundant Class IE, Divisions 1 and 2 4.16KV buses, but will be connected to Division 3 switchgear through an Isolation device, which is designed as follows:
- a. The isolation system will consist of a 4.16KV ciruit breaker, a 4.16KV/480V high Impedance transformer and a 480V circuit breaker as shown in Figure 8.3-3. The I sol at t on sy stem w Il I be q ual If led as Cl ass 1E up to the load terminal s of 480V circuit breaker.
- b. The Impedance of the isolation systom w11I be hIgh enough so that for the worst possible f ault (three phase bolted f ault) on the Nm-Class 1E 480V bus, the fofIowing conditions wilI be met:
(1) The pick-up val ue of the overc;rrent relays protecting the Class IE 4.16KV main supply circuit breaker w11l exceed the maximian
' current (combined maximum Iced current and maximum fault current l contribution) flowing through the supply circuit breaker by a 2:1 margin.
(2) When the 4.16 KV Cl ass 1E bus is being suppI Ied f rom of f site power, the voltage at the bus will not drop below 80% of naninal.
When the Class IE bus is being supplied fran on-site (standby) power supply, the voltage at the bus will not drop below 75% of nominal. The voitage ievels of 80 and 75 percent of nominal are chosen to be the same as the alIorabie minimum voitage Ievels l
l during the sequential loading of the 4.16kV Class IE bus or during l
starting of the largest motor af ter the bus has been f ully f oeded.
- c. The Isolation system 480 volt and 4.'16KV circuit breakers will perform redundant isol ation f unctions. They will be stored energy devices and wIlI be physically separated.
- d. Diverse means (eloctro-mechanical and sol Id state) wil I be used f or f ault sensing and tripping cf the isolation system.
8.3-30 Amend. 72 Oct. 1982
Paga - 1 (82-2155) [8,8] #35
- e. The isolation systom w!!I be able to accept any singt e component f ail ure concurrent wIth the worst f ault on the Non-Cl ass IE 480V bus w ithout unacceptabl e consequences. (This does not incl ude short circuits on the 4.16KV portion of the isolation system since this is considered an extension of the Class 1E bus).
f.
Protective devices have been provided in the design to clear any fault on the Non-Class IE system such as phase to ground, phase to phase and three phase f aults within a reasonable time such that there is no -
degradation to the Cl ass 1E system.
- 1) A phase to ground f ault (which is the most likely mode of f ailure) on a Non-Class 1E circuit will have no ef fect on the Class 1E system since the Isolation system inct udes a 4.16kV/480V delta-wya connected transf ormer with the high resistance grounded neutral.
The neutral is grounded through a 55.4 ohm resistor which will limit the line to ground current to approximately 5 anperes. The Cl ass 1E 480 volt and 4.16kV circuit breakers will be tripped to clear a grotnd f ault in the case that the af fected Non-Cl ass 1E feeder circuit breaker f all s to trip.
- 2) Any phase to phase or three phase f ault on the Non-Cl ass 1E circuits will be Isolated by Instantaneous operation of the af fected branch feeder circuit breaker. Back-up protection is provided by fast operation of the Class IE 480 Volt circuit breaker (0.2-0.3 sec clearing time) or by the 4.16kV circuit breaker (0.6-0.7 sec clearing time). In addition undervoltage sensors are provided at the input terminals of the Class 1E 480 Volt circuit breaker. These undervoltage sensors will Initiate tripping of the Class IE 480 Volt and 4.16kV circuit breakers within f ive (5) seconds upon sensing the undervoltage caused by loss of power or f ail ure of the circuit breakers to clear a f ault.
- 3) Af ter the f ault has been cleared the voltage at the 4.16kV bus will be restored to a minimum of 90 percent of nominal within (2) seconds, which w11I alIow alI connected Iceds to operate continuously.
- g. The high Impedance transformer used as an isolation device will be subjected t6 a short-circuit withstand test as part of the shop testing program at the manuf acturer's f acil ity. Af ter the transf ormer has been energized a three phase f ault will be applied at the secondary windings f or the maximtan duration of the f ault. The purpose ,
of this test is to demonstrate the mechanical and thermal capabli ity ,
I of the transf ormer to withstand short-circuit stresses which the I transf ormer coul d experience and to verify the transf ormer current l imiting capabil Ity.
The system is designed to keep the number of associated circuits to a bare minimum. Associated circuits will comply with one of the following paragraphs of IEEE Std. 3S4-1974: 4.5(1), 4.5(2) or 4.5(3), and positions C.4 and C.6 of Regul atory Guides 1.75-1975.
8.3-31 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
Pag? - 2 (82-2155) [8,8] #35 The cable Installation design prohibits the use of cable spicing Inside the cabl e tray or conduit raceway system.
The physical identification of Cl ass IE equipment, cables and raceway systems are described in Section 8.3.1.5.
The design provides two separate cable spreading roons, one above the Control Roan and one bel ow it. The design does not permit location of any high energy equipment in the cable spreading rooms as required by IEEE Std. 384-1974. The criteria for routing of circuits in the cable spreading rooms is given in Section 8.3.1.4 to assure physical separation.
The Divisions 1, 2 and 3 Class 1E Standby Diesel Generator units are described i n Sect i on 8.3.1.1.1. The diesel generator units and associated aux!!!arles and control equipment are located in separate Seismic Category I structures having independent ventil ating systems. The circuits related to redundant Standby Diesel Generators are routed in accordance wIth the criteria specified in Section 8.3.1.4, to assure physical separation.
The Non-Cl ass 1E and Cl ass 1E DC batteries and related uninterruptible power supply (UPS) equipment are described in Section 8.3.2. DC battery and associated UPS equipment of each saf ety division is separated f rom equipm'.,nt of the other saf ety division by reinf orced concrete walls. The Class 12 batteries and UPS equipment are located in Seismic Category I structures. The phy sical separation of circuits related to each separate division of catteries and UPS system is in accordance with the criteria described in Section 8.3.1.4.
l 6.3-31 a Amand. 73 l Nov. 1982 l
~
psge e m -vout LO,OJ 31 8.3.1.2.20 NRC Reaul atorv Guide 1.118. Rev.1 (6/78)
DERP Design Criterion 16 (GDC 18) has been established to satisfy the requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971 and 338-1977 and Regul atory Guide 1.118.
This requires the design to provide for appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important areas and features, such as wiring, insulation, connections and switchboards, to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components to check the operability and f unctional performance of the system components such as on-site power sources, relays, switches, buses and the system as a whole under conditions as close to design as practical.
l l CFERP design will comply with the above criteria and as a result, it wl!i comply with IEEE Std. 279-1971, 338-1977 and Regul atory Guide 1.118. For details of compi lance refer to Sections 8.3.1.1, 8.3.1.2, 8.3.1.2.1 and 8.3.1.3.
- 8.3.1.2.21 NRC Recul atorv Guide 1.131. Rev. 0 (8/77)
The eloctric cables, fleid spi Ices and connections wIlI be designed, qualifled and tested in accordance with IEEE Std. 383-1974, supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.131, positions as discussed herein.
The medlum voitage cables, Iow voitage power and control cables, and Instrumentation cables are specified to be type tested and quellfled to the requirements of IEEE Std. 383-1974 and IEEE Std. 323-1974 supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.131 and to the design basis events described in Table 8.3-3. The f feld splicing of cables inside the cabie tray or conduit raceway system is prohibited in accordance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 384-1974 supplemented by Regul atory Guide 1.75. The environmental conditions for all cables include the maximum sodium aerosol concentration, along with the values of pressure, temperature, radiation, chemical concentrations, htsnidity and I time, and are specified as applicable to the design of the power plant.
8.3.1.2.22 IFFF Standard 308 - 1974 Class 1E AC and DC Power Supplles and distribution systems will be designed to conform to the requirements of Class IE electrical systems as discussed below.
AlI Class 1E eloctrical equipment w11I be specifled and qualifled for the i
environmental conditions such that no design basis event will cause loss of electric power to any loeds related to safety, surveillance or protection, thereby maintaining the safety of the plant at all times.
1 1 Loss of electric power to any single Class 1E equipment or to any Class IE division wlll not cause damage to the f ue1 or to the reactor coolant system.
i The Class IE system is capable of performing its f unction when subjected to the ef fects of a design basis event at its location. (See Tabl e 8.3-3) No significant radiation hazard to Class IE loeds has been identified for either normal or emergency conditions.
Class 1E loeds are designed to perform their Intended f unctions adequately for I the variation of voltage or frequency in the Class 1E electric system.
8.3-33 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 au nten
page 2 nez-0301 L5,8J 37 8.3.1.2.28 IEEE Standard 387 - 1977 The Standby AC Power Supply conf orms to IEEE Standard 387-1977 which includes requirenents f or capabil Ity rating, independence, redundancy, testing, analyses, qual Ity assurance, and identification.
8.3.1.3 Conformance with Anoroorfate OualItv Assurance Standards Assurance that equipnent and workmanship quality is maintained throughout the construction process is provided by conf ormance tc IEEE Standard 336 - 1971, "I nstal 1 ation, inspection, and Testing Requirements for instrimentation and Electric Equipment during the Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations". The methods used to accompi ish enf ormance are described by construction procedures and Instructions and in Chapter 17.0 of this PSAR.
8.3.1.4 Indecencance of Class 1E Svstems The following criteria is used to preserve the independence of Class 1E sy stem.
A. Gener al Seoaration of Cables bv Voltaae Class A raceway contains cables of only one class. Classes are based on the nominal t
util ization voltage of the cable and/or vul nerabil ity to spurious signal s.
Voltage Classes are:
15KV Class - 13.8KY AC nominal power
! 5KV Class - 4.16KV AC nominal power 600Y Class - 480-277 volt AC and 250 volt DC nominal power Control - 120V/208V AC,125V DC,120V AC nominal power and control Low level Instrumentation including digital and analog signals l
When cable trays are arranged in a vertical stack, the pref erable arrangement l
Is in order of voltage class, with the highest voltage at the top.
B. Cable Derattna Ampacity reting and group dorating f actors of cables are in accordance with the insul ated Power Cable Engineers Association Publ ication IPCE A-P54-440 and I PCE A-P46-426. Cable 3 are selected to minimize deterioriation due to l temperature, humidity, and radiation during design l ife of the pl ant.
Environmental 1ype tests for the expected environments will be performed on all cables and terminations. The tests w il l include radiation exposure, heat aging, and electrical measurements to assure that the cable will function in the design environment for the required time. Cable darating as a result of I
fire stops / seals are included in the design.
l 8.3-35 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 aa ay a- _ _ _
Page 1 82-2149 [8,8] 34 C. Racewav F f f f Cable tray fill will be limited such that the samation of the cross-sectional areas of cables in a tray section will in general be not more than 40% of the usable cross-sectional srea of that tray section.
Conduits will be sized for a maximum percent fill of the inside area of the conduit in accordance with NFPA 70 " National Electrical Code" Art. 346.
D. SealIna Raceway Blockouts and Wall and Flear Penetrations Fire stops will be Installed for cable trays wherever the cables pass through fire walIs and fIoors other than the Reactor Containment vessel . Cable and cable tray penetrations of fire baarriors are sealed to provide protection at least equivalent to that required of the fire barrier. Penetrations are quellf fed to meet the requirements of ASTM E-119, and IEEE Std. 634-1978. The actual fire ratings of stops and penetrations are determined by fire hazards analysis.
Fire stops, fire barriers, and air seals wilI be constructed of mestic type material s or elastomer modular construction materials qualif led in accordance wIth IEEE Std. 623 and ASTM E-119. Fire stop/ seal material will be canpatible with Insulation and conductor materials and will be shock, vibration, seismic, and radiation resistant in accordance wIth the area (s) penetrated.
E. Physical Saoeration of Class 1E Cables The separation design description for raceways, Class 1E circuitry and associated cabling given below Incorporates the requirements of IEEE Std. 3!V.-1974, Regul atory Guide 1.6 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75.
Losd groups, cables and raceways of a safsty-relatod system wIlI be sep.srated f rom load groups, cabl es, or raceways of other saf ety-rr. lated groups in accordance with the separation criteria described herein. This separation criteria will preclude a single f ailure within the saf ety-related system f ra preventing proper protective acticn at the system level when required. Raceways and cables will be elassifled by separation groups, namely Class IE DivIslon 1, Class 1E Division 2, Class 1E Division 3, and Piant Protection System. For the purpose of physical separation criteria Class 1E Division 1, 2, and 3 are treated as redundant divisions.
Cables designated in each division will be run in raceways separated f ran cables designated in other divisions and f ran Non-Cl ass 1E cabnes. Associated cabies w11I be separated as If they were CIass 1E pursuant to the Class IE division associated witn these cables.
Each division of Class IE equipment of Divisions 1, 2 and 3 are located in separate rooms which are separated by a minime of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers.
8.3-36 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
__ _ .. _ . ._ _ __ ~ _ _ _ _
Pag 3 2 82-2149 [8,8] 34 l
F. Seoaration Crfterta between Class 1E and Non-Class 1E and Associated Circuits
- 1. Seoaration of Cables Within Safetv-Related Panels Within safety-related control boerds and panels the separation between wiring of redundant divisions or of non-Class IE wiring from Class 1E and associated Class 1E wiring will comply with at i east one of the f ol Iow ing:
I) A minimum separation distance of 6 Inches vertical and horizontal will be maintained where the control board or panel material s are fl ane retardant.
II) An analysis will be perf ormed to determine the minimum separation di stance. The analysis will be based on tests perf ormed to determine the flane retardant characteristics of the wiring, wiring materials, equipment and other material internal to the control board or panel.
Ill) Barriers will be installed in the event the above separation distances are not maintained.
With in saf ety-rel ated control boards and panel s, non-Cl ass 1E wiring is not harnessed with Class IE or associated Class IE w iri ng. Associated Class IE wiring is harnessed with Class 1E wiring of the same division.
- 2. Seoaration of Class 1E and Non-Class 1E Cables All Class 1E and non-Class 1E cables will be routed in raceways consisting of cable trays and conduits. Each raceway will contain cable (s) of one Cl ass 1E safety division or a non-cl ass IE system i only. For the purpose of cable and raceway, the plant areas have been divided into six (6) separation zones as described in Section 8.3.1.4.
- 3. Seoaration Between Cable Travs and Conduits of Another Division A Class IE conduit will contain circuits of only one load division. In non-hozard zones exposed C1 ass 1E conduits are separated from trays of another division as described in Section 8.3.1.4E. In al? other separation zones the Class IE conduits are not routed w Ith ;reys of another division.
- 4. Criteria for the Seoaration of Third Division The Class 1E electrical distribution system consists of three Cl ass 1E divisions (Division 1, 2 and 3). Each of these divisions is designed to have physical and electrical Independence f rom the other two divisions as described elsewhere in this section. Each of these divisions is provided with an onsite (standby) diesel generator and has the capabil ity to shutdown the pl ant saf ely. ,
However, from the consideration of connected Iceds, Cl ass 1E 8.3-36 a Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
- ~
_ _ . _ _ _ . . 21 ". _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
Paga 3 82-2149 [8,8] 34 Divisions 1 and 2 provide power to redundant load groups and as such are described as redundant divisions in Sections 8.1.2 and 8.3.1.1. Class IE Division 3 provides power to heat removal system of Loop 3 and to important non-Cl ass IE loads through an i sol ation subsy stem. Class 1E Division 3 as stated above has the capabil Ity to shutdown the pl ant safely; howe ~er, since all the loads powered from this' division are not simil ar or identical to those powered by Division 1 or 2, this division has not been identified as redundant to Division 1 or 2.
- 5. Criteria for Seoaration Between Associated Cables and Non-Class 1E Cables The associated circuits as der tned in paragraph 4.5 of IEEE Standard 384-1974 will be considered as Class IE cables for the purpose of their routing and installation. The separation criteria between associated cables and non-Class 1E cables is the same as described in item 2 above for the separation between Class IE and non-Cl ass 1E cabl es. These cables, once Identified as associated with a safety division, will be routed and installed in a raceway of that division. Each associated cable will be uniquely identified as described in Section 8.3.1.5.
- 6. Seoaration criteria Before and After an Isolation Device The cables bef ore an isolation device are Class 1E circuits and are routed in Cl ass 1E circuits and are routed in Cl ass 1E raceway system in accordance wIth criteria described in item 2 above f or phy sical separation of Cl ass IE cabl es. The cabl es 'af ter the Isolation device are considered non-Class IE cables and are routed in non-Cl ass IE raceway system.
The minimum separation maintained between cables of each division varies according to cable location wIth respect to potential hazards. The design intent is to provide :eparation greater than the minimum listed where consistent w Ith a practical pl ant l ayout. Six general cl assifications of hazard zones or e as are defined for electrical separation consideration:
- 1. Non-Hazard Zones 1
Areas in which the only potential hazard is a fire of an electrical nature.
II. Fire Hazard Zones Areas in which a potenti :l fire hazard could exist as a consequence of i the credible accumulation of a significant quantity of fixed or transient combustible materials as defined in PSAR Section 9.13.1. -
lil. Eauloment Hazard Zone (Ploe Break Hazard Zone) i
( Areas in which a potential hazard could exist as a consequence of l
postulated pipe break events in high energy lines.
8.3-36b Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
- , _ . . -. ._ ,,n
.,. .. ~.,s u.,.a .,
IV. Cable Screadine Ronmc Areas just above and below the main control room where control and instrumentation cables converge prior to entering the control room.
V. Containment Electrical Penetration Areas The areas and assemblies that allow cable passage through the Containment Building pressure boundary.
VI. Control Room Continuously manned utilized by plant operators to monitor and control the plant.
Non-Hazard Zenes Redundant cables entering panels, cabinets or other equipment enter through separate openings.
In Non-Hazard Zones, no minimum vertical or horizontal physical separati on is provided between conduits of the same division beyond that required for construction, installation or access clearances between conduits and/or metal enclosed ducts, in Non-Hazard Zones, exposed conduits of dif ferent Class IE divisions are routed as far apart as possible, preferably on opposite sides of the walls.
Parallel reuting of conduits of different divisions is avoided, if the design makes it unavoidable a minimum of one (1) Inch spatial separation is provided between conduits of dif ferent Class IE divisions as shown in Figure 8.3-6.
When the safety related conduit cross or run parallel to anoth<sr saf ety related tray the minimum horizontal and vertical clearance is the same as provided for cable trays of dif ferent Class IE divisions, if this clearance is unobtainable, a barrier is provided between the safety-related conduits and cable trays of other Class 1E divisions as shown in Figure 8.3-6.
~
l 1
l 8.3-37 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 82-2149
Page 5 82-2149 [8,8] 34 i
l In Non-Hazard Zones, a minimum horizontal clear space of three feet is maintained between cable trays of dif ferent divisions as shown in Figure 8.3-6. If a horizontal clearance of less than three feet is unavoidable, a fire barrier is provided between the divisions as shown in Figure 8.3-6.
Vertical stacking of cable trays of illf forent divisions is avoided wherever possibl e. Where cable trays of dif forent divisions are stacked vertically, a minima clear space of five feet is provided between the divisions as shown in Figure 8.3-6. If a vertical clearance of less than five feet is unavoidable, a fire barrier is provided between tne divisions as shown in Figure 8.3H5.
F f ra Hazard Zones
(
in fire hazard zones, Class 1E conduits, trays, wireways or raceways of only one saf ety division are routed. This division is suitably protected by fire barriers and fire protections systems to mitigate the ef fects of fire in this zone on the saf ety function of the other saf ety groups.
_Epulement Hazard Zone (Ploe Break Hazard Zone)
To the extent practical, Class 1E cables are routed in areas remote f ran high energy piping or areas of potential sodim fires; if unavoidable, the following precautions are taken:
a) CIERP has three (3) Class 1E Divisions with complete physical separation between divisions. Any damage to cable trays caused by pipe whip missles, jet Impingement, or environmental ef fect will be Iimited to the same safety divisloa to which the pipe belongs, and the two other div i si ons capabl e of saf ety sh utti ng down the - pl ant w il l remain unaf f acted.
Additional protection will be provided against any single Class 1E Division cable tray damage due to high energy pipe whip missiles by restraint of hign energy pipe lInes in the vicinity of Class IE racew ay s. The design of restraints and/or barriers will be determined by analysis to meet BTP APCS 8 3-1.
b) Redundant Class IE circults are routed or protected such that a postulated event in one system and division cannot preclude the operation of the other redundant system or division.
c) In alI areas of the plant, the separation between redundant CIass 1E cable raceways takes into censideration the presence of rotating equipment, monoralls, equipment removal paths and dropped equipment such that f ailure of rotating equipment will not cause f ailure of more i than one safety division and any dropped equipment will not cause f alI ure of any saf ety-rel atod raesways.
d) In general, Class 1E electrical distribution equipment (e.g.,
sw itchgear, motor control centers, etc.) is not located in areas where l high energy piping or other similar hazards are located.
l l
t 8.3-38 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
rays i sez-etoes to,o; no l I
i l l
action. Separation of C1 ass IE circuits is maintained through penetrations.
No Class IE cables share penetrations with Non-Class IE systems, other than associated Class IE cable systems.
Control Room Cables in the Control Roan are kept to the minimurn necessary for operation of the Control Roan. All cables entering the Control Room terminate there.
Cab!es are not Instalied in culverts or fIoor trenches.
Cables are not routed in a concealed celling or under floor spaces unless installed in a sol Id enclosed steel raceway.
Seoaration of Non-Cl ass 1 E Cables (Non-Saf etv-Rel ated)
The separation design description for Non-Class 1E circuitry fran Class 1E and associated cirecits .given below incorporates the requirements of IEEE Standard 384-1974 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75.
The trays carrying Non-Class 1E circuits are separated form the trays carrying Class 1E and associated circuits by a ministan horizontal clear space of three (3) feet and a minimisn vertical clear space of five (5) feet between the tray s. If a horizontal clearance of less than three (3) feet is unavoidabl e, a fire barrier is provided between the safety and non-saf ety related trays.
! Vertical stacking of saf ety and non-safety related trays is avoided wherever possibl e. Where saf ety and non-stf ety related cable trays are stacked vertically and a vertical clearance of less than five (5) feet is unavoidable, a fire barrier is provided between non-safety and safety related trays, in Cable Spreading Rooms a minimtsn clear separtion on one (1) foot horizontal and three (3) feet vertical is maintained between trays carrying Non-class 1E cables end trays carrying Class IE and associated cables. If the minimum horizontal or vertical separation does not exist, a fire barrier is provided.
Non-Cl ass 1E and Class 1E exposed conduits are routed as f ar as possible, pref erably on opposite sides of the walls. Parallel routing of safety related I
and non-saf ety rol ated conduits is avoided. If the design makes it unavoidable a minimum of one (1) Inch spatial separation is providou between non-saf ety rel ated and saf ety rel ated conduits.
Seearation Between Associated Cables and Non-Class 1E Cables The associated circuits, as defined in paragraph 4.5 of the IEEE Std.
384-1974, which become associated wIth Class IE cabiIng remain wIth the Ciass IE cables of the same division, or are separated in accordance with the above given requirements for physical separation of Class 1E cables. The associated cables are uniquely identified in accordance with Section 8.3.1.5.
8.3-40 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 n?-??u
Paga 2 tt82-0944 [8,8] 27 Secaration Criterfa Before and After an Isolation Device The cables bef ore an isolation device are Class IE circuits and are routed in Class 1E raceway system in accordance with criteria given above for physical separatton of Class 1E cabies. The cables af ter the Isolation device are non-Class 1E celes and are routed in non-Class 1E raceway system in accordance t.ith criteria given above for separation of Class IE and non-Class IE cabics.
PIant Protection Svstem (POS) SeoaratIen The PPS will meet the separation requirements of IEEE Std4 384-1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 and the fof IowIng:
a) All PPS wiring external to control panels is run in conduit, with wiring for redundant channels run in spearate conduits. Only PPS wiring is included in these conduits. Primary shutdown system wiring is not run in the same conduit as the secondary shutdown system wiring, b) Wiring f or each Primary PPS instrument channel (RI A, R18, RIC) is routed in separate conduits.
c) Wiring for each Secondary PPS instrument channel (S2A, S28, S2C) is routed in separate conduits.
d) There are dedicated containment penetrations f or 'each of the th'ree Primary PPS Instrument channel s and each of the three Secondary PPS instrument channel s which pass through containment. All requirerents for separation of PPS wiring in raceways are utilized for separation of PPS wiring through containment penetrations.
e) All wiring for the three Containment isolation System Instrument l channel s is routed exclusively with the three Primary PPS Instrument channels, or exclusively with the Secondary PPS instrument channels or through three independent conduits, f) The Primary PPS Logic Train Actuation wiring is routed through at least three separate conduits f rom three separate Primary PPS Logic Train Panels to the Primary PPS Scram Breakers. One conduit contains w iring f rom only one Primary PPS logic train, g) The Secondary PPS Logic Train Actuation wiring is routed through at least three separate condults f ran the Secondary PPS Logic Panel s to the Secondary Control Rod Solenold Valve Actuation wiring in the Head Access Area.
l 1
8.3-40a
Page 6 82-2149 L8,8] 34 h) Contalment isolation System (CIS Logic Train Actuation wiring is routed through two independent conduits. One condult contains wiring f ra only one CIS Logic Train. No Intermixing of CIS Logic trains within a conduit is permitted. CIS Logic Train 1 wiring is routed l fra CIS Logic Panel 1 to CIS Breaker 1 in the Intermediate Bullding.
CIS Logic Trian 2 is routed f ra CIS Logic Panel 2 to CIS Breaker 2 in the Intermediate Bullding.
- 1) The wiring f rom a PPS buf fered output which is used for a non-PPS purpose may be included in a PPS rack. The PPS wiring is separated f rm the non-PPS wiring. The amount of separation is def ined on an Individual case bests; however, it is designed to meet the requirements of IEEE Std. 384-1974 and Regul atory Guide 1.75.
j) Containment isolation valve actuation wiring (for either manually or autmatically Initiated actuation) to the Inside contairvnent and the outside containment isolation valves are separated as Olvision I and Division 2 cabi Ing, respectively.
k) Rigid, metallic, completely enclosed and unvented raceways are considered acceptable for any of the above appiIcations as they are equivalent to rigid metal condult, as defined in IEEE Std.100 and NFPA 70.
- 1) The physical separation between PPS conduits, containment penetrations, or panel s Is in accordance with IEEE Std. 384-1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 to provide assurance that a credible single event cannot simultaneously degrade redundant protection chantrols or shutdown systems.
m) The Primary Steam Generator Auxit lary Heat Removal System (SGMRS) channels and logic outputs are treated and separated as Primary PPS signal s. The primary SGMRS logic outputThe is kept separated f rom the Secondary SGMRS channels Secondary SGMRS logic output channel s.
and logic outputs are treated and separated as Secondary PPS signal.;.
The Secondary SGMRS logic output is kept separated f ra Primary PPS, CIS and non-PPS outputs. Redundant SGMRS logic train outputs are separated f orm each other. The manual trip and reset inputs to each SGMRS divisional latch logic are rcuted and separated as redundant PPS signals separated form the automatic SGMRS logic outputs and all other PPS and non-PPS channel s.
8.3-41 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
page I mad-uv42 t % es 43 .
T/ ELE 8.3-2c C1 ASS 1E DIVISION 3 125V DC IO/D t g '
NORMAt_ f11 NAX. (I)NT. EERMNCY f *)
t.QAD-ADPS ADFS DURATION "DtWKS inaq rf trmiPTION 4 4 0-120 MIN.
SGAHRS - STEMt TumlNE G0fERNOR (X)NTROL (1 IW) 208 227 FIRST I MIN. (IOTE 3) 120 VAC BUS 12NIE008C 182 EXT 14 NIN.
AS IWERTER LOAD EXT 105 HIN.s 165 18.2 II.2 0-120 MIN.
D.G. Q)NTROL PANELS LOCAL AND N04 (0.7108)
D.G. FIELD FLASHilG (7,500f) - 60 FIRST I MIN.
4 38 FIRST 1 NIN. -
4.16kV SflTOGEAR AND Asf USS BREAKER LOAD '
4 NEXT 119 MIN.
227 340 FIRST I NIN. _
TOTAL IN N FS EXT 14 NIN.
204 '
1 84 EXT 105 MIN. ,
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' Ncw. I982
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NON-MAIARD 10Nt5 - NON HAIARD T.0WE5 FIGUR.E 8.3-G i
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FIGUR.E 5.3-G ARRANGEMENT FOR V5TICAL 5AFETY EEUITS C1055lNG OTWER CLASS 15 DIV!!!ON CABLE TRAYS SOH-HAZARD ZONES. -
4 9.3-1f
As discussed in Section 15.5.2.4, an unlikely accident releasing radioactive cover gas f rom the reactor leads to a site boundary dose well below the guicel ine val ue of 10CFR20.
9.1.4.7 Safety Asoects of the Reactor Fuel Transfer Port Adactor and Fuel Transoort Port Cooline Inserts The reactor fuel transfer port adaptor (see Figure 9.1-19) is positioned on top of the reactor fuel transfer port and extends f rom the reactor head to the bottom of the floor valve which is located at the elevation of the RCB oper ati ng f l oor, it serves as an extension of the reactor cover gas containment and provides shielding when irradiated core assemblies are removed f rom the reactor. The adaptor also guides cooling air from an air blower to a cooling insert inside and below the adaptor.
The f unction of the cooling inserts, located around the EVST and FHC fuel transf er ports as well as the reactor port (see Figure 9.1-19), is to remove decay heat should an irradiated core assembly in a sodium-filled CCP become immobilized in a f uel transfer port during transfer between the reactor vessel, EVST or FHC and the EVTM.
9.1.4.7.1 Desian Basis The design bases f or shielding and radioactive release of the f uel transfer port adaptor are the same as f or the EVTM (see 9.1.4.3.1). The reactor, EVST,
,and FHC f uel transfer port cooling inserts have the capacity to remove decay heat f rom 20 KW Irradiated core assemblies in sodium-filled CCP's to prevent exceeding the 1500 E spent f uel cladding temperature limit specified for l unlikely or extremely unlikely events (Table 9.1-2).
9.1.4.7.2 Desien Deserlotion Tha reactor f uel transf er port adaptor extends f rom the upper surf ace of the f uel transf er port in the reactor head to the operating floor, see Figure 9.1-19. The upper surf ace of the reactor fuel transfer port adaptor consists of a flange which is bolted to the floor valve and provides the sealing surf ace for the double seals on the lower surf ace of the floor valve.
l Shielding is provided by a thick, annular lead cylinder surrounding the I adaptor cover gas containment tube over its entire length to limit the dose rate at the shield surf ace to less than the limits given in Sections 12.1.1 and 12.1.2. The lower part of the adaptor is bolted to the reactor head during ref ueling only.
The reactor fuel transfer port cooling insert extends f rom the top flange of the adaptor to the f uel transf er port nozzle. The cooling insert uses a cold wall cooling concept, similar to the EVTM. The CCP containing a spent f uel assembly is cooled by thermal radiation and conduction across the argon gas gap to the cold wall which forms the confinement barrier for the reactor cover gas. Ambient air is blown down the outside annulus of the cooling insert, and discharges into the reactor head access area. Air flow from the blower is adequate to limit the cladding temperature of a 20 KW fuel assembly to less than 1500 F.
9.1-61
Pcgs - 1 82-0946 [8,9] 39 This system is an alternate means of data and voice communications between CR3RP and other TV A generation and transmission f acilities and TVA Control Centers.
9.11.2.5 Maintenance Communications Jackino System (MCJ)
The system consists of sound powered headset / microphones and Jack stations.
Each headset / microphone contains a transmitter / receiver and need be only pl ugged into a jack station for operation.
The purpose of this system is to f acilitate the testing and calibration of equipment instrumentation and to provide for a fixed communications system for ef fective response to an emergency. The MCJ system may also be used for the support of remote plant shutdown. Jack stations are arranged and located where required throughout the pl ant. The 01BRP MCJ System consists of six loops distributed throughout the pl ant. The Reactor Containment Buil ding, the Steam Generator Building, Diesel Generator Building, Control Building, and Reactor Service Building have one loop each. The BOP buildings and areas will be covered by one additional loop. Each of the loops consists of three circuits and can accommodate three concurrent conversations. All Jack station loops are connected to the Control Room patch panel. where connections can be made to permit ine six building loops to communicate with one another. All Nuclear Island Jack station loops are also connected to a patch panel located on the remote pl ant shutdown panel . The user wears a headset / microphone assembly, plugs the cable into either a Jack station or a panel rock mounted Jack and thereby has hands-free canmunications.
9.11.2.6 VHF Radio Station The VHF Radio Station is provided to transmit emergency voice communications l
between the CRBRP Control Room and the TVA Power Production Emergency staf f operations of fice. The CRBRP VHF Radio station transmits at 163.175 megahertz and receives at 170.075 megahertz. The radio will be frequency checked in accordance with FCC regulations and be given frequent operating checks.
9.11.2.7 Portable Radio System This system consists of a number of selective all portable radios i (walkie-talkies) with paper and voice actuated microphone that transmit a low l power signal to the base station and its comparator. The comparator selects l the strongest signal received f rom a satellite receiver (voting system) and then wire transmits the amplified signal to the base station which in turn retransmits the amplified signal.
l The portable units have the capability to communicate among themselves on an al ternate f requency.
Fixed repeaters which permit use of portable radio communication untis are protected f rom exposure to fire damage by fire rated cabinets.
9.11-5
rays - a sc4 vussi Lo,sJ **'
9.12 LIGHTING SYSTEMS The Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant is provided wIth normal standby and emergency lighting systems using fl uorescent, high Intensity discharge (HID),
and incandescent l uninaires. The Normal Lighting System provides Illumination under alI normal plant operating conditions wIth power avalIable fram the Pl ant, Preferred, or Reserve power supply systems. The Standby Lighting System provides adequate ilIunInation under alI normal and emergency plant operating conditions w ith power avail able f ran the Plant, Pref erred, Reserve or Class 1E Onsite AC Power System. Under an emergency condition, resulting in loss of all of fsite power sources, the Standby Lighting System will be powered f ran the Cl ass 1E onsite AC power system (Emergency Diesel Ge~nerators) . Both Normal and Standby Lighting Systems utilize high pressure sodium and fl uorescent I ight f ixtures. The Emergency Lighting System provides adequate illunination at points of egress, in the Control Room, at remote shutdown locations and at all locations required for access to safety-related eq u i pment. The Emergency Lighting System util izes sel f-contained ladividual eight(8) hour rated battery powered units with sealed beam lamps and sel f contained eight(8) hour rated battery powered exit signs.
All lighting fixtures in Nuclear Island buildings are seismically qualified to maintain structural integrity in accordance with IEEE Std. 344-1974. The I ighting fixtures and raceways are supported to meet Seismic Category I requirmnents as described in Sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 of the PS AR.
The Standby Lighting System is classified as 1E up to and including the i Ighting panel . The circuits to Standby Lighting System light fixtures are al so 1E and are routed to maintain required separation from Non-Class 1E or Class IE cables of other divisions as described in Section 8.3.1.2. How ever, the i Ighting f ixtures are Non-Class IE, and as such, the circuits f rom the l Ighting panel s to the l ighting fixtures af the standby lighting system are considered associated IE.
9.12.1 Normal Lichtina System This system provides pl ant l ighting under all normal pl ant operating conditions with power avail able f rom the Pl ant, Pref erred, or Reserve Power Supply Systems by connection to the non-Class 1E AC Power Distribution System.
The Normal Lighting System is AC powered at 120/208VAC or 277/480VAC, 3-phase, 4-wire, in general, high pressure sodium luminaries are used in high ceiling areas and the fl uorescent l uninaries in all other areas including the main control room.
9.12-1 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 n? ngos
i l
Pega - 2 (82-0693) [8,9] #42 The normal lighting system will be designed for a high degree of availabil Ity.
A given area or cell of the plant will be Illuminated by luminaries connected to at least two dif ferent power circuits, where practical, thus preventing darkness due to the outage of one power circuit. In inaccessible cells, where remote view ing devices are used, spare l uminarios, normally of f, will be provided to allow for lamp bl owouts throughout the design l if e of the pl ant.
Accessible l uminaries will be l ocated to f acil itate ease of maintenance and rolamping oporations.
In general, wiring of all plant lighting systems will be designed and installed in accordance wIth the applicable sections of the National Electric Code.
! 9.12.1.1 Desion Bases l
l The plant i Ighting systems shall be designed to provide lilumination of pl ant f acilities to meet the following design objectives:
l l
l a. Provide illumination of pl ant components, f acil ities, and control l
locations to the level recommended by the IES Handbook, i
- b. Provide illunination of access ways and means of egress for the safety of pl ant personnel in accordance w ith "Lif e Saf ety Code" NFPA 101, Sections
( 5-8 thru 5-10, and the Standard Buil ding Code, Sections 1123 and 1124.
- c. Provide a lighting system which is ef ficient, rol table, and maintainable, i
within practical l im its.
Luninaires f or a particul ar area of the plant shall be selected based on the f ol l ow ing criteria:
- a. In l arge, high ceil ing areas (i.e., mounting height greater than 10 feet) high intensity discharge (HID) luninaires w il l be used.
- b. Outdoor f acilities and general site areas shall be Illuminated with HID l um inai res.
, c. In areas where HID l uninaires cannot be used, fl uorescent or incandescent i l uninaires will be used. Choice of incandescent or fluorescent will be I based on economic evaluation of capital cost, maintenance cost, l
rol labil ity, and ef ficiency.
l 9.12-2 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982
Page - 3 (82-0693) [8,9] #42 9.12.2 Standbv Lichtina Svstem This system provides adequate illumination under all normal and emergency
! pl ant operating conditlens wIth powor avalI able f rom the Pl ant, Preferred, i
Reserve, or Standby Onsite AC Power System by connection to the Class IE AC
~
Power Distribution System. The Standby Lighting System is AC powered at 120/208VAC or 277/480VAC, 3-phase, 4-wire. The Standby Lighting System contributes to the general Il l umination of the pl ant.
9.12.2.1 Des fon Bases
( a. The standby iIghting system w111 Illuminate those areas of the plant where ill umination is required for operation or maintenance of saf ety-rel ated equipment and provides an illumination of 20 foot candles.
- b. The standby iIghting system wIlI be supplled by the Class 1E Standby Onsite AC power supplies, Class IE diesel generators, under loss of all 4
offsIte powor sources.
- c. Luminaires will in general, be interchangeable with l uminaires util Ized f or the normal pl ant lighting system.
- d. The standby 1ightIng system wlll be designed to be avail able upon the complete loss of Pl ant, Preferred and Reserve Power by connection to the Class 1E diesel generator during the first load block.
- e. The standby Iighting system wIlI be separated into three Independent l ighting divisions, each division supplied by one of the Class 1E AC power supplles. Enh divIslon w!!I provide ilIumination to the equipment of the same division areas.
9.12.3 Emercenev Lichtlne System This sytem provides Illtsnination at points of plant egress, Control Roan and l remote shutdown areas during loss of pl ant, preferred and reserve AC power.
The Emergency Lighting System operates only during loss of normal or standby l ighti ng. The Emergency Lighting System provides one foot candle illumination, per NFPA 101,. Section 5-8, and IES recommendation, in all egress routes and where access is required for fire fighting in areas containing saf ety-rel ated equipment. The emergency iIghting system util izes sel f-contained Individual eight (8) hour rated battery powered units with sealed beam Iamps and sei f-contained eight (8) hour rated battery powered exit signs f or a period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, per Branch Technical Position (MB 9.5-1, paragraph 5g. In the Control Roan, fluorescent .Iighting provided av all operator work stations will be powered from the plant Class IE uninterruptible power ,
supplles (UPS) system and will provide an Illumination of minimum 10 foot l candles, in accordance with the requirements of Section 6.1.5.4 of MJREG 0700, during loss of all of fsite power.
9.12-3 Anend. 73 I
Nov. 1982 I -- -_ - _ _ - - _
Pcg3 - 4 (82-0693) [0,9] #42 9.12.3.1 Des fon Bases
- a. The emergency lighting syttom will be designed to meet the requirements of the "Lif e Safety Code", ifPA 101, and IES Handbook f or filmination and j identification of means of ogress in all plant areas. The system shall r al so provide Illmination of panel s at remote shutdown locations.
- b. The emergency Iighting system wIlI ilIisninate the points of ogress including the intersections of hallways, stairways, and corridors, to a minimtsn required level .
- c. The emergency lighting system will be capable of Illuminating the points of egress and remote shutdown areas for a period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to meet the Intent of NRC Branch Technical Position APCS 8 9.5-1. The equipment util Ized to supply emergency iIghting w IlI be set f-contained, Individual eight hour battery units with sealed beam lamps. Areas provided with standby lighting will have the emergency lighting units float charged from the standby iIghting panels such that the emergency iIghting units only provide Illumination during the time necessary for energization of standby lighting (diesel generator start) or complete loss of standby onsite AC or j
loss of power to the standoy lighting panel.
I
- d. The emergency lIghtIng system wIlI provide sol f contalned, battery powered, portable hand lights which will be used in unanticipated emergency situations requiring supplementary iIghting. These units shall be f ully charged and conveniently available to plant personnel when l
' needed. These portable hand lights will only be used in case of a bonaf ide plant emergency. Portable hand I ights are provided to meet the intent of NRC Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5, Appendix A, B.5(a).
Emergency lighting in the Control Room will utilize fluorescent fixtures powered f ra the pl ant Cl ass 1E uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
- e. Exlt signs IdontIfyIng points of egress wIlI be compietely sei f contained (battery, charger, and components wIthin exit sign housing) meeting the requirements of NFPA 101, Section 5.
9.12.4 Desfen Evaluation The Standby Lighting System provided for the Control Rom Drive Mechanism Roms, Switchgear Rooms and other remote shutdown areas is interrupted for ten seconds if both the preferred and the reserve AC power suppl les f all. It is energized autmatically upon Initial loading of the diesel generator. Where practical, the standby lighting system will be separated into three l ighting divisions, each division supplied by one of the Class 1E power supplies. Each division shalI pravide ilItaninatIon of the equipment of the same division 9.12-4 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982
~
)
Pcge - 5 (82-0693) [8,9] #42 areas where appl Icable. During the time Interval when the diesel generators are starting af ter the loss of of fsite power or when all AC power is lost, the emergency lighting system prwides essential Il l unination. The energency lighting prwided in the Control Room will be powered from the plant Class 1E uninterruptible power supply (UPS), which will remain operational under all modes of pl ant operation inci uding emergency conditions. ThIs system w II I prwide an illunination of minimun 10 foot canales during loss of of fsite power per NUREG 0700 Section 6.1.5.4 l
l i
l t
9.12-5 Anend. 73 Nw. 1982
l P gs 1 82-0947 [8,9] 66 l
9.13 PLANT FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 9.13.1 Non-Sodium Fire Protection Svstem The Non-Sodium Fire Protection System (NSFPS) provides the plant with equipment, piping, val ves, detectors, instrumentation and controls to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a non-sodium fire. Table 9.13-1 shows the areas covered by the Non-Sodlum Fire Protection System. Fire Hazard Zones are areas in which a potential fire hazard could exist as a consequence of the credible accumulation of a significant quantity of fixed or transient I combustibl e material. I 9.13.1.1 Desian Bases
- a. Fires that could indirectly or directly af fect Seismic Category I saf ety-related structures, systems and components are identi fied in Tabl e 9.13-2. Potenti al fire hazards which provide the base for the design of the fire protection system in areas containing engineered saf ety-rel ated structures, systems or components, are sel f-contained t ube oil systems, diesel generator fuel oil system, electrical cable insul ation, and activated carbon f ilters. The intensities of the maximum fires involving the above combustible materials are listed in Table 9.13-2 and described bel ow.
l These maximum fires, together with lesser Intensity design-basis fires, j
have served, via a preliminary fire hazards analysis, as the bases for the selection of fire protection measures taken will be confirmed in conjunction with a more detailsd fire hazards analysis which will be provided in the PS AR.
Lubricatina Oil The maximum fire involving lubricating oII would develop in the turbine lubricating oil equipment located in the Turbine Generator Building and would have an intensity of 20,000 BTU /lb. Fire from this source does not invol ve saf ety-rel ated areas and saf e shutdown of the pl ant wil l not be jeopardized.
Diesel Generator Fuel OII i
The largest potential source of fire f rom f uel oil is in the vicinity of l
the standby diesel generator f uel oil storage tanks, located below grade
' adjacent to the Diesel Generator Building. As these tanks are located below grade, the chance of an accident is reduced. Physical separation provided between the two tanks limits 9.13-1
page 1 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 9.j 4 0IEEEL GENERATOR AtlXlLfARY SYSTEM 9.14.1 Olesel Generator Fuel Of f Storace and Transfer System 9.14.1.1 Design Bases The emergency diesel engine fuel oil storage and transfer system (EDEFSS) provides f uel oil storage and transfer capability for the operation of the
- three (3) emergency diesel pnerator units. The EDEFSS is comprised of the f uel oil storage tanks, the f uel oII transfer pumps, day tanks, the Interconnected piping up to the diesel engine Interconnection and the l
Inctrumentation required for the operation, monitoring and testing of the sy stem.
Each diesel generator shall be provided with a fully independent f uel oil storage and transf er system. Interconnections shall not be provided between the systems. The Independence of these systems shalI be maintained by the Independence of the electrical power supply to the system components. Tne l active components for each fuel oil supply train shall have adequate l
redundancy to prevent f ailure of the system due to a single active component f ail ure.
9.14.1.1.1 Seisnf e and Oualitv Groun cf assif femtion a) The entire EDEFSS Including all components and piping shall be designed to Seismic Category I requirements, b) The Qual 'ty Group class f or the EDEFES system shall be Qual ity Group C, except f or the engine and alI casted diesel vendor suppl led components, incl uding the f uel oil filters and the f uel oil storage tank. The design of the engine and alI casted diesel vendor supplled components shalI meet the requirements of ANSI N195 and B31.1 and the Diesel Engine Manuf acturers Association (DEMA) Standards. (The interf aces between the the engine-mounted components and the external part of the system shall be clearly identified on the design draw ings. ) In lieu of the Quality Group C (ASE Section lil, Class
- 3) design for the f uel oil storage tanks, concrete tanks with steel l
liners designed in accordance with the ASE Section Vill requirements I is acceptable.
c) The design, construction and maintenance of the EDEFSS shall be in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.28 and ANSI N45.2-1977.
l 9.14-1 Amend. 73 l
' Nov. 198.2
page 2 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 9.14.1.1.2 General Arrananments a) The location of the Diesel Generator Building and the part of the f uel oil supply system located outside of the Diesel Generator Bullding shalI assure the independence of the three (3) EDEFSS supply trains. The fire separation between the EDEFSS trains shall be maintained in accordance with BTP OEB 9.5-1. The Diesel Generator Building and the associated equipment located outside of the building shall be placed outside of the turbine missile trajectory range, b) The components of the EDEFSS shall be ircated to provide adequate space for inspection, eleenIng, maintenance and repair of the system.
c) The day tanks to the emergency diesel generator shall be located in the Diesel Generator Bullding and separated f rom sources of fires or Ignition in accordance with the requirements of BTP QEB 9.5-1. The location of the day tanks shall be in accordance with the requirements of diesel engine manuf acturers and it shall take into account the not positive suction head requirements of the f uel pumps to assure the automatic start of the diesel generator unit. If a booster pump is required for starting the diesel engine, a rol table power supply sha;l be provided to assure the oil supply : luring the l
engine start cycle or until the f uel oil pressure is established by the engine drive pump. A day tank overflow line shall be provided to tha f uel oil storage tank f or the return of the excess f uel oil dof Ivered by the transfer pump. The piping f ran the f uel oil day tank to the diesel engine shalI be protected from heat sources and Ignition sources. The vent iIne f rom the fuel oil day tank shall be provided wIth fI ame arrestors.
9.14.1.1.3 Fuel Off Suentv a) The capacity of the fuel oil storage tanks shalI be established on the basis of the continuous seven (7) day operation of the diesel generators at their f ull loaded capacity. The method of calculation shalI be in accordance wIth ANSI N195, Paragraph 5.4.
b) Procedures shalI be estabt Ished to assure fuel oil delIvory to the site wIthin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during emergency conditions and extremely unf avorable environmental conditions. These procedures shall consider the potential fuel oil suppilors within a 100 mile radius and shall take into consideration the expected delIvory distances and road conditions for the establ ishment of the del Ivory time.
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l 9.14-2 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
paga 3 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 c) The design of the EDEFSS shalI assure the maintenance of fuel of f qual Ity and the prevention of the f ailure of the diesel engine due to oil degradation or contamination. Procedures shalI be establ ished (1) for the sampiIng and analysis of the newly delivered f uel oII,
( 2) for the periodic sampiing of the onsite stored fuel oil, (3) for the monitoring and removal of the potential accumulated water fran the storage tank, and (4) for the detection and prevention of organic material growth, l.a. al gae, in the f uel oil storage tank. These procedures shall be developed in accordance with the requirements of Regul atory Guide 1.137 and ANSI N195.
The diesel fuel oil storage tank shall be equipped with flav distributors on the fill lines to minimize the turbulence of the sediment in the bottom of the storage tanks. The f il l box f or the diesel fuel oil storage tank shall be provided with water-tight seals to prevent entrance of water and other contaminants including micrcrblological organisms. Additionally, procedures shall be established for the filling of the storage tanks to prevent entrance of any deleterious material as a consequence of adverse environmental conditions. This procedure shall specify the use of an inlet filter durIng f uel del Ivory.
d) The EDEFSS buried components shalI be protected against internal and external corrosion. The coating system and cathodic system for the buried portion of the system shall be in accordance wIth ANSI N195 and Regul atory Guide 1.137 requirements.
9.14.1.1.4 Protection f rom Natural Phenomena & Missiles a) The design of the EDEFSS system shall bs Seismic Category I and the buil ding housing the system shall also be Seismic Category i design.
The location of the Diesel Generator Building and externally placed auxiliaries shall prevent f ailure of the system due to a potential f ail ure of a non-Seismic Category I structure. The Diesel Generator Building and the storage tank and other external equipment shall be protected f ran tornados, tornado missiles and floods. The f!Il and vent point for the storage tanks shall be located higher than the potential maximtsn flood level. The tornado missile protection for '
the fuel oil storage tanic and associated buried piping sha!I utilize
- either appropriate thickness of earth cover or concrete missile shiel ding or the combination of botis.
l I
9.14-3 Amend. 73
. Nov. 1982
page 4 W82-0694 [8,93 43 b) The EDEFSS shalI be protected fran the consequences of moderate energy pipe i Ine f ail ures. High energy pipe Iines, except the diesel engine exhaust pipe, shall be excl uded f rom the Diesel Generator Bull ding. Postuiated piping f alIures shalI be evalusted in accordance wIth BTP ASB 3-1 and the location shall be established in accordance w ith BTP EB 3-1. The design of the piping systems shall util ize supports, restraints, spray shields and adaquate floor drain system to prevent direct Impingement of water on the diesel engine or electrical components and to prevent flooding of the Diesel Generator B ull ding.
c) The design of the Diesel Generator Building and the EDEFSS system shall be in accordance with BTP OEB 9.5-1 to minimize the potential and consequences of f f res.
9.14.1.1.5 TestInc. SurvefIIanca and QualIftentton l a) The design of the EDEFSS shall include provisions for testing of the system to verify the parameters of operation. The design shall l
consider and select the location of instrisnentation sensors and shall incl ude status Indication and al arm features. The sensors shalI be i accessible and designed to permit insp6ction and cal !bration in-place.
b) The EDEFSS shalI be provided wIth survellIance, instrumentation to provide status indication and f acIIItate trouble identification and diagnosis, c) The EDEFSS design shall provide for inservice inspection and testing in accordance with ASE Section XI requirements. The acceptable method of the Inservice inspection requirements shall be in accordance w ith Regul atory Guide 1.137, Paragraph C.I .e and ANSI N195.
d) The minimum instrumentetion for the EDEFSS shalI include ievel Indication and alarms for the f uel oil storage tanks and f uel oil day tanks, dif ferential pressure Indication for the fuel oil transfer pum p, Inlet filters, and temperature Indication to assure that the l
" cloud point" requirements for the f uel oil are not violated. .
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l 9.14-4 Amend. 73
- Nov. 1982
9.14.1.1.6 fpolleable codes and Standards
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Sel ection, Design and Qualification of Diesel-Generator Units As Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems At Nuclear Power Plants"
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.115, " Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles"
- 3. ' Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification" 4 Regulatory Guide 1.137, " Diesel Generator Fuel O!! Systems"
- 5. ANSI Standard N195, " Fuel Oil Systens for Standby Diesel Generaters", American Nationa! Standards institute
- 6. Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postul ated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment" (attached to SRP Section 3.6.1)
! 7. Branch Technical Position hEB 3-1, " Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment" (attached to SRP Section 3.6.2) t
- 8. Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, "Gu l dc l i nes for Fire Protection f or Nuclear Power Plants" (attached to SRP Section 9.5.1)
- 9. Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB), " Diesel Generator Protective Trip Circuit Bypasses" (attached to SRP 8.3.2, Appendix l 8A) l
- 10. IEEE Standard 387"lEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel Generator i Units Applied As Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power l Generating Stations" l
l 11. Diesel Engine Manuf acturers Association (DEMA) Standard
- 12. NUREG/CR-0660, " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator l Rel iab i l I ty" ,
9.14.1.2 Svstem Descriotion The Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transf er System f or the three (3) diesel generator units is designed to provide Independent storago and transfer capacity to supply No. 2 diesel fuel oil to each diesel generator unit cperating at f ul l load f or a period of at least seven (7) days.
l 9.14-5
psge 6 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 The f uel oil storage tanks are embedded in concrete in the yard adjacent to the Diesel Generator Building to provide adequate missile protection. The f uel oil day tank for each diesel engine has a capacity of 1,1D0 gallons. The Diesel Generator Building, diesel fuel lines, pumping systems, and tanks are designed to Seismic Category I requirements, and are designed to withstand the i
environmental conditions defined in Chapter 3.
The fuel oil system for each diesel unit is completely separate from other diesel units thus assuring that a f ailure in one (1) diesel unit will not af fect other diesel units. To make the system more rol lable, redundant -
transfer pumps for pumping diesel fuel from the storage tanks to the day tanks have been provided. Al so, two (2) pumps are provided to pump f rom the day tank to the diesel engine, one (1) shaft driven and one (1) motor driven.
The design code requirements for the system are as follows:
a) Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Seven (7) Day Storage Tanks - Code for l UnfIred Pressure Vestel s, ASE SectIon V llI, DivIslon 1. These tanks are embedded in Seismic Category I concrete structures and serve l essentially as i Iners.
l b) Piping and Coaponents f rom Fuel OII Seven (7) Day Storage Tanks to Diesel Generator Units - Boller and Pressure Vessel Code, ASE Section Ill, Cl ass 3.
i c) Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tanks - Boller and Pressure Vessel Code, ASE Section 111, Cl ass 3.
d) Diesel Engine and alI casted diesel vendor supplled components including the f uel oil filters - ANSI N195, B31.1 and DEMA Standard.
The Division 1 and Division 2 Fuel O!! Systems each consist of two (2) fuel oil storage tanks, two (2) redundant transf er pumps, a day tank, two (2) fuel pumps and associated piping and controls. The Division 3 Fuel Oil System consists of one fueI ofI storage tank, two (2) redundant transfer pumps, a day tank, two (2) f uel pumps and associated piping and control s.
For the Division 1 and 2 Fuel Oil System, each of the two transfer punps are to be capable of pumping f uel oil from both storage tanks. Each storage tank is provided with Independent level Indication and an alarm will be provided if the f uel oil level in the tanks becomes unequal Ized.
9.14-6 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
page 7 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 l
i l A Seismic Category I truck fill connection for the storage tank has a locked f IlI box w Ith a watertight gasket seal to prevent the entrance of water or other contamirates, inci uding microbiological organians. Connections and riser piping are provided for testing and for removal of condensate and sediment. The storage tank is l Ightly sloped toward the test riser. Test samples, water, and sediment will be removed with a portable pap. the pump suction w11I be Inserted into the tank through the test riser. AlI fili and test connections are located above maxima flood elevation.
Al l inlet I ines to the fuel oil storage tanks are provided "with flow 1
distributors to minimize the creation of turbulence in any sediment at the bottom of the tank.
Each f uel oil storage tank size is 35,000 gallons and the storage capacity for each diesel generator exceeds the requirements of ANS N195.
t Level transmitters are provided on each fuel storage tank to furnish signals f or the following f unctions:
a) Provide local fuel level indication.
b) Annunciate an alarm in the Main Control Room when the f uel level drops below a seven (7) day supply.
c) Annunciate an alarm in the Main Control Room on high level.
d) Permissive interlock for each of the two (2) transfer pumps to lock the pumps out if fuel level is below five (5) percent of tank gross vol me (sedimentation space).
j A 1/16 Inch corrosion allowance is provided in the design wall thickness for the embedded f uel oil storage tanks. The interiors of the tanks are coated wIth Hable Oil Company's Rustban No. 357 or equal for added corrosion protection. The fuel oil piping and fittings wIthi the Diesel Generator Building have more than ample corrosion allowance and have been designed per the codes noted above.
Two (2) electric motor driven f uel oli transfer peps are provided for each engine to transf er f uel fra the f uel storage tank to the day tank. Each of these pumps is independently capable of supplying adequate fuel to the day tank. Each pop is powered fran a Class 1E power source. Its capacity is approximately four (4) times the engine full load conseption rate at adequate head to of fset system friction loss. Motor horsepower is suf ficient to drive 9.14-7 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
pIge 8 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 1
the pump without overloeding. The pumps are high l if t, sel f-priming (with a foot valve on the tank suction riser), and the NPSH required will not exceed the NPSH avail able. Each transfer pump is provided with a separate duplex strainer equipped wIth high dif forenttal pressure indicating alarm switch.
Each transfer pop is al so provided with a discharge pressure gauge. The common discharge header is provided with local flow and temperature Indicators.
Each day tank is located in the Seismic Category 1 Diesel Generator Building in a cel l separate f rom the engine It' serves. No ignition source exists In the day tank room, in accordance wIth the requirements of olesel engine manuf ac-turers, the tank elevation provides flooded suction at both fuel pumps, but is not located over 20 feet above the crankshaf t centerl ine.
Two (2) sets of level switches are provided for each day tank. The level switches are arranged so that one(1) transfer pump wIlI be the primary pop and the other a backup. A selector switch is provided on the engine control cabinet which will alla the operator to administratively select the primary transf er pump. In addition, these level switches provide both local and Main Control Roan alarms to indicate high and low fuel oli level in the day tank.
Fran the day tank, fuel is supplled to the diesel injectors by a shaft driven pump. An electric motor-driven f uel pump, powered f rom a Cl ass 1E power source, is provided as a backup for f .e engine driven f uel pump. Separate suction and discharge I ines serve each pump. Each pump has a suction dupisx '.
strainer with dif ferential pressure and outlet pressure indicators and discharges through a duplex filter located downstraam frem the discharge junctlon. Each f11ter is provided wIth dif forential pressure Indication, outiet Iow pressure switches, and Int et and outiet pressure gauges. Fuel oil ~
pressure is monitored Just upstream of engine injectors. Low fuel oil pressure is indicated on the Diesel Engine Control Panel.
Fuel del ivery data, sources, and the distances to be traveled to the site will be provided in the FSAR.
High qual ity and rol table diesel fuel will be assured by purchasing only No. 2 diesel fuel oil which compiles wIth Federal Specif Ication YV-F-800C or equlvalent.
The diesel generator has a minimum design temperature of 40 F (for all postulated environmental conditions) thus assuring that f uel oII temperature remains well above cloud point. No direct method of Indicating, controlling, or monitoring f uel oil temperature is provided, other than temprature Indication fcr flow measurement purposes.
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9.14-8 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 i i
p:ge 9 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 1
l Fuel oII outline specifications are as follows:
Maximum Minfmum Viscosity, S.S.U. at 100 F ~ 45 32
- Grav Ity, Dog. A.P.1. 38 26 Sul phur, 5 1.05 -
Sul phur, Corrosion Test Pass Pass (Copper Strip, 3 Hrs at 212 F) 0.20 -
Conradson Carbon, % 0.10 -
Ash, % 0.50 Water & Sediment, 5 Fl ash Point, F (P.M.C.C.) 150 or legal Pour Point, at Ieast 10 F below col dost f uel oil temperature Cl oud Point, less or equal to coldost f uel oil temperature DISTILLATION, F 90% Point 675 IGNITION QUALITY Cetane Number 45
- Heat Val ue - determine from A. P. I . gravity limits shown to determine total or net Btu /lb or gallon.
The diesel generator units, including all engine mounted components, are qual if led to the normal and accident environmental conditions. This quel lf ication is done by testing the particular equipment or by inf erence f rm tests done on simil ar equipment. The environmental design and qual if ication is in accordance wIth the criteria of IEEE Stendard 323; "lEEE Standard for Qual Ifying Cl ass IE Equipment f or Nuclear Power Generating Stations".
The Diesel Generator Building, the walls separating the three (3) diesel generator roms, day tank roms, and transfer pump roms, and the systems within the roms are designed to Seismic Category I requirements.
The f ailure of one (1) Diesel Generator System therefore will not af fect the other two (2) units, t The Seismic Category I walls separating the three (3) engine roms are l
designed to contain the misiles and shrapnel that might be generated by the i rupture of a moderate energy fluid system or by a crankcase explosion.
Initial flooding f rom a cooling system break wilI be Iimited and w11I be handled by the drainage system.
9.14-9 Anend. 73 Nw. 1982
p:ge 10 W82-0694 [8,93 43 All systems and structures in the Diesel Generator Building or near the f uel oil storaga tanks and piping are designed to Seismic Category I requirements, or are qual ifled to moet the criteria of IEEE Standard 323. .
9.14.1.3 safety Evaluation The diesel fuel is stored in tank assembiles embedded in a concrete Seismic Category I encasement and separated by a minimum of 12 inches of concrete; therefore, each diesel generator unit is assured of having at least a seven (7) day fuel supply for any emergency condition. The Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank Assembl les, piping, and pumps are arranged so that mal function or f ailure of either an active or passive component associated with one (1) l diesel generator unit wIlI not Impair the f uel oil supply to other units.
1 Each diesel generator is located in a separate bay to prevent a single f ailure f ran rest:lting in loss of more than one (1) Diesel Generator Unit. The system thus, n.eets the requirements of the single f ailure critarla.
! All fuel connections and vents to the atmosphere are above maximurn flood el ev ati on. The vents are fl ameproof ed. Fire sprinkler protection is provided l
in each Diesel Generator Building.
[
The fill boxes for direct filling of the fuel oil storage tanks are locked to prevent unauthorized access. The emergency diese! fuel oil system w flI w Ithstand alI postui ated natural phenanena wIthout adverse of f acts on f uel oli q ual Ity.
All connections to the fuel supply tanks enter the top of the tanks and are designed and located such that an inadvertent line break for any cause will not siphon the contents of the f uel oil storage tanks. Bottom drains are not provided.
9.14.1.4 Insoection and Testina Raoutrements The electric motor and engine-driven f uel oil transfer pumps and day tanks are f unctionally tested in the vendor's shop in accordance with the Manuf acturer's j
standards to verify the performance of the Diesel Generator Units and i accessories. The f uel oil transfer planps in the Diesel Generator Building are I tested in the Manuf acturer's f actory to verify their performance. The embedded f uel oil storage tanks are hydrostatically tested to 39 psig prior to shipment to the plant site.
l 6
l 9.14-10 Anend. 73 i Nov. 1982
l l
p29311 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 f
The entire Diesel Fuel Oil System is flushed with oil and then functionally tested at the pl ant site. The diesel fuel oil system wilI be periodically tested. The diesel generators shall be test operated for a minimtsn of two (2)
! hours at least once per 31 days on a staggered test basis. Portions of these I surveillence requirements include the following:
l l
a) Verify the proper f uel oil levels in the day tank, i
b) Verify the proper f uel oil level in the Diesel Generator Building embedded f uel oil seven (7) day storage tank assembi les.
c) Verify that the fuel oil transfer pumps can be started and that they can transfer fuel fran the storage system to the day tank.
Precautionary measures that wIlI be taken to ensure the quality and rel labil Ity of the f uel oil supply for energency Diesel Generator Operations are as follows:
! a) Onsite sampi Ing wIlI be conducted as per ASTM D270-65 (Reapproved 1975) and analyzed to comply with Federal Fuel Oil Specification VV-F-800a.
b) Sample analysis prior to receipt of new fuel oil will incl ude f
' specific gravity, flash point, and a visual Inspection to detect any sediment or water content. Sanples will be collected at this time for future analysis to ensure empt lance of the purchase spect f Ication.
l c) As part of the operability test, sampies wIli be collected and l analyzed f or viscosity, water, and sediment f ran the f uel oil storage tanks on a quarterly basis.
l Fuel oil which has degenerated wIlI be pumped out, discarded, and rept aced.
Other control measures to be taken at a minimisn of once a month wIlI be as f ol I cw s:
a) Sanple will be visually checked to detect water accumulation in the f uel storage tanks and the day tanks checked for condensate accumulatlon.
1 9.14-11 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982 l .-
pago 12 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 b) Sample and test the f uel storage tanks for microbiological growth and for residual concentration of microblocide. The sampi Ing and testing shail be done in accordance wIth the microbiocide Manuf acturer's Instructions. Add microblocide as required to restore the original concentration. The microblocide shall be a commercial product such as B lobor JF, Nal co 8256 or 2210, or equal .
9.14.2 Diesel Generator Cool Ino Water Svstem 9.14.2.1 Deston Bases The Emergency Diesel Engine Cool Ing Water System (EDEWS) provides cool Ing water to the three(3) emergency diesel engines. The EDEWS comprises of a standpipe or expansion tank, an engine driven Jacket water pump, a parallel motor driven pump, a shelI and tube Jacket water cooler, a jacket water keep w arm sy stem, Interconnecting piping and instrumentation required for the operation, monitoring and testing of the system.
Each diesel generator shall be provided with a f ully independent engine cool ing water system. Interconnections shall not be provided between the sy stems. The independence of these systems shall be maintained by the independence of the electrical power supply and emergency plant service water supply to the system components. The active components to each cool ing water train shall have adequate redui,dancy to prevent f ail ure to the system due to a singt e active component f ali ure.
9.14.2.1.1 Seismic and Qualltv Groun Classification a) The entire EDE W S, including all components and piping, shall be designed to Seismic Category I requirements.
b) The Quality Group class for the EDEW system shall be Quality Group C except f or the diesel engine and all casted diesel vendor supplied components. The design for these components shall meet the ANSI B31.1 and DEMA standard requirements.
c) The qual Ity assurance for the design and construction of the EDErwS shall be in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.28 and ANSI N45.2-1977.
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9.14-12 Anend. 73 l Nov. 1982 l
L , e f, .
p:ge 13 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 .
i 9.14.2.1.2 Tkneral Arrananments
- )
a) The locatfM of the three(3) emergency diesel, generators in separate -
calls of the Diesel Generator Building shatt / usure the Independence .,
of the three(3) EDEWS supply trains. The f16 separation between f li the EDEWS treins shall be maintaber) In a'ccErdance with BTP OEB 9.5-1. The DJssel Generator (Bull Cing Mall 'be pl aced outside of the turbine missile trajectory. yf, s 9
b) The canponents of the,ELEOd shall be located to provide adequate ,
space for inspection, cleaning maintenance and refair of the system.
c) The highest point of the EDEWS shall be provided with a vent to atmosphere to assure that alI spaces are filled wIth water.,
. i 9.14.2.1.3 coolIno water Sagaly -', '
a) The EDEWS system shall be provided with chemical additives to cf '
precl ude long-term corrosion and organic foul ing that woul d degrade f system coo' Ing perf ormance. Chemicals used shall be compatible with material s rf the system and shall be as recommended by the engine
! manuf acture. s. ,
y b) A Jacket water keep warm system shall be provided for each'EDEWS to enhance the engine "f Irst try" starting rollabil ity while the engine ,
is in the standby mode.
)!
c) A three-way thermostatic valve shall be provided for each EDEWS so '
that the proper coolant temperature is maintained at the engine inletj * '
g, by controlling ficw.through the Jacket water cooler, s
\
d) Procedures shalI be estabiished to periodically inspect and analyze the EDEWS for systom Isakage.[ ,
,/
3 G ,'
9.14.2.1.4 Protection from Natural Phanomena & Missiles <>
d' l h a) The design of the EDECM system shall be Seismic Category I and the N building housing the system shall also be Seismic Category I design.
The location of +1's Diesel Generator Building shall prevent f ailure of the system due to .e potential failure of a non-Seismic Category I structure. The, Diesel Generator Bull ding shalI be protected f ran torrado, tort. ado miss!!e ard floods.
i f
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s 9.14-13 Anend. U Nov. 1982
1 pIge 14 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 l
b) The EDEWS shall be protected f rom the consequences of moderate energy pipe i Ine f ail ures. Higher energy pipe l ines shal l be '
j excl uded f rom the Diesel Generator Buil ding. The postulated piping '
i f ailure shall be eval uated in accordance with BTP ASP 3-1 and the location shall be established in accordance with BTP EB'3-1. The design of the piping systems shall utilize supports, restraints, spray shields and adequate floor drain system to prevent direct Impingement of water on the diesel engine oc electrical components and to prevent flooding of the Diesel Generator Building.
c) The design of the Diesel Generator Building and the ECEWS shall be in accordance wIth BTP OEB 9.5-1 to minimize the potential and consequences of fires.
9.14.2.1.5 TestInc. Surve!IIance and Qualification a) The design of the EDEWS shall include provisions for testing of the system to verify the parameters of operation. The, design shali consider and select the location of instruentation sensors and shall incl ude status indication and al arm features. The sensors shall be accessible and designed to permit inspection and calibration in I place.
b) The EDEWS shall be provided with surveillance instruentation to provide status Indication and f acilItate trouble and diagnosis.
c) The EDEWS design shall provide for Inservice inspection and testing in accordance wIth ASE Section XI requirements, d) The minimum Instrumentation for the EDEWS shall include level Indication for standpipe or expansion tank, pressures at the engines and coolers, and temperatures at the engines and coolers to permit operational testing of the system and to monitor operating paraneters of the system.
9.14.2.1.6 Aeol teable codes and Standecia
- 1) Regul atory Guide 1.9, "Sel ection, Design, and Qucl if ication of Diesel Generator Units Used As Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems at Nuct ear Power Pl ants"
( 2) Regul atory Guide 1.26, Nual ity Group Classif ications and Standards f or Water , Steam , and Radioactive-Weste-Containing Components of '
Nuci ear Powor Pl ants"
- 3) Regul atory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Cl assif ication"
- 4) Regulatory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Programs for Water Cocied Reactor Power P1 ants" 9.14-14 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
p ge 15 W82-0694 I" .] 43 I l
- 5) Regulatory Guide 1.115, " Protection Against Low Trajectory Turbine Mi ssil es"
- 6) Regul atory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Cl assif ication"
- 7) Branch Technical Position AEB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Contaltunent", attached to SRP Section 3.6.1.
- 8) Branch Technical Position EB 3-1, " Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment", attached to SRP Section 3.6.2.
- 9) Branch Technical Position ICS8-17 (PSB), " Diesel-Generator Protective Trip Circuit Bypasses", attached to SRP Section 8.3.2, Appendix 8A,
- 10) Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, "Guidel Ines'f or Fire Protection f or Nuclear powre Plants" attached to SRP Section 9.5.1.
- 11) IEEE Standard 387, "IrEE Standard Criteria for Diesel Generator Units Appl led as Standby Power Suppl les or Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
- 12) Diesel Engine Manuf acturers Association (DEMA) Standard
- 13) MJREG/CR-0660, " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Rei labil Ity" 9.14.2.2 Svstem DeserIotIon
' A Closed Loop Jacket Circulating Water Cooling System 10 f urnished for each of the three (3) diesel generator units. The Diesel Generator Building which houses the three (3) units is designed to Seismic Category I requirements, and is designed to withstand environmental ef fects as deHned in Chapter 3. Each unit, with its dedicated support systems, is located in a separate roon. Each jatkat water system consists of a standpipe or expansicn tank, an engine
! mounted pump driven f rom the accessory gear train, a parallel motor driven l
pump, a shell and tube Jacket water cooler, and a jacket water keep warm l sy stom.
A shell and tube t ube oil cooler rejects heat into the Jocket circulating wator cool ing systom.
f The shell and tube Jacket water cooler rejects heat into the Emergency Plant i
Service Water System. The coolers f or the Divisions 1, 2 and 3 engines reject
! heat into the Emergency Plant Service Water Systems A, 8, and C trains, respectively.
9.14-15 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982
pige 16 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 I There.are no shared auxillary suppor't systems for the Divisions 1, 2 and 3 diesel generators. Each safety division diesel generator system is supplied w ith DC power and AC control power from the same saf ety division. Therefore, the diesel generator is set f supporting.
The Divisions 1, 2 and 3 diesel generators, are independent of each other.
Division 1 and 2 diesel generators are each redundant to each other. Each engine is capable of operating wIthout emergency plant service wator system cooling water flow for the time required to start diesel engines, and bring
[
the emergency plant service water pv3p up to speed.
- Normal makeup water to the diesel gerarator cooling water system is drawn from l the Seismic Category iII demIneralIzod water system.
The caponents other than the diesel engine and alI casted diesel vendor supplled components are designed to Seismic Category I and to ASE Code Section ill, Class 3 requirements.
i The diesel engine and alI casted diesel vendor supplled components are designed to the ANSI B31.1 and DEMA standards. The engine and engine mounted components are tested and qualified to the normal and accident environmental conditions. The environmental design and qualification meet the criteria of IEEE Std. 323.
Each cooling water system consists of a standpipe (Division 1 & 2) or an expansion tank (Division 3), a motor driven auxiliary pep to operate. in parallel with the engine mounted, accessory gear caso driven pump, and connections to make-up water and to Emergency Plant Service Water. The tube side of the lubricating oil cooler is in the circuit to reject heat from the IubrIcatIng ofI systom into the jacket water cooling system.
! The Jacket water closed loop flow is fran the standpipe or expansion tank to the circulating peps, to the Jacket water cooler, to the oil cooler, to the engine, and back to the standpipe or expansion tank.
I The standpipe or expansion tank is vented to atmosphere at the high point of the system to assure that all system components are filled with water.
The standpipe or expansion tank has reserve capacity to of fsat the evaporation through the vent and leakage through the pop shaf t seals for seven days at rated load. Al so, a low water al arm is provided for each system.
(
9.14-16 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
(
pIge 17 t82-0694 [8,9] 43 To standpipe or expansion tank also is provided with a nozzle for adding wator treatment chemical s to the Jacket water. Corrosion protection wIlI be provided by using a commercial preparation in accordance with the diesel engine manuf acturers recommendation. This will prevent corrosion in the Jacket water passages in the engine, and on the Jacket water side of all components and equipment in the system.
An electric heater is Installed in the standpipe to maintain Jacket water temperature above 125 F when the engine is not running. The keep warm pep circulates water f rom the heater through the engine and back to the system.
The check valves in the main and auxillary circulating pep discharges prevent the fim from bypassing the engine. The heater and keep warm pump control circuits are interlocked in the engine starting and running control circuits such that they are doenergized when the engine is running and energized when the engine is not running. The electric heater is provided with a control thermostat and a high-high temperature trip and lockout, and manual reset.
The motor driven auxiliary circulating pep operates continuously in parallel wIth the engine driven pump when the engine is running. The pop is powered i
f ra a Class 1E AC source. This pep serves as backup for the engine driven p um p.
The Jacket water cooler is a shell and tube heat exchanger designed to reject into the emergency plant service water system the heat picked up by the Jacket water circulating system at rated engine load.,
A three way thermostatic valve maintains Jacket water temperature out of the engine between 170 F to 180 F by bypassing hot water around the Jacket water cooler. The yalve is set f-contained wIth internal thermostatic capsules positioning the pl ug. The's are no penetrations through the body or cover of l
this valve, theref ore, thure is no leakage to atmosphere.
(
The cooling water pressure, temperature, and level gauges are provided on the engine, on equipment, and on the engine control panel for monitoring engine operation. In addition, the following alarms and trips are provided at the engine control panel . Selected alarms are relayed to the mnIn control rom.
The trips are disabled if the engine is started under mergency conditions.
l
- a. Standpipe or Expansion Tank Level: Low Level Alarm I
- b. Cooler Pressures High Alarm l c. Cooler Pressure: L a Alarm J. Teograture in Engine: Low Alarm l
9.14-17 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
- e. Pressure in Engine: Low Alarm
- f. Pressure in Engine: Low-Low Trip 810 psig
- g. Tenperature out Engine: High Alarm
- h. Tenperature out Engine: H!gh-High Trip 8 200 F Potential leakage points on the engines are the main headers, the cylinder Jackets, the governor cooler, the turbocharger air af tercoolers, the turbochargers, and the exhaust Jackets. Potential leakage points of f the engines are the Jacket water cooler and the oil Cooler.
The regular surveil lance scheduled f or the diesel engine will check for the f ol lowing symptoms:
a) If oil leaks into the Jacket water system, the oil will appear in the standpipe or expansion tank overflow, and leakage will be evidenced by an abnormal decrease in oil sump l evel .
b) If Jacket water leaks into the oil system, sump level will increase, water wil l appear in the sump drain and the oil cooler drain, and the standpipe l evel wil l decrease.
c) If Jacket water leaks into the emergency plant service water system, the standpipe level will decrease.
d) If emergency plant service water leaks into the Jacket water system, the standpipe level will increase to overflow and the concentration of water treatment chemical will decrease.
Leakage to atmosphere will be evidenced by water dripping on the floor. If leakaga occurs, the f ault will be repaired, the systems will be repaired, the unit will be tested, and it will then be returned to available status.
The water treatment chenicals will prevent corrosion on the jacket water side and minimize the possibil ity of leakage.
When the engines are first run in, bolts will be retcrqued af ter several hours of operation.
The Jacket water keep warm system and the lubricating oil keep warm system will tend to minimize temperature changes in the systems, and thus tend to minimize the ef fect these changes have in causing leakage.
9.14-18
p:ge 19 W82-0694 [8,93 43 i
i 9.14.2.3 safetv Evaluation The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System meats sir.gle f allure eriterIa in that loss of cooling water to one diesel will not af fect the other diesel units. All piping in the engine rooms is designated Seismic Category I.
9.14.2.4 Insoection and Testf na Raouf raments The Emergency Plant Service Water System within each Diesel Generator Building is hydrostatically and f unctionally tested at the plant site. All system canponents are accessible for periodic Inspections during operation. The diesel generator Jacket water system is periodically tested.
AlI skid mounted Jacket wator system components are inspected and serviced under a regularly scheduled preventative maintenance program. This inspection program includes regular checking for system leaks and sampling and analyzing of the Jacket water qual Ity.
Engine maintenance will be progranmed on the basis of calendar time, engine running time, and a continuous review of engine operating data-with special attention being paid to data value trends. If al arms- occur, the engine w ill be shut down as soon as possible and repaired. if a trip occurs, the engine will be repaired on an expedited schedule, tested and returned to available status.
9.14.3 Diesel Generator startino system 9.14.3.1 DesIon Basu l
l The Emergency Diesel Engine Starting System (EDESS) assures reliable starting of the emergency diesel engine following loss of of fsite power. The EDESS is comprised of air compressors, air dryers, air receivers, engine cranking devices, piping and valves, filters and associated ancillary Instrumentation and controf s.
Each of the three (3) diesel generators shall be provided with an independent starting air system, fully separated f rom each other by three (3) hour rated walls and provided with Independent power supplies f rom the same power division as the diesel generator for which the air supply system provides serv ice.
The design of the EDESS shat I meet the requirements of SRP 9.5.6.
9.14-19 ivnend. 73 Nov. 1982
l p2g3 20 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 l 9.14.3.1.1 Seismfe and QualItv Groun classification
- a. The essential portions of the EDESS, except the diesel engine and all casted Diesel vendor suppl led components, but including the Isolation valves separating the essential and non-essential portions, shall be designed to the Qual Ity Group C, and Seismic Category I requirements,
- b. The diesel engine and alI casted diesel vendor suppl led components, the air compressor, and the af tercooler, shall be designed in accordance with the ANSI B31.1 and DEMA Standard requirements. The engine and engine mounted components shalI be tested and qualifled
. for the environmental conditions under normal and accident conditions. The environmental design and qual if ication shall meet the requirements of IEEE Standard 323.
- c. The P&lDs and other system documentation shall Indicate points of change in the system and/or components seismic or quality group ciassifIcation.
9.14.3.1.2 General Arraneaments a) The location of the Diesel Generator lullding housing the EDESS shall assure the independence of the three (3) EDESS supply trains. The
, f tre separation between the EDESS trains shalI be maintained in
! accordance w ith BTP OEB 9.5-1. The Diesel Generator Building shall be placed outside of the turbine missile trajectory range.
b) The components of the EDESS shall be located to provide adequate space for inspection, cleaning, maintenance and repair of the system.
9.14.3.1.3 Svstem Performang,3 a) Each diesel generator shall be provided with redundant starting air sy stenis.
b) Each starting air system shall have the capabil Ity of cranking the cold diesel engine fIve times wIthout recharging the receivers. The system capacity shall be in accordance with the, requirements of SRP 9.5.6, Paragraph 1.4.g.
c) The dew poir:t of the starting air shalI be not more than 50 F when I the system is Ir. stalled in a normally controlled 70 F environment, otherwise the starting air dew point shall be controlled 10 F below the expected lowest ambient temperature.
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9.14-20 Amend. 73 i Nov. 1982 j
paga 21 W82-0694 [,8,9] 43 9.14.3.1.4 Protection from Natural Phenomena & Missiles a) The design of the EDESS system shall be Seismic Category I and the building housing the system shall also be Seismic Category I design.
The Iocation of the Diesel Generator Bullding shat I prevent f allure of the system due to a potential f ailure of a non-Seismic Category I structure. The Diesel Generator Building shall be protected form
~
tornados, tornado missiles and fIoods.
b) The EDESS shall be protected from the consequences of moderate energy pipe i Ine f ail ures. High energy pipe l Ines, except the diesel engine exhaust pipe, shalI be excl uded from the Diesel Generator Bullding.
Postul ated piping f ailures shall be evaluated in accordance with BTP ASP 3-1 and the location shall be established in accordance with BTP EB 3-1. The design of the piping systems shall utilize supports, restraints, spray shields and adequate floor drain system to preven direct Impingement of water on the diesel engine or electrical components and to prevent flooding of the Diesel Generator Building.
c) The design of the Diesel Generator Bullding and the EDESS system shall be in accordance with BTP OEB 9.5-1 to minimize the potential and consequences of f f res.
9.14.3.1.5 Testino. Survet t lance and Qualif tention a) The design of the EDESS shall include provisions f or testing of the system to verify the parameters of operation. The design shall consider and select the location of Instruentation sensors and shall incl ude status indication and al arm features. The sensors shall be accessible and designed to permit inspection and calibration in-place.
b) The EDESS shall be provided with surveillance instruentation to provide status indication and f acilItate trouble and diagnosis.
c) The EDESS design shall provide for Inservice inspc.-tion and testing In accordance wIth ASE Section XI requirenents.
l 9.14.3.1.6 Anot Icable codes and standards
- 1) Regul story Guide 1.9, "Selectlon, Design, and Qual if Ication of Diesel-Generator Units Used as Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants"
- 2) Regul atory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Programs f or Water Cooled Reactor Power Pl ants" 9 .1 4 - 21 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
pag 3 22 W82-0694 [8,9] 43
- 3) Regul story' Guide 1.115, " Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Mi ssil es"
- 4) Regul story Guide 1.117; " Tornado Design Cl assif Ication"
- 5) Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postui ated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment", attached to SRP Section 3.6.1.
- 6) Branch Technical Position IEB 3-1, "Postul ated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment", attached to SRP Section 3.6.2.
- 7) Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB), " Diesel Generator Protective Trip Circuit Bypasses", attached to SRP Section 8.3.2, Appendix 8A.
- 8) lEEE Standard 387, "lEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies f or Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
- 9) Diesel Engine Manuf acturers Association (DEMA) Standard
- 10) MJREG/CR-0660, " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Rei labil Ity" 9.14.3.2 Svstem Descriotion l
Each of the three (3) diesel generator units is provided with two (2) l redundant and Independent pnetsnatic starting systems. Each system is compl eted w ith an air compressor, af ter cool er, air dryer, air receiver and two (2) redundant air solenoid valves in parallel, each of which is energized by a separate Class 1E 125 volt DC circuit. The engines are started by a local or remote manual control signal, or by an emergency automatic signal.
in the emergency mode, the only protective devices that will remain ef fective will be the engine overspeed and generator dif ferential trips, all other protective devices will be bypassed. In the normal condition or under testing elI protective f eatures w11I remain of f active.
The Diesel Generator Building which houses the three (3) units is designed to Seismic Category I requirements, and is designed to withstand environmetal conditions as defined in Qiapter 3. Each unit, with its dedicated support sy stem s, is located in a separate roon.
The individual room arrangement insures that a malfunction or f ailure of any system component associated with any single unit will not impair the operation of the other units. The system thus meets the requirements of the single f ail ure criteria.
9.14-22 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
page 23 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 The air compressors are two (2) stage, air cooled, equipped with dry type air l Intake filter / silencer, and air cooled intercooler and af ter cooler. I The air compressors f or the Division 1 and 2 diesels are motor driven and for the DIvlsion 3 diesel, one motor and one diesel engine driven.
The air dryers are twin tower, desiccant type wIth automatic regeneration and a moisture Indicator, designed to ASE Section Ylli and ANSI B31.1 requirements. The air receivers are vertical tank type wIth skirt and base designed to ASE Section lil, Class 3 requirements. The solenoid valves are pilat operated wIth 125 voit DC coil s.
Each air receiver has the capacity for fIve (5) diesel engine starts wIthout recharging. Each compressor (either motor or engine driven) is sized to recharge the corresponding air receiver in thirty minutes running time and is controlled through a hand-of f-automatic switch. In the autmatic position, each compressor is under on-of f pressure control fra its corresponding air receiver. Relevant pressures are as f ollows:
Rel lef Valve Setting 270 psig rising Compressor Off 250 psig rising Compeessor On 235 psig f aliIng Low Pressure Alarm 210 psig f aliIng Each of the air dryers is a twin tower desiccant type unit with a timer operated four (4) way valve which alternates each tower fra the drying to the regeneration cycle, and conversely. A moisture indicator shows the moisture content of the IeavIng air.
The diesel engines for the Division 1 and 2 diesels are started by the timed admission of high pressure air to 1he power cylinders during the equivalent of the power stroke of the respective cylinders, thus causing rotation of the engine comparable to the normal power stroke. As the engine accelerates on starting air, the heat of compression of the combustion air plus that of the starting air develops a suf fIclently high temperature to ignite the injected f uel within a f ew revol utions. The Division 3 diesel engine is started by the introduction of the starting air to the air start motors.
Upon receipt of either a manually or autmatically generated start signal, the folIowing steps in starting the diesel generator wIlI occur, provIded that the overspeed and generator dif forontIal trips are permissive and tha DC powor is avall abl es
- a. When energized by the DC power source, solenoid valves open, adnitting starting air fra the primary receiver to the engine cylinders or to the air starting motor.
9.14-23 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
l page 24 W82-0694 [8,9,] 43 l
- b. Fiel d flash timers are started. .
- c. FIashIng of the generator f feld wilI occur when the f feld fIash time delay times out or the (1) set of contacts on the rolay tachometer closes thus starting the engine,
- d. Starting air is cutof f upon reaching synchronous speed by the closure of a second set of contacts on the relay tachmeter. The cylinder head start air valves are closed by combustion pressure for the Division 1 and 2 engines.
- e. When voltage approximates normal, ready-to-load signal s are generated.
Each diesel generator is provided with an automatic start sequencer. The start sequencer is progranmed for five (5) automatic start trial cycles.
Following this sequence, the starting will be cut of f until the reset of the start sequencer and a new start trial.
9.14.3.3 safety Evaluation i
Since each diesel engine has two (2) Independent and redundant starting systems, each starting system with a separate compressor, dryer, accumul ator, distributor, and other equipment, the starting system for each diesel
! generator is designed to satisfy the single active f ailure criteria.
The air supply to each power cylinder bank is controlled by two (2) sol enoid val ves in paral lel . Each air supply is suf ficient for five (5) engine starts; therefore, the f ailure of one (1) air supply will not prevent an engine start.
Since the two (2) solenoid valves in each air supply are in parallel, the f allure of one (1) solenold valve wIlI not prevent an engine start. Each I redundant start system has a separate DC power supply. A single f ailure in the starting system of any diesel generator will not lead to a loss of function of the starting system of any other diesel generator because the starting system of each diesel generator is independent f rom any other and the diesel generators are physically separated.
In addition to an air compressor, a dryer, an air receiver, and the related piping and valves, each of the starting systems also has two (2) redundant starting air val ves, starting air distributor, strainer, rel lef valve, autanatic operated pressure control switch, and other equipment. The following equipment is provided in the starting air system to preclude the foul Ing of the starting air:
- a. A drip trap on the outlet of the compressor af tercooler to entrain excess water and any oil traces from the compressor.
9.14-24 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982 an nana
p2g2 25 W82-0694 [8,9] 43
- b. A separator, trap, and prefilter on the inlet of the air dryer.
l
- c. An af terf ilter on the outlet of the air dryer.
- d. An additional drip trap at the air receiver.
- e. Drip legs on the outlet of the air receiver.
- f. Strainers upstream of the start air admission valves.
- g. Filters downstream of the starting air header on the engine.
9.14.3.4 Insoec+ ten and Testina Each recciver is equipped with shutof f valves, a pressure gauge, drain valves, o saf ety-rel ief val ve, and l ow-pressure al arm contacts. The alarm contacts al ert operating personnel if the pressure of any air receiver f alls below the minimum allowabl e val ue. Both local and Main Control Room alarms are activated when the starting air pressure in any receiver f alls below 210 psig.
When this occurs, steps taken to correct the low-pressure condition include:
- a. Determining if compressor is operational.
- b. Check f or pressure sw Itch mal function.
- c. Oeck f or starting air system val ve mal function.
- d. meck f or system Ieakage.
l e. Verify that the redundant starting air system is operational and avallable fT service.
The operator is notified by the alarms that an abnormal condition exists. The above actions are performed by locally examining the system. By means of the autmatic operated pressure control switch and the starting system Instrumentation and cor. trol s, the receiver pressures are autcznatically maintained within an allowable operating range. The starting system of a given diesel generator has no shared structures, systems or components with that of another diesel generator. The building layout is such as to permit adequate inspection and repair of the starting system.
l 9.14-25 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982 l l
.mm = _ -__
p2g) 26 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 1
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l 9.14.4 Diesel Generator Lubrication System 9.14.4.1 Deslan Bases Each of the three (3) diesel generator units is provided with an independent Emergency Diesel Engine Lubrication System (EDELS) to lubricate and cool all bearing and rubbing surf aces, and to cool the power piston heads. Each system contains a makeup storage tank f or adding lubricating oil to the circulating sy stem. This tank is f or operating convenience only and is not required to replenish the sump tank during prolonged emergency operation.
9.14.4.1.1 reismic and Qualltv Groun Classification a) The entire EDELS Including all components and piping shall be designed to Seismic Category I requirements, b) The Qual ity Group class f or the EDELS shall be Qual ity Group C, except f or the diesel engine and all casted diesel vendor supplied components. The design for these components shalI meet the requirements of ANSI B31.1 and the Diesel Engine Manuf acturers Association (DEMA) Standards. (The Interf aces between the engine-mounted components and the external part of the system shall be clearly identified on the design drawings.)
c) The design, construction and maintenance of the EDELS shall be in accordance wIth the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.28 and ANSI N45.2-1977.
9.14.4.1.2 Genera'l Arranaements The location of the Diesel Generator Building housing the EDELS shall
~
a) assure the independence of the three (3) EDELS trains. The fire separation between the EDELS trains shall be maintained in accordance w Ith BTP CMEB 9.5-1. The amergency Diesel Generator Buil ding and the associated equipment located outside of the building shall be placed outside of the turbine missile trajectory range.
b) The components of the EDELS shall be located to provide adequate space f or inspection, cleaning, maintenance and repair of the system.
l i
i 9 .1 4-26 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 an aan.
t
prgs 27 t:82-0694 [8,9] 43 9.14.4.1.3 System Raoutrements a) The EDELS shall be provided with leak detection capability and capability for isolation in case of excessive leakage, b) The design of the EDELS shall assure the maintenance of t ube oil qual Ity and the prevention of the f ailure of the diesel engine due to l ube oil degradation or contamination. Procedures shall be establ ished (1) for the sampiIng and analysis of the newly delivered lube oil, and (2) for the periodic sampiIng of the diesel engine lube oII.
c) The EDELS shall be provided with adequate cool ing margin to prevent the degradetion of the l ube oil and to f acil Itate heat removal from tho systom.
d) The operating pressure, temperature dif forentials, flew rate and heat removal capability shalI be in accordance wIth the engine manuf acturer's recommendation, e) The EDELS shall provide protection to prevent crankcase explosions and to mitigate the consequences of such events.
f) The temperature and pressure in the EDELS shalI be maintained in l standby condition to enhance the "f Irst-try" starting rel labil Ity.
g) The design of the EDELS shall preclude entry of deleterious material due to operator error or other events.
l l h) The prelube time prior to manual starting shall be limited to 3 to 5 minutes or as recommended by the engine manuf acturer.
I) The EDELS shall be provided with features to prevent dry starting during emergency starts. The acceptable methods are as per SRP 9.5.7
- Section lil, 1.h.
9.14.4.1.4 Protection from Natural Phenomena and MissIIes a) The design of the EDELS system shall be Seismic Category I and the building housing the system shall also be Seismic Category I design.
I The Iocation of the Diesel Generator Bullding shalI prevent f allure of the system due to a potential failure of a non-Seismic Category I structure. The Diesel Generator Bull ding shalI be protected f rcm tornados, tornado missi1es and fIoods. The EDELS shalI be Iocated higher than the potential maximum flood level.
1 9 .1 4-27 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 l
- - ~ .
pega 28 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 b) The EDELS shall be protected f rom the consequences of moderate energy pipe l ine f ail ures. High energy pipe lines except the diesel engine exhaust pipe shall be excluded from the Diesel Generator Building.
Postul ated piping f ail ures shall be eval uated in accordance with BTP AS8 3-1 and the location shall be established in accordance with BTP MEB 3-1. The design of the piping systems shnli util Ize supports, restraints, sprey shields and adequate fIoor drain system to prevent direct Impingement of water on the diesel engine or electrical components and to prevent flooding of the diesel generator buil ding.
c) The design of the Diesel Generator Building and the EDELS system shall be in accordance wIth BTP CMEB 9.5-1 to minimize the potential and consequences of f ires.
9.14.4.1.5 Testino. Survelliance and Qualification a) The design of the EDELS shall include provisions for testing of the system to verify the parameters of operation. The design shall consider and select the location of Instrumentation sensors and shall incl ude status Indication and alarm features. The sensors shall be accessible and designed to permit inspection and calibration i n-pl ace.
b) The EDELS shall be provided with surveillance instrumentation to provide status Indication and f acilitate troubleshooting and diagnosis.
l c) The EDELS design shall provide for inservice inspection and testing
! In accordance with ASME Section XI requirements. -
1 d) The minimum instrumentatien for the EDELS shall incl ude l evel indication and alarms f or the fuel oil storage tanks and f uel oil day tanks, dif ferential pressure Indication f or the f uel oil transf er p ump, Inlet filters, and temprature Indication to assure that the
" cloud point" requirements f or the f uel oil are not viol ated.
9.14.4.1.6 Aeolicable Cedes and Standards
- 1) Regul atory. Guide 1.9, "Sel ection, Design and Qual ification of Diesel-Generator Units Used as Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems at Nucl ear Power Pl ants"
- 2) Regul atory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Programs f or Water Cooled Reactor Power Pl ants" 9.14-28 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 Se ese a
- 3) Regulatory Guide 1.115, " Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles"
- 4) Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification"
- 5) Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systerns Outside Contairenent", attached to SRP Section 3.6.1
- 6) Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1, " Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment", attached to SRP Section 3.6.2 l
- 7) Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection f or Nuclear Power Stations", attached to SRP Section 9.5.1
- 8) Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB), " Diesel-Generator Protective Trip Circuit Bypasses", attached to SRP Section 8.3.2, Appendix 8A.
- 9) IEEE Standard 387, "lEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel Generater Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
- 10) Diesel Engine Manuf acturers Association (DEMA) Standards.
- 11) NUREG/CR-0660, " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Operating Rel labil Ity" 9.14.4.2 Svstem Descriotion Each of the three(3) diesel engine units is provided with e.n independent pressure lubrication system to lubricate the various moving parts and cool all bearing and rubbing surf aces, and to cool the power l
pisten heads. Each system contains a makeup storage tank for adding l
lubricating oil to the circulating system. This tank is for operating conventence oniy and Is not required to reptenish the sump tank during prolonged emergency operation. .
The Diesel Generator Building which houses the three(3) units is designed to Seismic Category I requi renents, and is designed to withstand env!ronmental ef fets as defined in Chapter 3. Each diesel generator unit, with its dedicated support systems, is located in a separate roon. Each unit is arranged to supply power to its own auxiliaries so that a single f ailure will not interf ere with the operation of the other two(2) units.
9.14-29
pege 30 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 All EDELS components, other than the Diesel Engine and alI casted diesel vendor suppl led components, are designed to ASE Section lil, Class 3.
The diesel engine and alI casted diesel vendor suppl led components are designed to ANSI B31.1 and DEMA standards. The engine and engine mounted j components are tested and qualified to the normal and accident environmental conditions. The environmental design and qualification meet the criteria of IEEE Standard 323. ]
The Division I and Division 2 lube oil systems are " dry stenp" systems in which the supply of lubricating oil for the engine system is stored in a separate stanp tank, independent of the engine crankcase. As oli accumulates in the engine crankcase, it drains by gravity into the tank which is set at an elevation lower than the crankcase. The oil is picked up f rom the sump tank by the l ubricating oil circul ating pvp and circulated throughout the engine as required. This system minimizes the degradation of the oil by minimum exposure to crankcase gases and oxidation and also has the advantage of providing storage capacity for a seven (7) day supply of lube oil at f ull losd under emergency conditions. The Division 3 diesel engine util Izes a large capacity oil pan which is sized for seven day operation without lube oil makeup.
The dry sump systems consist of a sump tank with thermostatically controlled keep warm immersion heater, a diesel engine mounted and driven lube oil circul ating pump, a l ube oil cooleer, fil ters and strainers, a keep warm pump, and a makeup storage tank. The Division 3 diesel engine utilizes the lube oil cooler for keep warm purposes, taking heat from the Jacket water keep warm sy stem.
The purposes of the keep warm components are to keep the engine bearing surf aces warm and prel ubricated while the engine is not running. When the engine is running, the keep warm immersion heater (for the Division 1 and 2 engines) and the keep wann pump is autanatically turned of f. When the engine is not running, the keep warm Immersion heater (for the Division 1 and 2 engines) and the keep warm ptrnp is turned on. The immersion heater with its thermostatic control or the t ube oil heat exchanger for Division 3 engine then maintains the oil sump temperature between 110 F and 125 F. This warm oil is circulated through the engine, with the exception of the two (2) turbochargers I (thrust bearings are prelubricated) by the keep warm pump to keep the engine bearings warm and prel ubricated.
The Division 3 engine is provided with two keep warm pumps, one for the turbocharger thrust bearings and the other for the rest of the engine. The turbocharger keep warm pump operates at all times. The oil l evel is maintained below the camshaf t elevation during the prelubrication period to prevent l ube oil overflow to the exhaust manif ol d.
1 9.14-30 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982
_ _ _ _ _ ay_ngo q _ ,
l p203 31 t82-0694 [8,9] 43 l
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i The lube oil sump tank or pan is fitted with an engine crankcase drainage nozle, a strainer, a lube oil circulating pump suction nozzle, an electric keep warm immersion heater (for Division 1 and 2 only) a fill line, vent line, drain nozzle, and instrumentation.
The lube oil circulating pumps, for the Division 1 and 2 diesels only, are engine mounted and driven from the auxillary gearcase. The pumps have an internal high pressure-rel lef val ve. Two (2) pressure regulators (by-pass type) are piped in parallel to tne pump discharge and control main oil header pressure by bypassing back to the sump tank. The Division 3 diesel is -
provided with three engine mounted and driven lube oil pumps. The scavenger pump takes suction f rom the oil pan and delivers the lube oil to the common Inlet manifold of the main lubricating and piston cooling pumps. The main lubricating and the piston cooling pumps are driven by the same shaf t and l ocated in a common casing. Their separate discharge ports supply tube oil to the various engine parts and to the pistons, respectively.
The lube oil cooler is shell and tube type with 100 percent of the lube oil flow on the shell side, and Jacket water on the tube side. Tube pressure drop and surf ace area are designed to limit Jacket water flow rate through the cooler and control the t ube oil temperature wIthin the prescribed temperature range.
The oi l f il ter i s a f ul l fl ow dupl ex ty pe w Ith cartr i dge ty pe el ements.
Filter elements can be changed while the diesel engine is running.
The strainers are all metal sel f-cleaning type with autanatic bypass.
The keep warm pumps are electric motor driven rotary displ acement types sized
! to maintain warm oil circulation through the diesel engine lubrication system while the engine is not running.
The makeup oil storage tank stores lubricating oil for adding to the circul ating sy stem. The tank is fitted with a screened and capped fill nozzle, a vent with flame arrestor, a level gauge, a drain, and a piped connection to the l ube oil sunp tank f ill connection. The adding of lubricating oil to the makeup oil storage tank is under a&ninistrative control s which precl ude the entrance of deleterious material s. The interior of the tank is coated to prevent corrosion. This makeup oil storage tank is f or operating convenience only. The stored oil is not required to replenish l
the sump tank during seven (7) day 'prol onged emergency operation.
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9.14-31 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 no nsoe
page 32 W82-0694 [8,93 43 The turbochargers, except for the thrust bearings, are not prelubricated to minimize the possibility of oil leakage and collection in the hot gas turbine chambers which could cause a fire In the turbine when the engine is running.
The residual oil lef t in the turbocharger bearings f rom test runs at 30 day intervals is suf ficient prelubrication because the engine starts naturally aspirated and the turbocharger lubrication circuits are up to pressure by the time the turbocharger turbine picks up speed fran the hot exhaust gas af ter the engine starts. .
For the Division I and 2 engines, the lubricating oil flow rate at rated i
engine rpm will be 500 gpm. At f ull emergency power load, oII temperature on engine wIlI be 157 F and oil temperature of f engine w!!I be 171 F. The heat transf er capacity of the t ube oil cooler is suf ficient to obtain and maintain these temperatures.
The lubricating oil characteristics are:
S AE Grade 40 Of f Maxfmum Msg Viscosity index (ASTM 0567) - 70 Gravity, API 860 F (ASTM D287) 30 20 F1 ash Point (ASTM 092)
- 4250F Pour Point (ASTM 097)
- 100F Beicw Col dest Oli Starting Temperature l
l Crankcase explosions while the engine is running are prevented by ventit ating the crankcase wIth trotor driven, engine mounted crankcase vacuten b!cwers and maintelning the crankcase pressure at 0.5 inches of water vacuum.
Oil leakage can be detected by abnormal decreases in sump tank or pan level.
r The point of leakage will then be found, repaired, and tested. The diesel generator will then be returned to ready status.
Lubricating oil pressure, temperature, and level gauges are provided both on the engine and on the engine control panel. Alarms are annunctated both at the engine control panel and at the main control roon.
Following is a tabulation of the lubricating oil system alarms and safety-shutdow ns:
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9.14-32 Anend. 73
! Nov. 1982 l
Function Alarm Settina Shutdown SettInc Temperature 1400F Felling -
Temperature 1900F Rising 200cF Risir.g Pressure 40 psi Falling 30 psi Fal ling Filter Pressure Drop 20 psi Rising -
Turbocharger System Pressure 20 ps! Falling 15 psi Falling Sump Tank or Pan Level Low -
These shutdowns are a test or non-emergency conditions. When the engine is running under amergency conditions, the shutdowns are not active.
9.14.4.3 Safetv Evaluation During operation, integrity of the lubricating oil is protected by the fol lowing:
- a. The lube oil system is a closed system.
- b. A strainer is provided in the sump tank.
- c. A filter !s provided on the discharge of the lube oil pump,
- d. A strainer is provid9d at the engine header.
- e. A filter is provided on the discharge side of the keep warm pump.
'. A strainer is provided on the discharge side of the keep warm p um p.
Provisions are made to assure only acceptable grade and quality lubricating oil is used f or recharging of the system. Adm ini strative controls are used for repairs, maintenance, and addition of oil to the system. These controls preclude the entry of deleterious material into the system.
. 9.14.4.4 Insoection and Testine Recuirements The diesel generator lubricating oil system components are i nspected and serv iced initially and periodically thereafter, in accordance with the schedule tabulated below:
9.14-33
l I
paga 34 E82-0694 [8,9] 43 I
Maintenance Action Frec uenev Tenperature Daily ,
Daily Check f or Leaks Level in Sump Tank or Pan Daily Filter Pressure Drop Monthly Drain Water / Sludge from Filter Monthly Check Strainer Screens Monthly Check f or Fuel Dil ution with V iscosimeter Monthly i Send Sample to Laboratory or Analysis Monthly Drain Sump, Cl ean, Ref il l Annual Check Lubricating Oil Jets at Gears Annual 9.14.5 Diesel Generator Combustion Air intake. Exhaust Systems 9.14.5.1 Deston Bases The Emergency Diesel Engine Combustion Air intake and Exhaust System (EDECAIES) supplies combustion air of reliable quality to the diesel engines, and exhausts the products of combustion from the diesel engines to the atmosphere. The EDECAIES consists of outside air intakes, air intake f ilters, air intake silencers, and piping to the engine air intake connection, exhaust point where exhaust is released to the atmosphere, and the Instrunentation required for the operation, monitoring and testing of the system.
Each diesel generator shall be provided with a fully independent combustion air intake and exhaust system. Interconnections shall not be provided between the sy stems. The independence of these systems shall be maintained by the independence of the electrical power supply to the system components.
9.14.5.1.1 seismic classification a) The entire EDECAIES, including all components and piping, shall be designed to Seismic Category I requirements, b) The design, construction and maintenance of the EDECAIES shall be in accordance with the requirements of Regul atory Guide 1.28 and ANSI N45.2-1977.
9.14.5.1.2 General Arranaements a) The location of the Diesel Generator Building shall assure the independence of the three (3) EDECAIES trains. The f tre separation between the EDECAIES trains shall be maintained in accordance with
- BTP CNEB 9.5-1. The Diesel Generator Building shall be placed l outside of the turbine missile trajectory zone.
l 9.14-34 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
page 35 W82-0694 [8,9J 43 b) The components of the EDECAIES shall be located to provide adequate space for inspection, cleaning, maintenance and repair of the system, c) The combustion air intakes and exhausts shall be located with suf ficient horizontal and vertical separation to preclude short circuiting f rom the engine exhaust to the combustion air intake.
The combustion air shall be taken directly fran outside the building. The bottom of the combustion air intakes shall be located a minimum of twenty (20) feet above grade elevation. These intakes shall be tornado protected and provided with HEPA filters adequately sized to remove the maximum expected sodium aerosol quantitles, d) The combustion air intake and exhausi systems shall be configured to Insure that adverse atmospheric conditions, such as rain, ice or snow wIlI not accumulate and cause possible elogging during standby or while in operation. The intakes shall be provided with filters and sized for extended l If e under maximun dust storm conditions, e) Adequate dust control provisions shall be provided such as the filtering of combustion air as well as the filtering of the recirculating air conditioning system to prevent dust accumulation.
In addition, concrete floors and walls shall be treated to prevent the accumul ation of concrete dust, f) The engine, with its air intake and exhaust, shall be tested and qualifled to the project design environmental conditions for normal and accident conditions.
9.14.5.1.3 Er_otectlen frem Natural Phenemena & MissIIes a) The design of the EDECAIES system shall be Solsmic Category I and the bulld!ng housing the system shalI also be Seismic I design. The 1ocation of the Diesel Generator Bullding shalI prevent f allure of the system due to a potential f ailure of a non-Seismic Category I structure. The Diesel Generator Building shall be protected f ran tornado, tornado missile and floods.
b) The EDECAIES system shall be tornado protected and designed to mitigate the consequences of a sodlun aerosol release accident.
c) The EDECAIES shall be protected f rom the consequences of moderate energy pipe line f ail ures. Higher energy pipe lines shall be excl uded f rom the Diesel Generator Building. The postulated piping f ellure shall be evaluated in accordance with BTP ASP 3-1 i
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i 9.14-35 Amend. 73
pags 36 W82-0694 [8,93 43 l
and the location shall be established in accordance with BTP ASP 3-1.
The design of the piping systems shall utilize supports, rastraints, and spray shiel ds to prevent direct Impingement of water on the diesel engine or electrical components and an adequate floor drain system to prevent flooding of the Diesel Generator Building.
d) The design of the Diesel Generator Building and the EDECAIES system shall be in accordance with BTP CEB 9.5-1 to minimize the potential and consequences of f Ires.
l 9.14.5.1.4 TestIno surveiIIance and oualIfIcatIon a) The design of the EDECAIES shalI include provisions for testing of the system to verify the parameters of operation. The design shalI consider and select the location of instrisnentation sensors and shall incl ude status indication. The sensors shall be accessible and designed to permit inspection and calibration in-place.
b) The EDECAIES shalI be provided wIth survellIance instrumentation to provide status Indication and f acil Itate trouble and diagnosis.
c) The minimisn Instruentation for the EDECAIES shall incl ude combustion air manifold pressure and dif ferential pressure indication for the intake f Ilters.
9.14.5.1.5 Anelleable codes and standards
- 1) Regul atory Guide 1.9, "Sel ection, Design, Qual if ication of Diesel-Generator Units Used As Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems At Nuclear Power Pl ants"
- 2) Regul atory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Progres for Water-Cooled Reactor Power P1 ants"
- 3) Regulatory Guide 1.115, " Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Mi ssil es"
- 4) Regul atory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Cl assif ication"
- 5) Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment" (attached to SRP Section 3.6.1)
- 6) Branch Technical Position EB 3-1, "Postui ated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment" (attached to SRP Section 3.6.2) 9.14-36 Amend 73 Nov. 1982
page 37 W82-0694 [8,9] 43 i
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- 7) Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB), " Diesel-Generator Protective f Trip Circuit Bypasses" (attached to SRP 8.3.2, Appendix 8A)
- 8) IEEE Standard 387"lEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel Generator Units Appl led As Standby Suppi les f or Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
- 9) Diesel Engine Manuf acturers Association (DEMA) Standard l 10) MJREG/CR-0660, " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Rol labil Ity" 9.14.5.2 system DescrIntion Each of the three (3) diesel generator units is equipped with an independent combustion air intake and exhaust system. The three (3) systems are housed in l physically separated roms within the Diesel Generator Building. The building is designed to Seismic Category I requirements and to withstand the i
environmental ef fects as defined in Chapter 3. The Diesel Generator l Cmbustion Air intake and Exhaust System piping, filters, and silencers are l arranged in separate rooms for each diesel generator unit, therefore a
! mal function or f ailure of any system component associated with any single unit will not impair the operation of the other units. The subsystem thus meets the requirements of the single f ailure criteria.
Each diesel generator combustion air intake subsystem consists of a HEPA air intake filter, air intake silencers, and piping f ra the intake fliter to the engine air intake connection. The engine exhaust subsystem includes an exhaust silencer, piping f ran the engine to the silencer, and piping f ra the exhaust silencer to the roof where the exhaust is released to the -atmosphere.
The exhaust piping above the roof is encased in a Selsnile Category I tornado missile resistant concrete shield.
i The inlet to the combustion air intake plenum roon is in a Dullding side wall not less than twenty (20) feet above grade. Vertical separation is provided between the inlet and engine exhaust outlet. The horizontal separation is approximately seventy (70) feet. The not separation distance is adequate to prevent short circuiting from the engine exhaust to the combustion air inlet.
The inlet to the combustion air intake will be configured to prevent blockage by ice or snow. The intake filters are HEPA type and sized for extended Ilfe under maximisn dust storm conditions, in addition, the filters are selected and sized to remove soditsn aerosol from combustion air to maintain operability of the diesel generators under a soditsn release accident. Filter pressure drop under operating conditions will be monitored and the filters can be changed wIth the engine operating wIth no adverse af fects.
9.14-37 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
" ~ ~ *
~.
t p:Igo 38 W82-0694 [8,93 43 The engine wIth its air intake and exhaust wlll be tested and qualifled to the project design anyIronmental conditions under normal and accident conditions.
The environmental design and qualification shall meet the criteria of IEEE Std. 323: IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Design ambient pressure depressions will thus not degrade engine perf ormance at f ull rated power.
No gaseous fire extinguishing mediums will be used in or in the vicinity of the Diesel Generator Building. Lowering the combustion air intake oxygen concentration is theref ore precluded.
The Diesel Generator Building, the walls separating the three (3) diesel generator roms, day tank rocms, and transf er pisnp roms, and the systems The f ailure w Ithin the rooms are designed to Seismic Category I requirements.
of one (1) diesel generator system will therefore not af fect the other two (2) units.
Missiles and shrapnel generated within an engine room, and flooding by liquids within the rocm, will not af fect the operation of the other two (2) units.
Each engine room has a separate recirculating type HVAC cooling system; I theref ore, smoke cannot migrate f rom rocm to rom. The HV AC system consists of two 50% capacity f ans which circulate the rom air through cooling coils served by the emergency pl ant service water system.
Accumulation of dust on electrical equipment in the diesel generator engine rom, which can cause electrical mal functions, is kept under control by filtering alI recirculated alr. The door to each rom is weather sealed. The concrete wall s, cell Ings, and floors are sealed and painted to' prevent concrete dust. Engine combustion air, which sees only the inside of the engine, is filtered to minimize engine deposits end to minimize wear on siIding surfaces, in addition, adninistrative control over housekeeping will be established f early on and will be vigorously pursued. All equipment, appurtenances, and l walls are kept wiped f ree of dust and floors are kept mopped.
The folicwing pressure readouts and alarms are provided in the engine control panel :
- a. Combustion Air Manifold Pressure, Right Bank
- b. Combustion Air Manifoid Pressure, Lef t Bank I HEPA Filter Dif f erential Pressure High c.
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I 9.14-38 Anend. 73 Nov. 1982
p g3 av caz-vows Lo,vj ca 9.14.5.3 Safetv Evaluation The Diesel Generator Cabustion Air intake and Exhaust System is designed to f unction bef ore, during, and af ter an SSE, to ensure that a seismic event will not degrade the Diesel Generator Combustion Air intake, and Exhoust System to the point that the f unction of a diesel generator unit is jeopardized.
Vertical and horizontal separation t$etween the combustion air intake and engine exhaust gas discharge precl udes any significar.t dilution of the combustion air by exhaust gases.
No gaseous fire extinguishing meditas will be used in or in the vicinity of the Diesel Generator Building. Significant dilutf or, of the comoustion air f rom gases of this type is theref ore precl uded.
9.14.5.4 Insoection and Testina Reautrements Af ter installation, the entire Diesel Generator Cmbustion Air intake and Exhaust System w11I be functionally tested on the pl ant s!te.
Each Diesel Generator Combustion Air intake and Exhaust Subsystem is periodically tested to verify its abil Ity to f un: tion as part of the diesel generator unit.
f Under normal standby conditions, the Diesel Generator Combustion Air intake I and Exhaust Subsystem is Inspected at predetermined Interval s. These inspections include the air intake filter and water or debris accumulation in the exhaust silencers and piping. Inspections may be made at more frequent interval s, as dictated by the particular conditions and operating schedules of the diesel generator units.
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l 9.14-39 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982
.,_nen,
Pcg3 1 (82-0321) [8,10] s 10 10.0 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 10.1 Summary Description The Steam and Power Conversion System is designed to convert the heat produced in the reactor to electrical energy. The operation of the equipment, piping and valves in the system do not af fect the reactor and its safety features.
The CRBRP is a three-loop concept pl ant. Sodium coolant in the Primary Heat Transport System enters the reactor where It Is heated and paped to Intermediate heat exchangers (IHX's). The intermediate heat exchangers transfer hect to the Intermediate sodium coolant, which is pumped through The Steam Generator System. Heat is transferred to the Main Steam System by the steam generator modules In each of three Icops. Sufficient superheated steam is proviced to to drive a tandem compound steam turbine with a maximum capability of 436,799 KWe for the stretched reactor output of 1121 *t and its auxillaries operating in a closed condensing cycle with six stages.of rogenerative f eedwater heating. The turbine generator has a capability of 374,567 KWe f or the rated reactor output of 975 *t. Exhaust steam is condensed In one surf ace type steam condenser and returned to the steam generators as heated feedwater with a major portion of its gaseous, dissolved, and particulate impurities removed.
The major caponents of the Steam and Power Conversion System are:
turbine-generator-exciter, main condenser, condensate pumps, turbine gland steam system, turbine bypass steam system, condensate demineralizer system, steam generator f eed pumps and f eedwater heaters (Figure 10.1-1). The heat rejected in the main condenser is removed by tha circulating water system to the mechanical draf t cooling tower for ultimate disposal of waste heat to the atmosphere.
The superheated stem produced by the steam generator is passed through the high pressure turbine where the staam is expanded and then exhausted to the low pressure turbines. Frm the low pressure turbines, the steam Is exhausted into the main condenser where it is condensed, and then returned to the cycle as condensate. Condensate purnps take suction on the hotwell and discharge through the condensate deminerallzer ton exchanger, steam packing exhauster, three stages of low pressure feedwater heaters and into the deaertor. The steam generator feed pumps take suction f rom the deaerator and supply feedwater through two stages of high pressure heaters then through topping heaters to the steam generators. The f eedwater is heated in the heating cycle by steam supplied f ra turbine extractions and al so by recovering heat f rom the continuous steam generator drum drains.
The Circulating Water System is designed to receive and dissipate 65% of the total heat produced in the reactor following an abnormal shutdown of the turbine generator f rom a rated load condition. Heat dissipation under these circumstances is accomplished in the various plant cooling systems, turbine bypass to the condenser and deaerator and the steam generator atmosphere rollef valves. The turbine bypass system is designed to control steam generator pressure by dumping excess steam during startup, shutdown and for transient periods during power operation when the steam generation exceeds the turbine stem requirements.
10.1-1 i
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Page 2 (82-0321) [8,10] #10 '
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.I The condenser is provided with an air extraction, system to prevent loss of vacuum due to non-condensible gas accumul ation Ir, the condenser. The air extraction system is designed to maintain the condenser at 2" Hg absolute ,
pressure and the exhaust pressure Is monitored in the main control room. If the exhaust pressure Increases to 4.5" Hg absolute, the alarm in the control roon wIlI be on and the second vacuum pump wIlI have been automatically put in serv ice at 4.0" Hg absol ute.
Corrosion of the coridenser tubes is controlled by the proper materiel selected (90 Cu-10 NT/70 Cu-30 N!) and chemical treatment of the circul ated water.
Corrosion / erosion of the exterior of the condenser tubes is centrolled by the proper treatment of thq condensate (i.e., deaerating, condensi+e pol ishing, blowdown) to ensure low dissolved oxygen ar.d sol id content sand.orotection of the tubes f rom high velocity steam by the use 'of Impingement plates.
The fcitowing design features have been provided to preclude f ailures of cordensar tubes or components f rom turbine bypass, blowdown c other high temperature drains into the condenser shell. y a) Impingement baf fles are provided at all Inl ets except the make-up water inlet, main steam bypass and the exhaust neck, These baf fles which are prov ided f or all drains and blowdown l Ines are designed to precl ude a'ry '
l possibil ity of steam impingement tube erosion.
b) The condenser is protected durirg main steam bypass through the use of '
perf orated pipe discharge headers. These headers are designed to distribute the bypass flow evenly throughout the condenser.
The principal design and perf ormance charactIristics of the 3 team and' Power Conversion System are summarized in Table 10.1-1. The system heat bal ances for both rated load and stretened load conditions are shown la Figures 10.1-2 and 10.1-3.
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- N
's 10.1-2 Amend. 72 Oct. 1962
t 10.2.2 Descriotten The turbine consists of one single flow, high pressure cylinder and three double flow, low pressure cylinders. The turbine is equipped with extraction nozzles to provide steam for six stages of feedwater heaters.
Bleed steam for feedwater heating is provided from the following sources:
Heater Extraction Sourea/Staae 6 LP turbine bleed - 13th I 5 LP turbine bleed - 12th l 4 LP turbine bleed - 11th 3 (Deaerator) (P turbine bleed - 9th 2 HP turbine exhaust -7th 1 HP turbine bleed - 4th O
/
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i 10.2-la e
.... s....... ,
10.2.2.1 Each of the four main steam lines is provided with a stop valve and a control valve which are autcmatically activated by the turbiro control 4
sy stem. During an etent resulting in turbine stop and control valve f ast closure, turbine inlet steam flow will be stopped in less than .2 seconds.
Since the steam goes directly from the high pressure (HP) turbine to the low pressure (LP) turbine instead of going to a reheater or mot sture separator, no additional energy or large volume of stored energy exists and, therefore, stop and intercept valves are rot required between the HP and LP turbines.
10.2.2.2 A shaf t sealing system, using steam to seal the annular openings where the shaf t emerges from the casings, prevents steam outleakage and air inleakage along the shaf t. The gland sealing system includes all necessary piping, valves, centrols, and a steam packing exhauster which exhausts to ,
atmosphere througn a roof vont. )
10.2.2.3 The hwdrogen and water cooled generator, rated at 485.3 MVA at 90 percent power f2ctor, produces power at 22KY and 60 Hz. Generator rating, temperature risa and class of Insulation are in accordance with the manufacturer's codes and standards. Excitation is provided by a shaf t driven alternator with its output roctified. Stator conductors are water cooled.
10.2.2.4 Turbine generator bearings are lubricated by a conventional oil system. A turbt.no shaft driven lube oil pump takes suction from the lube oil tank through anl oil-driven booster pump. At shaft speeds below approximately l 3,240 rpm, or upon a drop in oil pressure, a motor-driven auxiliary oil pump provides lubrication. In addition, upon succeeding drops in . lube oil pressure to predetermined set points, the turbine generator will trip, and lubrication for coastdown wiII be provided by either an AC ofI pump or a DC emergency bearing oli pump. Heat from bearing friction is removed by the Secondary Service Closed Cooling Water system in either of two full capacity oil coolers, l 10.2.2.5 Supervisory instruments continuously monitor and record, except as I noted, such turbine generator parameters as: .
- a. Shaft vibration at the main bearings
- b. Shell expansion
- c. Control valve position (when unit is synchronized)
- d. Turbine speed (when unit is not synchronized)
- e. Shaf t eccentricity (at turning gear speed only.)'
- f. Differential expansion l
- g. Rotor expansion l h. Shell temperature
- 1. Vibration phase angle (as needed)
J. Throttle pressure
- k. Exhaust hood temperature
- 1. Stop and control valve temperatures
- m. Steam seal header temperature
- n. Crossover temperatures 10.2-2 rw
l -
i Other permeters to be continuously recorded are:
- a. Turbine generator bearing metal temperatures i b. Lube ofI temperatures
- c. Thrust bearing metal / drain temperatures
- d. Throttle temperature 10.2.2.6 The turbine uses an Electro Hydrau!Ic Contro! (EHC) System whose prime function is to contro! the speed of the turbine when the generator is not synchronized with the system and to control the output of the uni t when the generator is on the line. This is a:.::omplished by positioning the previously mentioned control valves .to regulate the flow of steam to the turbine. The control valves are operated by piston type servo-motors, using a pressurized non-flammable hydraulic fluid for opening the valves. The hydraulic syste receives control signal s f rom the speed governor and emergency governor.
The Turbine Generator unit has a load foiIcwing capability which can be initiated in several way s. Unit load changes can be accomplished through control signals initiated by the operator from the EHC section of the Main Control Panel. Alternatively, the EHC system can be put into the remote automatic mode whereby the loading or unloading signals are generated by the plant control systen (ref er to Section 7.7.1) . In both cases, the controlling signals will ramp the unit at the selected rate to the desired load provided a plant limiting condition does not override the loading r ap.
To assure high rel labil Ity of the trip circuits, mul ti pl e logic consisting of two out of two and two out of three logic system for important and vital trip f unctions are utilized in the EHC Systen. The trip solenoid and the trip relay will be energized if at least two out of the three actuating relays close their contacts. Failure of one rel ay to elose contacts wIlI not prevent the trip action, and acci dental actuation of one relay causing contact closure will not result in a f alse trip.
There are four methods of turbine overspeed control protection. They are:
- c. Mechanical overspeed trip
- d. Back-up overspeed trip The speed control unit of the electro hydraulic control systen provices speed error signals for repositioning the control val ves. Three distinct speed errer signals are derived by this unit and applied to a low value gate which permits propogation of the signal demanding the smal ler val ve opening.
10.2-2a
p0ge 4 W82-2267 [8,10] 12 i
The trip anticipator's f unctions are to avoid a turbine overspeed following a , -
load rejection which is accompanied by a f ailure of one or more of the control valves to close, and to prevent a turbine trip when the speed control unit is l A closing signal to the main stop valves is generated functioning properly.
by comparing the rotor speed with a load dependent reference signal. The ref erence signal has s characteristic which lInearly decreases in magnitude as the ioed increases. Thus, the speed at which the trip anticipator provides a
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I
! closing signal decreases wIth increasing Iced, thereby, reducing the possibil Ity of an excessive overspeed. Af ter the trip anticipator has closed the sQn valves and shaf t speed has decreased to near rated speed the trip anticipator wIlI reset causing the stop valvos to reopen. This w II I be followed by opening the control valves by the speed control unit to maintain the generator at rated speed. At this point, the Turbine-Generator unit is ready for rel oading.
If the turbine accelerates to approximately 110% of rated speed, the mechanical overspeed trip mecnanism trips the turbine. This system makes use of the conventional eccentric ring type overspeed trip device. The operation of the mechanical trip mechanism causes the stop and control valves to trip
. closed, as described in detail below, thereby, preventing all steam from l entering the turbine.
In addition, there is a back up electrical overspeed trip set at approximately l
l 1% above the mechanical overspeed trip setting. This protective system makes use of three magnetic speed pick ups which previos electrical signal s proportional to rotor speed. If two out of three of these signal s exceed the set point, a trip signal is generated. The set point dif ferential between the mechanical and electrical overspeed trip systems permits each trip device to be tested separately.
The turbine has two separate and distinct trip systems, both of which cause hydraul ic fl uid to be dumped from the stop, control and air pilot valves.
Ref er to Figure 10.2-3, Protection System Block Diagram.
l
- 1. The mechanical trip system requires the activation of the mechanical tr i p l atch assembl y by one of the f ol l ow ing : a) operation of the mechanical trip solenoid valve (MS1V) which is energized by an electrical signal framthe 125V DC trip bus or the overspeed trip test logic, b) operation of the mechanical overspeed trip (OST) mechanism
! Initiated by an overspeed or loss of bearing oil pressure, c) operation of the mechanical trip handle. Once the trip latch f
I assembly is activated, it operates the mechanical trip pilot valve which in turn actuates the mechanical trip valve. This causes the l
high pressure hydraulic fluid to be released resulting in the closure of the stop control and air rolay dump vaivos.
l l
10.2-2b
~
paga 5 #82-2267 [8,10] 12 I
- 2. The electrical trip system operates by deenergization of the electrical trip solenoid valve (ETSV) with a signal from the trip anticipator, the 24 DC trip bus or the overspeed trip test logic.
This solenoid actuates the electrical trip valve (ETV) which in turn w fil cause the release of high pressure hydraulle fluid and the closure of the stop control and air relay dump valves.
Either the mechanical overspeed or the backup overspeed trips will shut down the turbine by simultaneously closing all the main steen stop and control val ves, the f ail ure of any one stop or control valve to close will not
, disable the turbine overspeed control funetton, because the valves are in series.. Theref ore, if one valve f all s to close, the other velve will stop the steam fl ow. A f ail ure of one control valve causes the other valves to increase or decrease their opening to compensate for that valve. If one val ve f all s open at low load condition, the other valves close. If the closing of the other valves is not enough to compensate f or that valve, the turbine overspeeds thereby resulting in the operation of the overspeed protection sy stem.
The valves described above will be closed daily by using the valve test mode of the turbine control system. . Pressure variations caused by closing a control valve cause the other control valves to open. Theref ore, if operating near f ull load, testing must be done at a reduced power level to provide suf ficient margin f or pressure control.
in addition to providing speed and load control and overspeed protection, the control system automatically trips the turbine generator under any of the follow Ing conditions:
- a. Excessive shaf t vibration, l b. Generator el ectrical f aults,
- c. Law condenser vacuum,
- d. Thrust bearing f ail ures,
- e. Low bearing oil pressure,
- f. Low hydraul ic pressure
- g. High exhaust hood temperature,
- h. Manual operation of several trip levers, I. Loss of stator cool ant, or J. Low throttle pressure.
10.2.2.7 The extraction staan system is designed to withstand the transients imposed on it by a turbine trip and to prevent reverse flow of staan or water into the turbine. Each of the extraction steam l ines has at least one non-return valve and a motor driven isolation valve with the exception of the extraction l ines to the l ow pressure heaters 6A, 68, 6C. Whether one or two non-return valves are required in an extraction line is dependent upon the snount of unrestraingd energy available in the extraction line and heater.
l i 10.2-3 l - . - - -_ ,
p ge 6 W82-2267 [8,10] 12 Upon a turbine trip, air pressure is released f rom the actuator on the non-return valves allowing the springs in these valves to drive the valves in the closed direction. Under static conditions (no flow), these valves wIll close in less than 2 seconds. Upon a flow reversal these valves immediately cl ose. The valves receive a close signal upon a turbine trip. Because of the f ast closure time of the non-return valves and the short distance between the above valves and the extraction points at the turbine, steam in the extraction steam system does not af fect the turbine coastdown following a turbine trip.
The total enount of energy which would accelerate the turbine upon a turbine generator trip is that steam which is trapped in the turbine and the lines to the extraction steam check valves. The turbine stean system does not incorporate stop and intercept valves between the high pressure and low pressure turbine since the steam goes directly from the high pressure turbine to the low pressure turbine instead of going to a reheater or moisture separator and, theref ore, no additional energy or large vol ume of stored energy exists. This total stored energy is calculated based on the piping vol ume and extraction steam conditions and cannot exceed an energy val ue set by the turbine generator contractor for stable shutdown.
The Extraction Steam Check (Non-Return) Valve is a positive closing, free sw inging disc check val ve. The valve is of the power assisted (spring)
I closing type in which the operating cylinder is held in a neutral position (free swing) by air pressure until a trip signal releases the air the spring f orces the check valve closed. Additionally, the extraction check valve is counter-weighted to reduce the required closing moment.
10.2.2.8 The turbine generator is designed to accept the loss of external '
el ectr i cal load and remain in service supply Ing the pl ant's auxil iary load.
If the unit is suddenly subjected to a 40% or greater loss of load, the following events will take place in rapid succession.
- 1. The power load unbalance circuitry will start running the load set motor back toward zero load.
- 2. The turbine will begin accelerating.
i 3. The control valves will close at the maximum rate by means of the
! f ast acting solenold, this being Initiated by the power load unbal ance circuits.
Al so, if the unit is above approximately 70% load, the trip anticipator may close the stop valves as was discussed earlier.
10.2-3a
p:ga 7 W82-2267 [8,10] 12 4 The entrained steam between the valves and the turbine in the turbine l casing and in the extraction lines will expand wIthin approximately l 1.5 seconds.
- 5. When the entrained steam has ceased expanding, the rotor speed will I I
start decreasing gradually at a rate depending on the auxil iary load remaining on the generator.
- 6. If the trip anticipator was actuated, it will reses at this point opening the stop valves. The power / load unbalance circuit will clear automatically when the load ref erence motor reaches the no load flow point.
- 7. When the speed has decreased to approximately 100% of rated speed, the control valves wIll start to reopen under speed control.
- 8. The unit wIll now be close to rated speed ready for resy nchroniz ation.
10.2.2.9 For overpressure protection rupture diaphragms are provided in each l ow pressure turbine exhaust hood. Additional protective devices include exhaust hood high tanperature alarm and trip and a pilot dump valve for protective closing of extraction non-return val ves.
10.2.2.10 The generator hydrogen control system incl udes pressure regul ators f or control of the hydrogen gas, and a circuit f or supplying and controlling the carbon dioxide used in purging the generator during filling and degassing operations. To maintain the hydrogen within the generator casing at the~
purity level required, the generator is designed with sh.af t seal s and associated control equipment to prevent leakage of the hydrogen. This seal function is provided f or by a pressure oil supply which is f urnished with a separate, package-type combination of equipment incl uding f ilters, coolers, emergency DC seal oil pump, seal oil control equipment and necessary detraining tanks, loop seal s and pressure switches required f or detraining the gases f rom the oil bef ore it is sent to the shaf t seal s.
10.2.2.11 The bulk bydrogen and carbon dioxide storage systems consist of several pre-assembl ed modul es l ocated outdoors w Ith interconnecting piping, i
The storage bank is composed of ASME Coded Section Vlli storage units manif ol ded in active and reserve banks. Each storage cylinder is mounted in supporting f rames restrained f rom movement. Shut of f valves and vents are prov ided for each storage cyl inder.
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Pcga 3 (82-0321) [8,10] #10 10.3 Main steam su olv Svstem The Itain Steam Supply System is shown in Figure 10.3.1.
10.3.1 Desion Bases The Main Steam Supply System includes steam piping and components downstream of the steam piping anchor at the steam generator building penetration and conveys superheated steam from each of the three steam generator loops to the high pressure turbine. Each steam generator locp is designed to f urnish approximately 1,110,000 pounds per hour of 1535 psig, 906 F steam at the superheater outl et nozzle.
The portion of the Main Steam Supply System downstream of the piping anchor at the steam generator building penetration up to the turbine stop valves and including the turbine by-pass piping is designed to ANSI B31.1. The piping and component upstream of that point are safety related and designed in accordance with ASME Code Section t il as discussed in Section 5.5. Piping downstream of the turbine by-pass valves and the isolation val ve f or the steam seal regulator are designed in accordance with ANSI B31.1, or manuf acturer's standard. This portion of the system has no safety function, accordingly, no speci al precautions have been taken f or protection f rom environmental ef fects.
A turbine by-pass system bypasses up to 80 percent of the rated steam flow (975 Mdt) directly from the main steam header to the condenser and the deaerator.
No saf ety-rel ated equi pment is l ocated in the turbine buil ding. Therefore, a main steam line break cannot jeopardize any saf ety-rel ated equipment. The ventil ation system f or the turbine generator buil ding is not saf ety-rel ated
! and ef fluent resulting f rom a main steam line break will not af fect the HVAC l system f or any vital area.
10.3.2 Descriotion Three separate lines convey the superheated steam from the :%ree steam generator locps to the main steam header. Following temperature and pressure equalization in the main steam header, the steam is carried to the turbine by four parallel pipes. Each of these pipes contains a stop valve and a turbine governor control val ve.
The turbine bypass is connected to the main steam header located before the turbine stop val ves. Figure 10.3-1 shows a diagrammatic arrangement of the l Main Steam Piping System.
I l
l l
i 10.3-1 l
Pago 4 (82-0321) [8,10] #10 Steam to the deaerator is controlled by a 6" control valve. Construction details are not available at this time. This val ve serves two f unctions:
- 1. During low load operation (less than 25%) the valve maintains a minimum pressure of 21 psia in the deaerator.
- 2. Upon a turbine trip, the valve allows as much as 15% of rated steam flow to the deaerator to maintain a pressure of 65 psia in the deaerator.
To protect the deaerator the valve f alls closed and safety valves are provided on the deaerator.
Steam to the condenser is controlled by four pressure reducing control valves.
These val ves are 6" globe-type, air operated diaphragm, butt wel d ends, al loy steel, 2500 ANSI pressure rating, f all closed normally closed. The pressure reducing control val ves operate as follows:
During normal pl ant operation (above 40% reactor power) the valves are
! automatically controlled by the Plant Oontrol System based upon a load
! error signal (TG load vs. reactor power). For rapid reductions in the load, the valves are opened to minimize transients on the reactor and the valves are then generally closed as reactor power approaches the load.
l During turbine trip or operation below 40% power the bypass valves are controlled by steam pressure only. That is, they will open and close as necessary to keep steam header pressure at 1,450 psig.
See PSAR Section 7.7.1.8 for more detailed Information on the steam dump l and bypass control system, i
i Each valve can pass 16% of rated steam flow and maintain control down to 1/2 i
of 1% of rated steam flow. To protect the condenser, the val ves are f all closed design. They also close upon high condenser vacuum (5" Hg absolute) and desuperheater malfunction. Desuperheater mal function is determined by j monitoring bypass steam temperature to the condenser. The pressure reducing control valves reduce the pressure to 250 psia and are designed to open in less than three seconds.
The desuperheater consists of a mixing nozzle mounted in a 24" dicrneter pipe spool which is located in the bypass dump line between the condenser and the pressure reducing control val ve. The mixing nozzle injects atcm! zed condensate into the dump line in order to lower the dump steam temperature to 450 F. The tunperature is controlled by a water control valve which regulates the amount of condensate to the desuperheater nozzle. The water control val ve i s regul ated by a thermocouple downstream of the desuperheater. Because of l the f ast opening time of the pressure reducing valves, the water control valve Initially opens to the f ull open position and remains f ull open for 5-10 seconds and then responds to the thermocouple controller, thus avoiding the possibility of superheated steam being dumped into the condenser. The condensate is atonized by steam fran the main steam header. A drip pot is located downstream of the desuperheater and any condensate in the iIne is returned to the desuperheater.
- 10.3-l a
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r 10.3-4
Ptg2 - 1 [8,10] #13 10.4 OTHER FEATURES OF STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM None of the subsystems described in this section are related to plant nuclear saf ety. Tests, inspections, and instrumentation appl ications wil l theref ore not exceed those dictated by conventional good practice for steam power pl ants. Residual heat removal systems are discussed in Section 5.6.
10.4.1 condenser 10.4.1.1 Deslen Bases The condenser is designed for operation at all loads up to and including the maximum expected load (stretch loed 115 percent of rated load); it al so provides capability to accept up to 65 percent of the steam flow at 975 MWt upon Instantaneous turbine load rejection. The condenser hotwell is designed f or three minute storage capacity, approximately 17,200 gallons, at maximum load and to provide capability for deaeration in order to male tain a dissolved oxygen concentration of less than 0.005 cc/l. Table 10.4-1 gives design and perf ormance parameters.
The condenser is f urnished in accordance with Heat Exchanger Institute Standards f or Steam Surf ace Condensers, it is not regarded as safety related equipment because emergency residual heat removal is perf ormed by the SG AHRS (see Section 5.6).
10.4.1.2 Descrit +1on The single shell condenser is mounted beneath the low pressure turbine i exhausts with the condenser tubes oriented parallel to the turbine shaf t and provides capability to accept up to 65 percent of the steam flow at 975 Mit upon Instantaneous turbine load rejection. Four 24-inch diameter turbine bypass steam inlets to the condenser shell provide means of exhausting the rejected steam into the condenser without any detrimental ef fects to the condenser or turbine internal s.
The condenser is divided into two sec+!cns, east and west. Thus, to correct a condenser cooling water inleakage problem the plant could be powered down so that the condenser section found to 6 a leaky can be Isolated. The leak will then be located, repaired and the Isolated condenser section put cack into serv ice. ,
l 10.4.1.3 Evaluetten The condenser is designed to maintain an oxygen content of 0.005 cc/l or less.
The non-condensible gases are concentrated in the air renoval zones of the condenser and are removed by the air removal system (Section 10.4.2).
l 10.4-1 l
Page - 2 [8,10] #13 10.4.1.4 Testina and insosction Baputrements Following erection, the condenser is checked for leakage by filling the shell to a l evel above the expansion joint. The waterboxes are shop hydrostatically tested.
The condenser shell, hotwell, and waterboxes are proved with access openings to permit inspection or repairs.
10.4.1.5 Instrumentation Acol f eation .
Level controllers and alarms are provided as required in the condenser hotw el l . The condenser pressure and temperature are continuously monitored.
Pressure sw itches trip the turbine upon low exhaust hood vacuum.
10.4.2 _ Condenser Air Removal System The Condenser Air Removal System is shown in figure 10.4-1.
10.4.2.1 Deslan Bases The Condenser Air Removal System removes air and non-condensible gases f rom the condenser. The system includes two f ull capacity mechanical vacuum pumps.
Piping is f urnished in accordance w Ith ANSI B31.1. The air renovel system is I
not saf ety rel ated. Detection of tritium in the exhs.ust of Condenser Air Renoval System is discussed in Section 11.4.2.2.4. Detection of tritium in the drains f rom the vacuum pump is discussed in Section 11.2.6.2.
10.4.2.2 Descriotion The two f ull capacity mechanical vacuum punps have an Individual holding capacity of 20 scfm of free dry air at a suction pressure of 1 inch Hg Abs.
At startup, a vacuum of 4 inch Hg. Abs. Is obtained in approximately 40 minutes by operation of both vacuum pumps. Each rotary-type vacuum pump is f urnished w ith seal ing water.
The two vacuum pumps are erranged in parallel and take suction f rom a common header which is connected to the condenser shell.
The condenser vacuum pump exhaust (of f-gas) is routed to the turbine building ventil ation system. Drains f ran the two vacuum punps will be directed to a sump and processed the ugh the waste water treatment system.
10.4.2.3 Evaluation in normal operation, one of the two f ull capacity vacuum pumps is operating wIth the other pump in standby. The standby vacuum pump w IlI start autometically if the suction manifold pressure increases to 4.0 Inch Hg. Abs.
or if the running vacuum pump trips. In the event that the above actions are not suf ficient to maintain the requisite condenser vacuum, the turbine will autonatIcalIy trip upon iow exhaust hood vacuum.
! 10.4-2 Amend. 72 Oct. 1982
Pcg2 - 3 [8,10] #13 10.4.3.3 Evaluation The Turbine Gland Sealing System is designed to provide the required amount of sealing steam under all modes of operations. Major control valves in the steam seal regulator are bypassed by a motor operated control valve which can be controlled f rom the main control board in case of steam regulator mal f unction. The steam seal header is protected from overpressure by safety val ves.
10.4.3.4 Testina and insoection Reculrements, Piping is inspected and tested in accordance with Paragraph 136 and Paragraph 137, respectively, of ANSI B31.1, except for the piping f urnished by the turbine manuf acturer. That piping is inspected and tested in accordance with the manuf acturer's standards. The shell and tube side of the steam packing exhauster will be hydrostatically tested to one and one-hal f times their de si gn. Standby equipment will be periodically cycled in service to ensure its avail abil ity and f or preventive maintenance.
10.4.3.5 Instrumentation Aeolications Temperature, pressure, radiation monitors, and control Instrumentation are provided to ensure that the Gland Sealing System perf orms its required f unction automatical ly. The system is operated continuously during the warm-up and power operation of the turbine generator.
10.4.4 Turbine Bveass Svstem The Turbine Bypass System is shown in Figure 10.3-1, 10.4.4.1 Desian Bases .
The Turbine Bypass System is designed to perf orm the following f unctions:
l
- a. Provide a means to recover 80 percent of the main stean, flow at 975 l
Hit following a full load turbine trip by diverting 15% of the main l
steam flow to the deaerator to maintain approximately 300 F feedwater to the SGS and 65% of the main steam flow to the condenser.
(
- b. Provide a means to make rapid changes in the power of the turbine while the reactor is being maneuvered at ordinary rates.
The piping system associated with the Turbine Bypass System is designed, fabricated, inspected, and erected in accordance with ANSI B31.1 Power Piping.
10.4.4.2 Descriotion The Turbine Bypass System consists of four automatically and sequentially operated pressure reducing control valves piped Individually through a desuperheater to the main condenser and one automatically operated pressure reducing control valve piped directly to the deaerator.
i 10.4-4
[
Pcgs - 4 [8,10] #13 The Turbine Bypass System is utilized in the following manner:
During startup, bef ore the turbine is synchronized, the turbine will be in speed control and the turbine bypass control valves to the condenser will be automati c. Steam header pressure is controlled by the bypass valves to the condenser. Af ter synchronization is accomplished and initial load is applied to the turbine, the turbine control will be in load control. As reactor power and turbine load are increased the turbine bypass system dumps excess steam to maintain steam header pressure. When the reactor and turbine are at a high enough power, the turbi,ne, turbine bypass control valves, and the reactor are controlled by the supervisory control system. The turbine bypass control val ves perf orm a simil ar f unction during pl ant shutdown.
An interlock prevents the turbine bypass valves to the condenser from opening during a period of either low condenser vacuum or high desuperheater discharge temperature. During a turbine trip when extraction steam is no longer avail able f or feedwater heating, the control val ve in the bypass l ine to the deaerator will open automatically, pegging the deaerator at approximately 67 PSIA. This seeks to maintain approximately 300 F feedwater temperature to the SGS drums.
10.4.4.3 Evaluation A f ailure of the Turbine Bypass System to the condenser will have no adverse ef fect on the nuclear steam supply system. If the Turbine Bypass System shculd f all upon loss of f ull load, the Main Steam Safety Valves (described in Section 5.5) can dissipate to the environment all of the energy existent or produced in the steam generators. The ef fects of mal functions of the Turbine Bypass System and the ef fects of such f ailure on other components are eval uated in Section 15.3.2.4 10.4.4.4 Testina and insoection Recuirements The valves and major components of the Turbine Bypass system are subjected to manuf acturer's shop tests incl uding hydrostatic and perf ormance tests.
Tests and Inspection of the Turbine Bypass System piping, such as the radiographic inspection of the welds and the hydrostatic leak test prior to initial operation, is made in accordance with ANSI B31.1 Power Piping.
All system valves can be inspected and tested during normal operation on a schedul ed basi s.
10.4.4.5 Instrurentation Aeolications instrumentation applications are discussed in Section 7.7.1.
10.4.5 circulatine Water Svstem The Circulating Water System is shown in Figure 10.4-2. The circulating water analy si s i s given on Tabl e 10.4-2.
10.4-5
Pass - 5 [8,10] #I3
- b. Suspended and dissolved solids which may be introduced by small leakages of circul ati ng water through the ' condenser tubes.
- c. Solids carried in by the makeup water and miscellaneous drains.
At the design condensate flow and with circulating water inleakage within the capacity of the system Tne Condensate Cleanup System will produce ef fluent of the quality required by the Steam Generation System given in Section 5.5.3.11.
' The Condensate Cleanup System polishes 100 percent of the condensate and is designed for continual performance. Total head loss from Inlet to outlet terminal points will not exceed 50 psi. In addition, the system design provides f or removing Impurities in the condensate caused by an Intermittent inleakage in the condenser of cooling water from the Circulating Water System.
To assure that condensate /feedwater quality is maintained within the safe limits, the condensate polishing system is provided with capability to operate, without regeneration, for a period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, with permissible cool ing water inl eakage of 90 GPM. The basis f or this operating condition is as follows:
a) one vessel on line and at a point of exhaustion under normal operating conditions.
b) one vessel on line and hal f exhausted under normal operating conditions, c) one vessel in standby and f ully regenerated.
The condensate polishing system is al so capable of operating f or 5 days, with cooling water inleakage of 5 GPM and meet the ef fluent requirements f or operation above 55 Power. The basis f or this operating condition is that regeneration shall not be required f or more than one service vessel per day.
The circulating water analysis is given on Table 10.4-2. The maximum analysis I
shall be used f or the condenser leak design conditions.
The design al so provides a bypass of the entire Condensate Cleanup System.
The design of the polisher units and regeneration equipment is based on the Condensate Cleanup System operating on the hydrogen cycle.
Piping is f urnished in accordance with ANSI B31.1 Power Piping. Pressure vessel s which f all within the jurisdiction of ASNE Section V lil are f urnished in accordance with that code. The Condensate Cleanup System is not safety rel ated.
10.4.6.2 Deserlotten The Condensate Cleanup System consists of three hal f-capacity Ion exchanger, each containing a bed of mixed resins in the proportion of one-part cation resin to one-part anion resin by vol ume. The third (spare) lon exchangers may be placed in service if desired or in the event of a condenser tube leak. The Condensate Cleanup System is piped directly into the feedwater cycle downstream of the condensate pumps.
10.4-8
~
Pcgs - 6 [8,10] #13 Each resin bed is periodically transferred f rom the ion exchanger to an external backwash and regeneration system as required f or removal of solids and/or chemical regeneration.
Spare charges of resins may be held in the external backwash and regeneration system for immediate replacement of the exhausted beds so that an exchanger may be made avall ebl e f or prompt repl acement of a spent exchanger. An ef fluent strainer in the discharge piping f rom each fon exchanger protects the f eedwater system against a discharge of resin in the event of an underdrain failure.
i l 10.4-8a
Pags 6 (82-0321) [8,10] #10 i
TELE 10.4-1 DESIGN AND PERFORMAN& PARAETERS FOR THE CONDENSER 2 226,780 Surface (ft )
Number of passes 1 Number of tubes 19,464 Ef f ective tube I ength ( ft) 60 Tube diameter (in) 7/8 Tube material- 18,004 tubes of 90-10 Cu-NI
- Periphery and air removal 1,460 tubes of 70-30 Cu-Ni sections Tube vel oci ty ( f ps) 6.0 6
Condenser duty (Btu /hr) 2526X10 (2)
Circulating water flow (gpm) 185,200 I'I Maximum expected ini et circul ating 88 water temperature (deg. F) ,
Cool ing water temperature (deg. F) Normal 87, Max. 90 I 2I CI ret.1 ati ng water temperature 25 l rise (deg. F)
Exhaust steam temp. (no bypass) (deg. F) Normal 108-158, Max. 160 Turbine bypass steam temp. (deg. F) Normal 450, Max. 450(3)
Condenser vacuum 3.35(2) with maximtsn expected circulating water temperature (In. Hg. Abs. )
Max. 02 concentration ec/l at 0.005 rated load Min. Hotwel l Storage (gal lons) 17,200 Overali dimensions 75 '-9"L x 18'-0"W x 38'-6"H (1) based on 76 deg. F Wet Bulb 1 percent of peak stsnmer hours (2) stretched load condition = 1121 Hit (3) maximum turbine bypass flow occurs with turbine tripped l
l 10.4-16
Fagt - 7 [8,10] #13 TABLE 10.4-2 CIRCULATING COOLING WATER ANALYSIS
- Excressed a's Average Maximum Ca 85 108 Cal ci um Magnesium Mg 19.5 21 .3 Sodium Na 5.3 6.3 Potassium K 3.5 4.8 Chl ori ce Cl 11.8 32.5 Sul f ate SO 38 58 4
Nitrate NO 3.3 5.5 3
Phospate PO 0.13 1.0 4
Silica SiO 9.8 15.3 2
Manganese Mn 0.13 0.18 Total tron Fe 0.95 1.72 Total Alkal inity Ca00 240 290 3
pH 7.9 8.3 Total Dissolved Sol ids 355 435 Total Suspended Solids 33 115 l
Chl ori ne Resi dual ** Cl 0.2 5 (upset) 2 i
Specific Conductance 9 787 936 25 C (micrombos/cm)
- Concentrations and conductance are based on 2.5 times river water values.
All analysis values except pH and Specific Conductance are stated in ppm as expressed above. .
- Chlorine is added Intermittently as a biograde and controlled by special Instr umentation.
The maximum analysis used f or the condenser leak design conditions.
10.4-17
l j
Eight (8) release points (points 20A thru 20H in Fig.11.3-9) are associated with Thermal Mergins Beyond Design Basis (TEW) design f eatures which receive exhausts frem the Annulus Air Cooling System (this system is described in Section 9.6.2) . This system is not required to operate during normal operations or to mitigate the consequences of any design basis accidents.
Activity would only be released f rom these points in the event of very low probabil Ity accidents beyond the design basis, such as a hypothetical core disruptive accident. If required these exhausts woul d be initiated no sooner than twenty-four (24) to thirty-six (36) hours af ter the tem scenario. On I ine monitoring for particui ate, Iodine and radiogas wIlI be provided for these exhausts in the event of such an accident.
The Containment Cleanup System / Annulus Pressure Maintenance and Filtration System have a common exhaust (release point 21 in Fig. 11.3-9). During normal operation, the Annul us Pressure Maintenance and Filtration System exhausts thru release point 21 on top of the RG oome. In the event of very low probabil ity accidents beyond the design basis (T22) the Containment Cicanup System would exhaust thru the same release point, and the Annulus Pressure Maintenance and Fiitration System would no Ionger be in use. Particutatos, radiolodines, radiogases, and plutonim are monitored continuously in the of fI uent stream.
11.3.6.2 Balance of Plant A smal l fraction of tritium produced in the fuel and control rods passes into the steam-water system by dif f usion through stainless steel in the IHX and through the steam generator tubes. Tritium is expected to be in the steam-water system in the form of tritiated water. The condenser air removal system removes non-condensible gases (vapors) fra the condensing steam.
Tritiated water' vapor, present in the of f-gas flow, constitutes the only expected gaseous release contribution f rom the bal ance of the pl ant.
Mechanical vacuum pumps will remove the vapors together with the noncondensible gases and will discharge them to the exhaust plenum of the Turbine Generator Building (which corresponds to release point 7 on Figure 11.3-9). The vapors will mix with the exhaust air. The resulting gaseous tritium release from the TGB is provided in Table 11.3-16.
l The Demerator Exhaust and Steam Packing Exhruster exhaust are Independently vented to atmosphere fra the Turbine Generator Building (release points 24 and 25 on Figure 11.3-9). The BOP tritium contribution is included in the dose calculations presented in Section 11.3-8. Bal ance of Plant tritium release is based on the following asseptions: (1) Pl ant Capacity Factor of 0.68, (2) Vacuum Pep Operating Factor of 0.85, (3) Radioactivity input to Steam-Water System 0.016 CI/ day, and (4) Condenser of f-gas removal 7 s4fm.
The design val ue release of tritiated water vapor amounts to 6.3 x 10 i
CI/ day.
Description, design bases, and evaluation of the BOP design are provided in Section 10.
i 11.3-16 Amend. 73 Nov. 1982 A7-71 %1
i Paga - 1 W82-0948 [8,9] 30 l
i Thirteen other release points associated with the bal ance of plant coul.d contain some radioactivity. These points are:
l
- 1) Pl ant Service Bull ding (PSB) exhausts f rom the hot I aboratory and decontamination area, identified as Point 19 on Figure 11.3-9. Level s of radioactivity in these areas will make no significant contribution to l of f-sito dose rates.
- 2) Turbine Generator Building exhausts receiving ventilation exclusively from the Turbine Generator Building atmosphere are identified as Points 7 thru 18 on Figure 11.3-9. Level s of radioactivity in these areas are expected to make no significant contribution to of f-site dose rates. However, as l
per SectIon 11.4.2.2.3, sampies of the TGB atmosphere wIlI perlodically be analyzed.
The location, height, discharge flow rate, discharge velocity, discharge air temperature, and size and shape of the discharge orifice, for each BOP release point, are presented in Table 11.3-20.
l 11.3.7 Dilution Factors The maximi.sn dose at the site boundary due to normal releases f ran the gaseous waste system will occur at a point on the boundary that has the highest average annual x/Q as determined f rom meteorological data 4 Fo the GBRP site, the average annual x/Q for this point is 5.10 x 10 s/ .
11.3.8 Dose Estimates The' release of radioactive noble gases in the gaseous ef fluent f rom the CRBRP during normal operation will create a sl ightly radioactive pl ume downwind of the site; this will expose the public located in the downwind direction to smalI doses of external gamma and beta radiation. An external beta dose to body tissue will be received fran the relatively small amount of tritium discharged to the atmosphere. It should be noted that these exposure pathways imply a publ Ic completely exposed to the environment, whereas, in reality, most persons spend a significant portion of the iIves within structures that reduce the exposure of these types of radiation. The reduction in external dose coul d range f ran a f actor of two to 1,000 depending on the type of structure and the location of the person within (Ref.1).
l Exposure to tritium in the form of tritiated water vapor (HTO) can occur j through several pathways including:
- 1) Inhal ation and skin absorption
- 2) Ingestion of milk contaminated by the f allout of HTO to the cow's forage and by inhal ation by the cow 11.3-17 Amend. 72
' Oct. 1982 j
. _"taai*_ _ _
Pags - 1 (82-0956} J_e,11J r32 11.4 PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM 11.4.1 Destan ObfactIves Prheess radiation monitors are provided to allow the evaluation of plant equipment perf onnance and to measure, Indicate and record the radioactive concentration in plant process and ef fluent streams during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences. The monitors are provided in accordance with CRBRP (Section 3.1) Design Criterion 56.
Radiation monitoring of process systems provides early warning of equipment mal f unctions, Indicative of potential radiological hazards, and prevents release of activity to the environment in excess of 10CFR 20 limits. Each '
monitor will be equipped with a loss-of-signal instrument f ailure alarm and a '
high level alarm, (a high-high level alarm is also provided when required).
These alarms alert operating personnel to channel mal function and excessive
- radi oactiv ity. Corrective action will then be manually or automatically per f ormed.
Monitoring of liquid and gaseous ef fluents under normal operating conditions will be in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.21 and any activity released t will be within limits established in 10CFR20.
The number, sensitivities, ranges, and locations of the radiation detectors ;
will be determined by requirements of the specific monitored process during normal and postulated abnormal (accident) conditions. Al l monitors w il l be designed so that saturation of detectors during a severe accider' condition
, s wil.1 not cause erronpously low readings. Monitoring durirJg severe post t I accident conditions illi be accomplished by the high-range gamma area monitors di scussed in Section 12.1.4, in conjunction with the sampling lines described s in Section 11.4.2.2.1. _.
Radioactivity in the low level waste releases will be Integrated and recorded.
Control signals will be provided by the radiation monitor (s) to terminate liquid or gaseous ef fluent if an out-of-limit signal is recorded. The -
monitoring and control exerted by the process radiation monitoring equipment.
and the operator during any release will also be verified by periodic manual ;
l '
l sampling and laboratery analysis in accordance with Technical Specificationc.
For tritlated process liquids, tritium survelilance will be by sampling and ,'
l ab analysis.
All detectors.will be shielded against ambient background radiation levels so that requirec activity measurements can be maintained. Monitors associated w ith acci.isnt ccnditions are al so discussed in 3. A.3.1. Area monitors and airborne radioactivity monitors are discussed in 12.1.4 and 12.2.4, respectively. The radiological ef fluent sampling program is discussed in Section 11.4.3 and meets the reporting requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.21.
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11.4.2 Continuous Monitorina/SamolInc 11.4.2.1 General Descriotion The descriptive tebulation of the various continuous monitors / samplers for process and of fluent radioactivity monitoring, which includes those gas and liquid monitoring devices in or associated with IIquid or gas process streans"_
considered in this discussion, is f ound in Tabl e 11.4-1. The basis for selecting the locations as well as the control functions associated with the monitor, are described below.
Each continuous monitor wIII be equipped wIth power suppiles, micro-processor and accessories, Indication and local slarm Indicator lights. Each monitor will transmit radioactivity level and alarm status information for display and logging by Radiation Monitoring equipment located in the Centrol Rom with redundant display and logging equipment located in the Health Physics Area of the Plant Service Building. The alarms are provided to indicate instrument mal functions or a radioactivity level in excess of the monitor's alarm setpo i nt. Each continuous monitor has a local Indicator at the detector location to f ac!!! tate the testing and/or calibration of the equipment.
The lowest scale division of each continuous monitor's range is the maximum detector sensitivity deemed appropriate for the intended service. The range of the monitor will be a minimum of five decades above the maximum sensitivity Ievel; and wilI alIow for a minimum of one decade span above the monitor blgh-high setpoint (when high-high setpoints are ernployed). The ef fluent alarm setpoint corresponds to the alarm annunciation level dictated by the CRBRP Technical Specif ications (Chapter 16.) For each monitor, a sample chamber and/or detector is selected and will be installed in such a way as to minimize sampiIng losses and electrmagnetic and background interf erences. The output of al i ef fI uent raoni ters w Il l be continuousiy sampied and recorded by the CRSRP Plant Data Handling and Display System. The Ret.ctor Containment isolation Monitors (PPS), Control Rom Air Intake monitors and other saf ety-related monitors will be powered by Class IE, redundant 120 VAC power.
11.4.2.2 Gaseous System Descrfotion 11.4.2.2.1 Post-Accident Containment Atmosehere Monitors l The capability to monitor the containr.ont atmosphere radioactivity level following containment isolation during an accident0 condition shall be provided. Three pair of penetrations, located 120 apart around the containment structure will allow air samples to be taken by mobile or portable moni tors and sampl ing equipment. The penetrations design and locations will consider the following criteria
- 1. The penetration opening on the inside of containment will be positioned to obtain a representative sample.
~
- 2. The penetration opening on the outside of containment will be positioned in an accessible area to eneble connection of the monitoring and/or sampling equipment.
11.4-2 82-0956
Pago - 3 (82-0956) [8,11] #32 .
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- 3. Each penetration will have two isolation valves; a renote manual controlled valve inside containment and a manual, locked valve outside containment w ith a bl ind fl ange.
4 The penetration design will comply with CRBRP Design Criteria Numbers 45 and 47 (Section 3.1)
Each pair of penetrations can be connected to a mobile monitor which will be utilized f or continuous monitoring of the containment atmosphere. 7he sample is withdrawn f rom containment, passes through the monitor for radletion detection and returned to containment. Grab samples will also be obtained for f urther l aboratory analysis.
11.4.2.2.2 Reactor containment Isolation Montters The radiation level In the head access area will be monitored by three detectors f or direct gamma activity. The output of these detectors is routed to the plant protection system to Initiate closure of containment isolation valves if a preset limit is reached by two out of three of the detectors.
In addition, the radiation leve In containment exhaust, upstream of the Isolation valves will be isokinetically monitored for gaseous activity by three gas inonitors. Their output will also be provided to the PPS for Initiation of containment isolation when a preset radiat(on level is reached by two of the three detectors.
The monitoring system will be designed to comply with IEEE 2i>-1971. The overall containment isolation system design and protection logic is alscussed in Section 7.3. Figure 12.2-1 shows a typical block diagram of these channels and Figure 7.3-1 shows the trip logic configuration.
11.4.2.2.3 Buildino Ventilation Exhaust Monitors The number and location of building exhaust plenums f rom which potentially radioactive plant gaseous release may emanate are: One located in the Intermediate Bay (SGB-IB), nine located near the top of the RCB dome, two located in the Reactor Servics Building (RSB), one located in the Radwaste Area (Bay), one located in the Plant Service Building (PSB), fourteen in the Turbine Generator Buil ding (TGB), and three located in the Steam Generator.
Buil ding (SGB). Continuous monitoring will be perforced at those exhausts which could conceivably undergo a significant increase in detectable levels in radioactiv ity. The remaining exhausts will be sampled periodically.
The exhaust plenum located in the IB receives ventilation exhaust air from the Intermediate Bay area. A continuous air monitor (CIM) will be provided to detect particul ate, radiolodine and gaseous activity in the ef fluent stream.
The air sanple will be obtained isokinetically from the exhaust, on a continuous basi s. The operation of the three-channel CAM unit is described in Section 12.2.4.2.1.
11.4-3 l
The exhaust plenum located on the Radwaste Building receives ventilation exhaust air f rom the radwaste area. A Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) will be provided to detect particulate, Iodine and gaseous activity in the 'ef fluent stream. The air sample will be obtained Isokinetically from the exhaust, on a continuous basi s. The operation of the three channel CAM unit is described in .
Section 12.2.4.2.1.
The two RSB exhausts will be continuously monitored for radioactivity releases. The first exhaust plenum located on the RSB roof which receives ventil ation exhaust f rom the RG wil l be continuously monitored f or particulates, radio gases, and radiolodine activity in the ef fluent stream.
The second exhaust plenum located on the RSB which receives ventilation exhaust f rm the RSB via the RSB clean-up filtration units will also be continuously monitored f or particul ate, gaseous and radiolodine activity.
The exhaust plenum located near the top of the RG dome, which receives exhaust f rm the Containment Clean-up and Annulus Pressure Maintenance and Filtration System will be continuously monitored for particulate, radiolodine, radiogas, and pl utonium activity in the ef fluent stream.
The 8 exhausts located at the top of the RG dome for the Annulus Cooling Air becc*ne potential radioactivity release points only in the event of very low probabil Ity accidents beyond the design basis (e.g., Thermal Margin Beyond the Design Base). On l ine monitoring f or particul ates, radiolodires and radiogases have been provided for these exhausts in the event of such an accident.
TGB areas' wIlI be perlodically grab sampied and sampies w!!I be analyzed fcr tritium activity.
The exhaust in the kB receives ventilation f rom the combined laboratcry.
Sampies wIlI be colIected Isokinetically by a particulate (and lodine, If required) filter and analyzed for Isotopic content in the Counting Rom.
Certain ef fluent radiction monitors are Identified as Ac.cident Monitoring Instrumentation in Table 11.4-1. As such, these monitors will meet the requirements of Section 7.5.11 of the PS AR.
( The reporting of ef fluent radioactivity released f rm the CPSRP will be l consistent wIth the gut delInes estabi!shed in Regulatory Guide 1.21. This reporting will be based upon the results of Counting Rom analysis of ef fluent samples obtained at each location Iisted above.
11.4.2.2.4 Condenser Vacuum Pumo Exhaust. Demerator Continuous Vents and Turbine Steam Packino Exhauster Tritium Samolers l A gas sample will be continuously withdrawn f rom each one of the condenser
( vacuum pump air, deaerator exhaust, and turbine steam packing exhauster air Into tritium samplers comprised of sllIca gel dessicant column to enable
( determination of tritium activity to Indicate unacceptable tritium dif fusion in the steen generators. The sample will be analyzed using liquid scintillation techniques in the counting rom.
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kgo-5(82-0936)[8,11]#32 11.4.2.2.5 centrol Room Inlet Air Monitors The main and remote Control Room air intakes will each be continuously monitored by two redundant monitors. These three channel (particulate /radiolodine/radiogas) CAMS will detect radioactivity in the air intakes and will determine which Intake should be used during the Control Roan isolation condition. Detail s concerning the sequence of operation during Control Room isolation are given in Section 9.6.1.3.4.13. A fifth three channel CAM wIlI be InstalIed dewnstream of the parallel HVAC make-up alr filters to monitor the performance of the HEPA filter trains. A detailed description of the operation of each of these CAM units Is given in Section 12.2.4.2.1.
11.4.2.2.6 Inerted Cell Atmosehere Monitors The capability for monitoring the atmosphere of each individual inerted cell for high radioactivity will be accomp!!shed by three methods. One method is the sequential sampiIng of groups of celIs wIth on-lIne gas moniters as described in 3.A.I.4.2. Each monitor shall have a trip signal determined by the process system to initiate activation of cell purging equipment, in addition, mobile particulate, lodine and gas monitors are provided to sample any Individual inerted cells atmosphere, as described in 12.2.4 Finally to provide a sensitive method of sodium leak detection, particulate monitors are provided for continuous monitoring of inerted cells within the RCB containing components contacting radioactive sodium. These monitors w il l al arm f or activated sodium present in the cells atmosphere. The Individual inerted cells that are continuously monitored for sodium leak detection are l isted i n Tabl e 3. A.1-3.
11.4.2.2.7 RAPS and CAPS Monitorine' Gas monitors will be provided for the Radioactive Argon Processing System (RAPS) and Cell Atmosphere Processing System (CAPS). A monitor will be Iocated at the CAPS Int et for controliIng the rate of radicactivIty input.
Moniters wIlI also be Iocated at the output of these systems to ascertain that the radionuclide activity of the processed gas is within limits for reuse in RAPS or within 10 CFR 50, App. I and ALARA limits for those gases exhausted to the H&V systera by CAPS.
11.4.2.2.8 Safetv-Related Monitors Certain monitors which provide control signal s to saf ety related process systems or are used to monitor safety related systems are classified as safety rel ated monitors. These monitors will be supplied with Class IE power f ran redundant vital AC buses and will meet the requirements described in Section 7.1. Saf ety rolated monitors are identifled in Table 11.4-1.
These monitors will each have a dedicated Display and Control Unit (DCU) In the Control Room. The DCU will also ment the requirements described in Section 7.1 and will be supplied with Class IE power. The DCU's w il l be located in the back panel area of the Control Room adjacent to the Radiation Moni tor Console (computer).
11.4-4
11.4.2.3 Lieufd Sys+ ems Descrfotton 11.4.2.3.1 Radwaste Discosal System Lfould Effluen+ Monitor Ef fluents f rom the Liquid Radwaste Disposal System are discharged into the cool ing tower blowdown. A IIquid radioactivity detector will continuously monitor, record, and control the activity released to the cooling tower bl owdown stream. The blowdown flow rate available f or IIquid waste dilution and compliance with 10CFR20 will be considered in establishing a high radiation setpoint f or this monitor. A high radiation signal will automatically cicse the isolation valve in the discharge line and alarm in the Control room.
Frequent composite sampl es of the blowdown downstream of the radioactive IIquid input will be taken f or radionuclice determination including tritium.
11.4.2.4 pafntenance and calibration On canpletion of the monitoring system installation, each peccess monitor will be checked for proper operation and calibrated against a radiation check source (s) traceable back to tho. National Bureau of Standards or f rom ar.
equal ly acceptabl e source. This initial calibration, and subsequent calibration at six month intervals will verify the electronic operation of both local and Control Room Indications and also all annunciation points (loss-of-signal), loss-of-sampl e f l ow, high radiation, etc. In addition, each monitor is supplied with a built-in check source to provide rapid f unctional tests at periodic intervals.
11.4.3 Samolina This section provides information on the 043RP process and ef fluent sampling program. Process sampling provides the means f or determining and monitoring various plant systems containing radioactive and potentially radioactive fluids. Ef fluent sampling provides the means for the reporting of radioactive releases to the environment. The ef fluent sampling will meet the reporting l requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.21 and will provide data necessary for the j semiannual report required by 10CrR50.36a.
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P ca - 7 (82-0956) [8,11] #32 11.4.3.1 Process Samolino Periodic sampiIng is conducted to alert the operator of any abnormal condition that may be developing. Both local and remote iIquid samples are taken.
Gaseous samples are taken directly at the sample station adjacent to the gas analyzer. The locations for gaseous sample Instrumentation are given in Secti on 11.3.3.3. Operating procedures and performance tests of gaseous samples are discussed in Section 11.3.4 Sanpl ing of primary sodium, secondary sodium, ex-vessel sodlum and cover gas is discussed in detail in SectIon 9.8, entitled " Impurity Monitoring System". ThIs sectIon al so discusses the location of samples, expected composition and concentration, sampi ing f requency and procedures.
The basis f or selecting the locations f or sample stations is to provide an Indication of the ef fectiveness of key process operations. Analyses of these samples are related to the process sequence from which they were obtained to eval uate speci f ic equipment perf ormance.
Gaseous samples are monitored for gross activity and periodically analyzed f or isotopie content. Tables 11.3-1 through 11.3-15 IIst inventories of the expected concentration and composition of the of fluent gas samples.
Sections 11.4.3.1.1 through 11.4.3.1.5 describe in detail each of the iIquid sampi ing points in the Radioactive Waste Systems. Sanpl Ing procedure, analytical procedure, and sensitivity for each sample point are the same and are discussed in detall in the f ol icw ing paragraphs.
Sampl ing Procedure: Smples are collected in a sampling station located on the operating floor of the radwaste building. Sanple circulating lines run through this sampl Ing station. The upstream side of the, sample iInes are
- connected to the discharge of the punps serving the tanks. After passing through the sampiIng station, the circulating sample flu!d is returned to the tank f ran which it was drawn.
Analytical Procedure and Sensitivity: The quantity of sample to be counted i f or gross beta-gamma is pipetted onto a pl anchet. The pl anchet is pl aced on a turntable and evaporated to dryness under an infrared bulb. The rotation j insures a uniformly distributed dried sample for reproducible counting. The l height of the inf rared bulb is adjustable to obtain a moderate rate of ev apor ati on. Counting is done by means of an Internal proportional counter.
l The isotopic analysis is perf crmed by a completely autonated Pulse Height Anal y si s Sy stem. A shielded Ge (LI) detector is used with a computer-based pul se height anal ysi s system. The system satisfies the reporting requirements I of Regulatory Guide 1.21.
Provisions wlll al so be made f or al pha and tritium assay.
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. 11.4.3.1.1 Intermediate Level Act'lvItv LfouId waste colfeetfen Tanks These tanks receive decontamination waste f rcrn the Large Component Cleaning Cell. The analysis of this waste provides a check on the decontamination procedure.
The composition is expected to be sodium hydroxide solution, nitric acid sol ution and water rinses. Af ter neutral ization a sol ution of sodium sul f ate or sodium nitrate resul ts. Activity will be
- CI/cc.
The quantity to be measured is the gross activity.
Additional rinses woulJ be required if the activity of the component is higher than expected. Additional passes thrcugh the purification equipment would be required if the activity of the product from the evaporator is too high.
Corrective action would be taken if the DF is lower than the expectsd value.
The expected recircul ation flow through the sample l ine is 10 gpm.
11.4.3.1.2 Process DIstilIate Storace Tanks These tanks receive the distillate f rom the Process waste Evaporator. The sample provides the check en the DF of the evaporator and purity of the product to be rocycled for plant uses or released to the environment af ter dil ution w ith cool ing tower blowdown. The composition is expe,cged to be very dil ute sodium sul f ate or sodium nitrate with an activity 10 Cl/ce.
The quantity to be measured is the gross activity, if no excess inventcry exists, if excess inventory exists and a portion of the content is to be released to the low activity liquid system, an isotopic analysis will be perf ormed cons! stent w ith reporting requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.21. If the activity c+ the sample is unacceptably high, the contents of the tank are reprocessed through another evaporator-lon exchange cycle. Corrective measures would be taken if the DF is much lower than the expected value.
The expected recirculation flow through the sampling line is 10 gpm.
11.4.3.1.3 Lew Level Activ1tv Lfauid Waste colleetion Tanks These tanks receive laboratory drains, floor drains, lavatory drains, and shower drains f rcrn areas that may contain radicfetivity. An activity check at these points determines the possibility of the need for further processing.
It also permits a check on the DF of the purification equipment by ecnparing it with the activity of the purifled waste.
These tanks receive waste from several sources, honce the composition is not wel l def ined. The conductiv The expected activity is 10 jty will be measured CI/cc. to determine The quantity impurity to be measured level.
is the gro::s act i v i ty.
11.4-7
- e. j raga - y toz-vypo> Le,IlJ 7J4 I
, The sampling f requency will be in accordance with reporting requirements of '
Regul atory Guide 1.21.
Higher sanple activity indicates abnormal operations elsewhe.*e in the plant.
Corrective measures at those locat!ons would be taken. Al so, higher activity l Indicates that a second pass through the equipment would be required.
The expected recirculation flow of the sampling line is 10 gpm.
11.4.3.1.4 Lew Level Activity DIstfIlate Monitorina Tanks Since these tanks are holding tanks for the purified product f rom the low level waste evaporator, pending release to the discharge canal, sample analysi s i s mandatory. The composition is expected to be equivalent to grade C water or com2gy with federal and state regulations and have an average activity of 10 CI/cc.
A gross count is made bef ore releasing to the environment. Triti um content w il l al so be sampl ed. An isotopic analysis is performed for record purposes as required by Regulatory Guide 1.21. Sampling f requency ylli be determined by reporting requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.21.
Hign senple activity indicates the need for reprocessing the batch.
Corrective measures would be taken if CF is lower than the expected level. No particul ar process flow is associated with this sample point.
11.4.3.1.5 Cencentrated Waste Collection Tank The material in this tank is Intended to be solidified and shipped to the disposal site. To determine the type of packaging and degree of shielding required to meet the shipping regulation CFR Title 49, the analysis of sanple is necessary. The composition is expected to be a sol ution of sodium sul fate or sodium nitrate and an activity of 50 CI/cc. The quantity to be measured is the gross acti v i ty.
The sampling f requency will be determined in the FSAR. No process f l ow is associated w ith this sampl ing procedure.
11.4.3.2 Ef fluent Samolina The radiocetive ef fluents are continuously monitored or sanpled as indicated in Section 11.4.2.2.3 by activity and by flow. The sampl ing system is designed to obtain a representative ef fluent sanple to establish concentrations of radioactivity and to f acilitate radioisotopic analysis to assure compilance with recognized codes and standards f or radiation protection. Tne sanples are taken bef ore the ef fluent release to the env i ronment. The gaseous ef fluents are discussed in detail in Section 11.3 and liquid ef fluents are discussed in Section 11.2.
11.4-8
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The Cooling Tower blowdown, wastes and drains and other normally non-radioactive IIquid ef fluent streams will be sampled for suspended / dissolved activity incl uding tritium. The problem associated with continuous monitoring of low level activity in tritium is recognized and therefore, per! odic batch ,
samples f rom each liquid ef fluent stream will be taken and analyzed in the l Iaberatory. l Building Storm drains and Plant Service Building IIquid of fluents are normally non-radicactive and w!!I not be monitored, but wilI be periodically sampied for radioisotopic analysis as necessary.
1 To satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.21 requirements for gamma spectroscopy and l sensitivity, a high resolution automated radioisotopic analysis system will be provided at the plant site to f ac!!! tate precise identificPlon and analysis of compiex radionuct ide concenteoilons.
11.4.4 Recortina An autcrnated Report Processor wIlI be provided which wilI generate the Ef fluent Radioactivity Release Reports in acccrdance with Appendix B of NRC Regul atory Guide 1.21. This computer based processor wIlI be interf aced wIth the Radiation Monitoring System Controllers and the CPBRP Environnental Ccrnputer. The Report Processor wilI also accept manual entry of analyses perf crmed by the Health Physicist.
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11.4-9 82-0956
TMILE 18.4-1 PROGSS & EFFLtKHT K)NiiORING AND SAMLING Se ple or Range Expected Quant.
Elev. Cont. ( Cl/cc) 00S Concent. Meas. Rumarks i w i t;!- Bldg.
. w.. . . ::-a . . r Isolation Monitors (PPS):
80'#-10 ~2 See section Gross Saf ety-rel ated 3
-Contalrunent Ventilation (3) RG 842 Continuous Cs 11.3.2.6 Concent. Class IE PPS Exhaust (Gaseous) CAM Rel ated
~I ~4 Direct See Section
-4tead Access Area (3) RG 802 Continuous 10 -10 mR/hr Direct Gamma Ganma 7.3.1.2 Radeeste Monitor:
I37
-1 ALL Evaporator, Heating WA 775 Continuous 4x10'I4x10 -2 Cs Gross Elanent s Heating Water Concent.
Out (Liquid)
I37
-LALL Evaporator, Heating WA 775 Continuous 4x10~I4x10 -2 Cs Gross Elements Heating water Concent.
Out (Liquid)
-l ALL Evaporator, Distill. WA 775 Continuous 4x10~7 4x10 -2 Cs I37 Gross Coolerg Cooling Water Concent.
- Out (Liquid)
-LALL Evaporator, Distill WA 775 Continuous 4x10-I 4x10 -2 Cs I37 Gross Cool er: Cooling Water Concent.
Out (Liquid)
I37 Gross
-LALL Ef fluent WA 795 Continuous 4x10~74x10-2 Cs Concent.
RAPS & CAPS Process Monitors
-Gas Entering RAPS RG 733 Continuous 2.7-2.7x 105 Kr85 Gross Cold Box (Gaseous) Concent.
-Coolant Leaving RAPS RSB 779 Continuous 2.7x10-6-2.7x10~I kr 85 Gross In-Line Corcent. Monitoring Cold Box (Gaseous) (2) 85 Gross
-Gas Leaving RAPS RG 733 Continuous 2.7x10~3-2.7x10*2 kr Cold Box (Gaseous) Concent.
-4 85 Gross
-Gas Leaving CAPS RSB 779 (bnti nuous 2.7x10 -2.7g10* I Kg3I Surge Vessel (Gaseous lodine) 10~ -10 1 hnt.
85 Gross
-CAPS Header Serving PIB Continuous 2.7x10 -2.7x 10~I Kr
! RG ColIs (Gaseous) Concent.
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TieLE 11.4-1 PROGSS & EFFLtENT M)ttlTORING AND SAMilNG Seple or Range Expected Quant.
Description Bldg. Elev. Cont. ( CI/cci 005 Concent. Maa s. Renarks
-Gas From Nitrogen Cell RE 755 Continuous 2.7x104 -2.7x10~I kr 85 Gross Atmosphere $mpiing Unit Concent.
(Gaseous) 4
-Gas Fron Nitrogen Cell RW 752 Continuous 2.7x 10 -2.7x10"I Kr 85 Gross Atmosphere $mpiIng Unit Concent. .
IGaseous)
CAPS Process Gas Elfluent o 85 to HV AC (Gaseous) (2) RE 779 Continuous 2.7x10-5,f,7,gg Gross I
(lodine) 10'I -10" l Content.
t Ef fluent Gas From (2) inerted Cells to HVAC R$B 800 Continuous 2.7x104-2.7x10"I kr 85 Gross (Gaseous 1 Concent.
l>VAC Duct Monitoring (CAM of RAPS / CAPS Colis
-RAPS Col d Box & V al ve RW 733 Continuous 2.7x104 -2.7x10"I Kr 85 Gross in-line Gallery Cells (Gaseous) Concent. Monitoring &
Cell isolation
-RAPS Noble Gas Storage RG 733 Confinaous 2.7x104-2.7x10"I Kr 85 Gross in-Ilne vessel Cell (Gaseous) Concent. Monitoring &
Call isolation 4 -2.7x 10~I 85 Gross in-Line
-RAPS Compressor and RW 733 Continuous 2.7x10 Kr Aftercooler Cells (2) Concent. M>nitoring &
(Gaseous) Cell isolation
-RAPS Vessel s (Gaseous) RW 733 Continuous 2.7x104 -27x10"I Kr 85 Gross in-Line Concent. M>ni tor ing &
Cell isolation 4 -2.7 x 10"I Kr 85 Gross in-Line
-RAPS / CAPS Pipeway RW 780 Continuous 2.7x10 (Gaseous) Concent. Monitoring &
Cell isolation
-CAPS Cold Box Cell (Gaseous) R!B 792 Continuous 2.7x104 -2.7x10~I Kr 85 Gross in-Line Concent. M>nitoring &
Cell isolation 4 85
-CAPS Vessel Cells RSB 755 Continuous 2.7x10 -27x10"I Kr Gross In-Line
& Gallery (Gaseous) Concent. Monitoring &
Cell isolation 11.4-11 i l
TMLE 11.4-1 PROaSS & EFFLtKNT FONITORING AND SAMtING Se pte or Range Expected Quant.
Descript ion Oldg. Elev. Cont. ( CI/cc) 005 Concent. Meas. Rear ks
-CAPS Cm pressor & (2) Continuous 2.7xl0 -Rx10"I Kr 85 Gross. In-aIne After Cooler Cells (Gaseous) Concent. Monitoring &
Cell isolation 0
-RA0 Water Holding Continuous 2.7x10 -27x10 ~I Kr ' Gross In-Line Vessel & Pop Cell (Gaseous) Concent. Dbnitoring &
C611 Isolation
-Access Areas (4) Continuous 2.7x10 -Rx 10'I Kr0 ' toss in-Line (Gaseous) Concent, pbnitoring &
Cell Isolation
-Cover Gas Monitoriq Continuous 2.7x10 4-Rx10'I Kr ' Gross in-Line Cells (Gaseous) Concent. Monitoring &
Cell isolation 85 in-Line
-Pipe Gase & Vapor RSB 772 Continuous 2.7x10 Rx10'I Kr Gross Trap Cell (Gaseous) Concent. >bnitoring &
Cell isolation
-W AC Canon Header R(B 766 Continuous 2.7x104 -Ux10 ~I 0 Kr ' Gross In-Line for Various Cells Concent. >bnitoring &
(Gaseous) Cell isolation Mai n W AC Duct Fr a All RAPS / CAPS RSB 779 Continuous 2.7x10 .7x10 K Gross Cells (Gaseous) CAM 10 -10 1 Concent.
(lodine)
Sodle Leak Detection For Following Recirc. Gas Cooling Subsystems:
( All Par *1culate)
-5 24 Gross Alarm Only Reactor Cavity RW 733 Continuous 2.94 x 10~I 3-2.91x 10 Na
, Concent.
RITS Loop 1 MD 766 Continuous 2.94x10~I 3-2.94 x10-5 y,,!4 Gross Alarm Only Concent.
RITS Loop 2 RG 766 Continuous 2.94x10'I 3-2.94x 10 -5 p,24 Gross Alarm Only Concent.
4 FhTS Loop 3 RW 766 Continuous 2.94 x 10'II-2.9 4 x 10' Na Gross Alarm Only Concent.
-5 2d Gross Alarm Only Na Makeup Pop & Vessels Rm 752 Continuous 2.94x10'I 3-2.9 4 x 10 Na Concent.
Na Makeup P op & Pipeway F2 752 Continuous 2.94x10'I3-2.94x10 Na2 Gross Alarm Only Concent.
11.4-12
TMILE 18.4-1 PROMSS & EFFLUENT K)HITORING AND SAMllNG Seple or Itange Expected Quant.
Description 81dg. Elev. Cont. ( C1/cc) 005 Concent. Meas. Rmarks Continuous 2.94x10'I3-2.94 x 10 -5 Na24 Gross Alarm Only Col d Tr an, Nak Cells RG 794 Concent.
Control Room Main (2) (B 863 Continuous See Section Gross initiate C/R
-2 85 Concent, Air intake (Gaseous) CAM 12.2 i sol ation, see 3x10'I2-3x10 ~ I KrI I Sec. 7.6.4.5.6 (todine) 4x10'10 (Particulate) 2x10- -4x10~
-2x10 CsI37 Saf ety-Related (IE)
Continuous See Section Gross initiate C/R Control Room Roote (2) SGB 851
-2 85 Air intake (Gaseous) CAM 3x10'I- -I Kr II 12.2 Concent. Isolation, see (lodinel 4x10~I23x10
-10 4x10
-5 I I3 Sec. 7.6.4.5.7 (Particulate) 2x10 -2x10 Cs Safety-Related (IE)
Control Room Common W 847 Continuous See Section Gross Monitor Only Duck Downstream of 12.2 Concent.
Filter Units (Gaseous) CAM 3x10'7-3x10~2 Xr 85 (lodine) 4x10-I2-4x10-7 I I37 (Particulate) 5x10-10-5x10-5 Cs I37 lHTS Loop 1 SG8 765 Continuous 10-2-103 mR/hr Gross (Direct G amal Activity 3
IHTS Loop 2 SGB 765 Continuous 10-2-10 mR/hr Gross (Direct G amal Activity
-2 3 lHTS Loop 3 SGB 765 Continuous 10 -10 mR/hr Gross (Direct G ama) Activity Large Ca ponent RG 756 Continuous 10-I-10 dmR/hr Gross Cleentng ColI (LCCC) Act Iv i ty 4x10~7-4x10 -2 3
LCCC Cooling Water RW 733 Continuous Cs Gross (Liquid) Concent.
LCCC Process Gas Rm Continuous 10 -10'I Kr 85 Gross Ef fIuent (Gaseous) Concent.
Fuel Handling Cell (FHC) RSB 779 Continuous Gross Argon Gas (Gaseous) 10 10'I Kr 85 Concent.
(lodine) 10'10-10-5 ,131 II (Particul ate) 10- -10~ Cs EVST Argon Cover RSB 842 Continuous 10*-104 Kr 85 Gross Gas (Gaseous) Concent.
11.4-13
TMILE 11.4-1 PRO &SS & EFFLtKNT MDNITORING AND SAMllNG S eple or Range Expected Quan t.
Bldg. Elev. Cont. ( Cl/cc) 00S Concent. Moas. Remarks Descript ion FHC Utility Monitor RSB 779 Continuous 10'I-10 mR/hr Gross Act Iw Ity (Olrect G ame)
Radweste Bullding NB 867 Continuous Gross initiate Exhaust (Gaseous) -1 Concent. Filtering of 3x1{0 10~ -10 i Effluent 0 CAM (lodine) 10 Cs I I f rom 20 (Particul ate) 10 RSB Operating Finor (2) RSB 816 Continuous Gross initiate RSB
~7 ~2 Kr 85 concent. Confinement see Hy AC Exhaust (Gaseout) 3x10 -3x10 I3I CAM (lodine) 4xgI2Gx10 I Section (Par ticul ate) 10 -10 Cs 7.6.4.3.3 (4)
Safety related (IE)
Fuel Handling Cell (2) RSB 779 Continuous Gross - same -
3x10 3 -2 Kr 85 Concent.
HW AC Exhaust (Gaseous) II (lodine) 4xgI?x10 - x10 I (Particulate) 10 -10~ Cs Annulus Filter (2) RSB 840 Continuous Gross Select Filter
~I Concent, train Section Discharge (Gaseous) 861 4.4x10- -4x4x10 ~2 kg3I (lodine) 1.1x10 g1.tx10 -5 l I37 7.6.4.2.2 (1)
Saf ety Related (Particulate) 1.7x10~ -1.7x10 Cs (IE)
Annulus Filter inlet /(2) RSB 840 Continuous Gross 1) Start Filter Annulus Cooling Exhaust 861 Concent. see 7.6.4.7.7
~ 4 85 (6) 2) Monitor CAM (Gaseous) 3x10hlx10fr 1x10' -1xig II37 I3I Exhaust see (lodi ne) 4 (Particular) lx10 -1x10 Cs 11.4.7.7.3 (Accident (Monitor)
RSB Clean Up Filter RSB 816 Continuous Gross Select Filter Discharge (Gaseous) 794 3x10~I-3x10 -2 Kr I Concent. Train See 10 -5 I I3I Section (lodine) lx104 -1x10-I Cs I3#
(Particulate) lx10 -l=10 7.6.4.3.3(1)
Safety Related (IE)
Radmaste Ventilation 3 85 Effluent, Acci-Exhaust Ef fluent (Gaseous) RSB 867 Continuous 1x10 -lx10 r See Section Gross
-10 I I Concent. dont Monitor (lodine) 1x10 -Ixio I II.3.6 (Particulate) lx10-10-1x10 Cs I37 11.4-13a
a- ... .
4 TM)LE II.4-1 PRORSS & EFFLIJENT MINITORING ANO $AMLING Sample or Range Expected Q uant.
Description Bldg. Elev. Cont. ( Cl/cc) U0S Concent. > bas. Ramarks RGB Ventilation RSB B61 Continuous See Section Gross Exhaust Ef fluent (Gaseous) 1x10-6-1x10'I Kr 85 11.3.2.6 Concent.
IO (lodine) gCs I37 l31 (Particul ate) 1x10- -lx10-5 Ix10 10-Ix10'$
RGB Annulus /TMBDB (2) RSD 840 Continuous Accident
-6 1x10 -tal05 85 Moni tor Ef f l uent (Gaseous) 861 r (l odi ne) 10- I I Saf ety Related (Particulate) lx10 10 lx10 1x10 Cs I I37 (IE)
(Pl utoni um/Al pha) 1x10 12-Ix10'I 239 tul0- Pu R93 Exhaust RSB 816 Continuous Accident 85 Moni toring Ef fluent (Gaseous) 1x10 (lodine) lx10-101x10 I I33 (Particul ate) lx10-101x101x10337 SGB-lB Exhaust SGB 836 Confinuous See Section Acci dent Ef fluent (Gaseous) lx10-6-Ix103 Kr 85 11.3.2.6 Moni toring lx10 2 3131 (lodine)
(Particul ate) 1x10-10Ix10 2 CsI37 1x10 Hot Laboratory, Counting PSB Sampl e*
- Gross Room, and Decontamination Concent.
Area ventilation Exhaust Particulate Sampler Plant Discharge YARD - Sample see See Section Concent.
Canal Liquid Sampler 11.2.5 se Particulate collection on f liter, anstysis by proportional counters and spectroscopy system.
een Liquid Sanples collected In container. Analysis by proportional and liquid scintillation counters and spectroscopy system.
11.4-13b
1.-.- - .- A 12.1.4 Area Radfation Monitorina 12.1.4.1 Desfon criterra Area monitors are provided in selected building locations to continuously detect, measure, and Indicate the radiation level and to initiate alarms (audible and visual) for radiation levels above preset values. In high or varied noise level areas (195db) strobe lights are also provided in addition to the audible alarms. These monitors advise plant personnel of existing radiation levels during normal operation and warn them of potential radiation hazards that may cause higher exposure levels than expected.
The detector ranges of these monitors are chosen to provide continuous monitoring of gamma radiation levels ranging from one decade below to three decades above the design background level at each monitor location.
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The basis f or location of the various personnel protection monitors shall consider the fclIowing f actors:
- 1. The anticipated radiation level under operation, shutdown maintenance, and abnormal conditions.
- 2. The f requency and duration of occupancy, and the flow of traf fic under normal and accident conditions.
- 3. The proximity of high radiation sources.
4 The consequence of an undetected increase in radiation level. -
In addition to the personnel protection monitoring utilized during normal plant conditions, accidegt area4monitoring will al so be provided. Area
~
monitoring for range 10 to 10 R/hr will be provided in the following areas:
- 1. Inside buildings or areas which are in direct contact with primary containment where penetrations and hatches are located.
- 2. Inside buildings or areas where access is required to service equipment important to safety and the threat of radiation contamination exists.
Three high-range monitors of range 1 to 107 R/hr will be provided to moni, tor the level s of gamma cadiation in the Containment Area. The detectors f or these raonitors will be located approximately 120 apart around the Containment vessel periphery in the Annulus space so as to allow a measurement of gamma activity being radiated f rom containment. The location of these monitors is in the more benign environment of the Annulus rather than in containment to avoid the severe temperature transient and direct sodium aerosol which may occur during and following an acident. These menitors are saf ety-rel ated and each is supplied which a separate division of Class 1E power.
The Accident Monitors as identified in Table 12.3-5, will meet the requirements of Section 7.5.11 of the PSAR The locations of the area monitors provided for the CRBRP are shown on Figs.12.1-1 to 12.1-19d and are i Isted in Table 12.3-5.
t 12.1.4.2 Monitoring Svstem Descriotion Each area monitoring channel consists of a gamma detector, microprocessor and accessories, local Indicators, alarms, and Control Rocrn Indication. The gamma detector energy dependence wilI be fiat within 1205 for incident radiation above 100 Kev. Local monitor displ ay incl udes loss-of-signal, high and high-high radiation Indicator lights, high and high-high radiation audible alarms and mR/hr rate meter. Al so, an essential feature of each monitoring channel will be its ability to avoid "fon dover" following saturation in I4igh radiation t fields.
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! osnnso i
The detector signal is also displayed on redundant Radiation Monitoring System CRTs located in the Control Room and Heal th Physics Area of the Plant Service Building via their respective CenYral Processing Units and Mini-Computers (System Controllers). The Indicating analog meter in each local monitor indicates exposure levels on a suitable multi-decade logarithmic scale. The al arm signal s are al so permanently recorded by the redundant Radiation Monitoring System Line-Printers located in the Control Room and Heal th Physics Area.
Group annunciation is also provided on the Main Control Board.
6 12.1 -23b i
Each area monitor w sll contain a built-in solenoid actuated shielded check source which can be actuated f rom the remote process station in the vicinity.
All monitor components will be modular, commercially available units designed f or rapid repl acement upon f ail ure. Electronic components will be exclusively solid-state, as available; and power will be suppl ied f rom the Instrument AC (120V, 60H busses f or the nca-saf ety monitors. Area monitors perf orming containmenf) isolation f unctions (PPS) will be supplied with Class 1E power f rom redundant vital AC busses.
The high radiation alarms of all area monitors are transnitted f rom the local ronitors to the Remote Dat,a Aquisition Terminal units in the vicinity. The Plant Data Handling and Display system will display and log all high alarms.
Figure 12.1-21 shows a f unctional block diagram of an area radiation monitor.
Locations, design dose rates and ranges of sensitivities of the monitors are proviced i n Tabl e 12.3-5.
12.1.4.3 Maintenance snd Callbratten On canpletion of the monitoring system Installation, each aree monitor will be checked for proper operation and calibrated against a radiation checksource traceable to the National Bureau of Standards or f rom an equally acceptable source. The initial calibration and subsequent calibrations at six month Intervals will utilize a minimum of two source strengths to verify the l ineari ty of detector output. In addition, each monitor is supplied with a built-in check source to provide a rapid f unctional test at periodic i nterval s.
12.1.5 Estimates of Excesure
- Peak External Dose Rates and Annual Deses at Unrestricted Locations I
The peak dose rates and annual doses at the site boundary and control room due to direct plant radiation are low and considered small relative to the natural
! background radiation. These doses have been estimated and are shown in Table
( 12.i-49, Parts I, 11, and Ill.
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T/6LE 12.1-48 HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY DELETED L
12.1-79 l 82-0963 l
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rags I noz-UV29 Lc,8 4J B Sections 9.6.1 through 9.6.5 describe the ventilation systems for each building and the main control room. The conceptual design for the RCB provides 14,000 cfm of outside air. This is adequate to meet the design objectives for radiation protection. The conceptual design flow rate to each of the IHTS piping cells is 1000 cfm, which is suf ficient to meet the design objective for radiation protection and to satisfy personnel access G equi rements. Other plant areas will be designed in accordance with conventional heating and ventilation requirements. Analysis of design requirements f or other areas invol ving potential radioactive release will be undertaken and results incorporated, as necessary, in the heating and ventilation requirements f or these areas.
12.2.3 Source Terms Tge sources of radioactivity originate from the reactor cover gas leakage and H diffusion. The estimated radioactive leakages rates into normally accessible cells are presented in Table 12.2-1. The basis of the table is provided in Section 11.3.
12.2.4 Airborne Radioactivity Monitorina 12.2.4.1 Desien criteria Fixed and mobile continuous air monitors (CAM) will be employed in conjunction with portable air sampling equipment to satisfy the requirements of CRBRP General Design Criteria 17 and 56 and the relevant sections of 10CFR20; and to verify thst radioactive atmospheric contamination within the CRBRP remains normal ly "as Iow as reasonably achievabi e".
The above radioactivity monitoring which is provided for the CRBRP reflects a ~
design philosophy which identifies the following levels of radiation protection (exclusive of the portable personnel monitoring provisions described in Section 12.3).
- 1. Continuous monitoring (fixed) performed on the ventilation which serves the Reactor Containment Bullding (R(B) and Reactor Service Building (RSB) operating areas. Continuous monitoring is also performed to verify Control Room habitability.
- 2. Continuous monitoring (mobile) is performed in frequently occupied l
Nuclear Island operating areas adjacent to potential radioactivity I sources. Frequently occupied areas include radiation zone I and ll (Figures 12.1-1 through 12.1-19d) cells which house numerous process system control panel s.
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- 3. Low-volume (Integrating) air sampling is performed in inf requently occupied operating areas within the Nuclear Island, inf req uently occupied areas include radiation zone ll and t il cells where routine tasks are perf ormed on a limited access basis.
4 High-volume grab sampling is performed (with accompanying Counting Room analysis) prior to personnel entry into Zone IV radiation zones; and whenever a gross determination of short-lived airborne radioactivity in lower radiation zoned areas is desired.
Fixed CAM's are provided as ef fluent and process monitcrs (described in Section 11.4) at locations which could conceiveably be subject to increases in radioactivity level s during various pl ant evol utions. The process nenitors are used to monitor the ventilation exhaust f rom a particular cell o' group of cells. Upon detection of radioactivity abcve desired levels the radiation ,
monitor will produce an alarm at the process system local panel (In addition to the Control Room) and some monitors will Initiate a signal to autcrnatically isolate the affected area. The of fIuent mooi tors perf orm survelllance f unctions and provide (in the Control Room) !ndication of an abnormal occurrence warranting Investigation by Health Physics personnel. Since the ef fluent monitors don't perform Initiation of Isolation the ranges have been selected to provide monitoring during normal and accident conditions. These monitors are included in Table 11.4-1 Fixed CAMS, except those downstream of HEPA filters will withdraw the suples isokinectically in accordance with ANSI N13.1. In addition, the monitors will be located as close as practical to the sampl e point, and sample line bends are minimized to avoid plate cut.
Fixed CAM's are al so provided to ensure adequate protection against contamination of the Control Room atmosphere due to airborne radioactivity following an accident condition. This monitoring arrangement is descr! bed in-l Section 11.4. Fixed radiogas monitors (PPS) are also used to initlate Reactor
! Containment Isolation as discussed in Section 7.3.1.
! Mobile CAM's will be prcvided in select locations throughout the CRBRP to l perf orm the f ol low ing f unctions:
- 1. Continuously monitor the atmosphere at any specific location where maintenance is perf ormed.
, 2. Continuously monitor the atmosphere at any specific location where a l
process system f ailure is suspected of causing airborne radioactivity leakage.
- 3. Continuously monitor Individual inerted celi purging activities as required by the Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System.
l 4 Continuously monitor the R(B atmosphere following containment l Isolation, af ter connection to the post-accident containment sampling penetrations discussed in Section 11.4.2.2.1.
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- 5. Provide backup support to inoperative stationary airborne radioactive l monitors.
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The mobile CAM's will provide local audible and visual alarm Indication of airborne radioactivity levels which exceed the monitor setpoint(s). Locations and design parameters of the various mobile airborne activity monitors are given in Table 12.2-3.
High and low vol ume portable air samplers will be employed to obtain representative samples of breathing air at infrequently occupied operating areas of the CR3RP. Samples obtained will be analyzed in the Counting Room for gross activity and radioisotopic Identification, as required. The portable air sanplers will be supplied as health physics equipment, and their f requency of use will be governed by the operational procedures of the CRBRP Heal th Physics Program.
12.2.4.2 Moniterfnc system Descrfotton 12.2.4.2.1 Continuous Air Monitors Continuous air monitors (CAM) are used to provide detection of radiogas, particulate, radiolodine and alpha (Pu) activity as indicated in Table 12.2-3.
A combination of single and multichannel Instruments are used to perf orm the required monitoring f unctions. The following is a description of each type of monitor provided:
Gaseous Radionettvite Monitors Each radiogas CAM continuously draws gas / air samples through a particulate filter into a shielded 4-PI sanple chamber where the gas is viewed by a beta detector, and then returns the gas / air back to the original source.
A regulated vacuum pump is used to maintain desired flow rate through the monitor. Samples withdrawn from process or ef fluent flow will be obtained Isokinetically fraa the source streen. Esc.h monitor consists of a radiogas detector, vacuum pump, microprocessor and accessories, local The detector will have a minimun sensitivity of 3 x ind}cator 10 and Cl/cc .al f or arms.
Kr-85, at the 955 confidence level. Each monitor cabinet will incl ude l ocal loss-of-signal, high and high-high radiation Indicator lights, gas / air sample flowmeter and count-rate meter. Taps will be proviced to allow samples to be withdrawn for analysis in the Counting Room. For stationary monitors, the detection signal is continuously
- provided for display on redundant Radiation Monitoring System CRTs located in the Control Room and the Health Physics Area of the Plant Service
- Building, via their respective Central Processing Units and Mini-Computers (System Controllers). All control signals from monitors which are transmitted to Interf acing systems will originate f rom Remote Process l
' Stations which are part of the local monitor cabinet. The alarm signal s are permanently recorded by the redundant Radiation Monitoring System Line Printers located in the Control Room and Health Physics Area.
l 12.2-4 69 6MCM
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1pdIne and Gaseous RadIoactfvitv Monitors Radiolodine and radiogas CAM's provide two distinct detection channels within a single monitor housing. A regulated vacuum pump continuously draws a gas / air sample at a measured flow rate into the monitor assembly.
The sampled gas / air flows through a fixed lodine filter, where a gamma The detector observes radiolodine activitQhrough a discriminator window.
minimum radiolodine sinsitivity is 10 CI/cc for 1-131 at the 95%
confidence level .
Frcrn the lodine filter the air sample passes into a 4-PI shielded chamber l whege a beta detector observes gaseous activity with a minimum sensitivity of l
10 CI/cc f or Kr-85 at the 95% confidence level . The gas / air sample is then exhausted to the original Jource.
Each monitor contains the detectors, vacuum pump, microprocessor and l
accessories, and Indicators. Display provisions at each monitor cabinet incl ude (common f or each detection channel) loss-of-signal, high and high-high I
radiation Indicator lights, and (separate for each detection channel) count-I rate meters. A sample flow rate gauge is also provided.
The detection signal is continuously provided for display on redundant Radiation Monitoring system CRTs located in the Control Room and the Health Physics Area of the Plant Service Building, via their respective Central
- Processing Units and Mini-Computers (system Controllers). All Control signal s
( f rom monitors which are transmitted to Interf acing systems will originate f rom Remote Process Stations which are part of the local monitor cabinet. The alarm signals are permanently recorded by the redundant Radiation Monitoring System Line Printers located in the Control Room and Health Physics Area.
Particulate. !cdine and Gaseous Radioactivity Monitors Particulate, radiolodine and radiogas CAM's provide three distinct detection channels within a single monitor housing. A regulated vacuum pump continuously draws a gas / air sample at a measured flow rate into the monitor assembly. If process or effluent flow is being monitored, the sample is obtained IsokInsticalIy from the source stream. Particulaies are coliected on E ' ' ' **
a filter paper having an ef ficiency of 99.0% for and viewed by a beta detector of minimum sensitivity of 10 0.3 micronf0 ' CI/cc for Cs-137 at the 95% confidence level, during an Integrating tlas determined by sampl e flow rate. From the particulate filter, the sampled gas / air flows through a fixed Iodine filter, where a gamma detector observes radiof odine The minimum radiolodine sensitivli,f activity gough a discriminator window.
i s 4 x 10 CI/cc f or 1-131 at the 955 confidence level .
12.2-4 a
. . , . ............a -.
From the lodine filter the air sample passes into a 4-PI shielded chanber where a beja detector observes gaseous activity with a minimum sensitivity of 3 x 10 CI/cc for Kr-85 at the 95%~ confidence level. The gas /alr sample is then exhausted to the original source.
Each monitor contains the detectors, vacuum pump, microprocessor and accessories, and indicators. Display provisions at each monitor cabinet incl ude (common f or each detection channel) loss-of-signal, high and high-high radiation Indicator lights, and (separate for each detection channel) count-rate Indicators. Mobile monitors are provided with a multipoint strip-chart recorder and audible and visual alarms for high and high-high radiation conditions.
For stationary monitors, the detection signal is continuously provided for display on redundant Radiation Monitoring System CRTs located in the Control Room and the Health Physics Area of the Plant Service Building, via their respective Central Processing Units and Mini-Computers (System Controllers). All control signals f rom monitors which are transmitted to interf acing systems will originate from Remote Process Stations which are part of the local monitor cabinet. The indicating analog meter in the Remote Process Station will Indicate counts per minute on a five decade logarithmic scal e. The alarm signals are permanently recorded by the recundant Radiation Monitoring System Line Printers located in the Control Room and Health Physics Area.
Gaseous In-Line Penitors Gaseous In-line monitors provided to monitor radioactivity in some process systems incl uding HV AC. The Monitor consists of a shielded section of pipe which is mounted by end flanges in the process line. A penetration through the pipe wall allows a beta scintillation detector to be placed in the process system flow. The detector will have a minimum sensitivity of 6 Cl/cc for Kr-85, at the 955 confidence level.
10 Each monitor will have a local microprocessor with local Indicator and alarms.
The detection signal is continuously provided for display on redundant Radiation Monitoring System CRTs located in the Control Room and the l Health Physics Area of the Plant Service Building, via their respective Central Processing Units and Mini-Computers (System Controllers). All control signals f rom monitors which are transmitted to Interf acing systems will originate f rom Remote Process Stations which are part of the local monitor cabinot. The alarm signals are permanently recorded by the redundant Radiation Monitoring System Line Printers located in the Control Room and Health Physics Area.
Aloha Radioactivity Monitors Each alpha CAM (mobile units) provided will have the capability to di f ferentiate pl utonium al pha readings f rom the natural radon thoron alpha background through del ayed detection techniques. Each al pha CAM continuously draws air samples into a shielded chamber where particulates greater than 0.3 microns are deposited on a filter with an ef ficiency of 99.0% and viewed by detector ( s ) . A regulated vacuum pump will be used 12.2-4b
. up w .. . m uw,..a -.
to maintain desired flow rate through the monitor arrangement, and return the air sample back to the original source. Each monitor contains the al pha detector (s), vacuum pump, microprocessor and accessories and Indicators. The detector (s) will have a minimum sensitiv!ty of 10 -12 CI/cc for Pu-239 at the 95% confidence level for a collection time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Display provisions at each monitor cabinet include loss-of-signal, loss-of-sample flow, high and high-high radiation Indicator lights, sample fIow-meter, count-rate meter, strip-chart recorder and audible alarms f or high and high-high radiation conditions. These monitors shall have the capability to transmit data to the radiation monitoring consoles in the control room and health physics area when iInked to the communication loop at the option of plant operators.
Figures 12.2-1 and 12.2-2 show typical block ' diagrams of the containment exhaust (PPS) and typical fixed (non-PPS) continuous air radiati n monitoring channels. The PPS radiogas monitors used for Containment isol asion dif fer f rm the radiogas CAM described previously in the following manner:
- 1. Each Class IE Monitor is Individually wired to a dedicated Display and Control Unit (DCU) in the Control Rom.
- 2. An analog output is provided by each monitor to the Plant Protection System (Containment Isolation System) Comparators, Logic and Saf ety Circuits.
- 3. The buf fered output of each monitor is available for display on the Radiation Monitoring System CRTc and logging on Line Printers.
All CAM components will be modular, commercially available units designed for rapid repl acement upon f ail ure. Electric components will be exclusively solid-state, as available, and power will be supplied f rom the Instrument AC busses (120V, 60Hz), with the exception of Class 1E monitors. These l atter CAM's will receive Class IE power (120 Vac, 60Hz) from redundant vital Instrument AC busses. Certain design permeters, as well as locations of the various airborne activity monitors are given in Table 12.2-3.
12.2.4.2.2 Portable Air Samolers Portable air samplers will be used to obtain representative samples of both long and short-lived airborne radioactive contaminants in operating areas of the pl ant. Their use and placement will be under the direction of the CRBRP site Heal th Physicist.
l Lew Volume Samolers Each sampling station consists of a regulated air pmp and filter arrangement to deposit particulates greater than 0.3 microns in size, and/or radiolodine, as required. The sample flow rate is set locally and recorded to enable an accurate determination of activity. The fliters will be collected af ter a suitable integrating time Interval, and brought to the Counting Rom for analysis. The only local output f rom the sampler unit is the pep flow signal. The complete pump and filter (s) arrangement are standard, commercially available units designed for ease of maintenance and interchangeabilIty of components.
12.2-4c l
t
ia3e , ..w wn , uw,. a -. ,
Hf ch Volume Samolers ,
High voiuma sampiers wIlI empioy high speed air blowers to enable grab samples to be obtained in the 20-35 cfm range. Particulate and/or charcoal filters will be used for sample collection, and analysis In the Counting Room will be performed. This type of sampler will be used to determine the airborne radioactivity contribution due to shorter lived Isotopes.
12.2.4.3 Maintenance and caIIbratton On completion of the monitoring system Installation, each CAM will be checked for proper operation and calibrated against a radiation check source (s) traceable back to the National Bureau of Standards or f rom an equally acceptable source. This initial calibration, and subsequent calibration at six month Intervals will verify the electronic operation of both local and Control Rom ratemeters and also all annunciation points (loss-of-signal, high radi ati on, etc. ) . In addition, each monitor is supplied with a built-in check source to provide rapid f unctional tests at periodic Intervals.
12.2.5 inhalation Doses Inhalation doses to plant personnel will be limited and controlled consistent with 10CFR20 requirements via the heating and ventilation system design.
Resulting doses will be kept as low as practicable during operation and maintenance and exposures wilI be compatible wIth ext sting r egulations (10CFR20).
l The expected annual Inhalation doses to plant personnel in normally accessible l
cells can be determined f rom the leakage rates given in Table 12.2-1 and the design flow rates for ventilation air in the Heat Access Area and Intermediate Sodi un Piping cel ls.
The concentration In these cells, for the expected leakage rates, is estimated by assuming that there is a uniform concentration in the cell atmosphere and the ventilation air streen. Thus, an equilibrium concentration will exist when the curie content discharged per day is equal to the leakage into the cell. The expected concentrations in the accessible cells are given in Table 12.2-4 The doses f ran the expected concentration can be estimated by l
assuming the ratio of the concentration to MPC occupational Ilmits for each l Isotope present and multiplying this by 5 rem, the annual dose which would I result f ran exposure to the MPC for 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> per week for 50 weeks of the year.
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As shown in Table 12.2-4, the combin$~d expected activity level for the ,
I sotopes present is about 0.01 MPC (occupational) in the Head Access Area.
Thus, the corresponding annual dose would be about 5 mrem / year. ..
The release to the Intermediate Sodlun Piping cells is tritium ,a7d the %
resulting equilibrium concentration 12 4 0008 MPC. The resulting expected '
yearly dose would be about 4 mrem / year'. ;_ > .
s 3 ,
Both of the above annual dose estimates are conserv'a+Ive sit.cc 6xh assumes occupancy in the cells by an Indivf 4ual of 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />,per week f,.rl50 '
weeks of the year. The expected occupancy is snsiderably less. .
The contrel room wIII be designed to aI'sure(,ontInued occupency durIng postulated accident conditions. The expacte'd radioactivity ' in the control .
room during normal plant operations is backgh:und level. Additional '
discussion is provided in Section 12.1.5.
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t s
1 .
s s < , it Am 766 105M Particul ate / Radio- Operating Floor lodine / Gaseous of work areas and inerted cells in See Setions the containment 12.2.4.1 &
12.2.4.2.1.. Thi s location is tho
- ~# normal storage position of the x mobil e moni f orlog. .
I2.2-9
INIL E 12.2-3 (Cont'dl LOCAT10N TVI'E OF MONITOR AREA BtDG. ELEV. ELL NO. MONITOR DESCRIPTION DASIS FOR LOCATION / FUNCTION REMARKS f
RSR 779 3078 Par t i cul ate / Radio- Operating Floor Mublie moni tor to provide moni tor Ing See Figure 13.1-11, lodine / Gaseous of local work areas and post-accident See Sections '
monitoring of containment atmosphere 12.2.4.l. 12.2.4.2.1
& II.4.2.2.I. This location is the normal storage
' position of the mobile monitor.
R$8 816 308A Alpha Operating Floor Mobile monitor to provido monitoring See Figure 12.1-9, of local work areas and post-accident See Sections monitwing of containment atmosphere 12.2.4.1, 12.2.4.2.l, 1 II.4.2.2.1. This location is the normal storage position of the mobile monitor.
R$8 816 3088 Par t icul ate /Radlo- Operating Floor Mobile monitor to provide monitoring See Figure 12.1-9, lodine / Gaseous of local work areas See Sections 12.2.4.1
& 12.2.4.2.1. This location is the normal storage position of the mobile monitor.
SGB-1B 816 262 Particulate / Radio- Operating Floor Mobile monitor to provide monitoring See Figure lodine / Gaseous of SG8-lB local work areas and post- 12.1-19a, See
.scci dent moni tor i ng of containment Sections 12.2.4.1, I atmospher el 2.2.4.2.1
& 11.4.2.2.1. This location is the normal storage position of the mobile mongtor.
t i
12.2-?O a?nnm
Ir
! TABLE 12.2-3 (Cont'd)
I i
LOCATION TYPE OF NONITOR AREA BLOG. EL Ev. ELL NO. M)NiiOR DESOtlPTION DASl$ FOR LOCATION / FUNCTION REMARKS EB 816 431 Parliculate/ Radio- Operating Floor Mubile monitor to provide monitor ing See Section lodine /Geseous of control roam and local wor k areas 12.2.4.1 & "
12.2.4.2.l. This location is the normal storage position of the 1 moblie monitor.
i
- l 4
l 1
l 1
i i
a i
)
f i
l 1
12.2-10e n?_rww n
TMILE 12.3-5 FERSCNNEL FHOTECTION K)NITOR - AREA MWelTORS LOCATION AREA AND/OR K TER OK RATIONAL BASl$
FROMSS K)NITOR RANGE BACKGRQJND MONITOR FOR BLDG. ELEV. ELL K)NITORED TYPE mR/hr (mR/hr) OUTPUT ** LOCATION' 3
RCB 824' 162 1&C Cubicle Direct Gamma 0.01-10 0.2 A i.
RG 824' 163 l&C Cubicle Direct G a ma 0.01-10 0.2 A 1,5 RG 824' 164 IRC Cubicle Direct Gamma 0.01-10 0.2 A 1. 4,3 4
RG 780' 105U Primary f'ff Operating Direct Gamma 0.1-10 2.0 A 1.,2 Area RG 766' 105S Operating Floor Direct Gamma 0.1-10 4 2.0 A 1.,2.,5 RG 780' 161G Operating Floor Direct G ama 0.1-10 4 2.0 A 1.,2.
4 RQs 794' 152 Operating Floor Direct Ganma 0.1-10 2.0 A 1.,2.
RG 752' 105H Operating Floor Direct Gamma 0.1-10 4 2.0 A 1.,2. ,
RG 766' 105Q Operailng Floor Direct Gamma 0.1-10 4 2.0 A 1.,2 RW 1"* 105A Operating Floor Direct Gamma 0.1-10 4 2.0 A 1. 2,5 RSD 842'6" 311 Ref uel. Conn. Center Direct Gamma 0.01-10 3 0.2 8 1.,3 I
RG 802' 158 Head Access Area Direct Ganma 0.1-10 25.0 A 1. 2. 4.
3 RSD 816' 308A Operating Floor Direct Gamma 0.01-10 0.2 B 1.,2. 3,6 3
R'B 816' 308A Operating Floor Direct Ganma 0.01-10 0.2 0 1.,3,6 4
FWD 816' 643 Decontanination Bay Direct Ganma 0.1-10 2.0 0 1.,2 4
RG 794' 105V Operating Floor Direct Gamma 0.1-10 2.0 A 1. ,2,5 RSB 779' 307A Ex-Vessel S$P Operating Direct Gamma 0.1-10 4 2.0 A 1.
Area RG 752' 105K Operating Area Direct Ganma 0.1-10 4 2.0 A 1.
4 RSB 755' 306A Ex-Vessel Pil Operating Direct Ganma 0.1-10 2.0 A 1.
Area SGB 836' 271 SGBilB) Renote Shutdown Direct Gamma 0.08-10 7 Unr estricted A 1.
Panels Area (See NOTE 2) 12.3-13
TM3tE 12.3-5 (Cont'd)
AREA AND/OR KTER OPERAT IONAL BASIS LOCATION PRORSS K)NITOR RANGE DACKGROUND MONITOR FOR K)NITORED TYPE mR/hr (mR/hr) OUTFUT e e LOCATION' BLDG. ELEY. ELL 4 1,5 RG 7338 105F Make-up Pump Valve Direct G ama 0.1-10 2.0 A Operating Gallery 4
733' 105D Operating Area Direct Gema 0.1-10 2.0 A 1.
RG RG 766' 105M Primary SSP Operating Direct G ama 0.1-10 4 2.0 A 1.,2.
Area 4
Re 795' 605C lALL Distillate Direct G ama 0.1-10 2.0 A 1 Storage Tank Area 4
Fue 795' 620 Filter Handling Room Direct Ganma 0.1-10 2.0 A 1 4
R2 7338 3058 Operating Areas Direct G ama 0.1-10 2.0 A 1 RSD 779' 307A Operating Floor Direct Gamma 0.1-10 4 2.0 B 1.,2 8 8 g RSB 781' 341 Fuel Handllog Celi Direct'G ama 0.01-10 2.0x10 3, 3
R2 7798 339A FHC Operating Gallery Direct G ama 0.01-10 0.2 B 1.,2.
8 4 RSB 749' 336 Spent Fuel Cask Corridor Direct Gama 0.01-10 5.0xt0 B 3.
and Shatt R2 755' 306AA Operating Areas Direct Ganma 0.1-10 4 2.0 A 1.,2.
RSB 735' 335 SFSC Service Station Direct Gamma 0.1-10 4 10.0 B l.,2.,3 Equipment 7
SGB 8168 26 2 Operating Aseas Direct G ama 0.1-10 Unrestricted A 1.,4 (See NOTE 2) 4 *
$08 794' 253 Emerg. Airlock /A:alysis Direct Gamma 0.1-10 Unrestricted A 1.,4,6 Operating Area (See NOTE 2)
(B 816' 431 Control Roan Direct Ganma 0.1-107 Unr estricted A 1.
(See NOTE 2)
PSB 8168 146 Canblned Lab Direct Ganma 0.01-10 3 Unrestr icted A 1.
(See NOTE 2)
I RWB 775' 605A l ALL Distillate Storage Direct Gamma 0.01-10 2.0 A 1.
Tank Ares ,
12.5-14
. ~ .
TMILE 12.5-5 (Cont'd!
AREA AN0/0R KTER OfYRATIONAL DASIS LOCATION PROESS M)NITOR RANGE BACKGROUND MONITOR FOR TYPE mR/hr (mR/hr) OUTFUT** LOCATION' BLDG. ELEY. &LL M)NITORED RG 816' 161A Equipment / Personnel Direct Gamma 0.01-10 3 0.2 A 1.
Airlock Area RG 816' 169A RG Annulus Direct Gama 100 -107 0.2 A 4 7
RG 816' 169A RG Annulus Direct Gamma 10 -10 0.2 A 4 RG 816" 169A RG Annulus Direct Gama 10 -10 0.2 A 4 RG 7948 161E Primary Pump Drive Direct Gamma 10"I-10 4 2.0 A 5 RG 7948 161D P.-Imary Pump Drive Direct G ama 10~I-104 2.0 A 5 RG 794' 161C Primary Pump Drive Direct Gema 10~I-104 2.0 A 5 RG 766' 105Y Valve Operating Gallery Direct G ama 10~I-104 2.0 A 5 RG 7338 111 Stal rwel l Dire' ct Gamma 10'I-104 2.0 A 5 RG 7338 105E Access Area Direct Gama 10~I-104 10.0 A 5 RG 825' 106 Polar Crane Operating Direct G ama 10"I-104 0.2 A 5 RG 842' 165 El&C Cubicle Direct Gama 10"I-10 4 0.2 A 5 RG 842' 167 El&C Cubicle Direct Gamma 10'I-10 4 0.2 A 5 SGB 794' 247 Power Distrib. Panel Direct Gamma 10~I-10 4 Unresirlcted A 5,6 Area 100 7948 271 Operating Area Direct Camma 10'I-10 4 Unrestricted A 5,6 SGB 794' 271 Operating Area Direct Gamma 10~I-10 4 Unrestricted A 5,6 4
SGB 794' 26 2 Operating Area Direct G ama 10~I-10 Unrestricted A 5,6 SGB 794' 24 2 Operating Area Direct G mma 10'I-10 4 Unrest ricted A 5,6
~I 4 5x10 2 A 6 SGB 794' 211A Valve Gallery Direct Gamma 10 -10 4 4 SGB 794' 248 l HTS Pipe Chase Direct Gamma 10~I-10 1x10 A 6 4 4 7948 251 IHTS Pipe Chase Direct G ama 10~I-10 lx10 A 6 SG8 10~I-10 4 4 7948 252 IHTS Pipe Chase Direct Gama 1x10 A 6 SGB 12.3-15
TMILE 12.3-5 (Cont'd)
LOCATION AREA AND/OR K TER OFYRATIONAL BASl$
PROMSS K)NITOR RANGE BACKGROUND MONITOR FM BLOG. ELEY. ELL K)NITORED TYPE mR/hr (mR/hr) OUTFUT *
- LOCATION #
~I 4 0.2 6 RSB 785' 348 Cont. Cleanup Scrubber Direct G ama 10 -10 A .
4 RSB 785' 349 Cont. Cleanup & HV AC Direct G ama 10~I-10 0.2 A 6 Duct 4
RSB 840' 332 IOlX 3rd Loop Cell Direct Gama 10~I-10 0.2 A 5 4
l RSB 864' 395A Annulus Filter Direct Gama 10 -10 0.2 A 6
~I 4 RSB 733' 350 NAP Storage vessel Call Direct G a ma 10 -10 2.0 A 6
~I 4
- RSB 733' 305M Access Area Direct Gamma 10 -10 2.0 A 6
~I 4 RSB 733' 305C RSB/SGB Passageway Direct G ama 10 -10 2.0 A 6 10~I-10 4 2 6 R2 743' 311 SGD G2, 85 & 94 Area Direct Gamma 1x10 A 4
RSB 797' 314 SDD 23 Instru. Area Direct G ama 10"I-10 0.2 A 5 4
R2 755' 359 Cont. Cleanup Fil ter Direct G a ma 10~I-10 0.2 A 6 Cell
~I 4 3 RSB 779' 376 RAPS Pipe Gallery Direct G ama 10 -10 5x10 A 6 10~I-10 4 3
IS 775' 3511 EVS Cooling Pipeway Direct G ama 2x10 A 6 LEGElg eBASIS FOR LOCATION eaM)NITOR OUTPUT RG - Reactor Containment Bldg. 1. Provide personnel protection in A. Local and Control Room: Loss R2 - Reactor Service Bldg. trafficked area. of signal Indicator light, high SGB - Steam Generator Bldg. 2. Monitor adjacent high radio- level radiation alarm, high-G - Control Bldg. activity area. high level radiation alarm, PSB - Plant Service Bldg. 3. Monitor ref uellny operations. exposure meter (mR/hr).
IWB - Radwaste Area (Bay) 4 High level reactor containment B. Local, Control Room and Ref uel-radiation monitor (Accident Ing Canmunication Center:
Moni tcr ). (same as above).
- 5. Monitor areas conntaining saf ety-related equipment (Accident Monitor).
- 6. Monitor areas with hatches or penetratl(ns f rom containment
( Accident Monitor).
HQIES:
Unrestr icted: Def ined by 10 CFR 20, Paragraph 20.105.
Background specified in table is maximum design background value during operation, based on Na-24 gamma field.
12.3-16 .
O
.3 . .. ,,,,u ,.,a .,
15.3.2.4 Failure of the Steam Bveass System .
15.3.2.4.1 Identification of Causer and Accident Descriotion The turbine steam bypass system regalates the flow of steam to the main condenser following a turbine trip to maintain steam pressure at 1450 psig.
The system contains f our bypass val ves.
A f ailure of a bypass valve to open following a turbine trip, may result in a pressure increase in the steam system to the power relief valve set point.
The temperature transient at the core for this event is conservatively bounded by f ailure of all the bypass valves to open. In the event of a f ailure of all bypass valves to open, the main condenser would be unavailable for cooling.
Fl ow in the main steamline would be Interrupted resulting in a rapid increase in pressure until the power relief valves it the superheater exists opened.
The reactor would bs scrammed by any one of the three steam-feedwater flow ratio trips.
When the available normal feedwater supply is exhausted, the Steam Generator Auxiliary Heat Removal System (SGAHRS) would be activated by the low drum level trip and feedwater provided by the auxiliary feedwater pumps (see Section 5.6). A backup trip is provided by low steam drum level that occurs after the normal feedwater supply is u.chausted.
A f ailure of the bypass system valves to the open position would result in increased steam flow to the condenser. The action of the shutdown systems would depe,nd upon initial power level and the magnitude of the bypass flow.
In the l imiting case, at f ull power with the f ail ure of all val ves open, the steam-feedwater flow ratio quickly trips the plant.
(
15.3.2.4.2 Analvsis of Ef fects and Consecuences l A turbine trip with the plant operating at rated conditions is assumed to occur accompanied by a canplete f ailure of the steam bypass system to operate.
The steam line pressure increases and the superheater power relief valves open end blow steam to the atmosphere. The reactor trips on low steam-feedwater flow ratio in about two seconds. The resulting core temperatures are very simil ar to those for a normal trip f rom f ul l power. Af ter the normal feedwater supply has been exhausted (greater than 20 minutes) the Steam Generator Auxiliary Heat Removal System (SGAHRS) is a'ctuated on low steam drum level and automatically maintains drum water level. The event is conservatively bounded by the Loss of Normal Feedwater (Sec Section 15.3.1.6).
l l
l l 15.3-36 I
l
15.3.3 Extremelv Unlikelv Events 15.3.3.1 steam or reed Line Ploe Break 15.3.3.1.1 Identification of Causes and Accident Descriotion The breakage of a steam or feed pipe in the steam generator system is considered an extremely unlikely event. if such a break should occur, the resulting accident might have one of several forms, depending on where the break is located In the system, its size and whether or not it is insolatable, it should be noted that a reactor trip by the Plant Protection System will shut down the reactor before any of the steam system temperature changes have been transported back to the reactor core (at pony motor speed approximately 150 seconds) hence no problem results with immediate reactor safety. The event Instead is considered in the plant design for its ef fect on plant component service l if e through thermal-transient-induced stress.
The plant has incorporated design features to protect against the steam !!ne break. For instance the Superheater Outlet isolation Valve and Superheater Bypass Valve in each loop are cetive valves and will close within 3 seconds f ol l ow ing a steam l ine break. Closing of these valves in the f ailed loop will prevent blowdown of more inan one loop through the postulated pipe break. The valves in the f ailed loop u!Il close by either a low Superheater Outlet Pressure (< 1100 psig) or n High Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch. When a high steam /feeddater flow ratio occurs, the Superheater Outlet isolation Valves and Superheater Bypass Valves in the other two loops will close. A detailed description of the Outlet S1eem isolation Subsystem (OSIS) is presented in Section 7.4.2. The superheater Outlet Check Valve prue! des additional back-up to prevent blowdown but is not rolled upon in any analysis. The Superheater Bypass Valve is normally cicsed during operation.
In the event of f ailure of an active valve to close, the Superheater Outlet and Bypass Valves in the other two loops preclude their blowdown.
Breaks at the following locations have been investigated:
- a. Main steam line rupture.
- b. Steam line from a superheater to the main steam header.
- c. Saturated steam line between the steam drum and the superheater.
- d. Feedl ine break.
I
- e. Recircul ation l ine break.
The saturated steam line break has been selected as the most severe thermal transients of the events presented above. Analysis results for this event are presented in Figure 15.3.3.1-1. All of the above cased are summarized as f ol l ow s:
15.3-38
Main steam line rupture:
A steam break at the main steam header wout c. If not isol ated, produce a severe cold leg temperature translent in all three loops consisting of a down transient due to Initial excess cooling f oi f owed by an up-transient af ter dryout, it is not plausibl e, however, to escume that Isolation would f all to occur in all three loops, hence f or case (a) automatic isolation was assumed at three seconds with isolation Initiated by the Pl ant Protection System (PPS).
l i
I 15.3-3 8a l
Once the superheater outiet Isol att on val ves el ose, the plant achteyes a l new operating point based on steam load through the saf ety val Asves and noted below, hence no other excessive plant temperatures are produced. l a reactor shutdown is initiated by the PPS based on either the primary-shutdown system (steam /f eed flow mismatch) or secondary system- (Low Drum Lov el )., terminating high power operation bef ore excessive loss of water 1nventory. Elther the hlgh steam-to-f eedwater fIow ratio or the Low Steam Orum Water Level Trip also activates the steam generator auxil lary heatAll i
removal system (SGMRS) as noted below and discussed inWith Section the 5.6.
superheat three loops would provide heat removal frcm the core.
steam line isolated, pressure in the steam system will build up to the t rel ief setpoi nt.
The drum water level will drop due to steam venting and
' the Iow steam drum water- Ievel trip w11I then activate SGMRS If it has l not been activated earlier in the transient by the High Steam to Foodwater l
FI ow Ratio.
I Rupture in a Steam Line Between a Superheater and the Main Steam Header:
This event results f rcm a break occurring in the superheater exit steam l
' line upstream of the isolation valve. A simil ar event follows frcm a break downstream of the Isolation vaj ve (including a break in the main steam iIne) If the isol att on val ye f alI s to cl ose. For these cases.
l Isolation can still be ef f ectively accomplished by the superheater inlet I sol ation val ve, either by manual Initiation or autcznatically when steam l
t drum pressure f alls below 500 psig. Consequently, a break in the superheater-to-header line has an ef f ect simil ar to the preceding main steam iIne break case, but Its of f ects ere iImlted to a singt e Ioop.
Saturated Steam Line Break:
In the saturated steam line break, case (c) above, the break may be Ic,cated such that loss of water in the af f ected steam drum cannot be .
prevented. Isolation valves on the modules could still be closed, but j
saf ety val ve outflow will still lead to module dryout. Consequently, no l
credit is taken for Isolation in these cases.
/ss steam is reno'ved f rom the system by the break, increased flashing of water into steam within the steam generator occurs, removing additional heat and causing the sodium temperature initially to decrease at the evaporatcr exi t. A plant shutdown, when initiated by low steam feed flow, wilI cause coastdown of the Intermedlate sodtum pump, and hence w11l empilfy the initial decrease in evaporator exit temperature.
- Subsequently, when most of the mo!sture has been discharged f rcm the steam gener ator, both . evaporators and superheater wIII dry out, and the evaporator exit sodlum temperature will increase to approach the Intermediate hot leg temperature. The cold leg temperature increase will eventually be transported back to the reactor inlet, af ter being conducted through the IHX of the af f ected l oop. Due to extended transport delays at pony motor ficwrates, the temperature increase 15.3-39
m An alternate location f or this break is at the exit of one evaporator module.
Closure of the other Isolation valves, including the inlet valve on the af fected module, would lead to a dryout of the generator similar to If the Inlet isolation valve on the module does not previous cases.cl ose, the contents of the drum woul d be dumped through The the af f ected modul e, producing a severe temperature down-transient on that module.
renalning module will dry out and its resulting increase in sodium exit tanperature will mix with that f rom the f aulted module to attenuate the not Intermediate col d l eg tenperature transient.
For the steam and f eed break cases, the following conditions have been applied to assure a conservative analysis:
I a. The largest possible break size is assumed, corresponding to the f ull gullioti ne severance of the pi pe involved.
- b. The earliest PPS trip is used to predict the largest span f or the sodlum temperature translant f or cases In which the Intennediate cold r
l leg tanperature is considered.
- c. The t"ansients wer e run f rom a starting point at the 1121 MWt reactor l
l power design condition (stretch pgwer).
- d. Credit has not been taken f or heat storage in shell and structural metal in active or unheated parts of the modules In mitigating the Credit was taken only for 75% of the tube metal thermal transi ents.
in the heated part of the modul es,
- e. No Isolation was perf ormed on the af fected unit during the drum to superheater break, feed break and recirculation line break cases and the steam generator was allowed to go to full dryout.
The action of the Plant Protection System (PPS) In the above cases is the f ol l owi ng:
Primary Shutdown System
- s. Reactor and plant tri p - steam-feedwater flow ratio Secondary Shutdown System
- s. Reactor and plant trip - high evaporator outlet temperature i
l 15.3-41
- . a s.,
page - 6 [0.231 032 I
LAULf._1 (cont'd )
X = AVAILADLC TYPE JF CONT 1UNICATION FROM AREA CR & RSP TD AREA et Do GgtL GL). DESICNAD E EA-j g. 26X tjQ Egge, Head Access Area X X X X RCB 151 Operating Floor X X X X lotA 163 El&C Cubicle X X X X 165 El&C Cubicle X X X X X X X X 167 El&C Cubicle Annulus Above Operating Floor X X
- 169A IO5F Makeup Pump & Valve Cell X X X X l
IOSC Personnel & Equipment Access X X X i
IOSH Corridor != Valve Callerg X X X X 105Z Nakeup Pump Cooler Cell X X l
GCS430'27-9
page - 7 (0.231 G32 I A_ ELF __1
- (cont'd.)
X = AVAILADLE TYPE OF COMMUNICATION FROM AREA CR & RSP TO AREA CELL DESIGNATIDN EA-J EAX Qq) PRSe EL DG .. Cfik X X X ESB 305B El. 733* Access Area X X X 305E USS Cell X X X 305F USS Cell X X X 305C Heat Eschanger Cell X X X 3OSI Heat Eschanger Ces!
X X X X 306A El. 755' Access Area X X 3068 El. 755 ' Ac c e s s Ar e a X X X X X 307A El. 779* Access Area X X X 3075 El. 779* Access Area 1
X X X X 3008 RSB Operating Floor X X X X 309 NCC Area X X X X 311 Refueling Communication Center X X X 314 Instrumentation Area X X 325 EVSS Pump & Papeways Cooler X X X 326 ADHX Cell Unnt Cooler X X X 327 ADHX Cell Unnt Cooler Containment Clean-up Falter Cell X X X 347 X X 347A Radiation Monitor Cell Containment clean-up Chase X X 340 Contannment Clean-up Chase X X 349 EVST. ADHX Loop A Cell X X X 352A EVST. ADHX Loop D Cell X X X 353A e
0CS430.27-10
...,a page - O [0.233 032 f
IABLE.1 (cont'd )
X = AVAILABLE l
TYPE OF COMMUNICATION FROM AREA CR in RSP TO AREA PA-IE l'M. tLL PRSe RL DG GLLL CELL DESIGNAT ION .._.
X X X RSB 359 Containment Cle.an-up Scrubber & Washer Cell X X X 391 Containment Clean-up Filter Cell
)
X X X 395 RCB Annulus Filter Unit Cell X X X 398 RCB Annulus Filter Unit Cell l
OCS470.27-11
o asa page - 9 [8.233 C32 l
l i
i 1691E_t (Cont'd I X = AVAILADLE TYPE OF COMMUNICATION FROM AREA CR & RSP TO AREA CEt.L DESICNATIDti_ E6-1.G. E6 X., t1GM PRS
GCS430 27-12
_ - _ _ -_ -_ __ _ - - - _