ML20195J940

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 211 to License DPR-50

ML20195J940
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Site:	Crane
Issue date:	06/15/1999
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
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Download: ML20195J940 (6)

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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e

WASHINGTON. D.C. 2055fM)001 o

.....g SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO211TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-50 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY LERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY l

PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY J

f GPU NUCLEAR. INC.

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION. UNIT NO.1 DOCKET NO. 50-289 i

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 3,1996, the GPU Nuclear, Inc. (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1) Technical Specifications (TSs).

This change would incorporate certain improvements from the Standard Technical Specifications (STSs) for Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Plants (NUREG-1430). Additionally, there are some administrative, spelling and typographical corrections included.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The licensee's application includes the removal of information from the TSs. Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (the "Act") requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to state TS to be included as part of the license. The Commission's regulatory requirements s

related to the content of TSs are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires that the TSs include items in five specific categor.es, including:

(1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings;

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1 (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls.

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, L On July 19,1995, the Commission published revisions to 10 CFR 50.36 specifying what must be included in limiting conditions for operation (LCO) in the TSs (60 FR 36953). The four criteria added to 10 CFR 50.36 for determining whether a particular matter is required to be included in the TSs, are as follows:

. (1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant i

abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) a process variable,' design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis accident. or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the integrity of a fission product barrier; (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which 7

functions or actuates to mitigate a design-basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the integrity of a fission product barrier; and (4) a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

As a result, existing TS LCOs which fall within or satisfy any of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36 must be retained in the TSs, while those TS requirements which do not fall within or satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other licensee-controlled documents.

3.0 EVALUATION 3.1 Table of Contents, pages 11, iii, and vil The corrections to the Table of Contents pages incorporate changes to the TSs, correct typographical errors, and correct an omission associated with the issuance of TS Amendment 170. The NRC staff finds these enrrections acceptable.

l 3.2 Limiting Condition for Operation 3.1.10 and associated Figure 3.1-3 The licensee proposed to delete this LCO on the basis that 1) the LCO does not meet any of j

the requirements of Criterion 1,2,3, or 4 in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for retention in TS; 2) they monitor the allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for control rod operation and j

dissolved gas limits for the reactor coolant system (RCS) in controlled procedures specific to TMI-1; and 3) it is not a part of the STS. The requirement that dissolved gas concentration remains below 100 standard cubic centimeters per liter was designed to preclude the formation of gas bubbles in significant amounts during da;wessurization. By maintaining the reactor coolant temperature and pressure within speeW limits, any dissolved gases in the RCS a:e,

maintained in solution. This request and the runs given are similar to those granted to other B&W plants. During startup, power operation, and cooldown, the gas content of the RCS is -

controlled through operating procedures and practices such as venting and temperature / pressure control. Instrumentation, sampling and procedures are in place to ensure that the appropriate actions are taken to preclude conditions that would result in " gas-out" problems. In view of the unlikelihood of a " gas-out" incident, and installed monitoring instrumentation and plant-specific controlled procedures to preclude such an occurrence, the

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' staff finds the amendment to delete LCO 3.1.10 and associated Figure 3.1-3 acceptable and does not meet the criteria necessary for retention in the TSs.

3.3 Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3 Emergency Core Cooling and Reactor Building Spray System l

The proposed TS change in this section adds allowed outage time (AOT) to: 1) restore the

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Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) boron concentration, water temperature, and volume to 4

operable status; 2) provide a timeclock to restore to open the core flood tank discharge valve; and 3) restore NaOH concentration and BWST/NaOH tank differential limits.

1 The TMI-1 TSs have not had AOTs for these functions. The BWST AOT of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to restore j

boron concentration and water temperature and 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to restore tank volume are consistent with the STS and are acceptable. The AOT of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to open the Core F!ood Tank discharge valve is also consistent with STSs and is acceptable. Establishing an AOT for the proposed changes associated with the NaOH tank concentration is more conservative than having none and the time allowed is reasonable. This proposed change is acceptable to the staff.

3.4 Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4, Decay Heat Removal Capability The proposed changes in this section provide two editorial changes and one timeclock change, from 6 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, for the licensee to be in cold shutdown with respect to the operability of the emergency feedster (EFW) pumps or flow paths. The editorial corrections are acceptable. The j

AOT change allows for a more controlled power reduction and extends the time allowed to be in cold shutdown without altering the requirement to be in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and is consistent with the STSs and, therefore, is also acceptable.

3.5 Limiting Condition for Operation 3.5.2, Control Rod Group and Power Distribution Limits The correction of the misspellings in the Objective sectiori and subsection 3.5.2.2 are acceptable.

3.5.1 Subsection 3.5.2.2.a There are currently no timeclocks or actions ~ associated with more than one inoperable rod in the safety or regulating rod banks. This proposed change establishes both actions to bring the reactor to a hot shutdown condition and verification of shutdown margin (SDM) and establishes timeclocks to do so that are consistent with the STSs. This change allows for orderly action while permitting adequate time for operator actions and is acceptable.

3.5.2 Subsection 3.5.2.2.c There is currently no timeclock associated with bringing the reactor to a hot shutdown condition and no follow-up determination of adequate SDM for this subsection. This change establishes the addition of an SDM determination 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the initial determination and establishes a 6-hour timeclock to reach a hot shutdown condition. This change is more conservative in that it establishes a timeciock to determine the adequacy of SDM and time to reach a hot shutdown condition and it is consistent with the STSs and is acceptable to the staff.

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. 3.5.3 Subsection 3.5.2.2.e The proposed changes to this subsection include: 1) an editorial clarifying change linking this Subsection to Subsection 3.5.2.2.f with respect to rod group alignment; 2) a procedural change for modification of the power reduction for misaligned rod configurations from 60 percent to less than or equal to 60 percent; and 3) the establishment of timeclocks for power reduction, overpower trip setpoint reduction, and verification that ejected rod worth (ERW) within the assumptions of the ERW analysis to verify that the power peaking factors are within the limits specified by the Core Operating Limits Report.

These changes are additional requirements that are consistent with requirements already in the STS and provide reasonable and sufficient time to perform the required actions and evaluations and are acceptable.

3.5.4 Subsection 3.5.2.2.f There currently is no timeclock associated with the positioning of rods within a group that has an inoperable rod per Specification 4.7.1.2. This proposed change establishes a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> timeciock to perform the required action which is reasonable and is consistent with the STSs and is acceptable.

3.5.5 Subsection 3.5.2.2.g There is no timeciock associated with the actions required by this Subsection. The proposed changes establishes a 1-hour timeclock, which is acceptable because local xenon redistribution during this short interval will not cause a significant increase in local linear heat rate and it is consistent with the STSs.

3.6 Limiting Condition for Operation 3.5.4, incore Instrumentation Existing LCO 3.5.4 provides the specification for the functional and operational requirements for the incore detectors. The incore detector system is used to provide detailed information on the reactor core neutron flux distribution. The incore detector system is used for periodic surveillance of the power distribution, which verifies that the peaking factors are within their design envelope. Other (retained) TSs address the required power distribution limits, peaking factors, and excore detector calibrations. The incore detectors map the spatial neutron flux distribution of the core and provide this information to the plant computers. The provisions of the existing incore detector LCO, establishing incore detector operational requirements, are relocated in plant-specific procedures. The power range (excore) neutron flux instrumentation is also available to measure axial power distribution (axial imbalance) and quadrant power tilt.

The reactor protection system does not use the incore detector instrumentation but instead uses the power range (excore) neutron flux instrumentation to initiate a reactor trip as a result of unacceptable axial core power distribution. No automatic actions result from the incore detector system. The incore detector instrumentation does not provide an indication of a degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or an indication of a challenge to the integrity of a fission product boundary, nor does it mitigate the consequences of a design-basis accident (DBA), and therefore, it does not meet 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for retention in the improved TSs. The staff finds this change acceptable.

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l3.7 Surveillance Requirement, Table 4.1-2 and Surveillance 4.7-1

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' The frequency of the surveillance to verify rod freedom of movement (trippability), Surveillance j

Requirement (SR) 4.7-1 and Table 4.1-2, has been extended from monthly to quarterly in accordance with the recommendation in NUREG-1366, " improvements to TS Surveillance Requirements."; This SR frequency has been extended because of the unlikelihood of a stuck

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rod, the potential for a dropped rod during the performance of the SR, and the fact that an

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untrippable rod is most often' discovered when starting up or when performing rod drop tests.

i The licensee's proposed extension change is, therefore, acceptable.

1 3.8 Surveillance Requirement, Table 4.1-3 in improved TS 3.4.16, "RCS Specific Activity," the frequency of SR 3.4.16.1, to measure RCS gross specific activity, has been extended from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 7 days because of the time required

. to perform the. analysis and the more immediate availability of data from the Dose Equivalent.

1-131 analysis (SR 3.4.16.2) which is performed within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of power changes of

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15 percent or more of rated thermal power.

The proposed less restrictive requirement has been reviewed by the staff and has been found f

to be acceptable because it does not present a significant safety question in the operation of the plant and, similarly, the TMl-1 plant-specific TSs require the Dose Equivalent 1-131 analysis within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of power changes of 15 percent or more of rated thermal power. The TS

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requirements that remain are consistent with current licensing practices, operating experience

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and plant accident and transient analyses, and provide reasonable assurance that public health and safety will be protected and are, therefore, acceptable.

3.9 Surveillance Requirement,4.7-2 The licensee proposed to delete SR 4.7-2, which is a surveillance to verify that the designated control rod is operating in its functional position and group. The type of errors this surveillance would detect is addressed in the TMI-1 plant-specific procedures. This SR is not included in the STSs nor is there a LCO associated with this SR in the existing TSs. The licensee has applied the four criteria pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) to this SR and determined that none of the criteria are either applicable or are met and, therefore, the standard to establish or retain this SR is not met. Additionally, proper rod programming is addressed in TMI-1 plant-specific procedure 1301-9.2. In that this SR is addressed in a controlled plant procedure and it does not meet the standards for an inclusion in the TSs per 50.36(c)(3), the staff finds this proposed change acceptable.

3.10. Bases Pages The licensee has made changes to various bases pages which are not subject to staff approval, but are included for incorporation with the amendment being issued.

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4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

i in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

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5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

. The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility -

component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure, The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 66708). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmentalimpact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by

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operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor R. Eaton Date: June 15,1999 I

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