ML20054M928
| ML20054M928 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1982 |
| From: | Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054M926 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8207150156 | |
| Download: ML20054M928 (16) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454
) 50-455 (Byron Station, Units 1 and 2) )
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM L. FORNEY REGARDING DAARE/ SAFE CONTENTION 1 I, William L. Forney, being duly sworn, state as follows:
- 1. I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Senior Resident Inspector at the Byron Nuclear Station. A copy of my professional qualifications is attached.
- 2. I am responsible for coordinating and performing inspections of construction and preoperational test activities at the Byron Station, Units 1 and 2.
- 3. I have reviewed the Applicant's June 7, 1982 motion for summary disposition of Contention 1 and I am in general agreement with the statements of material fact numbered 1-5, 10, 12-16. I neither agree nor disagree with the remaining facts, which represent largely opinion.
i I further support the Applicant's motion for the reasons given below.
- 4. I have reviewed sections 13.1 through 13.4.7 of the Byron Safety Evaluation Report issued in February 1982 (NUREG-0786) and concur in and adopt that evaluation as part of my testimony. .
- 5. Contention 1 asserts that the Commonwealth Edison Company's (Ceco) past performance history at its other nuclear facilities demonstrates an inability, unwillingness or lack of technical qualifications to properly operate the Byron Station in compliance with NRC regulations.
8207150156 820714 PDR ADOCK 05000454 G PDR
2 In that regard, I have analyzed the inspection history at Byron Station as well as other Ceco nuclear facilities. Based on my review of inspec-tion reports, civil penalties for noncompliance with regulations, and the results of the NRC Systematic Appraisals of Licensee Performance (SALP), I have found that (1) Ceco's performance record compares favorably with other nuclear licensees and applicants, (2) CECO's performance has been improving over the past years and CECO has been responsive to NRC Staff positions, and (3) Ceco has demonstrated both the technical ability and commitment to operate Byron safely and in conformance with NRC regulations. Attachments (1-4) summarize CECO's performance relative to other facilities on a regional and national basis.
- 6. Contention 1(a) focuses on the fines levied against Ceco facilities for items of noncompliance. Under NRC inspection and enforcement procedures, resident and regional inspectors conduct site visits to evaluate licensee performance in specific categories. The results of these inspections are summarized in inspection reports which notify the licensee of any items of noncompliance. Follow-up inspections are conducted to determine if violations have been adequately corrected by applicants or licensees. Such follow-up inspections at CECO facilities have generally resulted in satisfactory resolution of these conditions as reported by NRC Region III inspection reports. The NRC Inspection and Enforcement (I&E) Manual utilized by regional and resident inspectors provides specific guidance to determine whether a licensee's response to items of noncompliance is in conformance with regulatory requirements and that corrective measures are, in fact, completed.
! Verification is accomplished by record review, observation, and discussions with licensee personnel.
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- 7. With few expections, when a noncompliance with NRC requirements is identified, enforcement action is taken. For most noncompliance, a Notice of Violation is sent from the NRC Regional Office, requiring a formal response from the licensee describing corrective action. For relatively small number of cases involving more serious violations, elevated enforcement action is taken which may include (1) the imposi-tion of civil penalties, (2) the issuance of orders modifying, suspending or revoking a license, or (3) the issuance of orders to cease and desist from designated actions.
- 8. During the time period referred to in Contention 1(a) (1974-1978),
the NRC used three categories of noncompliances and imposed fines based on the severity of the noncompliance. The three categories in order of increasing severity were deficiency, infraction and violation. The maximum fine that could be imposed was $5,000 per violation and the total civil penalties for any 30-day period was limited to $25,000.
Under the present NRC enforcement policy and procedure, licensee violations are divided into categories designated in descending order of importance as Severity Levels I through V. The maximum civil penalty the NRC can impose for any one violation may not exceed $100,000 per day.
- 9. Where the NRC has identified items of noncompliance, CECO has taken prompt corrective actions. The NRC has not identified any systematic CECO corporate policies or attitudes which would lead the Staff to consider that problems or noncompliance at one Ceco site will create similar problems at other CECO sites, notably Byron.
- 10. With regard to the " continuing management inadequacies" asserted in Contention 1(a), I have compared the number of violations l or items of noncompliance per nuclear unit at CECO facilities and f
.g.
their severity as indicated by the amount of the civil penalties, (i.e.,
fines imposed, see attachment 1) with those at other facilities.
As shown in attachment 1, fines levied on CECO facilities vary depending on the particular facility. However, for the most recent period (1979-1981), all of CECO's facilities were below the national average for civil penalties.
It is also important to note that CECO has more years of reactor operation than the majority of utility licensees and thus has been subjected to more inspections than other utility licensees.
- 11. With regard to the waste management problems at Dresden referred to in Contention 1(a), recent inspection reports have shown that appropriate corrective actions have been implemented. In addition, it should be noted that most of the civil penalties at Dresden were not imposed because of inadequate radwaste management, but resulted from plant personnel over-exposure during maintenance operations.
In addition, only one of these noncompliances is known to have involved an unplanned release of radioactive material to the environment.
l 12. The Byron SER contains the NRC Staff evaluation of the CECO corporate policies, facilities and staffing relative to radwaste management and procedures and concludes that the Byron Station is acceptable in these areas. As stated earlier in paragraph 9 above, the NRC has not identified any systematic Ceco corporate policies or attitudes that would lead it to conclude that problems experienced by the Dresden plant management will be experienced by the Byron plant management. Region III inspectors will complete the I&E Manual inspection requirements which include radiation protection and radwaste management,
radioactive waste systems (liquid, solid and gas) installation and operational requirements to ensure compliance to regulatory requirements prior to operation of the Byron station,
- 13. The recent performance of Ceco's operating sites has been improving. Based on Ceco's recent performance at its operating sites, as well as the staffing and facilities planned for Byron Station, I believe that CECO is capable of adequately operating its nuclear plants at Byron, including the areas of radwaste and radiation protection.
- 14. With regard to the continuing management and operating problems associated with CECO stations alleged in Contention 1(b), I have reviewed the reports of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Review Group (SALP) which contain recent information about CECO. The SALP review is an NRC program to assess individual licensee performance at all power reactors either operating or under construction. The reports issued by the review group represent a collective judgment of senior NRC managers viewing licensee nuclear safety performance. Recognizing that performance may vary among sites operated by the same licensee, each facility is rated separately to evaluate these variations. The SALP review committee utilizes the applicable I&E inspection reports for the period of the SALP evaluation as one of its inputs. The objectives of the SALP are: (1) to improve the NRC regulatory program with emphasis on resource allocation, (2) to improve licensee performance, and (3) to collect available observations on an annual basis and evaluate licensee performance based on these observations. The SALP review group has prepared reports for the two review pericds. The first report was NUREG-0834, dated August 1981 (SALP-1).
During the period of SALP-1 (7/1/79 to 6/20/80), the performance of CECO plants received an overall rating and was compared to plants nationally.
In the second SALP evaluation period (SALP-2) (7/1/80 to 12/30/81), nuclear sites were rated in a number of functional areas as appropriate but no overall rating was given. Each functional area was classified in one of three performance categories numbered 1 through 3.
- 15. The SALP-1 report concludes that the Applicant's operating plants and construction sites are average performers as compared to those of other licensees both in Region III and nationwide. Attachment 2 provides a summary of this comparison. Although the SALP-2 ratings were not intended as a tool to compare utilities, the Ceco SALP-2 demonstrates that the Applicant is in the average range on a regional level.
- 16. As noted in Contention 1(c), NRC increased the frequency of inspections at CECO's Dresden and Quad Cities plants as a result of noncompliances related to the operation, testing or maintenance of the diesel generators at the Dresden facility. I have reviewed the SALP 1 and SALP-2 reports and the inspection reports covering the two SALP evaluation periods. The Applicant's overall performance improved during the SALP-1 period. During the SALP-2 period, management attention or involvement at the Dresden facility was found to be acceptable and gave due regard to nuclear safety. However, significant weaknesses were evident l which indicate minimally satisfactory performance with respect to some areas of plant operation. Enforcement action has been taken and respon-sive licensee management action is being implemented. The NRC does not i
1 i
bclieve that the performance at Dresden is indicative of the expected operating experience at Byron. Byron has a completely different plant management and operating staff.
- 17. The performance at Dresden is below the average at other CECO facilities. See Attachment 1. The NRC Staff will continue to take the problems experienced at Dresden in into account in its inspection program at other CECO facilities, including Byron.
- 18. Contention 1(d) notes that Ceco's enforcement history includes violations at its various plants. Attachment 1 shows that similar enforcement histories exist at other Region III plants. In addition to the civil penalties discussed in paragraph 8 above, the Commission can and does employ more severe sanctions (such as a plant shutdown order) where the severity of the conditions warrant. No such sanctions have been taken against CECO.
- 19. Contention 1(e) refers to " abnormal occurrences" CECO allegedly has reported to the NRC. While the use of the term is improper (NRC reports abnormal occurrences, not licensees) presumably the contention refers to the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) which licensees submit to the NRC. By submitting LERs, licensees inform the NRC of incidents termed
" reportable occurrences" as required by a facility's technical specifications. The types of events which require reporting are not standard since they are established as a function of the individual unit at the time the technical specifications are issued. Generally, LER's are utilized by the NRC for analysis purposes to identify generic or repetitive problems; however, some LER's can and do result in the issuance of an item of noncompliance by the NRC. Attachment 4 contains a graph of LER's issued by licensee's for reactors in Region III.
L
- 20. Some LER's are of greater consequence than others. For example, an LER for the failur,e of a component which received required maintenance due to normal operation would be of lesser consequence than a failure caused by poor maintenance or an event such as a reactor trip caused by operator error which challenged safety systems.
- 21. Attachment 5 is a graph which scales the significance of LER's in Region III. A point value of 0-10 has been assigned to each LER. Attachments 4 and 5 indicate that CECO reactors have reportable occurrences at a rate only slightly higher than other Region III reactors.
- 22. An abnormal occurrence is an unscheduled incident or event which the Commission determines is significant from the standpoint of public health or safety. The Commission has a statutory duty to submit to Congress quarterly reports listing any abnorcal occurrences at or associated with any facility or activity regulated by the NRC. To determine which event constitutes-an abnormal occurrence, NRC reviews LERs, licensing and enforcement actions, generic issues, significant inventory differences involving special nuclear material, and other sources of information available to the NRC. Abnormal occurrences include but are not limited to (a) moderate exposures to or release of radioactive materials, (b) major degradation of essential safety-related equipment; and (c) major deficiencies in design, construction, use of, or management controls for licensed facilities or material. I have reviewed a summary of abnormal occurrences at nuclear power plants and find that the number of abnormal occurrences arising from events at CECO facilities is not disproportionate to those involving other facilities nationwide.
_g.
- 23. The ultimate resolution of the safeguards violations referred to in Contention 1(f) is addressed separately in the affidavit of James R. Creed.
- 24. As stated in Contention 1(g), deficiencies in past handling of low level waste resulted in a suspension of CECO's authorization to ship low level waste to Washington and South Carolina burial sites. Subsequent inspections have verified that actions have been taken to correct prior deficiencies and there are no outstanding concerns in this area. CECO is presently authorized to ship low level waste to both burial sites.
- 25. Contention 1(h) critizes Ceco's observance of quality control (QC) and quality assurance (QA) criteria. The Staff evaluation of the Byron quality assurance program is contained in Chapter 17 of the Byron SER (NUREG-0876) and the Staff concludes that the Byron program is acceptable. Furthermore, as a participant in on-site QA and QC inspections, and as a member of the present SALP board, I concur with the finding in the SER. Byron has demonstrated a good overall quality assurance program although some minor deficiencies have been identified during inspections. Corrective actions to resolve the particular deficiencies have been initiated.
- 26. Contention 1(j) alleges that CECO does not have certain research programs. The NRC does not require licensees to undertake specific research programs. However, Applicants often use these programs to demonstrate compliance with the Commission's regulations.
The NRC staff evaluates these analyses, where offered, as part of its safety review.
- 27. In sum, contrary to the claims in Contention 1, the Applicant l
, has demonstrated both the technical ability and commitment to operate Byron safely and in conformance with NRC requirements through its past nuclear performance and responsiveness to NRC Staff positions.
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William L. Forney Subscribed and sworn to before me this /d day of July, 1982.
7
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Attachment 1
SUMMARY
OF CIVIL PENALTIES IMPOSED Total Fines Commonwealth Edison Company 1974 - 1978 1979 - 1981 Facility Total Fines Average Fine Total Fines Average Fine Dresden $46,000 $23,000 $102,000 $34,000 Quad-Cities 25,000 25,000 4,000 4,000 Zion 34,000 17,000 LaSalle '
Byron Braidwood All Power 395,250 14,100 2,808,500 47,600 Reactors Total - RIII $141,000 $17,625 $418,000 $46,440 Power Reactors i
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Attachment 2 SALP I Information Sumary (for the Period 7/1/79 - 6/30/80)
Reactor Sites Under Construction Site Rating Byron Units 1 & 2 - Average Braidwood Units 182 Average LaSalle Units 1&2 Average Nationally Region III Ratings Number of Sites Percentage Number of Sites Percentage Above Average 0 0 0 0 Average 36 83.7 7 70 Below Average 7 16.3 3 30 Operating Reactors Site Rating Dresden Units 1, 2&3 Average Quad Cities Units 1&2 Average Zion Units 1&2 Average Nationally Region III Ratings Number of Sites Percentage Number of Sites Percentage Above Average 9 18 2 15.4 Average 26 52 9 69.2 Below Average 15 30 2 15.4 1
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PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS WILLIAM L. FORNEY U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I am employed as a Senior Resident Inspector at the Byron Station, in the Region III, Division of Projects and Resident Programs, Branch 1, Section IB.
I received a B.S. degree in Management Science from California State University, Hayward, California, in 1974.
I was assigned as the Senior Resident Inspector at Byron on October 5,1981.
In this capacity I have performed inspections of construction and testing activities during the construction and preoperational test phases to ascertain licensee confonnance with NRC regulatory requirements, FSAR commitments, and locally prepared administrative and technical documents.
Prior to assignment at Byron, I was the Senior Resident Inspector at the Lacrosse facility. In this capacity I performed inspections of operational, testing, refueling, security, rad-chemistry, and facility modification activities to ascertain licensee's conformance with NRC regulatory requirements, FSAR commitments, technical specification requirements and locally prepared operational, administrative and technical documents.
Prior to joining the Comission in January 1980, I worked 13 years for the Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California. I held the position of Senior Nuclear Ship Superintendent, Senior Refueling Engineer and Reactor Plant Test Manager.
From September 1959 to January 1967 I was in the United States Navy. While in the Navy, I was nuclear and submarine qualified.