ML20097B779

Proposed Supplemental Initial Decision Re Reinsp Program. Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20097B779
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	09/10/1984
From:	Gallo J, Mark Miller COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO., ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE
To:
Shared Package
ML20097B762	List: ML20097B760 ML20097B779
References
OL, NUDOCS 8409140144
Download: ML20097B779 (185)

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3 TOPICAL ABSTRACT OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY's PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL INITIAL DECISION Page I. INTRODUCTION................................. 1 Original Hearings....................... 1 Initial Decision........................ 2 Appeal Board Decision................... 3 Scope of Reopened Hearing............... 4 Overview of Reopened Hearing............ 6 II. APPLICABLE LAW............................... 8 III. INCEPTION OF THE REINSPECTION PROGRAM........ 11 CAT Inspection..................,....... 11 Recertification Program................. 12 Purpose of the Reinspection Program..... 13 IV. STRUCTURE OF THE REINSPECTION PROGRAM........ 14 Overview................................ 14 Selection of Contractors................ 15 Selection of Inspectors................. 16 Sampling scheme.................... 16 Engineering judgment............... 18 Ericksen on statistics............. 19 Frankel on statistics.............. 20 Conclusion on inspector sample..... 21 i

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. Selection of Inspector Work to be Reinspected.......................... 21 Accessible and recreatable......... 21 First 90 days...................... 22 Kochhar position on validity of first 90 days................... 23 Inspector Qualification Acceptance Criteria................................ 27 Objective and subjective attributes......................... 27 95 and 90 percent criteria......... 28 Reinspecting second three months if criteria not met for first 90 days............................ 29 Mechanism for sample expansion..... 30 Substitution of another inspector if original inspector has no further work beyond first 90 days -- results retained in data base.............. 30 V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REINSPECTION PROGRAM... 31 Meetings with Contractors............... 31 Contractors had no imput into formulation of Reinspection Program............................ 31 Instruction given to contractors... 31 Weekly meetings.................... 32 Physical Reinspection Activities........ 32 Began in March 1983................

Performed by properly certified reinspectors....................... 32 Performed to same or more stringent criteria........................... 33

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. - Hours spent, inspection points

looked at.......................... 33 Use of contractor QC inspectors as reinspectors.................... 34 Reinspectors not influenced by potential consequences to their employers.......................... 34 No reinspector reinspected his own work........................... 34 No evidence of buddy system........ 34 Independent third party reviews.... 35 Results often overly conservative.. 35 PTL special unit concept inspection......................... 36 Kocbhar position that reinspector knowledge of identity of original inspector could bias results....... 37 Kochhar position that reinspec-tor knowledge of original inspec-tion results could lead to bias -

the " mimic" effect................. 38 Termination of Allen Koca............... 40 VI. OVERSIGHT OF REINSPECTION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION............................... 41 CECO QA Audits and Surveillances........ 41 Details of audits and audit findings........................... 42 NRC Staff Overview...................... 48 VII. METHOD OF EVALUATING RESULTS OF REIN-SPECTION PROGRAM............................. 49

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t VIII. RESULTS OF~THE REINSPECTION PROGRAM AS THEY RELATE TO INSPECTOR QUALIFICATIONS...... 50 All Hatfield, Hunter and PTL Inspectors Passed.95 Percent Objective Criteria for First 90 Days.............. 50

, One Hunter, One Hatfield and 2 PTL Inspectors Indeterminate for Subjective Criteria After First 90-Days. Substitu-tion. Results Retained in Data Base.... 50

'One PTL Inspector Failed Second Three Months for-Subjective Criterios. 100 Percent of'His Work Reinspected.

Sample Expansion. All Additional Inspectors Passed....................... 51 Applicant and Staff Conclude Rein-

. spection Program Show Inspectors Qualified................................ 51 Conclusions not changed by fact certain inspections were inaccessible or not recreatable............................. 52 1 IX. SARGENT & LUNDY DISCREPANCY EVALUATIONS...... 54 overview................................ 54 Objective Attributes -- Hatfield Discrepancies........................... 56 Description of objective attributes......................... 56 Number of reinspections and discrepancies...................... 57 Three methods of evaluation........ 57 Number of discrepancies dis-positioned by each method.......... 58 Supplemental reinspection.......... 59 Conclusion of design significance.. 62

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- Objective Attributes -- Hunter Discrepancies........................... 62 Listing of objective attributes. . . . 62 Number of reinspections and discrepancies...................... 62 Three methods of evaluation........ 63 Number of discrepancies dis-positioned by each method.......... 63 Conclusion of design significance.. 65 Subjective Attribute AWS Welding --

Hatfield Discrepancies.................. 65 Description of subjective attributes......................... 65 Number of reinspections and discrepancies...................... 65 Sample of discrepancies evaluated.. 66 is Cosmetic discrepancies............. 66 Number of discrepancies according to strength reduction.............. 67 Static loading..................... 68 Seismic loading.................... 68 Additional investigations.......... 69 Conclusion on design significance.. 70 Subjective Attribute AWS and ASME Weld-ing -- Hunter Discrepancies............. 70 Description of AWS and ASME welding............................ 70 Number of AWS reinspections and discrepancies...................... 70 Number of AWS discrepancies accord-ing to strength reduction.......... 70 mye

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Conclusions on design significance of AWS discrepancies............... 71 Use of AWS'D1.1-83................. 71 Three months of evaluating ASME weld Discrepancies................. 72 Numbers of discrepancies dis-positioned by each method.......... 72 Measurement and testing of undercut........................... 75 Conclusion on' design significance of ASME discrepancies.............. 76 Matters Raised by Mr. Stokes............ 76 Fatigue loading.................... 77 Flare-bevel welding................ 78 Evaluation by Sargent & Lundy of ASME welds...................... 79 Repair of welds.................... 80 Design Margin...................... 81 Code Allowables and Overstress..... 82

, Objectivity and Impartiality of Sargent & Lundy.................... 83 Final Conclusion on Sargent &

Lundy Evaluations.................. 85 X. QUALITY OF THE WORK.......................... 86 Introduction............................ 86 Qualification of Inspectors -

Appeal board presumption........... 86 Sargent & Lundy Evaluation Results...... 87 No discrepancies had design significance......................, 87

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m a Inherent design conservatisms...... 89 Scope of Work Reinspected............... 89 Range of attributes examined....... 90

More than 160 reinspections of Hatfield and Hunter work were performed....-...................... 91 Work quality conclusions based on

' engineering judgment rather than statistics......................... 93 Ericksen's application of mechani-cal statistical theory to work quality inferences................. 93 Role of Statistician is Limited in These Circumstances............. 94 Ericksen's Criticism of Singh's Reliability Calculations........... 94 Inspector homogeneity.............. 95 Intra class correlation............ 95 Clustering......................... 96 Design effect...................... 96 Aggregation of inspection elements. 97 Statistical arguments rejected by Shoreham Board..................... 98 Applicant's Overall QA Program.......... 99 CECO corporate commitment to quality not in issue. Initial decision found CECO QA organiza-tion fundamentally sound........... 99 Behnke discussion of CECO QA program............................ 100 Sketch of QA development...... 100 Hatfield and Hunter........... 101

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Provides assurance of work quality....................... 102 Del George on independent layers of inspection and review of Hatfield and Hunter work........... 103 IE Reports pertaining to Hatfield since close of reinspection program............................ 104 NRC Staff Conclusions on Work Quality... 106 Overall Conclusion on Work Quality...... 108 XI. ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY SYSTEMS CONTROL CORPORATION.......................... 110

. Background.............................. 110 Applicant and Staff Witnesses...... 114 The Torrey Pines review............ 116 Main Control Panels................ 117 DC Fuse Panels..................... 122 Cable Trays........................ 125 Cable tray stiffeners......... 126 Cable tray fittings........... 129 Ladder cable tray and fittings...................... 130 Cable Tray Hangers................. 133 Delegation to NRC Staff....... 138 Local Instrument Panels................. 138 Conclusion Regarding SCC Equipment...... 142 XII. CABLE OVERTENSIONING......................... 143 XIII. TABLING ALLEGATION........................... 150

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. . XIV.' APPLICANT QA OVERSIGHT OF HATFIELD, HUNTER, AND PTL SINCE AUGUST 1983.................... 150 XV. APPLICANT'S QA MEASURES TO PREVENT INACCURATE OR UNRELIABLE CONTRACTOR DOCUMENTATION PRACTICES...................... 154 XVI. ACTIVITIES OF PITTSBURGH TESTING LABORATORY.. 162 XVII. DISPOSITION OF ALLEGATIONS................... 164 XVIII. MODIFICATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF FINDINGS AND CONCLU.3 IONS IN INITIAL DECISION. . . . . . . . . . 167 XIX. , CONCLUSIONS OF LAW........................... 170 XX. ORDER............................. ,,,,,,,,,, 3yn

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL INITIAL DECISION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION................................. 1 II. APPLICABLE LAW............................... 8 III. THE INCEPTION OF THE BYRON REINSPECTION PROGRAM.................................... 11 IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROGRAM................. 14

a. Selection of Contractors........... 15

b. Selection of Inspectors............ 16

c. Selection of Inspector Work To .

Be Reinspected..................... 21

d. Inspector Qualification Acceptance criteria........................... 27 V. IMPL1 ?NTATION OF THE PROGRAM................ 31

a. Meetings with Contractors.......... 31

b. Physical Reinspection Activities... 32

c. Termination of Allen Koca.......... 40 VI. OVERSIGHT OF REINSPECTION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION............................... 41

a. CECO QA Audits and Surveillances... 41

b. NRC Staff Overview................. 48 VII. METHOD OF EVALUATING RESULTS OF BRP.......... 49

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-VIII. -RESULTS OF THE REINSPECTOR PROGRAM AS THEY-

_ RELATE TO INSPECTOR QUALIFICATION............ 50 IX. SARGENT &'LUNDY DISCREPANCY EVALUATIONS...... 54

a. Objective Attributes --

Hatfield Discrepancies............. 56

b. Objective Attributes --

Hunter Discrepancies............... 62

c. ' Subjective Attribute AWS Welding --

Hatfield Discrepancies............. 65

d. Subjective Attribute AWS and ASME Welding -- Hunter Discrepancies.... 70

e. Matters Raised by Intervenor's

. Witness, Mr. Stokes................ 76 X. QUALITY OF WORK.............................. 86

a. Introduction....................... 86

b. Sargent & Lundy Evaluation Results............................ 87

c. Scope of Work Reinspected.......... 89

d. Applicant's Overall QA Program..... 99

e. NRC Staff Conclusione on Work Quality............................ 106

f. Board Conclusions on Work Quality.. 108 OTHER ISSUES XI. ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY SYSTEMS CONTROL CORPORATION.................. 110

a. Background...............,......... 110

b. Main control Panels................ 117

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c. D.C. Fuse Panels................... 122

d. Cable Trays........................ 125 Cable Tray Stiffeners......... 126 Cable Tray Fittings........... 129 J Ladder Cable Trays and Fittings...................... 130 Conclusion Regarding Cable Trays......................... 133

e. Cable Tray Hangers................. 133

f. Local Instrument Panels............ 138

g. Conclusions Regarding Adequacy of Systems Control Work............... 142 XII. CABLE OVERTENSIONING......................... 143 XIII. TABLING ALLEGATION............................ 150 .

XIV. APPLICANT QA OVERSIGHT OF HATFIELD, '

HUNTER AND PTL SINCE AUGUST 1983............. 154 XV. APPLICANT"S QA MEASURES TO PREVENT INACCURATE OR UNRELIABLE CONTRACTOR DOCUMENTATION PRACTICES...................... 159

-XVI. ACTIVITIES OF PITTSBURGH TESTING LABORATORY.. 162 XVII. DISPOSITION OF ALLEGATIONS................... 164 XVIII. MODIFICATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN INITIAL DECISION.......... 167 XIX. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW........................... 170 XX. ORDER..................................:..... 170

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CCLKITES ushRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE.THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING g g j g f BRANCH In The Matter'of. )

)

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454 OL

) 50-455 OL

)

(Byron Nuclear Power Station, )

Units 1 & 2) )

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL INITIAL DECISION ____

I.- INTRODUCTION

1. On January 13, 1984 this Board issued its initial deci-sion denying Commonwealth Edison Company's (" Applicant's" or

" CECO's"). application for a license to operate the Byron Nuclear Power Station.(" Byron"). Although we ruled in Appli-cant's favor on seven of the eight issues in controversy which were litigated during public hearings in the spring and summer of.1983, we found that CECO had not met the burden of proof on the issue of quality assurance.

2. The quality assurance issue as set forth in Inter-venors' contention lA and as originally litigated in the spring of 1983 was quite broad. Applicant was required to demonstrate its "willingnese and ability to implement and maintain an ade-quate quality assurance program." To make this broad showing, CECO submitted the testimony of a range of witnesses with both corporate and Byron specific QA experience and insight.

y .

3. In the first set of hearings on the quality assurance issue in March and April, we did not consider an item of non-compliance found in the March, 1982 NRC Construction Assessment Team inspection regarding the certification practice for quali-ty control inspectors by contractors at Byron. Our attention was drawn to this matter before the additional hearings we held in August 1983 as a result of granting Intervenors' motion to reopen the hearing record. At that time, testitnony was adduced on (1) the training and certification of a former QC inspector of the Hatfield Electric Company ("Hatfield"), (2) the very recently completed program of recertifying inspectors to re-vised criteria based on ANSI N45.2.6-1978, and (3) the struc-ture and preliminary results of a reinspection program designed to show that inspectors who conducted inspections prior to the revised certification procedures were adequately qualified. On the basis of the evidence before us with respect to this last issue we denied the operating license application expressing reservation both about the reinspection program itself and the quality of the work of two site contractors, Hatfield and Hunter Corporation (" Hunter"). (I.D. Ss D-429-441.)

4. When the evidentiary record wac closed the reinspection program was still in progress, and a final report on its results was not published until February 1984. In our initial decision we expressed several reservations regarding the ade-quacy of the Byron quality control inspector reinspection pro-p .

gram ("BRP"), none of which we thought had been eliminated by evidence presented at the August 1983 hearing. We noted that

it~had not been established that the program used a statisti-cally significant and reliable sample. (I.D., 1 D-382-4, 436)

We also expressed concern about documentation deficiencies which were discovered during a CECO audit of the BRP. (I.D.,

TD-379-382, 438) These concerns, together with the fact that the testimony,of the Region III Staff indicated that it was not catisfied completely with some aspects of the program's struc-tures and that it would not be able to judge the success of the l

BRP until its resuls were known, caused us to deny the operat-ing license application.

5. Applicant appealed and, following briefing and oral argument, the Appeal Board remanded this proceeding to the Licensing Board with instructions to receive further evidence on the BRP as it applied to Hatfield and Hunter and to render a supplemental initial decision. The Appeal Board agreed that the record was insufficient-to warrant issuance of an operating license, but held that further hearings should be conducted to allow a-full exploration of the BRP to determine whether there is reasonable assurance that Byron has been properly con-structed. (Memorandum and order, dated May 7, 1984, ALAB-770, 19 NRC (Slip Opinion at 27, 28))

6. Additionally, the Appeal Board noted the recent dis-closure of deficient welds on cable pan hangers supplied to the g _,

site by Systems Control Corporation (" SCC") and that CECO had apparently not fully met commitments to perform source inspec-tions of SCC equipment. These matters raised questions con-cerning the-overall adequacy of equipment supplied by SCC. To resolve this question the Appeal Board determined that further exploration of this issue on the evidentiary record was war-

' ranted. (ALAB-770, slip opinion at 31, 32)

7. Finally, the Appeal Board stated that the Licansing Board would have discretion to include within the scope of the reopened evidentiary record any other question which it deemed relevant to the ultimate question whether reasonable assurance exists that the Byron facility has been properly constructed.

(ALAB-770, slip opinion at 35, note 72.) Thereafter, we sought the advice of the parties on the proper exercise of this dis-cretion. (Transcript of Conference Call, May 9, 1984, at 8032.)

8. Applicant reviewed the Board's initial decision and in a letter dated May 9, 1984, identified various issues as those .

it perceived to be of concern to the Board and as to which the '

Board might require an evidentiary showing. These issues in-cluded the issue of the Region III Staff's acceptance of the BRP; the basis for the determination of inaccessible and non-recreatable inspection attributes in the BRP; the relationship of deficiencies identified during the BRP to a trend analysis; the number of Hatfield inspectors requiring recertification and retraining at the inception of the BRP; Hunter documentation y ,

practices regarding discrepant conditions identified during the BRP;.further evidence regarding possible fraudulent practices by contractors in the certification of quality control and quality assurance personnel; the disposition of allegations open as of the close of the record in August 1983; Applicant's-general control of its site contractors; and supplemental evi-dence regarding Hunter " tabling" practices and any pattern of nonconformances'by Hatfield.

9. As we ruled subsequently, Applicant's list was accurate and' fairly complete. However, the Board added the issue of whether CECO's commitment to repair any defects identified dur-ing the BRP had been effectively satisfied. (Memorandum and order Following'Prehearing Conference at 4, dated June 8, u

1984.)*/ The Intervenors proposed several additional issues of their own. Applicant objected to Intervenors proposal on the ground that it presented issues not relevant and material to

~the. issues remanded by the Appeal Board for further considera-tion. These conflicting views were fully exchanged during a prehearing conference conducted on May 30 and 31, 1984,

10. On June 8,'1984, we issued an order setting the scope of the reopened hearing. Beyond the issues discussed above we ruled that certain of the matters proposed by Intervenors

• / We observe that the Appeal Board characteri=ed this issue as whether "all identified discrepant conditions . . .

[have) been properly resolved". (ALAB-770, slip op.

at 29.) As discussed in Section IX, infra, repair was not the only basis on which discrepancies were dispositioned.

should be litigated. We ruled that the NRC Staff should pre-sent' evidence on certain worker allegations which the Staff had expected would be resolved by the BRP. For one allegation, that electrical cables were overstressed by excessive pulling

-during installation by Hatfield, we requested a full eviden-tiary: presentation on the cause and safety significance of the alleged episodes and their relationship to the BRP. Finally, we ruled that Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory ("PTL") should be added as one of the contractors to be considered with respect I to the.BRP. In this regard, we advised the parties that we ex-t pected a general showing of the scope of PTL's work and a dis-cussion of whether'the BRP has provided reasonable assurance that PTL's work presents no safety problems,

11. Hearings commenced on July 23, 1984. To address the issues in the reopened hearing, Applicant presented the testi-mony of 22-witnesses in four segments. The first segment de-scribed the formulation and implementation of the BRP and its results with respect to the qualification of the Hatfield, Hunter and PTL QC inspectors. The second and third segments of the testimony addressed the questions of the significance of the discrepancies discovered during the BRP and the adequacy of the Hatfield and Hunter work. Finally, evidence was presented concerning other issues, namely, the adequacy of the hardware furnished by Systems control Corp., the use by Hunter of a

" tabling" practice and the adequacy of cable installed by

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Hatfield that had been subjected to excessive stress or over-tensioning.

12. The NRC Staff submitted two witness panels who addressed these same issues. In addition, Mr. Keppler, admin-istrator of NRC's Region III, provided an overview and insight with respect to the Region's judgment concerning the adequacy of the BRP. Mr. William Forney, an NRC employee who was for-merly senior resident inspector at Byron also testified. An affidavit prepared by him which described his differences with the testimony of an NRC Staff witness panel with respect to the conclusions to be drawn from the results of the BRP was re-ceived into evidence as his direct testimony. Intervenors pre-sented three witnesses. One witness questioned the adequacy of the engineering evaluations performed by Sargent & Lundy of the discrepancies discovered during the BRP. The remaining two witnesses challenged the adequacy of various assumptions used by Edison in the formation of the BRP and the applicability of statistical principles to the results of that program.

13. All testimony was presented during the course of 3 weeks of hearings held in July and August of this year. The record was closed on August 24. All parties filed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of their respective positions.

14. On the basis of the extensive testimony presented dur-ing the July and August hearing, and after careful considera-

. tion of the proposed findings and conclusions submitted by the parties, we conclude that Applicant has now prevailed on Inter-venor Contention IA-on quality assurance.*/ The basis for this determination follows.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

15. An operating license for a nuclear power plant may be issued at such time as the NRC renders the findings required by 10 C.F.R. .5 50.57(a). The Commission, subject to the immediate effectiveness provisionf of 10 C.F.R. 5 2.764, has vested the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation with the authority to make the findings under section 50.57(a). 10 C.F.R. 5 2.760(a). Our authority is limited to deciding matters in controversy among the parties. 10 C.F.R. I 2.104(c) and 5 2.760(a). It was in the context of this regulatory regime that Contention 1A was decided against the Applicant.

16. We were unable to make these findings in our Initial Decision of January 13, 1984 because of outstanding questions raised by an item of noncompliance contained in NRC Staff

. Inspection Report 82-05. Specifically, noncompliance 82-05-19 questioned the qualifications of contractor QC inspectors cer-tified under procedures which the Staff deemed defective. The

• / The specific findings of fact and conclusions of law con-tained in our initial decision which are altered by this supplemental intitial decision are set forth in Section XVIII, infra.

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Appeal Board agreed that the record previously before us was insufficient to support the issuance of an operating license, but remanded the record to us to permit a-full exploration of the signifi-cance of the [ reinspection) program in terms of whether there is currently reasonable assurance that the Byron facility has been properly constructed. Stated otherwise, the focus of the inquiry should be upon whether, as formulated and executed, the reinspection program has now provided the requisite degree of confidence that the Hatfield and Hunter quality assurance inspectors were competent and, thus, can be presumed to have uncovered any construction defects of possible safety consequence.

(Memorandum and Order, dated May 7, 1984, ALAB-770, 19 NRC Slip Opinion at 27, 28)

17. Further, subsequent to our initial decision new infor-mation regarding another item of noncompliance resurrected questions we had deemed closed in our initial decision. (I.D.,

1 D-442; 1s 204 - 263, infra.) Noncompliance 80-04-01, con-tained in a December 30, 1980' inspection report, asserted that Applicant had failed to take prompt and effective corrective action with respect to deficient equipment supplied to the Byron Station by Systems Control Corporation (" SCC"). While we had been willing to delegate the closure of this item of non-compliance to the NRC Staff, the Appeal Board, as a result of the new information, directed that we hold further hearings on this issue as well.

18. Notices of violations regarding items of noncompliance

i. which are found during the course of NRC Staff inspection

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7-activities constitute an enforcement action prescribed by the Commission's regulations. (10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C, IV. A. " Notice of Violation.") The relationship between the resolution of NRC Staff enforcement actions and the finding we are required to make under 10 C.F.R. 50.57(a) is found in 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C " General Policy and Procedure,for NRC Enforcement Actions." The introduction to that Appendix states that the purpose of the NRC enforcement pragram is to promote and protect the health and safety of the public by, among other things, " ensuring compliance with NRC regulations and license conditions."

19. The basic issues in the reopened hearing, therefore, involved the adequacy of corrective actions taken by the Appli-car.t to close out these items of noncompliance to the satisfac-tion of the NRC Staff. The closing of Noncompliance 82-05-19 involved re:ertification of QC inspectors for, 37ter alia, Hatfield and Hunter, and a demonstration by way of the BRP that even prior to their recertification, the inspectors were compe-tent. As discussed in the body of this decision, the BRP also provided one basis for determining work quality of those two co.1 tractors. Full and proper resolution of this item of non-compliance satisfies the concerns we expressed in our Initial Decision.

20. With regard to the issue of the adequacy of equipment supplied by SCC, Noncompliance 80-04-01 has not been closed.

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' However,'the testimony ~of the NRC Staff.and Applicant indi-

-cates that only one discrete issue remains to be resolved. A a.

program:for' resolution of the one outstanding issue by way of a l 100%..inspectio'n'of certain components, is in progress and the NRC Staff expressed confidence that this program will satisfy their concerns.

21. It is within our authority to delegate an issue to the NRCShaffwhen-itisclearthattheNRCStaffcanadequately resolve-the issue. (See generally our discussion in the Ini-

.tial Decision, 's D-419 - 427 and cases cited therein.) The nature of the program for resolution of the outstanding SCC issue, as discussed below, presents an appropriate case for delegation to the~NRC Staff and we so ruled at the close of the hearings. (Tr. 11,169-71.)

III. THE INCEPTION OF THE B* IRON REIMSPECTION' PROGRAM

22. A specfal inspection was conducted at Byron during the Spring of'1982 by an NRC Construction Assessment Team (" CAT").

The CAT findings were published in IE Report Nos. 50-454/8:

and 50-455/82-04. One of the findings (noncompliance 82 r questioned the adequacy of the~on-site contractors' progra

'for certifying QC inspectors. The CAT inspectors found def.

.ciencies?in-(i) the' contractors' evaluations of initial inspes tor capabilities, (ii) the documentation of. initial certifica-2 tion, and (iii) the criteria'used to establish inspector quali-

s i-fication. '(Applicant's Exhibit 8; Del George, prepared testi-

- mony at 6, ff. Tr.-8400.) Although there was no finding that these deficiencies had compromised the quality of construction,

.-the NRC Region III Staff adopted the position that the' site contractors' QC inspector-qualification programs had to be upgraded and that the quality of the inspections already com-pleted required verification. (Del George, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9406.)

23. In response _to the Staff's criticisms, Edison ini-tiated a recertification program between June and September 1982, to review in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI

' N45.2.6-1978, and to revise where necessary, contractors' QC inspector certification procedures. These upgraded procedures

were used to. certify inspectors beginning on September 30, L

1982. This action solved the Staff's concern with respect to the1 qualification of QC inspectors after September 30, 1982; kl - however, it did not provide assurance that the inspectors who performed QC inspections prior to that-time were qualified.

.The BRP was constituted to address this latter concern.

-(Hansel,-prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George,

-prepared testimony at 7-10, ff. Tr. 8406; Connaughton,- Staff prepared testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 9510.)*/

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[ . jb/ A fall discussion of the recertification program is con-1tained in paragraphs D-385 through D-393 of our initial

. decision, j

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24. To verify the' effectiveness of inspector qualification and-certification practices used by site centractors between January 1976 and September 1982, the BRP was structured to reinspect the original QC inspections and to analyze any dis-crepancies'(differences between the results of the original

, inspections and the reinspections) to determine their signifi-cance. The data would then be used to draw inferences about-the, qualification of.the total inspector population on a con-tractor-by-contractor basis. Thus, the original-purpose of the BRP was not to directly validate work quality at Byron. Given the concerns about work quality raised in our initial decision, however, : both Applicant 1 and the Staff determined that . the BRP data could also be used as one basis for determining the qual-

-ity.of the construction work. (Del George, prepared testimony at 6, 7, ff. Tr. 8406; Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 9510.)

25. The NRC Staff's characterization of the purpose of the BRP.is stated differently than the description we have just articulated. .The Region III panel testified that the primary L purpose of the BRP was to determine whether QC inspectors had overlooked significant safety-related hardware deficiencies.

(Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4,ff. Tr. 9510; Tr.

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9577.) However, Mr. Little also-agreed, on behalf of the panel,-that' determining whether QC inspectors had overlooked

r significant deficiences was equivalent to determining whether they were competent. (Keppler, Tr. 10,134; Little, Tr. 9582-83.) Indeed, William Forney, former Region III senior resident inspector at Byron, testified for the Staff in August 1983 that the. purpose of the BRP was "to determine whether or not [the contractors] have used qualified inspectors."*/ (Forney, Tr.

7991.) In sum, it appears that any difference between the pur-pose of BRP as stated by CECO and the NRC Staff is a matter of semantics rather than substance.

IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROGRAM

26. The BRP was formulated to address the qualification of-QC inspectors who performed inspections for 8 on-site construc-tion contractors during the period January 1976 through Septem-ber-1982. In general, the adequacy of the original inspection results was determined by reinspection using qualified QC i' inspectors. Inspectors were selected for reinspection by a

• / We note that Mr.- Forney's most recent testimony contradicts this characterization. Mr. Forney testified at the re-opened hearing that in his opinion, the-fact that inspec-tors have not failed to discover significant deficiencies is not necessarily a-demonstration of their competence.

His reasoning appears to be that the Byron plant is so well constructed that there may not be very many significant discrepancies to discover. (Forney, Tr. 10,063-64, 10,-082.) In any event, Mr. Forney himself characterizes

-his disagreement as " miniscule" in importance. (Forney, Tr. 10,068.) We will come back to an evaluation of Mr.

Forney's' position in the work quality portion of this deci-sion.

sampling technique and the first 90-days of their work was reinspected. The subject matter of the inspections was grouped into two work categories called " subjective" and " objective" attributes;" If the reinspector agreed with at least 95% of the original inspector's calls for objective attributes or 90%

for subjective attributes, the inspector was deemed qualified.

The work of any inspector who initially failed to pass either acceptance criterion was subjected to an expanded inspection process; wherein the inspector either passed based on a rein-spection of a second 90-day period, or if the inspector still failed, all o5 his work was reinspected. These program ele-ments will be discussed in detail below,

a. Selection Of Contractors

27. The first element of the BRP was the selection of site contractors whose QC inspectors would be subjected to reinspec-

' tion. Mr. Del George explained that eight of the 19 contract-ors who had performed or were performing safety-related work at

-Byron were_ subjected to reinspection. The work inspected by these eight contractors accounted for approximately 93 percent-of the safety-related work at Byron. (Del George, prepared testimony at 8, 9, ff. Tr. 8406.)

28. Of the eleven contractors not subjected to reinspec-tion, three were excluded because they were not subject to ANSI N45.2.6-1978. In other words, the qualification of their QC

_ - _ _. _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ . ,

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inspectors was not in question. Three other contractors were already undergoing extensive reinspection of their work, making it unnecessary to address the question of their QC inspector

, qualification. Five contractors were excluded from the BRP because their work was neither accessible nor recreatable for purposes _of~ reinspection. -(Del-George, prepared testimony at 10,.11, ff. Tr. 8406; Del George, Tr. 8724-28.)

29. The selection of contractors included in the BRP was not a material issue in this proceeding. It appears that of the contractors who performed on-site construction work, the significant ones were captured in the program. Their work represented _93% of_the enfety-relatec work at Byron. In any event, these remanded proceedings were limited to Hatfield, Hunterfand PTL, and these contractors were included in the BRP.

.b. Selection Of Inspectors

30. The second element of the BRP was the selection of inspectors for reinspection. The inspection work of the origi-nal QC inspectors _of Hatfield, Hunter and PTL was reinspected on a sampling. basis. (Del George, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 8406.) Edison and the NRC Staff agreed that a 100 per-cent reinspection effort was not necessary since a properly structured.. sampling plan permits sound judgments to be drawn concerning the total population based on the sample results.

(Hansel, prepared. testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George,

.g- ,,

Tr. 8482-3~;- Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr.

9510.)

31. 1The names of inspectors for Hatfield,~ Hunter and PTL were compiled on rosters and listed chronologically by date of certification. The fifth and every fifth inspector thereafter

-on the' roster was included in the BRP. In addition, the NRC Staff senior resident' inspector, Mr. Forney, reviewed the sample and added both the first inspector certified and two to fourLadditional' names to each contractor's group of inspect-ors. This-selection method resulted in 27%, 26% and 27% of Hatfield, Hunter and PTL QC inspectors, respectively, being

. included in the program. -(Del George, prepared testimony at 30, ~ 31, 33, ff. Tr. 8406.)

3:2. .The table contained in Mr. Del George's testimony shows that Applicant made certain the inspectors selected were not only sufficient in number but represented.the range of inspection activities for.the entire six year span of inter-est. The table also shows that inspectors were chosen from

_ each year of work activity. .(Del George, prepared testimony at

13,'ff. Tr. 8406.)

33. To qualify to have his-work reinspected an inspector had to perform at.least 50 reinspectable inspections during the

_ period subject to reinspection. In the case of PTL, 25 inspec-tions were determined to be acceptable because of the limited L

,_E -

' number'of inspections-'for the typical inspector. Where rein-spection was initiated for.the original inspector but it was subsequently learned that the " minimum quantity" was'not avail-able, all~reinspections actually performed for the original inspector were-nevertheless included in the BRP data base.

(Del George, prepared testimony at 16, 17, ff. Tr. 8406.)

34. The Staff concluded that the sample size of inspectors whose work was reinspected was sufficiently large and provided an adequate basis for evaluating the qualifications of inspec-1 tors whose work was not reinspected. The Staff emphasized the adequacy of'the selection methodology, including the two to

-four inspectors added for each contractor by the resident inspector. (Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4, 5, ff. Tr.

9510.)

35. The. inspector sampling scheme was the result of an engineering judgment.that.for a small population of inspectors, a sample size in excess of 20 percent would provide a reliable-indicator of the quality of the total population of the Hat-field, Hunter and PTL inspectors, provided the sample covered the entire range of interest from January 1976 through Septem-

-ber'1982. The engineering judgment of both CECO and Staff personnel'which led-to the selection of the samp'le of inspec-.

tors.whosezwork was reinspected is responsive to our concerns regarding the statistical significance and reliability of the

-'b.-

M

- inspector sample expressed in our initial decision, even though

. there was'notfa' rigorous application of mathematical statisti-

~ cal' theory'to the inspector selection process. It would ap-pear, therefore,-that a sufficient.and representative number of inspectors was captured by the sampling process to provide confidence that inferences could be drawn with respect to the qualification of the Hatfield, Hunter and PTL inspectors not

- captured in the BRP. This judgment is reinforced by the nature hof.the selection process used by the NRC Staff to add inspec- ,

1 tors to the program. Based on his judgment, Mr. Forney se-lected inspectors whose qualifications he believed to be ques-tionable; and as a result, the list of inspectors to be rein-spected was biased to include the inspectors who would most likely be determined.to be unqualified. (Little, Tr. 9817- 19.)

36. Intervenors did not present any evidence which direct-ly challenged the sample selection process'for inspectors other

~

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than two general assertions by Professor Ericksen, an expert statistician. The first assertion is that at_any time a sample is selected and one wishes to make a generalization to the total population, that person is making a statistical state-ment. (Ericksen, Tr. 10,964.) Second, in his prepared testi-mony Dr. Ericksen asserted it is proper statistically to make generalization only to all population elements which had a known, non-zero chance of being selected into the sample.

(Ericksen, prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 11,045.) This type

.'* ; ~

-of sample is known as a probability sample. (Ericksen, Tr.

11,072.) Dr. Ericksen concluded that since certain inspectors

'had "no-chance" of being included in the sample, there was an inadequate. statistical basis-from which to draw inferences about:these inspectors. (Ericksen,' prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr.-11,045.)

37. Dr. Martin Frankel, an expert statistician testifying on behalf of Applicant agreed that the inspector sample does not' qualify asia " probability sample", mainly because of the

-addition of designated inspectors whose qualifications were considered suspect by the NRC Staff. (Frankel, prepared testi-mony at 7-8, ff. Tr. 11,120.) Although the sample of inspec-tors does not meet the criteria for a probability sample, Dr.

Frankel believes.that inferences to the total population of inspectors can be drawn if supported by the judgments of indi-viduals with appropriate substantive knowledge. (Frankel, pre-pared testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr. 11,120.) We agree. The fea-ture of the sampling scheme for inspectors which causes it to not constitute aJprobability sample is the addition of inspec-tors to the sample by the NRC resident inspector. These addi-p tions to the sample were designed to include in the BRP inspec-tors whose qualifications were suspect. It would be contrary to common sense to reject inferences drawn from the results of the BRP by experienced engineers employed by Applicant and Staff, as well as by independent consultants based on a ritual-fisticjapplication of statistical theory. We accept the validi-ty.of:the. inspector sample in the BRP and conclude that the result's' form an adequate basis for inferences to the qualifica-tions"of inspectors-whose work was not reinspected.

.c. Selection Of Inspector Work To Be Reinspected

38. The third element of the BRP involved the selection of

'the part-of_each inspector's work which would be reinspected.

This work was categorized'into discrete work activities called attributes. 'All. safety-related work attributes were reinspect-ed if they were both recreatable and accessible. An attribute

~

was considered recreatable if it could be traced to a specific.

-inspector and the' condition or state originally inspected was

~

capableiof reinspection at a'later time. An attribute was accessible for reinspection'if extensive dismantling was not required for th'e reinspection to be performed. However, attri-butes were deemed-accessible if reinspection could be accomp-lished through the erection of scaffolding or through the removal of paint, insulation or fireproofing. (Del George,.

prepared testimony at 17-19, ff. Tr. 8406.)

139. Approximately 80 percent of Hatfield's' total.inspec-ltions performed at Byron (up to the date its revised certifica-tion procedures were implemented) were reinspectable. For

' Hunter,-this figure was approximately 70 percent. (Tuetken, y prepared testimony at 25, 26,.ff. Tr. 8408.) Somewhat less

]

.than-50. percent of the inspections performed by PTL prior to the implementation of its revised certification procedures were reinspectable. (Tuetken,' prepared testimony at 25, 26, ff.

Tr. 840s ) This is because PTL performed mainly concrete and soil' inspections, which are not recreatable. (Tuetken, Tr. 8664.) 'It is undisputed that placement of work in either an inaccessible or nonrecreatable category was supported by proper documentation which showed appropriate reasons why a certain inspector's work could not be reinspected. (Hansel, prepared testimony at 17, ff. Tr. 8901; Hansel, Tr. 8982.)

'40. Finally, some attributes for work to be reinspected were not captured in the BRP. This was the case for 2 of 11 Hatfield inspection attributes and 5 of 48 Hunter inspection elements. The two Hatfield attributes involving component sup-port and equipment final inspection (cable pan covers and cable pan identification) were not reinspected because this work had not been initiated before September 1982. (Del George, pre-

. pared testimony at 17, 18, ff. Tr. 8406.)

41. The first 90 days-of each selected inspector's work was-reinspected. (Hansel prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr.

'8901; Del George,.Tr. 8490.)' Both Edison and the NRC Staff agree that the first 90 days of work is an appropriate period to. evaluate to determine inspector qualification. If training has been inadequate to produce a qualified inspector, the first i 90 days covers the time when an inspector is most likely to 4

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A r, maNti mistakes-as a result of that-inadequate training. There-l fore, in the judgment ofLCECo and the Staff, a conservative

O bias was' factored-into this element of the BRP. (Hansel, pre-lpa' red testimony at 11, 12,;ff. Tr.'8901; Hansel, Tr. 8948~;

. Del George, Tr. 8790-91;. Little, Staff prepared testimony at 5, ff.'Tr. 9510; Little, Tr. 9646'.)

~

i 42; .This judgment is disputed by Intervenors' witness Dr.

E .Dev. S. Kochhar, a human factors expert from the University of Michigan. According to Dr. Kochhar, inspector performance can be.' expected to attain its highest proficiency level in the period immediately following completion of training. He testi-ffied that in general newly trained inspectors perform better initiallyLbecause the-novelty of the job causes them to be more attentive. This " initial arousal" wears'off as novelty and sensory stimulation decline over. time. According to Dr.

Kochhar, .the level of performance effectiveness also declines.

Thus, in Dr. Kochhar's opinion, reinspection of only the first

. 901 days of inspectors' work is likely.to have caused a noncon-servative bias in.the BRP results. The better course, accord-ing to-Dr. Kochhar, would have been.to reinspect the work of

. inspectors over the' full range of their tenure at Byron.

.(Kochhar, prep ~ared-testimony at 7-10, ff. Tr. 10,538.)

2 143. -We have discerned.a fundamental problem with the s

application of Dr. .Kochhar's analysis to Byron. Dr. Kochhar's testimony misperceives the very purpose of the BRP, which was

n -

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to determine whether the training and certification procedures

used by contractors -before 1982 were producing qualif.ied inspectors. DWhen confronted with this purpose on cross-exam-

~ination, D r ~. Kochhar agreed that it was necessary to reinspect a' period of an inspector's work prior to the time his experi-

'ence on the job might mask any lack of adequate training.

(Kochhar, Tr. 10,571.) In the Board's_ view, it is obvious that the period of interest is the.first few months of an inspect-or's' job-performance. The question becomes therefore, whether Dr. Kochhar's testimony persuades us whether the first 90 day's as opposed to a longer period is appropriate.

44. 'Dr. Kochhar admitted that his analysis applied,-for the most part, only to the inspection of subjective attri-butesi that is, visual weld inspections. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,542-43.) For objective attributes, where measuring devices are

.used, the human factors issues addressed in Dr. Kochhar's tes-timony are of.-less concern.*/. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,543.) In this

~

regard, Dr.-Kochhar admitted that the only inspection proce-duresLhe reviewed at Byron were visual weld inspection proce-dures. He did not review inspection procedures for any objec-tivefinspection attributes. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,553.)

• / Indeed,' rebuttal testimony by James Buchanan, former Hatfield.QA/QC manager, and Malcolm Somsag, Hunter QA supervisor, makes plain that objective inspections involve the application and repeated use of standard measurements and other easily verifiable criteria. (Euchanan, prepared

. testimony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 11,174; Somsag, prepared testi-mony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 11,172.)

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.45. Dr. Kochhar further admitted that his experience with

. inspection activities b?s been limited, primarily, to assembly line or . batch manufacturing operations involving a Firestone Tire and Rubber Company assembly line operation where inspec-tors inspected three or four major attributes on tires which passed by at a controlled rate. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,548.) Dr.

Kochhar's laboratory experiments involved television monitors on which simulated products moved across the screen at con-trolled rates. The subject inspectors were required to identi-fy.any faults or defects in the products as they moved across the screen. (Kochhar,~Tr. 10,550.)

46. .Thus, aside from his review of the BRP, Dr. Kochhar has-no experience at all with nuclear plant inspection activi-ties. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,547.) Nevertheless, Dr. Kochhar as-serts that his Firestone and laboratory results are applicable to Byron QC inspection activities. (Tr. 10,547-48.) Surpris-

~

ingly, Dr. Kochhar makes this assertion without having evalu-ated the actual duties of the~ Byron QC inspectors. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,589.) He was aware that the work of QC inspectors was "somewhativaried", that they looked at different kinds of welds, that welds were located in various locations throughout the plant, and that access to some welds was difficult.

(Kochhar, Tr. 10,589-91.) Nevertheless, Dr. Kochhar simply assumed that their tasks like those which were the subject of his experience would require subjective judgments based on pre-

C

-determined: criteria. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,589.) On examination by the' Board, he agreed that the varied duties of the QC inspec-tors'might tend to break up the tedium that inspectors on assembly lines. ordinarily experience. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,591.)

47. Dr. Kochhar also testified that none of his experi-ments lasted.more'than 2 or-3 days. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,558.) He is not aware of any studies which have examined this job per-formance phenomenon over an extended period of time. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,558.) He testified that his predictions concerning long-term job performance are based on a simple analogy to daily performance. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,568, 10,592.) Yet Dr.

Kochhar'also testified that, based on what he has read in the literature, it is likely that the predicted downturn in in-spector performance would begin after only a couple of days.

(Kochhar, Tr. 10,562.) Given this, it is logical to assume that any downturn in inspector perfermance at Byron would have occurred within an inspector's first 90 days. This obviously belies his argument that more than three months of an inspec-tor's' work should have been reinspected in order to overcome

.the initial arousal effect.

48. Finally, . Dr. Kochhar was unable to quantify the effect of the alleged nonconservative bias on the results of the BRP.

Nor was he able to say when, if ever, an inspector who was ini-tially performing his tasks. competently would become incompe-tent. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,595.) He testified as follows:

p.- - _

i A Yes, well what I'm saying is that

-I don't'think anybody could quantify that bias. The fact is that if you had taken_a period of time that was longer and then sampled,'it may have been more reflective of the actual working span.

Q. Dr. Kochhar, just so we are clear on this, you don't know -- as you sit her) today -- whether the reinspection results have been overstated by a half a percent or 20 percent because of the selection of the first 90 days?

l A. That's correct. I do not know.

-(Kochhar Tr. 10,601, 10,603, 10,604.)

49. Thus, it appears that Dr. Kochhar's theory, which is limited to subjective attributes and based on limited relevant experience,- would have its impact, if at all, in the first 90-days of an inspector's job performance. Consequently we are not persuaded that Applicants choice of the first 90-days was inappropriate. Indeed, we find that reinspection of an inspector's first three months of' work wac appropriate to determine whether the inspector was adequately qualified following h'is_ initial training.

d. Insoector Qualification Acceptance Criteria

50. In order to evaluate the performance, and thus the qualifications, of the original inspectors, it was necessary to establish appropriate acceptance criteria. To facilitate the establishment of such criteria, the reinspection of QC inspec-tions was divided into two attribute categories: objective and L'

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F, ,

I

. subjective. ~ (Hansel, prepared testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George, prepared testimony at 19, 20, ff. Tr. 8406.)

51. .An a'ttribute is subjective if its inspection requires qualitative interpretation.by the inspector. Visual weld exam-

~ination was the only subjective attribute in the BRP. An attribute wasiclassified as objective if its inspection was not

.significantly affected by qualitative interpretation.

(Del' George, prepared testimony at 19, 20, ff. Tr. 8406.) The types of inspections included in this. category, such as dimen-sions that should not change and verification of materials and shape, are repeatable and require very little exercise of judg-ment by the inspector. (Hansel, prepared testimony at 13, ff.

'Tr. 8901; Del George, preapred testimony at 18, 20, ff. Tr.

8406.).

52. For, inspections involving objective attributes, the e acceptance-level was set at 95 percent, which means that 95 percent of the inspected work had to be found acceptable to

. qualify the original 1 inspector. (Hansel, prepared testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George, prepared testimony at 19, 20, ff.

Tr. 8406.)

53. Both Applicant and NRC Staff' witnesses testified that the 95 percent acceptance level for objective attributes was reasonably conservative and recognized that unintentional human (Del George, prepared testi-

~

error precludes total agreement.

pc .~ ,

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mony at 23, ff. Tr. 8406; Little, Staff prepared testimony at i8, ff. Tr. 9510.) We agree.

54. .For inspections involving subjective attributes, the acceptance level'was set at 90 percent. (Hansel, prepared tes-timony at 13, ff.' Tr. 8901; Del George, prepared testimony at 23-25, ff. Tr. 8406.) The 90 percent acceptance level for sub-

. jective .actributes recognized the likelihood for reasonable disagreement between-inspectors and reinspectors where judg-mental decisionmaking was involved in the inspection.

(Del George, . prepared testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 8406; see alio, Little, Tr. 9560,.9574.) As John Hansel testified, the inspec-tion agreement rate on a piece of hardware can range from 20 percent for a very' complex piece to 80 percent for a very sim-ple piece'. (Hansel, Tr. 8942.) Mr. Hansel ranked visual weld inspections in the 70 to 80 percent agreement range. (Hansel,

, Tr. 8943.) Thus, we find that the subjective attribute rate of 90 percent used in the BRP is acceptable. (Hansel, Tr. 8943.)

55. If an acceptance criterion was.not met for the first 3 months of an inspector's job performance, inspections during the second three months of the individual's inspection tenure were reinspected for the attributes for which the inspector failed the acceptance criterion. If-the results of the second

.three month period did not meet the acceptance criterion,-the inspector was judged to be unqualified. In this event, 100 percent of the inspections performed by that inspector of the w.

type found to-fail the acceptance criterion were reinspected.

~

In addition, the original inspector sample population for the particular contractor involved was expanded.by as much as 50 percent:for the attribute in question, depending on the number of inspectors still available for inclusion in the program.

Applicant's selection of inspectors added to the sample was made from-an overall list of-inspectors certified in the specific area.where the unqualified inspector was identified.

(Del George, prepared testimony at 26, 27, ff. Tr. 8406.)

56. If an inspector had no inspections beyond three months and did not meet an acceptance criterion,'the next inspector certified chronologically was substituted and his first three

- months of work was reinspected. The qualification of the orig-

.inal' inspector in such a case was considered indeterminate, but

-his results were retained in the program data base, and all observed discrepancies were evaluated for design significance.

(Del George, prepared testimony at 27, ff. Tr. 8406.)

57. The Board finds that the mechanisms used to expand the reinspection process in the event that inspectors failed to E _

pass the applicable acceptance criterion were reasonable.

Furthermore, we agree it was prudent to include the results of all reinspections in the BRP, including those of the inspectors characterized as indeterminate.

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, 2V.7 IMPLEMENTATION OF'THE PROGRAM

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g .a. ; Meetings With Contractors-s 158. :Implementat' ion o'Zlthe BRP began in February 1983. At

^

i Lthatitime Applicant's'represen'tatives met.with'the contractors.

zwhose'workLwas to-be reinspected.

.,E59h-We" note that the contractors whose inspectors were the subject'o'f,th'eJBRP;had no input into'the formation of the pro -

-  ; gram. ccording~to Mr..Tuetken/ the only contact between

' [' iApplicant'and<the' contractors-priorito NRC Staff approval

' occurred' whenLMr.zTuetken asked the contractors whether it was 1 possible' to produce a listing of inspectors by= certification date. _(Tuetken,7 Tr. 8845.) .No details of the reinspection ,

--  ; plan were-released;to:the: contractors until after NRC Staff-modification,ahd bpproval ofLApplicant's proposal for a rein -

spection program l on February 3, 1983'. (Tuetken, Tr. 8764.)

~

Subsequently,'at'itsiinitial meeting;with the contractors,fthe m- ,

l purpose andl nature of the reinspection activities to be per-

/ Lfonned, lan outline ofi the program and criteria for reinspection

.were discussed.'

~~

The basic instructions givenito the contrac-

- - tors.were (1):the'reinspections'were to be conducted employing m the acceptance criteria.used'at the time of the original

Tinspections;.(ii)Jindividuals involved in the reinspection of

);% '

07 . work could not be the same inspectors who performed the origi-

. :nal; inspection, and (iii) the need for removal of fireproofing, paint and insulation did not render an item inaccessible for i #

q: .

'47l.

i

purposes of" reinspection.~ (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 4, 5, ff. Tr. 8408.)-

60.. As the BRP proceeded, weekly meetings.were held between the participating contractors and the Ceco project

' construction department to discuss and resolve questions con-cerning the ongoing program, establish methods for recording results, and determine action to be taken on discrepancies

-observed in the reinspection effort. A series of written

' interpretations regarding implementation of the BRP were created, as necessary and disseminated to all contractors for their quidance. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr.

8408;-Shewski, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 8423. See Attachment A.to Teutken, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 8408.)

b. ' Physical Reinspection Activities

61. Physical reinspection activities began in the middle of March 1983. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr.

'8408.)*/ The BRP was performed.by reinspectors who were prop-

• / The Appeal Board noted that the reinspection program only covered inspectors certified up to September 1982 and the recertification program was not completed until early 1983. It therefore questioned whether Applicant had en-sured that inspectors certified between those dates were capable of performing their tasks. (ALAB-770, slip opinion at 29.) To address this concern, Mr. Tuetken explained that the reinspection program examined the first three months of work performed by inspectors right up to the date the revised certification procedures were implemented. The first three months'of work of at least a small number of inspectors who were certified during the summer of 1982 were included in the BRP and this three month period ex-tended beyond September, 1982. (Tuetken, prepared testi-mony at 18, ff. 8408.)

p erly recertified-to_ ANSI N45.2.6 (1978)'before commencing rein-spections.*/ (Del George, prepared testimony at 20, 21, ff.

Tr. 8406; Tuetken,_ prepared testimony at 16, 17, ff. Tr.

8408.) , The proper certification of the reinspectors was con-firmed on the basisfof extensive overview inspections by Appli-cant's project construction and quality assurance departments and the NRC Staff. (Del George, Tr. 8789; Ward, Tr. 9691-92.)

'62. .Reinspections were performed to the same or more

' stringent criteria than had been used in the original inspec-tion. (Del George, prepared testimony at 21, ff. Tr. 8406.)

This introduces a further conservatism, since the reinspectors,

'having been trained to 1983 standards, were required to apply less stringent earlier criteria. Mr. Tuetken testified that in many cases ~it was simply not possible to ignore the influence of the current standards. (Tuetken, Tr. 8706-07.)

~

63. More than 80,000 man-hours of actual reinspections were performed, and more than 160,000 additional man-hours were spent in construction, clerical, and administrative support

• /_-In our Initial Decision, we identified a concern about the

'nwdoer of Hatfield inspectors that required recertification and/or retraining at the inception of the BB'. (I.D.

1D-436.) In response, Mr. Connaughton explained that as of September 30, 1982, Hatfield_ employed 46 inspectors who re-quired additional training, tesring, and/or documentation to comply with the new QC inspector certification require-ments. Mr. Connaughton also explained that there is no particular significance to the number of Hatfield inspec-tors requiring recertification. inasmuch as all of them were included in the population considered in the BRP. (Con-naughton, prepared testimony at 18-19, ff. Tr. 9510.)

(_

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work related to the BRP. More than 202,000 inspection points were reinspected. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 19, ff.

Tr.~ 8408; Behnke, prepared testimony at 14, ff. Tr. 9336.)

64. Each contractor used its own QC inspectors as rein-spectors. (Del George, prepared testimony at 21, ff. Tr. 8406; Hansel, Tr. 8928.) However, steps were taken to ensure that no inspector reinspected his own work. (Hansel, prepared testi-mony at 15, f f. Tr. 8901; 8917. ) Supervisors assigned work to reinspectors only after verifying that the inspector performing the reinspection was not the original inspector. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 20, ff. Tr. 8408.)

65. In some cases, a reinspector knew whose work he was reinspecting. (Hansel, Tr. 8924-25.) However, a sample audit-by Mr. Hansel found no evidence or patterns indicating the presence of a buddy system or any attempt to alter the results. (Hansel, prepared testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George, Tr. 9480; See also, Little, Tr. 9854-57.) There was no evidence that reinspectors were concerned and/or influ-enced by the potential economic consequences to their employer of adverse program results. To the contrary, the reinspectors were judged by Mr. Hansel to be professionals concerned with their personal reputations. Mr. Hansel testified that the reinspectors would not be likely to jeopardize their own repu-(Hansel, Tr. 8928-33.)

tations for the sake of the contractor.

66. -Independent third-party reviews were conducted by Level III inspectors of all visual weld inspections which were ff.

found discrepant. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 19, 20, Tr. 8408.) L Third-party reviewers examined 3,136 weld discrep-ancies identified by Hatfield reinspectors, and determined that 1,150 of these should have been accepted by the reinspectors rather than rejected. The third-party reviewers examined 121

. weld discrepancies identified by Hunter and determined that 12 should have been accepted rather than rejected. For PTL the third-party reviewers examined 999 weld discrepancies identi-fied by reinspectors, concluding that 94.should actually have been accepted. These third-party review results confirm that the reinspectors of Hunter, Hatfield, and PTL generally evalu-ated weld inspections consistently and conservatively.

This judg-(Tuetken, prepared testimony at 30, ff. Tr. 8408.)

' ment was confirmed by the NRC Region III Staff. (Ward, Staff 9691-92, prepared testimony at 10-11, ff. Tr. 9510; Ward, Tr.

9776; Del George, prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 8406.)

67. .Mr. Ward, the Region's welding expert, testified that he found no instance where a zeinspector had missed a defi-ciency._ Indeed, in his opinion, in many cases the reinspectors were overly conservative, classifying welds as unacceptable even though they were in fact acceptable under the AWS Code.

(Ward, Tr. 9774-76; Ward, Staff prepared testimony at 10-12, ff. Tr. 9510; See also Little, Staff prepared testimony at p

14-16, ff. Tr. 9510.) Mr. Ward estimated that reinspections were Joverly conservative in about 10 percent of the cases.

(Ward, Tr. 9868.)

16 8 . To verify the accuracy of the reinspections, Edison directed'PTL to perform a_special unit concept inspection to determine whether PTL's inspectors would independently arrive at the same results as the contractors' QC inspectors who were performing the reinspections. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 19,_20, ff. Tr. 8408.) PTL performed a sample reinspection of the items inspected during the. reinspection program.

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PTL randomly selected QC inspectors and activities for reinspec-tion, _ PTL inspectors were able to. reproduce the reinspection results for Hatfield and Hunter at a very high ratt (See Shewski, prepared test at 21, ff. Tr. 8423) providing an addi-

'tianal level of confidence that the reinspections by Hatfield and Hunter were reliable and conservative (Shewski, prepared test at 5, ff. Tr. 8423)

69. The special unit concept inspection also verified that the reinspection personnel for Hatfield and Hunter were not involved in the reinspection of work that they had originally inspected. In addition, the reproducibility of the results by PTL, whose inspection personnel had no connection with Hatfield and Hunter employees, demonstrated that the reinspectors did not bias their results in favor of the inspectors whose work they were reinspecting. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 22, ff. Tr. 8423; Tuetken, prepared testimony at 21l ff. Tr. 8408. )

70. Despite this evidence of conservatism, Dr. Kochhar testified for Intervenors that knowledge by the reinspectors of the identities of the original inspectors could have biased the reinspection results nonconservatively, that is, in favor of conforming reinspections. Dr. Kccchar testified that the rein-spection effort should have been undertaken by individuals with no previous involvement at the site to minimize any bias However, (Kocchar, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr.10538. )

on cross-examination Dr. Kocnhar admitted that he could not state whether such knowledge did in fact lead to nonconserva-tive bias in this particular inspection setting. Nor would he even attempt to quantify the amount of bias which may have been Moreover, con-introduced. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,604-05, 10,612.)

sistent with the Staff testimony, Dr. Kochhar admitted that such bias, even if it was introduced, might just as well have led to stricter reinspection rather than leniency. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,605.) We. conclude that there simply is no evidence that reinspectors' knowledge of the identities of some original inspectors nonconservatively biased the results of the BRP.

71. It is also significant that in many instances the reinspectors simply did not know the inspectors whose work they were reinspecting. For Hatfield, almost the entire population of inspectors had turned over by the time of the BRP. Of the five Hatfield original inspectors who remained, only one was included in the program sample. (Hansel, Tr. 8926-27.) For

Hunter, only th2 identification number of the original inspec-tor was provided to the reinspector. (Hansel, Tr. 8927.)

Obviously, a person is much less likely to remember a number than to recognize initials. Finally, for PTL, offsite FTL inspectors wer s brought in to perform the reinspections.

(Hansel, Tr. 8927.)

72. In most instances the reinspectors knew the results of (Hansel, Tr. 8933-5; Kochhar, the original inspections.

prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr.10,538) The reason for this is easy to understand. The reinspection program was set up so that the only inspections which were reinspected were those where the items inspected had been found originally to conform to requiremente.*/

73. Dr. Kochhar proposed that this knowledge of the orig-inal results introduces another source of possible bias. In

.his opinion, the fact that in most instances the reinspectors knew the results of the original inspections could have result-ed in a " mimic" effect where reinspectors conform their results to the original inspection results. (Kochhar, prepared testi-mony at 12, ff. Tr. 10,538.) Dr. Kochhar testified that this

" phenomenon is based on the " general human tendency to avoid deviation from a prior determination." (Kochhar, prepared

• /

The single . exception is with respect to "as-builts", where -

the reinspector was simply asked toInmeasure the dimensions these capes, the rain-of certain components as-built,.

spectors' measurements were compared with the measurements of the original inspectors. (Kochhar, Tr. l'O,619.)

-38.- - -...,_.. - .

l i

testimony at 12, . f f. Tr. 10, 538. ) Dr. Kochhar further testi-fied, however, that he had never personally observed this phen-omer~n in any of his laboratory experiments; rather his testi-mony regarding this. theory is based on his review of the liter-ature. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,620.)

74. As with Dr. Kochhar's earlier theories, we are not persuaded that a mimic effect played a significant factor in the results of the BRP. First, by program definition, the only

-inspections which were subject to reinspection were those where the items inspected had-been found originally to conform to (Kochhar, Tr. 10,618.) Thus, the original

-requirements.

the original inspection results can be viewed as a constant,

-inspector always having found the items to meet requirements.

We! find, as a matter .of common sense, that the mimic effect is less likely_to operate in conjunction with such a constant.

75. Moreover, and of even more importance, Dr. Kochhar's

. theory is inconsistent with the actual evidence which the re-suits,of the-BRP produced. Dr. Kochhar conceded that if the

-inspectors were very thorough and rigid -in their reinspection, the mimic effect would be lessened. (Koechar, Tr. 10,621-22.)

Such' thoroughness and rigidity in fact took place. The Staff C

testified that weld ruinspectors were often overly conserva-

1 tive, even to t$.e point of being " gun shy", in their assessment

>5 (Ward, Tr. 9776, 9790; See also of earlier inspection results.

-u Kocchar,-Tr. 10,625.) ,

e

1 1 I

l 1

76. Finally, John Hansel testified that the reinspectors knew 1their work would receive a great deal of attention. They

' knew particularly that they themselves might be reinspected, by the NRC Staff, by a CECO auditor or by someone like Mr. Hansel.

.In Mr. Hansel's judgment, the reinspectors were strongly moti-vated t's perform their jobs properly, even stringently, not to mimic the results of the earlier inspections. (Hansel, Tr.

8939-40.)'

c. Termination Of Allen Koca

77. In our June 8 order setting.forth the scope of the reopened proceedings, we denied Intervenor,'s request to make the circumstances surrounding the termination of Allen Koca, former Hatfield QA supervisor, a mandatory issue to be addres-sed. However, Intervenors had been granted the right to dis-

. cover information concerning Mr. Koca's termination (Tr. 8156-

61. ) and we stated that the parties themselves should determine its relevance,_if any, to the BRP. (Memorandum and Order Fol-In

lowing Prehearing Conference, dated June 8,1984, at 6. )

the interest of a complete record, Edison and the Staff pre-sented undisputed testimony concerning Mr. Koca.

78. First, Mr. :Koca's release from Hatfield in October

'1983 was not related in any way to his work on the BRP.

(Tuetken, prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 8408; See also Bayes, Tr. 9965.) Second, Mr. Koca's role in the BRP was

-limited to supervising the Hatfield QA clerical staff review of

c certification records to identify the roster of inspectors Thereafter, his role consisted based on certification dates.

solely of supervising the clerical staff members who were res-pensible for searching the inspection record files to identify each individual inspection performed by the selected inspectors during their first 90 days. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 7, ff. Tr. 8408.)

79. . Finally, Mr. Koca's work on the BRF was satisfactory, as demonstrated by audits performed by the CECO Site QA Depart-ment in June 1983 (Audit 6-83-66) and August 1983-(Audit 6-83-124). These audits confirmed that Hatfield had properly prepared the chronological listing of inspectors from which the reinspection sample was selected, and had properly established the population of inspections for each selected inspector.

(Tuetken, prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 8408. )

VI. OVERSIGHT OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

a. CECO QA Audits And Surveillances l

! 80. CECO's quality assurance department conducted three L Two of the audits f' audits and four surveillances of the BRP.

dealt with the activities of all site contractors, including Hatfield and Hunter. The third audit involved only Hatfield.

Additional.surveillances were performed to close out all audit findings.and observations. These audits and survellances were Mr.

described in detail in the testimony of Walter Showski.

~ * - - - ~ _ . _ _ , ,

- ~ - . - _ . - - _ _ _ _ .

f' Shewski testified that a$1 findings, observations or other con-cerns raised as a result of these audits and surveillances have

.been closed by Applicant on the basis of acceptable corrective actions. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 5-20, ff. Tr. 8423. )

We discuss the specifics of the_ audits in the following para-

. graphs. s

81. Audit 6-83-66 was conducted between June 21, 1983 and July 6, 1983 and examined the following areas for each of the seven contractors involved in the BRP:

-- Reinspection sample size of inspectors

.and inspection items.

-- ' Items determined to be inaccessible.

-- -Third party review of potentially un-acceptable subjective type inspections.

-- Dispositions of nonconforming condi-tions discovered during the BRP.

-- Adequate documentation of the reinspec-

_ tion program as implemented by the con-l . tractors.

l

-- Qualifications of inspection personnel performing reinspection.

Audit 6-83-66 resulted in-a single finding. Part A of that finding ' applied to Hunter, Part B to Hatfield and Part C to ff. Tr.

PTL. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 8, Attachment E, l

8423.)

! -82. Part A of the audit finding identified two problems with potential consequences on the analysis of the BRP re-sults. The first problem involved the use of field problem I -

t a

I I

l 1

sheets by Hunter rather than discrepancy reports. A subsequent quality assurance surveillance (number 5189) verified that dis-crepancy reports had in fact been initiated for the particular discrepancies as required by Hunter's procedures. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 9, Attachment F, ff. Tr. 8423.) The second problem involved the reinspection of bolted connections by Hunter. This item was dispositioned by a letter from Sargent & Lundy which stated that the particular bolt values would relax over . time and thus could not be reproduced for purposes of the reinspection program. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 9, ff. Tr. 8423.)

83. Part B of the audit finding determined that Hatfield was using field problem sheets to resolve discrepancies identi-

..e fied during reinspection for conduit and termination attri-butes. A subsequent quality assurance surveillance (5202 R1) found that Hatfield NCR number 674 was written to disposition a deficient' item discovered during the reinspection process which had previously been the subject of a field problem sheet.

(Shewski, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 8423) .

84. Part C determined that PTL had not yet transmitted inspection reports generated during the BRP to the appropriate contractors. These inspection reports described discrepant conditions in work performed by other contractors, but in-spected by PTL. PTL was working on the premise that reports with nonconforming conditions would be reported,to the contrac-l tors upon completion of the BRP. Upon being advised during the audit to immediately transmit nonconforming reports to the appropriate contractors after concurrence by the independent third party inspector, PTL began and continued transmitting such reports as they were prepared. No further corrective action was required. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 10, ff.

Tr. 8423.)

85. The second audit, 6-83-93, was conducted between November 14 and November 17, 1983 and examined the following areas for each of the seven contractors involved in the BRP:

-- Accuracy of BRP results as reported to the NRC in the Interim Report.

-- The design basis for the engineering evaluation of visual weld inspection discrepancies as described in the Interim Report.

-- Qualifications of the third party inspectors.

-- Documentation of third party inspec-tions.

-- Basis for project construction depart-ment " Interpretations" regarding the BRP.

-- Correction of deficiencies identified as a result of the BRP.

(Shewski, prepared testimony at 14, Attachment N, ff. Tr. 8423. )

86. Audit 6-83-93 identified no findings or observations applicable to Hatfiel6 or Hunter. It did, however, result in one finding applicable to PTL. Following implementation of a

-project construction department interpretation of the BRP, PTL

' .m_

1 1

- had changed the deficient status of some welds which previously had received third party concurrences on rejectability without allowing the independent third party inspector to concur or disagree with the changes. Corrective action for this Finding )

involved the resubmittal to the third party inspector of the particular reports which changed the deficient status of the rejected welds for reasons other than those addressed by the Interpretation. In addition, the contractors were advised that such second inspections should not be performed without allow-ing the third party to concur or disagree. This corrective action was documented in Ceco surveillance 5696. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 15, Attachment 0, ff. Tr. 8423. )

87. The third Ceco quality assurance audit, 6-83-124, was directed solely at Hatfield and was conducted between August 24 and September 1, 1983. Its purpose was to verify proper imple-mentation of the BRP by Hatfield. The audit exanined welding and Hatfield reinspection methodology for welding. Specifi-cally, field and record reviews were performed to determine 1

that Hatfield had adequate traceability of weld travelers to installations in the field. The reviews were accomplished by retrieving weld travelers from Hatfield for a particular compo-nent and then going into the field to determine which weld Since travelers corresponded to which weld on the component.

welders identify welds on a component with a unique identifica-tion number assigned to them traceability of weld traveler to

weld could be made. In addition, this audit reviewed the method hatfield used to identify hangers which had been re-worked or renumbered so that a reinspection could be performed /

if required. This was done by reviewing the inspection history of a component to determine the completeness of inspection as well as identification of the most current inspection. Final-ly, the audit was performed to verify that Hatfield was proper-ly inspecting combination cable pan hanger welds (hangers This was performed through

. shared with the HVAC contractor).

identification of combination hangers, and review of installa-tion and inspection documentation to support the installation.

ff. Tr.

(Shewski, prepared testimony at 16-18, Attachment P, 8423.)

Audit 6-83-124 resulted in two findings. The first 88.

finding was that in some cases the weld traveler cards did not The adequately identify the weld in the field for inspection.

second finding was that not all combination hanger inspections had been documented to~ indicate conclusively that the inspec-tion was completed. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 18, ff.

Tr. 8423.)

89. Hatfield's corrective action for the first finding was to correlate the weld traveler inspection data to design drawing cable pan hanger data using computer data base manage-ment techniques to demonstrate traceability of inspection.

This use of the computerized data base identified the welders

and inspectors who worked on and inspected the component as well as components not inspected. For those components for which no correlation existed between comoonent and inspection data, it was assumed that no weld inspection had ever occur-red. An' inspection was initiated to complete the documentation and any necessary repairs. This corrective action was docu-mented in CECO QA surveillance 5275. (Shewski, prepared testi-mony at 19, Attachment Q, ff. Tr. S423. )

90. Hatfield's corrective action for the second finding involved the identification of all combination hangers for which inspection accountability was indeterminate. The hangers identified were considered as never'having been inspected. An inspection was performed and, where required, rework was per-formed. This corrective action was documented in CECO surveil-lance 5274. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 19, Attachment R, ff. Tr. 8423.)

91. The audit finding in Audit 6-83-66 regarding the use

! of field problem sheets by Hatfield and Hunter was one of the l

t matters discussed in our initial decision as indicating con-i tinuing documentation problems on the part of Hatfield and Hunter. (I.D. 1D-444.) In the remanded hearing we had the opportunity to place that audit finding in the context both of l

the overall evolution of documentation requirements for Hatfield and Hunter (see infra l's 301 - 306) and oversight of the BRP by the Ceco Quality Assurance Department.: While we do 4

not condone the use of the field problem sheets we now do not believe that they undermined the reliability of the results of the BRP. Moreover, Ceco's overall quality assurance effort, ,

including the special audit of Hatfield (1's 87 - 90) and the

~

special unit concept inspection of the BRP by PTL adds to our confidence that the program was conducted in accordance with the program description, that there were no alterations of the results and that the reported results are accurate.

b. NRC Staff Overview

92. Staff oversight of the implementation of the BRP has been extensive. Mr. Ward testified that he and another Staff s

inspector visually examined approximately 500 welds which had been previously examined by Hatfield, Hunter or PTL inspectors and which had been subject to the BPP (Ward, Staff prepared testimony, at 10, Enclosure 1 at 37, ff Tr. 9510). The Staff inspectors examined the welds to determine that they had in fact been reinspected and that the reinspector had not over-looked a discrepancy. Mr. Ward testified that he also examined the documentation of welds generated by the BRP as well as the he documentation generated by the original weld inspection.

also held discussions with supervisors and lead weld inspec-tors. (Ward, Staff prepared testimony at 10, 11, enclosures 1, 2, ff. Tr. 9510.)

93. Mr. Ward testified that during his oversight inspec-tions he found no case of a reinspector missing a deficiency.

.o

I l

l l

l

.~.

To the contrary, Mr. Ward concluded that in many cases the reinspection results were overly conservative because reinspec-tors were classifying welds and attributes as unacceptable even though, in Mr. Ward's judgment, they were in fact acceptable under the applicable welding code. Nor did Mr. Ward find any instance of a reinspection not being conducted correctly.

Finally, Mr. Ward found no deficiencies in the documentation (Ward, generated by the BRP or by the original inspections.

Staff prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 9510. )

94. For other then welding attributes, Staff oversight of Hatfield and Hunter included the review of inspection reports, nonconformance reports, deficiency reports, and the observation of work activities, including inprocess inspections. (Ward, Love, Staff prepared testimony at 11, enclosure 3, ff. Tr.

9510.)

95. The Staff also verified Applicant's oversight of the BRP by reviewing audit and surveillance reports and by inter-views with CECO personnel. (Love, Staff prepared testimony at 11, 12, ff. Tr. 9510.)

VII. METHOD OF EVALUATING RESULTS OF BRP

96. The original inspection record and the reinspection record were compared and evaluated to determine whether any discrepancy between the two records existed. (Del George, pre-pared testimony at 20, 21, ff. Tr. 8406.)

.s

97. Acceptable items were defined as those for which the i

{

reinspector agreed with the condition recorded on the original  !

inspection record.

Without that agreement, the item was graded Cs unacceptable. (Del George, prepared testimeny at 21, ff.

Tr. 8406.)

98. All observed discrepancies were recorded and tabulated tnd subsequently compared to the BRP acceptance criteria.

These discrepancies were counted against the original inspector whether or not the observed discrepancy was later demonstrated to be a valid discrepancy when compared to current design or installation parameters and tolerances. (Del Gecrge, prepared tostimony at 22, ff. Tr. 8406.)

VIII. RESULTS OF THE REINSPECTION PROGRAM AS THEY RELATE TO INSPECTOR QUALIFICATION

99. The BRP results for Hatfield, Hunter and PTL inspec-tors demonstrated with velry few exceptions, that the sampled inspectors were qualified. All Hatfield, Hunter and PTL inspectors passed the 95% acceptance criteria for objective cttributes during their first three months of inspections.

(Del George, prepared testim >ny at 27, 26, ff. Tr. 8406; see also Hansel, prepared testimony at 22, ff. Tr. 8901. )

100. For the subjective attribute (visual weld inspec- I tion), Hatfield and Hunter each had one inspector whose first three months of work failed to meet the 90% acceptance crite-rim. PTL had two such inspectors. Because these, individuals

I i

mony at 23, ff. Tr. 8901; Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4,- ff. Tr 9510; connaughton, Tr. 9876. ) As Mr. Del George i

emphasized, the fundamental objective of the BRP was to verify by reinspection the adequacy of the qualification and certifi-

- cation practices for contractor QC inspectors. He concluded, as we do, that the BRP demonstrated the effectiveness of those practices for a representative sample of inspectors from which it can be inferred that the same practices were effective as applied to the remaining inspectors and, therefore, as to all inspection work performed by the entire inspector population.

(Del George, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 8406.)

103. The f act that certain inspections were inaccessible as or not recreatable does not affect these conclusions, since, i Mr. Del George pointed out, the qualification and certification  ;

1 programs for inaccessible and non-recreatable attributes were the same as those verified by the BRP. (Del George, prepared I

testimony at 22, ff. Tr. 3406. ) Indeed, Messrs. Buchanan and l Somsag testified that Hatfield and Hunter QC inspectors were i

i selected and trained in the same manner regardless of the types l

[

i of inspections they were to perform. (Buchanan, prepared rebuttal testimony at 3, 4, ff. Tr.11,174; Somsag, prepared testimony at 2-5, ff. Tr. 11,172.) The requirements imposed ,

' for prior experience, job training, and performance demonstra- <

tion have the same general scope and technical content .w ,sa for each

' of these attributes. In addition, the attributgs not rein-l i

l 1

-e- - , . ---~ v.~, a%r.- -,_,,.,-m-,,~ .+,.v--...-,.m.m,,-%.-,-n.,.w e e,w ,-m-e,.,,,_m..-~ y,, ,_

~

spected are similar in many respects to those captured for reinspection. (Del George, prepared testimony at 33-35, ff.

Tr. 8406; Muffet, Tr. 9871; see generally, Muffet, Staff pre-pared testimony at 21-23, ff. Tr. 9510.)

104. We have previously found that the sample selection process for inspectors whose work was to be reinspected was appropriate (1 37, supra); that the choice of the first 90 days of an inspectors tenure on the site was a proper time period for checking the validity of an inspector's training and ini-tial qualification (1 49, supra); the acceptance criteria for establishing whether an inspector was qualified, based on the results of the reinspection are appropriate and conservative (5's 53, 57, supra) the results of the BRP are accurate and reliable (1 91, supra), and there was extensive oversight of the entire BRP by CECO's QA department and the NRC Regional Staff (5's 80 - 90, supra). Based on the results of the BRP, the Board finds that Applicant has provided reasonable assur-ance that the Hatfield, Hunter and PTL inspectors who performed inspections at Byron, beginning with the construction of safety-related work in 1976 through September 1982, were qual-ified, even though their certifications were not in strict accordance with ANSI N45.2.6 (1978).

IX. SARGENT & LUNDY DISCREPANCY EVALUATIONS 105. On July 26 and 27, 1984, Applicant presented testi-mony on the engineering evaluation of discrepancies performed by Sargent & Lundy. Applicant presented a panel comprised of John M. McLaughlin, Partner and Manager of the Structural Department at Sargent & Lundy; Ernest B. Branch, Associate and Director of Mechanical Design at Sargent & Lundy; Richard X.

French, Partner and Manager of the Electrical Department at Sargent & Lundy; and Anand K. Singh, Associate and Assistant Head of the Structural Analytical Division at Sargent & Lundy.

On July 30 and 31, 1984, the NRC Staff presented the testimony of William Little, Branch Chief in the Division of Reactor Safety, NRC Region III; Kavin D. Ward, Ray Love and James Muffett, Reactor Inspectors in the Division of Reactor Safety, NRC Region III; and Kevin Connaughton, Resident Inspector at Byron. On August 22, 1984, Intervanors presented the testimony of Charles C. Stokes, an engineering consultant with P/S Asso-ciates. In response to questions raised by Mr. Stokes relating to Sargent & Lundy's engineering evaluation of discrepancies, Applicant presented the rebuttal testimony of Bryan A. Erler, Associate and Director of the Structural Division at Sargent &

Lundy; Robert W. Hooks, Assistant Division Head of the Struc-tural Engineering Division at Sargent & Lundy; Dennis DeMoss, Mechanical Project Engineer in the Project Management division y

at Sargent & Lundy; and Ernest B. Branch, who was part of the original panel.

106. Sargent & Lundy performed an engineering evaluation of discrepancies in work performed by Hatfield involving hard-ware installation and work performed by Hunter involving hard-ware installation and related documention, which were catego-rized as objective attributes. A total of 63,085 reinspections of Hatfield objective attributes was performed as part of the Reinspection Program out of which 2,153 discrepancies were identified. Another 3,896 reinspections of Hatfield objective attributes were performed under a supplemental reinspection program and 158 discrepancies were identified. A total of 71,510 reinspections of Hunter objective attributes was per-formed under the Reinspection Program out of which 689 discrep-ancies were identified. (French, prepared testimony at 4,6, 12, ff. Tr. 9044; Branch, prepared testimony at 5-7, ff. Tr.

9051.) As we will explain below, evaluations 1,244 of the Hatfield discrepancies and 614 of the Hunter discrepancies were determined upon evaluation either not to exceed design param-eters or tolerances or to involve inconsequential documentation items and were, therefore, not valid discrepancies. (1's 112 and 122, infra.)

107. Sargent & Lundy also performed an engineering evalua-tion of visual weld discrepancies on welds produced by Hatfield covered by the American Welding Society ("AWS") standard and welds produced by Hunter covered by AWS and the American

' Society of Mechanical Engineers ("ASME") Code. The ASME Code governs welding for piping and pressure vessels and the AWS Code governs all other welding. A total of 27,538 Hatfield AWS welds were subjected to reinspection during the original pro-gram, out of which 1,986 discrepancies were identified. A total of'3,725 Hunter welds were reinspected (27% AWS welds,

-73% ASME welds), out of which 109 discrepancies were identi-fied, 60 AWS and 49 ASME. (McLaughlin, Prepared Testimony at 3-5, 7, 14, ff. Tr. 9047; Branch, prepared testimony at 6, 10-11, ff. Tr. 9051.)

Objective Attributes -- Hatfield Discrepancies

~

a.

108. Hatfield installed all the components, materials and equipment associated with the electrical systems at Byron, including the installation of electrical equipment, cable tray and conduit and the pulling and terminating of cable. Hatfield also installed concrete expansion anchors that were initially inspected and reinspected by PTL. This work was divided into the following objective attributes for reinspection: conduit installation, cable termination, cable-tr ay and cable-tray hanger installation, equipment modification, conduit as-built reconciliation, A-325 bolting, and concrete expansion anchors.

(Visual weld inspection, discussed infra, was separately char-acterized as a subjective Hatfield attribute.) (French, pre-pared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9044; Summary of Objective Dis-crepancy Evaluation--Hatfield, ff. Tr. 9239. )

109. The 63,085 reinspections of Hatfield objective attri-butes performed as part of the reinspection program included 2,840 reinspections of concrete expansion anchors inspected by PTL.*/ Of the 2,153 discrepancies identified, 3B were associ-ated with concrete expansion anchors. Most of the discrepan-cies were associated with conduit as-built reconciliation.

These discrepancies consisted primarily of differences between the installed locations of conduit, conduit supports and junc-tion boxes and the locations shown on the installation draw-ings. (French, prepared testimony at 6-8, ff. Tr. 9044.)

110. For the 2,153 observed discrepancies, 1,713 evalua-tions were performed. The number of evaluations was less than the total number of discrepancies because some evaluations

< covered more than one discrepancy. The discrepancies were first compared with current design parameters and tolerances.

This involved a comparison of installed component locations and dimensions with the corresponding locations, dimensions, and tolerances shown on the design drawings. The discrepancies found to be outside of design tolerances were evaluated either by engineering judgment or by engineering calculations.

(French, prepared testimony at 6. ff. Tr. 9044) 111. Engineering judgment evaluations were performed in two ways, by either a revicw of the component design function

• / As indicated supra, PTL only provided inspection services; it did not perform any construction Jork at.the Byron site.

I I

l to determine whether the function of the component was affected by the discrepancy, or a comparison of the discrepancy to the current design to determine whether the discrepancy had design significance. Engineering calculations were used to resolve I

the remaining discrepancies. (French, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9044.)

112. Of the 1,713 evaluations, 1,244 found the discrepan-cies to be within current design parameters and tolerances.

The reason the reinspectors identified these as discrepancies was that the acceptance tolerances established for the Rein-spection Program were more stringent than the tolerances indi-cated on the installation drawings. (French, prepared testi-mony at 7, ff. Tr. 9044.) Obviously, these so-called discrep-ancies were not real discrepancies; rather they were the product of a conservatively-structured reinspection program.

113. Eighty evaluations of discrepancies were deemed acceptable by engineering judgment. Approximately two-thirds of.these evaluations involved a review of the component design function to determine whether the function was impaired by the existence of the discrepancy. None of these discrepancies <

impaired component design function. The balance of these eval-untions involved a comparison of the discrepancy to current design requirements to determine significance. None of the discrepancies was significant. (French, prepared testimony at 7, ff. Tr. 9044) 8

_ _ _ , . . ~ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .___ _ __.___._ _

r 114. The remaining 389 evaluations were conducted by re-viewing the conduit support, junction box loading, and mounting detail design calculations. The variations in support loca-tions and associated variations in loads were recalculated and found to be acceptable. (French, prepared testimony at 7-8, ff. 9044) 115. The detailed engineering evaluation of the discrepan-cies in Hatfield objective attributes demonstrated that none of the evaluated discrepancies had design significance and, there-fore, no safety significance. (French, prepared testimony at 8 ff. 9044.)

116. A supplemental program was established for the rein-spection of certain Hatfield attributes, namely, equipment set-ting, equipment modification, A-325 bolt installation and con-duit-support bolting. This program was established, cmong other reasons, to provide further assurance that work in these areas,was properly done. (French, prepared testimony at 9, ff.

Tr. 9044.)

117. With respect to equipment setting, 778 inspections associated with 50 pieces of electrical equipment identified 34 discrepancies. The majority of the discrepancies consisted of equipment anchoring details with weld length and weld spacing deviations. An evaluation of the discrepancies determined that none had design significance. (French, prepared testimony at 9, ff. 9044.) With respect to equipment modification, a 100%

wiring inspection performed on 1,850 elements associated with 50 pieces of safety-related equipment identified 44 discrepan-cies. The discrepancies were minor wiring variations that did not affect the functioning of the equipment. An evaluation of the discrepancies determined that none had design signifi-cance. (French, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 9044.) With respect to A-325 bolting, which was used in the assembly of cable-tray riser supports, inspection of 295 bolts on 50 sup-ports identified 46 discrepancies. The discrepancies repre-sented bolts with torque less than the acceptance criteria.

The design of the associated connections was reviewed and it was determined that the connections were structurally sound despite the lack of complete bolt torque. Therefore, the dis-crepancies were determined to have no design significance. In any event, all A-325 bolted connections were retorqued because of the unsatisfactory discrepancy rate. (French, prepared tes-timony at 10-11, ff. Tr. 9044. Tr. 9232-34. )

118. With respect to the supplemental reinspection of con-duit-support bolting, inspection of 1,008 conduit-support bolts on 305 supports identified 34 discrepancies. The discrepancies were evaluated and determined to have no design significance.

(French, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 9044.) However, two missing conduit clamps were detected during the inspection and, because a missing clamp at a critical location could have design significance, a walk-down was performed of all 8,532 a

critical clamp locations. Ten locations were found with mis-sing bolts or clamps. Based on these results, a walkdown of the remaining accessible conduit clamps and bolts was conduct- -

ed. An evaluation of the 10 cases showed that the discrepant conditions had no design significance. The last of these eval-uations to be completed involved a missing clamp on a six or seven foot run of conduit in a hard to reach location. Due to the presence of another conduit and a large piece of steel in the area, even without the clamp, the conduit could only move a fraction of an inch. Sargent & Lundy's evaluation demonstrated that the conduit could not be pulled out during a seismic event and that there was no design significance. (French, prepared testimony at 11-12, ff. Tr. 9044. Tr. 9282-85.)*/

119. Including the supplemental reinspections discussed in paragraphs 116-118, 66,981 reinspections of Hatfield objective discrepancies were performed. Although 2,311 discrepancies f

• / The design significance of another discrepancy was debated during the cross-examination of the Region III Staff Panel. This discrepancy involved the miswiring of a damper l that without correction would not have closed automatically under certain accident conditions. However, it was conclu-sively established that the discrepancy lacked significance since operation of the damper on a manual basis, an accept-able alternative to automatic operation, was not impaired.

Moreover, although the discrepancy had been missed by the original inspector, by the time of the BRP, it had already l

t been discovered and repaired during system turnover test-ing. This corrective action presents a good example of the successful operation of the in-depth mechanisms that are in c

i place at Byron to assure work quality and safety. (Tr.

l 9732-47.)

l .

L -

I I

~

were identified, none of the evaluated discrepancies had design t

significance. (French, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr.

9044.) Accordingly, the quality of the foregoing reinspected Hatfield work is adequate. (French, prepared testimony at 12 ff. Tr. 9044. Tr. 9273-74.)

b. Objective Attributes -- Hunter Discrepancies 120. Hunter was responsible for the installation of nearly all the mechanical systems at Byron. This work included in-sta11ation of mechanical equipment and interconnective process piping and supports, and the supply of miscellaneous piping and welding materials. As noted supra, the Hunter work fell into three attributes: hardware installation, related documenta-tion, characterized as objective attributes, and welding, char-acterized as a subjective attribute. Each objective attribute consisted of a number of elements. For example, the documenta-tion attribute was subdivided into such inspection points as work process sheets, weld material regulation sheets, field inspection reports and discrepancy reports. (Branch, prepared testimony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 9051; Summary of Objective Discrep-ancy Evaluation--Hunter, if. Tr. 9265.)

121. A total of 69,624 reinspections of Hunter object 2ve attributes was performed as part of the Reinspection Program.

Another 1,886 Hunter installations of concrete expansion anchors were inspected by PTL. Thus, there were 71,510 total reinspections of Hunter objective attributes. of,this amount, l

l l

l a total of 689 discrepancies were reported. The 689 discrepan-cies involved 441 documentation and 248 hardware discrepan-cies. Five of these discrepancies were associated with con-crete expansion anchors inspected by PTL. (Branch, prepared testimony at 6-7, ff. Tr. 9051. )

122. Sargent & Lundy evaluated all 689 discrepancies. The evaluations were performed by the same procedure as described for the discrepancies associated with the Hatfield objective attributes. (Branch, prepared testimony at 7-9, ff. Tr.

9051.) A total of 614 discrepancies in Hunter objective attri-butes was evaluated by comparison to the design parameters and tolerances. This included all 441 documentation discrepancies and 173 hardware discrepancies. Discrepancies evaluated typic-ally included cosmetic flaws, minor dimensional errors, and documentation errors. The dimensional errors consisted primar-11y of minor as-built piping and pipe support dimensional errors or incomplete as-built information. Documentation errors consisted primarily of minor data-entry errors and omis-sions on work reports and process sheets. These discrepancies were evaluated by reviewing corroborating information on the affected documents and other independent documents. The evalu-ation showed that all hardware discrepancies were within the current design parameters and tolerances. All documentation discrepancies were deemed acceptable based upon reviewing other corroborating documentation. (Branch, prepared testimony at 8, l

I l

ff. Tr. 9051.) Again, this class of discrepancies, like simi-lar ones for Hatfield, contains discrepancies which are either

-extremely inconsequential or in conformance with current design requirements, and as such they cannot be considered valid.

123. A total of 54 hardware discrepancies was evaluated by engineering judgment. Discrepancies evaluated included dimen-sional errors and omissions for piping, pipe supports and pipe whip restraints; hardware substitutions; minor configuration None changes; and minor mechanical joint bolting deviations.

of these discrepancies impaired component design functions or had design significance. (Branch, prepared testimony at 8, ff.

Tr. 9051.)

124. A total of 21 hardware discrepancies was evaluated using detailed engineering calculations. Discrepancies evalu-ated included three as-built pipe support dimensions, four con-crete expansion anchors, three pipe whip restraints, and 11 small-bore pipe bends with excessive ovality. These elements were originally established by engineering calculation and a new calculation was necessary in order to account for the iden-l tified discrepancy. For example, with respect to pipe ovality,

! which is a measure of the pipe roundness at the point of bend-ing, the 11 pipe bends exhibited average ovality values of 10.5%, which is in excess of the 8% limit of ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code -- Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Com-Accord-ponents -- Division I (1974 Ed. Summer,1975 Addenda) .

l - . _ _ . _ _ , - . -

r ingly, calculations were performed verifying the acceptability of the pipe-wall thickness and flow-area reductions allowed by the ASME Code. Stress intensification effects were evaluated as negligible because all of the pipe bends are five pipe dia-meters in radius. (Branch, prepared testimony at 9, ff. Tr.

9051) 125. The detailed engineering evaluation of the 689 dis-crepancies in Hunter objective attributes demonstrated that none of the discrepancies had any design significance and, hence, no safety significance. (Branch, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 9051.) Accordingly, the quality of the foregoing reinspected Hunter work is adequate. (Branch, prepared test-imony at 14, ff. Tr. 9051; Tr. 9277-7P. )

126. The Board finds that, based upon the Sargent & Lundy evaluations of discrepancies in the Hatfield and Hunter object-ive attributes, none of the discrepancies had design signifi-cance and, accordingly, no safety significance.

c. Subjective Attribute AWS Welding --

Hatfield Discrepancies 127. The Hatfield AWS welding covered by the Reinspection Program included the welding of conduit supports, junction-box supports, cable-tray supports, cable-tray holddown welds, and auxiliary steel for electrical supports. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9047.)

128. Of the 27,538 AWS Hatfield welds that were subjected to reinspection during the original program, 1,9q6 welds were

identified with various discrepant conditions. A total of 169 welds was taken from this group for analysis by Sargent &

Lundy. An additional 187 discrepant welds was included as a part of the sample to be analyzed by Sargent & Lundy when, in response to NRC questions, additional inspections were made of welds not initially covered by the Reinspection Program. Thus, a total sample of 356 Hatfield discrepant welds was analyzed by Sargent & Lundy. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 7, ff. Tr.

9047.)

129. Of the 356 Hatfield weld discrepancies analyzed by Sargent & Lundy, 50 were selected at random, 50 were selected by a third-party inspector on the basis of being the worst welds from a weld discrepancy viewpoint, and the remaining 256 discrepancies involved welds at the most highly-stressed con-nections, where the design margin was least. (McLaughlin, pre-pared testimony at 7-8, 17, ff. Tr. 9047.) Thus, the sample of 356 Hatfield weld discrepancies analyzed by Sargent & Lundy was biased to examine the most highly stressed welds in the Rein-spection Program, where the greatest potential existed for exceeding design margins. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 8, 16-17, ff. Tr. 9047.)

130. A review of weld maps for the 356 discrepant Hatfield welds indicated that five of the discrepant welds involved are strikes, spatter and convexity. Arc strikes and spatter are cosmetic discrepancies which would create a strength problem e4 only Af there were a large number in a given weld. The weld maps indicated that arc strikes and spatter were minimal. Con-vexity is of no consequence when, as in this case, the welds on the structures under consideration are not subject to fat $ te loading. Thus, these five weld discrepancies do not reduce the load-carrying capacity of the weld and, therefore, have no structural impact. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 10, ff.

.Tr. 9047.)

131. A detailed engineering evaluation based on the weld maps was conducted with respect to the remaining 351 discrepant welds to determine (i) the effect of the discrepancy on the strength of the weld and (ii) because the discrepant welds were among the several welds joining steel members and components, the effect of strength reductions on these joints or connee-tions. It was determined that 162 welds had strength reduc-tions of less than 10% and 186 discrepant welds had strength reductions equal to or greater than 10%. Three welds had cracks. Irrespective of the actual strength reduction, the discrepant portion of the weld was entirely disregarded for evaluation purposes. For example, if the weld map indicated that 1-1/2" of porosity existed in a 10" weld, Sargent & Lundy recalculated the capacity of the connection on the basis of only 8-1/2" of weld. This is a conservative calculation in that there is probably no reduction at all in the capacity of the connection for this 1-1/2" of porosity. In the case of

- - _ _ __ _ _ . _ _._ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . _ . . _ . _ _ . .. ~ _ _.

Y . .

welds with cracks, no credit was given in the evaluation for the presence of the weld. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 10-11, ff. Tr. 9047.)

132. , After the weld strength reductions were determined, an evaluation of the connections' ability to withstand the expected loads or forces was performed. The forces on the con-nections are made up of two major loadings. The first is the dead weight or static load of the cables and the tray. The second is the seismic load on the connection. With respect to the static load, S rgent & Lundy reviewed the cable loadings to confirm that the loads on the cables were less than that assum-ed in the o iginal design. Because maximum or bounding loads were used in the original design of the cable tray and conduit system, the actual loads are expected to be less than design loads. 'In each case, where Sargent & Lundy calculated the

~

actual load, it found that load to be less than the original design load. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 11-12. ff. Tr.

9047.) The neighboring welds to one of the three cracks, which involved a cable-tray hold-down weld, bore a slight additional load (still within the Code allowable) as a result of the These welds were inspected by Sargent & Lundy. The crack.

inspection-revealed that none of the neighboring welds was discrepant. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony at 5-6, ff.

Tr. 11,158.)

.133.",Sargent & Landy next reexamined the seismic loading

t and performed a seismic analysis representative.of the Byron o ,s

i site which reduced the load from that determined initially.

The seismic loading used in the original design of the cable tray and conduit system was based on a response spectra design method, a very conservative design method used in the nuclear industry. The reevaluation of the seismic loading on connec-tions was based on a time-history seismic analysis, which as indicated is a more refined and accurate determination of the seismic loading. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 11-12, ff.

Tr. 9047.)

134. Due to the recurring nature of two types of discrep-ancies, additional investigation was performed by Sargent &

Lundy to determine their significance. The first recurring discrepancy involved a fit-up gap between the horizontal and vertical cable-tray members. Strength tests performed by Sar-gent & Lundy demonstrated that even though the AWS Code requir-ed that the strength of this connection be reduced, there was no actual reduction in the joint capacity. The second recur-ring discrepancy involved the use of a partial penetration weld rather than a fillet weld as called for in the design. Labora-tory testing by Sargent & Lundy demonstrated that the as-built partial penetration weld had less than a 10% reduction in capa-city when compared to the original design. (McLaughlin, pre-pared testimony at 12-14, ff. Tr. 9047.)

135. The detailed evaluations described above were con-ducted oh ull 356 discrepant Hatfield welds. The results of 5

these evaluations demonstrated that none of the discrepancies exceeded design margin and, accordingly, none had design or safety significance. Accordingly, the quality of this rein-spected work is adequate. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 9047.)

d. Subjective Attribute AWS and ASME Welding -- Hunter Discrepancies 136. The Hunter AWS welding covered by the Reinspection Program included pipe supports and pipe restraints.

(McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9047.) The Hunter ASME welding covered by the Reinspection Program includ-ed large-bore butt welds, socket and fillet welds, NF support welds, and pipe penetrations and reinfor ing saddles. (Branch, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 9051. ) of the 3,725 welds produced by Hunter that were reinspected (27% AWS welds, 73%

ASME welds), 109 discrepancies were observed. One hundred per-cent of these 109 discrepant welds were evaluated by Sargent &

Lundy. As noted above, this included 60 AWS welds and 49 ASME welds. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 5, 14, ff. Tr. 9047; Branch, prepared testimony at 6,10-11, ff. Tr. 9051. )

137. The 60 discrepant Hunter AWS welds were evaluated by the same procedure as described for the Hatfield discrepan-cies. Nineteen of the welds fell into the no-structural impact category encompassing are strikes, weld spatter and convexity, which do not reduce the load-carrying capacity of the weld.

Eighteen of the we's!,had a capacity reduction o,f less than

. _ G e b

-s ? %.;f% % .? m n. %a- y

• g i:e ;..v; my-;:; . p ,u.a

> a ,7.m 10%. The remaining 23 welds had a capacity reduction of 10% or more. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 14-15, ff. Tr. 9047.)

138. The detailed engineering evaluation of the 60 dis-crepant Hunter AWS welds indicated that none of the discrepan-cies exceeded design margin and, accordingly, none had design or safety significance. Accordingly, the quality of this rein-spected work is adequats. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 15, ff. Tr. 9047.)  :

139. The evaluations of AWS weld discrepancies by Sargent & Lundy were performed pursuant to the 1983 edition of the AWS D1.1 Structural Welding Code while the welding itself was performed pursuant to earlier editions of the Code. Mr.

Stokes questions this procedure on the premise that differences among the Code editions could result in more lenient standards for the evaluation performed by Sargent & Lundy. (Stokes, pre-pared testimony at 19-20, ff. Tr. 10,770.) Contrary to Mr.

' Stokes' assertion, the Board finds that this practice is appro-priate. Excluding the year 1978, a revised version of the AWS Code has been published every year from 1975 to the present.

The design requirements have not changed significantly since the issuance of AWS D1.1-75, which was the Code in effect at the time of initial construction. The allowable stresses are the same. The few changes that have been made with respect to calculation of stresses have all been more restrictive with regard to weld capacity. These stricter weld design require-e ments in no way require less demanding calculations for evalu-ating a discrepancy. If anything, it is conservative to use ,

the latest edition of AWS DI.1 for evaluation of discrepan-cies. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony at 9-10, ff. Tr.

11,158.)

140. The 49 discrepant Hunter ASME welds were evaluated to ASME Section III Code design criteria using three methods to determine whether the Code was met and whether the discrepant welds had design significance. The initial method. involved comparing the weld discrepancy with the current design para-meters and tolerances and the ASME Code to deternine if it was acceptable on that basis. For example, in some cases, such as with surface porosity, the visual welding reinspection criteria were overly stringent and exceeded code acceptance criteria.

These reported discrepancies were determined to meet the code design criteria and were, therefore, judged to be acceptable.

If it was not possible to disposition a discrepancy using the first approach, the second method involved evaluation by engin-eering judgment based on a comparison of the effect of a weld discrepancy to design margins or the component design fune-tion. The final method of resolution of the weld discrepancy was an evaluation by detailed engineering calculation.

(Branch, prepared testimony at 11-12, ff. Tr. 9051.)

141. Three discrepancies were reported involving large-bore piping butt welds. Two were within current design param-t eters and tolerances. The third was compared to design margins and determined to be acceptable by engineering judgment.

(Branch, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 9051.)

142. A total of 30 discrepancies involving socket and fil-let welds was' reported. Three were within current design para-meters and tolerances; four were compared to design margins and determined to be acceptable by engineering judgment; and 23 were evaluated by engineering calculation and met ASME Code design criteria. The majority of the calculations involved a simple arithmetic computation of the code-required fillet weld size. (Branch, prepared testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 9051.)

143. A total of 14 discrepancies involving NF support welds was reported. One was within current design parameters and tolerances and 13 were reviewed by calculation and met ASME Code design criteria. The majority of the calculations involv-ed recalculating the designed weld with consideration of the discrepancy accounted for. All welds were found to meet ASME Code design criteria. (Branch, prepared testimony at 13, ff.

Tr. 9051.)

144. A total of two discrepancies involving welds with pipe penetration and reinforcing saddles was reported. Both were reviewed by engineering calculation and found to meet ASME Code design criteria. Both welds were compared to actual design requirements and neither of the discrepancies was deter-mined to have design significance. (Branch, prepared testimony at 13-14, ff. Tr. 9051.)- ,-

1

Q'

^

145. Intervenors' expert alleged that two ASME welds were impermissibly accepted by Sargent & Lundy because of the impre-cision in the gauges used in measuring weld undercut. Specifi-cally, Mr. Stokes stated that the 1/64-in. accuracy of the gauges supplied for measuring the welds was in violation of some ASME Code section allegedly requiring " machine shop type .

~

accuracy to the thousandths." (Stokes, prepared testimony at 24-25, ff. Tr. 10,770.) The ASME Code does not expressly state a tolerance for the measurement of undercut; it does not re-quire " machine shop type accuracy to the thousandths" to deter-mine Code compliance, as alleged by Mr. Stokes. The acceptance criterion for undercut is stated in ASME Section III, paragraph l ND-4424 as a common fraction, 1/32 inch, which means that the Code intended the value to be treated as an approximate, frac-tional dimension. Whenever the Code intends exact precision, an acceptance value is stated as a decimal value. (Branch, prepared rebuttal testimony at 3, ff. Tr.11,158. )

146. An acceptance criterion stated in terms of 1/32 inch has an acceptance level within 1/64 inch, that is, the Code is The met if the measurement for undercut is 3/64 inch or less.

undercut measurements of the two welds referred to by Mr.

Stokes were .041 and .037 inch. Inasmuch as these values fall below 3/64 inch, the Code requirement has been met. (Branch, prepared rebuttal testimony at 3 ff. Tr. 11,158.) 'x 147. In any event, Sargent & Lundy did not rely solely on this Code interpretation to disposition these diperepancies. A calculation was done to establish the effect of the reported undercut on code minimum wall thickness requirements and code stress criteria. The calculation was perfermed to answer two questions. First, was the depth of undercut sufficient to encroach on code-required minimum pipe wall thickness? Second, was the stress intensification introduced by the undercut suf-ficient to cause code allowable stresses for moment loading to be exceeded? The calculation was conservatively biased in that it assumed that the undercut extended completely around the total weld circumference when it actually extended around only a portion of the weld circumference. In addition, the stress intensification factor for the undercut was multiplied by the intensification used in the original analysis for the weld joint instead of treating the effects separately. (Branch, prepared rebuttal testimony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 11,158) 148. The pipe wall thickness calculation showed that the wall thickness remaining after deducting the maximum undercut and the manufacturing tolerance was about 27 times the code-required minimum wall. This is not surprising because the ser-vice pressure for the system is 150 psi and schedule 80 pipe was selected to provide adequate mechanical strength for a power plant environment. The stress intensification calcula-tion showed that even when considering the maximum undercut to conservatively extend all the way around the circumference of the weld, and multiplying the fillet weld intensification by

the undercut intensification, code-allowable stresses for the applicable loading conditions, including seismic load, were not exceeded. (Branch, prepared rebuttal testimoony at 4-5, ff.

Tr. 11, 158) 149. In the case of all 49 ASME discrepant welds, the weld connections met Code design criteria. The Sargent & Lundy evaluations of the Hunter ASME weld discrepancies demonstrate that, as was true with respect to the Hunter AWS weld discrep-ancies, as well as the Hatfield weld discrepancies, none of the discrepancies had design significance and, hence, no safety significance. Accordingly, the quality of this reinspected work is adequate. (Branch, prepared testimony at 14, ff. Tr.

9051.)

150. The Board finds that, based upon the Sargent & Lundy evaluations of the Hatfield AWS discrepant welds and the Hunter AWS and ASME discrepant welds, none of the discrepancies had design significance and, accordingly, no safety significance.

e. Matters Raised By Intervenors' Witness, Mr. Stokes 151. The portion of Mr. Stokes' testimony that was ad-mitted into evidence essentially consists of a call for an independent review of discrepancies based on an alleged lack of objectivity and impartiality on the part of Sargent & Lundy.

We will now address the specific concerns raised by Mr. Stokes that have not already been discussed and his allegations re-garding the need for an independent review of discrepancies.

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First, Mr. Stokes asserted that pipe supports which were in-cluded in Sargent & Lundy's Hunter AWS welding discrepancy evaluations are subject to fatigue loadings and, thus, con-vexity should have been considered a defect more serious than a cosmetic flaw. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 18, ff. Tr.

10,770.) However, as Mr. Stokes acknowledged, the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Code does not require a reduction in the allowable stress in a weld for fatigue loading until the number of 3*.ress cycles exceeds 20,000. (Stokes, Tr.

10,841-42; Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr.

11,158.) Further, Mr. Stokes admitted that he did not have adequate information to determine whether pipe supports at Byron would experience 20,000 cycles of fatigue loading over their lifetime. (Stokes, Tr. 10,842-43.) In fact, the number of stress cycles experienced by pipe supports at Byron is sub-stantially'less than 20,000. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testi-mony at 8, ff. Tr. 11,158.)

152. Mr. Stokes also asserts that waterhammer could cause fatigue loading. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 18-19, ff. Tr.

10,770.) The evidence indicates, however, that waterhammer loading on a piping system is not a loading that could cause a fatigue problem. Waterhammer is a dynamic pulse loading with low frequency of occurrence. Therefore, the number of stress cycles is extremely low and fatigue is not a problem as defined in the AISC Code. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 9, ff. Tr.

10,770; Tr. 10,844-65.) ,'

153. The discrepancy evaluations performed by Sargent &

Lundy included 30 flare-bevel AWS welds produced by Hatfield and captured by the Reinspection Program. Intervenors' expert expressed concern with flare-bevel welding based upon Attach-ment 7 to his testimony indicating that Sargent & Lundy may have used invalid assumptions in establishing design parameters for flare-bevel welding. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 16-17, ff. Tr. 10,770.) On cross-examination, Intervenors' expert conceded that if the attachment and the information contained therein were void, he would have no concern with the flare-bevel weld radii at Byron based on that attachment. (Stokes, Tr. 10,792.) As Applicant's witness testified, that attachment has been voided and the information contained therein is not applicable to either Byron or Braidwood. (Hooks, prepared testimony at 3-5, ff. Tr. 11,158.)

154. Intervenors' expert also expressed concern because flare-bevel groove welding was included under a prequalified welding procedure designated as 13AA. (Stokes, Tr. 10,800-01.) Such welding should be produced against a qualified weld-ing procedure, i.e., one that is validated by establishing through a field demonstration that the procedure produces an adequate weld. However, the Hatfield AWS flare-bevel welds captured in the Byron Reinspection Program were produced during the period May, 1978 through September,1982. During that period, flare-bevel groove welds were, in fact, produced under l _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

qualified procedures 13Q and 13AB. Procedure 13AA, a prequali-fied welding procedure, was not approved until December 30, 1983, and flare-bevel groove welding was erroneously included in that procedure. This error is being rectified and the pro-cedure for flare-bevel groove welding is being issued as a qualified procedure. (Erler, prepared testimony at 7, ff. Tr.

11,158.)

155. In any event, the 30 flare-bevel welds produced by Hatfield and captured by the Reinspection Program were inspect-ed for a determination of the actual radius. The inspection yielded a radius measurement of at least two times the tube wall thickness (2T) for all tubes except one, which had a radius equal to 1.75 T. The stress of each weld was conservat-ively evaluated using the AWS formula for effective throat of 5/16 R with the smallest R measurement of 1.75 T. This demon-strated that the AWS allowable stresses were met. (Erler, pre-pared rebuttal testimony at 6-7, ff. Tr. 11,158) The Board concludes that no legitimate concerns have been raised with respect to flare-bevel welding at the Byron plant.

156. Intervenors' expert also alleged that the discrepant ASME welds identified in Attachment 8 to his testimony were not evaluated by Sargent & Lundy. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 17-18, ff. Tr. 10,770.) This allegation is incorrect. With the exception of three welds that were not part of the Rein-

spection Program,*/ all the welds in Attachment 8 to Mr.

Stokes' testimony, including the 46 ASME welds, were evaluated by Sargent & Lundy. This can be demonstrated by a comparison of the drawing numbers in Attachment 8 with the component num-bers in Sargent & Lundy document BRP-1, which is a summary of Hunter discrepant welds that were evaluated in the reinspection program. A comparison of the two sets of numbers reveals that these are the same welds. (DeMoss, prepared rebuttal testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 11,158; Stokes, Tr. 10,829-34.)

157. Applicant's witnesses were questioned about the fact that some of the Hunter visual weld discrepancies and dis-crepancies in Hatfield and Hunter objective attributes were repaired prior to evaluation by Sargent & Lundy. The repair of a discrepancy in no way interferred with Sargent & Lundy's engineering evaluation inasmuch as all the information neces-sary to perform the evaluation was contained in the discrepancy reports. (McLaughlin, French, Branch, Tr. 9278-80; 9293-96.)

158. All discrepancies subject to ASME Code examination acceptance criteria were reparied, even though they were deter-

• / These welds, which were alluded to by Dr. Ericksen (Ericksen, Tr. 10,951, 10,958), were initially included in the program because it was believed that they were attri-

. butable to Inspector A, an inspector captured in the pro-gram. It was subsequently learned that these three welds had been reworked and inspected by a QC inspector other than Inspector A. Thus, the reinspection of these three welds could not be attributed to Inspector A and, accord-ingly, they were excluded from the program and the statis-tics shown for Inspector A in Table B-3 in Applicant's Exhibit R-4. (DeMoss, Tr. 11,162-63.) .

mined by evaluation not to have design significance. All other discrepancies were either reparied or dispositioned as accept-Male "as-is"- based on the engineering evaluation results.

(Del George, prepared testimony at 36, ff. Tr. 8406.)

159. The Board was initially surprised by the absence of any design significant discrepancies out of all those analyzed by Sargent-& Lundy. This result is attributable to the exten-sive margin incorporated in the Byron design and, as explained

-by the Sargent & Lundy panel, is an inherent consequence of the design process. Engineers design a structure such that it is i

sufficiently strong to withstand the expected forces and stres-ses with spare or extra strength to account for uncertainties and contingencies. This extra strength is called margin.

Design margin is that margir, imposed by engineers during the design. process. For example, connections are designed in groups rather than individually. As a consequence, the force or load-bearing capability for each connection is established on the basis of the most highly-stressed connection. The ac-tual stresses for most connections will be less than those established by the design process. The difference between the two is an example of design margin. The existence of this de-sign margin in the work evaluated by Sargent & Lundy is the primary reason that none of the weld discrepancies was found to be design significant. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 8-9, 11-12, ff. Tr. 9047; French, Branch, McLaughlin, Tr. 9254-61.)

160. There is a second margin in the structural design of connections. This is the margin that the code writers put into the design process in the form of allowable stresses. The code writers typically attempt to obtain a margin of approximately two when they write the code. This means that a structure designed to a code could carry approximately twice the design load and not fail. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 9, ff.

Tr. 9047.)

161. In Sargent & Lundy's detailed engineering evaluation, the Code allowable was not exceeded for any discrepancy.

'(McLaughlin; prepared testimony at 9, ff. Tr. 9047; Erler, pre-pared rebuttal testimony at 4-5, ff. Tr. 11,158; McLaughlin, Tr. 9271-72.) Although Mr. Stokes initially stated that some of Sargent & Lundy's calculations " appeared" to exceed the Code allowable for stress (Stokes, Intervenors' Trepared Testimeny at 7, 8, ff. Tr. 10,770), following cross examination Inter-venors and Applicant stipulated that after reviewing the calcu-lations and discussing them with Sargent & Lundy personnel, Mr.

Stokes found no calculations for work performed by Hatfield or Hunter where the actual stress exceeded the Code allowable.

(Tr. 10,936.)

162. There were a few instances where a 10% overstress factor was used by Sargent & Lundy at an intermediate point in the calculative process. The 10% overstress factor refers to a 10% limit where Sargent & Lundy engineers are allowed to use 1

their. knowledge of the margin in the structural analysis to decide, when the calculated stress is less than or equal to-10%

greater than allowable, that the calculated stresses have suf-ficient conservatisms or margin in them to meet the AISC Code stress allowable. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony at 4, l~ ff. Tr. 11,158.) However, as Intervenors and Applicant stipu-lated, in each of these instances, the overstress factor was not relied upon for the ultimate conclusion in the calculation that the actual stress did not exceed the Code allowable. (Tr.

10,936; Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony at 4-5, ff. Tr.

11,158; Tr. 11,159-60.)

163. Intervenors' witness charged that the judgments and assumptions used by Sargent & Lundy in its evaluation of the d

BRP discrepancies lacked " objectivity and impartiality" and, hence, an independent review was required. (Stokes, prepared

_ testimony at 7, If. Tr. 10,770.) However, outside of pointing to an alleged inconsistency between Sargent & Lundy's structur-al engineering group and the mechanical engineering. group in the treatment accorded fatigue loading (Stokes, Tr.-10,893),

l Mr. Stokes could point to no specific instance, including no I

specific calculations, where Sargent & Lundy demonstrated a lack of " objectivity and impartiality." (Stokes, Tr.

10,885-904.) As Mr. Stokes himself stated, "I'm just saying they [Sargent & Lundy) ignored certain things, but I can't cite one." (Tr. 10,894.)

i i

f'

164. With respect to the alleged inconsistency between the mechanical group and the structural group in their treatment of fatigue loading, Mr. Stokes asserted that if mechanical designs account for fatigue in the piping system, then the structural group should take that into account when designing those respective pipe-supports. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 18, ff. Tr. 10,770.) Contrary to Mr. Stokes' assertion, there is no inconsistency in Sargent & Lundy's treatment of fatigue loading for piping and for pipe supports. Due to the nature of loading on.a piping system, the requirements may vary depending on the class of the system. For example, the ASME Code requires an explicit calculation of fatigue loading for a Class 1 piping system while Class 2 and 3 piping systems are affected by. cyclic loading only if the number of cycles exceeds 7,000 (ASME Section III NC 3611.2). For pipe supports with respect to Class 1, 2 and 3 piping, both ASME and AISC are consistent in not requiring any reduction in allowable stress for less s

than 20,000 cycles. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony at 8,

[

ff. Tr. 11,158.) At Byron, for Class 1 piping systems, the l analysis has accounted for the number of cycles as required by L

the Code. Fatigue loadings were properly neglected for Class 2 and 3 piping systems and for pipe supports because the number of cycles experienced is less than the threshholds established

) in the Codes for requiring a reduction in the allowable stress

[ limits. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony, at 8, ff. Tr.

L l

i

11,158.) Mr. Stokes apparently failed to understand the dif-fering Code treatment for factoring fatigue loadings in the design of Byron. No inconsistency exists and Mr. Stokes' criticism is rejected.

165. The Board finds that the Sargent & Lundy evaluations were performed in accordance with proper engineering standards and that the assumptions used in performing these evaluations were sufficiently conservative. In the words of Mr. Muffett, Sarge'nt & Lundy's program for evaluating the discrepancies was "more than adequate." (Muffett, Tr. 9813.) Accordingly, the 4

Board finds no evidence to support the need for an independent review based upon any alleged lack of objectivity or impar-

^

tiality on the part of Sargent & Lundy. In addition, in re-sponse to the issue added by the Board concerning Applicant's repair of defects, the Board finds that all discrepancies were either repaired or dispositioned as acceptable "as-is" based on engineering evaluation results, thereby resolving this issue.

l Finally, the Board finds that the absence of any design-sig-nificant discrepancies demonstrates that the pre-September, l 1982 inspectors had not overlooked any significant safety-related deficiencies, thereby reinforcing the conclusion that i

these inspectors were qualifed. -

I h

- X. QUALITY OF THE WORK

a. Introduction 166. In evaluating work quality, we begin with the Appeal Board observation, previously noted, that for purposes of this proceeding a presumption of work quality follows a showing of inspector competence. (ALAB-770, slip opinion at 28.) This is also consistent with the position taken by Edison and by the Staff. As Mr. Laney testified, the presence of competent inspectors suggests that significant discrepancies are unlikely to go undetected. Indeed, as noted above, this very phrase-ology was used by the Staff in its description of the purpose of the BRP. (Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr.

9510.) By removing doubt as to the qualification and capabil-ity of the whole body of inspectors, the BRP has provided con-fidence in the quality of the work that was originally inspect-ed. (Laney, prepared testimony at 18, ff. Tr. 9339; Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 9510.) We have already found the inspectors in question to be qualified. (1 104, supra.) Accordingly, in line with the Appeal Board reasoning, this finding, on its own, raises a presumption of the adequacy of Hatfield and Hunter work quality that has not been rebutted.

167. Applicant, however, did not rely solely on the favor-able results of the BRP. It presented extensive testimony of seven witnesses who relied on various additional bases for con-

cludinglthat the quality of the Hatfield and Hunter work was adequate. The testimony of these witnesses, that of the NRC l Staff and the Intervenors, as-well as that of Applicant's re-buttalfwitness, are advanced below.

- b. Sargent & Lundy Evaluation Results 168. ' Based on the engineering evaluation performed by Sargent & Lundy of discrepancies found in the Hatfield and Hunter work reinspected, numerous witnesses concluded that the

- quality of'all Hatfield and Hunter work at the Byron plant is adequate. John M. McLaughlin, Partner.and Manager of the

. Structural Department at Sargent & Lundy, whose testimony was discussed in the previous section, concluded that based on his engineering _ judgment, the Sargent & Lundy evaluation demon- ,

strates that the quality of all Hatfield and Hunter work per-

- formed at the Byron. Station is adequate. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 16-17, ff. Tr.-9047.) His conclusion is premised on the fact that none of the visual weld discrepancies or dis-crepancies'in objective attributes identified with the Hatfield or Hunter work _had design significance.-(McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 17, ff. Tr. 9047.) This encompasses an engineer-ing evaluation of over 3,400 discrepancies. (See section IX,

- supra.); In reaching this conclusion, Mr. McLaughlin observed that of'the 356.Hatfield weld discrepancies analyzed by Sargent

& Lundy, 50 were selected at random, 50 were selected by a v

4

.'l ,

. third-party-inspector on the basis of being the worst welds

from a weld discrepancy viewpoint,.and the remaining 256 dis-crepancies involved welds at-the most highly-stressed connec-

. tions'where the design margin'was the least. (McLaughlin, pre-

' pared' testimony.at 7-8, 17, ff. Tr. 9047.) Thus, the sample of

- 356 Hatfield weld discrepancies analyzed by Sargent & Lundy was biased to examine the most highly-stressed welds-in the Rein- 1 1

4 spection. Program, where the greatest potential existed for exceeding design margins.. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at i

8; 16-17 ff. Tr. 9047;.Laney, prepared-testimony at 14-15, ff.

Tr. 9339.) Yet, no design-significant discrepancies were found. Mr.~McLaughlin's conclusion that the Hatfield and Hunter work.is adequate is also based on' conservative loadings and assumptions used in the design of the Byron plant, and the

- margins inherent in that design. (McLaughlin, prepared testi-mony at 16-17, ff.- Tr. 9047.)

169. Mr. McLaughlin's conclusion on.overall work quality was reinforced with respect to Hatfield by Richard X. French, Partner and Manager of the Electrical Department at Sargent &

Lundy. Mr.. French testified that, based upon the absence of any discrepancies with design significance out of over-60,000 Hatfield: objective attributes reinspected, he would conclude ithat-the similar unreinspected Hatfield work was also ade-t

-quate. '(French, Tr. 9305-06.)

r-L .

! p:

170. Mr. Laney explained that the engineering analysis of discrepancies demonstrates that inherent design conservatism renders virtually all the discrepancies inconsequential. This conservatism, combined with an extremely rigorous code defini-tion of weld discrepancies (the AWS Code defines as a discrep-ancy almost any deviation from a perfect weld even though the Code.also states that discrepancies need not actually be de-

~

fects), results in the generation of reports of many discrepan-cies that1are later found to be acceptable. (Laney, prepared testimony at'10, 19-23, ff. Tr. 9339.) This is readily demon-

- strated by the Sargent & Lundy evaluations discussed in l's 112 and 122, supra. Mr. Laney concluded that the total absence of any identified design-significant discrepancies provides addi-tional assurance that the work of Hatfield and~ Hunter is ade-

' quate. (Laney,-prepared testimony at 23, ff. Tr. 9339.)

171. Mr. Del George and Mr. Behnke similarily conclude

' that Sargent & Lundy's finding of no design-significant dis-crepancies' contributes to a demonstration of the adequacy of the Hatfield and Hunter work. (Del George, prepared testimony

- at 49, ff. Tr. 8406; Behnke, Applicant Prepared Testimony at-

- 14,-ff. Tr. 9336.)

c. Scope Of Work Reinspected 172. Mr. Laney, testifying on behalf _of Applicant, also expla'ined how the scope of the reinspection program supported his conclusion that the quality of the Hatfield and Hunter work 9

r-

. was adequate. He stated that he assessed the adequacy of the Hatfield and Hunter data in relation to all work performed by Hatfield and Hunter. (Laney, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr.

9339.) Specifically, Mr. Laney performed a comparison of the attributes _that.were inspected with the total of each contrac-

~

tor's attributes. For Hatfield, nine out of 11 attributes that could be reinspected were reinspected. The two that were accessible but not reinspected were cable pan covers, not yet

-installed, and cable pan identification, a less significant attribute. Ten attributes were either inaccessible or not recreatable. These 10 attributes were, according to Mr. Laney, less significant in size and importance than the nine that were reinspected. In addition, these attributes were installed us-ing the same procedures as attributes that were reinspected.

(Laney, prepared testimony at 12, 13 ff. Tr. 9339.)

173. For Hunter, 18 out of 21 work elements (comprising the three Hunter attributes) that could be reinspected were reinspected. Fourteen work elements were not reinspected either because they were not recreatable or were inaccessible.

Seven of the 14 that could not be reinspected were welding-in-process inspection points such as preheat or welding interpass temperature. However, the BRP found Hunter's welding quality to be good, with less than a three percent discrepancy rate on 3,725 welds and no design-significant discrepancies. The BRP also reinspected Hunter's quality-assurance documentation.

f .

4

-. ' Twenty-five out of 33 documentation elements were reinspected j

. \

Jand found satisfactory (Laney, prepared testimony at 13, 14, ff. Tr.'9339.)1 174. In addition to:the fact that a broad range of attri-butes was examined, Mr. Laney also-noted that over 160,000 reinspections of Hatfield and Hunter work were performed.

.(Laney;, prepared testimony at 27, ff. Tr. 9339.) Eleven per-cent of all Hatfield inspection months were reinspected in the

~

program and six percent of all Hunter inspection months were reinspected. .From this it is reasonable to infer-that, over-all, some.five to ten percent of the total work of these two contt& tors was reinspected. (Laney, prepared testimony _at 14-15, ff..Tr. 9339.) 131e vast amount and the broad ' range of Hatfield and Hunter work reinspected provides a basis for Mr.

~

Laney to' draw conclusions on the work quality of these two

-; contractors . -(Laney, prepared testimony at 13-15, ff. Tr. 9339)

^

175. Next, Mr. Laney testified 'that the BRP data shows that for Hatfield, of 87,783 inspections made, less than 4,000 discrepancies were found. Only approximately 11% of these

, ineeded to1be analyzed by calculation to determine their signif-icance. And, as discussed above, none of these'Hatfield dis-crepancies had design significance and none reduced design mar-

. gins below the level required'by conservative design practice.

(Laney, prepared testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 9339.) For Hunter, "the BRP data shows that of 73,349 inspections performed, less

Fp Y

than 800 discrepancies were found. Only approximately 10% of these needed to be analyzed by calculation to determine their significance. As discussed above, none of these Hunter dis-crepancies had design significance and none reduced design mar-gins.below the. level ~ required by conservative design practice.

(Laney, prepared testimony at 16-17, ff. Tr. 9339.)

176. In short, of the over 160,000 reinspections of Hatfield and Hunter work,. fewer than 500 discrepancies were of

~

such a nature as to require an engineering calculation to determine their significance. And, as discussed previously,

the evaluations demonstrated that none had design-signifi-cance. Thus, . Mr. Laney_-concluded that, in addition to the-qualification of inspectors, the absence of any discrepancies with design 1 significance combined with the inherent design con-

, servatism, and CECO's QA program, the scope of the reinspected 4

work demonstrates that the quality of all the Hatfield and.

- Hunter. work at the' Byron plant.is adequate.

177. Mr. Del George.similarly concluded that.the large number of Hatfield and Hunter items reinspected, the relatively small' number of discrepancies, and.the absence of any design-significant discrepancies (discussed above) provide a basis for his' conclusion that the quality of work is adequate. ,

(Del George,; prepared testimony at 49, ff. Tr. 8406.) .Specifi-cally, Mr. Del George pointed to (1) the inspection of approxi-mately 130,000 Hatfield and Hunter objective attributes and

, 30,000 Hatfield and Hunter subjective attributes and (2) the diverse data base developed for Hatfield and Hunter, including related indicia of acceptability for inaccessible and not recreatable_ attributes. (Del George, prepared testimony at 50-51, Attachment E, ff. Tr. 8406.)*/

178. All these judgments on work quality were made on the basis of engineering judgment rather than on the basis of the application of mathematical statistical theory. (Del George, Tr. 8518; Little, Staff Prepared Testimony at 4, ff. Tr.

9510.) Notwithstanding the use by these expert witnesses of engineering judgment . sus the basis for determining that the work quality was adequate, Intervenors presented the testimony of Dr. Ericksen in an effort to demonstrate that, applying mathe-matical statistical theory, inferences could.not be made regarding the entire scope of Hatfield and Hunter work based upon'the sample of the work reinspected in the BRP.

179. In assessing the significance of the testimony of Intervenors' statistical expert, Dr. Ericksen, we recognize

• / In response to a Board concern, Mr. Del George's testimony explained that the results for all attributes were evalu-ated on a contractor-by-contractor basis to determine whether any trends existed in the observed discrepancies that might warrant further review. Only two such trends were found, one involving reproduction of original visual weld inspection reports by PTL, the other involving a relatively large. number of Hatfield visual weld discrep-ancies associated with sheet steel welds. Both of these trends involved discrepancies that were minor in nature and were caused by factors that have since been remedied.

(Del George, prepared testimony at 38-41, ff. Tr. 8406.)

, that he does not purport to be an expert in the design, con-struction or evaluation of nuclear power plants and that he has no experience as a quality control inspector at a nuclear power plant. (Tr. 11,026-11,045). He is an expert statistician, but he recognizes that the conclusions expressed by knowledgeable professional engineers in this proceeding may in fact not be statistical statements at all, but rather the results of an engineering analysis. (Ericksen, Tr. pp. 11,077-78.) The limited role of a statistician in these circumstances was also recognized by Dr. Frankel, the statistical expert testifying on rebuttal for. Applicant, who explained that a sampling statis-tician is not qualified to draw inferences where a non-proba-bility. sample is used, but can only assist the subject matter expert in drawing inferences from that sample and has no role to play when a subject matter expert does not purport to apply mathematical statistical theory at all. (Frankel, prepared testimony at 8. ff. Tr. 11,120.) None of the witnesses pre-sented by Applicant or Staff, except Dr. Singh, purported to rest their conclusions on an application of mathematical sta-tistical theory and Mr. McLaughlin specifically stated that the results of a' statistical analysis were immaterial to his con-clusions. (McLaughlin, Tr. 9272-74.) Thus, recognizing that mathematical statistical theory plays an extremely minor role

.in the evaluation of the quality of Hatfield and Hunter's work, we turn to a consideration of Dr. Ericksen's testimony.

s l

... 180. Dr. Ericksen's basic criticisms focussed on a formula )

used by Dr. Singh to calculate the reliability for Hatfield and Hunter inspection attributes. That reliability calculation expressed the proportion of work items in a total population which had no discrepancies with design significance and is stated in the formula R = 1 - 2.9955/n where R = reliability at a 95%~ confidence level and n = number of inspections. (Singh, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9055.) Application of the formula resulted in calculated reliabilities in excess of 99%

for all but two Hatfield inspection attributes (the two which were lower had small sample sizes and were in excess of 96%)

and for both Hunter attributes. (Singh, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9055.) Dr. Ericksen testified that use of the reli-ability formula in Dr. Singh's testimony was valid only if the

-inspectors within the sample were homogeneous. (Ericksen, pre-pared testimony at 10-11, ff. Tr. 11,045.) Dr. Ericksen pur-ported to demonstrate that the inspectors were not homogeneous based on a mathematical calculation of "intraclass correla-tion," a statistical technique for measuring homogeneity.

(Ericksen, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 11,045.) However,

'Dr. Ericksen's calculations on which he based his conclusion

-that the inspectors were not homogeneous used data relating to observed discrepancies. Dr. Ericksen admitted that a calcula-tion based on design significant discrepancies would lead to a

-calculated intraclass correlation of zero and thus a conclusion

-. . _ ___ ._. _. ._ _ _ _ _ ,__ _ __ -- _ _ . - . _ _ __ _~_

t that inspectors were homogeneous. (Tr. 11,058) Of course, observed discrepancies are not a measure of the adequacy of Hatfield and Hunter work. It is only the existence of pre-v'ously i undetected design significant discrepancies which would

-call the adequacy of those contractors work into question and it was the likelihood of undetected design significant discrep-ancies that Dr. Singh was attempting to estimate. We find,

,itherefore , that this criticismon the use of the reliability formula by Dr. Singh misunderstands the basic purpose of the calculation and does not detract from conclusions expressed by any witness regarding the adequacy of Hatfield and Hunter work.

181. Dr.'Ericksen's second criticism of Dr. Singh's appli-cation of the reliability formula, that it did not take the effects of " clustering" the sample into account, is based on a similar, misreading of the significance of the data collected by the BRP. Dr. Ericksen testified that the calculation of intra-class correlation is used in another calculation which deter-mines to what extent clustering, i.e., the limitation of the sample of work to the inspections of the selected inspectors, affects the reliability of the statistics generated by the for-mula used by Dr ..ngh. (Ericksen, prepared testimony at 15, ff. Tr. 11.0 , ; Jhis calculation is known as the " design ef-fect". There can be no effect on the reliability of the sample as a result of clustering with respect to design significant discrepancies, . -r which the intraclass correlation is zero.

(Tr. 11,066) As a result, in calculating design effect, when the inspectors are homogeneous (roh=0 in Erickson's design effect formula) the design effect of using any clustered sample of design significant discrepancies is 1. As a result, the sample size required to generate reliable data as to design significant discrepancies is unaffected by clustering.

(Frankel, Tr. 11,124.) Accordingly, Dr. Singh's reliability calculations are reasonable estimates. (Frankel, Tr.

11,124-25.)

182. Dr. Ericksen also criticized Edison's aggregation of inspection elements, claiming that in some cases the sample sizes of individual inspection elements for Hunter were too small to be meaningful for extrapolation of the results to the remaining population. The BRP basically aggregated inspections into two categories, subjective and objective (See 150 supra) and Hunter identified only two objective inspection attributes, documentation and hardware. Dr. Ericksen himself acknowledged that such an aggregation might be proper if done under the guidance of a subject matter expert. (Ericksen, Tr. 11,048-9.)

183. The rebuttal testimony of Mr. Somsag established the similarity of all the Hunter hardware inspections and specifi-cally demonstrated that the same inspection parameters, type, size, location and condition applied to a variety of inspection elements, some of which had been identified by Dr. Ericksen as lacking adequate sample size. (Somsag, Rebuttal testimony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 11,172.)

l l

184. Dr. Ericksen's statistical arguments are similar to those which were rejected by the Licensing Board in the recent Shoreham decision.*/ At Shoreham, an independent verification of_ construction adequacy was conducted by an engineering firm, Torrey Pines Technology. Witnesses for Suffolk County, an intervenor, criticized Torrey Pines for its decision to rely on engineering judgment rather than statistical methodology in the selection of the structures, systems and components which were inspected during the verification. The Board rejected any sug-gestion that an application of statistical methodology control-led its evaluation of the adequacy of construction at Shoreham, stating in pertinent part:

(T]here has been no application of stat-istical methodology to a problem as diverse and complex as the verification of con-struction of a nuclear power station. . ..

The Commission's Quality Assurance Criteria, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, do not require the use of statistical sampling methodology, Moreover, throughout the nuclear power industry, it is not the practice to utilize statistical methodology in quality assurance auditing programs.

(18 NRC at 619-20.)

185. We do not believe that there has been any showing that Applicant's use of statistics was erroneous. In any event, mathematical statistical theory played little, if any, role in the conclusions reached by the engineering witnesses

• / Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445 (1983).

who appeared before us and we specifically decline to base our conclusions regarding work quality on an application of statis-tical methodology. The BRP, although not intended to specifi-cally address the adequacy of Hatfield and Hunter's work, col-lected a large amount of data which showed no design signifi-cant discrepancies. Knowledgeable and experienced engineers conclude that this data is useful in reaching conclusions regarding the work of those two contractors which was not rein-spected. We will not ignore this data either and it is one basis for our conclusion that the work of Hatfield and Hunter is adequate.

d. Applicant's Overall QA Program 186. In concluding that the quality of work at Byron is adequate Applicant's witnesses also relied on their familiar-ity with CECO's overall QA program. We recognize initially that CECO's corporate commitment to safety and the adequacy of the structure of its QA program are no longer issues open to dispute in this proceeding. Indeed, in our initial decision we noted the express failure of Intervenors to file any proposed findings which controverted either CECO's commitment to safety or the adequacy of its corporate structure pertaining to qual-ity assurance. (ID, 1 D-12.) We went on to find that CECO's quality assurance program is fundamentally sound, comprehensive and independent. (ID, 1 D D-71, D D-89.) As dis-cussed below, these initial findings are reinforced by the most recent testimony of CECO's QA program. Edison's comprehensive QA programs provide a further basis for our conclusion that the quality of Hatfield and Hunter work at Byron is adequate.

187. Wallace Behnke, the Vice Chairman or Commonwealth Edison Company and the individual to whom Mr. Shewski reported in the 1980-March, 1984 period testified regarding the scope and coverage of CECO's quality assurance program as it applied to Hatfield and Hunter at Byron. Mr. Behnke has experience with CECO quality assurance activities dating back to 1965. In 1973, when he was elected Executive Vice President, Mr. Behnke revised CECO's quality assurance organization and established a separate quality assurance department which reported directly to him. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 9336.)

Given his position within the Company, Mr. Behnke has had a unique opportunity to view the effectiveness of CECO's QA pro-gram as it relates to Hatfield and Hunter work quality at Byron.

188. According to Mr. Behnke, the activities of the CECO QA department have taken place in an overall context of un-equivocal corporate management commitment to quality. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 7, ff. Tr. 9336.) CECO's QA program has expanded significantly over the years both in terms of person-nel and financial resources committed to the QA function.

(Behnke, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr 9336.) With Mr.

Behnke's knowledge and concurrence the level of supervision of the site quality assurance organizations was increased in

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1980. This led to the appointment of QA superintendents at each construction site. 1982 brought the implementation of the Unit Concept Inspections by PTL at Byron and Braidwood. A spe-cial and more comprehensive CECO management audit was conducted at Byron and Braidwood in 1983 as well as a number of independ-ent audits. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 6, 7 ff. Tr 9336.)

189. Mr. Behnke was also familiar with Hatfield's and Hunter's work history at Byron. He testified that on three separate occasions Hatfield's activities resulted in senior management attention. In 1980, an NRC inspection of Hatfield's activities at the Byron site led to multiple items of noncom-pliance and issuance of a stop-work order by the Quality Assur-ance organization. At Mr. Behnke's suggestion, CECO's presi-dent met with the president of Hatfield and communicated directly and forcefully CECO's concerns regarding the quality of Hatfield work. In 1981, an increased audit schedule of Hatfield by the CECO QA department was implemented. In 1982, extensive reinspection of cable pan hangers installed by Hatfield was performed at CECO's request because of incomplete documentation of inspections by Hatfield. Mr. Behnke knew of these matters and concurred in implementation of increased quality assurance attention for their resolution. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 10, 11, ff. Tr. 9336.) To Mr. Behnke's

' knowledge, Hunter's activities have not necessitated similar intervention. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 9336.)

-101-

190. The tables which comprise Attachment A to Mr.

Behnke's testimony show the extent of CECO's quality assurance program for Hatfield and Hunter. The tables show numerous audits by both contractors personnel and audits and surveil-lances by Applicant's QA department, as well as overview in-spections and unit concept inspections by PTL. When asked to compare the inspection effort performed by CECO's own QA de-partment with that of PTL, Mr. Behnke testified that the bulk or mainline of the effort was by CECO's own QA department.

(Behnke, Tr. 9346-48.)

191. On the basis of his extensive experience with CECO's QA program and his knowledge of the coverage of that program over the activities of Hatfield and Hunter, Mr. Behnke con-cluded that the QA program adequately controls the activities of Hatfield and Hunter and provides assurance that the work of these two contractors is adequate. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 12-14, ff. Tr. 9336.) While these conclusions are not based on any detailed evaluation of the various discrepancies in Hatfield and Hunter's work over the years, they rest on the judgment of an experienced senior officer of CECO who has viewed the QA program in its totality over the years. Mr.

Behnke specifically recognized that a number of construction discrepancies had been uncovered with respect to Hunter and Hatfield's work, but concluded that discovery of these discrep-ancies was an indication that the QA program is functioning

-102-

effectively. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr.

9336.) We note that none of Mr. Behnke's conclusions were challenged on cross examination.

192. Mr. Del George also testified that his confidence in the Hatfield and Hunter work quality at Byron was based in part on the many independent layers of inspection and review of the work of Hatfield and Hunter. (Del George, prepared testimony at 51, ff. Tr. 8406.) He noted that both Hatfield and Hunter had implemented several reinspection programs, apart from the BRP, over the course of their tenure at Byron. Hatfield rein-spections included concrete expansion anchor verification in 1979, cable routing reinspection in 1981, and 100% weld travel-er card validation and 100% cable pen hanger configuration and dimensio.7 reinspection between 1982 and 1984. Hunter reinspec-tions involved a 100% reinspection of all hangers installed prior to 1980, and of all concrete expansion anchors installed prior to 1979. (Del George, prepared testimony at 52, ff. Tr.

8406.) Similarly, Mr. Laney based his engineering judgment on the adequacy of Hatfield and Hunter work in part on the cover-age and effectiveness of CECO's quality assurance program.

(Laney, prepared testimony at 26-27, ff. Tr. 9339.)

193. We recognize that the BRP was never intended to make a definitive and all-inclusive statement regarding the adequacy of the Applicant's QA program. It is only in the presence of a quality assurance breakdown that a reinspection program can

-103-

. serve as a substitute for a functioning quality assurance pro-gram. See, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2), ALAB-763, 19 NRC 571, 582 (1984).

There is no indication that a quality assurance breakdown took place at Byron. Indeed, the BRP was originally conceived as a response to one Severity Level IV item of noncompliance identi-fied by the Staff in the CAT inspection dealing with inspector qualification. Considering both the record in the remanded proceeding and our findings in our initial decision regarding CECO's QA program, we find the program sufficient to provide an appropriate basis for our conclusion that the work of those contractors is adequate.

194. Following completion of the BRP, two sets of Staff Inspection Reports were issued which relate to Hatfield QC activities. (Del George, prepared testimony at 42, ff.

Tr. 8406.)

195. IE Report 454/84-27, 455/84-19 identified two items of non-compliance. The first noncompliance involved failure to incorporate a drawing requirement on cable pan cover installa-tion into an inspection procedure. However, the affected con-tractor personnel had been trained on the drawing requirement and are believed to have properly implemented it. There is no basis to conclude that inspectors who were trained did not effectively monitor the pan ccver installation activities.

(Del George, prepared testimony at 43, ff. Tr. 8406.)

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196. The second item of noncompliance identified a limited number of discrepant cable pan hangers caused by deficient inspector activity. The majority of the observed discrepancies involved an inspection element only recently applied (fit-up gap) and does not compromise the integrity of previously per-formed inspections. The valid discrepancies were shown not to be significant. (Del George, prepared testimony at 43-45, ff.

Tr. 8406.)

197. IE Report 454/84-09, 455/84-07 identified one appar-ent item of noncompliance involving a single Hatfield discrep-ancy report (DR-3382) which dealt with the removal of a cable from a conduit. The discrepancy report inaccurately described the pulling force applied in the removal of that cable, result-ing in a deficient engineering evaluation. This event was determined to be an isolated occurrence. (Del George, prepared testimony at 45, ff. Tr. 8406.) This matter is discussed fully, infra,E293-297.

198. Taken together, these three items of noncompliance do identify an apparent weakness in translating design require-ments into inspection procedures. However these procedural discrepancies have not resulted in major rework on the affected .

safety-related components. (Del George, prepared testimony at 47, ff. Tr. 8406.) Consequently, our conclusions set forth in 1 193 supra on the effectiveness of CECO's QA program as one basis for supporting the adequacy of Hatfield and Hunter's work remafn unchanged.

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1

e. NRC Staff Conclusions On Work Quality 199. Mr. Little, on behalf of the NRC Staff, testified that Region III believes that the reinspection of over 160,000 safety-related elements for Hatfield and Hunter, the results of those inspections, and the analysis and disposition of the reinspection findings provide reasonable assurance that the overall quality of the work of those contractors is good.

(Little, Staff prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9510.) When polled by the Board, the members of the Region III Staff panel reinforced this conclusion with their personal views. For example, Mr. Ward testified that with resp 2ct to welding Byron is probably the safest plant ever built. (Ward, Tr. 9872, 9910.) Mr. Muffet agreed with Mr. Ward, adding that the Staff review of Byron construction was unusually " critical" in its search for discrepancies. Mr. Muffet concludes that the results of the BRP reinforce the Staff's already positive con-clusions about Byron. (Muffet, Tr. 9872.) Messrs. Little, Love and Connaughton each testified that contractor work qual-ity was adequate, even rigorous, and that Byron can be operated safely. These conclusions are based, not only on the results of the BRP, but also on the Region's long and detailed inspec-tion history at Byron. (Little, Tr. 9872-73; Love, Tr. 9875; Connaughton, Tr. 9876-77.)

200. Moreover, the testimony of William Forney, as it concerns work quality, is entirely consistent with that of the

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Region III panel. Mr. Forney testified, vigorously, that the results of the BRP provide assurance that Byron construction quality is adequate. As with the Region III panel, Mr.

Forney's conclusions on work quality are based as well on his extensive experience with Byron construction activities. Mr.

Forney's point of departure with the testimony of the Staff panel has to do with inferring QC inspector competence from the fact that they did not overlook safety significant deficien-cies. Although Mr. Forney's reasoning here is a little vague, one basis for his position appears to be Mr. Forney's very strong belief, based on his experience as the senior resident inspector, that safety-significant discrepancies do not exist at Byron. In Mr. Forney's words:

[I]t has been Region III's position all along, and . . . mine, that the construction at the Byron plant was good, because we had not discovered obvious hardware problems like we have at other sites. . . .

I feel at this time that the information provided by the reinspection program did, in fact, provide a very large data base to con-firm Region III's position that the quality of the Byron site is acceptable and that it is generally good. . . .

And when you couple this with the work . .

that the workers do, which I believe to be generally of good quality, the inspection programs that not only does the NRC under-take, but Licensee has inspection programs, they've had reinspection programs, they've l had overinspection programs, you have that, coupled with the constructio1. testing before it's turned over to preoperational testing, and when you put those all together and you have the overlap, . . . it's my belief and

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my professional opinion that those together have provided that degree of assurance re-quired by 10 CFR 50, Appendices A and B, as to the requisite safety and health of the public.

(Forney, Tr. 10,044-45). This being the case, there is simply no reason for Mr. Forney's " miniscule" disagreement with the Staff panel to weigh against our finding that work quality at Byron is adequate. Indeed, Mr. Forney's testimony shows that he believes strongly in the adequacy of Byron work quality.

201. James Keppler, the Region III administrator, describ-ed his own conclusions and those of the Staff on Byron work quality. His views are perhaps best summed up by the following passage from his testimony:

I want to take this opportunity to emphasize to the Board that, despite the identifica-tion of certain quality assurance problems at the Byron site, my staff and I had, and continue to have, confidence in the quality of completed construction at Byron. This confidence is based on our overall inspec-tion effort and was reinforced by the spe-cial team inspection conducted in early 1982. The applicant's reinspection program further reinforced our confidence. Unfor-tunately, I believe that in the August 1983 hearing we may have failed to convey to this Board our degree of confidence.

(Keppler, prepared testimony at 2, ff. Tr. 10,135).

l

f. Board Conclusions on Work Quality 202. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence, the Board observes that Applicant has presented numerous bases to support a determination that the quality of the Hatfield and Hunter work at the Byron plant is adequate. We have already found

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1

[.;  :

that Applicant's quality control inspectors were qualified, from which, based on the Appeal Board's observation, an infer-

= ence of adequate. work quality can be made. However, we do not rely cn1 this' inference'alone. Applicant also presented evi-dance demonstrating that-of all the discrepancies analyzed by

-Sargent,& Lundy,'none was found to have design significance.

Applicant's evidence also demonstrated that over 160,000 inspections 1were. performed of Hatfield and Hunter work covering a' wide range of the work these two contractors performed.

~

Of the approximately'5,000 discrepancies found in all these rein-I spections, the inherent design conservatisms or margin rendered most of them. inconsequential. The fewer than 500 discrepancies that did need to be dispositioned by detailed ~ calculations were all found to be within Code stress allowables and, as noted above, were not design-significant. Finally, Applicant's com-prehensive QA program adds to'our confidence in the adequacy of

- the Hatfield and Hunter work.

203. lIntervenors' only real challenge to the overall qual-ity of the Hatfield'and Hunter work lies in their assertion that, based upon mathematical statistical theory, inferences -

could not;be made regarding the. entire scope of the Hatfield and Hunter work based upon the sample of work reinspected in the Byron Reinspection Program. As noted above, we do not

-believe that there has been any showing that Applicant's use of statistics was erroneous. In any event, mathematical statisti-

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~

calLtheory played little, if.any, role in the conclusions

, reached by the engineering witnesses. These witnesses made clearLthat their conclusions lwere based on engineering judg-ment . . As did=the Licensing Board in the recent Shoreham deci-

. sion when it noted that 10 CFR Part 50,-Appendix B,.does not

-require the use of, nor-is it the practice in the nuclear

industry to utilize, statistical sampling methodology, we spe -

cifically decline to base any conclusions regarding work qual-

' ity_on the application of that methodology. We find that the

' numerous bases presented by Applicant, considered together,

- demonstrate that the overall quality of the Hatfield and Hunter work at the Byron plant is adequate.

OTHER ISSUES XI. ADEQUACY OF' EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY SYSTEMS CONTROL CORPORATION

a. . Background' 204. Systems. Control Corporation (" SCC") is the vendor that supplied safety related electrical equipment to Byron Sta-tion, specifically main control' panels, local instrument panels, DC fuse panels, cable. trays, and cable tray hangers.

205. At the 1983 licensing hearings, evidence was present-ed of past deficiencies in the implementation of SCC's quality

assurance' program, some of which led to the assessment of an item;of. noncompliance by the NRC Staff in an inspection report

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dated December 30, 1980. (Intervenors' Exhibit No. 8 - NRC Inspection ^ Report 454/80-04). Based on the evidence of the v

corrective actions taken with regard to SCC's work, we found

-that the matter could be resolved by the NRC Staff as a delega-h

~

ble' function. Thus, we concluded that there was nothing left-

-to adjudicate with respect to SCC. (I.D., 1 D-442.)

-206. Subsequent to the 1983 licensing hearings, uncorrect-ed weld deficiencies were found on equipment supplied by SCC.

It also became apparent that the Applicant had not fully met its commitments with respect to the corrective actions it had

~

taken in response to-the December, 1980 item of noncompliance.

Through board notifications made by counsel for the Applicant

' and by the NRC Staff in March and April, 1984, these matters were brought to the attention of the Appeal Board, which then.

had jurisdiction. (Letter of Michael Miller, dated March 14, 1984; letter of Thomas Novak, NRC Board Notification 84-074,

~ dated April 17, 1984.) Based on this new information, the

. Appeal Board deemed that the adequacy of the equipment supplied by SCC warranted further exploration in the remanded hearing.

(ALAB-770,-slip op. at 31-32.)

207. Evidence presented at the 1983 hearings and the remanded hearings recounted the history and extent of the cor-

. rective action program regarding SCC's work. In early 1980, Applicant identified a generic problem with welds on local instrument panels supplied by SCC. At the same time, as the r

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r 1

,. . result of allegations by an SCC, employee, the NRC Staff was- l

-conducting an. investigation of SCC quality' assurance activities i

(I.D., 1 D-97-98; Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony at 4-5,.ff. Tr. 10,478.) To resolve this problem, on February 15,

'1980 Applicant implemented an' inspection program for local instrument panels. 'All safety-related local instrument panels shipped prior to that date were inspected at Byron by Pitts-burgh Testing Laboratory (PTL) and.either repaired and rein-spected on site orisent.back to SCC for repairs. Local instru-ment panels initially shipped from SCC after February 15, 1980 were -inspected by PTL prior to ' shipment (" source inspected") .

Ultimately, all-safety-related local instrument panels were independently inspected by PTL and accepted. (Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 10,478.)

^

208. On December 30, 1980, the Staff issued its inspection report.concerning its investigation of SCC quality assurance practices and.found that Applicant had failed to take timely and effective actions ~to assure that deficiencies in the SCC r quality assurance program'and equipment fabrication activities

~

were corrected. (Intervenors' Exhibit No. 8 - NRC Inspection Report 454/80-04..) On January 26, 1981, eleven months after the implementation of the source inspection program described above, Applicant sent a letter to the Director of Inspection and Enforcement for Region III in response to the item of non-compliance. (Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony at 5-6 and

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i

. Attachment A, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Applicant's January 26, 1981 letter indicated that all safety-related equipment (not just local instrument panels) shipped from SCC since February, 1980 had been source inspected by PTL prior to shipment.*/ (Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Subse-quently, it was determined that 100 percent source inspections for that eleven month period were performed only for the safety-related local instrument panels. (Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Shipments made dur-ing that time of other safety-related equipment were only in-spected on a sample basis and there were no source inspections for seven main control panels shipped in that period. (Marcus, prepared testimony at 6-7 and Attachment A.) Mr. George F.

Marcus, Applicant's Director of Quality Assurance for Engineer-ing and Construction, acknowledged that Applicant failed to fully meet the commitment as stated in the January 26, 1981 letter regarding source inspection of equipment shipped during the period from February, 1980 to January, 1981. (Marcus, pre-pared testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr. 10,319.)

209. Nonconformance reports issued by Applicant in late 1983 and early 1984 regarding SCC weld discrepancies led the

• / Applicant's Janaury 26, 1981 letter also stated that all future shipments of safety-related equipment would be sub-ject to source inspection. Consistent with that statement, source inspections on a sample of each SCC shipment were performed subsequent to January 26, 1981. (Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 10,475.)

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v NRCLStaff to believe that SCC quality control inspections, as

-well as Applicant's corrective actions, had not been effect-ive . - (Hayes, Connaughton, Muffett, prepared testimony at 8, ff.ETr. 10,478.) 'Thus, the NRC Staff.took the position that-Applicant had to demonstrate that all equipment supplied by SCC as built-is able to withstand-as-built loads in conformance with applicable codes. (Hayes, Connaughton,'Muffett, prepared

' testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 10,478.)

210. Applicant's primary witnesses on this matter were Mr.

Bradley F. Maurer and Mr. Kenneth T. Kostal. Together, their test' imony' described the showing that Applicant has made to the INRC_ Staff to demonstrate the adequacy of the SCC equipment.

Mr. Maurer, a Senior Engineer with the Equipment Qualification Analysis Department of the Water Reactor Division of Westing-

- house Electric Corporation, described the inspections and analyses that were' performed by Westinghouse-to address the structural adequacy of the main control panels. (Maurer, pre-pared testimony, ff. Tr. 10,158.) Applicant retained Westing-

. house' in 1982 to evaluate the SCC main control panels. West-inghouse had previously been conducting similar evaluations on the main control panels supplied by Westinghouse which monitor and control the nuclear' steam supply functions. (Maurer, pre-pared testimony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 10,158.)

211. Mr. Kostal, a Partner and Assistant Manager of the Structural Department of Sargent & Lundy, detailed the inspec-

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,_._,__.___A_m _____-.------- - - - - - - - - * - -

'mW

+

tions andl evaluations performed by Sargent & Lundy of the SCC

~

DC. fuse panels, cable trays, cable tray hangers, and local

' instrument panels. . (Kostal, prepared testimony, ff. Tr.

J10,159.) Sargent~& Lundy's conclusions regarding the adequacy of ithose. components which were only inspected on a sample basis are, supported by a statistical analysis performed by Dr.

Anand K.-Singh; a structural engineer and Assistant Head for Sargent - & - Lundy's.1 Structural Analytical Division. (Singh, pre-

_- pared. testimony,.ff. Tr. 10,160.)

212. The NRC Region III Staff presented a panel of three

~

-witnesses who described their review and evaluation of the analyses.whichLwere performed by Westinghouse and Sargent &

Lundy.*/. The panel was comprised of Messrs. K. A. Connanghton, D. W. Hayes, and James Muffet, all of whom have been identified previously in. conjunction with their testimony regarding the

• / The NRC Staff witnesses also addressed Applicant's procure-l ment ~ practices with respect to SCC. The NRC Staff believed that 1D-105 aof our Initial Decision, which stated that

- Applicant had barred SCC indefinitely from procurement activities on safety-relatea puchases, should be qualified to. indicate that, although new purchase orders did not issue after. January, 1978, Applicant ~did procure additional

-safety-related items from SCC through change orders to existing orders.

(Connaughton, prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Applicant objected to this testimony as being beyond the scope of the' remanded hearings and irrele-

.vant to~any of the admitted. issues. (Tr. 10,467-69.) Al-though we agree with Applicant that procurement practices

'is'not an issue and is unimportant to the issue of the ade-quacy of the' SCC equipment, we admitted this testimony into evidence for the limited purpose of clarifying the nature and' extent.of the practices associated with the purchases.

(Tr. 10,475-76.)

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l l

Reinspection Program. (Hayes, Connaughton, Muffet, prepared testimony, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Except for a few concerns raised by Mr. Stokes.which are disposed of below, Intervenors pre-sented no witnesses addressing the adequacy of the SCC work, instead relying on their cross examination of Applicant's and the NRC Staff's witnesses.

213. In addition-to the Westinghouse and Sargent & Lundy

-inspections and evaluations, and the subsequent NRC Staff re-view ~thereof, Applicant sponsored the testimony of Mr. Louis D.

Johnson, a mechanical engineer and Manager of Projects for Torrey Pines Technology ("Torrey Pines"). (Johnson, prepared testimony, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines. conducted a further review of the SCC equipment and components. The purpose of the Torrey Pines review was to provide a third-party opinion on the adequacy of the safety-related SCC hardware at Byron. The personnel.used in;the Torrey Pines review were either qualified

' inspectors or engineers experienced in the fields of structural analysis, quality assurance, statistics, mechanical systems, and project management. -(Johnson, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 10,294.)-

l 214. The Torrey Pines review encompassed all of the SCC components: main control panels, DC fuse panels, cable trays, 1 cable. tray hangers, and local instrument panels. The Torrey

. Pines review program included the following tasks for each com-ponent: ' collection of all records pertinent to the accepta-

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- blility of SCC items; a review of records and evaluation of their objectivity; an engineering evaluation of the technical bases used to substantiate the acceptability of SCC items; identification of samples of the SCC work for reinspection; and documentation of any discrepancies found during the Torrey Pines reinspection between an observed condition and a required condition. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 9-12, ff. Tr.

10,294.)

215. The results of the various evaluations demonstrate that, except for one discrete area still under review and dele-gable to the NRC Staff for final resolution, the SCC work at the Byron Station is adequate to accept design loads without exceeding the code-allowable stresses. Based on this uncontro-verted evidence, we conclude that the quality of the SCC work is acceptable. The bases for this conclusion is discussed be-low.

b. Main Control Panels 216. The main control panels are located in the main con-trol room and house various controls, monitors and instruments necessary for all aspects of operation of the Byron Station.

The main control panels comprise the main control board, which is a U-shaped assembly of separate panels. Main control panels also stand alone or in panel line-ups in the main control room apart from the main control board. (Maurer, prepared testimony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 10,158.)

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J

'217. To determine the structural adequacy of the main con-trol panels to withstand seismic loadings, Westinghouse per-formed a_ detailed computer analysis using finite element model-ing techniques. By_this method, the structural elements of the main control panel are modeled by mathematical representations and the seismic loadings are determined by using the appro-priate response spectra at the elevation of the main control room. Moreover, it was assumed that the welds were adequate to keep the joints in a fixed condition and thus able to transmit loads. The finite element modeling analysis thereby determined

-the loads and stresses on each structural member. (Maurer, prepared testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr.10,158; Maurer, Tr. 10,169, 10,284.)

218. To assure that the finite element analysis addressed the as-built condition of the control panel welds, Mr. Maurer, accompanied by a Westinghouse Level II welding engineer, visu-ally inspected all of the accessible welds in each of the con-trol panels in the main control room. (Maurer, prepared testi-mony at 8-9, ff. Tr. 10,158.) The minimum values for weld

-length and size found as a result of the visual inspection (the.

" lower bound weld _ condition"), and tne maximum seismic loads acting on each type of structural member as determined by the finite element analysis, were then applied in a calculation to determine whether specific welded connections would have suffi-

.cient strength to withstand applied loads. (Maurer, prepared

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l l

testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 10,158; Maurer, Tr. 10,310-11, 10,165-67, 10,283-84.) The maximum stress calculated was found to be within the allowable stress criteria prescribed by the applica- l ble codes. (Maurer, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 10,158; Maureri Tr. .10,284.) In view of the margin of safety present in the construction of the main control panels, Mr. Maurer con-cluded that the structural integrity of the Byron main control panels, including those supplied by SCC, will be maintained in

-the event of design basis earthquake for the Byron Site.

(Maurer, prepared testimony at 11-13, ff. Tr. 10,158.)

219. NRC Region III Staff witness Mr. Muffett reviewed the Westinghouse analysis of the structural adequacy of the main control panels, and further reviewed correspondence between Sargent & Lundy and Westinghouse regarding the analytical methodology applied. From this review, Mr. Muffett concluded that the Westinghouse analysis demonstrated that stresses in the structural members and welds of the main control panel are within code allowable stresses and accordingly found this equipment acceptable. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 8-9, ff.

Tr. 10,478.)

220. .Torrey Pines reviewed the seismic analysis performed by Westinghouse of the main control panels and confirmed the validity of that analysis. Further, Torrey Pines conducted its own reinspection of one of the main control panels. This inspection verified that the weld discrepancies found were com-

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. . parable to discrepancies identified on main control panels in previous weld inspections. The Torrey Pines review also found q that redundant load paths were present in the structure of the main. control panels, and that significant design margins were present in~the components of the main control panels. Based on these' findings of Torrey Pines, Mr. Johnson concluded that the safety-related main control panels were capable of accepting design loads without exceeding code-allowable stresses.

(Johnson, prepared testimony at 13-18, ff. Tr. 10,294.)

-221. Intervenors' witness, Mr. Stokes, expressed concern over the reported use of tack welds and Bondo, an auto bcdy repair compound, in the repair of main control board panels.

(Stokes, prepared testimony at 22-24 and' attachments 12, 13, ff. 10,770.) Specifically, Mr. Stokes questioned this practice when design drawings call for full penetration welds. Further, Mr. Stokes postulated that the Bondo could crack and cause par-ticles to lodge in contact switches. (Stokes, prepared testi-mony at 23, ff. 10,770.)

222. In rebuttal, Mr. Maurer explained that epoxy resin surface filler such as Bondo was used by both SCC and Westing-

. house to repair surface marks or scratches on the main control panels. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testimony at 2-3, ff. Tr.

11,158.) However, in three instances it was discovered that Bondo was used for other than cosmetic purposes. In three locations on the face of the main control panels, steel plates

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F1 .

had'been tack' welded and filled with epoxy resin surface filler rather than welded with full penetration welds. (Maurer, pre-pared rebuttal testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 11,158.) To repair these conditions, the steel plates were welded using full pene-tration welds. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testimony at 3, ff.

Tr. 11,158.) In addition, a complete inspection of all of the main control panels supplied by Systems Control and Westing-

~ house was performed and no other instances of tack welded plates with Bondo were found. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal tes-timony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 11,158.)

223. In the course of their cross examination of the Staff witnesses, Intervenors also raised the question of whether the full penetration welding repair could cause unacceptable warp-ing of the main control panels. (Tr. 10,528-29.) Mr. Maurer explained that the welding of the steel plates was performed using techniques that limited the heat build up, thus, minimiz-ing the potential for warping of the panels. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 11,158: Connaughton, Tr.

10,517-18.) Moreover, the panels were inspected upon comple-tion of the welding and no warpage was found. (Maurer, pre-pared rebuttal testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 11,158.)

224. Mr. Maurer also explained, in response to Mr. Stokes' other concern, that it is not possible for particles of Bondo to become lodged in a safety-related control switch since those switches are enclosed to protect the contacts from dirt and

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debris. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testimony at 4, ff. Tr.

11,158.)

225. Mr. Stokes also questioned whether SCC had been allowed to write its own acceptance criteria to close out NCR-F-544. This NCR was issued in August, 1980, and it indicated that certain main control panels did not meet the AWS Code. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 11,158.) Mr.

Maurer explained that SCC did not supply the acceptance cri-teria.to close out the nonconformance report. Rather, Westing-house established the criteria in accordance with AWS DI.1 (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 10,770.)

The results of the Westinghouse inspection of the welds in the main control panels have already been discussed in this deci-sion, and the conclusion renders moot any concerns raised by the nonconformance report. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testi-mony at 5, ff. Tr. 11,158; Maurer, prepared testimony at 8-10, ff. Tr. 10,158; Connaughton, Tr. 10,520.)

c. DC Fuse Panels 226. Four DC fuse panels were supplied to Byron by SCC.

These cabinet-type structures are used to house the fuses and relays which protect-the DC electrical system. The fuses and relays are mounted to the internal structural steel members of the panels. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 45-46, ff. Tr.

10,159.)

t 227. In 1981 discrepant welds were found on the SCC DC fuse panels during an inspection by Sargent & Lundy level III

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7 inspectors. lif the 2,170 welds inspected, 986 were found dis-crepant. -In addition. stitch welds were missing on one location in one of the panels, Panel No. 2DC10J. These inspection re-

'sults caused. Applicant to question the efficacy of a seismic qualification analysis of the DC fuse panels performed by Wiley Laboratories in 1980. Consequently Sargent & Lundy was re-quested to requalify these four DC fuse panels by performing a Lfurther analysis. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 46-47, ff.

Tr. 10,159.)

228. The 1980 Wyle Laboratory seismic qualification test consisted of a resonance test and a " shake table" test per-formed on one of the DC fuse panels, Panel No. 1DC10J. The latter test simulated the ground motion to be experienced by the DC-fuse panels during the design basis earthquake. The

' panel tested by-Wyle contained the discrepancies discovered by Sargent & Lundy in 1981. Consequently, the Sargent & Lundy requalification analysis compared the discrepant weld condi-tions in the other three panels with the discrepancies in the Wyle-tested panel to determine equivalency. Based on this analysis, two of.the non-tested panels were found to have greater effective weld than the Wyle-tested panel, thus those two panels were determined to be equivalent to the tested panel and were therefore considered seismically qualified. (Kostal,

' prepared testimoney at 48, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

229. The panel with the missing stitch welds, Panel No.

'2DC10J,-was found in one location to have less e'ffective weld

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r, '\

' 3 i

.j '

s .

quantity than the Wyle-tested panel. Sargent & Lundy performed a finite element model computer analysis of that panel to determine whether it was equivalent to the Wyle-tested panel for purposes?of seismic qualification. The finite element l

model incorporated the as-built condition of the panel, includ-

[

' ing the missing welds. The computer analysis utilizing this

( /

mode 1' determined that the dynamic characteristics of the panel r

were 'similar to the dynamic characteristics found in the Wyle-tested panel. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 48-49, ff. Tr.

10,159.)- Thus, Mr. Kostal concluded that panel 2DC10J is equivalent to the Wyle-tested DC fuse panel in terms of seismic fqualification. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 49, ff. Tr.

'10,159.) Further, Sargent & Lundy determined that all stresses lin the members and the weld are well within code-allowables.

(Kostal, prepared testimony at 49-50, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

b .230. The NRC Region III Staff reviewed the Sargent & Lundy analysis of the DC fuse panels and concluded that the struc-tural adequacy of the DC fuse panels had been demonstrated.

(Muffstt, prepared testimony at 10-11, ff. Tr. 10,478.)

231. Torrey Pines also concluded that the DC fuse panels were adequate for design use. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 20, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines reviewed the seismic quali-fication testing on the DC fuse panel performed by Wyle Laboratories and. independently inspected 47 welds in the DC fuse panels which revealed three nonsignificant discrepancies.

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. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 20-21, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Based on its inspection and review, Torrey Pines concluded that the non-tested DC fuse panel-can be' deemed equivalent to the tested

. panel for the purposes of seismic qualification. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 21, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines also found that the structure of the DC fuse panels has redundant

. load paths which do not depend on single welds or single weld connections for structural integrity and that there was signif-icant design margin in the construction of the DC fuse panels.

(Johnson, prepared testimony at 21, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines also reviewed the finite element model computer analysis performed by Sargent & Lundy on the one panel found by Sargent & Lundy to have a weld quantity less than the Wyle-tested panel. Based on this review, Torrey Pines concluded that Sargent & Lundy properly conducted that analysis, thus validating its conclusion.. (Johnson, Tr. 10,299-300.)

d. ' Cable Trays 232. Cable trays supplied by JCC are used to support and protect electrical cables in the Byron Station. A majority of the cable trays are constructed of sheet metal formed into troughs 12 to 30 inches wide and 4 to 6 inches deep. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 24 and Figure 7, ff. Tr. 10,159.) These flat bottomed trays have V-shaped sheet metal stiffeners stitch

-welded across their bottom at 5 feet intervals to provide addi-tional support. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 24 and Figure

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8, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Cable tray fittings are used to accommo-date changes of directions in a cable tray run, to connect cable tray intersections, or to adapt trays of different sizes. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 24 and Figures 2, 7, ff.

Tr. 10,159.) Less than three percent of the antire length of cable trays is comprised of ladder-type cable trays and ladder-type tray fittings. Ladder cable trays are constructed by con-necting two sheet metal side channels with pipe rungs at approximately 12 inch intervals. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 25 and Figure 10, ff. Tr. 10,159.) T-type ladder tray fit-tings are used to join intersecting ladder trays and are con-structed in a similar manner to straight ladder trays.

(Kostal, prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Sargent &

Lundy performed engineering evaluation'on all these types of cable trays and fittings. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

Cable Tray Stiffeners 233. Discrepant welds on cable tray stiffeners were ident-ified in July, 1980. To address this issue, a random sample of stiffeners was inspected, encompassing cable trays and fittings from all building floor elevations. (Kostal, prepared testi-mony at 26, ff. Tr. 10,159.) This inspection, conducted by Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories and verified by Applicant's site quality' assurance personnel, found weld in excess of the minimum amount required by design on all of the 227 stiffeners

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w-

f inspe ted. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 26-27, ff. Tr. -

a 10,159.) Subsequently, at the request of the NRC Staff, the -

q same stiffeners were reinspected for weld quality. This rein- _

n-spection found weld discrepancies on each stiffener. The weld discrepancies found included lack of fusion, undersize, ;_

craters, undercut, and porosity. (Kostal, prepared testimony I .

at 27, ff. Tr. 10,159). In addition, small linear crack indi- =

cations approximately 1/4 inch in length were observed. These cracks were determined to be non-propogating. (Kostal, pre-pared testimony at 27, ff. Tr. 10,159.) c-234. Sargent & Lundy's engineering evaluation of the dis-crepant welds, which conservatively deleted the discrepant por-tion of the weld from total weld length, determined that all r-welds were adequate to transfer design loads. (Kostal, pre-pared testimony at 27, ff. Tr. 10,159.) An additional engi-  ?

neering evaluation of the stiffeners which were found to have Cf k

the small crack indications conservatively assumed the complete

}

absence of the stiffener from the cable tray. This additional [-

evaluation showed that the complete absence of tray stiffeners t---

is not significant to the design, and cable trays will carry Ek design loads even without stiffeners. (Kostal, prepared testi-mony at 28-29, ff. Tr. 10,159). Based on these evaluations, Sargent & Lundy concluded that the stiffeners supplied by SCC __

to Byron are adequate to carry design loads. (Kostal, prepared _

_1 testimony at 28-29, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

E_ _

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w

x 235. The NRC Region III Staff reviewed Sargent & Lundy's

-analysis of the effect of a missing cable tray stiffener on

. cable tray-design and generally agreed with the conclusion that the stiffeners are not required to carry the design loads.

(Muffett, prepared testimony at 14-17, ff. Tr. 10,478.) How-ever, the NRC Staff did observe that the load combination methodology used by Sargent & Lundy did not adhere to the methodology to which the Byron plant is committed pursuant to

'its FSAR. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 16, ff. Tr.

10,478.) In response to this concern, Sargent & Lundy per-formed a re-analysis using the appropriate combination method-

= ology. This re-analysis has been received and reviewed by the NRC Staff and found to be acceptable. (Muffett, Tr. 10,479-480.)

236. . Based on its review of the Sargent & Lundy analysis of-SCC cable trays, Torrey Pines concluded that the Sargent &

~

.Lundy evaluation provides a valid demonstration of the adequacy of the SCC cable trays. (Johnson,-prepared testimony at 37-38, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines' conclusion regarding the valid-ity of Sargent & Lundy's evaluations is supported by the re-sults of its own inspection of the cable trays. (Johnson, pre-pared testimony at 38-39, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Further, Sargent &

-Lundy's conclusion is upported by the results of other cable tray inspections performed over the years, the presence of

. redundant. load paths in the structure of the cable trays, and

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the significant design margin in the cable trays. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 39-40, ff. Tr. 10,294.)

Cable Tray Fittings

'237. Cable tray fittings were inspected in 1977 as part of an overall response to a nonconformance report regarding SCC welder qualifications and procedures. 99 out of the approxi-mately 1200 fittings then present at Byron were inspected by Industrial Contract Services for the purpose of determining SCC weld quality. Four fittings were found to have side channel weld discrepancies, including lack of fusion, porosity, and a missing weld attaching a corner bent plate to the cable tray side channel. An engineering assessment performed at that time of the weld discrepancies concluded that none of them had de-sign significance. This conclusion was based on the presence of alternate load paths available to transfer loads through the fitting around the discrepant fitting weld. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 29-30, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

238. In June, 1984, an editional engineering evaluation by Sargent & Lundy confirmed that the fitting welds are not required-to meet structural load-carrying requirements for any fitting because of the presence of alternate load paths to carry the cable loading through the tray fittings. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 30, ff. Tr. 10,159.) However, the eval-uation determined that in one configuration, involving the out-side fitting weld of a 90 degree fitting, only one load bearing

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redundancy exists, and that is the redundancy offered by the fitting stiffener. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr.

10,159.) In order to ensure that either the outside weld or the stiffener veld is present at each 90 degree fitting, all such fittings were inspected. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr. 10,159; Kostal, Tr. 10,234-35.) The inspection found that all of the outside fitting welds were present.

(Kostal, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr. 10,159; Kostal, Tr.

10,234-35.)

239. The NRC Region III Staff reviewed the Sargent & Lundy evaluation of the cable tray fittings and concurred in the con-clusion that fitting welds are not required to carry the design loads except where the fitting stiffener weld is missing.

(Muffett, prepared testimony at 15-16, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Upon hearing Mr. Kostal's testimony that the inspection had been completed and that all outside fitting welds were found to be in place, Mr. Muffett expressed confidence that the reinspec-tion effort with respect to cable tray fittings had been con-cluded and indicated satisfactory welding on those fittings.

(Muffett, Tr. 10,521.)

Ladder Cable Trays and Fittings 240. A recent inspection of ladder cable trays and fit-tings supplied by SCC found that a particular weld called a

" horizontal weld," prescribed in the design drawings, was generally missing. This weld was one of two welds contemplated

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- n I

l for use to connect the tray rungs to the side channel to the ladder cable tray. The discovery of the missing welds prompted a further inspection to assure the adequacy of the trays. The inspection, which included a random sample of 17 straight sec-tions'of ladder tray encompassing 300 weld connections, dis-closed several weld discrepancies. No welds were missing (other than the horizontal welds as noted above) and no cracks were observed. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr.

10,159.) In addition, 10 randomly selected ladder tray fit-tings were inspected and it was thereby verified that the welded connections there are similar to those found in the straight sections of ladder trays. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

241. Sargent & Lundy performed engineering evaluations to determine whether the inspected ladder trays could adequately support the design loads given the missing horizontal welds and the. identified weld discrepancies. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 33,.ff. Tr. 10,159.) The results of these evaluations show-ed that the ladder cable trays were structurally adequate, assuming the absence of the horizontal welds, and that none of the weld discrepancies had design significance. (Kostal, pre-

_ pared testimony at 34, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Thus, the ladder trays and ladder tray fittings supplied by SCC were determined to be of adequate quality. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 34, ff.

Tr. 10,159.)

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[

, _ . . ,..., . . . . . _ . . . . ~ . . . . _ . _ . . . . . .. . . . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ . .. __

242. The NRC Region III Staff reviewed the Sargent & Lundy analysis of the structural adequacy the ladder cable trays and fittings and, with one reservation, concurred with Sargent &

Lundy's conclusion. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 13-14, ff.

Tr. 10,478.) The NRC Staff believed that the Sargent & Lundy method for calculating the strength of those weld connections where the pipe rung on a ladder tray fitting intersects the side channel at a 45 degree angle should be refined to take into account the reductic a in effective weld throat at such intersections. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 14, ff. Tr.

10,478.) In response to the NRC Staff's concern, Sargent &

Lundy performed recalculations incorporating the suggested refinement. The NRC Staff has received and reviewed the re-analysis and found it acceptable. (Muffett, Tr. 10,479.)

243. Torrey Pines also conducted a review of the Sargent &

Lundy analysis of the ladder cable trays and fittings supplied by SCC. Based on that review, Torrey Pines confirmed that the as-built condition of the ladder cable trays and fittings is adequate to accept design loads. (Johnson, Tr. 10,302-03.)

Conclusion Regarding Cable Trays 244. Based on the absence of any design significant weld discrepancies on SCC cable tray work, the load bearing redun-dancies present in the cable tray system, and the conservative design of the cable trays and conservative analytical criteria used by Sargent & Lundy, we conclude that the quality of the

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cable trays supplied by Systems Control, including solid-bottom trays and fittings and ladder trays and fittings, is adequate.

(Kostal, prepared testimony at 34-37, ff. Tr. 10,159; Kostal, Tr. 10,235; Johnson, prepared testimony at 37-41, ff. Tr.

10,294; Johnson, Tr. 10,302-03; Muffett, prepared testimony at' 12-16, ff. Tr. 10,478; Muffett, Tr. 10,479-80, 10,521.)

e. Cable Tray Hangers 245. Cable tray hanger assemblies supplied by SCC are installed to support the cable trays. A typical assembly has horizontal and vertical members that are joined by connections which are comprised of welds applied in the shop by SCC and welds applied in the field by Hatfield Electric Company, the contractor responsible for hanger installation. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 10-11, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

246. Mr. Kostal detailed the several engineering evalua-tions that have been performed on varying aspects of the cable tray hanger system over last several years, none of which ever found any weld discrepanices of design significance. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 12-20, ff. Tr. 10,159.) The most signif-icant of these evaluations was conducted in 1984 pursuant to Applicant's nonconformance reports regarding weld quality dis-crepancies found by Hatfield Electric Company on the SCC shop welds. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 10,159.) To address the general concern for SCC weld quality, Sargent &

Lundy identified for weld inspection a random sample of 80

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hangers out the population of 5717 SCC cable tray hangers at the Byron Station. The sample captured all commonly used con-nection types, and 44 connections that were deemed to be highly stressed. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 12-13, ff. Tr.

10,159.) The 80 selected hangers included 358 SCC shop-welded connections. Of these, 252 were found to have no discrepan-cies, and 106 were found to have some form of discrepancy such as underlength, undersize, overlap, undercut, and craters. Two of the discrepant connections were missing portions of welds.

No cracks were found on the welds. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 12-13, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

247. Sargent'& Lundy's engineering evaluation of the dis-crepant SCC hanger welds conservatively deleted the discrepant portion of the weld from the total weld length, and new connec-tion capacities were thereby calculated. (Kostal, prepared testimony at-13, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Comparison of these newly calculated connection capacities against the design capacities showed that none of the discrepant welds had design signifi-cance. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

248. A further analysis was performed with respect to the most discrepant welds identified during the inspection pro-gram. Detailed computer models were developed for the three hanger assemblies which contained the three welds found during the evaluation of the 358 connections to have the greatest reductions in load capacity. All identified weld discrepancies

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- for each of those hanger assemblies were incorporated in the computer model. The analysis of this model redistributed the loads among the hanger connections to reflect the presence of weld discrepancies. This analysis showed that despite the reduction in weld capacity, there remained a design margin of at least a factor of three, that is, each of the three hanger assemblies analyzed could accommodate three times the design load without exceeding code-allowable stress for any of the connections or structural members. (Kostel, prepared testimony at 14-15, ff. Tr. 10,159; Kostal, Tr. 10,241.)

249. Although the two instances of missing portions of welds on the SCC cable tray hanger connections were evaluated and found to be without design significance, they caused the greatest amount of capacity reduction in the evaluated connec-tions. The greatest capacity reduction was found to be 53 percent. (Kostal, Tr. 10,261-62.) To assure that missing welds do not compromise the adequacy of other connections, an additional inspection program was undertaken. This program called for every connection which cannot accommodate a capacity reduction of 53 percent when subjected to design loads to be inspected for missing portions of welds. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 23, ff. Tr. 10,159; Kostal, Tr. 10,243-248, 10,255-256.) The program also called for any welds found to be missing a portion of weld to be evaluated and restored if required by design. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 23, ff. Tr.

10,159.)

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250. There are approximately 3000 SCC hanger connections which cannot accomodate a 53 percent capacity reduction under design loads. (Muffett, Tr. 10,506.) At the time of Mr.

Koctal's testimony, the additional inspection program was approximately 30 percent completed. (Kostal, Tr. 10,256.) By the time the NRC Staff witnesses testified, slightly more than two weeks later, that program had been completed and had identified at least one instance where a hanger connection capacity was reduced by more than 53 percent. (Muffett, Tr.

10,507.)

251. Because of the finding of an instance where a missing weld caused a hanger connection capacity reduction in excess of 53 percent, the inspection program was expanded to include inspection of all accessible SCC hanger connections for missing welds. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 17-18, ff. Tr.

10,478.) In addition, all SCC DV-8 and DV-8(a) type connec-tions are being reinspected, regardless of their accessibil-ity, i.e. fireproofing or block walls will be removed to access these connections. (Muffett, Tr. 10,484, 10,488-489.) The DV-8 and DV-8(a) connections are being 100 percent inspected since they have been found to have had the most discrepancies, including the missing welds. (Muffett, Tr. 10,484.)

252. Under the expanded hanger connection inspection pro-gram, if a portion of a missing weld is found, an evaluation will be performed to determine whether the capacity of the con-

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nection is reduced by greater than 53 percent. (Muffett, Tr.

10,512.) If any hanger connection is found to have a capacity reduction in excess of 53 percent, the program will be further expanded to include all inaccessible connections. (Muffett, Tr. 10,483, 10,512-13.) However, further expansion of the inspection program may not be necessary if Applicant can demon-strate the NRC Region III Staff circumstances associated with the connection which would obviate the necessity of inspecting all inaccessible connections on the hangers. (Muffett, Tr.

10,483-84.)

253. The expanded hanger connection inspection program is an extensive undertaking. There are approximately 10,000 DV-8 and DV-8(a) connections, accessible and inaccessible, and approximately 20,000 connections of all other types, 80 to 90 percent of which are accessible and therefore subject to the expanded reinspection program. (Muffett, Tr. 10,488.) At the time of the hearings, Applicant had established a procedure for conducting the expanded program of inspection for missing welds on SCC cable tray hanger connections. This procedure was reviewed by the NRC Region III Staff and found to be acceptable for the purpose of determining the acceptability of the in-stalled cable pan hangers. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 17-18, ff. Tr. 10,478; Muffett, Tr. 10,480-81, 10,500; NRC Staff Exhibit R-1 " Instruction for Walkdown of Cable Tray Hanger Connection Welds, Byron Station.")

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254. Although the results of the expanded inspectior pro-gram were not yet available at the time of the hearings, we find no need to hold the record open for its results. (Tr. 11, 169-71.) We conclude that responsibility for final resolution of the adequacy of the SCC cable tray hangers may be appro-priately delegated to the NRC Region III Staff. As a basis for this conclusion, we note

• hat the expanded inspection program for SCC cable tray hangers calls for a 100 percent inspection of all accessible hanger connections for missing welds. This is a task requiring little subjective or skilled analysis.

(Tr. 10,253.) All that remains to be done is to confirm that this work is completed and that any necessary repairs are made. The NRC Region III Staff's acceptance of the expanded inspection program confirms our judgment that the program will adequately resolve any question as to the quality of the SCC cable tray hangers.

f. Local Instrument Panels 255. Local instrument panels are located throughout the Byron plant and are used to support instruments which monitor and control functions and equipment located in proximity to the panels. SCC supplied 76 local instrument panels to the Byron

. Station. The panels are four feet or eight feet wide and are

{

constructed of horizontal, vertical and angular steel members joined by welded connections. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 37-38 and Figures 11, 12, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

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256. As stated previously in the background discussion of

.this section, a 100 percent reinspection of the SCC local instrument panels was performed by PTL after the discovery in 1980 of discrepant welds in the panels. Weld discrepancies on the-local instrument panels discovered during the PTL reinspec-tion were repaired to preserve the validity of prior seismic qualification tests conducted by Wyle Laboratories. These tests concluded that all local instrument panels fabricated by SCC were seismically qualified as long as their fabrication conformed with the fabrication drawings and specifications that were used in the fabrication of the panel tested by Wyle Labo-ratories. -(Kostal, prepared testimony at 38-40, ff. Tr.

10,159.)

257. However, in June, 1984, during the course of its sam-ple inspection of seven of the SCC local instrument panels, Torrey Pines found 17 weld discrepancies. The Torrey Pines inspection encompassed 205 welds, which is approximately 10 percent of the total number of welds on the sample of seven panels. Three of the panels had no discrepancies. (Kostal, prepared testimony at-40-41, ff. Tr.'10,159; Johnson, prepared testimony at 23-24, ff. Tr. 10,294.)

258. The Torrey Pines inspection findings raised the pos-sibility that the as-built condition of the non-tested local

~ instrument panels might be sufficiently different from the con-

,, dition of the Wyle-tested panel such that the seismic qualifi-

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t_

cation test results could not be used as a basis for reaching conclusions regarding the seismic qualification of all remain-ing local instrument' panels. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 28-29, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Thus, Applicant implemented a weld inspection program to confirm that the local instrument panels installed at Byron were sufficiently equivalent to the Wyle--

tested panel to warrant application of the seismic test results to the entire population of local instrument panels. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 28; Kostal, prepared testimony at 41, ff.

Tr. 10,159.)

259. Under this new weld inspection program, Sargent &

Lundy Level III weld inspectors inspected 17 of the local instrument panels-including the Wyle-tested panel. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 41-42, ff. Tr. 10,159.) A total of 389 connections, encompassing 1455 welds, were inspected. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 42, ff. Tr. 10,159.) The inspection found 271 discrepancies, none of which were cracks or missing welds. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 42, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

Based on comparisons of the total effective weld, Sargent &

Lundy found the untested panels are equivalent to the Wyle-tested panel for purposes of application of the seismic quali-fication. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 43, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

Sargent & Lundy thus concluded that the entire population of SCC local instrument panels at the Byron Station is in suffi-ciently equivalent condition to the Wyle-tested panels to jus-

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______:______c___:__.__________.______________.____________.______.____

tify application of the seismic qualification test results to the non-tested panels. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 43-44, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

260. Sargent & Lundy's conclusion is further supported by a computer analysis it performed utilizing a finite element model of one of the local instrument panels. A dynamic analy-sis of the model found that the model shared similar dynamic characteristics with the Wyle-tested panel. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 44, ff. Tr. 10,159.) The analysis also showed that the most highly stressed connection was stressed to only 10 percent of the code-allowable stress. Further, application of the greatest reduction in weld capacity that was identified in the inspections of the local instrument panels to the most highly stressed connection showed that connection to be stress-ed to only 12 percent of its code-allowable stress, thus indi-cating a design margin factor of at least eight in all local instrument panel connections. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 44-45, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Thus, Sargent & Lundy concluded that the quality of the SCC local instrument panels is adequate.

(Kostal, prepared testimony at 45, ff. Tr. 10,159.)

261. Torrey Pines also concluded that the SCC local instrument panels are adequate for design use. (Johnson, pro-pared testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines' con-clusion is based on its review of the seismic qualification testing performed by Wyle Laboratories, and the equivalency of

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I

]

the seven local instrument panels inspected by Torrey Pines to 1

the Wyle-tested panel. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 24-27, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines' conclusion is also based on the presence of redundant load paths in the panels' components and l the significant design margin in the construction of the pan-els. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 27-28, ff. Tr. 10,294.)

Torrey Pines also reviewed the recent inspection and evaluation performed by Sargent & Lundy of the local instrument panel welds and found that analysis to be complete and accurate.

(Johnson, Tr. 10,302.)

262. The NRC Staff also reviewed the Sargent & Lundy eval-uation of the local instrument panels and the Wyle Laboratory seismic qualification tests. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 10,478.) The NRC Staff found that the equivalency analysis and the finite element model computer analysis demon-strate '.he structural adequacy of the SCC local instrument panels. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 10,478.)

13.. Conclusion Regarding Adequacy Of Systems Control Work Corporation's Equipment 263. We do not condone the fact.that Applicant did not fully meet its commitment to the NRC Region III Staff in 1980 to conduct source inspections of the SCC-supplied equipment.

However,' Applicant has not attempted to justify its failure to fully meet its source inspection committment, devoting its attention instead to.an extensive _ inspection and analytical effort designed to evaluate the adequacy of SCC equipment in

' - 142- .

w . w y- , ------y e v ,- w . --w- .--v.- ,r,- - , ~ .

f l

. its as-installed condition. The results of this effort are i

satisfactory, indicating both that the design of these compo-nents was sufficiently conservative so that they could accomo-date many minor discrepancies in fabrication without compromis-ing their ability to withstand design basis events and that the recent inspection efforts have been sufficiently extensive so as to have uncovered any significant discrepancies that had previously gone undetected.

264. Based on this uncontroverted evidence, we find that, except for cable tray hangers, the SCC equipment at the Byron Station has been demonstrated to be adequate to accept design loads without exceeding the code-allowable stresses. With regard to the cable tray hangers, we find as discussed above that the final resolution of the adequacy of that equipment may be delegated to the NRC Region III Staff. Thus, we conclude that the adequacy of SCC equipment no longer presents a safety issue requiring our further attention.

XII. CABLE OVERTENSIONING 265. In our June 8 Order we requested a full evidentiary presentation on the cause and safety significance of alleged instances of overstressing of electrical cables during pulling and the relationship of these instances to the Byron Reinspec-tion Program. This matter was not considered during the rein-spection program because cable pulling is not a recreatable activity. (Love, prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 9510.)

-143-

l 266. Applicant presented two witnesses to address this issue. James O. Binder, Applicant's Project Electrical Super-visor ~at Byron, discussed the history of the cable overtension-ing issue at Byron and explained Applicant's response to items of noncompliance and open items regarding cable overtensioning which were identified by the Staff during various inspections.

. Bobby G. Treece, Sargent & Lundy's Senior-Electrical Project Engineer at Byron, described the analysis performed by Sargent

& Lundy of all of the safety-related electrical cables in-stalled in conduit at Byron before December, 1982. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether any of those cables had been rendered unacceptable due to overtensioning. (Treece, prepared testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 9408.) The testimony of R. S.

Love of the NRC Staff also addressed the question of possible cable overtensioning. (Love, prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr.

9510.)

267. Hatfield Electrical Company was responsible for cable installation at Byron. Cable tension criteria, addressing both maximum allowable tensile strength and maximum allowable side-wall pressures, have been established to give reasonable assur-ance that the cable's published _ rating will not be impaired during installation. Tension in excess of either criterion could render a cable unable to perform its intended function.

(Binder, prepared testimony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 9406.)

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268. Possible cable overtensioning was first identified during an NRC Staff inspection conducted in September, 1981, when it was observed that Hatfield's procedure governing class lE cable installation did not address verification that allow-able tension has not been exceeded when small cables were pulled. (Binder, prepared testimony at 5 and Attachment A -

Inspection Report 81-16/81-12 at A-7 to A-8, ff. Tr. 9406.)

Hatfield revised its procedure to address the precautions to be taken when small cables are pulled and the NRC Staff subse-quently closed this unresolved item. (Binder, prepared testi-mony at 6 and' Attachment B - Inspection Report 83-16 at B-6, ff. Tr. 9406.)

269. The Construction Assessment Team (" CAT") inspection conducted in the Spring of 1982 found that Hatfield's cable installation procedures did not address the requirements for calculating electrical cable sidewall pressure and did not pro-vide instructions regarding cable rework. (Binder, prepared testimony at 6 and Attachment C - Inspection Report 82-05/82-04 at C-70 to.C-71, ff. Tr. 9406.) In response, Hatfield revised its procedures to address allowable pulling tension considering sidewall pressure limitations and instructions regarding elec-trical cable rework. The revised procedures were implemented in December, 1982. The NRC Staff found the revised procedures satisfactory and closed this portion of the item of ntncompli-l

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. ance. (Binder, prepared testimony at 7 and Attachment B In-spection Report 83-16 at B-6, ff. Tr. 9406.)

270. For cables installed prior to the implementation of the' revised procedures, Applicant committed to review the reports for previously installed cables against the current criteria and to take appropriate corrective action, if needed, to-ensure that regardless of when installed, all cables would perform their intended function. (Binder, prepared testimony at 8 and Attachment D at D-3, ff. Tr. 9406.)

271. Mr. Treece explained the details of the analysis and methodology o5 this review, which was performed by Sargent and Lundy. The analysis covered all safety-related cables in-stalled in conduit prior to December, 1982, including those cables-for which cable pull reports do not exist. Most of

- these cables were found acceptable based on information found in the cable pull reports, or, where such reports are non-

. existent, on calculations which showed that the expected pull-ing tensions did not exceed the cable's allowable pulling tension. (Treece, prepared testimony at 5-9, ff. Tr. 9408.)

For'those cables for which the actual or expected pulling ten-sion was found or calculated to have exceeded the allowable pulling tension, specific analyses were performed by the manu-

_facturers of.the cables.to determine whether the cables were acceptable. (Treece, prepared testimony at 6-7, 9-10, ff. Tr.

9408.) Based on this review by Sargent & Lundy and the cable

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. manufacturers,.all safety-related cables pulled in conduit before December, 1982, were determined to be acceptable, i.e.

their ability to perform their intended functions had not been impaired by overtensioning. (Treece, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 9408.) )

272. The NRC Staff reviewed Sargent & Lundy's analysis and concluded that there was reasonable assurance that the safety-related cables that were the subject of the analysis would perform their intended functions. (Treece, prepared testimony at 11 and Attachment D - Inspection Report 84-27/84-19 at D-14 to D-15, ff. Tr. 9408; Love, prepared testimony at 26-27, ff.

Tr. 9510.)

273. Allegations concerning Hatfield's construction activities prompted an-NRC Staff special inspection between August, 1983, and January, 1984. As a result of that inspec-tion it was determined that the one allegation regarding an instance in which a cable h'da been overstressed.to the breaking point had been mooted by the documented replacement of that cable. (Binder, prepared testimony at 9 and Attachment F -

Inspection Report 84-02 at F-14, ff. Tr. 9406.)

274. The NRC Staff inspection in response to the allega-tions also involved a review of Applicant's Nonconformance Report (NCR) Log; at least 25 NCRs concerning potential cable overtensioning were found. The allegations thus resulted in'an open item, pending verification of corrective action on cables

-147-

~

m installed prior _to December 1982, and cables identified in NCRs and Discrepancy Reports (DR) as potentially overtensioned.

(Binder, prepared testimony at 9-10 and Attachment F at F-17, ff. Tr. 9406.) The former part of this open item was closed out by the Sargent & Lundy analysis and the subsequent NRC review described above. The latter portion of this open item prompted an NRC Staff review of Applicant NCRs. Since some of the NCRs had yet-to be closed by Applicant, the NRC considered the item unresolved. (Binder, prepared testimony at 10-11 and-Attachment G - Inspection Report 84-09 at G-6 to G-9, ff. Tr.

9406.) The unresolved item was closed by the Staff upon their review of Applicant's subsequent disposition of the open NCRs.

The NRC Staff-found the disposition of the NCRs pertaining to potential cable overtensioning to be acceptable. (Binder, pre-pared testimony at 11 and Attachment E at E-15, ff. Tr. 9406.)

275. Applicant dispositioned its NCRs pertaining to poten-tial cable overtensioning by determining the acceptability of ,

the~ cable as installed through analyses performed by Sargent &

Lundy or by the cable manufacturer. vmen analysis demonstrated that a cable was unacceptable, it was replaced. (Binder, pre-pared testimony at 11-12, ff. Tr. 9406.)

276. The NRC Staff inspection also reviewed 1,000 dis-crepancy reports prepared by Hatfield. One of those reports,

~

which concerned potential cable overtensioning of neighboring cables during a cable removal, was determined to have been i-

-148-

inadequately dispositioned and resulted in an item of noncom-pliance. (Si;. der, prepared testimony at 12 and Attachment G - Inspection Report 84-09/84-07 at G-12 to G-13, ff. Tr.

9406.) The DR.was faulted for providing an inadequate written description of the problem, which prevented the evaluating engineer from addressing the actual problem. Subsequent veri-  ;

fication by a different.QC inspector determined that the engi-neering resolution adequately addressed the problem as de-scribed,'thus closing the discrepancy report. (Binder, pre-pared testimony at 13-14, Tr. 9406.)

277. This item of noncompliance was resolved by replace-ment of all cables in question and review of all other DRs con-cerning cables pulled out of conduit to confirm that the inaccurate description associated with the improperly disposi-tioned discrepancy report was an isolated incident. (Binder, prepared testimony at 14-15 and Attachment I - April 25, 1984, letter from Applicant to NRC, ff. Tr. 9406.) To prevent recur-rence of this kind of problem, Applicant established criteria for determining the allowable pulling tension when cable is pulled out of. conduit. (Binder, prepared testimony at 15 and Attachment J - February 2, 1984 letter from Applicant to Hatfield.) The NRC Staff accepted this resolution of the item of_ noncompliance.-(Binder, prepared testimony at 15 and Attach-ment E - Inspection Report 84-27/84-19, at E-15, ff. Tr. 9406.)

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g --

3 I

278. Based.on'the revised procedures implemented by )

i l

Hatfield in December, 1982, and the Sargent & Lundy analysis of the safety-related cables installed in conduit at Byron prior to that time, the Licensing Board concludes that all such cables at the Byron Station are acceptable and that their ability to perform their intended functions has not been impaired by overtensioning. Although the inspection of this activity by a quality control inspector was deemed not recreat-able for purposes of the BRP, the revision to procedures and analyses described above. indicate the acceptability of the Y cables and~ demonstrate that the BRP is not the sole basis on which work quality can be determined.

XIII. TABLING ALLEGATION-279. During the hearings held in the Spring of 1983, former Hunter QA auditor Michael Smith testified, inter alia, "that he was sometimes instructed not to include in his final inspection reports discrepant conditions he hcd discovered. He was told, he said, that the problem would be' caught later on.

As an example, Mr. Smith described an incident in which he was allegedly instructed not to document missing component supports Land support documents. (I.D., 1 137.) In our Initial Decision

._ we found that: Edison had failed to meet the thrust of this

" tabling" allegation. (I.D., 1 139.) We concluded that'the essence of-the tabling allegation had been substantiated, our

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' ~

.x

~

-}

\

i 1

'particular concern being a perceived lack of assurance that missing component supports had been identified and that ade-quate. documentation. existed for all component supports. (I.D.,

l'144.) LWe also concluded that.an effective reinspection pro-

~

gram was essential toan verification of the adequacy of Hunter's QA program. (I.D., 1 170.)

280. We identified this tabling issue as a proper subject s

for,the remanded hearing, insofar as the BRP would address our concerns regarding tabling. Applicant addressed this concern

, through-the testimony of Malcolm Somsag. Mr. Somsag is the

~

l site-quality ~ assurance supervisor for Hunter at Byron. He has pre'viously_ testified for. Applicant, primarily in response to Mr. Smith's allegations. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 1, ff.

Tr. 9452.) Messrs. Connaughton and Ward addressed the tabling

~ ' issue'on behalf of the Staff. (NRC Staff, prepared testimony at.19-21, ff. Tr. 9510.).

281. The BRP included a review of safety-related component

~

supports' installed by Hunter Corporation and of documentation associated with the installation of suchtsupports. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 9452.) Tha BRP did not iden-tify one instance in which documentation of safety-related con--

ponent-supports required by the design was missing or one s

. instance in which documentation existed but the associated sup-

port was'not installed.

(Somsag, prepared testimony at 4, ff.

Tr. 9452.) JThus, the results of the BRP confirm the adequacy

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of the inspection program established by Hunter to provide assurance that component supports at Byron have been properly installed and documented. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 9452; NRC Staff, prepared testimony at 21, ff. Tr.

9510.)

282. Mr. Somsag described the inspection program to which the BRP was applied in detail. The program consists of four broad inspection types to which all safety-related work, in-cluding the installation of safety-related component supports, is subjected. Type 1 inspections are conducted during initial installation of activities to verify the existence and adequacy of required documentation. Type 2 inspections are also con-ducted during installation activities and are designed to

,=,

determine whether the hardware meets design requirements and whether the dccumentation continues to reflect the status of construction and inspection. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 2, 3, ff. Tr. 9452.)*/

283. Once the work and Type 1 and 2 inspections associated with the work on a construction drawings are completed, Type 3 inspections are conducted to verify the overall adequacy work.

Type 3 inspections include a detailed review of documentation s

• / Mr. Somsag testified that this program was established in March, 1980. Hunter conducted an inspection of 100% of the supports installed prior to March, 1990 to assure that these supposts had been properly installed and documented.

(Somsag, prepared testimony at 2, ff. Tr. 9452.)

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2 generated during construction to verify that all required

, inspections have been conducted and documented, and that the hardware conforms to the requirements of the construction draw-ings and associated as-built documentation. (Somsag, prepared s

testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 9452.)

284. Type 4 inspections take place immediately before Hunter notifies Applicant that its work on a given system has

_ been completed. The Type 4 inspection program was developed in part to deal with the concern we expressed in our initial deci-sion, that hangers which had been installed and inspected might subsequently be removed during construction without follow-up S inspection. The Type 4 inspection program requires physical reinspection of 100 percent of the safety-related hardware in-stalled by Hunter to verify that the installations have remain-ed in place, intact and undamaged. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 3-5, ff. Tr. 9452.)

285. Mr. Somsag further testified that even if, following

~-

completion of Type 3 or Type 4 inspections, hardware is removed

=- or altered other than as required by a design change, the r Hunter QA program requires that a Hardware Removal / Alteration

[ Report be filed detailing the change. The report is routed to the QA Department and triggers reinspection to verify that the

[-_ hardware has been reinstalled and is acceptable. (Somsag, pre-pared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9452. )

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Y s i

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?

286. We find that the design of the program described by Mr. Somsag assures that component supports were properly in-stalled and documented, and that supports were not subsequently altas red or removed without the knowledge of the Hunter QA orga-nization. We find that the reults of the BRP confirm that this program was improperly implemented.*/

XIV. APPLICANT QA OVERSIGHT OF HATFIELD, HUNTER AND PTL SIFCE AUGUST 1983 287. In accordance with our June 8 Order, Applicant, through Mr. Shewski, provided testimony regarding QA department oversight of Hatfield, Hunter and PTL between August 1983, when we closed the record, and the start of the reopened proceedings.

288. Mr. Shewski told us that special audit and surveil-lance attention was paid to Hatfield during this period. He testified that 14 audits and at least 22 surveillances of Hatfield were performed. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 32, ff. Tr. 8423.)

• / In passing, we also note that Mr. Somsag also directly ad-dressed Mr. Smith's tabling allegation. According to Mr.

Somsag, during the course of a Hunter audit (059-3), Mr.

Smith initially selected for review certain non-safety re-lated component supports. Since non-safety related sup-ports are not subject to quality assurance review, Mr.

Somsag instructed Mr. Smith not to review those supports as part of the audit. Mr. Somsag believes these were the sup-ports which were referenced in Mr. Smith's testimony.

Thus, Mr. Somsag ascribes no safety significance to Mr.

Smith's specific allegation. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 5-7, ff. Tr. 9452.) We agree with Mr. Somsag.

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i 289. The audits covered Hatfield's work activities, including welder qualification testing, material traceability, procedures, insportiens, auditing, personnel qualifications, corrective actions, training, installation activities, calibra-tion activities, records, fire protection, storage and house-keeping, field change requests, design control and document

_1 control. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 32, ff. Tr. 8423.)

290. The Hatfield surveillances looked at such items as corrective actions, personnel qualifications, calibration acti-vities, document control, welding, inspection reports, instal-lation activities and design change control. (Shewski, pre-

[ pared testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 8423.)

291. The Hatfield audit results identified 17 deficiencies

=_

(7 findings and 10 observations). The findings involved audit follow up and objective errors, inadequate identification on

weld traveler cards, lack of inspection of combination hangers, improper disposition of discrepancy reports and failure of some

' QC inspectors to perform required read / study activities.

(Shewski, prepared testimony at 32, 33, ff. Tr. 8423.)

292. Hatfield's correction actions consisted of additional inspections, auditing, training, review of personnel documenta-tion packages and review of discrepancy reports to ensure prop-er disposition. Mr. Shewski testified that for all audit find-ings acceptable corrective action by Hatfield has been achieved

_~ -155-

or is underway. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr.

8423.)

293. Mr. Shewski concludes that, overall, quality assur-ance implementation by Hatfield during this period has been acceptable. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 8423.)

294. In Hunter's case, Applicant's quality assurance orga-nization has conducted 34 audits and at least 142 separate sur-veillances between August, 1983 and the start of the reopened hearing. The audits covered the key aspects of Hunter's work activities and quality program requirements, including width restraint installations, handling, storage and shipping, non-conformances, welder qualification testing, inspector qualifi-cat. ions, design and installation methodology, control of field change notices, concrete expansion anchors and bolted connec-tions, equipment installation, corrective action, auditing, piping and equipment component support, installation and engi-neering activities, document control and quality assurance implementation in general. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 30, ff. Tr. 8423.)

295. The 142 surveillances performed of Hunter looked at such iteme as personnel qualifications, calibration activities, welding and weld rod control, housekeeping and storage, in-specting and walkdown activities and installation activities.

(Shewski, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr. 8423.)

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296. In view of the extensive scope of these audits and surveillances, the results demonstrate exceptional perfor-mance by Hunter. Of the 16 deficiencies identified (6 finding and 10 observations), none were found to be significant and each required only minor corrective action. All deficiencies were closed out by subsequent surveillances. (Shewski, pre-pared testimony at 30, 31, ff. Tr. 8423.)

297. For PTL, 8 audits and at least 51 surveillances have been performed since August, 1983. The audits covered PTL's inspection activities in such areas as tool, gauge and instru-ment control, calibration activities, corrective actions, trending, inspections of electrical installations, document control, test / inspection reports, visual weld inspections, handling, storage and shipping, procurement and equipment con-trol, auditing, and radiographic and ultrasonic examination.

(Shewski, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr. 8423.)

298. The 51 surveillances of PTL covered such items as calibration activities, personnel qualifications, ultrasonic, radiographic, magnetic particle and dye penetrant examinations, visual weld inspections, document control, material control and civil activities. (Shevski, prepared testimony at 31, 32, ff.

Tr. 8423.)

299. The PTL audits identified 10 deficiences (4 findings and 6 observations). These involved an inspector improperly accepting seven two-inch welds, a receiving inspector not hav-

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. ing proper certification, whiteout having been used by one per-son on sample logs, and incomplete documentation on ultrasonic test records. Corrective action for these deficiencies basic-ally involved retraining. Mr. Shewaki testified that these PTL findings and observations did not have significance and that adequate corrective measures were easily achieved. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 32, ff. Tr. 8423.)

300. Applicant's QA program prescribes that a large number of varied types of audits and surveillances be conducted at its nuclear construction sites. As we noted in our Initial Deci-sion, Applicant's practice is to delegate the initial responsi-bility for quality control and quality assurance to the con-tractors actually performing the work. (I.D., 1 D-80.)

According to Mr. Behnke, this is based on CECO's belief that the organization doing the work will produce a higher quality product if it inspects and audits itself. This is also con-sistent with CECO's policy to insist on obtaining documented quality performance from each of the contractors and vendors with whom it does business. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 5, 6, ff. Tr. 9336.) We find that Applicant's QA eversight since August, 1983 of Hatfield, Hunt.*r and PTL was extensive and indicates that Applicant has overcome any excessive delegation of the quality assurance function to those contractors which was previously observed.

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XV. APPLICANT'S QA MEASURES TO PREVENT IN-ACCURATE CiR UNRELIABLE CONTRACTOR DOCUMENTATION PRACTICES 301. Given the concerns expressed in our initial decision regarding the reliability of Hatfield's documentation and our a.ssessment that Applicant's initial evidentiary presentation on this issue " bordered on default," we heard evidence in the reopened proceeding regarding Applicant's current efforts to assure itself that quality documentation is accurate and relia-ble. As background for this issue Mr. Shewski testified on the changes in Hatfield documentation which have taken place over the years and on the current state of Hatfield's documentation practices. (Shewski, Tr. 6755-60.)

302. According to Mr. Shewski, Hatfield's documentation procedures have gone through several changes since Hatfield began work at Byron in 1976. Originally, weld inspections were performed using drawings as the inspection document. In this regard, about 5% of the welds were spot checked against the drawings and the results were indicated on the drawings.

Thereafter, Hatfield changed from inspections based on drawings to the use of weld traveler cards. These traveler cards con-stitute the primary record of weld quality and record the inspection results by Quality Control Inspectors (See App. Ex.

R-1) In 1981, Hatfield changed from spot checks to 100%

inspection of all welds. (Shewski, Tr. 8756-57.) It should be noted that all cable pan hangers installed prior to this re-

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quirement for 100% inspection were inspected on a retrospective basis, (Shewski, Tr. 8758; Del George, Tr. 8760; Behnke, pre-pared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 9336.) Mr. Shewski testified that, based on his experience, neither Hatfield's documentation practices nor its procedures over time differ markedly from those of electrical contractors at other nuclear sites.

(Shewski, Tr. 8736.) This evolution in inspection practices and documentation is at least partially responsible for the apparent difficulty which Hatfield has experienced in maintain-ing proper documentation from time to time. Since Hunter per-forms much of its construction work under the ASME Code they have always had a weld traveler system and documented inspec-tions and have not experienced documentation problems compara-ble to Hatfield'c. (Shewski,, Tr. 8761.)

303. Mr. Shewski told us that since mid-1982, special attention has been given by Applicant's site quality assurance organization to actions by site contractors which might lead to inaccurate or unreliable documentation. Training for detecting sossible alterations to documents was conducted for site QA personnel. Lead auditor retraining also covers this subject.

Auditors have been trained to check for improper records as part of document review activities, even when specific ques-tions are not on the audit checklist. We earlier discussed CECO's audit of Hatfield's implementation of the BRP which specifically included a review of the accuracy and reliability

-160-l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

of Hatfiell's records (1's 87 - 90, supra). There is no evi-dence that the records of certification of QC and QA inspectors or of the BRP are inaccurate or unreliable. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 25, 26, ff. Tr. 8423; Hansel, Tr. 9013.)

304. A two month long Applicant audit of over 10,500 rec-ords was conducted in late 1982 to verify the authenticity of contractor QC documentation. Another related audit was per-formed for the BRP in early 1984 by Applicant's general office quality assurance department. Hunter, Hatfield and PTL records were covered by the audit. One purpose of the audits was to make certain that no fradulent documentation practice has occurred. The contractors' method of control and administra-tion of QC qualification tests were reviewed, including reviews to verify that retests were done with a different test than the original and that tests and test answers were controlled.

Calibrat:.on records were reviewed to ensure that information and date were unique, complete and not improperly altered and that signatures on documents were original and by authorized personnel. Reviews were also conducted to verify that site QA personnel were checking contractor welder qualifications and QC inspector qualification packages for acceptability and authen-ticity. No fradulent activities were identified. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 26, ff. Tr. 8423.)

l 305. Mr. Shewski concluded that recently increased audit and surveillance programs have shown that all of the contrac-

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tors, including Hatfield, are currently doing a good job of maintaining accurate documentation. (Shewski, Tr. 8669.) In his opinion, any problems have been isolated and have involved human errors or misunderstandings without serious impact.

(Shewski, Tr. 8685, 8759.)

306. On the basis of Mr. Shewski's testimony, we find that in our initial decision, at 19 NRC 214-15, paragraph D-438, we misunderstood Hatfield's documentation procedures when we stated that Hatfield appeared incapable of maintaining reliable records. This confusion was caused in part by Hatfield's changing documentation methodology. (Shewski, Tr. 8756.) We also conclude that Applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated adequate measures to prevent inaccurate or unreliable documen-tation by Hatfield as well as by the other contractors.

XVI. ACTIVITIES OF PITTSBURGH TESTING LABORATORY 307. PTL has been on site at Byron sinca September, 1977.

PTL has not been responsible for any underlying construction work. (Del George, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 8406.)

Rather, PTL reports to the CECO Site QA Department and per-forms independent inspections and destructive and nondestruc-tive testing involving many of the key activities of the site contractors. The scope of work performed by PTL includes non-destructive testing of welds, concrete testing, aggregate test-ing, concrete expansion anchor inspection and testing, soils

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- N y ..  ; testing,tcalibration, and bolting inspection. The nondestruc-tive testing includes radiographic testing of welding and most ofLthe magnetic. particle, liquid penetrant and ultrasonic test-ing. '(Showski, prepared testimony at 27, 28, ff. Tr. 8423.)

'308.- PTL also performs overinspections to check construc-tion' work performed and inspected by the site contractors and f

' to survey contractor activities in the structural, mechanical

and electrical disciplines. -These overinspections have been

. performed by PTL since 1980 and are in addition to the QC inspections required of the site contractors. They generally

. cover up to l'O percent of a work activity and have been concen-trated'in the areas of welding, electrical' installations and

~HVAC installations.

309.- In September, 1982, Applicant's quality assurance department initiated an additional form of inspection called a unit-concept inspection ("UCI") which PTL is required to per -

form each week at Byron. :PTL uses a team of inspectors who are qualified.in various disciplines to inspect items installed

-within particular spatial boundariea or in conjunction with

' specific equipment for compliance with vendor and engineering documents. . This particular inspection encompasses all contrac-tors who performed work activities within a given area. These UCIs areLin addition to the normal inspections and overinspec-

~tions performed on site. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 28,

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q

~

. :29, ff. Tr. 8423; Del George, prepared testimony at 53, ff. Tr.

H f 8406.)

l~

i 310. The Board finds that the overinspections and UCIs

. provide additional confidence that the field work and the inspection activities of the contractors have been performed acceptably. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 28, ff. Tr. 8423.)

XVII. DISPOSITION OF ALLEGATIONS 311. In our Initial Decision, we expressed concern over several matters regarding Hatfield arising from worker allega-tions that were still pending with the Region III and the Office of Investigations, and noted that the NRC Region III Staff intended to close out several allegations on the basis of the results of the reinspection program. (I.D., 1's D-406, D-407, D-439.) In our June 8, 1984 prehearing order, we clari-fied that our concern was limited to whether, in accordance with the NRC Staff's expectations, the BRP has been effective in resolving some of the worker allegations. We also asked whether the NRC Staff or Applicant had identified any allega-tions, as having independent and important relevance to the reinspection program. (Memorandum and Order at 8-9, June 8, 1984.)

312. The NRC Staff presented a panel of two witnesses, Messrs. Hayes and Connaughton, to address these matters.

(Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony, ff. Tr. 9964.) The

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I I

- BRP was relied upon to resolve two worker allegations regarding Hatfield welding, and supplemented the resolution of three others. The remainder of the 23 allegations assigned to Region III and as yet uninvestigated at the close of the August, 1983 hearings have since been resolved independent of the BRP.

(Hayes, prepared testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 9964.)

313. Of the two allegations resolved by the BRP, one con-cerned widespread undercut in excess of AWS code limits. This allegation was found to be unsubstantiated through third-party inspections and independent NRC inspections. (Hayes, prepared testimony at 3 and Attachment A, ff. Tr. 9964.) The other allegation, received in August, 1982 stated that two QC inspec-tors were unqualified. The allegation was considered substan-tiated, but was subsequently resolved by the ERP's extensive examination of the work of QC inspectors at the Byron Station.

(Hayes, prepared testimony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 9964).

314. The three allegations whose resolution was supple-mented by data from the BRP all concerned Hatfield welding.

(Hayes, prepared testimony at 4 and Attachment C, ff. Tr.

9964.) One allegation, that approximately 90 percent of cer-tain Hatfield hangers which were covered with fireproofing and which were inspected because of missing weld trevelers were rejectable, was disproven by results of inspections which were conducted to resolve a related nonconformance report. The BRP reinspected welds that were covered with fireproofing and found

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.n'one that required repair, thus confirming the above results.

(Hayes, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 9964.) A second alle-gation claimed that the rejection rate for Hatfield hanger

. velds merited removal of fireproofing to reinspect additional welds. This allegation was resolved in the course of the BRP, which removed all the fireproofing in areas identified by the alleger and the finding thereby of only one unacceptable con-nection. (Hayes, prepared testimony at 4-5, ff. Tr. 9964.)

315. A third allegation charged that fireproofing covered tack welds and that there was no documentation of such un-acceptable welds. This allegation was resolved by the inspec-tion and completion of the welds identified by the alleger, and the BRP inspection of 5,500 fireproofed welds which found only two tack welds. Further, it was found that discrepancy reports were not issued because the tack welds had not yet been accepted by QC at the time of the allegation. (Hayes, prenared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9964.)

316. In response to our second request, the NRC Staff found, with one exception, no other allegations of independent and important relevance to the BRP. In the one exception, the NRC Staff found an allegation regarding the improper certifica-tion of one QC inspector to be substantiated. Appropriate cor-rective actions were taken with respect to this individual and found acceptable to the NRC Staff. (Hayes, prepared testimony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 9964.)

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317. Based on the NRC Staff's testimony, we find that the

BRP has been effective, as expected by the NRC Staff, for resolving:certain allegations regarding Hatfield. Thus, our

~

-questions in this regard have~been satisfied.

XVIII. MODIFICATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN INITIAL DECISION

^318. Based on this supplemental decision, several of the findings and conclusions in our Initial Decision of January 13 must now be either modified or withdrawn. The Summary and Com-ments Section of our Initial Decision does not constitute any portion of our factual findings and we make no change in that part of our Initial Decision. Similarly, we make no change in the Conclusion and order Section of the Initial Decision, stat-ing, however, that it is superseded in its entirety by the Con- .

clusions of Law and Order Sections of this Supplemental Initial Decision.

319. Findings D-137 through D-145 of our Initial Decision are modified insofar as they suggest that Mr. Smith's allega-c tion of " tabling" has safety significance. (See l's 279 -

286.) Accordingly, our conclusion in finding D-169, that the alleged " tabling" is a serious matter which could have impor-tant consequences, is withdrawn.

320. Finding D-378 is modified to reflect the final re-sults of the BRP for inspector qualifications. (See 1's 99 - 101.)

-167-

)

321. The concerns expressed in findings D-403 and D-404 regarding possible fradulent contractor practices have now been resolved in our ' satisfaction and CECO has established that Hatfield documentation is not fraudulent and is adequately reliable and accurate.. (See l's 301 - 306.)

322. Finding D-410 is modified insofar as it suggests that Region III has taken exception to the 90 percent acceptance criterion for subjective inspections and the definition of sub-jective weld attributes. Undisputed testimony in the reopened hearing has shown that the Staff fully concurs with this accep-tance criterion and the definition of subjective weld attri-butes. (See.1 54.)

323. Finding D-414 is modified insofar as it suggests that Edison's presentation on the BRP has been inadequate.

324. Finding D-429, which concludes that Intervenors pre--

vail on the essence of the quality assurance contention, is withdrawn. We now conclude that Edison has fully met its bur-den of proof on the quality assurance issue..

'325. The second sentence of finding D-433, which concludes that Edison does not have an adequate quality assurance pro-gram, is withdrawn.

326. In finding D-434 we concluded that we did not have confidence in the-quality of Hatfield's work at Byron. On the basis of the testimony adduced at the reopened hearing, we now

-163-

)

. have confidence in the quality of Hatfield's work. Finding D-434 is therefore withdrawn.

327. Findings D-435, D-436 and D-437, which raise ques-tions as the adequacy of the BRP, are withdrawn.

328. Finding D-438 is withdrawn. The testimony of Mr.

Shewski and others has convinced us that Hatfield is not inca-pable of maintaining reliable records of nonconforming and deviating conditions. In addition, our concerns as to the validity and accuracy of the BRP results for Hatfield have been satisfied.

329. Findings D-439 and D-440 are modified to reflect the fact that the BRP has resolved all allegations within the scope of the reinspections conducted pursuant to that program.

330. Finding D-441, which concludes that Hatfield's qual-ity assurance program is inadequate, is withdrawn. The BRP results, together with the other testimony is the reopened hearing, show that Hatfield quality control inspectors were qualified, that Hatfield work quality is adequate and that Hatfield's quality documentation is adequate.

331. Finding D-442, which states our conclusion regarding the adequacy of SCC equipment, is withdrawn except for its first three sentences which may remain as stated. The status l of Applicant's commitment to conduct source inspections of SCC equ.4.pment and the status of its program to reinspect the SCC

-169-l

c) work has been addressed in this supplemental decision. (See T's 204 - 265.)

332. Finding D-444 is modified insofar as it suggests that the quality of Hunter's work is inadequate. Testimony in the reopened hearing has shown that Hunter inspectors were quali-fied and that Hunter work quality is inadequate.

333. The first sentence of Finding D-448, which concludes that Edison's QA performance with respect to Hatfield and Hunter has been inadequate, is withdrawn.

XIX. CONCLUSIC'JE OF LAW 334. Applicant has met its burden of proof with respect to Contention 1A, and the contention is hereby rejected. Having decided in our previous decision that Applicant had met its burden of proof with respect to the other seven issues in con-troversy, the Licensing Board concludes with respect to each of these contentions that there is reasonable assurance that the Byron Nuclear Power Station can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public.

XX. ORDER WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, in accordance with 10 C.F.R.

Il 2.760(a) and 2.762, that the Initial Decision as modified by this Supplemental Initial Decision shall constitute the final action of the Commission thirty (30) days after the date of l

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0 The forgoing document, Commonwealth Edison' Company's Proposed Supplemental Initial Decision, is respectfully submitted "by the undersigned, attorneys for Commonwealth Edison Company.

l} g

lib:a: t Ylb.Y'b' Michael I. Miller i

N n d / r.l b

/ Joryeph Gallo i-Isham, Lincoln & Beale Three First National Plaza Suite 5200 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 558-7500 .

i Isham, Lincoln & Beale

1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Suite 840 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-9730 Date: September 10, 1984 I

~

I 00tr.!TED u%nC UNITED STATES OF~ AMERICA u NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

. '84 SEP 13 P12:00 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

. , FFi U :KM "

h~00$[11NG&SEK BRANCH

' In The Matter of )

)

- COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454-OL

) 50-455-OL

_.(Byron Nuclear Power Station, )

Units 1 & 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'The-undersigned, one of the attorneys for Common--

- wealth Edison Company, certifies that he' filed the original and-two copies of the attached " COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL INITIAL DECISION" with the Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory' Commission and served copies on

'the persons and at the addresses shown on the attached

~

service list. Unless otherwise noted on the Service. List, service on the Secretary and all parties was made by deposit in 1the U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, this 10th day of September, 1984.

One of the Attorneys for Commonwealth Edison Company ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE Three First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 558-7500 m,

n .. .

SERVICE LIST COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY -- Byron Station Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455

• Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Dr. Bruce von Zellen Administrative Judge Department of Biological Sciences Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Northern Illinois University U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dekalb, Illinois 60115 4350 East West Highway West Tower - Room 439 ** Douglas W. Cassel, Jr.

Bethesda, Maryland 20814 BPI 109 N. Dearborn St.; Suite 1300

• Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Chicago, Illinois 60602 Administrative Judge 102 Oak Lane Mrs. Patricia Morrison Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 5568 Thunderidge Drive Rockford, Illinois 61107

• Dr. Richard F. Cole Administrative Judge *Mr. Steve Lewis Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mr. Michael Wilcove U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal 4350 East West Highway Director West Tower - Room 439 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, Maryland 20814 7735 Old Georgetown Road Room 96C4 Joseph Gallo, Esq. Bethesda, Md. 20814 Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 840 Atomic Safety and Licensing 1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW Board Panel Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Region III U.S. Nulcear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of Inspection & Enforcement Appeal Board Panel 799 Roosevelt Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Betty Johnson Docketing & Service Section 1907 Stratford Lane Office of the Secretary Rockford, Illinois 61107 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Diane Chavez SAFE 405 South Fourth Street Rockford, Illinois 61108

• Served by Federal Express

• • Served by Messenger I . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _