Text

Bsep,Units 1 & 2 SW Single Failure Analysis, Reflecting Installation of Plant Mods
	ML20046A326
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	03/27/1992
From:	Casey M; CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20046A307	List: ML20046A306; ML20046A313; ML20046A320; ML20046A326; ML20046A329; ML20046A335; ML20046A340; ML20046A449;
References
	G0050A-16, G0050A-16-R01, G50A-16, G50A-16-R1, NUDOCS 9307270243
	Download: ML20046A326 (108)
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Calculation C0050A 16 Rsv. 1 Pcge i TABLE OF CONTENTS

' Cover Sheet Table of Contents i List of Effective Pages ii I. Purpose 1 II. References 1 III. Single Failure Analysis 3 A. Introduction 3 B. BSEP Service Water Single Failure 10-Methodology and Analysis C. Limiting Failures 16 IV. Sucanary 23 V. Attachments 25 A. Table 1 20 pages B. Table 2 5 pages C. Design Verification Sheets 12 pages f

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Cal'culation G0050A-16 Rev. 1 Page ii LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Pare Revision Eagg Revision i 1 Att. A 1 ii 1 Att. B 0 1 1 Att. C 1 2 1 3 1 4 0 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 0 9 0 10 1 11 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 15 1 16 1 17 1 18 1 19 1 20 1 21 1 22 0 23 1 24 0 25 0 l

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Csiculation C0050A-16 Rev. 1 Page 1 of 25 I. PURPOSE The purpose of this document is to analyze the Brunswick Unit 1 and

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Unit 2 Service Water systems for the ability to withstand the effe:ts of a single failure.

II. REFERENCES A. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Appendix A.

B. SECY-77-439, Inf ormation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on the Single Failure Criterion.

C. Standard Review Plan (NUREC-0800), Section 9.2.1.

D. ANSI N658-1976/ANS-51.7 Single Failure Criteria for PWR Fluid Systems.

E. ANSI /ANS 38.9-1981 Single Failure Criteria for Light Water Reactor Safety-Related Systems.

F. Brunswick Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 9.

C. ANSI /IEEE 379-1972, 1977, 1988 IEEE Standard Application of the ,

Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems.

H. Letter f rom Mr. L. I. Loflin to Mr. E. A. Bishop dated ,

December 18, 1989 -

Subject:

Service Water System Hydraulic Report-I. IEEE 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear ,

Generating Stations.

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~J. BSEP Calculations '

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1. C0050A-12, Rev. 4, BSEP Unit 2 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis. j

2. C0050A 10., Rev. 4, BSEP Unit 1 Service Water System-Hydraulic Analysis.

3. C0050A 17 Rev. O, Loss of Service Water Lube Water. ,

-l K. Plant Modifications89-049, 89-04B, 89 088, and 89-089. !

1 L. System Description SD-43, Service Water System, Rev. 13.

M. Technical Specification Interpretation No. 90-03 'Rev. 0. '

N. EER 89 0333, vital Header Operation from the CSW header.

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0. EER 89-0334, Loss of Service Water Lube Water, t P. Service Water System Operating Procedures 1-OP-43. Rev. 38, and -

2 OP-43, Rev. 75.

Q. Technical Specification No. 3 7.1.2.

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'III. SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS A. INTRODUCTION

1. Background The Single Failure Criterion has been successfully used as a tool to verify an acceptable level of equipment redundancy in safety-related systems. Briefly, it is the requirement for a system to perform its safety function in spite of the failure of any single component within the. system or in any system which supports operation of a safety system.

Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," established the requirement to analyze for single failures. Since that time, the concept of single failures has been the subject of numerous !

interpretations and standards. The Appendix itself was indefinite, stating that some of the considerations - for example, the need to design against a single failure of a passive component in a fluid system - were not sufficiently developed.

The first part of this single failure section deals with the pertinent laws, standards, and definitions regarding single failures. Included in this part are the specific interpretations for the Brunswick Service Water system. The second part provides a description of the methods for selecting the components and malfunctions and leads into Table 1, a listing of BNP Unit 2 components. The Brunswick Service Water P& ids were examined, the system was analyzed, and components subject to the Single Failure Criterion were listed. The possible failure modes and effects were added, with compensating factors and remarks. Power supplies were incorporated to aid in demonstrating separation and redundancy. The Unit 1 P& ids and system were also examined and Unit 1 components and power supplies were listed in Table 2. The failure modes and effects, compensating factors, and remarks are the same as Unit 2. The Unit 1 analysis is enveloped by the Unit 2 analysis, The last part of this section details the selection of the j most limiting cases and discusses these cases more fully.

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Calculation C0050A-16

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2. Regulatory Documents

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10 CFR.Part 50, Appendix A. General Design Criteria for ;

Nuclear Power Plants, Definitions and Explanations, defines

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" single failure" as:

"A single failure means an oc 4 ce which results in the loss of capability of a com; o perform its intended _ ,

safety function. Multiple faa./. esulting from a single l

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occurrence are considered to be a single failure. Fluid and electric systems are considered to be designed against an .{

assumed single failure if neither (1) a single failure.of +

any active component (assuming passive components function properly) nor (2) a single failure of a passive component (assuming active components function properly), results in a !

loss of the capability of the system to perf orm its saf ety ;

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10 CFR 50, Appendix A, footnote 2 addresses the need to-design for electrical active and passive f ailures:

" Single failures of passive. components in electric systems =i should be-assumed in designing against a single failure."

SECY-77-439 (2.B.)' interprets this as follows:

l "This means that for electric systems no distinction is made between failures of active and passive components and all ,

such failures must be considered when applying the Single l Failure Criterion.'"

s General Design Criterion 44 - Cooling Water, requires:

"Suitat ' - redundancy in components and features, and ,

suitv51e interconnections, leak detection, and isolation ,

cap:.bilities shall be provided to assure that for on-site elect ric power system operation (assuming off site power is not avai'asle) the system safety function can be accoc9' eso , assuming a single failure."

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Calculation G0050A-16 Rcv. 1 Pegs 5 of 25 GDC 44 does not differentiate between mechanical active and/or passive failures; however, passive failures are mentioned in Footnote 2 to the single failure definition:

"The. conditions under which a single failure of a passive component in a fluid system should be considered in designing the system against a single failure are under development."

SECY-77-439 (2.D.) (issued in 1977) defines passive fluid system failures, using a check valve failure as an example:

"A passive failure in a fluid system means a breach in the fluid pressure boundary or a mechanical failure which adversely affects a flow path. Examples include the failure of a simple check valve to move to its correct position when required, the leakage of fluid from failed components, such as pipes and valves- particularly through a failed seal at a valve or pump--or line blockage." The SECY continues with an explanation of why passive mechanical failures are not analyzed in the short-term and only limited passive failures ~

are assumed in the long-term: "In the study of passive ,

f ailures, it is current practice to assume fluid leakage owing to gross failure of a pump or valve seal during the long-term cooling mode following a LOCA (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or greater after the event) but not pipe breaks. No other passive failures are required to be assumed because it is judged that compounding the probabilities associated with other types of passive failures, following the pipe break associated with a LOCA, results in probabilities suff?.ciently small that they can be reasonably discounted without substantially affecting overall systems reliability." Also: "

.. in keeping with the defense in depth approach, the staff does consider the effects of certain passive failures (e.g., check valve failure, medium a e high energy pipe f ailure, valve stem or tonnet f ailure) is potential accident initiating events."

SECY-77-439 (6. paragraph 2) also describes how ANSI N658 is inconsistent with the current (1977) regulatory practice by considering check valve failures as active failures.

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Calculation G0050A 16 Rev. 1 Page 6 of 25 i

Section 9.2.1 (II.4.b) of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), Station Service Water System, specifies that the system's "saf ety f unction can be performed assuming a single active component' failure coincident with the loss of off-site power." ,

3. Additional References The definitions for active and passive failures are given in ANSI /ANS 58.9-1981, Single Failure Criteria for Light Water Reactor Safety-Related Fluid Systems, Section 2.0, Definitions: (note that this document was issued af ter the Brunswick licensing; "An active failure is a malfunction, excluding passive failures, of a component that relies on mechanical movement to complete its intended function upon demand. Examples of active failures include the failure of a powered valve or a check valve to move to its correct position, or the failure of a pump, fan, or diesel generator to start. Spurious operation of a powered component due to a failure originating within its automatic actuation or control ,

systems shall be regarded as an active failure unless specific features or operating restrictions-(such as

" racking out" a breaker to a motor operated valve) are incorporated to prevent such spurious operation. An ex mple of spurious operation is the unintended energizing of a powered valve to open or close."

"A passive failure is a failure of a component to maintain its structural integrity or the blockage of a process flow path. Blockage of a process flow path _could occur, for example, due to separation of a valve disc from its stem."

According to these later definitions, check valves are considered active devices; however, the definition in effect at the time of Brunswick's licensing considers check valves as passive _ devices.

In practice, many mechanical passive failures are bounded by the malfunctions selected below. For example, all listed valves are analyzed for the effects of the single failure of (47uNEaWPLtr)

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Page 7 of 25 the. valve failing closed. This could be the result of the active mechanical-failure of-a powered valve to move to-its-intended. position, the passive mechanical failure-of the valve disc separating from its stem, or the electrical f ailures of 1) _ loss of power due to an open or shorted power -

supply, or 2) spurious actuation due to'a short in the control circuits.

4. BSEP References

Brunswick Updated. Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 3 .

paragraph 3.1.2.4.15 b) details BSEP's compliance with

General Design Criteria 44.

"The piping, valves, pumps, and heat exchangers in each system are arranged so that the safety functions of the cooling water system can be performed .under normal operating and accident conditions assuming a single failure.

Electrical power for the operation of :h system may be

. supplied f rom off-site or on-site electrical power systems, with distribution arranged such that a single failure will _

not prevent the system f rom performing its safety function."

An additional description of the electrical separation and' redundancy is found in UFSAR 8.3.1.4, On-site Power Systems, AC Power, Independence of Redundant Systems. which states:

"The separation criteria utilized in the arrangement and design of electrical equipment,-control. devices, sensors,-

conduit, cable tray network systems, and.the interconnecting cable provide for the physical separation of the equipment and the interconnecting wire to assure actuation of engineered safety features and their auxiliary supporting systems during all incidents. This system has been. designed in accordance with IEEE 279-1971. Two separate and redundant divisions have been provided for all equipment and.

wiring associated with the engineered safety features and ,

their auxiliary supporting systems. Class 1E electrical systems provide. emergency power to the plant. The AC and DC subsystems are each divided into redundant' systems,'with independent control systems. These control systems are designed and' tested in a manner that meets the requirements (mmentunno A

Calculatica G0050A-16 Rsv. O Page 8 of 25 of the IEEE 308 criteria for Class IE electrical ' systems and the applicable sections of IEEE 279.*

5. CP&L Licensing Position Summary In a letter from Mr. L. I. Loflin to Mr. E. A. Bishop dated December 18, 1989 Licensing responded to several NED questions.

a. ' Single passive mechanical failures during the time of Brunswick Licensing were considered to be breaches in the fluid system boundary. Design against such failures was accomplished by making the essential portions of the SW system seismic Category I, and having the capability to isolate components, subsystems, or piping if required so that the system safety function will not be compromised. The Brunswick design achieves this and was approved by the NRC. Later guidance indicating that passive mechanical failures include such events as valve disk and stem separation need not be considered in the SW _

system design analysis.*

b. " Active and passive electrical failures should be considered in the SW system design analysis." '

c. " Reasonable operator errors should be considered as single failures, but in most cases, the resulting consequences should be comparabic to single active failures."

d. "A LOCA need not be considered concurrent with a hurricane since plant procedures require shutdown prior to onset of a hurricane. Single failure criteria remains in effect during external events."

e. "Further discussions on this topic determined that administrative controls would be implemented to ensure that operation of RHRSW during Mode 1, 2, or 3 would be monitored and limited in such a manner that risk involvement would not exceed previously established (acceptable) limits. This will be accomplished by tmmman)

Calculctign'C0050A 16 Rav. O Page 9 of 25 establishing an administrative LCO, as specified in Technical Specification 3/4.7.1. Based on these additional controls, the justification for excluding the RHRSW operation during Modes 1, 2, and 3 f rom design analysis is acceptable."

f. " Check valve f ailures for the Brunswick SW system are to be considered passive failures.

6. BSEP Position Summary This document considers active mechanical, active electrical, and passive electrical single failures. Passive mechanical failures are addressed by the Seismic Class 1 design of the safety-related portions of the system and the ability to isolate the nonsafety-related portions of the system, as well as the system redundancy. Although BSEP is not required by commitment, check valves have been evaluated as active failures to assess system adequacy against current industry practice.

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I Calculation G0050A-16 Rev. 1 Page 10 of 25 B. BSEP Service Water Single Failure Methodology and Analysis

1. Selection of components The Service Water system was analyzed ~ for components which are subject to single mechanical active, electrical active, and electrical passive failures. System pumps, motor driven strainers, motor-operated valves, air-operated valves, relief valves, safety related check valves, instrument loops with contrcl functions, several indication and annunciation instrument loops, and major power supplies are listed and evaluated in Table 1. Table 2 contains the listing of Unit I components.

The losses of Emergency Buses El, E2, E3, and E4 and Diesel Generators 1, 2, 3, and 4 are included and analyzed as single failures. This analysis illustrates the separation .

of power supplies, and demonstrates that the effects of a failure of a diesel generator, a minor power panel, or a motor control center are bounded by the failure of an Emergency Bus (El, E2., E3, or E4) for most analyses. Some .

minimum pump flow cases are an exception since a single DG failure proves more limiting.

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2. Selection of Failure Modes The selection of malfunctions addresses the system effects of active mechanical and active and passive electrical single failure modes of the component in question. Passive mechanical failures are addressed by the seismic design of the system and by the system redundancy.

The malfunctions of components of electrical switchgear, load centers, motor control centers' breakers, and control circuits for pumps, strainers, and valves are assumed to result in one of two cases: the equipment becomes inoperable when called upon to operate, or the equipment undergoes spurious operation when not called upon.

In each failure mode, the component is assumed to fail to an undesired state. " Fails to open" means the same as " fails to the closed position" and " fails to close" means the same scuwmwrsmo

Calculatica C0050A-16 R3v. 1 Page 11 of 25 as " fails to the open position." The various types of l equipment and the types of malfunctions selected are listed below; a) Pumps fail to start when needed or start when not required. These malfunctions could' result in excessive or insufficient pump flow leading to pump.

failure and/or lack of cooling water supplies to vital

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components.

b) Motor driven strainers fail to operate when needed or operate when not required. An inoperable pump ,

strainer is assumed to result in an inoperable pump (the strainer is assumed to clog up). The unneeded operation of a pump strainer does not affect the pump.

c) Motor operated valves fail to open (fail in the closed position) or fail to close (fail in the open position). For example, an MOV could have a

mechanical binding problem, loss of power, or other electrical problem, which could result in the valve not moving when called upon to move, or in spurious operation to an undesired position. These valves are combined with their respective power supplies,' control circuits, and components. Any active or passive malfunction in their associated controls is assumed to result in the valve failing to the open or closed position.

d) Air operated valves are assumed to fail to open or fail to close. An ADV could have a mechanical binding problem, loss of power, loss of air pressure, operator or solenoid valve malfunction, or control circuit open or short, causing the valve to remain in, or move to, an undesired position. The A0Vs listed in the table include the associated solenoid valve, control circuits, air pressure supply, and power supply. Any failure in these associated components is assumed to result in the AOV failing to the open or closed position.

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Calculation G0050A Rev. 1 Page 12'of 25 e) Relief valves are. assumed to fail open without a need or to fail' closed (fail to open) on a high pressure condition. The small line sizes of the Service Water -

system RBCCW and TBCCW heat exchanger relief valves ,

limit the flow loss assuming a valve fails open.

f) Check valves are assumed to fail to open or fail-to close a) expected. Examples'are a disk which sticks in the open or closed position and a ' broken hinge pin or disk which allows or blocks flow.

The consequences for.the valve types listed above being in an undesired position are excessive pump flows, insufficient i pump flows, loss of cooling water supplies'to critical components, excessive or unnecessary cooling of components, ,

and/or loss of isolation. The specific effects for each component are listed in Table 1. The effects of a valve failing to the mid position (partially open) are assumed to be bounded by the high flow effects of the fail to close case and the low flow effects of the fail to open case.

Components such as the two reliefEvalves, the pressure

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regulating valve, and the check valve in'the Lube Water flow path to each Service Water pump are grouped together (Item 1.6 for example). Their various malfunctions are considered only as interrapting flow to the SW pump bearings and motor cooler, causing a loss of the respective SW pump.

This selection of malfunctions is intended to envelope all j possible effects of failure modes of associated-components.

Table 1 lists these components and their applicable failure e modes, failure effects, compensating factors, and power supplies.

Unit I components will have the same failure modes and compensating factors. Table 2 lists the Unit I components ,

and power supplies only.

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An electrical discipline review of the analysis included:

Ensuring that Table 1 included all appropriate failure modes Identifying " cascade failures" - i.e., failure of a specific component or control circuit that will cause failure of another component. Assuring that cascade failures do not affect multiple divisions of redundant functions.

Identifying and/or verifying power supplies Identifying those monitoring only instrument loops necessary for operator actions -

3. Operator Error Most operator errors have effects that are enveloped by active single failures as listed in Tables 1 and 2. The valve and electrical lineups in the BSEP Service Water Operating Procedure, OP-43, were examined for any components ~

subject to operator manipu14tions that would not have the same effects as active mechanical, active electrical,.or passive electrical failures already listed in Table 1.

a) Maloperation of the SW A Loop Outlet and Cross-Tie manual valves: Manual valves SW-V661, SW-V662, and SW-V668 control the outlet flow from the RBCCW heat exchangers as well as the A components of RHRSW and .

vital headers. Operator error could result in loss of flow to these components and reduction in SW pump flows, b) Maloperation of the Service Water discharge header isolation manual valves: Manual valves SW-V442 (U1 and U2 SW discharge header isolation valves) and SW-V443 (U1 and U2 SW discharge header cross-tie valves) control the entire SW discharge from each unit. These valves could be closed in error, resulting in the loss of all flow through the vital (ouMKLE75mr)

Calculation ~C0050A-16 Rev. 1 .

'Page 14 of 25 header and'the RHR, RBCCW, and TBCCW heat exchangers,. ,

with subsequent dead-head' operation of the SW pumps.

Compensating features and remarks for potential errors a) and b) are Manual actions are by procedure-steps and' ;

independent verification is required'(OP-43, Sections 8.20 & 8.21 for Item a)-and Sections 8.7 & 8.8 for Item b)). 1 Closure of the thirty' inch valves would. occur slowly and would result in plant changes'and alarms which would alert-the operator to'r,eopen the. valve. High temperature alarms on RHR, RECCW, and TBCCW outlets, as well as header high pressure indications', will allow detection and correction.

Caution statements in GP-43 vill reduce the l probabilities of these operator errors. ,

c) Maloperation of'the Lube Water header cross connect valves:

Manual Valves 2SW-V482 and 2SW-V483 (P&ID.D02041, l

. Sheet 1, Zone B-2,3) cross connect.the Unit l'and Unit 2 Lube Water headers. If one of these valves were closed in error during cross-connected operation, 5 the Lube Water supply to one. unit's SW pumps could be lost. Compensating features are:

EER 89-0334, Loss of Service Water Lube System,. ;

explains how the SW pumps can provide their own bearing cooling and lube water supplies. .

OP-43, Section 8.17., contains the procedure steps for cross-connecting and splitting the Lube Water headers.

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Calculation C0050A-16 Rev. 1 Page 15 of 25 PS-1315, LW. header low pressure switch will cause an alarm.to alert the' operators.

Inadvertent opening of either valve would not have an effect if the other valve remained closed (these are_

normally closed valves).

Caution statements and independent verifications in OP-43 will reduce the probabilities of these operator ,

errurs.

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Calculation G0050A 16 Rev, 1 Page 16 of 25 C. LIMITING FAILURES j The selection'of the most limiting failures from Table 1 involves .

analysis with respect to several assumptions. The following 'l breakdown consists of the plant operating mode, the time periods .

after the event, and the minimum and maximum flow cases. .The time after the event is divided into the 0 to 10 minute phase (no operator action assumed) and the after 10 minute phase (operator response assumed). The most limiting initiating event and the worst single failure for each of these combinations are selected on the basis of their effects on the SW system. The SW pump flows ,

must stay within minimum and maximum bounds to prevent damage to the pumps and allow the completion of the SW system safety functions. Exceeding the maximum flow limits causes NPSH and '

cavitation problems Dropping below the minimum flow limits causes excessive loading on the pump motor thrust bearing (future modifications will upgrade the motor thrust bearings).

The plant operating mude affeci che selection of the most limiting failure. From the Technical Specifications, Modes 1. 2, i and 3 are defined as the reacter coolant system temperature above 212*F; Modes 4 and 5 are defined as the RCS temperature being less than or equal to 212*F. ,

For each set of initial conditions, an analysis is made to determine the highest and lowest SW pump flows that could result from the various single failures. These flows should not exceed ,

the safe minimum and maximum operating flows.

NSW to vital header isolation valve SW-V117 is normally open and at least one RHR room cooler is required to be part of the NSW flowpath per Plant Modifications89-049 and 89-048. This provides a minimum flowpath for the NSW pumps.

Vital header loads are assumed to be valved in and supplied from the NSW header during LOCA/LOCA signal events since the Emergency Air Compressors are non-Q and are assumed to fail.

RBCCW primary and secondary isolation Valves SW-V103 and SW-V106 will close to a throttled position in the event of a LOOP (loss of j off-site power) and/or a LOCA (loss of coolant accident). This ensures suf ficient minimum flowpath for the NSW pumps without 4

Calculation G0050A 16 Rev. 1 Page 17 of-25 allowing' excessive flow to the non-essential RDCCW heat exchangers The flowrates contro14ed by these valves are relatively large, so their failures can have a significant effect on pump flows.

The NSW pumps will start in AUTO on an NSW header low pressure signal or a LOCA signal. The CSW pumps also start on an NSW or CSW header low pressure signal, depending on which header the pump is aligned to supply. All NSW, CSW, and RHRSW pumps trip on a ,

LOOP-due to the undervoltage devices. The NSW pumps in both units ,

are automatically started after a LOOP by the diesel generator sequential loading relays. The CSW pumps do not automatically start except on the header low pressure signals (pump start on low header pressure assumes power is available to the pump). The RHRSW pumps have no automatic starts.

The diesel generators start on a LOCA or a LOOP signal, opening the normal SW cooling supply valves from the primary unit (ISW-V210, 1SW V211, 2SW-V212, 2SW-V213). The SW cooling supply valves for each DG are interlocked to open the alternate supply valve from the other unit when a low pressure signal plus time delay o: curs. The normal supply valve is interlocked to close when the alternate supply valve reaches full open.

1. Modes 1 through 3 (RCS temperature greater than 212*F.)

a. 0- 10 minute phase

1) Runout For the runout flow condition, a LOCA outside primary containment /high energy line break (HELB) is the most limiting. initiating event.

This accident creates the greatest flow demand on the SW system and is assumed to make the reactor building inaccessible, limiting operator actions.

The single failure of an E-bus would prevent one NSW pump from starting and would prevent one of the RBCCW isolation valves, SW-V103 or SW V106, (mmmwnmo

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from throttling. 'This would provide less flow resistance in the RBCCW1 path'and increase the-

total flow from the single NSW pump. .The' single l NSW pump.would supply RBCCW, both. diesel 1 generators, lube water,' and'all_of'the vital ,

header loads. .The loss of an E-bus also causes-the loss of one CSW. pump. The resultant low CSW ,

header pressure (as the remaining pump (s) tries ,

to supply the additional. flow) generates a .

signal for Valves SW-V3 and SW-V4' to close'to.

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their throttled positions. This reduces:the CSW . ,

system flow demand and prevents runout of the remaining pump (s). ;

2) Minimum flow For the minimum flow condition, a LOOP is ,

assumed because it will' start both NSW pumps; ,

without opening the vital header component j isolation valves. The RBCCW isolation valves will throttle and the diesel generators will ,

start.

The worst' single failure for. minimum flow would 1 occur 'if an RBCCW primary or secondary isolation valve failed to the fully closed'instead of-throttled position. -(See Table 1., 13.12 and 13.13.) The resulting lineup of two NSW pumps-supplying one RHR pump room cooler,-lube water, and two diesel generators would provide the worst case for minimum flow.

b. After 10 minutes [

Operator action is taken to restore the system to appropriate flowrates and lineups. Runout and minimum pump flows are not a concern for this reason; however, the minimum cooling flows to essential loads are a concern. Operator action may be limited byLthe inaccessibility of the Reactor Building due to a >

LOCA/HELB. 'The flows are limited by the RHRSW pump ,

suction pressures due to NPSH concerns.

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2. Modes 4 & 5 "

(RCS temperature less than or equal to 212*F.)

Technical Specification Interpretation 90 03 explains the requirements for operable SW pumps _in Modet 4 & 5. The most .

.l limiting situation is a function of the particular lineup, which can consist of two NSW pumps or one NSW pump and one CSW pump (Cases 1 and 2 below). Separate analysis is-needed for each lineup. This flexibility in header use allows j maintenance and repair activities to be performed on the [

conventional header.

A major difference between Modes 1, 2, & 3 and Modes 4 & 5 t is the primary system pressure. Because the RCS is at atmospheric pressure in Modes 4 & 5, a HELB LOCA is not a ;

credible accident; however, a LOCA signal could be generated by an operator error or instrumentation failure. ,

Another major difference between Modes 1, 2, & 3 and Modes 4

& 5 is that the RHRSW pumps are required to be in operation

~

during Modes 4 & $ to support decay heat removal. This f raises the possibility of a single failure of an RHRSW pump '

breaker trip coil as described below.

a. Case 1, 2 pumps on Nuclear header I

1) 0 - 10 minute phase a) Runout The initiating event-that creates the ,

worst challenge is a LOCA signal. f Although the RCS is depressurized, a LOCA ,

signal can still be generated due to !

operator error or instrumentation failure. i For the maximum' flow condition, the LOCA ,

signal is combined with a LOOP, which will I start both diesel generators, both NSW 6 pumps, and throttle flow to the RBCCW heat ;

exchangers. ,

i l

J l

conNEDWP54r) 1 i

F

~

Calcu1ation1G0050A-16 Rev. 1 Page 20 ofL25 The runout. condition is affected most by the single failure of an E-bus. This ,

leaves one operable NSW pump, causes E11 F068 to fail as-is, and prevents either SW-V103 or'SW-V106 from stroking to.

a throttled position. One NSW pump:is ,

lined up to supply.the RHRSW loop..the vital header loads, both diesel ,

generators, lube water, and the RBCCW heat exchangers.

b) Minimum flow For the minimum flow case, a LOOP is the I most limiting event.

The single failure of one of.the two RBCCW isolation valves failing to.the closed ,

position results in two NSW pumps in '

operation supplying one RHR room. cooler, lube water, and two diesel generators. _

2) After 10 minutes Operator action is taken to restore normal system flows and lineups, so runout and minimum pump flows are not a concern. SW pumps can be aligned to supply required loads. Operator action in the reactor building can be creditedL t because a HELB is not a credible accident in Modes 4 and 5.

b. Case 2, 1 pump on Nuclear header and 1 pump on Conventional header-

1. 0 - 10 minute phase .

Z a) Runout The most limiting initiating event for runout conditions is a LOCA signal (as described above). This will. align the .

(CDNED.WPMbr)

.i

Calculation G0050A-16' Rev. 1 . ,

Page :21.of-25 greatest number of components to the SW' supply: the vital) header loads, RHRSW, and two diesel generators. ;

The most limiting single failure for the maximum flow case is the continuation of operation (LOCA without LOOP) or the restart (LOCA with LOOP) of'an RHRSW pump zi (See Table 1, 8.1). This pump start may -

starve the rest of the'SW system by drawing excessive flow from the NSW header. With only one operable NSW pump, no automatic backup is available to supply the NSW header. If the assumed failure ,

resulted from a loss of the' pump breaker trip coil, for example, the breaker.will not trip on subsequent low suction '

pressure or remote manual control. This-scenario requires the RHRSW pumps to be in-operation prior to the event so that a flowpath is present through the RHR heat exchanger and E11-F068. The diesel-generator cooling water' supply might be '

switched to the'other unit's NSW header l due to low supply pressure. If this happens, the other unit will be capable of supplying the 4 DCs since Technical Specification No.'3.7.1.2 ensures it will have two operable'NSW pumps remaining for this case.

b) Minimum flow A LOOP is taken-as the initiating event.

Because one NSW pump is inoperable, this is not as serious as the case with two operable NSW pumps. The single failure of ,

a diesel generator (Tables 1, 15.1 and 15.2) results in the NSW pump supplying the single operable diesel generator, lube water, and one RHR room cooler. The DC failure is most limiting since RBCCW is ,

fbO.DN)

. Calculation C0050A-16 Rev.'1 Page 22 of 25 ^"

assumed to be isolated initially (allowed.

when only one NSW pump is. operable) and-RHRSW isolates when.the RHRSW pumps trip.

2. After 10 minutes Operator action is taken to--restore desired, system'and pump flows and: lineups. The operable

~

CSW pump may be lined up to the NSW header to-supply additional RHRSW cooling water flow and-ensure that the system safety function is continued.

(C13NED.WP$Abr) '

Csiculation G0050A-16 Rtv. 1 Pege 23 of 25 IV.

SUMMARY

The Brunswick Unit One and Unit Two Service Water systems have been analyzed for the most limiting initiating events and single failures in accordance with the restrictions of TSI 90-03, Rev. O. The results are summarized here.

1. Modes 1, 2, & 3:

a. Runout LOCA-HELB outside primary containment with a single failure of an E-bus

b. Minimum flow LOOP with a single f ailure of either SW V103 or SW-V106 to throttle (fails to the fully closed position)

2. Modes 4 & 5: _

a. Case 1, 2 pumps on NSW header

1) Runout LOCA signal with LOOP and a single failure of an E-bus

2) Minimum flow LOOP with a single failure of either SW V103 or SW-V106 to throttle (fails to the fully closed position)

b. Case 2, 1 pump on NSW header and one pump on CSW header

1) Runout LOCA signal with a single failure of an RERSW pump breaker to trip.

(cueen w

Calculstien G0050A-16 Rev. O Pega 24 of 25

~

2) Minimum Flow LOOP with a single failure of a diesel generator SW supply valve to open 1

[

I

Calculatica G0050A-16 Rev. O Page 25 of 25 V. ATTACIDfENTS A. Table 1 B. Table 2 C. Design Verification Sheets i

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2.0 t4SW PUMP 20 FIND RSSUClfiTED cut 1PtitJEN!'.. ' .. - 1 .11 wo **M M *n MMM *M*MMu**Mu se. ' e + + * +

2.1 NSW 20 NUCLERR 514 PUMP 20. E4 (l:C ti:SO- W lf-2B; il: SD + 10, DIN I D) 2.2 STRRINER .NSW PUMP 20 STRRINER E4-E8-2PU 2.3 PV-140 STRRINER DRCl(WOSH lOV < I".'-140 ROU (E4-EU-SOV & PDIC-140, dP SWIT131 > 2PD) 2.4 SW-V25 DISCH CHECK VALVE-NSH Plit1P .?H N/ft 2.5 SW-V20 .DISCH NOV-NSW PUMP 20 E4-EO-i:PD 2.6 -Various- LUBE WATER MOTOR COOLING S!!PI'LY N/H RV-0, V200,-PRV-2064, RV-13

3. 0 CSW PUt1P 2R RND RSSOCIRTED COMPONENIS MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMNMMMMMMMMMMMMMDMMMMb 3.1 CSW 2R CONVENT 10NRL-SW PUMP 2R 'E3 (DC N:SB-2ft,DP-2R; R:SB-IR.DP-lR)

Fails to start ioss of flow from CSU 211 1:SH pump OU and 2C, NSl1 header inadvertent. start Excess pumping capacitg possible Operalor action 1ou F1ou pump damage 3.2 STRAINER CSW PUMP 2R STRRINER E3-E7-2PR Inoperable-clogged. Gradual loss of flow from CSU 2H USH pump 20 and 2C, NSW header (PDSH-Il7 alarms)

Operating when not tio errect Operalor act ion , t o correc L required 3.3 PV-Il6 STRRINER BRCKWRSil ROV ( PY- l i f., ROV (E3-E7-SOV f6 PDIC-116. dP SWITCH > 2PR)

. Fails to open Gradual loss of Flow from CSU 2H CSH pump 20 and 2C, NSW header, as strainer becomes clogged operator action to manuallg blowdown strainer. (PDSil-ll7 alarms >

Fails to close .51ight loss of flow to backwash Negligible impact on total flow Strainer operation possible (Bactuash valve is AttV-fail open) 3.4 SH-V21 DISCH CHECK VRLVE-CSW PUMP 2R N/R Fails to.open. Loss of flow from CSU'pua.p 2R CSU pump 28 ami 2C, NSW header Possible low flow pump damage Operator action Fails to close Loss of backflow isolation Discharge. valves SW-V13. -V14 onto close when pump.is tripped

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-vv -, w- w em - -ee- .r +

....... ...+ ,o...>..+.+.y-......... ..... ....+.... ... ... .. . ..... .. .. ..... .... ............

le a l1P lil P. 112 SERVill tillIE R Sital.I l l i t t l i 4Ji l itJt it Y' . l'. 1.it. t i, . 13 t' r .l it t li. P. ~ it. l . .l .1 1, ' J ..

t ...t . 'l l 14 0 . C1 Il tl'Uf Ji.tJ 1 ltE5t.R il'1 li ttJ 111111 R Sill 11 Y Fa i l ure t h . des Iailure et t~rr t s 1 :. .og .+ 4 r .t i s n t Iu l i .e < < Prm. ir t: )

- mun3.um***ummw*%+++++w..++...+++.++++.................. ..... .... .... +. .......+++.... +...+..+

3.5 Su-V13 DISC 11 MuV-C5W PunP Uit til 1241 ilDR I t - i-K'111 Fails to open l ow of Flow from ILil poaq . .fi t to til h r- D.Il pompa, fr .H lie.w icr CSU header l'oss i b l e low Ilow pomii . t on-vy - I lj m al . e - a. I own Fails to close Will prevent normal ar o l ou t a ta.n bypa-ss disciur ge va l v.- closed pump start permi ss i ve t a g goi ng t o l i tCHL on .

tJt1RtfHL -LUCHt. switch at p.unp breal er ioss of backf' lou isolatsia. I h u h<.e qr cin,L' Sll-V21 an.1. discharge titiV Sil- V14 to isolate luck flou ,

(Not er SH -V13 tt - -V14 pn ~ reil I e o.n uime pouer supple;>

3.6 SW-V14 DISCH NOV-C5W PUMP 2R 10 NSW HDR E 3-E 7-2PH Fails to open Loss of flow from CSU pomp :14 t o NSti pumps, other CSM pumps NSW header Possible low flow pump damage Operator action Fails to close Hill prevent auto and norinal pomp Can la; pass discher ge valve closed start permissme by goirig to i OClit nn NORMHL-LOCHL switch at pornp breaker toss of backflow isolation IIischarge check SW-U21 an.i discharge lluV Sil-V13 to isolate backflow

3.7 Various LUBE WRTER MOTOR COOLING SilPPLY IUH RV-4, U276, PRV-2076, RV-9 Fails thereby loss of bearing tube ar.d mot or NSU pomp t o provide own bearirv3 stopping supply cooling water supply lobe arvi cooling water supply (RV fails open or- (Reference EER 89-0334) '

check valve or PRV CSU pump D and C, NSW header

!- fails closed) to backup

! 4.0 CSU PUMP 20 RND R550CIRTED COMPONEN15 See 3. 0 xxxxxxxx******xx******xxxx***xxxx***

4.1 CSN 28 CONVENTIONRL-SW PUt1P 28 E4 (DC N:50-20,DP-20; R:58-lD.DP-10) 4.2 STRRINER C5W PUMP 20 STRRINER E4-EU-2PD i' STRRINER BRCKHASH ROV < PY-il8, HUV (E4-EU-4.3 PV-Il0 50V & PDIC-110, dP SWITCil ) 2PD) 4.4 SW-V22 DISCH CHECK VALVE-C5W PUMP 20 tun 4.5 SW-V15 DISCH NOV-C5W PUMP 2B TO CSM HDR 'E4-EO-2PB

, 4.6 SW-V16 DISCH NOV-C5W PUMP 2B TO NSW HDR E4-EO-2PD 4.7 Various LUBE WRTER MOTOR COOLING SUPPLY N/A RV-5,-U277, PRV-2073,-RV-10 i

.... 4...u.....,...u .....-........e............. .....-....... ..... . . .. ... ..... . . . . . . . .4 ............o IN P til n 112 SERUlf1 !!H IH: 5 t tJG1 I i u t! Ilt :1 utni! Y'.t" t..t. ft, turant h. la ti. i . ,t l . I, *1 . .l ,.6 J1 t t h .. Lilill11 tit.ill ICSIR IP I Il ft1 ( 1 :1!!_ l : ' J H 1 't. Y Faifore th u to i . o l or e e t 6 .r. . t s t . .+p. , . . . I o .. t I.a t . .r - . la .+ ,e I - .

u w * + s u u u * + m *

m 4. .

n o m . m . . . . . . . . o + , o w. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ...........+....+.+..+.........+..+....*n. .

5.0 CSU PUMP 2C HND H550CIHILD CHHPHtJENIS 5. . :L H

- - - - +******++4+

5.1 CSU 2C CONVENTlotJHL SW Put1P 2C El (DC fi:Sil-lH.DP-lH; it:SD-2H.DP-2H) 5.2 STRHINER CSN PUMP 2C STRHitJER El-ES-IPH 5.3 PV-120 STRHINER DHCKHHSH HOV < PY-120 HOV (El-ES-50V & PDIC-120, dP SUITCil ) IPfD 5.4 SH-U23 DISCH CHECK VHLUE-CSU PUMP 2C N/H 5.5 SH-Ul? DISCH NOV-C5H PUMP 2C TO CSU HDR E l -LS - I PH 5.6 5H-V10 DISCH NOV-C5H PUNP 2C TO NSW HDR El-ES-IPH 5.7 Verious LUDE HHTER MOTOR COOLING SiIPPl.Y fini RV-6, V270, PRV-2870, RV -- I l 6.O HEHDER PRESSURE CONIROL HND INDICHTItIN

- - - - =*******************.***

6.1 PS-271 N5H HDR PRESS 5 HITCH, RELHY 63-XH2 1.II-Jt i. l iP - 1./H Fails to start 11ill not start needed pump. PSI-14J alarms. PT-143/PI-pump on-low possible high pump flou 14 F 1 tu alert operators pressure condition Fails starting Hill start unneeded pumps, t sperat or action. PT-143/PI-pump without possible low pump flow 143-1 to elert operaters low pressure condition 6.2 PS-3214 N511 HDR PRESS 5 HITCH, RELHY 63-XB2 See 6.1 SU-20, t iP-120 6.3 PS-129 C5H HDR PRESS SullCH, RELHY 63-XHI Su-2H,DP-12H Fails to start. Hill not start needed pump. PSt -l ita a l arms, PT-131/PI-pump on low possible high pump flou 131-1 to alert operators pressure condition rails start.ing Hill start unneeded pmp, i tper at o.- actson, PT-131/PI-pump without possible low pump flou 131-1 to aler t operators low pressure condition 748to1Tla sant. Fa:L5 Sw.v44 w.iA eJor 74%uW F5-32.15 Aup sw-G AME AJ4RASLE.

6.4 PS-3213 C5H HDR PRESS 5 HITCH, RELf tY 63-XUI See 6.3 Su-20,Di'-120

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n a.n n u.+m m ,.u n e.n +e..n. .......... i.... .+.......w+...... . ..- .. . ...........+....,............,,;..

It.El* til o 112 -SERVICE HHil' k GitEl 1 1 H11.!iR1 nrati r .I'. 4 :. . l . rti f.inrails li. P. .- re, I c.b l . t, * .i .. ..m t . .i ?n rJo. I;Hf1PutJEt4T ' DEST ~ RIP 1 IUt1 11it!FR t.ilri'l Y Failure Modes F.n lure ethi s t ..i.p. nm. . ! u c i i . -4. s ( Re..n*3 4

. *

e m

m * *

m * * *

o m x m . . . m u o + + o + m + + + + w + , o . + + + +. + + + . -+ . . . . . . + . . . u . . . * * . + . + + . . * + + . . .. + + . u + . . . u u . u + e 0.0 SH SUPPLY TO RHR 11X 2R 8.1 E11-C001R RHRSH PUMP 2R l .I (I'U tt:St I-2H . DP- [

Fails to start Partial loss of RHRSH flow to RHR*:.11 pump Jt:, other tr<nn RHR llX 2ft (th v i s ion II)

Inadvertent starL Excess capacity mag starve e..st up.'ralnr action of SH header 0.2 Ell'-F005R DISCH CHECK-VHLVE-RHRSH Pilt1P 2R ti/H Fails to open Loss of flow-RHRSH 2R PURSH pomp 2C, other train (TSH-1109 alarms)

Fails to close Loss of flow due to rever se flow Uther t ra i n,. indication:

thru idle pump PI-1154-1, PI-Il5E.-1, 1R-RHRSH pressure less than RilR 605, FI-E02H, pressure PDS-tJD03H alarms 0.3 PS-1175R SUCTION PRESS SWITCH-RHRSil 2R DC DRKR C0f11 PHR Fails t.o. trip Possible pump damage due to Uther train, indication:

, pump on low operation with low suction PI-1154-1 PI-Il56-1, 1R-suction pressure presssure 605, FI-602H, Trips pump without Loss of flow pump inoperatave RilRS11 pump 2C, other train low pressure i

8.4 SH-V136 STATOR CLG INLET RHRSH 2R ROV-FD fluV (E3-E7-2E7-2fD Fails to open Loss of stator cooling, loss of RHRSH pump 2C, other train motor and. pump remain i n tac t. , (Sil-V136 is a fail open ROV)(TY-4097 alarms) ,

Fails t.o close- Unnecessary. cooling of stator tio. ef fec t 8.5 TY-4007 STRTOR CLG RELRY RHRSH 2R.

. Fails'to elarm on L.oss of annunciation possible RHRSH pump 2C, other train high' temperature pump motor damage remain intact Alarms without tlnnecessary annunciation- flo effect, operator .

high temperature no effect . action (local TI-tin 7) 0.6 PT-ll54/ RHRSH 2R DISCHRRGE PRESSURE INDICRTOR -UPS 2R-VOR/VIDH PI-1154-l' No' indication Data unavailable to operators Pump running indication available Indicates high Data potentially misleading to '

RHRSH HX outlet flow Ell-or low operators .

FI-R602R available r

i e----* - ,,w= a e *w wme -, y e w r a ~ *, .- *--w. -ee =~ = -w

. 3o....).o...w,..,..,. . e+ ........+_......-.....

... ....o..+ ..... . .... ....., ..... ......u..1 L"lP til 10 H2 SERVILE L-4 tlE R Sit 01.1 I llil lllel t ilh H Y' I'. i .,[l i . ft- I J it t* .t il l it. P. fl. l..l.l. I, ' l e. 4 - t

. or ht ;

tiv . cut 1PutJEH T . DESCRIPT1Ori PsnEI?1.itR1.Y Failure Modes Fai lnr .- el l ect s t a .mper e.al i ng Fw t or -

P.-w.e i < >

m *nmmuunmm

o uw wwo wm. . mu m . o mw w. . * + . + n . . . . . . . . . ...... % ..n o n o e..w++o.oe. m uo m G.7 E11-COOIC RHR511 PutIP 2C See D.I L1 <DC t1:SR-1R,DP-IH;. II:SD-28,DP-2R) 0.0 E11-F005C DISCH CHECK URLVE-RHRSH 2C See 0.2 N/H 0.9 PS-Il75C SUCTION PRESS SWITCH-RilR5il See 0.3 DC DRKR CONT PHR 0.10 SW-V137 STRTOR CLG INLET RHR5N 2C. See 0.4 HOV (E3-E7-2E7-2fD .

8.11 TY-4889 STATOR CLG RELFlY RHRSH 2C See 0.5 8.12 PT-1156/ RHR5W 2C DISCHARGE PRES 5URE IllDICATOR See 0.6 UPS 2H-UOR/V10R PI-1156-1 0.13 Ell-FOO2R DUTLET 150 MOV-RHR HX 2R EFL7-2XH Fails to open Loss of RHRSH t o RHR HX litier RHR HX and trw n remain intact (Ell-F002R is a normally open MOV) '

Fails to close Loss of isolation Other valves to isolate. Ell

-F0600 & Ell-F014R 8.14 Ell-F060R DUTLET PDV MOV-RHR HX 2R E3-E7-2XR Fails to open Loss of RHRSH thru RHR HX Uther RHR HX and train remain intact.

Fails to close Loss of flow from rest of C.,n isolate with Ell-F002H SM system and use other train Loss of RHR to SH differential pressure 8.15 5W-U143 NELL WRTER SUPPLY TO RHRSM HEADERS HOV HOV xm Fails to open Loss of well water layup ' tio effect, operator action Fails to close Loss of isolation 1. Check valves SW-V144 and SH-V148 will. prevent backflow to welI water system

2. Flow limited by 1.5 inch Iine size, low header pressure

<5H-V143 is a fail closed ROV)

.0.16 SW-V144- WELL NHTER SUPPLY 10 RHRSM HERDERS CHECK VRLVES . tJ/R SW-V148 Fails to open ' Loss of well water layup No effect, operator actien Fails-to close Loss of isolation to well Flow: limited by 1.5 inch water, loss of isolation- 1ine size, (V105 or U101 are between Div I and Div II- . opened manually after inject. ion phase of LOCR response, operator action permitted) 1

_ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . . _ m m. _i_. _ _.__.-.__m__., - . - i_ m _ . _ .__m ____.._._..-.-_-i_._____.m__.-_____.__m_m.____-___:m____.m.__.___.__.___.._____l_'..J.__.-[-__._m

.-_.__.__._-_____m__m__.._-__u_.

, 1

.... %++.4. u.+ m o.+.u . ...:....+ . . ..... ... ................. . . . . . . .............. ...+........m...

tr_.EP Ut & tf2 SERVILL tallLR 'ilNt;l L i i t I L t (RL HNH1 W. P . I b I. IL i_ f n r t il i h. P. s t. l .t.i.. t. i .I +1 or 21i flu . cut 1POtJEt4I .DESCRIP110N l't ILIEk S li'i'LY Failure Modes. Fazlure effects t . wep.ensat i n y Fac t or_ < Re.. .r t s >

u *

m u m u n u * *

n

u u m m u m u u u u u m n .u u m + u u m + + + + + + + + + . + + u + . + u

u m m u + + + + + = * + u o u o u m .

9.0 SW SUPPLY TO RHR HX 2D See 0.0 9.1 E11-C0010-RHR5W PUMP 28 Es (DC ti:50-20,DP-2L, n:SB-10.DP-10)-

9.2 E11-F005D DISCH CHECK VRLVE-RHR5W 20 HeA 9.3 PS-11768 SUCTION PRESS SWITCH-RHR5LI 20 DC DRKR CONT PWR 9.4 SW-V138 STRTOR CLG INLET RHR5W 20 ROV-F0 HOV (E4-EB-2E8-29) 9.5 TY-4888 . STRTOR CLG RELRY RHR5W 2B 9.6 PT-1155/ RHR5W 2D DISCHRRGE PRESSURE ItIDICR10R llP5 20-V00/V10ll-PI-1155-1 9.7 E11-C001D RHR5W PUMP 2D E2 (DC H:50-10,DP-1D; ft:58-29,DP-20) 9.0 E11-F005D DISCH CHECK VRLVE-RHR5W 2D FUH 9.9 P5-1176D- SUCTION PRESS SWITCH-RHRSH 2D DC ifRKR cot.' tWR 9.10' 5W-V139 STRTOR CLG INLET RHR5W 2D It0V-10 fluV (E4-EO-M H 20) 9.11 TY-4990 STATOR CLG RELRY RHR5W 2D 9.12 PT-1157/ RHR5W 2D DISCHRRGE PRESSURE INDICHTOR llPS 20-UOR/V100 PI-1157-1 9.13 E11-F0028 OUTLET 150 MOV-RHR HX 28 E4-EU-2XD 9.14 E11-F0600 OUTLET PDV MOV-RHR HX 20 E4-E8-2XB 9.15 E11-F073 RHR5W TO RHR X-CONNECT NOV E4-EG-2XB Fails to open Loss of SW backup to R' R Uperator action allowed after 10 minutes (uould require various other failures io need SW t>ackup io RHR)

Fails to close Partial loss of isolation between- E11-FU75 to isolate (E11-F073-and SW & RHR F075 are normally closed HOVs>

(Note: E11-F073 and -F075 powered from same supply) 9.16 E11-F075 RHR5W-TO RHR X-CONNECT NOV - See 9.15 E4-EO-2XB 9.17 E11-F074 RHR5W TO RHR X-CONNECT DRRIN HOV-FC ROV (E4-EU -2EU -2D)

- - - Fails to open Loss of header drain, possible Operator action leakage from SW to RtIR or

-from RHR to SW Fails to close Partial loss of SW flow to Flow limited by 1 inch line RHR system size (main header is 16 incli) i

= 4

.c- , - , . ,r, . r 3m s se ,-.,e> + +v -eo -em --# * . *- .t

+++-.. m ++++ n n u n ++a...+ !+..n m + n.s.++ ..++-++.. .. .++..+ .. .... .. ...++. ,.+..... ..+~.....< + n+ m ++,..s

[tSEP. Ul 15 112 SERVICE WHitR Sit:GLE l ait in 1 Httill.Y'.ti Ca l .- tt.. s .t ie r .ni I,.. b . u. l . .t. f i. 1, a .i ci ot' ;'il t ke. cut 1PutJEttT DESCRIPlIUN' Pt tutR'siiPPLV '

Failure (todes t oi t urv ef rec t 3 i m . pes .s.-it n .q f ac t i ., ,, ( Renc , Os >

- - - - w*****************************.+++++**+***+++*+++******. ......+......v.++++++.+v++++++++++++.*+.+,*********+

10.0 LUBE WRTER PUt1P5 RND VALVES MMMMMME*RMMMMMMMMMMMAMMMMWM 10.1 LW 2R LUBE WRTER PUt1P 2R E3-07-2PR Fails to start loss of lobe water flow from Ott 15 -1316 will start standby Ll4 Potential loss of SM pumps due

n pomp. PS-1315 would annunciate loss of motor cooling low pressure inadvertent start Excess capacity ti; effect 10.2 SW-V203 LUBE 14RTER PUtiP 2R DISCH 011ECK V tut t Fails to open Loss of lobe water flou f*P 131b will s t or t st.u.dt=j 111 froin 2R pump pu.np Fails to close Loss of flow due to reverse Flow I'S-1315 will cause anen2nciator, through idle LW pump PS-1316 will st ort st arnby til pump LLR 89-0334: Sil pumps .o supply own Lil supply 10.3 SW-V205 LUBE WRTER PUt1P 2R SUC CHECK V tuH Fails to open Loss of alternate suction pat h I'5-1316 will start st andby t il pump Fails to close Some loss.of SW system flow I.oss of 511 system flow limited by backwards thru check valve 4 inch line size-less than to pump bay capacity of one SW pu.np 10.4 LW 28 LUBE WRTER PUf1P 28 See 10.1 E4-EU-2PD 10.5 SW-V202 LUBE WRTER Put1P 20 DISCH CllECK V See 10.2 tuR 10.6 SW-V204 LUGE WRTER PUt1P 29 SUC CHECK V See 10.3 tuH 10.7 SW-V200 LUBE'WRTER C5W HERDER SUC CilECK V tull Fails to open Loss of C5W header supply to N511 header to supphj. pump Lube water pumps bag io backup Fails to close Possible flow from t1511 header in I nss of NSW syst e.n flow limited depressurized C5W header. by 4 inch line size-less than .

capacitg of additiona1 tiSW pump 10.8 SM-V2OI LUBE WRTER NSW HERDER SUC CllECK V'. tun Fails to open Loss of NSW header supply to C5W header to supply. pump Lube Water pumps bay to backup Fails to close Possible flow from CSN header to Loss of C5W system flow limited depressurized NSW header . bg 4 inch line size-less t han

, capacity of ad.litional CSit pm p

-x 4 **s x mum mWummum.u.e . * * * - . . - . .4 . n +++u= w +-+ vo- -- +.. .+= n . . . . .u . 4- + :+ o . + + <

w ow n * * < n o d wn ;

. - USEP Lil & U2 SERVICE & filter SIIIfa.E f iiit tti-:t iit8it.YSiS C.,t. . tt t i a H r a tit-1e., Rov. It, Iabie i. Sheet . or 211

, tJo. COMPONENT DESCRIPTIUt4 P SIERT.iiPpij Failure tkes _ Faitnre . -lh i 5 I:..m p- m.tiiy l'act.y n ( lhi ., M >

n n u o * *

m .* u x n w o u n x u o n u ~ * + o * * . . < + u n. w m . n + + + + , + *. . _ . . . . . .. . . o r. . . . . m o * . m. . . . . w m * + + . . , + o m u 10.-9 PV-136 ~ Lil SUCTI0ta FROt1 SH < PY-13h SUV, 11tW< E3- E7-

& PS-136 PRES 5URE SulTCH > 2PH)

Fails to open- Iube water puinp suction isolat-.i tobe water pomp so.:Iuw.

From flSH B CSU headers Fe um pump boy (PU-136 is a rail-open HOV)

Fatis to close Loss of lube water suction t'r m th.old require both 511 headers depressurized headers may air- to be depressorized-band Ll1 pumps causing Inss of (mol t iple ' Failures',

SLI punp and motor cooling i:ER 89-0334: 511 pumps to supp19 own L!! supp1y 10.10 PS-1315 LUDE WRTER HDR PRESS SUITCli 141HL SD-2H, DP- -

12H; SD-20, DP-12D Fails to alarm on - L oss of arvnanciat or ' only I"3-1316 would st ar i st ar vitaj low pressure .LH pomp.

! Hlarms without Unnecessary annunciation, liperalor acLaon low pressure no eFFect 10.11 PS-1316 LUBE uRTER llDR PRESS SHITCll .

E4 -EO-2f'O Fails to start. pump Fails to start standbg LLI pomp, PS-1315 uould cause annunciator on low pressure loss of Lube Hater, 514 pumps to alert operators.

Start.s pump without Hould start unnecessary LH pump. Operat or actinn

,. low pressure no effect I

t 4

I i

s i

L i

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u . . u u + ., . . -. . + . + . 3 . . . . + + . . . + . . . o . . . n . . . . . . u u o n + n _ u u BSEP U1 & U2 SERVICE LIRIER Sit 1GLE F Rit tfRE llNHLY515 Cale. tio . GOU5 tnt-Ib. Fev.'U, L,ble 1. Sheet-~ ~or 20 ~

tio. COMPONEtJT - DESCRIPT10t3 POWER 5iifPL Failure Modes Failure effects Compensatseig Factors ( Remarks ).

monunnmmumumnonm uu o*u.*nnmmum. o . n .- + . .o + + + w o .w o n =o u s.+u u m o u + o* uuu 12.0 .VITRL HERDER LORDS See 12.0 !

12.1 SW-U123 C5 PUMP 20 ROOM CL.R OUT fiOV-FO HUV-(E4-E8-2EO-20)'

12.2 SW-V124 RHR PUMP 2B ROOM CLR OUT HOV-F0 ROV (E4-EO-2EO-2D) .

12.3- SW-V125 RHR PUMP 2D SERL CLR OUT ROV-F0 ROV (E4-EB-2E8-2D) !

12.4 SH-V126 RHR PUMP 28 SERL CLR OUT ROV-FD ROV.(E4-E9-2EB-20) 12.5 SW-V128 C5 PUMP 2C R00t1 CLR DUT ROV-FU ROV (E3-E7-2E7-2C) 12.6 SW-U129 RHR PUMP 2R ROOtl CLR Oui HOV-Fu ROV (E3-E7-2E7-2C)-

12.7 SW-V130 RHR PUMP 2f1 SERL CLR OUT HOV-F0 flOV (E3-E7-2E7-28) 12.8 SW-V131 RHR PUMP 2C SERL 1R DUT HnU-F0 Rt.N (E3-E7-2C7-20)

Fails to op.n 1 :ess of cool ien). Will limit fl. 41 r e g. s i r -i l mes rie ut . l . mivit at es associated pump run time. Hilous tame for operator action.

Other t rain operable i Fails to close (Valves are F. i l open ftHW)

Honecessar y cool a ng or e . a .m tio e r ld. )

or seal cooler 12.9 FT-5115/ VITRL HEfiDER D DISCHHRIM F1 OW F1-EO-2EO FI-5115 No indication Date unavailable to ope, al or s Uther indication / alarms available as follows:

Indicates high ihta potentially misleading to -S!1-V111 -V117 -Vil8 posi t m or low operators -C511 E N511 header pressores

, PI-131-1 & PI-143-1

, -C5 2D Rm cooler 511 supply lou pressure alarm PSL-Il78

-RHR 2B room cooler SW outlet valve Su-V124 posit. ion

-RHR pump'28/2D seal cooler outlet low Flou alarm FSL-835/025 12.10 FT-Sil4/ VITRL HERDER fl DISCllRRGE FLOW See 12.9 E3-E7-2CR F1-5114 12.11 SW-V141 WELL WATER SUPPLY.10' VIIRL llEHDER fl0V-FC HuV nn- Fails to open Loss of-well water lagop tk. et ru t , operator action

i. Fails to close Loss of isolation 1. Ctect vcive SW-Vl92 will prevent backflow

2. Loss of Flow limited by 1.5 line size

' 12.12 SM-V192 WELL WRTER SUPPLY TD VITRL HERDER CHECK VALUE N/R (157R) Fails to opea Loss ~of well water layup .

tio effect, operator. action Fails to close Loss of isolation, loss of vital Loss of_ Flow limited by 1.5 inch header flow to well uater line' sire.

u u n x u x u n *

m n u * **

u * *

u m

o .u o

u u m * *

m + u + u . + o n o . . m m o + + . m . . + u m o . u m -. w . m *

u

u ,

DSEP UI & U2 SERVICE WATER SINGl E FRIlllRE ANRLYSI5 Cale. tio . t u tOSUH - 16, Rev. O, Table 1, Sheet of 20-

~

t Jo .- cut 1POtJEtiT DESCRIPTI0ti- POWER'50ih Failure Modes Failure effects Comper,satirg Factors < Remarks > i uo**mummnmmnxuxm*u

u *m *

uummm u u.o u.* u . .u u . u s .m.u um n o *um. u u n n u u*_

13.0 NSW HERDER LORDS - DIESEL GEt4ERRTOR RtJD ROCCW

- - - - xmwxx**xm**xxw=********r*+********

13.1 SM-V255 DIESEL BLDG SW SUPPLY MOV E4-EU-DGD Fails to open Loss of cooling I' rom Unit 2 Cooling ilow from Unit I (SH-to DG3 & DG4 V255 is a normally open MOV)

Fails to close Loss of isolatinn lC 511 snpply t10Vs to isolate (25L1-V210 -V211 -V212, n - V213 Reference item 13.4>

13.2 15H-V212 UNIT 1 SW SUPPLY 10 DG3 HuV E3-E7-DGC Fails to open Loss of Unit I cooling t o DG3 U. .o l i n g t e om Unit 2 thru 25W-V212 Fails to close finnecessary cool ing uat er Coo l doun . limi ted by jacket wat er flow to DG s i d.- I v.nper at or e- c ontro l 13.3 15tt-V274 UNIT 1 SW SUPPLY 10 DG3 CHLUK V tJni Fai!= to open toss of Unit I cooling 1o DG3 Cooliry ieom Unit 2 ibru 25H-V212 Fails to close Loss of reverse flow isolation 15ti-V212 to isolate (interlod ed untb 25U-V212-1.oth carnot t.e open) 13.4 25W-V212 UNIT 2 SH 5UPPLY TO DG3 fl0V E3-E7-DGC Fails to ooen Loss of Unit 2 cooling to DG3 Cooling t' rom tini t. I thru 15H-V212 Fails to close Unnecessary cooling water Coo l down s l imi ted by jad et wat er flou to DG side temperature control 13.5 25W-V274 UNIT 2 SH SUPPLY 10 DG3 CitLUK V See 13.3 ft/H 3

13.6 PS-1996 DG3 PRESS 5 HITCH FOR SW-V212 E3- E 7-ICC Fails to trip on loss of cooling, loss of IIG3 O t her DGs, train intact low pressure plus time delag Trip when not Hill shift to alternate SH suppig Cooling from Unit 1 SH necessary

' 13.7 15W-V213 UNIT 1 SW SUPPLY TU DG4 MOV E4-EU-DGD Fails to open Loss of Unit I cooling to DG4 Cuolang trum Unit 2 thru 25H-V213 Fails to close _ Unnecessary cooling water Cooldown limited by jacket water flow to DG side temperature control 13.8 15W-V275 UNIT 1:SH SUPPLY TO DG4 CHECK V N/A Fails to open Loss of Unit I cooling to DG4 Cooling from Unit 2 thru 25W-V213 Fails to close Loss of reverse Flow isolation 15W-V213 to isolate (interlocked with 25W-V213-both cannot be open) 1 a

L-- u____mm__ W e4 r..e-e e We g a q.- ,%y ,y., g y,,- , g 4 , , ._

[

munwaxwx*mmuxxxxm*m*u uumm*** mum **mw*nm o u n n m + + + unom u* u u mu *

n u m*

o* +m ** ux BSEP UI & U2 SERVICE WOTER SINGLE THILURE RNRLYSIS Calc. flo . GOO 500-16, Rev. O. Table 1, Sheet ___ of 20, No. COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY Failure Modes Failure effects Comperisat ing Factors < Remarks )

n um*

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13.9 25W-V213 UNIT 2 SW SUPPLY TO DG4 Muu E4-EG-DGD Fails to open Loss of Unit 2 cooling to DG4 Couling from tinnt I thru 15W-V213 Fails to close tlnnecessary cooling water rooldown limited by jacket uater flow to DG sade t e,rperature cont e ol 13.10 25W-U275 UNIT 2 SW SUPPLY TO DG4 CHECK V See 13.0 N/n 13.11 P5-1995 DG4 PRESS SWITCH FOR SM-V213 E4-FO-DGD Fails to trip on loss of cooling, loss of DG4 i ll i ,er DG , . tr ain int ac t low pressure plus time delag Trip when not Will shift to alternate Sll sogply 6 :i n il i nq fr om f in a l 1 Su necessary 13.12 SM-V103 NSW TO RBCCW HX PRitt 150 MDU L4-EO-2XU.

FaiIs to open Loss of al1 511 to RDCCW llXs, and Non essential 1oad reduction of NSW pump Flou 0.c 1

ator action, l~l-1150/

< envelopes throltled Ilou case) Fi-1150 <1511-U37 alarms)

Fails to close loss of ability to isolate RUl rtl Sil-Ulu6 to isolate flow FAics 1b idsotrLe. Ikas er1Neucs ti'cM Flow sta-dl% Ana.aatr_ vs Ttleotrtz. 6J 13.13 SW-VIO6 NSW TO ROCCW HX SEC 150 MOV E3-E 7-2Xif Fails to open loss of all Su to RUCCW llXs. . ind Non essential load reduction of' N5W pomp flou llperator action, i1-1150/

< envelopes thr ott led I low rane) i1-1150, (1511-U37 alor mm.)

Fails to close Loss of ability to isolate RDCCW 'u-V103

_. Io isolate flow t h .s ms T11geist A Ibes Arr'REmucs 'R15ccw b so-Vm3 MaiLA5tE To 'TuccinA b 13.14 V150,153,156 RELIEF URLVES ON RDCCll HXs N/R wu* Fails to open Possible overpressure damage Non- sential load, (one due to thermal expansion spare.HX)

Fails to close Leekage from Su to SW drains leakage limited lui .750 innh line sice 13.15 FT-1150/ SW FLOW TO RDCCW HXs llPS Cit-Van /VIDH FI-1150-1 No indication Data unavailable to operators Sll-VIO R-Ulu6 position available Indicates high Data potentially misleading in flot o flow r educt ion on LUCH or low operators or LOOP unaffected 1511-037 alarms on high HX outlet temperature

- . . .. _ _ . . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _____._.-_._._._._______________..____._______._-__m -

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DSEP UI & U2 SERVICE HflTER SIrlGLE FHilltRE fitJHLYSIS C.-i l t fl. . t a lHN IH - l b. Rev. U, Table 1. Sheet- of 20 tJo. CuttPONEtJT DESCRIPTIOtl PUHER 506'PL9 -

Failure t1 odes F ailure effects Compensatituj factors ( Remarks >

- - - - w********++++++=*************+++.++++++++++++=..+******+**+++++*****+++++++**+****+*********

14.0 CSM HERDER LOHDS - TBCCH, CH PUttP DEHRItlGS, HtJD CliLORIllHilut1

- - - - +******************.*****+A 14.1 SH-V3 CSM TO TDCCH HX SEC 150 t10V E4-EG-2XD

-n Fails to opr n Loss of all 511 to 11tCCH ltXs, tJon essent ial lood k possible low pump flow c or u li t m oi .

Fails to close Loss of isolation ability 1. S!EV4 to isolat e

2. tJS!! available to supply ersential loads Faits % O N 5,qq ,3 _n;go37tg {

14.2 SH-V4 C511 TO TDCC14 HX PRIff 150 ItttV E F E P-Oxit rails to open t oss ut all St3 to IUt:Cil Hxo. H n e n.r il i .. I 1. .. u l f"'ss i b l e low pomp flow un n h i ion Fails to close loss of isolation ability 1. tt..tl avo i l ab l e to sopply esse loa.b Faits n TdRontri- 2.sa-n ditial esot Ars_

g # n w y m ze m s_

4 j.

14.3 RV-1,2,&3 TOCCH HX RELIEF URLVES tJnt n *.

Fails to open Possible overpressure desmair Non essential load (ore llX due to thermal expansion is spare)

Fails to close Leatage from Su t o f l oor - drainu 791 un.h line si. r limi t s finu 14.4 SH-V36 CSU TO CH PUt1P DRGS PRIll ISU t1UV E 3 -E7-2Pfl Fails to open Loss of all Sil to C11 punip tirep C11 pneps not safety related tion essentmal load Fails to clnse Flow path of 100 gpm I NStJ available to supply essenLia1 1oads 4

2. 5ua-t31 Te isotAw!. L 14.5 SH-V37 CSM TO Ct1 PUt1P DRGS SEC 150 tt0V .

E4- E O-2f 'O

';-- Fails to open Loss of all 514 to C,4 pump brgs Cll pumps not safety-related 4 Non essentia1 1oad L Fails to close Flou path of 100 gpm 1. Sli-V36 to isolate

2. flSH available to supply esserit ial loads 1

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Failure flodes Failure effects lh pensatinw3 Factors < Remarts >

a mm mM* nM u n om u n M o M .u n n u . . . .u uu m m o n s m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . u u m .w . . . s u . u . . . u u . . . . u a m u 15.0 ttRJOR ELECTRICRL C001PONENTS MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 15.1 DG3 DIESEL GENERRTOR 3 Inoperable Does not, supply associated Effects bounded by loss or emergency bus associated E-bus Reduction in Sil cooling demar *1 15.2 DG4 DIESEL GEt1ERRTOR 4 See 15.I 15.3. E3 .4160V Et1ERGEtlCY U115 Dt; 3 Deenergized t oss of NSH pump 2f t, CLil ru m p t ill w; t v a i r. ui l l e ema i n 2H, RilRSH pump 2R, E7, av.d i r e t .sc i to suppig essential other associated loa.fs au loads: f4Sil pomp 20, CSH listed below: p.mp 2U, ae.d RilR5W pump 211 powered from E4, CSl4 pump 2C a RilRS11 pomp 2C txuer ed from El, RHRSW 2D powered from E2, 51RRItJER tJ514 PUl1P 2H STRHItJER PV-138 STRHINER BRCKHHSil liHV < PY-130, 50V & PDIC-130, dP Sill TCil >

SU-Vl9 DISCil t109-NSil Pitt1P 211 C5W 20 CONVEttTIUNHL Sil PtIttP 2H-STRRINER CSU PUMP 211 STRHINER PV-116 .STRRINER DRCKURSil ROV < PY-116, SOV & PDIC-116, dP 51111C11 )

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BSEP UNIT 1 & UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS CALC NO. G0050A-16, Rev. O, Table 2, Sheet 1 of 5 No. COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POW SUPPLY co*****************************************************ER*************

See the last page of Table 1 for abbreviations

indicates the component is not safety-related 1.0 NSW PUMP 1A AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS 1.1 NSW 1A NUCLEAR SW PUMP 1A El (DC N:SB-1A,DP-1A; A:SB-2A,DP-2A) 1.2 STRAINER NSW PUMP 1A STRAINER El-ES-1PA 1.3 PV-138 STRAINER BACKWASH AOV-FO ( PY-138, AOV (El-ES-SOV & PDIC-138, dP SWITCH ) 1PA) 1.4 SW-V24 DISCH CHECK VALVE-NSW PUMP 1A N/A 1.5 SW-V19 DISCH MOV-NSW PUMP 1A El-ES-1PA 1.6 Various LUBE WATER MOTOR COOLING SUPPLY N/A V279, PRV-2867 2.0 NSW PUMP 1B AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS 2.1 NSW 1B NUCLEAR SW PUMP 1B E2 (DC N:SB-1B,DP-1B; A:SB-2B,DP-2B) 2.2 STRAINER NSW PUMP 1B STRAINER E2-E6-1PB 2.3 PV-140 STRAINER BACKWASH AOV-FO ( PY-140, AOV (E2-E6-SOV & PDIC-140, dP SWITCH ) 1PB) 2.4 SW-V25 DISCH CHECK VALVE-NSW PUMP 1B N/A 2.5 SW-V20 DISCH MOV-NSW PUMP 1B E2-E6-1PB 2.6 Various LUBE WATER MOTOR COOLING SUPPLY N/A V280, PRV-2864 3.0 CSW PUMP 1A AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS 3.1 CSW 1A CONVENTIONAL SW PUMP 1A E4 (DC N:SB-2B,DP-2B; A:SB-1B,DP-1B) 3.2 STRAINER CSW PUMP 1A STRAINER E4-E8-2PB 3.3 PV-116 STRAINER BACKWASH AOV-FO ( PY-116, AOV (E4-E8-SOV & PDIC-116, dP SWITCH ) 2PB) 3.4 SW-V21 DISCH CHECK VALVE-CSW PUMP 1A N/A 3.5 SW-V13 DISCH MOV-CSW PUMP 1A TO CSW HDR E4-E8-2PB 3.6 SW-V14 DISCH MOV-CSW PUMP 1A TO NSW HDR E4-E8-2PB 3.7 Various LUBE WATER MOTOR COOLING SUPPLY N/A V276, PRV-2876 i

l

,i Loco *****************************************************************

BSEP UNIT 1 & UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS ,

CALC NO. G0050A-16, Rev. O, Table 2, Sheet 2 of 5 No. COMPONENT DESCRIPTION oco************************************************* POWER SUPPLY '

4.0 CSW PUMP 1B AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS 4.1 CSW 1B CONVENTIONAL SW PUMP 1B El (DC N:SB-1A,DP -

1A; A:SB-2A,DP-2A) 4.2 STRAINER CSW PUMP 1B STRAINER El-ES-1PA 4.3 PV-118 STRAINER BACKWASH AOV-FO ( PY-118, AOV (El-ES- '

SOV & PDIC-118, dP SWITCH ) 1PA) 4.4 SW-V22 DISCH CHECK VALVE-CSW PUMP 1B

.4. 5 SW-V15 N/I DISCH MOV-CSW PUMP IB TO CSW HDR El-ES-1PA

4. 6- SW-V16 DISCH MOV-CSW PUMP 1B TO NSW HDR 4.7 El-ES-1PA Various LUBE WATER MOTOR COOLING SUPPLY V277, PRV-2873 N/A 5.0 CSW PUMP 1C AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS 5.1 CSW 1C CONVENTIONAL SW PUMP 1C E2 (DC N:SB-1B,DP- '

5.2 STRAINER ElB; A:SB-2B,DP-2B) l CSW PUMP 1C STRAINER E2-E6-1PB 5.3 PV-120 STRAINER BACKWASH AOV-FO ( PY-120, i AOV-(E2-E6-SOV & PDIC-120, dP SWITCH ) 1PB) -

5.4 SW-V23 DISCH CHECK VALVE-CSW PUMP 1C 5.5 SW-V17 N/A

DISCH MOV-CSW PUMP 1C TO CSW HDR E2-E6-1PB'

-5.6 SW-V18 DISCH MOV-CSW PUMP 1C TO NSW HDR E2-E6-1PB 5.7 Various LUBE WATER MOTOR COOLING SUPPLY N/A V278, PRV-2870 6.0 HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL AND INDICATION 6.1 PS-271 NSW HDR PRESS SW, RELAY 63-XA2 SB-1A,DP-11A

'6.2 PS-3214 NSW HDR PRESS SW, RELAY 63-XB2 SB-1B,DP-11B-6.3 PS-129 CSW HDR PRESS SW, RELAY 63-XA1 SB-1A,DP-11A '

6.4 PS-3213 CSW HDR PRESS SW, RELAY 63-XB1 SB-1B,DP-11B 6.5 PT-143/ NSW HEADER PRESSURE INDICATOR UPS 1A-V7A/V9A PI-143-1 6.6 PT-131/ CSW HEADER PRESSURE INDICATOR UPS 1A-V7A/V9A PI-131-1

- 7. 0- SW TO RHRSW MOVs 7.1 SW-V101 CSW TO RHRSW PUMPS 1A & 1C El-ES-1XA 7.2 SW-V102 RHRSW HEADER CROSSOVER MOV 7 '. 3 SW-V105 E2-E6-1XB NSW TO RHRSW PUMPS 1B &'1D E2-E6-1XB i

I

-t

- - . .-. . = . .-

BSEP UNIT 1 & UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS CALC NO. G0050A-16, Rev. O, Table-2, Sheet 3 of 5 No. COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY :

l 8.0 SW SUPPLY TO RHR HX 1A 8.1 E11-C001A RHRSW PUMP 1A E3 (DC N:SB-2A,DP-2A; A:SB-1A,DP-1A) .

8.2 E11-F005A DISCH CHECK VALVE-RHRSW PUMP 1A N/A '

8.3 PS-1175A SUCTION PRESS SW-RHRSW 1A DC BRKR CONT PWR 8.4 SW-V136 -STATOR CLG INLET RHRSW 1A AOV-FO AOV (El-ES-1ES-1A)' ,

8.5 TY-4887- STATOR CIG RELAY RHRSW 1A 8.6 PT-1154/ RHRSW 1A DISCH. PRESSURE INDICATOR UPS 1A-V7A/V9A PI-1154-1 8.7 E11-C001C RHRSW' PUMP 1C El (DC N:SB-1A,DP-1A; A:SB-2A,DP-2A)

.8.8 E11-F005C DISCH CHECK VALVE-RHRSW PUMP 1C N/A 8.9 PS-1175C SUCTION PRESS SW-RHRSW 1C- DC BRKR CONT PWR '

8.10 SW-V137 STATOR CLG INLET RHRSW 1C AOV-FO~ AOV (El-ES-1E5-1A)

- 8 '.11 TY-4889 STATOR CLG RELAY RHRSW 1C 8.12 PT-1156/ RHRSW 1C DISCH PRESSURE INDICATOR UPS 1A-V7A/V9A .t PI-1156-1 8.13 E11-F002A OUTLIT ISO MOV-RHR HX 1A El-ES-1XA 8.14 E11-F068A OUTLET PDV MOV-RHR HX 1A El-E5-1XA ,

8.15 SW-V143* WELL WATER SUP TO RHRSW HDRS AOV-FC AOV (N:El-E5-1ES-1A, A:E2-E6-1E6-1B-RX) 8.16 SW-V144 WELL WATER SUP TO RHRSW CHECK V N/A ,

SW-V148 9.0 SW SUPPLY TO RHR HX 1B

- - - - t r

. 9.1 E11-C001B RHRSW PUMP 1B E4 (DC.N:SB-2B,DP- i 2B; A:SB-1B,DP-1B) 9.2 E11-F005B DISCH CHECK VALVE-RHRSW PUMP 1B N/A 9.3 PS-1176B- SUCTION PRESS SW-RHRSW 1B DC BRKR. CONT PWR. ;

9.4 SW-V138 STATOR CLG INLET'RHRSW 1B AOV-FO AOV (E2-E6-1E6-2B) .

9.5 TY-4888 STATOR CLG RELAY RHRSW 1B !

9.6 PT-1155/ RHRSW 1B DISCH PRESSURE INDICATOR UPS 1A-V7A/V9A PI-1155-1 9.7 E11-C001D RHRSW PUMP 1D

. E2 (DC N:SB-1B,DP-1B; A:SB-2B,DP-2B) ;

l9.8 E11-F005D DISCH CHECK VALVE-RHRSW PUMP 1D N/A 9.9 PS-1176D. SUCTION PRESS SW-RHRSW 1D DC BRKR CONT PWR 9.10 SW-V139 STATOR CLG INLET RHRSW 1D AOV-FO AOV (E2-E 6-1E6-2 B) l 9.11 TY-4890 STATOR CLG RELAY RHRSW 1D 9;12 '

PT-1157/ RHRSW 1D DISCH PRESSURE INDICATOR UPS 1A-V7A/V9A PI-1157-1 ,

,. ,. , - .- ~

r kr. s BSEP UNIT 1 & UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER SIFGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS CALC NO. G0050A-16, Rev. O, Table 2, Sheet 4 of 5 No. COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POWER SUPP

- - - - LY ******

-9.13 E11-F002B OUTLET ISO MOV-RHR HX 1B E2-E6-1XB 9.14 E11-F068B OUTLET PDV MOV-RHR HX IB E2-E6-1XB -

9.15 E11-F073 RHRSW TO RHR X-CONNECT MOV E2-E6-1XB-9.16 E11-F075 RHRSW TO RHR X-CONNECT MOV E2-E6-1XB 9.17 ,

E11-F074* RHRSW TO RHR X-CONNECT DRAIN AOV-FC AOV(E2-E6-1E6-1B)-

10.0 LUBE WATER PUMPS AND VALVES 10.1 LW 1A LUBE WATER PUMP 1A El-E5-1PA 10.2 SW-V203 LUBE WATER PUMP 1A DISCH CHECK V N/A 10.3 SW-V205 LUBE WATER PUMP 1A SUC CHECK.V N/A

-10.4 LW 1B LUBE WATER PUMP IB E2-E6-1PB 10.5 SW-V202 LUBE WATER PUMP 1B DISCH CHECK V N/A 10.6 SW-V204 LUBE WATER PUMP 1B SUC CHECK V N/A 10.7 SW-V200 LUBE WATER CSW HEADER SUC CHECK V N/A 10.8 SW-V201 LUBE WATER NSW HEADER SUC CHECK V N/A ;

10.9 PV-136 LW SUCTION FROM SW ( PY-136 SOV, AOV(El-ES- '

& PS-136 PRESSURE SWITCH ) 1PA) 10.10 PS-1315 LUBE WATER HDR PRESS SW DUAL,SB-1A,DP-11A;SB-1B,DP-11B -

10.11 PS-1316 LUBE WATER HDR PRESS SW E2-E6-1PB :

11.0 VITAL HEADER SUPPLY MOVs 11.1 SW-Vill CSW HDR TO VITAL HDR MOV 'El-ES-1XA 11.2 SW-V117- NSW HDR TO VITAL HDR MOV E2-E6-1XB 11.3 SW-V118 VITAL HEADER DIV ISO MOV El-ES-1XA 12.0 VITAL HEADER LOADS 12.1 SW-V123 CS PUMP 1B ROOM CLR OUT AOV-FO 12.2 SW-V124

-AOV (E2-E6-1E6-1D) ,

RHR PUMP 1B ROOM CLR OUT AOV-FO AOV (E2-E6-1E6-1D) 12.3 SW-V125 RHR PUMP 1D SEAL CLR OUT AOV-FO 12.4 SW-V126 AOV (E2-E6-1E6-1B) '

RHR PUMP 1B SEAL CLR OUT AOV-FO' AOV ~(E2-E6-1E6-1B) l 12.5 -SW-V128 CS PUMP 1A ROOM CLR OUT AOV-FO AOV (El-E5-1E5-1C) ;

12.6- SW-V129 RHR PUMP 1A ROOM CLR OUT AOV-FO AOV (El-ES-1E5-1C) 12.7 .SW-V130 .i RHR PUMP 1A SEAL CLR OUT AOV-FO AOV (El-E5-1E5-1A)L !

12.8 SW-V131 RHR PUMP 1C SEAL CLR OUT'AOV-FO AOV (El-ES-1ES-1A)'

12.9- FT-5115/ VITAL HEADER B' DISCHARGE FLOW E2-E6-1E6 FI-5115 12.10 FT-5114/ VITAL HEADER A DISCHARGE FLOW El-ES-1CA FI-5114 12.11 SW-V141* WELL WATER SUPPLY TO VITAL HDR-FC AOV (N:El-ES-1E5-1A, 12.12 SW-V192 A:El-ES-DGA-1A-DG)

WELL WATER SUPPLY TO VITAL HDR CHECK N/A

t BSEP UNIT l '& UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS '

P CALC NO. G0050A-16, Rev. O, Table 2, Sheet 5 of 5 No. COMPONENT. DESCRIPTION

- - - - POWER SUPPLY 13.0 NSW HEADER LOADS - DIESEL GENERATOR AND RBCCW 13.1 SW-V255 DIESEL BLDG SW SUPPLY MOV El-ES-DGA

'13.2 1SW-V210 UNIT 1 SW SUPPLY TO DG1 MOV El-ES-DGA i

13.3 ISW-V272 UNIT'1 SW SUPPLY TO DG1 CHECK V N/A 13.41 2SW-V210 UNIT 2 SW SUPPLY TO DG1 MOV .El-E5-DGA

-13.5 2SW-V272- UNIT 2 SW SUPPLY TO DG1 CHECK V 13.6 PS-1999 N/A i DG1 PRESS SW FOR SW-V210 BRKR CONTROL POWER 1.3 . 7 1GW-V211 UNIT 1 SW SUPPLY TO DG2 MOV E2-E6-DGB 13.8 1SW-V273 UNIT 1 SW SUPPLY TO DG2 CHECK V 13.9 2SW-V211 N/A UNIT 2 SW SUPPLY TO DG2 MOV. E2-E6-DGB 13.10 2SW-V273 UNIT 2 SW SUPPLY TO DG2 CHECK V N/A 13.11 PS-1998 DG2 PRESS SW FOR SW-V211 BRKR CONTROL POWER 13.12 SW-V103 NSW IJ RBCCW HX PRIM ISO MOV E2-E6-1XB 13.13 SW-V106 NsW TO RBCCW HX SEC ISO MOV El-ES-1XA 13.14.V150,153,156* RELIEF VALVES ON RBCCW HXs N/A 13.15 FT-1158/ SW FLOW TO RBCCW HXs UPS 1A-V7A/V9A'

~

FI-1158-1 14.0 CSW HEADER LOADS - TBCCW, CW PUMP BEARINGS, AND CHLORINATION 14.1 SW-V3*- CSW TO TBCCW HX SEC ISO MOV- E2-E6-1XB '

14.2 SW-V4 CSW TO TBCCW HX PRIM ISO MOV El-ES-1XA 14.3 RV-1 & 2* TBCCW HX RELIEF VALVES 14.4 SW-V36 N/A-CSW TO OW PUMP BRGS PRIM ISO MOV- El-ES-1PA 14.5 SW-V3 7A-- CSW TO CW PUMP BRGS SEC ISO MOV E2-E6-1PB 14.6 SW-V294 . CSW TO~ CHLOR PRIM ISO MOV El-E5-1PA 14.7 SW-V2954- CSW TO CHLOR SEC ISO MOV E2-E6-1PB 15.0- MAJOR ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS 15.1 DG1 DIESEL GENERATOR 1 15.2 DG2 DIESEL GENERATOR 2 15.3 El 4160V EMERGENCY' BUS DG 1 15.4 E2 4160V EMERGENCY BUS DG 2 15.5- -DG3 DIESEL GENERATOR 3 15.6 DG4 DIESEL GENERATOR 4

-15.7 E3 4160V EMERGENCY BUS DG 3-15.8 E4 4160V EMERGENCY BUS DG 4 '

.15.9 BATTERY BUSES '

i

DESIGN VERIFICATION RECORD Cac. 6cogoA-lb g,j Instrgiona to Verification Personnt1~ L Qoog,g,9, Pls.nt: t09dP TAR No.: Project: 4CCS O A, File No. : Ob Design Documents:

6ec.T. IE- 6,we F.,w a s.h aum S- sssmr 4fcNu c Aam(M ;

(Docu=ent No.) (Rev.) (Document Title) R e(* M~ l d Ar (Document No.) (Rev.) (Document Title)

Design in verification should be done in accordance with ANSI N45.2.ll, Section 6, as amended by Reg. Guide 1.64, Rev. 2.

Verification Methods to be used: Documents (s) "O." Level:

/ Design Reviev Alternate or Simplified Calculations

/Q RW-Q Qualification Testing FP-O Non-O Special Instructions:

.L.,u ) < d r_; ~ l '> b nec} yea ev VEAW 17 R %

DFE Date Verification Docu=entation:

Method Used:

/ Design Review ( Attach any documentation)

Alternate or Simplified Calculations (Attach calculations)

Qualification Testing Design Document Acceptable: Yes / No If Not Acceptable, Give Reasons or Provide Comments on Reverse Side of This Form:

/

Verification Check Completed By (Signature) N Acknowledgement of Verification: ![crx .

/ 2-/8 -89 (DFE) 'Da t e III. Resolution of Comments Comments Resolved (See Reverse Side):

Responsible Engineer Date Action taken makes Design Document Acceptable Discipline Date s l Project Engineer Verifier Date

t DESIGN REVIEW CHECK SHEET Plant BM Document Type Adh%er Project C, oo 6 o k Document No. 00050A - l(o File No,bG CO fCth I' b ri E C Revision o

Description:

Mark each iten yes, no.

by you. or not applicable and initial each item checked 1.

'4ere the inputs correctly selected and incorporated into design?

2.

Are assumptions used in the design adequately described and reasonable?

JA (p%g 7

NOTE:

Review shall include but is not limited to applicable inputs specified in NED Procedure 3.1.A, paragraph 3.1.A.4 3.

Are the appropriate quality and quality assurance requirements specified7 '

ed 4

Are applicable codes, scandards, and regulatory /

requirassants including issus and addendum properly .

identified, and are their requirements for design met? d

5. ,1 Has applicable construction and operating experience been considered? '

WA //

6. ,

Have design interface requirements been satisfied?

d 7.

Was an appropriate ' atgn method used?

M B.

Is the output reasonable compared to inputs?

'd+

9.

Are the specified parts, equipment, and processes '/

suitable for the application?

O 10.

Are the specified materials compatible with each other and the design environmental conditions to which the materials will be exposed?

O O

Document Type Aa m dst 9 Document No. Goc > rom - I6.

Revision o 11.

Have adequate naintenance features and .equirements been specified?

/

J/A -

12. 1 Are accessibility and other provisions adequate for /

perfornance of naintenance, repair, and any expected in-service inspections? ,j 13.

MIM Has publictheand design properly considered radiation exposure to the to plant personnel (AMRA)?

14. d/M [At _

Are acceptance criteria in the design documents sufficient to allow verification that design requirements have been satisfactorily accomplished?

dA ,

15.

Have specified?

been adequate preoperational and periodic test requirements d 71y 16.

Are adequate storing, handling, cleaning, shipping, and identification requirements specified? , j/

17.

d[ M Are requirements for record preparation, review, approval, retention, etc., adequately specified? b,'/

18.

Have all problems with this design known from prior application been considered and resolved? )/

do E'j -

date at bottom of each explanation.For each question on the check ,

Sigpature

/2-/8-89 Date

( sign erifier/Checkar)

I ram d

18 ,,_ _ _ . Th e_ % de. E ur e-- msk g u g,jjim d ib e ysh b ku-ep Ahhv~~ d^

b T0d-% O hbA B ReOld b M u r n / ped Ak .

e

e.- g DESIGN VERIFICATION RECOTG I. Instructinns to Varifierttion Psrsnnn11' gj Plant: ON f I+ 1 TAR No.: A/d Projecc:dOCLfC4 File No.: 86Cdf04

Design Documents: -

M / /c ME- d IN (Document No.; (Rev.) (Document Title) a coso A - I e, O Bau wal.cre * -2 5 eT2AcEwnTM (Document No.) (Rev.) (Document Title) N(4(, fA/l-(16 ru G >

Design in verification should be done in accordance vit SI N . 11, Section 6, as amended by Reg. Guide 1.64, Rev. 2.

Verification Methods to be used: Documents (s) "Q~ Level:

/ Design Review t/ Q

, Alternate c- Simplified Calculations RW-Q Qualification Testing FP-Q Non-Q Special Instructions:

VE/' M Fat. /L //d/tW DPE g;/w' Date II. Verification Documentation:

Method Used:

Design Review (Attach any documentation)

Alternate or Simplified Calculations (Attach calculations)

Qualification Testing Design Document Acceptable: Yes V No If Not Acceptable, Give Reasons or Provide Comments on Reverse

Side of This Form:

Verification Check Completed By (Signature): NA/.m o- / #9 Acknowledgement of Verification: ~Jy ( 2[(9 (DPE) Date III. Resolution of Comments Comments Resolved (See Reverse Side)<(-!/7fff.

h d/b h / 19 Responsitile Engineer Date Action taken makas Design Document Acceptable ~ ~ ~'"

h~ ?NM lbNd Y Al2n /2/2)lM~ '

~

Discipline O Date dat'e Project Engineer )/erifier ' ~ ~~

ACpt.

fam. RCrlved l No. Y/N Comment

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1 DESIGN REVIEW CHECK SEEET l

a Plane 8IEP /*1 Document Type C/9LCQ uPD OA/ l Project G cof0 A '

Document No. 600$O A - 10 '

ru. no. BG coron- DE- Am navi.to. O-

.: 1 i

Description:

Mark each item yes, no, or not applicable and initial each item checked by you. ,

L. Were the inputs correctly selected and incorporated into - !

design?

fe, AAiW ,

2. Are assumptions used in the design adequately described and reasonable? /8, A4n/

i NOTE: Review shall include but is not limited to applicable inputs specified in NED Procedure 3.1.A, paragraph 3.1.A.4.

i

3. Are the appropriate quality.and quality assurance t'

requirements specifiad?

f/4AM

4. Ara applicable codes, standards,-and regulatory . I requirements 4= had4== issue and add =ad== properly identified,'and are chair requirements for design met? .[AM

5. Has applicable construction and operating experience-3 been considered? .;

M/ M i

6. Have design interface requirements been' satisfied? in

7. Was an arr..r.iate design method used? Al/4-M !

8. M ufn/rs Is the output reasonable compared to inputs? V*1 M M

9. Are the specified parts, equipment, and processes , 5#/W1 k suitable for the application? N/4dM ,

4

10. Are the specified materials compatible with each other and the design environmental conditions.to which the materials will be exposed?- M/ M e i

?

- - . ~

. s 4

4 @

_ . NGC f/ d'y i

, i Document Type /^4U)ilAr4A/-

Document No. 6 er CeA -// '

Revision a i

11. Have adequate maintamance features and requirements. '

been specified?

/AA4n/

12. Are accessibility and other provisions' adequate for ";

performance of-maintenance, repair, and any expected

.in-service inspections?

4M '

13. Has the design properly considered radiation exposure ta the.

public and to plant personnel (ALARA)? A//sde/

14. Are acceptance criteria in the design documents sufficient '4 to allow verification that design requirements have been antisfactorily accomplished? b/ld./

./

15. Have adequate preoperational and periodic test-requirements.

been specified?-

Af/36v

' 16. Are adequate storing, h w 14= , c1===4=g, shipping, and y

-i identification requirements specified?.

. SN f

17.

Are requirements retention, for record etc., adequately specified? preparation, review, approval,

dl' Ad '

18. :

Have all problems with this design known~from prior applicaties been considered and resolved? '7bN ,

y For each question on the check list not answered yes, explain, sign, and date at botton of each explanation.

l,

. A/s n -f2/22/ rg Signahure Date' ,

(Design Yerifier/rs,ir.,) ;

l* h E 9 lo If /2, /3,I.G /4,17 4tc,yg geagg 7kgc4teu wtow'b R k i

twoee #we nayra e nryumas Acrx rzwf,my masigr,ers~ j

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Il 74afS DISCIPLINE DESIGN VERIFICATION RECORD Page;1- l 1.- Instrtsticeis to verification Persomel '

, Plant DY [ (Class A)

Project C7CD6CC Q [ ] Seismic (Class 8)

File No. MS O46DC/2/ - 3E- 45V3 Level- t 1 FP-Q'(Class D)

Docunent No. C7 CCEM */IC ev e / ( 3 Other Design verification should be done in accordance with ANSI W45.2.11, Section 6, as amended by Regulatory !

Guide 1.64, Rev. 2. '

PLE7E 32StCkdfB//&& 0ffcf SkGE:(

, i m. /

Discipline Project Engineer $ /3 L fi d M II. Verification consuuntation Amlicability Discieline Discieline Mechanical HVAC

% Civil Structural IJ ,

I1 Seismic Equip. Qual. [] r Electrical I3 Civil Stress I] [

IEC Fire Protection

~

I3 ()

Envirorsnental Qualification [] ;

Human Factors !] '!

Materials [] -

other kl ;

[]

Verification Methods used:

K Design Review ( l Alternate Calculations [ ] Qualification Testing

^i Design Docunent Ac table Yes N coments attached.

/

Design verifier N [X/. Date 3/O E 'i

/

j v +

Acknowledgement f ifica ' :/

(DPE) / ./ -

~'

/f M Date 7 D l

0 Ill. Resolution of Cemaments:

Coment esolved ' tt hed):

7 (RE) / N Date II b ,

D g r i Date 7fD .i (DPE) %3fK 'l 0 Date iWw' 6

Proc. 3.3 Rev. 38 I

650f0A/6 WC 910.i A Es s 12 7?

Page 2-DISCIPLINE DESIGN VERIFICATI0tt RECDRD COMMENT SHEET Pitnt' Projsct b' W File No. 0 $"bS"b b Document ho. bN d"/b'eev /

This sheet is only recuired ninen cortnents are being mace.

Consnent Resotvec No. Cocment Resolution Initial /Date

% MJ Lt .

)

. Proc. 3.3 Rev. 40

GezsM-/6 .

/h r: c 72sv./.

COMMENT SHEET CALC. G0050A-16. REV. 1 Comment Comment Resolution Resolved No. Initial /Date

1. Add System No. and Calc. Type to Mrs.I;>

existing to update cover sheet to E4 Rev. 2. ,

2. Add revision bar as marked on page 14.

) ppg !W !

3. Add reference to PM 89-048 as 2-marked on page 16.

[.pg 4 Page 17: The CSW start logic gg c 3[#f/92 description could be interpreted that CSW pumps can start on low gg pressure following a LOOP. Please clarify.

5. Page 17: The automatic action of / * !Ik the DGSW supply valves is gg inadequately described. Please clarify. ,

6. Page 19: Change " idle" header to $[pJsgD

" conventional" header.

7. Pages 20,21: In modes 4 and 5, use "LOCA signal" instead of

/fgvl6(b "LOCA" to be consistent. ,

8. Page 21: TS 3.7.1.2 should be [ /.5E.d ! 2-referenced as the requirement for 2 operable NSWP's instead of TSI 90-03.

9. Page 21: Clarify that the RBCCW kpgp ! M and RHRSW flow restrictions are the basis for the DG single failure being worst case. .

10. Table 1, Items 13.12 & 13.13: A separate description should be g c 3/WN2 provided for failure to throttle since this is a safety related function. 1

11. Table 2, Items 14.1, 5, 7: Delete @ 65CP N IP asterisk, these components are /}577.E/R6 safety-related. !

)

12. DV Record for Rev. O should not Mcw ooda R.O t3 /k,5 ~ 3/W/47.-

Coastsrc#r w M be included in this revision. or#cA @cs ,

13. See miscellaneous editorial comments as marked in review h7pg) copy.

l l

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GOD 5b4-4 A ri C

@v'. I il PA6E5 DESIGNREVIEWCHECKSHEkT Plant Document Type C" bCTIN Project OODb~DC Document No. b NCA 'b File No. M M bbC!2/" N '4 I 8 Revision !

Description:

Mark each item yes, no , or not applicable and initial each item checked by you.

1.

Were the inputs correctly selected and incorporated into design?

2. Are assumptions used in the design adequately described and reasonable? 1 NOTE: Review shall include but is not limited to applicable inputs specified in NED Procedure 3.1.A, paragraph 3.1. A.4.

3. Are the appropriate quality and quality assurance requirements specified?

4 Are applicable _ codes, standards, and regulatory requirements including issue and addendum properly identified, and are their requirements for design met? {

5. Has applicable construction and opercting experience been considered?

/

6. Have design interface requirements been satisfied?

7. Was an appropriate design method used? Abf

8. Is the output reasonable compared to inputs?

9. Are the specified parts, equipment, and processes suitable for the application?

10. Are the specified materials compatible with each other and the design environmental conditions to which the materials will be exposed?

i I

CW5M-/6 A4r c-a.ases Document Type Document No. 6CD5co-/6

11. a Revision /

are maintenance f eatures and requirements been

12. Are accessibility and other provisions adequate for performance of maintenance, repair, and any expected in-service inspections?

13. Has the design properly considered radiation exposure to the public and to plant personnel (ALARA)?

14 Are acceptance criteria in the design documents sufficient to allow verification that design requirements have been satisfactorily accomplished?

15. Have adequate preoperational and periodic test requirements been specified? +

16. Are adequate storing, handling, cleaning, shipping, and identific requirements specified?

17. Are requirements for record preparation, review, approval, retentio etc. , adequately specified?

18. Have all problems with this design known from prior application been considered and resolved?

For each question on the check list not answered yes, explain belos. If "Not Applicable

give reason.

w m/2/ E ?L Sign re V Date (Des n Verifier)

I 3, $,b, i, lO, I , l l,/ h/ f,/6, l7. [h ddL b A P/

&&J LY8

% a % &x L - F MM - b yz74 u

.. _ . . . _ _ _ .m . _ _ _ . -

.__ - ,. . . _. m .

V. HYDRAULIC DESIGN ANALYSES C

A. Model Develonment and Background A complete hydraulic analysis of a complex, multi path fluid ,

system such as the Service Water systems at. the Brunswick units is extremely difficult and time-consuming to perform by manual

calculations alone. Determination of flows, head losses, and i pressures at discrete points in the system can be done by field testing to supplement manual calculations, but only within the bounds of available instrumentation and system operation. !

To quickly and accurately analyze the hydraulic characteristics of_

the SW system (without resorting to a multitude of field flow tests), the SW system was modeled using the KYPIPE hydraulic

analysis program. KYPIPE was developed by Dr. Woods of the University of Kentucky, and has been design verified for use with safety-related fluid systems by CP&L's Nuclear Engineering Department. In modeling the Brunswick SW system, the system is represented by three basic components: fixed grade nodes, junction podes, and pipe segments. Fixed grade nodes can be considered as inlets or outlets to the system. For the SW system, the pump bay intake is an inlet; outlets are where the system returns to the intake or discharge canals, or any other point where water is removed from the system. Nodes are points in the system that '

define the ends of the pipe segments. Junction nodes are usually -

placed where changes in pipe characteristics occur (i.e., size, '

material, roughness, etc.), at the inlets and outlets of equipment (pumps, heat exchangers), and at points where a pressure' indicator can be used to measure pressure. Pipe segments are the piping ,

lengths, valves, and other components contained in the piping between the nodes. In the KYPIPE program, nodes can be located to predict pressure at discrete points, and individual pipes can be 'I chosen to provide information about flowrates and head losses for specific flow paths.

The Brunswick SW system piping and instrumentation diagrams were ;

used by NED engineers to determine fixed grade nodes, junction nodes, and pipe segments for the KYPIPE model. -Physical information on the SW system was taken from piping isometrics, piping and instrumentation diagrams, and 1.;1d walkdowns. This inf ormation was assembled into data sheets, and then input into the KYPIPE model. The hydraulic characteristics of the' system V-1 (4611NED.WP/che)

- - . . _ . =.. . .. .-- - . . -

r components (K values, etc.) and piping (friction factors,.etc.)

were derived from information given in fluids engineering references. Once the information was entered and checked for consistency by the computer program software, the initial model of -

the SW system was complete. '

However, the initial model was not an accurate representation of the Service Water system since hydraulic characteristics taken f rom standard ref erences are generic and do not account for~ actual conditions in the field. To make the model accurate enough for [

prediction of SW system performance, a series.of flow tests were conducted on the SW systems with additional pressure and flow instrumentation installed for the tests.- After coupletionLof the flow tests, the characteristics of individual components and piping in the KYPIPE model were revised as needed to make-the computer model consistent with the field test data. Once the model was predicting the flows and pressures measured in the field within an acceptable range. the model was considered to be !

calibrated, and could be used to analyze SW system performance.

The main advantage of the calibrated KYPIPE model is that it allows an analysis of the whole system relatively quickly, without resorting to hand calculations or extensive field flow tests. The computer model also can predict' the performance of _the system during accidents or other conditions that cannot be easily tested in the field.

During the initial model setup and calibration, the field flow data revealed discrepancies in certain assumptions regarding SW .

system performance. The first ' discrepancy concerned Service Water pump performance. The ' design TDH curve' for the pwnps had been . l used in setting up the model, but field data indicated the' actual pump TDH is approximately 9 percent less than design. A new pump l curve based on this data was entered into the model. The reduced i pump TDH curve was confirmed by vendor testing at a later date.

The second discrepancy identified by the field data was cross-tie -l

, leakage between the Nuclear SW header and the Conventional SW )

header. The conventional header and its components were not included in the KYPIPE model; therefore, the model had'to be ]

altered to account for the cross tie leakage between headers. 'A' new pipe and fixed grade node, representing the exit path for all cross-tie leakage, was added to the model. The-resistance of the v2 (4611NED.WP/che) i

l pipe was adjusted such that the leakage from the system in the model reflected the leakage measured in field tests. '

Another required addition to the model related to the RHR Service Water flow path. When the booster pumps are running, the KYPIPE '

model results are in close agreement with the field measured l flowrates. However, a single failure can be postulated which

results in the RHR SW pumps.being tripped. but the discharge .;

isolation valves being open. In the field, service water would '

flow through the pumps; however, the computer model as originally !

configured would not show this flow. Therefore, diversion lines were added around the RHR SW pumps in the KYPIPE model to account for the resultant flow in this situation.

The KYPIPE model was also revised after installation of an orifice modification to ensure an accurate representation of the revised ;

system. Analysis results and field data had shown the Service Water flow to the Core Spray pump room cooler in the cement-lined loop of the vital header was too low. A modification was implemented to install a new flow restricting orifice to reestablish design flow to the cooler. After installation, ,

acceptance testing verified the resultant flow rates and pressures .

were accurately predicted by the computer model.

Unit 2 piping drawings and Unit 2 field test results were used to assemble and calibrate the model. Unit 1 performance was ,

considered bounded by the Unit 2 model based on similarity of 1 components and physical layout, subject to results of a specific Unit I cross-leakage test. The Unit I test demonstrated cross- I leakage approximately half that of Unit 2, supporting the assumption of Unit 2 as the bounding unit. Later, after a Unit I system flow test procedure was written and implemented, the flow '

data was used to calibrate and verify a specific Unit I computer model. I 1

Calibration of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW models is an ongoing process. After each refueling outage, tests are run to provide data again t which to compare the models. Any discrepancies are resolved and the model is updated, if necessary.

l l

I V-3 (I.611kED.WP/che) i I

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B. Analyses and Results '5 This section of the report presents the actual design analysis l cases which were simulated with the Unit 1 and 2 Service Water systems' computer models (Reference C0050A-10 and 12). The purpose of each analysis and the limiting assumptions incorporated.into the simulation'are explained. The analysis results are discussed .

and any. impacts on the Service Water system are identified.

Possible impacts on the Service Water system might include .

restrictions on operating parameters such as flow rate and I pressure or implementation of design changes to the system. Only cases for normal SW system lineups are given; off-~ normal lineups l are addressed in the referenced calculations or applicable EER's. -i The design analysis cases are organized into groups by unit and ,

operating modes (e.g... Unit 2, Modes 1, 2, and 3). Within each group, the analyses form event " sequences" which show Service Water system performance during the limiting design events. I Typically, an event sequence begins with one simulation I representing.the initial, pre-event system configuration. .The initial setup case is chosen to provide the most limiting system conditions for the' postulated event which follows. The 0-10 minute analysis cases are next ~in the sequence. These cases analyze system performance in the first 10 minutes of the event

{

when operator action cannot be'eredited and the worst-case single {

failure must be assumed. The specific parameters investigated in - .

the 0-10. minute analyses are Service Water pump minimum required.

and maximum allowable flow rates. The last analysis case in the ;

event sequence is the after 10 minute phase of the event, when

~

operator action can be assumed subject to the limitations imposed ;

by the postulated event and single failure. Minimum required ;

service water flow rates to safety-related components are verified. :

in these analyses. -

Both minimum and maximum pump bay water levels are' considered in ,

determining worst-case conditions for system response during normal and shutdown operation. In addition, the extreme water levels associated with hurricane and flood events are simulated to ensure operations required of the Service Water. system during. ,

these events can be met. '

i t

I V-4

- (4611NED.WP/Che) s I ., , , ,..,.a.. ,,L-,..--

The specific design analysis groups'are:

a. Unit 1, Modes 1-- 3

b. Unit 1, Modes 4 and 5

c. Unit 2, Modes 1 - 3

d. Unit 2. Modes 4 and 5 ,

e. Unit 1, Extreme Low Water Level, Modes 4 5

f. Unit 1, Flood, Modes 1 - 3 and 4 - 5

g. Unit 2, Extreme Low Water Level, Modes 4 - 5 ,

h. Unit 2, Flood, Modes 1 - 3 and 4 - 5 As stated above, the design analysis cases are structured to .

represent the worst-case scenario for the particular aspect of Service Water system performance being investigated by assuming the most limiting combinations of event, single failure, and system conditions. The specific analysis methodology and limiting parameters utilized to ensure the analysis cases are worst-case are discussed in the paragraphs below. Following these discussions, the specific analysis groups and event sequences are presented in tabular format. Detailed explanations of the results ;

are given in the SW system hydraulic calculations. [

~

1. . Minimum SW Fump Flow For minimum pump flow investigations, the most limiting ,

initial conditions are those which minimize Service Water pump flow during the first 10 minutes of an event. The initial setup of the system has an impact on service water flow in the first 10 minutes if a flow path aligned to the system during the first 10 minutes has been minimized (throttle valve more closed) as a result of the initial i setup. Normally, the only flow paths'which might be throttled (or isolated) for the initial configuration are RBCCW and RHR SW. 'Since the worst case event scenario causes these flow paths to be closed in the first 10 minutes, the initial throttling of these flow paths does not impact the minimum pump flow results though complete ;

isolation of RBCCW in the initial condition does require postulation of a different single failure in the first 10 minutes of the event, In the 0-10 minute time f rame for minimum pump flow analysis, several assumptions are made which minimize flow.

v-5 (46i1NED.WP/che)

= - - - ,- .

1 The postulated design basis event is a LOOP, which causes ]

both Nuclear Service Water pumps to be started and aligned ~j to-the nuclear. header. Also,.since a LOOP does not generate .

an auto open signal for the Core Spray. pump room coolers or a

=

the RHR pump seal coolers, these loads are assumed to stay- ]

closed. One RHR pump room cooler is assumed open because ;

current plant operating-instructions require one room cooler to be aligned at all times. The other room cooler-is assumed to be closed since it opens on high temperature, and high temperature is not anticipated during a LOOP. The single active failure which is postulated is a-function of RBCCW status. For RBCCW initially aligned to~the-NSW I header, a spurious complete closure of one throttle valve

~

. (V103 or V106) results in isolation of all RBCCW flow; for.

RBCCW initially isolated from the NSW header (allowed only when a single NSW pump is operable), failure of one DC .

jacket water cooler isolation valve results in isolation of flow to one DG, Pump bay water level is assumed to be at the minimum level consistent with the plant operating mode. '

Cross-tie leakage to the conventional header is not assumed since this ensures the minimum flow configuration is most "

conservative. Credit is taken for lube water flow since the ;

Nuclear Service Water header is considered to be at a higher' .

pressure than the conventional header in this scenario and ,

is therefore the supply header for lube water. Finally, the' two diesel generators associated with the particular unit l are assumed to be open since.the-LOOP signal aligns the -;

-diesel generators to the nuclear header The LOOP scenario j is more' limiting than a LOCA since a LOCA signal also aligns the diesel generators and, additionally, generates an auto- -i open signal for the Core Spray pump room coolers and RHR pump seal coolers. :

2. Maximum SW Pump Flow For maximum pump flow investigations, the limiting initial j conditions are those which maximize Service Water pump flow !

with respect to NPSHR during the first 10 minutes of the, event. Unlike the minimum pump fica cases, where low pump bay water level could be' judged most limiting by inspection, ;

the most limiting' maximum pump flow case is not immediately -

obvious. The maximum bay level will generate the greatest j pump flow, but also results in the highest value of NPSHA.

v-6 '

(4611NED.WP/che) -l l

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- -- - . . __ _ _ . . - _ ~ _ _ _ -. - _ . -

i The minimum bay level generates a lower flow rate, but might

-actually prove most limiting because of its lower NPSHA. !

Accordingly, both water levels are investigated.

q In the first 10 minutes of an event, .no operator action can. i be-credited. Therefore, the initial setup'which maximizes flow through any flow path aligned in the 0-10 minute phase l of the event (by causing throttled valves to be the most j open) will be the most limiting. The limiting setup'is !

established based on specific plant operating limits. The first setup case is applicable to normal and certain outage ;

(1 NSW pump operable) operating conditions, and assumes operation of the nuclear header at the lowest pressure possible without a low header pressure alarm and/or auto- [

start of the second pump. This pressure is 40 psig based on ,

current nominal plant setpoints. The low header pressure ~ [

means the throttled valves are more open to enable the a maximum allowable flow to pass through these lines. The ,

second setup case is applicable to outage conditions with 2 i

NSW pumps operable. The maximum allowable RBCCW anr 8 RHR SW ;

flows cannot be obtained with one pump operating,.so two j pumps are assumed operating with RBCCW and RHR SW flows.at 'l

^

their allowed maximum values and a header pressure' greater

{

than 40 psig. The effect of the higher pressure on ;

throttled valve positions (valves more closed) is more than offset by the more open valve positions' associated with the-higher flow rates. Cross-tie leakage is assumed in the initial setups, but has negligible effect since.the conventional header is also assumed-to be at 40.psig. Also, lube water and one RHR pump room cooler are assumed to be- ;

aligned to the nuclear header to maximize flow (note: 'one -i RER room cooler is required to be open by TSI 90-03 R.0). l In the 0-10 minute phase of the event, assumptions are made. j which ensure service water flow is maximized. Some of these ;

assumptions apply to all operating modes; others are unique i to the specific operating mode, Cross-tie leakage is assumed for all cases, and is based on a depressurized. .

conventional header since the Conventional Service Water '

pumps are assumed to trip as a consequence of the event, j Additionally, one RHR pump room cooler is assumed open for.

all cases.

l l

V-7 (4611NED.WP/che) l 1

Assumptions considered specific to operating modes are the actual initiating events and single failures. The assumptions specific to operation in Modes 1, 2 and 3 are a LOCA as the initiating event and the loss of an E-bus as the single failure-. The LOCA generates an auto open signal for the Core Spray pump room coolers and the RHR pump seal coolers. The second RHR pump room cooler is assumed to come on due to high room temperature. The failure of the E-bus causes the loss of one Service Water pump and prevents one of the RBCCW throttle valves (V103 or V106) from going to its throttled position. All four diesel generators start on the LOCA and align to their respective unit's nuclear header. Lube water flow is assumed.

Certain accident scenarios result in four diesel generators aligned to one unit. However, these scenarios are not as ,

limiting since 2 NSW pumps are available on the other unit to provide an adequate supply of service water to the DGs.

For Modes 4 and 5, a LOCA signal is still the limiting initiating event since no other event results in as many loads aligned to the SW system. However, operation of the RHR SW pumps during Modes 4 and 5 requires consideration of two possible limiting single active failures: loss of an E-bus and failure of an RHR SW pump trip coil. The loss of an E-bus has the same effect as in Modes 1, 2, and 3 operation except Valve F068 in the RHR SW flow path is assumed to remain as-is, allowing flow to pass through the freewheeling RHR SW pump (s), Loss of the RHR SW pump trip coil allows the RHR SW pump to continue to run in the 0-10 minute phase of the event. This failure maximizes the service water lost through the RHR SW flow path, but also means all other equipment can be assumed to remain operable. For example, the second NSW pump (if initially operable) and both RBCCW throttle valves can be assumed to operate.

3. SW System Cooling Capacity For the cooling capability verification cases, the most limiting conditions are those which result in the least amount of flow available from the Service Water system for component cooling. Flow to nonsafety-related components such as the RBCCW heat exchangers reduces the available flow v-a (4611NED.WP/che)

for-safety-related components; Accordingly, the initial setup for the cooling cases l ensures-maximum RBCCW: flow-(most open throttle valve position). .As with the minimum pump flow cases, minimum pump bay water level is obviously the '

most limiting with respect to system flow.

With respect to component cooling, in the.after.10 minute phase. .the mest limiting event is the LOCA (LOCA signal in Modes 4 and 5) since the greatest. number of cooling loads are aligned to the SW system. All, vital header loads are assumed open and two diesel generators are aligned. Cross- '

tie leakage to a depressurized conventional header and lube water flow are also assumed. The postulated single failure is the loss of an E-bus, which prevents one RBCCW throttle ,

valve from throttling. Operator action can be credited in the af ter 10 minute time f rame to mitigate the consequences

~

of the event and single failure, but'only if operator access ;

is possible. In Modes 1 3, the LOCA/HELB makes the Reactor Building inaccessible, so RBCCW flow cannot be manually ,

isolated. In Modes 4 and 5, an'HELB is not credible, so' l

operator access to isolate RBCCW can be assumed. Also, since operator action in the Control Room can be credited

~ '

after 10 minutes for all modes, a second SW pump'can-be aligned to either SW header for additional cooling capacity.

Finally, RHR SW flow is assumed to be at the maximum possible flow rate consistent with an RHR SW pump suction '

pressure of 18 psig. The 18 psig conservatively bounds the low suction pressure trip setpoint for the RHR SW pumps.

{

L As mentioned above, credit is taken for the ability to align a second SW pump to either header. In scenarios ~which assume an E-bus failure, a second NSW pump is not operable (since its power supply has failed), so a Conventional SW Pump must be operable to provide sufficient cooling, Also, if the failure is of the E-bus which supplies power to Valve :

SW-V103 (the NSW header supply valve to the RHR SW pumps), [

then the RHR SW pumps cannot be fed from the NSW header and the CSW header must be used as the source of service water.

Therefore, the CSW pumps must be operable and available following a design' basis event.

5 To ensure the CSW pumps' operability following an accident, i EER 89-0363, Revision 0, was issued to establish I v-9 )

-(4611NED.WP/che) !

i 4 - _ ...

- m.m. ._ _ . ._ .._

h restrictions'on the operation of the CSW pumps. This EER. ;

addressed ~the potential failure of the CSW pumps due to i

- runout either when'a single CSW pump attempts to supply a system initially aligned for two pump operation, or when two ' '

CSW pumps attempt to supply'a system initially aligned for

- three pump operation. The restrictions established by EER I 89-0363 are no longer required. _ Plant Modifications PM 90-008 and 90-009 implemented a throttling logic.for Valves SW- !

V3 and SW-V4 on-both units. If low CSW' header pressure is '!

sensed (e.g., following an E-bus failure and CSW pump trip), -

both SW-V3 and SW V4 close to an intermediate-position, reducing total header flow and preventing runout of'the '-

remaining CSW pump (s). The intermediate position is .;

selected for the valves also ensures enough flow so:a spurious closure of one of the valves to its' throttled ,

position will not violate minimum flow requirements for the operating CSW pump (s). !

i r

f I

1 4

i i

?

V - 10 (4611NED.WP/che) l 4

, . . . - , . _ . . . m . . ,, , e

'1. Unit 1, Modes 1 3

" MODES 123" is the filename of the compute'r model for the Unit 1. Service-Water system operating in Modes 1 e 3. .The final _ analysis cases and their relations to one another are shown below:

Initial Setun 0- 10 minute > 10 minute Change O Change 1 --

(max SW pump flow, max bay level)

Change 2 Change 3 . Change 4-(max SW pump flow, min bay level)

For minimum SW pump flow cases, use the Modes 4 and 5 analyses for.2 NSW pumps operable.

V - 11 (4611NED.WP/che)

E Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Chances 0. 2 Chances 1. 3 Chance 4

ninimum pump bay

minimum pump bay

minimum pump bay water level water level water level (change 2) (change 3) e maximum pump bay

maximum pump bay water level water level

LOCA/HELB event ;

(change 0) (change 1) e maximum SW

one RHR pump

1 NSW pump strainer DP room cooler open operating e all Vital Header e one NSW pump

all vital header loads operating loads

V103 or V106 fails

NSW header at

2 diesel generators to throttle >

40 psig

2 diesel generators

CSW header

lube water flow pressurized

RHR SW pump suction (40 psig)

LOCA event pressure 1 18 psig

cross-tie

loss of E-bus

loss of E-bus leakage (single failure) (single failure) e minimum

V103 or V106

cross-tie leakage SW strainer DP fails to throttle e conventional header _

lube water flow

second NSW pump depressurized unavailable o RBCCW at

lube water flow 7200 gpm maximum

Conventional header allowable value depressurized

Reactor Building (Change 0) inaccessible

RBCCW throttled

minimum SW for 40 psig SW strainer DP header pressure (Change 2) i 1

i V- 12 (4611kED.WP/Che) l l

l 1

I i

- ~ - - _ . - . . . _ . _ . - . - . .

i :-

a i?

s i i ..

.q '

2. Unit 1,-Modes 4-5

j '- ,

j " MODES 455" is the filename of the computer model for the Unit 1 Service Water system operating'in Modes 4 - 5, The final analysis cases and i ;

y their relations.to one another are shown below: _'

j- ;

1' :i b i Initial Setur > 10 minute-

=

J. 0 - 10 minute l 1

a.

Jf- Change O Change 1 -- f j_. (max SW pump .l' l flow, max bay i level, 2 NSWPs i j- operable) i j' Change 2 Change 3 Change 4 .!

l (max SW pump j j . flow, min bay- :

level, 2 NSWPs -j

[<-

operable) l

g. ,

j. Change 5 Change 6 -- '

i (max SW pump :

I flow, max bay a

j. level, 1 NSWl' ~!

j operable).

]

l !

, Change 7 Change 8 -- =?

{ (max SW pump

~

flow, min bay level. 1 NSWP . ._

operable) i!

[ Change 9 (min SW pump Change 10 --

Change 11 e

flow) 1J a

t n

,Il l -

i i

i I

,. 1 E

i, u

s 1-b ..

i .I -

L 1 l' :

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.'. 'e

$ I i' !

- v - 13 ;

j (4611NED.WP/che)

, e I

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!1 .._;._..__.:. ,..__..--.-~,.-..__._.._..-_....__..;~_._....--__-._1-..--..--...a.._,----- ---,.--,.-~rik'

Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Chances 0. 2 Chances 1. 3 Change 4 +

minimum pump bay

minimum pump bay

minimum pump bay water level water level water level (change 2) (change 3)

1 SW pump operating

maximum pump bay

maximum pump bay water level water level

LOCA signal event (change 0) (change 1) e maximum SW e one RHR pump

1 NSW pump strainer DP room cooler open operating e all vital header

RBCCW flow at e all vital header loads 5500 gpm loads

RBCCW isolated

RHR SW flow at

2 diesel 4500 gpm generators e 2 diesel generators

CSW header o cross-tie leakage

RHR SW pump suction pressurized pressure 1 18 psig (40 psig) e lube water flow

loss of E-bus e cross-tie

LOCA event (LOCA (single failure) leakage signal)

cross-tie leakage

minimum

loss of E-bus strainer DP (single failure) e conventional header depressurized a lube water flow

V103 or V106 _

fails to throttle

lube water flow

2 RHR pump seal coolers

Conventional e Reactor Building header accessible

= 2 RHR SW pump depressurized "

motor coolers

2 NSW pumps e minimum SW

4 RHR pump seal operating strainer DP coolers e second NSW pump

2 RHR SW pump unavailable motor coolers e 4 RHR pump seal coolers

RHR SW pump motor coolers isolated (on pump trip)

V - 14 (4611NED.W/che)

Initial Setup 0- 10 minute > 10 minute Chances 5. 7 Chances 6. 8 e minimum pump bay

minimum pump bay

Operator action water level water level allowed - see ,

(change 7) (change 8) change 4-

maximum pump bay

maximum pump bay water level water level (change 5) (change 6)

one RHR pump

1 NSW pump room cooler open operating

RBCCW . flow at

all vital header 4000 gpm loads *

RHR SW flow at '

2800 gpm

CSW header

2 diesel generators pressurized (40 psig)

cross-tie o cross-tic leakage leakage

lube water flow

minimum strainer DP

LOCA signal event . +

lube water flow e RHR SW pump trip coil failure

1 RHR pump seal cooler

both V103 and V106 throttle

1 RHR SW pump .

motor cooler

Conventional header depressurized

4 RHR pump seal coolers

1 RHR SW pump motor cooler V - 15 (4611NED.WP/che)

Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute ,

Change 9 Chances 10. 11

minimum pump bay

minimum pump bay

Operator action water level level allowed -

see Change 4

One RHR pump

2 NSW pumps room cooler open operating (change 11)

0 gpm RBCCW flow

1 NSW pump (Note. RBCCW is operatino assumed to be (change 10) 2500 gpm for change 11

1 RHR pump room analysis) cooler open

I diesel generator (Change 10)

lube water flow *- no cross-tie leakage

1 RHR pump seal * .V103 or v106 f ails cooler closed (single failure for change 11)

1 RHR SW pump

lube water flow motor cooler .

no cross-tie

LOOP event leakage

maximum SW

one DG valve fails strainer DP closed (single failure for change 10)

maximum SW strainer DP .

2 DG's (Change 11) i V - 16 (4611NED.WP/che)

.)

-l 1

9

3. Unit 2, Modes 1-3 l

"b2 MOD 123" is the filename of the computer model for the Unit 2 Service j Water system operating in Modes 1 - 3. The final analysis cases and.

their relations to one another are shown below:

]

1 Initial setun 0 - 10 minute i 10 minute ll Change O Change 1 --

(max SW pump 1

flow, max bay level)

Change 2 Change 3 Change.4 (max SW pump flow, min bay level) 1 For minimum SW pump ilow cases, use the Modes 4 and 5 analyses for 2 NSW pumps ~

operable, j f

f P

W f

t i

s V - 17 t (4611NED.WP/che)

, , , .~ -- - . , . , ,

i Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Chances 0. 2 Changes 1. 3 Chance 4

minimum pump bay

minimum pump bay

minimum pump bay water level water level water level (change 2) (change 3)

2 SW pumps operating a maximum pump bay

maximum pump bay ,

water level water level . LOCA/HELB event (change 0) (change 1) e maximum SW

= one RHR pump . 1 NSW pump strainer DP room cooler open operating e all Vital Header e one NSW pumn e all vital header loads operating loads

. V103 or V106 fails

. NSW header at = 2 diesel generators to throttle 40 psig -

e 2 diesel generators e CSW header

lube water flow pressurized e RHR SW pump suction (40 psig) e LOCA event pressure 1 18 psig e cross-tie = loss of E-bus e loss of E-bus leakage (single failure) (single failure) e minimum . V103 or V106 e cross-tie leakage SW strainer DP fails to throttle e conventional header

lube water flow e second NSW pump depressurized unavailable e RBCCW at . lube water flow 7200 gpm maximum o Conventional header allowable value depressurized . Reactor Building (Change 0) inaccessible ,

RBCCW throttled

minimum SW f or 40 psig SW strainer DP header pressure (Change 2) i j

l l

l V - 18 (4611NED.WP/che) l 1

. . . . . , . . . . ~

. . . . . . .. - ~

1 i

'l 4', Unit 2, Modes 4 -5 "U2 MODE 45" is the filename of the computer model for the Unit 2 Service .:

Water system operating in Modes 4 --5. The final analysis cases and- !

their relations to one another are shown below:

Initial Setun 0- 10 minute > 10 minute

, Change O Change 1 --

(max SW pump ,

flow, max bay .i level, 2 NSWPs "

operable) !

?

Change 2 Change 3 Change 4 (max SW pump- 1 flow, min bay

1evel, 2 NSWPs operable) ,

Change 5 Change 6 --

i (max SW pump flow, max bay.

level, 1 NSWP operable) '

Change 7 Change 8 --

'(max SW pump ;

flow, min bay. :!

. level, 1 NSWP . l operable) .;

i Change 9 Change 10 --

(min SW pump Change 11 --

flow) ' i.

.I l

6 li k

e

':t

..k y

f

?

'i V - 19 . . i (4611NED.WP/che) .!

l

Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Chances 0. ? Chances 1. 3 Chance 4 e minimum pump bay

minimum pump bay a minimum pump bay water level water level water level (change 2) (change 3)

= -1 SW pump operating e maximum pump bay

maximum pump bay water level water level e LOCA signal event (change 0) (change 1) e maximum SW e one RHR pump e 1 NSW pump strainer DP room cooler open operating e all vital header e RBCCW flow at e all vital header loads-5500 gpm loads e RBCCW isolated e RHR SW flow at

2 diesel 4500 gpm generators e 2 diesel generators e CSW header

cross-tie leakage e RHR SW pump suction pressurized pressure 1 18 psig (40 psig)

lube water flow a loss of E-bus

= cross-tie e LOCA event (LOCA (single failure) leakage signal) e cross-tie leakage e minimum o loss of E-bus strainer DP (single failure) e conventional header

~

lube water flow e V103 or V106

' fails to throttle e lube water flow e 2 RHR pump seal coolers

Conventional

Reactor Building header accessible e 2 RHR SW pump depressurized motor coolers e 4 RHR pump seal e minimum SW coolers e 2 NSW pumps strainer DP operating

2 RHR SW pump a second NSW pump motor coolers unavailable e 4 RHR pump seal coolers e RHR SW pump motor coolers isolated (on pump trip) v - 20 (4611NED.W/che)

Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute i 10 minute Changes 5. 7 Chances 6. 8

minimum pump bay a minimum pump bay

Operator' action water level water level allowed - see (change 7) (cl.ange 8) change 4

= maximum pump bay a maximum pump bay water level water level (change 5) (change 6) e one RHR pump e 1 NSW pump room cooler open operating

RBCCW flow at

all vital header 4000 gpm loads e RHR SW flow at

2 diesel 2800 gpm generators e CSW header e cross-tie leakage pressurized (40 psig) e lube water flow

cross-tie

LOCA signal event leakage e RHR SW pump trip a minimum coil failure strainer DP e both V103 and V106 .

a lube water flow throttle e 2 RHR pump seal

Conventional header coolers depressurized e 2 RHR SW pump e 4 RHR pump seal '

motor coolers coolers ,

e 2 RHR SW pump motor coolers b

V - 21 (4611NED,WP/Che)

Initial Setup 0 - 10 rainute > 10 minute Chance 9 Changes 10. 11

minimum pump bay

minimum pump bay

Operator action water level level allowed see Change 4

One RHR pump e 2 NSW pumps room cooler open operating (change 11)

0 gpm RBCCW flow e 1 NSW pump (Note: RBCCW is operating assumed to be (change 10) 2500 gpm for change 10 e 1 RHR pump room analysis) cooler open

lube water flow e 2 diesel generators e 2 RHR pump seal e no cross-tie coolers leakage e 2 RHR SW pump e V103 or V106 fails motor coolers closed (single failure for change 11) e no cross-tie

lube water flow leakage >

e maximum SW

LOOP event strainer DP

one DG valve fails closed (single failure for change 10) e maximum SW strainer DP y - 22 (4611NED.WP/che)

. . . - . _ _ - _ - -. .~ , . -

f i

5. Unit 1, Extreme Low Water Level, Modes 4 and 5 "UlTYFOON" is the filename of.the computer model for the Unit 1 Service Water system operating in Modes 4 and 5 during extreme low water level' conditions. The final analysis cases and their relations to one'another are shown below:

Initini Setun 0- 10 minute > 10 minute Change O Change 1 --

(max SW pump flow, 2 NSWPs operable)

Change 2 Change'3 Change 4 !

(max SW pump :

flow, 2 NSWPs _4 operable)

Change 5 Change 6 --

(max SW pump flow, 1 NSWP ,

operable)

Change 7 Change 8 --

(max SW pump r flow, 1 NSWP ,

operable)-

Change 5 Change 6 - -

(min SW pump .

flow, 2 NSWPs ,

operable) '

Change 7 Change 8 - -

(min SW pump ,

flow,.1 NSWP operable) >

F

'l

.i V - 23 (4611NED.WP/Che)

,*wv- ,

-=

. Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Changg_0.2 Chance 1.3 Change 4

extreme low pump

extreme low pump

extreme low pump bay water level bay water level bay water level e one RHR pump

1 NSW pump

1 SW pump operating room cooler open operating

LOCA signal event

CSW header e all vital header pressurized loads e maximum SW (40 psig) strainer DP

2 diesel e cross-tie generators e all vital header leakage loads e cross-tic leakage

minimum

RBCCW isolated strainer DP

lube water flow

2 diesel generators-

lube water flow

LOCA signal event

RHR.SW pump suction-

2 NSWPs pressure 1 18 psig operating

loss of E-bus (single failure)

loss of E-bus e 2 RHR SW pump (single failure) motor coolers

V103 or V106 fails to throttle

cross-tie leakage

2 RHR pump

Conventional header e conventional header seal coolers depressurized depressurized .

minimum SW

lube water flow

SW header strainer DP pressure at

2 RHR SW pump 59 psig motor coolers 0

V - 24 (4611NED.WP/Che)

Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute' Chance 5.7 Chance 6.8

= extreme low pump

extreme low pump e Operator action bay water level bay water level allowed - see change 4 e one RHR pump e 1 NSW pump <

room cooler open operating e NbW header at e all vital header 56 psig loads (Change 7) e NSW header at 47 psig (Change 5) ,

a CSW header = 2 diesel pressurized generators (40 psig) e cross-tie leakage e cross-tie leakage e lube water flow

minimum o LOCA signal strainer DP event a lube water flow e RHR SW pump trip coil failure e 1 NSWP, (single fai;ure) -

operating

both V103 and V106 throttle

1 RHR pump e Conventional header seal cooler depressurized a 1 RHR SW pump

minimum SW motor cooler strainer DP

1 RHR SW pump ,

motor cooler I

i l

J i

l V - 25 (4611NED.WP/che)

Initial Setup 0- 10 minute > 10 minute Chance 9 Chance 10

extreme low pump

extreme low pump

Operator action bay water level bay water level allowed - see change 4

One RHR pump

2 NSW pumps-room cooler open operating a 2 NSWPs

1 EHR pump room operating cooler open

1 RHR SW pump

2 diesel generators motor cooler a no cross-tie

1 RHR pump leakage seal cooler ,

no cross-tie

V103 or V106 fails leakage closed (single failure)

lube water flow

LOOP event

maximum SW strainer DP

no RHR SW flow b

V 26 (4611NED.WP/che) i

. _ ____1___

Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Change 11 Chance 12

extreme low pump

extreme low pump

Operator action bay water level bay water level allowed - see change 4

One RIIR pump

1 NSW pump room cooler open operating

1 NSWP operating

1 RHR pump room cooler open

1 RHR SW pump motor cooler

1 diesel generator

1 RHR pump

no cross-tie seal cooler leakage e one DG valve fails closed (single failure)

lube water flow

LOOP

maximum SW strainer DP

.i I

5 y - 27 (4611NED.WP/che)

t

6. Unit 1, Flood, All Modes *

, 'FLDCASE" is the . filename of the computer model for the Unit 1 Service Water system operating in Modes 1-3 and Modes 4-5 during flood conditions. The final analysis cases and their relations to one another ,

are shown below:

f Initial Setun 0- 10 minute > 10 minute _

Change O Change 1 Change 2 '

(no rma l '

operation, max SW l pump flow) '

Change 3' Change 4 -- *

(shutdown operation, max SW pump flow.

2 NSWPS operable) '

Change 5 Change 6 Change 7

-(shutdown ,

operation, max.

SW pump flow, 1 NSWP operating)

't i

s v 28 ~

(4611NED.WP/Che)

I

Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Chance O Chance 1 Chance 2

extreme high pump

extreme high pump.

extreme high pump bay water level bay water level bay water level e one RER pump

1 NSW pump

2 SW pumps operating room cooler open operating

LOCA/HELB event

RBCCW flow at

all vital header max allowable loads a maximum SW (7200 gpm) strainer DP

CSW header o all vital header pressurized

2 diesel generators loads (40 psig) e cross-tie leakage e V103 or V106 fails e cross-tie to throttle leakage

lube water flow e 2 diesel generators e minimum

LOCA event '

strainer DP

RHR SW pump suction pressure 1 18 psig

lube water flow

loss of E-bus (single failure)

loss.of E bus (single feilure)

V103 or V106 fails to throttle e cross-tie leakage

Conventional header e conventional header .

depressurized depressurized

minimum SW e lube water flow strainer DP

2 RHR SW pump.

motor coolers

- Reactor Building inaccessible i

i l

l l

1 V - 29 (4611NED.WP/che) l l

l l

I d

. Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Chance 3 Chance 4 e extreme high pump

extreme high pump

Operator action bay water level bay water level allowed - see change 7 e one RHR pump e 1 NSW pump room cooler open operating e RBCCW flow at e all vital header 5500 gpm loads e RHR SW flow at

2 diesel 4500 gpm generators

CSW header e cross tie leakage pressurized (40 psig)

lube water flow e cross-tie

LOCA signal event leakage e minimum o loss of E-bus strainer DP (single failure) "

e lube water flow e V103 or V106 fail to throttle e 2 RHR SW pump seal coolers e Conventional header _

depressurized a 2 RHR SW pump motor coolers e minimum SW strainer DP

F068 valve fails as-is (allows SW flow through RHR '

SW pumps)

I s

b y - 30 (4611kED.Wp/che)

Initial Setup 0- 10 minute > 10 minute Chance 5 Chance 6 Chance 7

extreme high pump = extreme high pump

extreme high pump-bay water level bay water level bay water level e one RHR pump

1 NSW pump e 1 SW pump operating room cooler open operating

LOCA signal event e RBCCW flow at e all vital header 4000 gpm loads e maximum SW '

strainer DP

R11R SW flow at = 2 diesel 2800 gpm generators e all vital header

CSW header loads pressurized e cross-tie (40 psig) leakage e RBCCW isolated a cross-tie leakage e lube water flow e 2 diesel generators e minimum o LOCA signal event

tiainei Lr e. RHR SW pump suction e RHR SW pump trip pressure 2 18 psig

lube water flow coil failure (single failure)

loss of E-bus e 1 RHR pump seal (single failure) ,

cooler o both V103 and V106 throttle e cross-tie leakage .

1 RHR SW pump motor cooler

Conventional header o conventional header depressurized depressurized

1 NSW pump e minimum SW e lube water flow operating strainer DP e 2 RHR SW pump

1 RHR SW pump motor coolers motor cooler V - 31 (4611kED.WP/che)

- ,- -. . , . . . ~ .-.-. - -.~. ~ ~ - . ~ . - - . - . . . . - . - . .- - . -

7 .. Unit 2, Extreme Low Water Level Modes-4 and 5

"U2XLOLVL" is the filename of the. computer model for the Unit-2 Service Water system operating"in Modes 4 and 5 during extreme low water level conditions. The final analysis cases and their relations to one another are shown below:

Initial Setun

~

0- 10 minute > 10 minute i

Change O Change 1 Change 2 (max SW pump flow. 2 NSWPs '

operable)

Change 3 Change 4 --

(max SW pump flow, 1 NSWP operable)

Change 5 Change 6 -

(min SW pump ;

flow, 2 NSWPs-operable)

Char o e 7 Change 8 --

(min SW pump flow, 1 NSWP -

operable)- ,

4 i

I I

I r

.i b

y - 32 (4611NED.WP/che).

J

u Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Chance O Chance 1 Chance 2

extreme low pump

extreme low pump

extreme low pump bay water level bay water level bay water level e one RHR pump

1 NSW pump

1 SW pump operating room cooler open operating

LOCA signal event

CSW header

all vital header pressurized loads

maximum SW (40 psig) strainer DP

2 diesel e cross-tie generators

all vital header leakage loads e cross-tie leakage strainer DP

lube water flow

2 diesel generators e lube water flow

LOCA signal event

RHR SW pump suction

2 NSWPs pressure 1 18 psig operating

loss of E-bus (single failure)

loss of E-bus e 2 RHR SW pump (single failure) motor coolers

V103 or V106 fails to throttle e cross-tie leakage ,

2 RHR pump

Conventional header o conventional header seal coolers depressurized depressurized .

SW header o minimum SW

lube water flow pressure at strainer DP 51 psig

2 RHR SW pump motor coolers b

V 33 (4611NED.WP/che)

P T

Initial Setup 0- 10 minute > 10 minute Chance 3 Chance 4 i

e extreme low pump e extreme low pump e Operator action bay water level bay water level allowed - see change 2

one RHR pump

1 NSW pump room cooler open operating

NSW header at e all vital header 52 psig loads

CSW header . 2 diesel pressurized generators (40 psig) e cross-tie leakage

cross-tie leakage e lube water flow 4

e minimum e LOCA signal strainer DP event a lube water flow'

RHR SW pump trip coil failure e 1 NSWP, (single failure) operating

both V103 and V106 throttle c

2 RHR pump e Conventional header _

seal coolers depressurized

2 RHR SW pump e minimum SW motor coolers strainer DP e 2 RHR SW pump motor coolers b

l i

~

1 V - 34 !

(4611NED.WP/che) l

'I 1

N

Initial Setup 0- 10 minute > 10 minute Change 5 Chance 6 e extreme low pump

extreme low pump e Operator action-bay water level bay water level allowed - see change 2 e One RHR pump e 2 NSW pumps room cooler open operating e 2 NSWPs e 1 RHR pump room operating cooler open e 2 RHR SW pump e 2 diesel generators motor coolers e no cross tie e 2 RHR pump leakage seal coolers e V103 or v106 fails e no cross-tic closed (single leakage failure) e lube water flow e LOOP event e maximum SW strainer DP e no RHR SW flow p

V - 35 (4611NED.WP/che)

1 Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Chance 7 Chance 8

extreme low pump

extreme low pump

Operator action bay water level bay water level allowed - see change 2

One RHR pump

1 NSW pump room cooler open operating

1 NSUP operating

1 RHR pump room cooler open

2 RHR SW pump motor coolers e 1 diesel generator

2 RHR pump

no cross-tie seal coolers leakage

one DG valve fails closed (single failure)

lube water flow

LOOP

maximum SW strainer DP l

1 I

v - 36 (I.611NED.WP/che) i l

,4 - _ -- , . - . .

1

,J hl 1

8. Unit 2 Flood,~All Modes-l "U2 FLOOD" is the filename of the computer model for-the Unit.2~. Service Water system-operating in Modes 1 3 and Modes 4-5 during flood conditions. The final' analysis cases and their relations to one another j are shown below; Initial Setun 0- 10 minute > 10 minute Change O Change 1 Change.2- ,

(normal s operation, max SW pump flow Change 3 Change 4 --

(shutdown operation,- ;

max SW pump '

flow. 2 NSWPs operable)

Change 5 Change 6 Change,7 t:

(shutdown operation,. 1 max-SW pump i f l ow ., 1 NSWP _

operating) .

1 f

f

?

'l T

i t

t i

I V - 37 (4611NED.WP/che) t

, . ., ,- .- i,

c l

Initial Setup 0- 10 minute > 10 minute '

Change O Chance 1 Chance 2 e extreme high pump

extreme high pump = extreme high pump bay water level bay water level bay water level r

e one RHR pump 2 SW pumps operating

1 NSW pump

room cooler open operating e LOCA/HELB event e RBCCW flow at e all vital header max allowable loads a maximum SW !

(7200 gpm) strainer DP e CSW header 9 all vital header ;

pressurized . 2 diesel generators loads i (40 psig) e cross; tie leakage e V103 or V106 fails ;

e cross-tic to throttle leakage a lube water flow e 2 diesel generators ;

e minimum . LOCA event strainer DP

RHR SW pump suction s pressure 1 18 psig

= lube water flow a loss of E-bus (single failure) e loss of E-bus (singic failure) e V103 or V106 fails to throttle e cross-tie leakage a Conventional header o conventional header .

depressurized depressurized

minimum SW = lube water flow !

strainer DP I e 2 RHR SW pump ;

motor coolers ;

e Reactor Building inaccessible i

-l f

f i

l I

v - 38 (4611NED.WP/che)

Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute '

Chance 3 Chance 4 e extreme high pump

extreme high pump

Operator action bay water level bay water level allowed - see change 7-e one RHR pump

1 NSW pump room cooler open operating e RBCCW flow at e all vital header 5500 gpm loads

RHR SW flow at

2 diesel 4500 gpm generators

CSW header

cross tie leakage pressurized >

(40 psig)

lube water flow

cross-tie

LOCA signal event leakage e minimum o loss of E-bus strainer DP (single failure) e lube water flow

V103 or V106 fail to throttle e 2 RHR SW pump '

seal coolers

Conventional header depressurized

2 RHR SW pump L motor coolers e minimum SW strainer DP ,

F068 valve-fails as-is (allows SW flow through RHR l SW pumps)

N 1

F 4

L i

V - 39 (4611NED.WP/che)

Initial Setup 0 - 10 minute > 10 minute Chance 5 Chance 6 Chance 7

extreme high pump

extreme high pump

extreme high pump bay water level bay water level bay water level e one RHR pump

1 NSW pump

1 SW pump operating room cooler open operating

LOCA signal event

RBCCW flow at

all vital header 4000 gpm

~

loads

maximum SW strainer DP

RHR SW flow at

2 diesel 2800 gpm generators e all vital header

CSW header loads pressurized

cross-tie (40 psig) Icakage

RBCCW isolated a cross-tie leakage

lube water flow

2 diesel generators e minimum

LOCA signal event strainer DP

RHR SW pump suction

RHR SW pump trip pressure 1 18 psig

lube water flow coil failure (single failure)

loss of E-bus e 2 RHR pump seal (single failure) coolers e both V103 and V106 throttle e cross-tie leakage .

2 RHR SW pump motor coolers

Conventional header a conventional header depressurized depressurized 1 NSW pump

minimum SW

lube water flow operating strainer DP .

2 RHR SW pump !

2 RHR SW pump motor coolers ,

motor coolers l

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C. Condlusions :!

4' The conclusions of this hydraulic l analysis report are discussed in' 3

, "Section I, Executive Summary" and are not repeated here. '

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- VI. Service Water System Setpoint Review

!. _The Service. Water Systems setpoint review required as part of Service Water System Project PCN G0050A has been performed as a separate, design-verified calculation. The calculation number is G0050A 18, Rev. O and is included in its entirety asSection VI of this. hydraulic report.

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ML20046A326

Text

Subject:

SUMMARY

Description:

Description:

Description:

1 NSW pump

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