ML20046A340

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Bsep,Unit 1 SWS Hydraulic Analysis, Reflecting Installation of Upgraded NSW Pump Motor Thrust Bearings
ML20046A340
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/11/1992
From: Reynolds L
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20046A307 List:
References
G0050A-10, G0050A-10-R05, G50A-10, G50A-10-R5, NUDOCS 9307270259
Download: ML20046A340 (100)


Text

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ATTACHMENT 4 BSEP 93-0112 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR-62.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST

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UNIT 1 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS (G0050A-10, REV. 5)

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l l i Computed _by: Date: alculation IN Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A 10 . i Checked by: Date: Pg. 4 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues l l Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. I Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void j LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Pane No. Revision 1 (Title Page) 5 2 (Title Page) 3-3 (Title Page) 1 4 (List of Eff. Pages) 5  : 5 (List of Eff. Pages) 5 6 (List of Eff. Pages) 5 7 (Table of Contents) 5  : 8 (Table of Contents) 5 9 (Table of Contents) 5' 10 5 11 5 12 5 , 13 5 14 5 15 5 16 5 17 5 18 5 19 5 20 5 21 5 22 5 23 5 24 5 25 5 26 5 27 5 l 28 5 29 5 30 5 31 5 32 5 33 5 34 5 35 5 36 5 37 5 (CALCTEXT.WP) r i

Computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 5 Rev. 5 TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Final n Void Status: Prelim.] LIST OF EFFECTIVE PACES (cont'd.) Pace No. Revision 38 5 39 5 40 5 41 5 42 5 43 5 44 5 45 5 i l l (CALCTEXT.WP)

_, . . _. _ . __ _ _ , = ._ Computed by: Date: a culation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company , C0050A 10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 6 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project-Title: Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis , Status: Prelim. Final u Void LIST OF EFFECTIVE PACES (cont'd.) Page No. Revision 1 (15 pages) Att. 5 Att. 2( 6 pages) 5 i Att. 3 (27 pages) 5 Att. 4 (10 pages) 5 Att. 5 (26 pages) 5 ( Att. 6 (10 pages) 5 Att. 7 (23 pages) 5 Att. 8 (10 pages) 5 ' Att. 9 (1 page) 5 Att. 10 (1 page) 5 Att. 11 (1 page) 5 , Att. 12 (1 page) 5 - Att. 13 (13 pages) 5-Att. 14 (17 pages) 5 Att. 15 (17 pages) 5 Att. 16 (16 pages) 5 ' Att. 17 (1 page) 5 Att. 18 (1 page) 5 Att. 19 (11 pages) 1 Att. 20 (10 pages) 0 Att. 21 ( 2 pages) 0 Att. 22 ( 3 pages) 0 Att. 23 ( 2 pages) 0 Att. 24 ( 1 drawing) 0 Att. 25 ( 6 pages) 0 Att. 26 ( 5 pages) 0 Att. 27 ( 3 pages) %58 1 (CALCTEXT.WP) {

Computed by: Date: Carolina Power & Light Company * "" "** "

  • G0050A-10 Checked by: .Date:

Pg. 7- Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void [)) TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page f Title Page 1 List of Effective Pages 4 i 4e of Contents 7 l , 1.0 Purpose 10 2.0 Summary of Results 13  ! 3.0 References 14 4.0 Assumptions 17 -  ! f 5.0 Computer Model Validation 27 , 6.0 Calculations 28 6.1 Normal SW System Configuration 28 6.2 Vital Header Aligned to the CSW Header 41 j 6.3 RBCCW Isolated From the NSW Header 41 > 6.4 RHRSW Isolated From the NSW Header 41 j 7.0 Conclusions 43 t

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f Computed by Date: Carolina Power & Light Company Calculation 1D: G0050A-10 i Checked by: Date: p. g 8 Rev. 5

                                           ^    ^           ~

TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNG0050A , Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues i Calculation

Title:

BSEP1 Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis ' Status: Prelim. Final n Void , TABLE OF CON 12NTS (cont'd.) Section Title Pace  ; Att. 1 Accident Analysis Results - Power Operation - Att. 2 Accident Summary Tables - Power Operation - Att. 3 Accident Analysis Results - Outage Operation

j Att. 4 Accident Summary Tables - Outage Operation -

Att. 5 Accident Analysis Results + Hurricane Operation - Att. 6 Accident Summary Tables - Hurricane Operation - Att. 7 Accident Analysis Results - Flood Operation - - i-Art. 8 Accident Summary Tables Flood Operation - l Att. 9 Deleted - Att. 10 Deleted - l Att. 11 Deleted - i Att. 12 Deleted - Att. 13 Data File for " MODES 123" - Att. 14 Data File for " MODES 4&S" - Att. 15 Data File for "UITYFOON" - ' Att. 16 Data File for "FLDCASE" - Att. 17 Deleted - (CALCTEXT.WP) 4 1

Computed by: Date: alculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A 10 Checked by: Date: ' Pg. 9 Rev. 5 i CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A , Project

Title:

Service Water System.DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic. Analysis i' Status: -Prelim. Void Final [I] x  ; TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd.) k I section Title Zaga Att. 18 Deleted - f - Att. 19 Data File for "UlCALEN2" - - Att. 20 Data File for "UlMASTER" - t Att. 21 NPSHA Calculations - i Att. 22 Cross-Header Leakage Evaluation - Att. 23 CSW' Pump Long-Term Cooling Capacility - Att. 24 Service Water System KYPIPE Model Flow Diagram - - Att. 25 RER Pump Seal Cooler Evaluation - Att. 26 Service Water Lube Water Flow Requirements - Att. 27 Design Verification Forms -

                                                                                                     'j i

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Computed by: . Da te.: Calculation 1D:

                                 ~ Carolina Power E Light Company G0050A-10 Checked by:        Date:

pg. 10 Rev. S'

                                          ^    ^

IAR/PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNG0050A-Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Final u Void Prelim.{] 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this calculation is to verify the design capability of the BSEP Unit 1 Service Water system. Full design capability is . established by satisfying the system functional requirements defined by the following two criteria: 1.1 The Service Water system design shall provide the required cooling flows to all safety-related equipment aligned to the system. These cooling flows shall be supplied under all credible system operating conditions, including the worst-case combinations of design basis events, single failures, and initial system parameters. , 1.2 The Service Water system shall ensure full operability of all required safety-related equipment by operating within established L equipment design limits. Normal system operating lineups will be examined. Any design and/or operational limitations required to ensure full system design capability , will be identified by evaluation of predicted Service Water system performance during the worst-case design basis accidents and transients; Service Water system performance will be simulated using a KYPIPE ', computer model of the U1 SW system for various operating scenarios. In general, the approach followed in this calculation is intended to ensure the worst-case conditions for the Service Water system are , analyzed. The design basis events for which the BSEP Service Water system must be designed are 4dentified, primarily by review of UFSAR Chapter 15. Those events which are most limiting with respect to SW . system performance are selected for simulation. Then, the functional requirements'(component flows, equipment limitations, etc.) the SW . system must satisfy during-these events are established.- The next step involves selection of the most limiting single failures which must be assumed to occur coincidently with the design basis events; Finally, the initial (pre-event) configuration of the SW system and the specific. , ., process conditions which would'be the most limiting following eccurrence of an event are identified. :All these factors are used to structure the  ; computer simulations to represent the worst case' scenarios. The simulation results are then used to verify the Service Water system is fully capable of meeting tne design criteria listed above. , (CALCTEXT.W)

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$p. ' P Computed by: Date: a culation 1D: Carolina Power & Light Company. G0050A-10 g p- Checked-by: Date: - Pg. 11 Rev. 5 TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A FiJe: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues , Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System llydraulic Analysis Status: Final u Void Prelim.] The evaluations of SW system performance will cover operation under the

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four operating scenarios listed below for normal system configurations:

                                                                                               ]
  • Power operation
  • Outage / Shutdown operation
  • Extreme ' ow Water (Hurricane) operation
  • Flood optration System and equipment responses to design basis events.(accidents and/or transients) are divided .into two time periods t- d on the ability of plant personnel to take manual actions to mitiga the consequences of  ;

the ctant. The two time periods are the 0 10 minute phase and the'after

             '10 minute phase. Each time period. entails unique challenges to                      '

equipment and system parameters which must be evaluated. Genera 1 system - and equipment design requirements which will be verified are listed below for each phase. The specific quantitative. values for these , parameters are defined'in the applicable sections'of this calculation. 0-10 Minute Phase i e SW Pump NPSHR restrictions ,

  • Component cooling loads a

5 (CALCTEXT.WP) 1 w

  • Computed by: Date: Calculat i on ID:

Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A , thecked by: Date: Pg. 12 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysir Status: Prelim. Final u Void

                   >10 Minute Phase
  • Component cooling limitations Service Water system response during an event is also a function of system configuration prior to the event. Positions of throttling valves and SW strainer pressure drop are two of the factors which can influence SW system performance. Accordingly, the initial system configurations from which the design basis events (DBE) are assumed to occur are also simulated. This ensures the worst-case SW' system configurations are used for the DBE simulations.

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Computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company

                                                                    -G0050A 10 Checked by:         Date:   -

Pg. 13 Rev. 5 l CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues l Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void 2.0

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS The following paragraphs provide a general picture of the SW system 4 capabilities for the statef configurations. Specific conclusions about. flow restrictions, . lineup restrictions, etc. are addressed in detail in Sections 6.0 and 7.0. 2.1 No rma l SW System Configuration l The SW system is capable of meeting its design bases requirements provided specific operating restrictions are observed. Flon restrictions include maximum limits for RBCCW and RHRSW to ensure , acceptable flow rates through the SW pumps. During extreme low water (hurricane) operating conditions, NSW header flow restrictions are tightened further because of the lower intake canal level. 2.2 Vital Header Aliened to lhe CSW Header The SW system can meet its design bases requirements.with the , Vital header isolated from the NSW header provided normal SW system constraints are imposed. Previous flow and lineup restrictions are no longer required due to tFc implementation of ' modifications described in Assumption 4.35. Certain operating restrictions still apply and are outlined in * *cn 6.2. 2.3 RECCW Not Aliened'to the NSW Header The SW system can meet its design bases with RBCCW iso._ tad f rom , the NSW header provided normal SW system constraints are imposed. Previous system' restrictions are no longer required due'to implementation of modifications described in Assumption 4.35. Certain flow restrictions still apply as outlined in Section 6.3. 2.4 RHRSW Isolated From the NSW Header i The SW system can meet its desigr. bases with RHRSW isolated f rom the NSW header.  : 1 o I (CALCTExt.WP) 1! i l 1 l l l

Computed by: Date: """1"*'"" Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 14 Rev. 5  ;

                                       ^'  ^

TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Proj!ct

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation' Title; BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u . Void t

3.0 REFERENCES

       . 3.1    Johnston Pump Co. Report, Johnston Job No. NA-6508, dated 6/26/89 (CP&L P.O. No. 556884C)                                                      ;

3.2 Calculation OSW-0032, Rev 0, Intake Canal Hydraulic Analysis, , (William C. Daniel and Associates) # 3.3~ Calculation C0050A 20 Rev. O,'" Hydraulic Analysis of Cooling Water Intake Canal and Pump Intake Structure" 3.4 System Description SD-43, Rev. 14, " Service Water System" 3.5 Calculation PCNiG0050A-01, Rev. 2, "RHR Room Cooler Allowable Service Water Inlet Temperature"  ! 3.6 Calculation PCN-G0050A-02, Rev. 2, " Service Water Flow Rate. - l Reduction Effect on Service Water Inlet Temperature for Core Spray , Room Air Coolers" 1 3.7 Calculation No. C0050A-16, Rev. 1, "BSEP U1 and U2 Service Water Single Failure Analysis" 3.8 Calculation C0050A-14, Rev. 1, "BSEP U1 and U2 Service Water ., Systems Cross-Leakage Evaluations  ; 3.9 Calculation PCN-G0050A 11 Rev. O, "RHR Service Water Flow During Cold Shutdown" 3.10 Calculation G0050A-08, Rev'. 1, " Resizing of Flow Orifices 2-SW FO-1187 and 1-SW-FO 1188" 3.11 BSEP Calculation No. M-89-0008, Rev. O, " Heat Balance on DG #2 i Jacket Water / Service Water HX", File No. 5110 3.12 Acceptance Test Results for Special Procedure 2-SP-89 021, Rev. 1 .,

                " Unit 2 NSW System Flow Tests"                                              ,

3.13 Acceptance Test Results for Special Procedure 1-SP-89-027, Rev. 1,  ;

                " Unit 1 NSW System Flow Tests.

(cRcTEXT.WPI I

g-6 Computed.by: Date:

                                 . Carolina Powerf& Light Company-       alculation ID:

G0050A 10 Checked by: Date: --- Pg. 15 Rev, 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service _ Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final Void 3.14 Acceptance Test Results for Plant Mod No. 89-075, "Eeplacement of F0 1187 to Restore Design Flow Rate" 3.15 Test Results for Special Proced .re 1-SP-90-004, " Service Water System Hydraulic Perf ormance Test" 3.16 EER-89-0166, Rev. 1, " Verification of Acceptable Service Water Flow to RHR f or Worst-Case Expected LOCA Cortainment Cooling" l 3.17 EER-89-0135, Rev.-1, "JC0 for Adequacy of Service Water System to-Meet Design Bases Flow Requirements" 3.18 EER-82-0220, Rev. O, "JC0 for Adequacy of Service Water System to Meet Design Bases Flow Requirements" 3.19 EER-89-0163, Rev. 1, " Revised Operas: c, 'neup for SW System" 3.20 Plant Modification No. 89-048, " Upgrade of SW Valve SW-V103 to Motor-Operated Valve - Unit 1" 3.21 Plant Modification.No. 89-051, " Unit 2 RHR SW Pumps Supply' Header Pressure Switches" 3.22 Plant Fodification No. 89-088, " Add LOOP Closure Logic to SW-V103 and SW V106" - Unit 1 3.23 GE Letter f rom J. S. Mokri to E. A. Bishop', dated 7/19/78, NED File No. PCNG0050A 3.24 Johnston Pump Company letter to Mr. A1 Bishop from Mr. Mark D. Moon, dated September 1, 1989, File No. BC0050A AA-A500 3.25 Telecon dated 11/10/89 between Mark Moon (Johnston Pump Co.) and-Michael Casey (CP&L), File No. BG0050A-DE A543 3.26 Cameron Hydraulic Data, 16th Edition 3.27 Crane Technical Paper No. 410, 1982 3.28 BSEP Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (CALCTEXT W)

4 Computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company , G0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 16 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A Pile: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues T Calculation Title BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Void Final [2] , 3.29 BSEP Abnormal Operating Procedure No. A0P-013 Rev S, " Operation During Hurricane. Tornado, or Flood Conditions" 3.30 Deleted (previously 3.29) 3.31 Deleted (previously 3.30) 3.32 Deleted (previously 3.31) 3.33 EER 91-0039, Rev. O, " Evaluation of Service Water Design Capability" 3.34 Periodic Test 1 PT-24.6.4, Rev. 1, " Service Water System Hydraulic-Performance Test" 3.35 Plant Modification No. 90-008, " Service Water Valve V3 & V4 Vaive Closure Logic Change" 3.36 BSEP Abnormal Operating Procedure No. AOP-18.0, Rev 7, " Nuclear Service Water System Failure"

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(CALCTEXT.tlP) i

r- 3 i Computed by: Date: Ca cu a Carolina Power'& Light Company 0 0 Checked by: Date: Pg. 17: Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET File: PCNC0050A TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A i Project

Title:

Service' Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis  ; Status: Prelim. Final og Void 4.0 ASSUMPTIONS 4.1 Lube water flow rate is set for individual computer simulations based on interpolation of test data from Reference 3.12; although this data is for the U2 SWLW system, it is assumed that the two units' LW systems behave identically. Further, lube water flow rate is a small percentage of total flow'and any error introduced would be insignificant considering the design margins used. 4.2 The maximum normal water level in the SW pump bay is +2.0 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). 4.3 The minimum normal water. level in the pump bay is 6.0 feet MSL based on References 3.3 and 3.4. Reference 3.4 states the maximum

  • circulating water flow rate is approximately. 1,050,000 gpm. l Reference 3.3 provides head loss curves for circulating water and service water in terms of intake canal level. A maximum SW flow -

of 50.000 gpm (25,000 per unit) is assumed for use with i Reference 3.3. 4.4 A minimum SW strainer AP of 1.0 psid is assumed for the initial configurations for maximum flow cases. The low AP is consistent , with plant-observations of low strainer AP during SW system operation and is conservative since it results in greater system / pump flow in the 0 10 minute phase of an event. The maximum strainer AP of 4.5 psid is used for component cooling -l evaluations in the greater than 10 minute phase of'an event since ' it minimizes pump flow. 4.5 The SW Strainer Backwash system operates during an accident to limit the maximum strainer AP to 4.5 psid. 4.6 Deleted a 4.7 SW inlet temperature is at the design maximum of 90*F. 1 4i8 No credit for operator action is taken for the 0 10 minute. phase of a design basis event. (cAttitxt.up) l e -, - =r4t-

Computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company-G0050A 10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 18. Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A-Project.Titic: Service Water System DET 1ssues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1' Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis , Status: Prelim. Final u Void E

            -4.9    Operator action is assumed for the >10 minute phase of:an event                   '

(subject to availability of equipment and accessibility to specific areas) to perform manual operations including: a) align a 2nd SW pump to the operating SW header b) establish RHRSW flow-4.10 For power operation (Modes 1-3), the accidents / initiating events  ; to be considered are LOCA outside Primary Containment (HELB) and LOOP. These events will be evaluated in concert with the most limiting single active failure. Initiation of a LOCA signal causes the greatest number of component flow paths to be automatically aligned to the NSW header. The diesel generator supply valves and the Vital header component isolation valves all open. Additionally, the standby NSW pump starts, and any operating RHRSW pumps trip. Initiation of a LOOP signal causes the same actions as a LOCA signal, with one exception: the Vital header component isolation valves will not open automatically. These isolation valves are held closed l following a LOOP by air from the emergency air compressors. These  ; compressors are no longer safety-related and cannot be credited during a design basis event. However, when having the component " isolation valves closed is more limiting, the air pressure in the ' emergency air header is assumed not to decay an'd the isolation valves remain closed. For the maximum flow scenarios-(0-10 minute phase), emergency air , is assumed to fail, causing the Vital header component isolation l ? valves to fail open. With the Vital header component flow paths open, the LOOP and LOCA events are equivalent. For the component cooling scenarios (310-minute phase), these events are equivalent since Reactor Building access is no longer required to isolate RBCCW due to automatic closure of SW-V103 and SW-V106 on an accident signal. (cALCTEXT.WP) i e-+- n m y

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1 Computed by: Date: Calculation 1D: Carolina Power'& Light Company G0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 19 Rev. 5-

                                      ^

TAR /PID No, PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System flydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. ' Final u Void l 4.11 The limiting single active failures listed below for power operation with normal system configurations have been applied in accordance with Ref 3.7. Limiting failures for other scenarios are addressed in applicable sections of the calculatian body. 4.11.1 For the 0-10 minute phase (maximum pump flow case), the emergency bus supplying one NSW pump fails. 4.11.2 Deleted 4.11.3 For the after 10 minute phase, one E-Bus fails, preventing operator action to restart the associated SW pump (s). , 4.12 For outage operation (Modes 4 and 5), the following accidents / initiating events are considered:

  • LOOP
  • LOCA sienal (not an actual pipe break) due to operator error or instrumentation failure The discussion under Assumption 4.10 regarding which event is bounding applies here, also, with the exception of the:>10 minute phase. For the >10 minute phase of an event during outage operation, operator action can be taken for both events since an IIELB is not assumed.

(CAltTEXT.VP)

                                                  ._                                     ~          .     . _

M Computed by; Date: " *"I"'* " *

                                 . Carolina Power _& Light Company C0050A-10 Checked by:        Date:

Pg. 20 Rev. 5-CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

'BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final n Void 4.13 The limiting single active failures listed below for outage

                                          ~

l operation with normal system configurations have been applied in , accordance with Ref 3.7. Limiting failures for_other scenarios are addressed in applicable sections of the calculation body. 4.13.1 For the 0-10 minute phase (maximum pump flow cases), two different situations exist. 4.13.1.1 When two NSW pumps are operable on the NSW header,-the emergency bus supplying one ..' NSW pump and RHRSW pump throttle valve F068 l fails, resulting in unavailability.of these , components. 4.13.1.2 When one NSW pump is operable on the NSW header', the trip coil on one of the operating RHRSW - pumps fails, causing that RHRSW pump to restart - - on re-energization of.the E-Bus (LOOP) or to continue running-(LOCA). The-F068 valve is assumed to stay open since the'only time it goes closed is when both RHRSW pumps are-off. For conservatism in the analysis, both pumps are assumed to be on. 4.13.2 Deleted 4.13.3 For the after 10-minute phase, one E-Bus fails, preventing operator action to restart the associated SW pump (s). 4,14 During the 0-10 minute and after 10-minute accident phases, the o conventional SW header (or nuclear header, in certain outage'- scenarios) is_ assumed to be depressurized. -This maximizes cross-tie leakage. 1 4.15 Deleted < I 4.16 Service water specific gravity = 1.03. 4.17 The initial SW system configurations assumed for the accident scenarios'are those providing the most limiting conditions (CALCTEXI.WP)- ll i s l l

1 l 1 i Computed by: Date: a culation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company j C0050A-10  : ,;. Checked by: Date: Pg. 21 R e v .. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis i Status: Prelim. Final u Void (consistent with system operating restrictions) upon initiation of the accident. For example: 4 4 4.17.1 Deleted 4.17.2 For the maximum flow cases (power operation), the only loads aligned to the NSW header are Lube Water and RBCCW. Upon an accident signal, RBCCW is isolated by closure of valves V103 and V106. In the initial configuration, RBCCW is at the maximum flow consistent with a minimum 40 psig SW header pressure SW header pressures lower than 40 psig would cause auto-start of the standby NSW pump, which is not as conservative as one pump in operation. With one pump in operation, ' all flow will go through one strainer. Consequently, a lower minor loss through'the strainer will be . required to maintain 1.0 psid. This in turn will cause accident flows to be higher and_thus provide a limiting starting configuration. 4.17.3 For the maximum flow cases (outage operation), RBCCW and RHRSW are at their maximum allowed flow rates-which minimizes NSW header-pressure and causes RHRSW throttle valves to be placed in a more open position. 4.17.4 For the component cooling flow cases, minimum water level in the SW pump bay is assumed. Additional limiting assumptions for initial configurations are discussed in applicable sections of this calculation. 4.18 The only required cooling loads in the 0-10 minute phase are the DC jacket water coolers and SW pump lube water. 4.19 The minimum pump bay water level during a hurricane is 8.63 feet MSL. This is based on information found in UFSAR Section 9.2.1.3, which is the lowest and therefore the most conservative extreme low pump bay water level value, i (CALCTEXT.WP)

Computed by; Date: Calculation ID: i Carolina Power & Light company

                                                                   -G0050A-10 Checked by:          Date:

Pg. 22 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues

                                                                              ~

Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Finalam Void 4.20 The maximum flood water level is +22.0 feet MSL, as stated in UFSAR Section 2.4.5. 4.21 Minimum submergence requirements for the SW pumps are satisfied at

  • a water level of -8.63 feet MSL, based on data in Reference 3.1.

4.22 The maximum allowable pump flow rate is 10,000 gpm per Reference 3.25 This flow rate assumes NPSHR requirements of the SW pump are satisfied. 4.23 The maximum allowable pump flow rate for hurricane conditions is 8225 gpm based on NPSHR data contained in Reference 3.1. 4.24 The maximum allowable flows given by Reference 3.24 will be used i in lieu of the SW pump NPSHR curve to determine acceptable SW prmp flows for accident scenarios run with SW pump intake bay water levels of -6.0 feet MSL and +2.0 feet MSL. - 4.25 Service Water pump operability requirements consistent with Technical Specification 3.7.1.2, as defined by current TSI's and/or operating procedures, have been assumed in this calculation. These restrictions provide single failure protection for both the Unit I and Unit 2 SW systems and ensure acceptable SW system and SW pump performance during all operating conditions, including hurricane and flood, i 4.26 Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires two NSW pumps operable on the applicable unit during Modes 1-3 and three NSW pumps operable per site during Modes 4-5. With these requirements in place, no credible design basis event scenario can be postulated which requires one unit to supply all 4 DG's with only one NSW pump operable. A minimum of two NSW pumps per site will remain after a-postulated' single failure. These two pumps,-coupled with the DG swapover logic, will ensure adequate supply to.all four diesels. 4.27 A cross-header leakage factor equal to the previously established Unit 1 leakage factor has been assumed in this' calculation. This assumption provides SW system performance margin which can be used in the future to offset system and equipuent degradation.

                                                                                           -l I

(CALCTEXT.WP) i l 1

Computed by: Date: Carolina Power & Light Company "I'"I"ti " IU G0050A*10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 23 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SIIEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET T= sues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final N Void []} 4.28 For many of the hydraulic analyses contained.in this calculation,- the flow rates through the RBCCW and RHRSW flow paths in the initial configurations were limited to ensure satisfactory system performance during any subsequent design basis event. The flow rates were limited by varying the minor loss factors of the . respective throttling valves for these flow paths. The final minor loss factors were then carried through to the subsequent simulations. Two methods can be used with the KYPIPE program to establish the appropriate minor loss factors for the throttling valves. The.two methods produce equivalent results and both have been used in this calculation. The.first method is straightforward, but can be very time-consuming. The second method offers the advantage of reduced time to run some simulations, but is more involved. The most obvious way to set a predetermined flow rate through the RBCCW and RIIRSW flow lines is to vary the minor loss factors for the throttle valves in these lines until the desired flow rates are achieved. This method can require a lot of time when two flow paths are being varied for the same simulation. The second method uses the flow demand feature of the KYPIPE software package to set flow rates through RBCCW and/or RHRSW. First, the throttle valve line segment is closed. Then, the desired flow rate is removed from the SW system model at the inlet node of the throttling valve ' as a fixed demand, and returned to the model at the outlet node of the throttling valve as a fixed input. The KYPIPE program calculates pressures at the junction nodes based on this preset flow value. The pressure computed at the inlet node of'the throttling valve minus the pressure at the outlet node (corrected for node elevation differences, if applicable) represents the pressure drop which must exist over the throttling valve to generate the desired flow rate. This pressure difference can be converted to the corresponding throttle valve minor loss factor using the following equation derived from standard head loss f o rmula s : Minor Loss = 387 * (2.31

  • AP) * (ID')

(Q ') * (Sp. Gr.) (ID'= inches; AP = psid; Q = gpm) (tALCTEXT.WP) 1

                                                                                               )

l

                         -                             ~   ..

Computed by: Date: Carolina Power & Light Company a cu ati n D: C0050A-10 Checked by: Date: P. 24' Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water-System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void Once the minor loss f actor is established, the subsequent model simulations are revised to use the minor loss method rather than the fixed demand / input approach. 4.29 Deleted (previously 4.29). 4.30 A spurious LOCA signal is considered during outage operation in a hurricane, even though a spurious LOCA signal at.that time would be very unlikely. This signal would probably result from operator error or instrument failure, such as that caused by a worker jarring sensitive reactor water level instrumentation. During-a hurricane, operators would be more alert due to storm conditions; also no personnel would be working on or near sensitive instrumentation. In any case, the system response to a LOCA is identical to that for a LOOP for.most (maximum flow) scenarios. 4.31 Where RHR SW Pumps are needed, it is assumed that RHR SW Pumps'"B" , and "D" are used. This is realistic since they'are the two pumps closest to the NSW Header. It is assumed that the behavior of the "B" and "D" pumps is identical to that of the "A" and "C" pumps, that is the short length of piping on the RHR SW Pump. inlet header causes no variation in performance between "A" Loop pumps and "B" Loop pumps. Calibration data supports this assumption. Any. differences between trains would be insignificant considering'the conservative design margins used. 4.32 RHRSW Pump suction header pressure switches have a trip setpoint range between 13.7 and 17.3 psig (Ref 3.4). Initial configuration results in this range and above (i.e. greater than 13.7) are acceptable. However, for accident analysis results , a conservative minimum trip setpoint of 18 psig must be maintained to ensure adequate NPSHR. 4.33 The worst-case single failure for scenarios'that begin during. Operational Modes 4 and 5 (shutdown). when one NSWP is operable is. failure of an RHRSW pump trip coil (see Assumption 4.13.1.2 for further explanation). In the KYPIPE scenarios that assume this type of failure, the RERSW pump suction pressure sometimes falls well below the 18 psig required to maintain NPSHR. In'these cases, it is conservatively assumed'that. the pump that experienced the failure and subsequently restarted fails. However, the other (CALCTEXT.WP)

LJ ' Computed by: Date: a culation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A 10 Checked by: Date: Pg; 25 Rev. 5

                                            ^    ^  " "

TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Void Prelim.[)) Final}}  ; RHRSW pump on that loop as well as the other loop's RHRSW pumps and all normal and emergency power' supplies remain to supply R!lRSW needs once RHRSW is required. 4.34 This calculation assumes implementation of the portion of Service Water Lube Water modifications 82-220L and 82-221L which installs L upgraded NSW pump motor thrust bearings. The new thrust bearings are sized for the thrust load at zero flow and thus eliminate the ' previous requirements for minimum RBCCW flow rate and one RHR pump room cooler in service. Additionally, restrictions on maximum allowable RBCCW and RHRSW flow rates can be loosened in the future-since full closure of valves SW-V103 and SW-V106 (previously i throttled on accident signal) is now possible. A minimum' flow rate of 25 gpm is assumed to cool the pump shaft sleeve bearings. Since no credible system lineup will result in zero flow (i.e., all components isolated), a minimum flow of'25 gpm is assumed. This minimum flow is achieved with as few as one component aligned - to the system. Therefore, no minimum flow calculations are required. 4.35 The Diesel Jacket Water Cooler SW Inlet-Pressure Switches have a setpoint of 10 1 1 psig (Reference 3.4). When this setpoint is reached on a particular unit, a swapove' r results which f orces the Diesels to be supplied from the other unit. For. conservatism,-the setpoint plus toleracce plus an additional margin of 20% will be used to determine when a swapover will occur. Therefore, whenever a value of 13 psig is reached, a swapover is assumed to occur and the effects will be evaluated. ' 4.36 When establishing minimum SW header pressures in these analyses, the nominal pressure value is used rather than the worst-case > pressure _considering instrument tolerance. .This is considered-reasonable since-a conservative factor of 5% is being applied to , the predicted system flow rates Incorporating pressure > instrument tolerances would provide additional, unnecessary conservatism. Also, test results show pressures are relatively insensitive compared to flows for the SW system (large flow. changes cause relatively small pressure changes). k (CALCTEXT.WP) , r P vo.

t Computed by: Date: alculat2cn ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A 10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 26 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID PcN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project Tic. . Service Water. System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis + Status: Prelim. Final Void An exception to this assumption is made for the RHRSW pump low suction pressure trip setpoint since RHRSW cooling is so critical for plant recovery'following an event, I t ) (CALCTEXT.VP) p m v .,

Computed by: Date: a culation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 27 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final me Void 5.0 COMPUTER MODEL VALIDATION The U1 SW system computer model has undergone several revisions since it was first developed in 1989. The latest revision incorporated L calibration changes made so the model results match test results from  ; L Periodic Test 1-PT-24.6.4, which was run at the end of the BSEP U1 refueling outage in January 1991. The calibration and its acceptability have been previously evaluated in Engineering Evaluation EER-91-0039, ] and will not be addressed in depth here. This EER created a final ' calibrated computer model file, "UICALBN2", from which the file "U1 MASTER" was made. File "U1 MASTER" is the base file from which all analysis / evaluation files in this calculation were-created. The latest calibration case should only serve to make the computer model more accurately portray the flows scen in the field; as such, the 5% accuracy previously applied to model flow results (although probably improved upon by the latest calibration) will continue to be used for model results. Likewise, as established previously, in the few places that model pressure results are addressed, the raw test results will be examined with no compensation for model accuracy. This is conservative because previous calibration testing has shown the model to be relatively accurate with respect to pressure readings (although the model is only specifically calibrated for flow, not pressure). Furthermore, the model is insensitive to pressure results with respect to flow results (i.e., large changes in' flow only cause minor changes in associated pressures). Finally, the vast majority of acceptance criteria of this calculation regards flow results, not pressure results. (CALCTEXT.W) _-a _ma___ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ - .__ _______________._m

Computed by: Date: { "'C"'" i"

  • carolina Power & Light Company G0050A 10 Checked by: Date:

Pg. 28 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SKEET TAR / PIP No. PCN G0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Void Final [2] 6.0 CALCULATIONS Attachment 24, " Service Water System KYPIPE Model Flow Diagram," is a useful reference when reviewing this section. This flow diagram identifies specific line and junction numbers used in the computer model and shows their relationships to individual components in the Service Water system. Minimum NSW pump flow requirements have been eliminated due to the installation of larger pump motor thrust bearings. See Assumption 4.34. 6.1 Normal SW System Conficuration 6.1.1 Power Operation 6.1.1.1 Initial Conficuration During normal power operation, the only loads aligned to the NSW header are lube water and RBCCW. Lube water changes with header pressure and cannot be used to provide a limiting initial configuration.- RBCCW is isolated at the start of an event and therefore is not used to establish a limiting initial configuration, To provide a starting point for evaluating maximum SW pump flow evaluations in both phases, one NSW pump operating at the lowest possible NSW header pressure is assumed in conjunction with alignment of lube water and RBCCW loads (Ref 4.17.2). 6.1.1.2 0-10 Minute Phase

  • 6.1.1.2.1 SW Pumn NPSHR Restrictions
                                      .Since operator action is not credited in the first 10 minutes of an event, the SW pump flow resulting from the worst-case design. basis event must stay within the limitations imposed by the maximum flow /NPS!!R requirements of the SW pumps.

The maximum allowable SW pump flow rates for the l extreme normal operating pump bay water levels are (Reference 3.24): (CALCTEXT.W) I J

   ,               .   . - _ -    -_. -   ~_ ..        -              _.    -. - .                              .                 .

Computed by: Date: calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-10 , Checked by: Date: Pg. 29 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SIIEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues ., Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Ilydraulic Analysis Status: Final u Vold 'e Prelim.((J

                                                         +2.0 feet MSL:     9552 gpm 6.0 feet MSL:     9292 gpm The worst-case design basis event for maximum SW pump flow is a LOCA, since the LOCA causes the
                                                . greatest number of components to be aligned to                                      .t the SW system. The worst-case single failure is the failure of one E-Bus since one NSW pump is lost.

The results.of the computer simulations are shown in Attachment 1, Changes 1 (maximum pump bay water level) and 3 (minimum pump bay water level). The resultant SW pump flow rates (plus , 5% for program accuracy) are listed below and i are compared to the allowable maximum flow . ' rates. -

                                                +2.0 feet MSL:                                                                          ;

(5299)'(1,05) = 5564 < 9552 gpm

                                                 -6.0 feet MSL:

(5186) (1.05) = 5445 < 9292 gpm , Since the predicted flows.are less than the allowable flows, operation.in this scenario is acceptable. Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in. Attachment 1, Changes 1 and 3 are above the 13 , psig minimum, therefore no swapover will occur., Note: These.results show all SV loads can be supplied by one NSW pump. Per Assumption 4.26-; . a second NSW pump would be.available to share DG cooling loads. (CALCTEXT.WP) I g - - ,, - - . - . . . -. .- , ,

l l J

                                                                   ~~                                         k computed by:       Date:                                                   Calculation ID:                     I Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A-10 Checked by:        Date:

Pg. 30 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues l Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic-Analysis Status: Prelim. Final n Void 6.1.1.2.2 comoonent cooling The most limiting cases for cooling water flows to individual components in the first 10 minutes are the maximum SW pump flow cases (Attachment 1, Changes 1 and 3). The SW system pressure is at its lowest value in these cases; therefore, component flows are at their lowest values. The resultant flow rates for these scenarios are , tabulated and compared against required flow rates in Attachment 2, Tables 1 and 4 (maximum. bay level) and Tables 2 and 5 (minimum bay level) As seen in the tables, all cooling loads are satisfied. 6.1.1.2.3 Minimum SW Pumo Flow Reauirements This section has been deleted. 6.1.1.3 After 10-Minute Phase In the >10 minute phase, minimum pump bay level will. , provide the lowest SW system flow rate and the lowest flow rate to each component. Therefore, only.the minimum bay level scenario is simulated. The maximum flow rate which can be supplied by the SW system in the >10 minute phase is limited by the RIIRSW pumps low suction pressure trip. Since the RHRSW  ! pumps must be in operation for cooling of the RHR j system, the SW system _and RHRSW system flow rates must 'j be such that the RHRSW pumps suction pressures remain above the trip setpoint. An 18.0 psig-minimum.RHRSW pump suction pressure has been used for this calculation based on setpoint data contained in , Reference 3.21. l (CALCTEXT.WP) l l I

Computed by: Date: a culation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A 10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 31 Rev 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void If operators are unable to start a.second NSW pump, a conventional SWP can be aligned to the Nuclear header. This will enable the minimum RHRHX flowrate of 4500 gpm (Ref 3.16) to be maintained. The operators are also able to throttle back the DG's (Ref 3.36) to assist in maintaining the 4500 gpm. Results of this simulation are given in Attachment 1, Change 4. The resultant flows are tabulated and compared against required flows in Attachment 2, Tables 3 and 6. Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in Attachment 1, Change 4 are above the 13 psig minimum, therefore no swapover will occur. As shown in the tables, all component cooling requirements can be met, while maintaining an RHRSW ' pump suction pressure of 1 18.0 psig. 6.1.2 Outane Oneration 6.1.2.1 Initial conficuration i For the maximum SW pump flow scenarios, the limiting initial configuration varies according to the number of operable NSW pumps, since the different numbers of operable NSW pumps require different maximum limits on- . RBCCW and RHRSW flows. For the two operable NSW pumps scenario, the limiting initial configuration has two NSW pumps operating'with RBCCW and RHRSW at their maximum allowable values for i two NSW pumps operable (see'Section 6.1.2.2.1). This -l is more limiting than one pump operating with reduced' RBCCW and RHRSW flows and a SW header pressure of 40 , psig (the autostart setpoint for the other NSW pump) ] since the higher flow rates allowed with two pumps l operable result in the RHRSW throttling valves being. - more open. These valves then allow more flow in the

                                                                                                  ~

0-10 minute phase. (CALCTEXT.W) l

computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A 10 Checked by: _Date: Pg. 32 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /pID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void For the one operable NSW pump scenario, the limiting configuration is one pump operating with the maximum RBCCW and RHRSW flows allowed for one pump operation (see Section 6.1.2.2.1). 6.1.2.2 0-10 Minute Phase 6.1.2.2.1 NPSHR Restrictions During outage operation, the most limiting event for the maximum SW pump flow cases is a LOCA signal (not an actual HELB) since the greatest number of components are aligned to the SW system. The most limiting single failure is a function of the number of operable NSW pumps. l For one operable NSW pump, the most limiting failure is the failure of an RHRSW pump trip coil. The loss of the trip coil allows the RHRSW pump to continue running in the 0-10 minute phase (assuming a LOCA signal) or to restart following E-Bus re energization (assuming a LOOP). The operating RHRSW pump then pumps a significant amount of flow through the RHRSW flow path, possibly causing NSW pump runout. For two operable NSW pumps, the most limiting failure is the loss of an E-Bus. The E Bus failure causes the loss of one NSW pump and failure of RHRSW Throttle Valve F068 as-is. The trip coil failure for the two NSW pumps operable I scenario is not as severe as an E-Bus failure since operation of the second NSW pump can be credited when a trip coil is taken as the single i failure j i The specific simulation results for the maximum i pump flow cases are given in Attachment 3, I (CALCTEXT.WP)

_ _- . . . . ~ _ - - . .- - . -

                                                                                                                       'l Computed by:           Date:                                                Calculation 1D:

Carolina Power & Light Company , C0050A 10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 33 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A i Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues

                                                                                                                       'i Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void []} t Changes 1, 3, 6, and 8. Resultant NSW pump flows are summarized below: Two NSW Pumns Ocerable

                                       +2.0 feet MSL:                                                              -

l (6459) (1.05) = 6782 < 9552 gpm '

                                       -6.0 feet MSL:

(6324) (1.05) = 6640 < 9292 gpm One NSW Pumn Onerable

                                       +2.0 feet MSL-                                                                    !

(7291) (1.05) = 7656 < 9552 gpm

                                       -6.0 feet MSL:                                                                    l (7152) (1.05) = 7510 < 9292 gpm As stated earlier, different flow limits apply to the different operable pump cases            The                               '

results shown above are based on the following - RBCCW and RHRSW flow limits: , 2 NSW pumps operable - 5500 gpm RBCCW-4500 gpm'RHRSW  ! i 1 NSW pump operable - 4000 gpm RBCCW 2800 gpm RHRSW 4 The predicted flow rates are within the maximum  ; allowable flow rates set by the vendor and are , therefore acceptable. .,l Diesel Jacket' Water Cooler inlet pressures in Attachment 3, Changes 1,3,6, and 8 are above-.the 13 psig minimum, therefore no swapover will occur. i l (CALC 1 EXT.VP)  ; j y--, - - -

7 7 l Computed by: Date: Carolina. Power &' Light Company "I'"I" "

  • C0050A 10 J Checked by: Date:

Pg. 34 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET

                                                                                                      )

1 TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A  ! Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic' Analysis Status: Prelim. Final n Void j 6.1.2.2.2 Comnonent Cooling As with power operation, the maximum SW pump flow cases are also the worst-case component cooling flow cases. The maximum pump flow cases are given in Attachment 3, Changes 1, 3, 6, and 8. The resultant flow rates are tabulated and compared against required flows in Attachment 4, Tables 1 through 4 and Tables 6 through 9. . As can be seen from the tables, all cooling I loads are satisfied. . 6.1.2.2.3 Minimum SW Pumo Flow Reauirements This section has been deleted.  ; 6.1.2.3 After 10 Minute Phase A LOCA signal is the most limiting event in the after 10-minute phase of an event. The most limiting single failure is the loss of an E-Bus since a second SW pump i is unavailable and cannot provide additional cooling ' flow. As with the power operation case,'RHRSW pump suction pressure must be 1 18.0 peig. The specific simulation results are given in  ; Attachment 3, Change 4. The individual flows are  ; tabulated and compared against required flows in , Attachment 4, Tables 5 and 10, , 1 As shown in the tables, all component cooling requirements can be met, while maintaining an RHRSW J

                               . pump suction pressure of 1 18.0 psig.                                ,
                                                                                                   'l
                                                                                 -(CALCTEXT.WP) i I

i Computed by: Date: "" "'5 " Carolina Power & Light Company l "C0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 35 Rev. 5

                                     -CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A                                             File:  PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues 1 Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Void Final [I] Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressure in Attachment 3, Change 4 is below'the 13-psig minimum. A swapover is assumed to occur causing the diesels to be supplied from the other unit. This is acceptable since there will be an adequate number of NSW pumps per Assumption 4.26. 6.1.3 Extreme Low Water (Hurricane) Ooeration 6.1.3.1 Initial Configuration

  • The initial configurations for the extreme low water scenarios are the same as those for the outage operation scenarios, with the exceptions of SW pump intake bay water level and minimum allowable SW header -

pressure. The minimum bay water level is taken as

                              -8.63 feet MSL as stated in Assumption 4.21. The minimum allowable SW header pressure is. taken as the highest header pressure seen in the initial configuration runs. The pressures in the initial configurations ensure adequate header pressure during accident conditions. Based on model results, the minimum allowable SW header pressure is 58 psig           BSEP Procedure'ADP-13 requires service water to be minimized and circulating water to be secured at 7.5 feet MSL. The AOP also specifically requires a-SW header pressure of at least 63 psig be maintained whenever pump bay water Icvel falls to 5.0 feet NSL or below. The AOP requirements outlined here meet the bounding requirements set forth in the model.

6.1.3.2 0 10 Minute Phast 6.1.3.2.1 NPSHR Restrictions The limiting assumptions, events, etc., applied to the maximum SW pump flow cases for outage operation also apply to extreme low water operation. (CALC 1 EXT.WP)

Y computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 36 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues d Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void ((} Specific simulation results are given in Attachment 5, Changes 1, 3, 6, and 8. Resultant SW pump flows are summarized below: 2 NSW Pumos Onerable

                                     -8.63 feet MSL:
                                            '6281) (1.05) = 6595 1 8225 gpm (ref. Assumption 4.23)

J NSW Pump Ooerable 8.63 feet MSL: (7115) (1.05) = 7471 1 8225 gpm (ref. Assumption 4.23) 7 These results are valid assuming the following: a) the 58 psig (minimum) SW header pressure requirement discussed in Section 6 1.3.1 . is observed; and b) the maximum outage related limits on RBCCW/RHRSW flows are not exceeded. The outage related flow limits are: RECCW = 5500 (2 pumps), 4000-(1 pump), and .; RHRSW = 4500 (2 pumps), 2800 (1 pump) Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in Attachment 5, Changes 1,3 and 8 are above the 13 psig minimum, therefore, no swapover aill result. However the pressere in Attachrent 5, Change 6 is belov 13 psig and a swapover is assumed to  ; occur. This is acceptable for reasons. explained in Assumption 4.26. ' i s (CALCTEXT.WP) {

                                                                .            - , -  s ,. e          y

Computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-10 J' Checked by: Date: Pg. 37 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void j 6.1.3.2.2 Comnonent Cooling As with the outage-operation cases, the maximum SW pump flow cases are also the_ worst-case scenarios for cooling flows. Accordingly, the , results of the maximum pump flow cases in Section 6.1.3.2.1 are tabulated and compared to-required cooling-flows in Attachment 6. Tables 1 through 4 and Tables 6 through 9. As shown in the tables, all cooling requirements are satisfied. 6.1.3.2.3 Minimum SW Pumo Flow Recu*rements This section has been deleted. . 6.1.3.3 After 10 Minute Phase Specific results for extreme low water operation are shown in Attachment 5, Change 4. These . results are tabulated and compared to required I flows in Attachment 6, Tables 5 and'10. The results in Tables 5 and 10 show sufficient cooling can be supplied. 1 Diesel Jacl.et Water Cooler inlet pressures in Attachment 5, Change 4 are below the 13 psig minimum. A swapover is assumed to occur but is acceptable for reasons. explained in Assumption 4.26. { 6.1. 4 - Flood Operation  : The higher pump- bay water level associated with a flood will generate higher SW system flow rates which can result in SW pump runout. Therefore , the maximuni SW pump flow cases must be evaluated to determine if i additional operational restrictions are required to (CALCTEXT.W) r t e i f F T

  • r -

Computed by: Date: a cu ation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 38 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void {}} guarantee acceptable maximum SW pump flows during the worst-case flood scenarios. For SW system operation during flood conditions, both normal and shutdown operating modes must be analyzed. BSEP Procedure AOP-13 requires plant shutdown when intake canal level reaches.+20.0 feet MSL. Since the analyses for normal operation ,(Attachment 1) used +2.0 feet ESL for a maximum level, additional. analyses at

                            +20.0 feet MSL are needed. For conservatism, these analyses are run at +22.0 feet MSL.

Analyses for shutdown / outage operating modes are also required. Since the number of operable NSW pumps can vary in shutdown (can be 1 or 2), enalyses for both cases are necessary. These analyses are run at

                            +22.0 feet MSL per Assumption 4.20.                                    -

NOTE: Though cooling flows are considered acceptabla by inspection, they are tabulated in AttacNnent 8 for completeness. 6.1.4.1 Initial Configuration With the exception of pump bay leve? the initial system configurations for flood conditions use the same assumptions as for the high bay level cases analyzed for normal and outage conditions (Sections 6.1.1.1.and 6.1.2.1, respectively). 6.1.4.2 0-10 Minute Phase 61.4.2.1 SW Pumo NPSHR Restrictions The limiting maximum SW pump flow scenarios for > flood conditions use the same assumptions as the respective cases for power and outage operation. (CALCTEXT.WP)  ; 1

Computed by: Date: Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A-10 , Checked by: Date: - Pg. 39 Revi 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNC0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. } Service Water System Hydraulic-Analysis Status: Prelim. Final PA Void []} 6.1.4.2.1.1 Power coeratine Modes Specific simulation results are given in Attachment 7 Change 1, and are'summarizea below:

                                         +22.0 feet MSL:

(5574) (1.05) = 5853 gpm 1 9552 gpm The resultant flow rate of 5854 gpm is less than the 9552 gpm allowed for operation at +2.0 feet MSL (Reference 3.24) and is considered acceptable. 6.1.4.2.1.2 Shutdown Oneratine Modes Specific simulation results are given in Attachment 7, Changes 4 and 6. SW pump flows are summarized below:

                                         +22.0 feet MSL, 2 NSW Pumps:                         i (6785) (1.05) = 7124 gpm 1 9552 gpm           I l
                                         +22.0 feet MSL, 1 NSW Pump:                         ,

(7566) (1.05) = 7944 gpm 1 9552 gpm These resultant flows are less than the 9552 gpm value allowed by the vendor (Reference 3.24) for.a +2.0 feet MSL pump bay water level; Therefore, these flows-are acceptable. Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in Attachment 7. Changes 1,2,4 and 6 are above_the 13 psig minimum, therefore no swapover will occur. Ilowever, pressures in Attachment 7, Change 7 are below the 13 psig minimum and a swapover is assumed to occur. This is acceptable for reasons explained in Assumption 4.26. , l (CALCTEXT.WP) J i

                                                                                                'l l

1

                                                  . . _ ..       _       . = - . . _             m     .

J Computed cy* -Date: alculati n ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A 10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 40 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A-Project

Title:

Service Water-System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1. Service Water System Hyd.raulic Analysis Status: Final ed Prelim.] Void] r or the >10 minute phase, if operators are unable to start a second NSW pump, a conventional SWP can be aligned to the Nuclear Header. This will enable the minimum RHRHX flowrate of 2500 gpm (Ref 3.16) to be maintained. The operators are also able to throttle back the DC's to assist in maintaining ti.e 2500 gpm. L f f I (CALCTEXT.WP) i l l l 1

t Computed by: .Date: Calculation 13: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-10 l Checked by: Date: Pg. 41 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No, PCN C0050A . File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Void F4nal[}} 6.2 Vital Header Aliened to the CSW Header I Previous methods to provide minimum flow protection are no longer required. i Two operating restrictions are specified for this abnormal lineup. The first restriction is necessary to ensure NSW header operability. The NSW header supply valve to the Vital header, SW-V117, opens automatically on a LOCA signal. With the CSW header supply valve already open, NSW pump runout is practically assured since a significant amount of service water will be flowing from the NSW header to the CSW header. To prevent this, manual-valve SW-V116 in the NSW header supply line to.the Vital header is required to be closed or SW-V117 closed with power removed. The l second restriction is necessary to ensure operability of the RHRSW system in the long-term cooling phase of an event. If the NSW header is not available to supply RHRSW and a failurelof the power-supply tc valve SW-V101 (the supply valve to RHRSW from the CSW ' header) is assumed, cooling of RHRSW cannot be accomplished in those situations in which an HELB makes the Reactor Building inaccessible for operator action. Opening and disablics SW-V101 , while the Vital header is being supplied from the CSW header precludes this situation. Analysis for this . abnormal lineup is bounded by normal lineup analysis due to the additional flows seen in normal operation and the absence of minimum flow restrictions. 6.3 RBCCW Not Aliened to the NSW Header l RBCCW alignment to the NSW header is no longer required due to modifications described in Assumption 4.34. Analysis for this abnormal lineup is equivalent to normal operation analysis since RBCCW is now isolated upon an accident signal. 6.4 RHRSW Isolated From the NSW Header 1 Previously, operation in this abnormal system lineup had not been allowed due to a common mode failure mechanism which could have' resulted in the loss of all CSW pumps and, consequently., all RHRSW cooling. Specifically, if one of the TBCCW isolation valves (SW-V3 or SW-V4) failed closed spuriously, the TBCCW flow path would be lost. Since TBCCW accounts for essentially all of the CSW- j (CALCTEXI.WP) i

Computed by: Date: ~ Carolina Power & Light Company # """'" C0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 42 Rev. 5-CALCULATION SHEET . TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: .PCNG0050A ir Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP-Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. - Final u Void header flow demand, the subsequent low flow condition on the _ CSW - ' header will result in failure of all the CSW pumps due to inadequate pump flow. An additional concern had been the , possibility of CSW pump runout following an E-Bus failure and loss  ! of one CSW pump. Since no automatic throttling or isolation of , flow paths on the CSW header woul'd occur in this scenario, the ' remaining pump (s) could exceed the maximum flow limit. Operating with one CSW pump in standby eliminates this concern, but does not correct the potential minimum flow problem. To eliminate these failure mechanisms and allow operation with RHRSW on the CSW header, Plant Modification 90-008 was implemented. This modification made two changes to TBCCW valves I SW-V3 and SW-V4. First, a low CSW header pressure closing circuit was added to each valve. Second, limit switches were' installed in the closing direction to stop the valves in a partially closed position. The closing circuit prevents pump runout by sensing low-header pressure and closing the valves to their' throttled positions. This throttled position is chosen to prevent pump d runout following an E Bus failure (with the loss of one CSW pump) and to ensure adequate minimum pump flow following spurious movement of V3 or V4 (regardless of the number of CSW pumps aligned: to the CSW header). Thus, the CSW pumps will survive these failure scenarios, and a source of supply is ensured for RHRSW cooling when it is isolated from the NSW header. No additional operational restrictions' or-constraints need be.placed upon-the CSW-or NSW header while RHRSW  ! is isolated from the NSW header for the SW system to meet its , design basis functions. , (CALCTEXf.W)

l l . Computed by: Date: a culation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company i C0050A Checked by: Date: P . 43 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET IAR/PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A~ Project

Title:

Service. Water System DET Issues  ! Calculation Titte: BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void 7.0 [ONCLUSIONS The BSEP Unit 1 Service Water System can satisfy its design basis functional requirements under all operating conditions provided .the following operational restrictions are implemented. Restrictions are grouped by system configuration to correspond to the specific groupings in Section 6.0. 7.1 Normal SW System Configuration 7.1.1 Deleted 7.1.2 Deleted 7.1.3 RBCCW flow shall not be increased above 7200 gpm during any operating mode. 7.1.4 During outage / shutdown operation, the following maximum flow J restrictions on RBCCW and RHRSW shall apply: 7.1.4.1 With two NSW pumps operable, RBCCW flow shall not exceed 5500 gpm and RHRSW flow shall not exceed 4500 gpm. 7.1.4.2 With one NSW pump operable RBCCW flow shall not_ exceed 4000 gpm and RHRSW flow shall not exceed 2800 gpm. 7.1.5 Cross-header leakage must be limited to a maximum value of 947 gpm at a pressure differential of 40 psid between the NSW and CSW headers to ensure the accuracy of the analyses in this calculation. Allowable leakage flows at other-header APs are given in Attachment 22. (CALCTEXT.WP)

computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company  ; C0050A ' Checked by: Date: Pg. 44 Rev. 5 ' CALCULATION SIIEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Service Water System DET Issues Project

Title:

Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void 7.1.6 During hurricane operation, the following restrictions shall be observed. 7.1.6.1 At a SW pump intake bay water' level of .

                                     -6.0 ft MSL or lower, maintain either:

a) a pressure of at least 58 psig in the NSW header; or b) the maximum allowable flow rates for RBCCW and i RHRSW specified in Conclusions 7.1.4.1 and 7.1.4.2 above, provided the resultant NSW header > pressure is 1 58 psig. If NSW header pressure is < 58 psig, reduce RBCCW and/or RHRSW flows as needed to bring SW header pressure up to at . least 58 psig. l 7.1.6.2 Reduce all circulating water flow to maintain SW pump *aay water level above

                                             -8.63 feet MSL.

7.1.6.3 Consistent with Conclusion 7.1.6.2 above, minimize all service water flow paths when the SW pump bay water level-decreases to

                                             -6.0 feet MSL.

7.1.7 During flood operation, observe the maximum flow rate limitations on RBCCW and RHRSW established for power and outage / shutdown operations. 7.1.8 When a BSEP unit is in Mode 4 or 5 with less than two NSW pumps operable, the other BSEP unit must maintain two NSW pumps operabic to ensure SW system design capability (Ref 4.26). 7.2 Vital Header Aliened to the CSW Header The operational restrictions in Section 7.1 apply to this system configuration also, except as revised below. 7.2.1 Deleted (CALCTEXT.WP)

Computed by: Date: " ""'" Carclina Power & Light Company G0050A-10 Checked by: Date: Pg. 45 Rev. 5~ CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project

Title:

Service Water System DET Issues Calculation

Title:

BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis Status: Prelim. Final u Void 7.2.2 Deleted 7.2.3 Valve SW-V101 must be fully open and disabled. 7.2.4 Valve SW-V116 must be closed or SW-V117 closed with power removed. 7.2.5 Deleted (previously 7.2.5). 7.3 RBCCW Not Aliened to the NSW Header No additional constraints are. imposed for this operational alignment. 7.4 RHRSW Isolated Frem the NSW Header No additional constraints are imposed for this operational - alignment. (CALCTEXT.W)

Calc.~G0050A-10 Att. 02, Rev. 5 Page 1 of_ 06 , i ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES POWER' OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02. TABLE 1 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 123 / 01 , The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of i the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased-by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components.  : Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling * , RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 618.07 648.97 587.17. Loop A Vital Header 516.61 542.44 490.78-Loop B DG 1 HX 1361.00 1429.05- 1292.95 DG 2 HX 1423.36 1494.53 1352.19 ' Lube Water 190.00 199.50 180.50 Cross-tie Valve 1189.93 1249.43 1130.43 Leakage Total Pump Flow '5298.97 5563.92 5034.02 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)

         =  N/A     feet (See Assumption 4.24)

Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level'of +2.0 feet (from Attachment 21)

         =  45.1    feet
 *See Table No.       4     for Component Cooling Evaluation

Calc. G0050A-10' Att. 02, Rev. 5 Page 2 of 06 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES i POFER OPERATION  !

                                                                                 )

i ATTACHMENT 02. TABLE 2 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 123 / 03 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 603.76 633.95 573.57 Loop A Vital Header 504.77- 530.01 479.53 Loop B DG 1 HX 1332.33 1398.95 1265.71 DG 2 HX 1393.38 1463.05 1323.71 Lube Water 186.00 195.30 176.70 Cross-tie Valve 1165.30 1223.56 1107.03' Leakage Total Pump Flow 5185.54 5444.82 4926.26 Required NPSH for Service hater Pump (from Reference 3.1)
       =  N/A     feet (See Assumption 4.24)

Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -6.0 feet (from Attachment 21)

       =  37.1    feet
  • See Table No. 5 for Component Cooling Evaluation
                       .                    .   -.- _        ..   .  ~..         _  .. .

t Calc. G0050A-10 Att.-02, Rev. 5 Page 3 of 06 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES POWER OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02, TABLE 3 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 123 /4 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased to add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 584.70 613.93 555.46 Loop A Vital Header 483.44 507.61 459.27 Loop B DG 1 HX 1298.26 1363.17 1233.35 DG 2 HX 1357.75 1425.64 1289.86 Lube water 182.00 191.10- 172.90 RHR HX Flow 5000.00- 5250.00 4750.00 RHR Pump Motor 114.03 119.73 108.33 Coolers Cross-tie Valve 1140.02 1197.02 1083.02 Leakage .

Total SW Pump 10160.20 10668.21 9652.19 l Flow -RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be more than 15.5 1 1.8 psig per PM 89-051): 37.16 psig Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)

       =    13   feet Available-NPSH with Pump Bay Level of          -6.0     feet (from Attachment 21)
       =  37.1   feet
 *See Table No. 6     for Component Cooling Evaluation

Calc. G0050A-lO-Att. 02, Rev. 5-Page 4 'of 06 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES , POWER OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02. TABLE 4 l HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change'No.: MODES 123 / 01 , REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS 9 Required Flow Versus SW Temp. - Component (s) Available o o Flow (gpm) 75 F 80 F 85 F 90 F Two Diesel 2645.14 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm ' Generators SW Lube Water 180.50 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm-RBCCW O O gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm ' (Nonsafety Load) Total 2825.64 795 gpm 795 gpm 795'gpm 795 gpm I l l

                                                                                        =

( -. . . Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 02, Rev. 5 Page 5 of. 06 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES POWER OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02. TABLE 5 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 123 / 03 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS I Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available o Flow (gpm) 75 F 80 F 8 5"F 90 F  ? Two Diesel 2589.42 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 176.70 95 gpm' 95 gpm 95 gpm 95'gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2766.12 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm l 1

Calc. G0050A-10 , Att. 0 2 ,.. R e v . 5 Page 6 of 06 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES POWER OPERATION , ATTACHMENT 02. TABLE 6 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 123 / 04 i REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp.. Component (s) Available o o o o Flow (gpm) 75 F 80 F 85 F 90 F 2 RHR Rm 812.10 <164 gpm 164 gpm 216._gpm 372 gpm Coolers 2 CS Rm Coolers 144.13 27.4 gpm '34 gpm 47.4 gpm 94 gpm 4 RHR. Seal 58.48 0 gpm -0 gpm' O gpm Q gpm Coolers RHR HX 4750.00 4,500 gpm 4,500'gpm 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm. 2 Diesel 2523.21 700 gpm 700 gpm 700.gpm 700 gpm Generators SU Lube Water 172.90 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm_ 95 gpm 2 RHR SW Pump 108.33 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm-Motor Coolers RBCCW (Non- 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Safety Load) _ Total 8569.15 <3,562 gpm 3,569 gpm 3,634 gpm 3,837 gpm

Calc. G0050A Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 1 of. 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES , OUTAGE OPERATION l ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 1 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPECATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 4&5 / 01 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be' increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to . the components. Component , Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 560.62 588.65 532.59 Loop A -

t Vital Header 467.61 490.99 444.23 Loop B DG 1 HX 1245.21 1307.47 1182.95 DG 2 HX 1302.28 1367.39 1237.17 Lube Water 173.00 181.65 164.35 Cross-tie Valve 1091.46 1146.03 1036.89 Leakage Total Pump Flow 6459.08 6782.03 6136.13 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)

         =  N/A    feet (See Assumption 4.24)

Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +2.0 feet (from Attachment 21)

         =  45.3   feet
 *See Table No.       6    for Component Cooling Evaluation v
                                -     -   -           _   =     . -                   -.

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 04, Rev 5 Page 2 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES

                                  -OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 2 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE                                                                         l File / Change No.: MODES 4&S / 03 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test                   ,

data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header '547.39 574.76 520.02 Loop A Vital Header 456.63 479.46 433.80 Loop B DG 1 HX 1218 77 1279.71 '1157.83 DG 2 HX 1274.63 1338.36 1210.90 Lube Water 170.00 178.50 161.50 Cross-tie Valve 1068.76 1122.20 1015.32 Leakage Total Pump Flow 6324.03 6640.23 6007.83 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)
         =  N/A    feet (See Assumption 4.24)

Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -6.0 feet (from Attachment 21)

         =  37.1   feet
 *See Table No.      7    for Component Cooling Evaluation

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page. 3 of 10-ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES

  • OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 3 ,

HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE , PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 4&S / 06 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 5G0.99 535.49 484.49 Loop A -

Vital Header 425.15 446.41 403.89 - Loop B DG 1 HX 1145.18 1202.44 1087.92 DG 2 HX 1197.68 1257.56 1137.80 Lube Water 145.00 152.25 137.75 Cross-tie Valve 1006.71 1057.05 956.37 Leakage Total Pump Flow 7290.60 7655.13 6926.07 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)

       =  N/A    feet (See Assumption 4.24)

Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +2.0 feet (from Attachment 21)'

       =  45.1   feet
  • See Table No. 8 for Component Cooling Evaluation
                                                                               )

i o l l

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 4 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 4 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 4&S / 08 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of-the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling *- RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 495.07 519.82 470.32 Loop A Vital Header 410.18 430.69 389.67 Loop B DG 1 HX 1112.44 1168.06 1056.82 DG 2 HX 1163.44 1221.61 1105.27 Lube Water 135.00 , 141.75 128.25 L Cross-tie Valve 978.69 1027.62 929.76 Leakage Total Pump Flow 7152.30 7509.91 6794.68 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)

                          = N/A       feet (See Assumption 4.24)

Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -6.0 feet (from Attachment 21)

                          = 37.1      feet f
l. *See Table No. 9 for Component Cooling Evaluation

[ i I l w _ _ _- - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ __ _______-_ - _____-______-____-_______-____:_--_______-__- _ - .

                                                                              .) '

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 5 of- 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES

                              . OUTAGE OPERATION I

l ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 5 , HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE - File / Change No.: MODES 123 / 4 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased ' to add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0- 0 0 Vital' Header 470.90 494.44 447.35 Loop A Vital Header 391.62 411.20 372.04 Loop B DG 1 HX 1069.27 1122.73 1015.81 DG 2 HX 1118.30 1174.21 1062.38 Lube water 119.00 124.95 113.05 RHR HX Flow 2925.75 3072.04 2779.46 RHR Pump Motor 92.38 97.00 87.76 Coolers Cross-tie Valve 941.92 .989.02 894.82 Leakage Total SW Pump 7129.16 7485.62 6772.70 Flow -

RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be more than 15.5 1 1.8 psig per PM 89-051): 19.42 psig Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)

      =     13  feet Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of        -6.0   feet (from Attachment 21)
      =  37.1   feet
  • See Table No. 10 for Component Cooling Evaluation f

Calc. G0050A-10 , Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 15 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION-ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 6 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES  ! PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 4&S / C1 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS tr - Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available i Flow (gpm) 75 F 8 0,F ' 85 F 9 0,F Two Diesel 2420.12 700 gpm 700 gpm -700 gpm .700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 164.35 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm. -Ofgpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2584.47 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm l l l

                                                                                  ._ l

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 04, Rev.'S- > Page 7 of' 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION-' ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 7 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 4&5 / 03 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 8 0,F 8 5,P - 9 0,F Two Diesel 2368.73 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators ' SW Lube Water 161.50 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm '95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm. O gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2530.23 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm' e 5 F

I l

                                                                              'l Calc. G0050A-10 ,l Att. 04, Rev. 5    l Page 8- of- 10     l l

ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION f ATTACHMENT 04, TABLE 8 ' HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 4&5 / 06 i REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS t Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) -Available Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 8 0,F 8 5,F .90,F Two Diesel 2225.72 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 137.75 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2363.47 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 4 I i i

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 9. of 10 ACCIDENT S3MMARY TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 9 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 4&5 / 08-REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75,F 80,F 85 F 9 0,F Two Diesel 2162.09 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 128.25 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0-gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2290.34 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm

i Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 10 of '10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04, TABLE 10 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES

                                                                                           ^

PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 4&5 / 04 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. . Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75,F 80 F 8 5,F . 9 0,F 2 RHR Rm 655.85 <164 gpm 164 gpm 216 gpm 372 gpm Coolers  : 2 CS Rm Coolers 116.35 27.4 gpm 34 gpm 47.4 gpm 94 gpm

'4 RHR' Seal              47.21          0 gpm        0 gpm        0 gpm          0 gpm Coolers                                                                                    ,

RHR HX*- 2779.46 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm

                                                                             ~

2,500 gpm i 2 Diesel 2078.19 700 gpm 700'gpm- -700 gpm 700 gpm Generators  ! SW Lube Water 113.05 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm-2 RHR SW Pump 87.76 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm Motor Coolers  ; RBCCW (Non- 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm O gpm i Safety Load) Total 5877.87 <3,562 gpm 3,569 gpm 3,634 gpm 3,837 gpm o Required RHR HX Flow is 2500 gpm during Modes 4 and 5 (Reference 3.9)

1 l e i Calc. G0050A-10 l Att. 06, Rev. 5 l Page 1 of 10 l ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES l HURRICANE OPERATION AT.TACHMENT 06. TABLE 1 liYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 01 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 5%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling *' RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 543.16 570.32 516.00 Loop A Vital Header 453.12 475.78 430.46 Loop B DG 1 HX 1210.31 1270.83 1149.79 DG 2 HX 1265.79 1329.08 1202.50 , Lube Water 169.50 177.97 161.02 Cross-tie Valve 1061.50 1114.58 1008.42 Leakage Total Pump Flow 6281.42 6595.49 5967.35 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)

       =  12.0   feet Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -8.63           feet (from Attachment 21)
       =  32.0   feet
  • See Table No. 6 for Component Cooling Evaluation

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 2 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES HURRICANE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 2 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 03 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 543.28 570.44 516.12 Loop A Vital Header 453.22 475.88 430.56 Loop B DG 1 HX 1210.57 1271.10 1150.04 DG 2 HX 1266.06 1329.36 1202.76 Lube Water 168.50 176.92 -160.07 Cross-tie Valve 1061.72 1114.81- 1008.63 Leakage Total Pump Flow 6281.66 6595.74 5967.58 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)
      =  12.0   feet Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -8.63       feet (from Attachment 21)
      =  32.0   feet
  • See Table No. 7 for Component Cooling Evaluntion

i l l l 1 Calc. G0050A-10 ; Att. 06, Rev. 5

                     =_

Page 3 of 10 ACCIDENT SUMhaRY TABLES l HURRICANE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 3 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 06 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW O O O Vital Header 491.66 516.24 467.08 Loop A Vital Header 406.46 426.78 386.14 Loop B DG 1 HX 1103.74 1158.93 1048.55 DG 2 HX 1154.34 1212.06 1096.62 Lube Water 131.00 137.55 124.45 Cross-tie Valve 971.24 1019.80 922.68 Leakage Total Pump Flow 7115.03 7470.78 6759.28 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)
     =   19.0  feet Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -8 61_ feet (from Attachment 21)      +
     =   32.0  feet
  • See Table No. 8 for Component Cooling Evaluation l

1

9

                                                                                 \

Calc. G0050A-10 'I Att. 06, Rev. 5 j

                                                           'Page 4 of- 10       ]

l ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES l HURRICANE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE'4 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 08 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to ' the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling * , RBCCW O O O Vital Header 492.01 516.61 467.41-Loop A Vital Header 406.33 426.65 386.01 Loop B DG 1 HX 1103.45 1158.62 1048.28 DG 2 HX 1154.05 1211.75 1096.35 Lube Water 133.00 139.65 126.35 Cross-tie Valve 971.00 1019.55 922.45 Leakage Total Pump Flow 7116.32 7472.14 6760.50 l Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)

       =   19.0  feet Availab3e NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -8.63    feet (from Attachment 21)
       =   32.0 feet i
 *See Table No. 9    for Component Cooling Evaluation

4 Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 5 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES HURRICANE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06, TABLE 5 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 04 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased to add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate minimum cooling flow to the components.

 ;;omponent         Model Results          +5% for NPSH       -5% for Cooling
  • t RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 465.15 488.41 441.89 -

Loop A Vital Header 386.76 406.10 367.42 Loop B DG 1 HX 1057.98 1110.88 1005.08 DG 2 HX 1106.50 1161.82 1051.17 Lube water 115.50 121.27 109.72 RHR HX Flow 2951.07 3098.62 2803.52 RHR Pump Motor 91.07 95.62 86.52 Coolers Cross-tie Valve 932.30 978.91 885.68 Leakage Total SW Pump 7106.34 7461.66 6751.02 Flow RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be , more than 15.5 i 1.8 psig per PM 89-051): 18.58 psig  ! Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)

       =   18   feet 1

Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -8.63 feet (from Attachment 21)

       =- 32.0  feet                                                              l
*See Table No. 10   for Component Cooling Evaluation

Calc.-G0050A-10 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page -6 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES HURRICANE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TADLE .fi HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 01 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED. LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75,F 80,F 8 5,F 90,F Two Diesel 2352.29 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm-Generators SW Lube Water 161.02 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) ' Total 2513.31 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm i l i l 1 i i l

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 7 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES HURRICANE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06, TABLE 7 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 03 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available o Flow (gpm) 75,F 8 0,F 85 F 90 F Two Diesel 2352.80 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 160.07 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2512.87 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 qpm_

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 06, Rev. 5

                                                                   'Page. 8 of 10 ACCIDENT 

SUMMARY

TABLES HURRICANE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 8 ' HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 06 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 80 F 85 F 90 F Two Diesel 2145.17 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 124.45 95'gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2269.62 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm t 1 i 1 1

l Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 06, Rev. 5 i Page 9 of 10 1 l ACCIDENT'

SUMMARY

TABLES ' HURRICANE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 9 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 08 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. , Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75,F 8 0,F 8 5 ,F 9 0,F Two Diesel 2144.63 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 126.35 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm r RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) ' Total 2270.98 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm

                  +                                         w

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 10 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES HURRICANE OPLRATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 10 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES. PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: UlTYFOON / 04 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS , Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 8 0 ,F 8 5,F 90,F 2 RHR Rm 647.78 <164 gpm 164 gpm 216 gpm 372 gpm Coolers 2 CS Rm Coolers 114.91 27.4 gpm 34 gpm 47.4 gpm 94 gpm 4 RHR Seal 46.62 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Coolers RHR HX* 2803.52 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm' 2 Diesel 2056.25 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm

  • Generators SW Lube Water 109.72 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 2 RHR SW Pump 86.52 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm Motor Coolers RBCCW (Non- 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Safety Load)

Total 5865.32 <3,562 gpm 3,569 gpm 3,634 gpm 3,837 gpm ORequired RHR HX Flow is 2500 gpm during Modes 4 &5 (Reference 3.9).  ! 1 Q'- '

Calc. G0050A-10 , Att. 08, Rev. 5

                                                               ,Page 1 of 10 ACCIDENT 

SUMMARY

TABLES i FLOOD OPERATION , e ATTAC'iMENT 08, TABLE 1 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: FLDCASE / 01 - The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurata within iS%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. 1 Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 652.25 684.86 619.64 Loop A Vital Header 544.99 572.24 517.74 Loop B l DG 1 HX 1429.97 1501.47 1358.47' DG 2 HX 1495.48 1570.25 1420.71 Lube Water 202.00 212.10 191.90 Cross-tie Valve 1249.23 1311.69 1186.77 Leakage Total Pump Flow 5573.93 5852.63 5295.23 i

Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1)  ;

        =    11   feet                                                           '

r Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +22.0 feet (from Attachment 21);

        =  65.1   feet                                                           '
 *See Table No.      6    for Component Cooling Evaluation i

f. Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 2 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 2 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File /Ch.ange No.: FLDCASE / 04

                                                                                  )

1 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within iS%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. 1 Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 592.40 622.02 562.78 Loop A Vital Header 493.97 518.67 469.27 l Loop B DG l'HX 1308.93 1374.38 1243.48 DG 2 HX 1368.91 1437.36 1300.46 Lube Water 183.00 192.15 173.85 Cross-tie Valve 1146.20 1203.51 1088.89 Leakage Total Pump Flow 6785.02 7124.27 6445.77 J

i Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) l

         =    15    feet                                                           l l

Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +22.0 feet (from Attachment 21)'

         =   65.1   feet
  *See Table No.      7    for Component Cooling Evaluet. ion
                                                                                -l

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 3 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 3 > HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: 'FLDCASE / OQ_ The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within iS%. To assess adequacy of. the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling *' RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 546.24 573.55 518.93 Loop A Vital Header 451.92 474.52 429.32 Loop B DG 1 HX 1210.14 1270.65 1149.63 DG 2 HX 1265.61 1328.89 1202.33 Lube Water 168.00 176.40 159.60 Cross-tie Valve 1062.36 1115.48 1009.24 Leakage Total Pump Flow 7565.74 7944.03 7187.45 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference.3.1)

       =   27     feet Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of        +22.0 feet (from Attachment 21)
       =  65.1    feet
  • See Table No. 8 for Component Cooling Evaluation

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 4 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES FLOOD' OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 4 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: FLDCASE / 02 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased to add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 541.22 568.28 514.16 Loop A l Vital Header 433.52 455.20 411.84 Loop B DG 1 HX 1219.52 1280.50 1158.54 DG 2 HX 1275.42 1339.19 1211.65 Lube water 171.00 179.55 162.45 RHR HX Flow 9395.68 9865.46 8925.90 RHR Pump Motor 98.89 103.83 93.95 Coolers Cross-tie Valve 1078.74 1132.68 1024.80 Leakage Total SW Pump 14214.22 14924.93 13503.51 t

Flow l RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be I more than 15.5 i 1.8 psig per PM 89-051): 26.67 psig Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference'3.1)

        =    18   feet Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of                                           22.0   feet (from Attachment 21)
        =   65.1  feet
 *See Table No. 9    for Component Cooling Evaluation L                                                                                                _

l l i l l Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 08, Rev. 5 l Page 5 of 10 I i ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08, TABLE 5 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: FLDCASE / 07 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased i to add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate 1 minimum cooling flow to the components. s Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling

  • RBCCW 0 0 0 Vital Header 463.94 487.14 440.74 Loop A Vital Header 383.65 402.83 364.47 Loop B DG 1 HX 1056.99 1109.84 1004.14 DG 2 HX 1105.46 1160.73' 1050.19 Lube water 116.00 121.80 110.20' RHR HX Flow 4111.97 4317.57 3906.37 RHR Pump Motor 90.60 95.13 86.07 Coolers Cross-tie Valve 932.65 979.28 886.02 Leakage Total SW Pump 8261.25 8674.31 7848.19 Flow RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be more than 15.5 i 1.8 psig per PM 89-051) : 18.02 psig Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) l
       =   38    feet Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of         +22.0 feet (from Attachment 21)
       =  65.1   feet                                                           '
  • See Table No. 10 for Component Cooling Evaluation

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 6 'of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 6 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS'- FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: FLDCASE / 01 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75,F 8 0 ,F 8 5,F o 90 F _ Two Diesel 2779.18 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators - SW Lube Water 191.90 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0.gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2971.08 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 1 L' i

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 7 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 7 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE . File / Change No.: FLDCASE / 04 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Rcquired Flow Versus SW Temp.. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75,F 8 0,F 8 5,F 9 0,F Two Diesel 2543.94 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 173.85 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm -O gpm (Nonsafety Load) , Total 2717.79 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm l 1 l l l I

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 8 of 10 ACCIDENT

SUMMARY

TABLES FIDOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 8 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: FLDCASE / 06 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS l Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available ( Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 80,F 8 5,F 9 0,F i l Two Diesel 2351.96 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm l Generators i SW Lube Water 159.60 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2511.56 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm i ,

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          .1 l

2

                 ,              .    ~,   --       .-    . .-         ._   ..                . . - . - -       . . .-
                                                                                                                      .l Calc. G0050A-10' Att. 08, Rev. 5                     i
                                                                                    'Page 9 ~of 10 ACCIDENT 

SUMMARY

TABLES FLOOD OD5'n.tTIQ ._ ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 9-HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES l PIPEDATA/KYPIPE 'I File / Change No.: FLDCASE / 02 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS

                                                                                                                   -6 Required Flow Versus SW Temp.

Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 8 0 ,F 8 5 ,F. 90,F 2 RHR Rm 741.03 <164 gpm 164.gpm 216 gpm. 372 gpm Coolers-2 CS Rm Coolers 131.67 27.4 gpm 34 gpm 47.4 gpm- 94 gpm 4 RHR Seal 53.33 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm , 0- gpm - Coolers RHR HX* 8925.90 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm 2 Diesel 2370.19 700 gpm 700 gpm 700'gpm. -700.gpm-  : Generators SW Lube Water -162.45 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95'gpm

   .2 RHRiSW Pump               93.95           .76 gpm        76 gpm          76;gpm              76~gpm Motor Coolers RBCCW (Non-                   0'              0 gpm         0 gpm.           O gpm                 0 gpm Safety Load)

Total 12478.52- <3,562'gpm 3,569 gpm 3,634 gpm. 3,837 gpm'

  ?* Required ~RHR HX Flow is 4500 gpm during Modes 1 through 3 (Reference 3.'15i)
                                                                                     'I Calc. G0050A-10    l Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 10 of 10 ACCIDENT 

SUMMARY

TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 10 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.* FLDCASE / 07 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Availabl'e Flow (gpm) 75 F 8 0,F 85'F 90,F 2 RHR Rm 644.48 <164 gpm 164 gpm 216 gpm 372 gpm Coolers 2 CS Rm Coolers 114.36 27.4 gpm 34 gpm '47.4 gpm 94 gpm 4 RHR Seal 46.37 0 gpm 0 gpm O.gpm 0 gpm Coolers RHR HX* 3906.37 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2 Diesel 2054.33 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube. Water 110.20 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 2 RHR SW Pump 86.07 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm Motor Coolers RBCCW.(Non- 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Safety Imad) Total 6962.18 <3,562 gpm 3,569 gym 3,634 gpm 3,837 gpm

  • Required RHR HX Flow is 2500 gpm during Modes 4 and 5 (Reference 3.9)

L _

m Calo.'G0050A-10 Att. 21, Rev.-0 Page 1 of- 2 NPSHA CALCULATION 8 i PURPOSE The purpose of this attachment to Calculation G0050A-10 is to determine the NPSH available at the SW Pumps' intakes for various . pump bay water levels.  ! CALCULATION NPSHA will be calculated for the following bay levels:

      - 8.63  feet
      - 6.00  feet
      + 2.00  feet
      +22.00  feet The above elevations are referenced to Hean Sea Level.

From Reference 3.25, ' NPSHA = H + Hg - H, - Hy A where H4 = Atmospheric Pressure Head Hg= Static Head above impeller center line H, = Vapor Pressure Hr = Friction Loss ' From Reference 3.1 (p. 4), impeller center line = -11.76 feet , MSL.

  • From Reference 3.17 and Assumption 4.7, H,= 1.6 feet MSL. -

From Reference 3.27 (Section 2.4.5.1), the worst-case barometric pressure is during a hurricane and is 26.86 in..Hg or.26.86 x 1.135'= 30.5 feet HO. g For normal. atmospheric conditions, H 4 = 32.9 feet H r 0 based on: HA " f14*7} I144 (62.4) (1.03) Since velocity approximately equals O fps, Hr = 0 m

                                                                           ~_

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 21, Rev. O Page .2 of' 2 NP8HA CALCULATIONS For -8.63 feet: Use H4 = 30.5 feet since -8.63 feet corresponds to a hurricane condition. H 37 =.(-8.63) (-11.76)

                  = 3.13 feet and NPSHA = 30.5 + 3.13 - 1.6.- 0                                          .
                       = 32.0 feet                                              i For -6~.00 feet:

Hsr = (-6.0) - (-11.76)

                 = 5.76 feet                                                       -

and - NPSHA = 32.9 + 5.76 - 1.6 - 0 .i

                       = 37.1 feet For +2.00 feet:                                                             t Hs7  ' =
                    = (+2.0)'- (-11.76)                                           '

13.76 feet and ' i NPSHA = 32.9 + 13.76 - 1.6 - 0 [

                       = 45.1 feet For +22.00 feet:

Hsy = . (+2 2. 0 0) - - (-11. 7 6)

                 = 33.76-feet and                                                                       'l NPSHA = 32.9 + 33'.76 - 1.6 - 0                                      '
                       = 65.1 feet                                                 i
                                                                                 .i
                                                                              .l l

r  ; [ I

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 22, Rev. O Page 1 of 3 CROSS-HEADER LEAKAGE EVALUATION Purpose The purpose of this attachment is to quantify the cross-header leakage flow rate assumption used in the BSEP Units 1 and 2 SW System computer models. l The leakage rate quantities identified in this attachment will define the leakage rates for which the SW Systems are able to maintain full design capability. Leakage rates above those identified in this attachment will prevent the SW Systems from meeting all design functional requirements. Summary of Results The Units 1 and 2 SW Systems can meet all design functional requirements assuming the leakage rates identified in this attachment are not exceeded. Calculation In the computer models, cross-header leakage is modeled as a 20" line with an equivalent "K" factor which represents i resistance to leakage flow. The "K" factors originally I selected for'the models were based on Unit-specific leakage i test data collected during special test procedures performed I for this purpose. Based on the test data, the Unit 2 leakage was calculated to be approximately twice that of Unit 1. Preliminary analyses indicated the U2 SW System would not meet all its design requirements under the worst-case accident scenarios with the leakage rates determined from the test data. Accordingly, a more restricted cross-header leakage rate was assumed for the final U2 analyses. Unit 1 analyses had shown full SW System design capability could be maintained with leakage rates equal to those determined from U1 test data. Therefore the U1 leakage rate assumption was used as the leakage assumption for U2 as well. Following is a discussion of the specific leakage criteria used for the U1 and U2 SW System computer models.

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 22, Rev. O Page 2 of 3 CROSS-HEADER LEAKAGE EVALUATION The formula used to calculate an equivalent "K" factor for input into the models is: K= (387) (2.31) (AP) (ID)* Q (Note: This formula can be derived from formulas in Crane technical Paper No. 410) All leakage from the system was assumed to be flowing through one 20" line for the purpose of representing leakage in the models. Therefore, the assumed ID is 18.63" (20" cement-lined pipe). The U1 data collected by Special Procedure No. 1-SP-89-024 supported a calculated equivalent "K" factor of 4800. Using the above formula and this "K" value, leakage flow rates for specific NSW Header to CSW Header AP's can be determined. These calculated flow rates then represent the leakage flows above which the SW Systems cannot be assumed to meet their full design requirements. (Note: These leakage rates are most representative of actual system leakage at higher header AP's since the 4800 "K" factor is a limiting value as header A('s increase. At lower header AP's, the calculated "K" factor based on test data is less than 4800. Therefore, the actual system leakage will be greater than predicted. This is a conservative treatment of leakage at low header AP's.) l 1 l i [

Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 22, Rev. O Page~ 3 of 3 CROBB-HEADER LEAKAGE EVALUATION Specific leakage flows and header AP's are given below: Header AP (nsid) Leakaae Flow (anm) 5 335 10 474 15 580 20 670 25 749 30 820 35 886 40 947 45 1005 50 1059 Conclusion In order to maintain full SW System design capability, SW System cross-header leakage limits, as defined by the calculated values above, must not be exceeded. L

i Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 23, Rev. O Page 1 of 2 l CSW PUMP LONG-TERM COOLING CAPABILITY PurDose The purpose of this attachment is to verify a CSW pump can supply required cooling flows to safety-related components after the first 10 minutes of a DBE. Summary of Results One CSW pump can supply RHRSW and Vital header cooling after the first 10 minutes of a DBE. References

1. Calculation G0050A-14, Rev. 1, "BSEP U1 and U2 Service Water Systems Cross-Leakage Evaluations"
2. Calculation PCN-G0050A-11, Rev. O, "RHR Service Water Flow During Cold Shutdown"
3. Acceptance Test Results for Procedure 1-PT-24.6.4, Rev. 1, " Unit 1 SW System Hydraulic Performance Test" Assumptions
1. A SW pump flow rate of 7000 gpm results in sufficient suction pressure in the RHRSW pump suction header under all system conditions.
2. Chlorination and CW pump bearing water flows can be isolated by operator action after the first 10 minutes of a DBE.
3. Vital header flow is approximately 1000 gpm at these system pressures and SW pump flows.
4. Leakage from the CSW header is 1000 gpm at a header pressure of 40 psig.

Calculation During the long-term cooling phase following a DBE with the i unit in Mode 1, 2, or 3, a second SW pump must be placed in operation. If the second SW pump is a CSW pump and either the Vital header or RHRSW is isolated from the NSW header, l 1

l l Calc. G0050A-10 Att. 23, Rev. O Page 2 of 2 CSW PUMP LONG-TERM COOLING CAPABILITY then all safety-related cooling other than the DG's must be supplied by the CSW header and CSW pump. This is necessary due to the high flow rates on the NSW header due to the nonsafety-related RBCCW flow. Previous revisions to Calculations G0050A-10 & -12 have assumed a CSW pump is capable of providing this cooling based on similarity to the NSW pumps and the NSW header. The limiting parameter in the long-term cooling phase is'the RHRSW pump suction pressure. As discussed in the body of Calculations G0050A-10 & -12, a minimum of 18.0 psig must be maintained or the RHRSW pumps will trip. The_conputer simulations in G0050A-10 & -12 show an 18.0 psig RHRSW pump suction pressure can be maintained as long as SW pump flow remains below 7000-7200 gpm (the specific value in this range depends on system configuration). At SW pump flows of 7000-7200 gpm, minimum SW header pressure is approximately 41 psig. After the first 10 minutes of a DBE, operator action can be taken to isolate nonsafety-related flow paths on.the CSW header. Accordingly, the only flow paths which must be supplied by the CSW pump after 10 minutes are RHRSW, the Vital header, and possibly SW pump lube water. In addition, the maximum anticipated leakage from the CSW header must be included as a flow path. If all these flow paths add up to a total CSW pump flow rate of 7000 gpm or- less, then the CSW pump and header are capable of adequate long-term cooling. The minimum required RHRSW cooling to shut down the unit from Mode 1, 2, or 3 is 4500 gpm (Ref. 2). The total Vital header cooling flow rate at a SW header pressure of 41 psig is less than 1000 gpm (from analyses in_ Calculation G0050A-10 &'-12). The maximum CSW header leakage calculated in Reference 1 for a SW header pressure of 40 psig is 1000 gpm. Lube water flow will be no more than 200 gpm. Adding these flows gives: 1 4500 + 1000 + 1000 + 200 = 6700 gpm Since this value is less than 7000 gpm, the capability of the CSW pump and header to supply required long-term cooling ) is assured.

Sa' Qoo6%A -1O RRR Pu r e ha Eamma Ar 25,$v.O ATTACHMENT 26 RHR PLHP SEAL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS The RER pump seal coolers are Sorg-Warner heat exchangers for mechanical seal cooling. Reviews of recent flow testing perfor=ed by SP-89-021, Nuclear SW System Flow Tests, indicated that service water flovrates through the seal coolers were_less than design values. The design flowrate is 15 gpm per-cooler. A review of design inter =ation by General Electric (see attached) indicates that the seal coolers perform a saf ety-related mechanical function. This function is to maintain service water and RHR system pressure boundaries; pressure integrity failures can cause a spray that =ay damage other vital equipment. However, the function of the seal cooler is not required during accident modes of RER operation (LPCI, Contain=ent Cooling, Suppression Pool Cooling). The RHR system fluid temperature coes not exceea the design temperature limits of the pump eecnanical seal. Thererore, the reduced flows enrougn the RHR Pump Seal Coolers recorded in SP-89-021 do not degrade Nuclear Safety.

4 4 p Grnbirwr 25  ? go. m -so o >=re A, 25, w.o mz4 77, SAFETT-RELATED CIASSIFIC471051strry catcELtst . r u.se,: Aoo-o m o-

                                                              ?05b rart n.s.r: D'X 6 6 2 5 '- P pu ?

AhW: (as .,,11emble) 70(.Db -229 esMskge 4m it.. n..: _ OOO/ (aa applicable - Part

Description:

5MI [Ibd7/bEk _ Plane code: _Nbb (CE use only) Functional Classification of Part(Q/N/8): _ MPL Application: /??/4 af/d per /e/ew _ r (parent equipesnt ID) E// - d o 0 2 e3 C. Amex fB/r9 b&

  • f Basis for Classification of Part:

FUNCTION _ DIRECTLY PERIORMS SATETY RELA _ I StDOfARY AND ofHteflft10tt , lated on the research filed in the referenced DRT _ for the identified part have been given Safety.Ralated, the applications show classifications. 1 I have that: reviewed all of the applications identified abov't and h ave deterstned-  :! k All reviewof Page the 3applicatione

2) listed above are Safety.R d ated (see application D

None of the applications listed above are Safety Related (t es Page 3 7). O *5ome follows: of the applications listed above are Safety Rel . (see application review page 8 2). - ated and are listed ae -;. f Part re.identificati j is required (see EOF 55 10,00, Interchangeability) Forformer:- Y )!&>74 v Date: M' I have that verified reviewed the this safety Related Classification Review Ch

                                                                                                     .ecklist and have
                                                                                                                          ~

l for the liste fety Related classification assigned above is appropriate Verifier: a Ltcat bens based on the information contained . t 7AL / Manager: Date: - 4 2 ., Date: 4 - ( 7-- N #'

  • If.this' devise is used cations, a separate checklist is required for eneh applicationmulti .
                                                            /)frR e meer 25                                   G*-' o h                                                      g Ar 25,Ru.o- [ k.-       '

l f.3op-b i

                                 $AFETT.RE!ATED CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CXICE1.187 (continued).

DRF Essber 1A00-02710- 0Fb Part Number: _ b['"' ((k (The land Systes Engineer (LSE) signature is only required if the iten being reviewed is a systen MPL ites.) I have reviewed this safety.Related Classifteetion Review cheek 11st'and. concur with the safery Related classificacion assigned. Systen LSE ' ' Date-Amelication Review 7

1. a. Is the part applied in a system er component classified as ,

nonsafety related.in accordance with this procedure? , '

     ,                     Yes              .- Ce to 7 No _ X            . Ce to 1.b                                                                  -
b. Does the part have an application in at least one system or aamponent aseting the criteria of paragraph 2.7.1 of E0F 65-2.10.

Yes -X . List components and/or systems in 2. and se to 3. No . Co to 7. . '

2. Applicable' component or system (required to be completed): '

Part Number or Model Number / X' X' _ i GNITIFUG#L 90hifS De aription i i Part Number er N.d.1 Number Description _ l Part Number er Model. Number Description i

                                        ,      w        ,.    - - -
                                                                                 -+4                     e--+      n          ,                4 --
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                  .  .                                      =

Ogmas*I 25 O"S** '

                                                          $                                 W Ac 75j 1hv.O+f.

i 9 4 con (o -- SAFETT.M1ATED CIASS!p! CATION REVIET CNBCELIST (eentinued) DRF 38 umber: . A00-02710- b , X -- o 6 2 Part 3hamber: 3.

                                                                           -FW[                         -
                                                                                                                                  ]

Mechanical Review: i Zaa Ea s. Is the part function relied upon ta saintain the reaccer coolant primary pressure boundary integrityt , b. Is the part required for the system to accomplish s' Safety-Relatec function?- ,

c. i Vould mechanical- or structural failure er malfunction of tho' part
       .                                          have the potential. co prevent or inhibit the operation of a safety                 '

Raltted function of its system er seepenentt* *

                       ,,,,,,,               d.
         -                                        Is- the part relied upon to maintain the containment boundary integrity?                                                                          ,

Basis for Response: _ 8//IMI [MIMI8 CAM OMN i (required to be completed).  !

                                                              . S'&'k Y TA/$7' A/AY                   -]8A//lCo?                 'i
                                                          $7//A2 R&'//A+1EA/i' ,lA/B Rsr DF Cocum=, hvA~rEA :^rO                                                       i
                                                                                                                                    .i Notes:                            RA DwASTE
                                                                                                                                 'I I

If any of the Questions a through d are answered *yes", go te! 4. -4 If Questions a through d are gh answered *ne*, go ts.4.f i I If answered yes, provide espy of eempleted checklist /evaluaties fers to Licensing and Censulting Programa.

l

                                                                                                                            ,l k00524 4o Q                .~ 2 5                 Ar 26 v g.$GV.O a

SAFETT.RELAft3 CLASS 17! CATION REV1RW C38CELTST (eentinued) b~- DAF W A00-02710 - I rare u a, #x -06 25 ~ Pcu - l 1 7. Does the part (including its redundant eeunterparts) provide a5y i Safety.Related functions either. directly by the function it performs er indirectly dua' to interfaces with safety Related systems? ' Yes . Ce to 3.

                                  .No              .

Classify nonsafety-related, attach explanation, if warranted. Ce to 11.

8. Declare the part Safety.Related, state the criterion fros attachamplifiedexplanation,ifwarranted,andseto9.h4,3,.6.er~7 .

Mechanical

9.  ;

Can the part be provided by CE as Safety.Related under current part - i

             .                     identity?

Ye s ,, ,n ,,, 8 top. No . I Go to 10,

10. ' '

Does the part weet the requirements for 'Ceamarcial.Crade* in 10CFR217 l (Refer to EOF 65 2.20) ' Yes Functionally classify Q. Part reidentifiestion'will be , required, Ne . Further investigation is indicated. Exit clatalfication  ; i process. ,

11. Does the part funettenally classified N have any special regulatory functions or requirements?  ;

Yes . Attach list of special' requirements, classify 8. Step. No. . Classify B. Step. ' 1 SD.045 (9/30/88) Page 5 7 (sheet 7 of 8 (04580627.8DF) L_. :

                                  .      _             .                      _ . . _ _ .                ..              ~ _ . . _ _ .        __          _ _ _ . _ . -           .,

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                                                                                                                                                                              /       !

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                                                                                                                                                      ? l. oeb& . O SAFSTT.REIATED C1ASSIFICAT20R RETIEW CERCE2.2ET. (continued) '

7

                           .DEF Number                    A00-02710--                                       :s Part Number:                    NY Nb d
  • b[,d./ ,

APPLICARLE REVIEW DOCUMENTS ~

                            '(List only these desuments.actually used in the review, including revision of documents and'eutstanding ECNs and FDDRs)
1. FURCHASE DOCUMENTATION: i FURCHASE FAAT DRAVINC REV. l ASSIMSLY DRAVINC 32V.

IELECTED ITEM DRAVINC REY.

                                                                                                                                                                        '~

FURCHASE SPECIFICATION _ REV. e-VENDOR PRINT FILE (VPF)

                                   -DRAVINC f1                                      .

2-776 2-

                                                                                                                                                                                     ~
                                    ,m3 u,T                                                                                                        m.

MATERIAL LIST REY.

2. MASTER FARTS LIST (MPL) __
3. F1 PING AND INSTRUNIN. ,

TATION DIACRAM _ _ _ _

                                                                                                                                                 - REY.                              l
4. INSDtVKINT AND ELACTRICAL DIACRAN REV.
5. ELEMENTARY DIACRAM . REV. {
6. FUNCTIONAL CONTROL DRAU190 REV.

t =====.- m. - ., DIAGRAN

                             ..      .T m (u ,7 Doc. m .>                                                                                          ..                    -

q

                                                                                                                                                  -REY.                    .

H4NJAQOfJ & 2-07 13 m. 1

                              . . . . . . . . . - . . . .                                                                                ..... ... , , ,.. . . e r -                 .

v_E k_______________________________ m -,- - .i

ham \\/ATER Luns NATe.R bW WRE Ib

                                                                       $cc5b4 -l O
                                                                      /g;r . 26 Mw.O ATTACIMENT 2(o                  TI F$

SERVICE WATER LUBE WATER Service Water Lube Water Flev Distribution adequacy has been considered. Flow rates from the SW Nuclear Header were recorded during the implementation of special procedure SP-89-021, Nuclear SW System Flow Tests, on April 26, 1989. During high system flow conditions Lube Water flowrate was reduced to ' 119'gpm, this flowrate was assessed at approximately rated flow for a SW pump. The SW Lube Water is branch-supplied to each SW Pump from a single header. Each branch supply is routed through a cyclone separator (

Reference:

Design Drawing, 0-FP-82596). The cyclone separator is designed to provide a 20 gpm capacity, based on 40 psig pressure drop across the separator. A supply pressure greater than 40 psig to the cyclone separator can be ensured, even at lowest SW header pressure, i.e., 35 paig (calculated worst-case), with assistance from the Lube Water Pumps. These pumps are safety-related and powered from separate divisions. Rated flow for one Lube Water Pump is 150 gpm @ 175 TDH. Single pump operation can adequately. maintain cooling supply to each SW pump assembly. ThefollowinganakysisassumesasingleLubeWaterpumpisoperating,a calculated vorst-case Nuclear Service Water header pressure of 35 psig (including cross-tie Leakage between the Nuclear and Conventional headers), and a Lube Water system supply flovrace of approximately 95 gpm (a realistic value, based upon flow test data from 2-SP-89-021):

1. Nuclear SW header pressure is 35 psig.
2. For a Lube Water System flovrate of 95 gpm. The tube Water Pump performance curve indicates a head (TDH) of 205 feet:

(fter. Sb-43) 205 feet = 92 PSIC 2.24 feet /PSIG Thus, the total discharge pressure of the Lube Water pump will Le%psig + 35 psig, or 127 psig.

3. Static losses (elevation differences) = 10 psig  ;

i 4 Friction losses are negligible. l

5. From (2) and (3), above, the inlet pressure to the cyclone separator is 127 psig - 10 psig = 117 psig.
6. Maximum cyclone separator pressure loss is 40 psid.

I

G.ccW-I o Ar 24,%o

                                                                                                                                                             ,_ .a                                             W 2 - s-
7. From (5) and (6), above, the cyclone separator outlet pressure is 117 psig - 40 psig = 77 psig.

Conclusion:

Since the require supply pressure range for pump flushing is 65 to 75 psig, 77 psig is acceptable. As the cyclone separator is rated for a 20 gpm overflow to pump and pump motor cooling loads, the required flowrates vill be assessed: The SW Pump Motor upper thrust bearing cooler requires 2 gpm cooling water flow at 95 degrees F (maximum SW inlet temperature). The original thrust bearing rated capacity (continuous downthrust) was 8100 pounds. ~ D e thrust bearing capacity has been revised upwards to 13,000 + pounds., and accepted by the General Electric Company. GE has accepted.the increase in bearing load as long as the 2 gpm Lube Water supply is continuously maintained. The higher bearing thrust loads occur r.t minimum flow conditions, i.e., 2200 gpm. SW header pressures are high l during reduced-flow system operation, and adequate Lube Water Flowrates. are, therefore, assured. During rated flow conditions with'the.SW header, system pressure is relatively low. Although the flowrate to the Lube Water system is.reduer. at low header pressures, (as documented in Special Procedure 2-SP-89-041), adequate flow-(2 spa) is provided to the TV Pump Motor Cooler. This is because motor thrust bearing loads'are decreased towards 8100 pounds (original design rating) at higher flows. This value is well below the low SW system flow condition thrust value of 13,000 + pounds. The design drawing for the pump (0-FP-81518) indicates that Lube water is supplied f or et;s tube nut and column bearings. The required pump flushing is 15 gpm, maximum, and 8 gpm, minimum. l

   'The required pump flushing supply pressure is 65 psig, minimum, and 75 psig, maximum.

The overall required flow for SW pump motor cooling and the pump tube nut and column bearings is a maximum of 17 gpm (2 to the motor bearings plus 15 for flushing). The cyclone separator is rated for 20 gpm overflow supply, which will meet these requirements. 1 i 1 l

                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ~" "

6Cc5bA-10 ' j Aruuu. 26 AT2QThrJD

                                                                   -- p? soe ct        \

RECEIVED ~ NEEO-%.. t yee ENGINEERING SERVICSS i Plant Equipment and Cesign l } ggg April 22, 1988 ~ To: Wanda Yae __ Ard Q FROM: M.E. Nussbaum

SUBJECT:

Service water Pump Motor cooling vetor modification. .

REFERENCE:

(1) L4tter: S.7. 3tidham (CP&L) to W. Yee. received 4/13/88. The purpose sur analysia  : :naOf this lattar 12 *o rsport the conclusions.of

                                                 .                                    i
squentud enangaa I: tne BrunswicX Servica Water pump =oter (Modal No. SX6226XC279A) cooling water flow su ~

outlined in reference (1). The analysis and calculations-are included in DRF E00-00170. This latter completes the requirements of WA XS32050230, Change.Crder No. 2. The information requested included the following: .

                 -" Perform analysis of acceptability of using' water from            ,

the discharge of the Servica' Water- pumps for cooling the pumps=otor bearing oil. This analysis shall include the following considerationes , s

a. Maximum temperature of the cooling water will he 105F.
b. Cooling water' flew shall be non-continuous: e.g.,

no cooling vatar will flow when:the associated pump is not running, allowing a. draining of cooling water piping. ,

c. . .

All pump operation scenarios snould be considered, such as restart of a recently de-energized pump.. Furthermore, to ensure this study conservatively. envalopes worst. operating conditions, the following input dr.ta shall be caed: Maximum motor stator running tamperatura:266F Maximum ambient tamperature: 104F Maximum down-thrusti 15,363 lbs.a' , (at the bearing).

                                                                   \

Mrr7kW n ecce4-oe

 ' -   ~

Av 26 ,Rht.o i 7? 4 c,.s The analysis was-performed with all of the above considerations maximum. and conditions estse-thrust requirement. employed with the. exception of the .j Review showed that this vmLue.- - exceedthe.neser out.on > ths>specified ostlineend-of-shaft drawing. down-thrust of~8100 1he called. The spectried loan at the bearing la obtained by adding.the rotor weight to the end-of-shaft load (1075 1he + sloo 1bs - 9175 lbs). Further-investigation showed that the 15,363 1he down-thrust also : exceeds - the at a rated. capacity. of of bath temperature the motor upper thrust bearing (13,300 lbs) 120F.  ! This analysis was therefore based on that the bearing is not overloaded. lbs at the bearing ' to ansure a maximum down-thrust of 13,300 , The method combination of analysis employed for this study was of analyzing a similar type, - existing cent data cor a meter et ' this test data and input data outlined above.and performing theoracical calculai obtained frca the test data included: The information i

                      -An antimata of-the ecoling coil overall. heat transfar coefficient, 1

(UA)cc. j

                      -An estinata of the upper motor housing overall heat transfer coefficient, (UA)es.                                                                ;

The critical parameter in this study-is the oil bath temperature. Bearing performance is a complex function er t.his temperature, so by solving for it, the effect of changing other parameters can be evaluated. Major factors affecting oil'hath temocrature in this attum*4an inetud., 1) ambi.ns 3.mp.r suse, 23  : cooling of the oil. water inlet-temperature, 3) heet transferred into and out This analysle - rocused on formulating A . aocel. of the upper motor housing that included these factors. Calculations. wore performed to determine the heat input into the bearing oil from the journal guide bearing. These calculations were based on standard equations and utilized the bearing geometry from this actor. Input, which included rated ~ load and heat losses'from the thrust bearing, was obtained from the bearing manufacturer for the described operating conditions  : at a range of oil bath temperatures. A note'.of caution concerning , operating the thrust bearing at the requested rated 1 cad of ' 15,363 1he was also included. of a two heat inputs vers inccrporated into the formulatien for the upper motor housing. This model included heat losses into the oil from the bearings, heat lesses from the eil to'the surroundings, and heat extracted.by the cooling ^ water.. The formulation was then solved for the oil bath tamperature as a function of the ambient temperature, cooling water-inlet temperaturs,. thrust load- and specific bearing geosecry. The - various input data was entered and an iterative tecanique was employed to determine the oil bath temperature at th,e appropriate operating-conditions.

                                                =rw,.      ,,      w                              e-~ y       -

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                                                                        @ S w 5~

conditione outlined'above,The arer conclus' ions s, based reached on the from th

1) 1 cirouastances with a"non-continuous a y of cooling vatar (e.g.,ino cooling water will fl ow when the associated ' pump is not -running) maximum inlet temperature of.105F, ,ea and a'. maximum ~

dcWR-thrust-is 9175 lbs-(down-thrust ta veight), rotor mum drawing. as specified on the actor outline'.

                '2)                                                                                         ?

Wat.theall motor should'ba-able to s under circumstances with a nonafely. operate supply of cooling water-(e.g., continuous no v111 flow when the associated pumpccoling water - 2 caximum inlet temperature of 10$F,-is not running;, sabient down-thrusttamperature of 104F,'and.a maximuma maximum veight) of 13 300 lbs - based on r,ated bearing 1oad, in aa!far(dow as the motor bearing cooling re;quirements are concerned. All motor-indications should be monitored and alaras closely to ensure thater oth motor parameters, not' addressed here, do not exceed specified values. - 3) If' increase required or maximum load to 15 363 , s is lb further a,nalysis performed utilizings this te t data load. to evaluate the bearing at:the-higher conclusions reacned,If there are any questions concerning thi please emel-cree-to call. s analysis or tho' l Perfor=ed by: 54 Marx 2. Musseaum,1 Engineer NNN Heat Exchanger & Pump Design , verified by: 2

                   // **binson, Engineer            d/21L/ff West Exchanger & Pump Design                                                           R concurred
                    ,s.

Mokri, Tecnnical ImedeTr - Heat Exchanger &' Pump Design f

f cAtc Goo 5o A Att. 27 , Rev 5 PP I of 3 DISCIPLINE DESIGN VERIFICATION RECORD Page 1

1. Ittstructions to Verification Personnel Plant 3 f$ b DQ Q (Class A)

Project 60050L Q [ 3 Seismic (Class B) File No. 34 ooscn - be - AsA 3 tevel () FP-Q (Class D) Document No. C70 05 O A - 3 D #ev 6 [ ] Other Design verification should be done in accordance with ANSI N45.2.11, Section 6, as amended by Regulatory cuide 1.64, Rev. 2. Special Instructions:

                                                                           '    In                 ? n
 ~

i Yl+ . (%/ F , / Discipline Project Engineer / / /// / U f Y /l M / r v II. Verification Documentation Applicability Discipline Discipline Mechanical M Civil structural [] HVAC [] Seismic Equip. Qual. IJ Electrical !3 Civil Stress [] I&C [] Fire Protection [] Environmental Qualification [] Htsnan f actors [] Materials [] l3 Other [} Verification Methods Used: A q Design I!eview [ ] Alternate Calculations [ } Qualification Testing est e - Date __ /D!9 2 l/ U ~

                         !     !                                                   Date      b lL/               /       "

III. Resonutimi of cements:

                                            ):

Corments (RE) I. Res lved (See AttacipMd 4 NAW# Date 7-bob Action taken makes si'gn Doc . A eptable: Desigrr'/erifier #mA Date 5/[f2_. (DP ' Date N/ h g

                        ,/

Proc. 3.3 Rev. 38 i a

(-'. Calc . G00SoA-l0 Att. 29 , Cev 6 PP 2 =f 3 Page 2 DISCIPLINE DESICN VERIFICATION RECDRD COMMENT SHEET Pttnt bY

     . Project                          h O O TO C -

File Nc. WOO TO b ' DG ' A S'43 Doctsnent no. (DOSOA* /O nev (

     '.This sheet is only recuired when comments are being rade.

,g Cocrnent Resolved No. Cocrnent Resolution Initial /Date

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k . tipt ko COMA (Mr {.~ b . ~

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