ML20046A329

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Analysis for Bsep,Units 1 & 2 SWS for Analysis for TS 3.7.1.2 Proposed Change.
ML20046A329
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1992
From: Prater G
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20046A307 List:
References
OSW-0048, OSW-0048-R00, OSW-48, OSW-48-R, NUDOCS 9307270247
Download: ML20046A329 (57)


Text

_. _ _

ATTACHMENT 2  !

BSEP 93-0112 l BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 '

NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST l

ANALYSIS FOR TECH SPEC 3.7.

1.2 PROPOSED CHANGE

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LUNCON~~ROiLEJ CO?Y FOR lNFO: ONLY j CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY P. O. BOX 1551 RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA' 27602- '

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ANALYSIS

,OR. FOR F0MTON ONLY

.BJIP Units 1 Pad 2 Service Water Systes '

I FOR ANALYSIS FOR TECH SPEC 3.7.

1.2 PROPOSED CHANGE

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% ANALYSIS I.D. OsW-0048 SAFETY CLASSIFICATION: ( o )-

SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION: ( 'I' ') _!

APPROVAL REV. NO. PREPARED BY/ VERIFIED BY/' PRIN. OR RES. .. ENG . / -

PROJECT' .

DATE DATE

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l REASON--

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REASON FOR- l CHANGE l

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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Pace No. Revision 1'(Title Page) 0 2 (List of Eff. Pages) 0 3 (List of Eff. Pages) 0 4 (Table of Contents) 0 5 (Table of Contents) 0 6 (Table of Contents) 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 10 0 11 0 12 0-13 0 14 0 15 0 16 0 17 0 18 0 s 19 0 20 0 21 0 22 0 23 0-24 0 25 0 26 0 27 0 28 0

?. 9 0 30 -0 31 0 32 0 33 0 34 0 35 0 36 0 37 -0 38 0 39 0 40 0 41 0 42 0 43 O_

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Calc. OSW-0048 Page 3.

Rev. O LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (cont'd.)

Pace No. Revision Att. 1 (10 pages) 0 Att. 2 (23-pages) 0 Att. 3 (28 pages) 0 Att. 4 (27 pages) 0 Att. 5 (22 pages) 0 Att. 6 (28 pages) 0 Att. 7 (29 pages) O Att. 8 (19 pages) 0 Att. 9 (26 pages) 0-Att. 10 (27 pages) 0 Att. 11 (19 pages) 0 Att. 12 (26 pages) 0 Att. 13 (20 pages) 0 Att. 14 (28 pages) 0 Att. 1F (28 pages) 0 Att. 1. (21 pages) O s Att. 17 (28 pages) 0 Att. 18 (18 pages) 0 Att. 19 (20 pages) 0 Att. 20 (20 pages) 0 Att. 21 (18 pages) 0 Att. 22 (20 pages) C ,

Att. :23 (20 pages) 0 Att. 24 (18 pages) 0 Att. 25 (20 pages) 0 Att. 26_(20 pages) 0 Att. 27 (18 pages) 0 Att. 28 (20 pages) 0 Att. 29 (18 pages) 0 Att. 30 (20 pages) 0-Att. 31 (20 pages) 0 Att. 32 (18 pages) 0 >

Att. 33 (20 pages) 0 Att. 34 ( 2 pages) O i

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Calc. OSW-0048 Page 4 Rev. O TABLE OF CONTENTS Seption Title Page Title Page 1 List of Effective Pages 2 Table of Contents 4 1.0 Purpose 7 2.0 Summary of Results 9 3.0 References 10 4.0 Assumptions 13 5.0 Computer Model Validation 20 6.0 Calculations 22 s

6.1 Event Unit 23 6.2 Non-Event Unit 32 7.0 Conclusions 46 (DSW 0048.WP)

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Calc. OSW-0048 Page 5 Rev. O.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd.)

Section Title Page  ;

Att. 1 Proposed Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 Event Scenarios -

Att. 2 Accident Analysis Results - U1123EU2 -

Att. 3 Accident Analysis Results - U145EU6 -

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Att. 4 Accident Analysis Results - U145EU22 -

Att. 5 Accident Analysis Results - U2123EU2 -

Att. 6 Accident Analysis Results - U245EU6 -

Att. 7 Accident Analysis Results - U245EU22 -

Att. 8 Accident Analysis Results - U1123NE2 -

Att. 9 Accident Analysis Results - U145NE2 -

s Att. 10 Accident Analysis Results - U145NE14. -

Att. 11 Accident Analysis Results - U1123NE6 -

Att. 12 Accident Analysis Results - U145NE6 -

Att. 13 Accident Analysis Re ults - U2123NE2 -

Att. 14 Accident Analysis Results - U245NE2 -

Att. 15 Accident Analysis Results - U245NE14 -

Att. 16 Accident Analysis Results - U2123NE6 -

Att, 17 Accident Analysis Results.- U245NE6 -

Att. 18 Data File - U1123EU2 -

Att. 19 Data File - U145EU6 -

Att. 20 Data File - U145EU22 -

Att. 21 Data File - U2123EU2 -

Att. 22 Data File - U245EU6 -

Att. 23 Data File - U245EU22 -

(OSW-0048.WP)

.Colc. OSW-0048-Page 6 Rev. O TABLE'OF CONTENTS (cont'd.)

Section Title Pace Att. 24 Data-File - U1123NE2 - -

Att. 25 Data File - U145NE2 -

Att. 26 Data File - U145NE14 -

Att. 27 Data File - U1123NE6 -

Att. 28 Data File - U145NE6 -

Att. 29 Data File - U2123NE2 -

Att. 30 Data File - U245NE2 -

Att. 31 Data File - U245NE14 -

Att. 32 Data File - U2123NE6 -

s Att. 33 Data File - U245NE6 -

Att. 34 Design Verification Forms -

(OsW 0048.VP)

Calc. OSW-0048 ,

Page 7 Rev. 0 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this calculation is to support proposed changes to Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. The current method of operation, under TSI 90-03 Rev.1, requires that each operating unit have two operable Nuclear Service Water Pumps (NSWP) in Modes 1, 2, and 3 with a minimum of three operable NSWS per site in Modes 4 and 5.

l The proposed Tech Spec change would L;. low operation with three operable Nuclear Service Water pumps per site for all Modes of operation. This change will require that the Non-Event Unit as well as the Event Unit be analyzed. This is a change from past calculations where only the Event Unit SW system was of concern.

Therefore, the majority of analysis in this calculation deals with the Non-Event Unit. Most of the scenarios involving an Event Unit are covered by calculations G0050A-10 and G0050A-12 (these two calculations form the basis for this calculation). .There were several instances though, where the change in the number of required NSWPs per site created new Event Unit scenarios which are included 'n this calculation. This calculation will verify the design capability of the BSEP Unit 1 and 2 Service Water systems with three operable NSWPs per site for all Modes of operation.

Full design capability is established by satisfying the system functional requirements defined by the following two criteria:

1.1 The Service Water system design shall provide the required cooling flows to all safety-related equipment aligned to the system. These cooling flows shall be supplied under all credible system operating conditions, including the worst-case combinations of design basis events, single failures, and initial system parameters. '

1.2 The Service Water system shall ensure full operability of all required safety-related equipment by operating within ,

established equipment design limits.

Normal system operating lintups will be examined. Any design and/or operational limitations required to ensure full system design capability will be identified by evaluation of predicted Service Water system performance during the worst-case design basis accidents and transients. Service Water system performance will be simulated using KYPIPE computer models of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Service Water systems for various operating scenarios.

In general, the approach followed in this calculation is intended to ensure the worst-case conditions for the Service Water system are analyzed. The design basis events for which the BSEP Service  !

Water system must be designed are identified, primarily by review of UFSAR Chapter 15. Those events which are most limiting with respect to SW system performance are selected for simulation.

Then, the functional requirements (component flows, equipment (OSW-0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 8 Rev. O limitations, etc.) the SW system must satisfy during these events are established. The next step involves selection of the most limiting single failures which must be assumed to occur co-incidently with the design basis events. Finally, the initial (pre-event) configuration of the SW system and the specific process i conditions which would be the most limiting following occurrence of an event are identified. All these factors are used to structure the computer simulations to represent the worst-case scenarios.

The simulation results are then used to verify the Service Water system is fully capable of meeting the design criteria listed above.

The evaluations of SW system performance will cover Event Unit and Non-Event Unit operation under the four scenarios listed below for system configurations:

  • High Bay Level
  • Low Bay Level
  • Flood Level s

Extreme Low Water (Hurricane) Level System and equipment responses to d? sign basis events (accidents and/or transients)-are divided into two time periods based on the ability of plant personnel to take manual actions to mitigate the consequences of the event. The two time periods are the 0-10 minute phase and the after 10 minute phase. Each time period entails unique challenges to equipment and system parameters._ For this evaluation, the concern is the O to 10 minute period. For the post 10 minute period operator action is assumed. General system and equipment design requirements which will be verified are listed below. The specific quantitative values for these parameters are defined in the applicable sections of this calculation.

0-10 Minute Phase

  • SW Pump NPSHR restrictions +
  • Component cooling loads Service Water system response during an event is also a function of ,

system configuration prior to the event. Positions of throttling l valves and SW strainer pressure drop are two of the factors which can influence SW system performance. Accordingly, the initial system configurations from which the design basis events (DBE) are assumed to occur are also simulated. This ensures the worst-case ,

4 SW system configurations are used fo the DBE simulations.

(DSW-0048.WP)

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Calc. OSW-0048 Pcga 9 Rev. 0 2.0

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS The following paragraphs provide a general picture of the SW system capabilities for.the stated configurations. Specific conclusions about flow restrictions, lineup restrictions, etc. are addressed.in detail in Sections 6.0 and 7.0.

2.1 Event Unit The SW system of an Event Unit is capable of meeting its design bases requirements provided specific operating restrictions are observed. Flow restrictions include maximum limits for RBCCW and RHRSW to ensure acceptable flow rates through the SW pumps. During certain. scenarios, however, the Event Unit will have no operable NSWPs due to a single failure. For these cases the Event Unit diesel generators will swap to the Non-Event Unit. It has been shown that the Non-Event Unit can maintain the four diesel generators for these cases.

2.2 Non-Event Unit s

The SW system of a Non-Event Unit is capable of meeting its design bases requirements provided. specific operating restrictions are observed. Flow restrictions include maximum limits for RBCCW and RHRSW to ensure acceptable flow rates-through the SW pumps. During certain scenarios, however, the Non-Event Unit will have no operable NSWPs due to a single failure. For these cases, the Non-Event Unit diesel generators will swap to the Event Unit. It has been shown that the Event Unit can maintain the four diesel generators for these cases.

Therefore, the Service Water System can meet all-design requirements under the proposed change to Tech Spec 3.7.1.2.

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(OSW-0048.WP) i

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 10 Rev. 0

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1 Johnston Pump Co. Report, Johnston Job No. NA-6508, dated 6/26/89 (CP&L P.O. No. 556884C) 3.2 Calculation OSW-0032, Rev 0, Intake Canal Hydraulic Analysis, (William G. Daniel and Associates).

3.3 Calculation G0050A-20, Rev. O, " Hydraulic Analysis of Cooling Water Intake Canal and Pump Intake Structure" 3.4 System Description SD-43, Rev. 14, " Service Water System" 3.5 Calculation PCN-G0050A-01, Rev. 2, "RHR Room Cooler Allowable ,

Service Water Inlet Temperature" 3.6 Calculation PCN-G0050A-02, Rev. 2, " Service Water Flow Rate Reduction Effect on Service Water Inlet Temperature for Core Spray Room Air Coolers" 3.7 Calculation No. G0050A-16, Rev. 1, "BSEP U1 and U2 Service s Water Single Failure Analysis" 3.8 Calculation G0050A-14, Rev. 1, "BSEP U1 and U2 Service Water Systems Cross-Leakage Evaluations" 3.9 Calculation PCN-G0050A-11, Rev. O, "RHR Service Water. Flow During Cold Shutdown" 3.10 Calculation G0050A-08, Rev. 1, " Resizing of Flow Orifices 2-SW-FO-1187 and 1-SW-FO-1188" 3.11 BSEP Calculation No. M-89-0008, Rev. O, " Heat. Balance on DG #2 Jacket Water / Service Water HX", File No. 5110 3.12 Acceptance Test Results for Special Procedure-2-SP-89-021, Rev. 1, " Unit 2 NSW System Flow Tests" 3.13 Acceptance Test Results for Special Procedure 1-SP-89-027, Rev. 1, " Unit 1 NSW System Flow Tests.

3.14 Acceptance Test Results for Plant Mod. No.89-075,

" Replacement of FO-1187 to Restore Design Flow Rate" 3.15 Test Results for Special Procedure 1-SP-90-004, " Service Water System Hydraulic Performance Test" 3.16 EER-89-0166, R e v'. 1, " Verification of Acceptable Service Water Flow to RER for Norst-Case' Expected LOCA Containment Cooling" (OSW-0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 -

Page 11 Rev. 0 3.17 EER-89-0135, Rev. 1, "JCO for Adequacy of Service Water System' to Meet Design Bases Flow Requirements" 3.18 EER-89-0220, Rev. O, "JCO for Adequacy of Service _ Water System to Meet Design Bases Flow Requirements" 3.19 EER-89-0163, Rev. 1, " Revised Operating Lineup for SW System" 3.20 Plant Modification No.'89-048, " Upgrade'of SW Valve SW-V103 to Motor-operated Valve - Unit 1" 3.21 Plant Modification No.89-051, " Unit 2 RHR SW Pumps Supply Header Pressure Switches" 3.22 Plant Modification No.89-088, " Add LOOP Closure Logic to SW-V103 and SW-V106" - Unit 1 3.23 GE Letter from J. S. Mokri to E. A. Bishop, dated.7/19/78, NED File No. PCNG0050A 3.24 Johnston Pump Company letter to Mr. Al Bishop from s Mr. Mark D. Moon, dated September 1, 1989, File No. BG0050A-AA-A500 3.25 Telecon dated 11/10/89 between Mark Moon (Johnston Pump Co.)

and Michael Casey (CP&L), File No. BG0050A-DE-A543 3.26 Cameron Hydraulic Data, 16th Edition 3.27 Crane Technical Paper No. 410, 1982 3.28 BSEP Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 3.29 BSEP Abnormal Operating Procedure No. AOP-013, Rev 8,

" Operation During Hurricane, Tornado, or Flood Ccoditions" 3.30 Calculation No. G0050A-10, Rev. 5, "BSEP Unit No. 1 Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis".

3.31 Calculation No. G0050A-12, Rev. 5, "BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits".

3.32 EER-91-0039, Rev. O, " Evaluation of Service Wster Design capability" 3.33 Periodic Test 1-PT-24.6.4, Rev. 1, " Service Water System Hydraulic Performance Test" 3.34 Plant Modification No.90-008, " Service Water Valve V3 & V4 Valve Closure Logic Change" (OsW-0048.WP) ,

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 12 Rev. 0 3.35 BSEP Abnormal Operating Procedure Fo. AOP-18.0, Rev 7,

" Nuclear Service Water System Failure" 3.36 IRR BM-1794, Diesel Generator _Setpoint Change-s f-

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(OSW-0048.WP) t

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 13 l Rev. O' 4.0 h.SSUMPTIONS 4.1 Lube water flow rate is set for individual computer simulations-based on interpolation of test data from Reference 3.12; although this data is for the U2 SWLW system, it is assumed that the two units' LW systems behave identically.

Further, lube water flow rate is a small percentage of total flow and any error introduced would be insignificant considering the design margins used.

4.2 The maximum normal water level in the SW pump bay is +2.0 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL).

4.3 The minimum normal water level in the pump bay is -6.0 feet MSL based on References 3.3 and 3.4. Reference 3.4 states the maximum circulating water flow rate is approximately 1,050,000 gpm. Reference 3.3 provides head loss curves for circulating water and service water in terms of intake canal level. A maximum SW flow of 50,000 gpm (25,000 per unit) is assumed for use with Reference 3.3.

4.4 A minimum SW strainer AP of 1.0 psid is assumed for the initial configurations for maximum flow cases. The low AP is consistent with plant observations.of low strainer AP during SW system operation and is conservative since it results in greater system / pump flow in the 0-10 minute phase of an event.

4.5 SW inlet temperature is at the design maximum of 90*F.

4.6 No credit for operator action is taken for the 0-10 minute phase of a design basis event.

4.7 Operator action is assumed for the >10 minute' phase of an event (subject to availability of equipment and accessibility to specific areas) to perform manual operations including:

a) align a 2nd SW pump to the operating SW header b) establish RERSW flow 4.8 For power operation (Modes 1-3), the accidents / initiating events to ha considered are LOCA outside Primary Containment (HELB) and LOOP. These events will be evaluated.in concert with the most limiting single active failure. . However, a-LOCA is assumed to occur only on the Event Unit. ;Also, for the Non-Event Unit, a LOOP is not assumed because it would isolate RBCCW which would reduce the challenge to thd SW system. For cases such as this one, where it is more limiting to have a LOOP on only onc Unit, it is defined as a Unit LOOP.

(OSW-0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 14 Rev. O Initiation of a LOCA signal on the Event Unit causes the greatest number of component flow paths to be automatically aligned to the NSW header. The diesel generator supply valves and the Vital header component isolation valves all open.

Additionally, the standby NSW pump starts, and any operating RHRSW pumps trip. Initiation of a LOOP signal causes the same actions as a LOCA signal, with one exception: the Vital header component isolation valves will not open automatically. These isolation valves are held closed following a LOOP by air from the emergency air compressors. These compressors are no longer safety-related and cannot be credited during a design basis event. However, when having the component isolation valves closed is more limiting, the air pressure in the emergency air header is assumed not to decay and the isolation valves remain closed. For the maximum flow scenarios (0-10 minute phase), emergency air is assumed to fail, causing the Vital header component isolation valves to fail open. With the Vital header component flow paths open, the LOOP and LOCA events are equivalent.

For the Non-Event Unit, the LOCA signal on the Event Unit s

causes the two diesel generators for the Non-Event Unit to come on line. A LOOP is not considered for the Non-Event Unit because it would isolate RBCCW and reduce the challenge to the SW system.

4.9 The limiting single active failures listed below for power '

operation with normal system configurations have been applied in accordance with Ref 3.7. Limiting failures for other scenarios are addressed in applicable sections of the calculation body.

4.9.1 The emergency bus on either the Event Unit or the Non-Event Unit supplying one NSWP fails.  !

4.10 For outage operation (Modes 4 and 5), the following l i

accidents / initiating events are considered for the Event Unit:

  • LOOP l LOCA sicnal (not an actual pipe break) due to operator error or instrumentation failure The discussion under Assumption 4.8 regarding which event is bounding also applies here.

4.11 The limiting single active failures listed below for outage operation with normal system configurations have been applied in accordance with Ref 3.7. Limiting failures for other i

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Calc. OSW-0048 Page 15 ,

Rev. O scenarios are addressed in applicable sections of the calculation body.

4.11.1 When two NSW pumps are operable on the NSW header, the emergency bus supplying one NSW pump and RHRSW pump throttle valve F068 fails, resulting in unavailability of these components.

4.11.2 When one NSW pump is operable on the NSW header, the trip coil on one of the operating RHRSW pumps fails, causing that RHRSW pump to restart on re-energization of the E-Bus (LOOP) or to continue running (LOCA). The F068 valve is assumed to stay open since the only time it goes closed is when both RHRSW pumps are off.

4.12 Service water specific gravity = 1.03.

4.13 The initial SW system configurations assumed for the accident ,

scenarios are those providing the most limiting conditions s

(consistent with system operating restrictions) upon ,

initiation of the accident. For example:

4.13.1 For the maximum flow cases (power operation), the only loads aligned to the NSW header are Lube Water and RBCCW. Upon an accident signal, RBCCW is isolated by closure of valves V103 and V106. In'the initial configuration, RBCCW is at the maximum flow consistent with a minimum 40 psig SW header pressure or 7,200 gpm. SW header pressures lower than 40 psig would cause auto-start of the standby NSW pump, which is not as conservative as one pump in operation. With one pump in operation, all flow will go through one strainer. Consequently, a lower minor loss through the strainer will be required to maintain 1.0 psid. This in turn will cause. accident flows to be higher and thus provide a limiting starting configuration.

4.13.2 For the maximum flow cases (outage operation), RBCCW and RHRSW are at their maximum allowed flow rates ,

which minimizes NSW header pressure-and causes RHRSW j throttle valves to be placed in a more open i position. '

Additional limiting assumptions for initial configurations are discussed in applicable sections of this calculation.

(0 @ 0048.WP)

Cnic. OSW-0048 Page 16 Rev. 0 4.14 The only required cooling loads in the 0-10 minute phase are the DG jacket water coolers and SW pump lube water.

4.15 The minimum pump bay water level during a hurricane is -8.63 feet MSL. This is based on information found in UFSAR Section 9.2.1.3, which is the lowest and therefore the most ,

conservative extreme low pump bay water level value.

4.16 The maximum flood water level is +22.0 feet MSL, as stated in UFSAR Section 2.4.5.

4.17 Minimum submergence requirements for the SW pumps are satisfied at a water level of -8.63 feet MSL, based on data in Reference 3.1.

4.18 The maximum allowable pump flow rate is 10,000 gpm per Reference 3.25. This flow rate assumes NPSHR requirements of.

the SW pump are satisfied.

4.19 The maximum allowable pump flow rate for hurricane conditions is 8225 gpm based on NPSHR data contained in Reference 3.1.

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4.20 The maximum allowable flows given by Reference 3.24 will be used in lieu of the SW pump NPSHR curve to determine acceptable SW pump flows for accident scenarios run with SW pump intake bay water levels of -6.0 feet MSL and +2.0 feet MSL. These are 9552 gpm at +2.0 feet MSL and 9292 gpm at -6 feet MSL.

4.21 Service Water pump operability requirements consistent with Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 have been assumed in this calculation. These restrictions provide single failure protection for both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems-and ensure acceptable SW system and SW pump performance during all operating conditions, including hurricane and flood.

4.22 The proposed change to Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires three NSW pumps operable per site. With these requirements in place, there are credible design basis event scenarios which can be postulated that require one unit to-supply all 4 DG's with only one NSW pump operable.

4.23 A cross-header leakage factor equal to the previously established Unit 1 leakage factor has been assumed in this calculation. This assumption provides SW system performance margin which can be used in the future to offset system and equipment degradation.

4.24 For many of the hydraulic analyses contained in this calculation, the flow rates through the RBCCW and RHRSW flow (OSV-0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 17 Rev. O paths in the initial configurations were limited to ensure satisfactory system performance during any subsequent design basis event. The flow rates were limited by varying the minor loss factors of the respective throttling valves for these flow paths. The final minor loss factors were then carried through to the subsequent simulations.

Two methods can be used with the KYPIPE program to establish the appropriate minor loss factors for the throttling. valves.

The two methods produce equivalent results. The first method is straightforward, but can be very time-consuming. The second method offers the advantage of reduced time to run some simulations, but is more involved.

The most obvious way to set a predetermined flow rate through the RBCCW and RHRSW flow lines is to vary the minor loss factors for the throttle valves in these lines until the desired flow rates are achieved. This method can require a lot of time when two flow paths are being varied for the same simulation. The second method uses the flow demand feature of the KYPIPE software package to set flow rates through RBCCW s

and/or RHRSW. First, the throttle valve line segment.is closed. Then, the desired flow rate is removed from the SW' system model at the inlet node of the throttling valve as a fixed demand, and returned to the model at the outlet node of the throttling valve as a fixed input. The KYPIPE program ~

calculates pressures at the junction nodes based on this preset flow value. The pressure computed at_the inlet node of the throttling valve minus the pressure at the outlet node (corrected for node elevation differences, if applicable) represents the pressure drop which must exist over the throttling valve to generate.the desired flow rate. This pressure difference can be converted to the corresponding.

throttle valve minor loss factor using the following equation derived from standard head loss formulas:

gg , 387 x(2.31 x AF)x(ID4)

Q2x(Sp. Gr.)

(ID = inches; AP = psid; Q = gpm) i Once the minor loss factor is established, the subsequent model simulations are revised to use the minor loss method rather than the fixed demand / input approach. This second method is used exclusively in this calculation.

(OSV-0048.VP)

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Calc. OSW-0048 Page 18 Rev. 0 4.25 A spurious LOCA signal on an Event Unit is considered during outage operation in a hurricane, even though a spurious LOCA signal at that time would be very unlikely. This signal would probably result from operator error or instrument failure, such as that caused by a worker jarring sensitive reactor water level instrumentation. During a hurricane, operators would be more alert due to storm conditions; also no personnel would be working on or near sensitive instrumentation. In any case, the system response to a LOCA is identical to that for a LOOP for mont (maximum flow) scenarios.

4.26 Where RHR SW Pumps are needed, it is assumed that RHR SW Pumps "B" and "D" are used. This is realistic since they are the two pumps closest to the NSW Header. It is assumed that the behavior of the "B" and "D" pumps is identical to that of the "A" and "C" pumps, that is the short length of piping on the RHR SW Pump inlet header causes no variation in performance between "A" Loop pumps and "B" Loop pumpe.. Calibration data supports this assumption. Any differences between trains would be insignificant considering the conservative design margins used, s

4.27 RHRSW Pump suction header pressure switches have a trip setpoint range between 13.7 and 17.3 psig (Ref 3.4). Initial.

configuration results in this range and above (i.e. greater than 13.7) are acceptable. However, for accident analysis' results, a conservative minimum trip setpoint of 18 psig must be maintained.

4.28 The worst-case single failure for scenarios that begin during Operational Modes 4 and 5 (shutdown) when one NSWP is operable is failure of an RHRSW pump trip coil (see Assumption 4.13.1.2 for further explanation). In the KYPIPE scenarios that assume this type of failure, the RHRSW pump suction pressure sometimes falls well below the 15.5 psig required to maintain NPSHR. In these cases, it is conservatively assumed that the pump that experienced the failure and subsequently restarted fails. However, the other RHRSW pump on that loop as well as the other loop's RHRSW pumps and all normal and emergency power supplies remain to supply RHRSW needs once RHRSW is required.

4.29 This calculation accounts for implementation of the portion of Service Water Lube Water modifications 82-220L and 82-221L which installs upgraded NSW pump motor thrust bearings. The new thrust bearings are sized for the thrust load at zero flow and thus eliminate the previous requirements for minimum RBCCW flow rate and one RHR pump room cooler in service.

Additionally, restrictions on maximum allowable RBCCW and

.RHRSW flow rates can be loosened in the future since full (OSV-0048.VP)

Calc. OSW-0048 page 19 Rev. O closure of valves SW-V103 and SW-V106 (previously throttled on accident signal) is now possible. A minimum flow rate of 25 gpm is assumed to cool the pump shaft sleeve bearings. Since no credible system lineup will result in zero flow (i.e., all components isolated), a minimum flow of 25 gpm is assumed. -

This minimum flow is achieved with as few as one component aligned to the system. Therefore, no minimum flow calculations are required.

4.30 The Diesel Jacket Water Cooler SW Inlet Pressure Switches are-assumed to have a setpoint of 5 2 psig (for a range of 3 to 7 psig) (Reference 3.36) . When this setpoint is reached on a particular unit, a swapover results which forces the Diesels.

to be supplied from the other unit. For conservatism, the setpoint plus tolerance plus an additional margin of 25% will be used to determine when a swap over will occur. Therefore, whenever a value of 9 psig is reached, a swapover is assumed to occur and the effects will be evaluated.

4.31 When establishing minimum SW header pressures in these analyses, the nominal pressure value is used rather than the s

worst-case pressure considering instrument tolerance. This is considered reasonable since a conservative factor of 5% is being applied to the predicted system flow rates.

Incorporating pressure instrument tolerances would provide additional, unnecessary conservatism. Also, test results show pressures are relatively insensitive compared to flows for the SW system (large flow changes cause relatively small pressure changes).

An exception to this assumption is made for the RHRSW pump low suction pressure trip setpoint since RHRSW cooling is so critical for plant recovery following an event.

(OSV 0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 20 Rev. 0 5.0 COMPUTER MODEL VALIDATION 5.1 Unit 1 The U1 SW system computer model has undergone several revisions since it was first developed in 1989. The latest revision incorporated calibration changes made so the model results match test results from Periodic Test 1-PT-24.6.4, which was run at the end of the BSEP U1 refueling outage in January 1991. The calibration and its acceptability have been previously evaluated in Engineering Evaluation EER-91-0039, and will not be' addressed in depth here. This EER created a final calibrated-computer model file, "U1CALBN2", from which the file "U1 MASTER" was made. File "U1 MASTER" is the base file from which all analysis / evaluation files in calculation GOO 50A-10 were created. In turn, this calculation (for Unit 1 portions) is based on G0050A-10. The latest calibration case should only serve to make the computer model more accurately portray the flows seen in the field; as such, the 15% accuracy previously applied to model flow results (although probably improved upon by the latest calibration) will continue to be used for model results. Likewise, as established previously, in the few places that model pressure results are addressed, the raw test results will be examined with no compensation for model-accuracy. This is conservative because previous calibration testing has shown the model to be relatively accurate with respect to pressure readings (although the model is only specifically ~

calibrated for flow, not pressure). Furthermore, the model is insensitive to pressure results with respect to flow results (i.e.,

large et snges in flow only cause minor changes in associated pressures). Finally, the vast majority of acceptance criteria of this calculation regards flow results, not pressure results.

5.2 Unit 2 The U2 SW system computer model has undergone several revisions since it was first developed in 1989. The latest revision incorporated calibration changes made so the model results match test results from Periodic Test 2-PT-24.6.4, which~was run at the end of the BSEP U2 refueling outage in November 1991. The calibration and its acceptability have been previously evaluated in Engineering Evaluation EER-91-0450, and will not be addressed in-depth here. This EER created a final calibrated computer model file, "U2CALBN2", from which the file "U2 MASTER"~was made. File "U2 MASTER" is the base file from which all analysis / evaluation files in calculation G0050A-12 were created. In turn, this calculation (for Unit 2 portions) is based on G0050A-12. The latest calibration case should only serve to make the computer model more accurately portray the flows seen in the field; as such, the 5% accuracy previously applied to model flow results-(although probably improved upon by the latest calibration) will continue to (OSW-0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 21 Rev. O be used for model results. Likewise, as established previously, in the few places that model pressure results are addressed, the raw test results will be examined with no compensation for model accuracy. This is conservative because previous calibration testing has shown the model to be relatively accurate with respect to pressure readings (although the model is only specifically calibrated for flow, not pressure). Furthermore, the model is insensitive to pressure results with respect to flow results (i.e.,

large changes in flow only cause minor changes in associated pressures). Finally, the vast majority of acceptance criteria of this calculation regards flow results, not pressure results.

\

s I

I (0 E 0048.WP) l I

1

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 22 Rev. 0 6.0 CALCULATIONS Attachment 24 of calculation G0050A-12, " Service Water System KYPIPE Model Flow Diagram," is a useful reference when reviewing this section. This flow diagram identifies specific.line and junction numbers used in the computer model and shows their relationships to individual components in the Service Water system.

Minimum NSW pump flow requirements have been eliminated due to the installation of larger pump motor thrust bearings. The parameters being monitored includa; NSWP flow, diesel generator flow and pressure, and RHRSW pump inlet pressure. The NSWPs are monitored for run out conditions, the diesel generators require at least 350 gpm of flos and will switch units if their inlet pressure drops below 9 psig, and the RERSW pumps will trip off if their inlet pressure drops below 18 psig.

For all cases listed in Section 6.0, the NSWP flows obtained from the KYPIPE model runs have been increased by five percent. Also, the flows to the diesel generators have been decreased by five percent. This conservatism is in accordance with the discussion in Section 5.0.

(OSW-0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 23 Rev. 0 6.1 Event Unit The following cases are primarily used to demonstrate that an Event Unit can maintain flow and pressure with four diesel generators aligned to it's SW system.

6.1.1 Unit 1 ,

6.1.1.1 One NSWP Operable followina Event NOTE: .The following Subsections are listed by KYPIPE run file name.

For a complete list of these file names and the situations '

to which they apply, please see Attachment 01.

s 6.1.1.1.1 U1123EU2 For this run (see Attachment 02), the initial set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 7200 gpm. The initiating events for this run are a LOCA, an E-Bus failure, and a unit LOOP. The LOCA. signal shuts off RBCCW and the remaining loads on the nuclear header are-lube water flow, cross header leakage, the ,

Vital Header, and up to four diesel generators.. '

In the O to 10 minute phase, the following information is obtained:

Hich Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 6890 (1.05) = 7235 gpm 7235 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1048 gpm 0 15.2 psig DG2 1095 gpm 0 17.0 psig DG3 1127 gpm 0 15.8 psig DG4 1191 gpm 0 19.1 psig (DSU-0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 24 Rev. O Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 6740 (1.05); = 7077 gpm  !

7077 < 9292 gpm i Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1026 gpm 0 14.3 psig DG2 1073 gpm-@ 16.1 psig DG3 -1104 gpm @ 14.9 psig DG4 1167.gpm @ 18.1 psig Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow: .72431(1.05) = 7605 gpm 7605 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1150 gpm 0 17.5 psig DG2 1100 gpm 0 19.5 psig DG3 1184 gpm @ 18.2 psig DG4 1251 gpm 0 21.8.psig-Extreme Low Water Level:

Not required for an operating unit.

s This information shows that the NSWP-flows are acceptable per Sections 4.19 and 4.20 and the diesel generator inlet pressures are acceptable -

per Section 4.30. Therefore, the Event Unit can handle all of the loads with no diesel ~

generator swapping and no NSWP run out problems.

6.1.1.1.2 U145EU6 For this run (see Attachment 03), the initial set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 5500 gpm and RHRSW set at a flow of 4500 gpm. The initiating events for this run are a LOCA, an E-Bus failure, and a unit LOOP.

The LOCA signal shuts off RBCCW and.the LOOP shuts off RHRSW. However, the E-Bus failure prevents the RHRSW throttle valve, F068B, from shutting which allows flow to pass through the pumps. The remaining nuclear header loads are lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Header, and up to four diesel generators.

In the o to 10 minute phase, the'following information is obtained:

(Osv-0048.WP)

Calc.- OSW-0048 Page 25 Rev. 0 ,

Hiah-Bay Level: (change 1).

NSWP flow: 7680 (1.05) = 8064 gpm 8064 < 9552.gpm Diesel Generator flow'& pressure: DG1 949 gpm 9.11.3 psig DG2 992 gpm @ 12.7 psig DG3 1020 gpm @ 11.7 psig *

'DG4 1079 gpm @ 14.4 psig

  • i Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 7515 (1.05) = 7891 gpm 7891 < 9292 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG 929 gpm @.10.5 psig DG2 972 gpm.0 11.9 psig DG3 999 gpm @-11.0 psig DG4 1056 gpm @ 13.6 psig Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow: 8075 (1.05) = 8479 gpm s

8479 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 997.gpm @ 13.1 psig DG2 1042 gpm @ 14.8.psig DG3 1072 gpm @ 13.6 psig DG4 1132 gpm @ 16.6 psig.

Extreme' Low " iter Level: (change 7)

NSWP flow: 7460 (1.05) = 7833 gpm 7833 < 8225 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure:

~

DG1 922 gpm-@ 10.3 psig DG2 965 gpm @ 11.7 psig DG3 993 gpm @ 10.7 psig DG4- 1049 gpm.@ 13.3 psig This information shows that the NSWP-flows are acceptable per Sections 4.19 and 4.20 and the diesel generator inlet pressures are: acceptable per Section 4.30. Therefore, the Event Unit can handle all of the loads with no diesel.

generator swapping and no NSWP run out problems.  ;

(DSW-0048 vP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 26 Rev. 0 6.1.1.2 Two NSWPs Operable followino Event' 6.1.1.2.1 U145EU22 1 For this run (see-Attachment 04), the initial set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 5500 gpm and RHRSW set at a flow of 4500 gpm. The initiating events for this run are a LOCA, an RHR trip coil failure, and'a unit LOOP. The LOCA signal shuts off RBCCW and the LOOP shuts off RHRSW. However, the RHR trip coil failure allows one RHRSW pump to restart. The remaining nuclear header loads are lube water flow, cross header leakage, and the diesel generators. In the o to 10 minute phase, the following information is obtained:

Hich Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 5856 (1.05) = 6149 gpm 5856 (1.05) = 6149 gpm 6149 < 9552 gpm s Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1145 gpm @ 19.5 psig DG2 1197 gpm @ 21.7 psig DG3 1231 gpm 0 20.2 psig DG4 1302 gpm @ 24.2 psig RHRSW pressure: 36.2 psig Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 5764 (1.05) = 6052 gpm 5765 (1.05). = 6053 gpm 6053 < 9292 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1117 gpm @ 18.3 psig DG2 1169 gpm @ 20.4 psig DG3 1202 gpm @ 18.9 psig DG4 1271 gpm @ 22.7 psig RHRSW pressure: 33.5 psig Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow: 6078 (1.05) = 6382 gpm 6078 (1.05) = 6382 gpm 6382 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1209 gpm @ 22.6 psig DG2 1265 gpm 0 25.0 psig DG3 1302 gpm @ 23.4 psig DG4 1376 gpm 0 27.8 psig RHRSW pressure: 43.1 psig (osv-oo48.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page-27 Rev. O Extreme Low Water Level: (change 7)

NSWP flow: -5733 (1.05) = 6020 gpm 5734 (1.05).= 6021 gpm 6021 < 8225 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1109 gpm @ 17.9 psig DG2 1159 gpm @ 19.9 psig DG3 1192 gpm @ 18.5 psig DG4 1261 gpm 9 22.2 psig RHRSW pressure: 32.6 psig This information shows.that the NSWP flows are acceptable per sections 4.19 and 4.20 and the diesel generator inlet pressures are acceptable per Section 4.30. Therefore, the Event Unit can handle all of the loads with no diesel generator swapping, no NSWP run out, and no RHRSW pump trip.

6.1.2 Unit 2 s

6.1.2.1 One NSWP Operable Followina Event '

6.1.2.1.1 U2123EU2 For this run (see Attachment 05), the initial set up has two NSWPs operable > ' OCW set at a flow of 7200 gpm. The init; cvents for this run are a LOCA, an E-BM #a n , and a unit LOOP. The LOCA signal <tf RBCCW and the only remaining loads on tt_ uuclear header are lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Header, and up to four diesel generators.

In the O to 10 minute phase, the following information is obtained:

Hich Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 6516 (1.05) = 6842 gpm 6842 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 949 gpm 0 21.6 psig DG2 990 gpm 0 23.2 psig DG3 1113 gpm 0 19.2 psig DG4 1051 gpm 0 26.1 psig i

(DSW-0048,WP)

C91c .' 0SW-0048-Page 28 Rev. O Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 6374 (1.05) =.6693 gpm 6693'< 9292 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 929 gpm-@ 20.5 psig DG2 970 gpm @ 21.9 psig DG3 1091 gpm @ 18.1 psig ,

DG4 1029 gpm 0 24.7 psig Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow: 6851 (1.05)' = 7194 gpm

.7194 < 9552-gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 997 gpm @ 24.6 psig DG2 .1040 gpm @ 26.3 psig DG3 1170 gpm @ 21.9 psig DG4 1103 gpm 0 29.5 psig Extreme Low Water Level:

Not required for an operating unit.

s This information shows that the NSWP flows are acceptable per Sections 4.19 and 4.20 and the diesel generator inlet pressures are acceptable per Section 4.30. Therefore, the Event Unit can handle all of the loads with no diesel ~

generator swapping and no NSWP run out problems.

6.1.2.1.2 U245EU6 For this run (see Attachment 06), the initial set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 5500 gpm and RHRSW set at a-flow of 4500 gpm. The initiating events for this run are a LOCA, an E-Bus failure, and asunit LOOP.

The LOCA signal shuts off RBCCW and the LOOP shuts off RHRSW. However, the E-Bus failure prevents the RHRSW throttle valve, F068B, from shutting which allows flow to pass through the pumps. The remaining nuclear header loads are lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Header, and up to four diesel generators. i l

In the 0 to 10 minute phase, the following '

information is obtained: 1 l

1 (Osv-0048.WP)

C21c. OSW-0048 l Page 29 Rev. O Hiah Bay Level: (change 1) -

NSWP flow: 7370 (1.05) = 7739 gpm 7739 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 854 gpm 0 16.2 psig DG2 892 gpm 0 17.5 psig DG3 1003 gpm 0 14.3 psig DG4 946 gpm 0 19.9 psig Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 7212 (1.05) = 7573 gpm 7573 < 9292 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 837 gpm 0 15.3 psig DG2 873 gpm 0 16.5 psig DG3 982 gpm 0 13.4 psig DG4 926 gpm 0 18.8 psig Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow: 7751 (1.05) = 8139 gpm s

8139 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 897 gpm 0 18.6 psig DG2 937 gpm 0 20.0 psig DG2 1054 gpm 0 16.4.psig DG4 993 gym 0 22.6 psig Extreme Low Water Level: (change 7)

NSWP flow: 7159 (1.05) = 7517 gpm 7517 < 8225 gpm Diesel Generator ,

flow & pressure: DG1 830.gpm 0 15.0-psig DG2 867 gpm 0 16.2 psig.

DG3 976 gpm 0 13.1 psig-DG4' 920 gpm 0 18.4:psig This information shows that the NSWP flows are acceptable per-Sections 4.19 and-4.20 and the diesel generator inlet pressures are-acceptable per section 4.30.- Therefore, the Event-Unit can handle all of the loads with no diesel generator swapping and no NSWP run out-problems.

(

l f 5 P

(OsW-0048.WP) 4'

,y..n,

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 30 Rev. 0 6.1.2.2 Two NSWPs Operable followina Event 6.1.2.2.1 U245EU22 r For this run (see Attachment 07), the initial

~

set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 5500 gpm and-RHRSW set at a. flow of 4500 gpm. The initiating events for this run 's are a LOCA, an RHR trip' coil failure, and a unit LOOP. The LOCA signal shuts off RBCCW and the LOOP shuts off-RHRSW. However, the RHR trip coil failure allows one'RHRSW pump to restart. The remaining nuclear header loads are lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Header, and up to four diesel generators. .

In the O to 10 minute phase, the following information is obtained:

Hiah Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 5628 (1.05) = 5908 gpm 5628 (1.05) = 5908 gpm s

5908 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1022 gpm @ 26.3 psig DG2 1067 gpm 0 28.0 psig DG3 1200 gpm @ 23.4~psig.

DG4 1131_gpm~0 31.4 psig RHRSW pressure: 36.8 psig Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 5541-(1.05) = 5818 gpm 5541 (1.05) = 5818 gpm ,

-5818 < 9292 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 998 gpm @ 24.7 psig DG2 -1041 gpm @ 26.4 psig DG3 1171 gpm 0-22.0 psig DG4 1105 gpm @ 29.6 psig.

RHRSW pressure: 34.1 psig Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow: 5837 (1.05).= 6129 gpm I 5837 (1.05) = 6129 gpm j 6129 < 9552 gpm j Diesel Generator i flow & pressure: DG1- 1080 gpm @ 30.1 psig -1

-DG2 1128.gpm-@.32.1 psig '

DG3 1268 gpm.@ 26.9 psig DG4 1196 gpm @ 35.9.psig -

RERSW pressure: 43.8 psig l (OsV-0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 31-Rev. O Extreme Low Water Level: (change 7)

NSWP flow: 5512 (1.00) = 5788 gpm 5512 (1.05) = 5788.gpm 5788 < 8225 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 990 gpm 0 24.2 psig DG2 1034 gpm 0 25.9.psig DG3 1163 gpm 9 21.5 psig DG4 '1096 gpm @ 29.0 psig RHRSW pressure: 33.1 psig-This information shows that the NSWP' flows are acceptable per Sections 4.19 and 4.20 and the diesel generator inlet pressures are acceptable per Section 4.30. Therefore, the Event Unit can handle all of the loads with no diesel generator swapping, no NSWP run out, and no RHRSW pump trip.

I (OsV- 0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 32 Rev. 0 6.2 Non-Event Unit 6.2.1 Unit 1 6.2.1.1 One NSWP Operable Followina Event 6.2.1.1.1 U1123NE2 For this run (see Attachment 08), the initial set up has one NSWP operable'with RBCCW set at a flow of 7200 gpm. There are no initiating events because this is a Non-Event Unit. The single failure is assumed on the Event Unit.

The loads on the nuclear header are RBCCW, lube water flow, cross header leakage, the. Vital Header, and up to two diesel. generators. In the o to 10 minute phase,-the following information is obtained:

Hiah Bay Level: (change 1) '

NSWP flow: 8199 (1.05) = 8609 gpm s

8609,< 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 941 gpm @ 9.0 psig DG2 984 gpm @ 10.5 psig Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 7983 (1.05) = 8382 gpm 8382 <-9292 gpm. -

Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 908 gpm @ 8.0 psig DG2 950 gpm 0 9.3 psig Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow: 8551 (1.05) = 8979 gpm 8979 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1000 gpm 0 11.1 psig DG2 1046 gpm @ 12.8 psig i

j i

Extreme Low Water Level: .(change 7)-

Not required for an operating ~ unit. j This information shows that the NSWP flows are acceptable per Sections 4.19 and 4.20.

However, the Non-Event Unit can not handle all of the loads with no diesel generator swapping (OsW-0048.WP)

I

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 33-Rev. O during Low Bay Level conditions. One of the Non-Event Unit diesel generators will swap (on low pressure, not on low flow) to the-Event Unit. This is an acceptable condition because the Event Unit initially had two NSWPs operable and therefore has at least one remaining. It is possible that an Event Unit diesel could swap back to the Non-Event Unit. That is also acceptable because the Non-Event diesel generator swapped on low pressure and not low flow. Therefore, adequate flow would be-assured even though pressure would be less than the setpoint.

6.2.1.1.2 U145NE2 For this run (see Attachment 09),-the initial set up has one NSWP operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 4000 gpm and RHRSW set at a flow of 2800 gpm. There are no initiating events for s

this run because this-is a Non-Event Unit. The single failure ir assumed on the Event Unit.

The nuclear header loads are RHRSW, RBCCW,-lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Header, and up to two diesel generators.. In the O to 10 minute phase, the following '

information is obtained:

Hiah Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 8947 (1.05) = 9394 gpm 9394 < 9552:gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 798 gpm @ 4.6 psig DG2 835 gpm 0 5.6 psig RHRSW pressure: 4.1 psig Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 8791 (1.05) = 9231 gpm 9231 < 9292 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 772 gpm @.3.8 psig DG2 808 gpm @ 4.8 psig RHRSW pressure: 2.5 psig i

(0SW-0048.VP)

Calc. OSW-0048' Page-34 Rev. 0- -

Flood Level: (change.5)' _

NSWP flow: 9301 (1.05) = 9766 gpm ,

9766 > 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1- 866 gpm @ 6.6 psig DG2 906 gpm.9 7.9 psig RHRSW pressure: 8.4'psig Extreme' Low Water Level: (change 7)-

NSWP flow 8741 (1.05) ='9178 gpm 9178 >:8225 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 763 gpm @ 3.6 psig.

DG2 798 gpm.@ 4.5 psig RHRSW pressure:. 2.0 psig-This information shows'that the NSWP flows for . .

the Flood Level and the Extreme Low l Water Level-are unacceptably high. However, the RHRSW header pressure is also shown to be far below the. trip setpoint of 18.psig. This will cause s

-the RHRSW to isolate. This will reduce the-requiredLflow=from the NSW header by approximately 2500 gpm.- This provides more than enough margin to bring the NSWP flows into acceptable range. Also,.the Non-Event Unit'can not handle all of-the loads with no diesel' generator swapping. Both of the Non-Event-Unit diesel generators will swap-(on low pressure, not on low flow)lto.the Event Unit. This is-acceptable because the' Event ~ Unit initially had ,

two NSWPs operable. The diesel generatorsrfrom the Event Unit may swap back to the Non-Event '

Unit. This is an acceptable. condition because.

the Non-Event-Unit diesel generators' originally swapped due to low pressure'and not low flow.

Therefore, theLdiesel generators would receive adequate-flow even though the pressure is below.

the setpoint. Following.the initial 1 ten.

minutes of the' event", the-operators.can~take action to restore RHRSW, isolate RBCCW, and reduce flow to the diesel generators.

3 6.2.1.1.3 U145NE14 For this run'(see Attachment 10),.the initial. .

set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 5500 gpm and RHRSW set at a-flow of 4500 gpm. There are no initiating events 1for this run... However, a single failure'of an'E-cosw-oo4a.WP) i

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 35

-Rev. O Bus is considered. The E-Bus failure will disable 1 RHRSW pump and leave'l RHRSW pump

' running. The remaining nuclear' header loads are RBCCW, lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Header, and up to two diesel generators. In the o to 10 minute phase, the following information is obtained:

Hich Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 9418 (1.05) = 9889 gpm 9889 > 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1- 692 gpm 0 1.7 psig DG2 723 gpm 0 2.5 psig RHRSW pressure: -1.86 psig Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 9245 (1.05) = 9707 gpm 9707 > 9292 gpm Diesel Generator s flow & pressure: DGl' 665 gpm 0 1.1 psig DG2 695 gpm 0 1.8 psig RHRSW pressure: -3.2 psig Flood Level: (change 5) -

NSWP flow: 9822 (1.05) = 10313 gpm 10313 > 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 758 gpm 0 0.5'psig DG2 793 gpm 0 4.4 psig RHRSW pressure: 1.8 psig Extreme Low Water Level: _(change 7)'

NSWP flow: 9192 (1.05)' = 9652 gpm 9652 > 8225 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 656 gpm @ 0.9 psig DG2 686 gpm 0 1.6 psig RHRSW pressure: -3.7 psig This information shows'that the NSWP flows for all Levels are unacceptably high. However, the RHRSW header pressure is also shown to be far below the trip setpoint'of 18 psig. This will cause the RHRSW to isolate.- This will reduce the required flow from the NSW header by approximately_4000 gpm. This provides more than'enough margin to bring the NSWP flows:into acceptable range. Also, the_Non-Event Unit can cosv-oo4a.wp>

-i Calc. .0SW-0048 Page 36 Rev. O not handle all of the loads with no diesel generator swapping. Both of the Non-Event Unit diesel generators will swap (on low pressure, not on low flow) to the Event Unit. This is acceptable because the Event Unit' initially had a NSWP operable. The diesel generators from the Event Unit may swap back to the Non-Event Unit. This is also an acceptable condition because the Non-Event Unit diesel generators originally swapped due to low pressure and not.

low flow. Therefore, the diesel generators would receive adequate flow even though the pressure is below the setpoint. Following the initial ten minutes of.the event, the opera'cors can take action to restore RHRSW, isolate RBCCW, and reduce flow to the diesel generators.

6.2.1.2 Two NSWPs Operable followina Event 6.2.1.2.1 U1123NE6 For this run (see Attachment 11), the initial set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 7200 gpm. There are no initiating events or single failures for this run. .The nuclear header loads-are RBCCW, lube water.

flow, cross header leakage, the. Vital Header, and up to four diesel generators. In the O to 10 minute phase, the following information is obtained:

Mich Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 6073 (1.05) = 6377 gpm 6074 (1.05) = 6378 gpm ,

6379 < 9552.gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 1124 gpm 0 18.6 psig DG2 1175 gpm 0 20.7 psig DG3 1209 gpm @ 19.2'psig' DG4 1278 gpm 0 23.0 psig Low Bay Level: (change 3) i NSWP flow: 5982 (1.05) = 6281 gpm I 5983 (1.05) = 6282 gpm  !

6282-< 9292 gpm i Diesel Generator '

flow & pressure: DG1 1096 gpm @ 17.4 psig  :

DG2 1147 gpm 0 19.3 psig.

(OSV-0048.VP)

F Calc. OSW-0048 Page 37 Rev. O DG3 -1180 gpm 0 18.0 psig DG4 1247 gpm 0 21.6 psig Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow: 6289 (1.05) = 6603 gpm 6289-(1.05) = 6603 gpm 6603 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DGi- 1190 gpm 0 21.7 psig DG2 1245 gpm 0 24.0 psig DG3 1281 gpm 9 22.4 psig DG4 1354 gpm 0 26.7 psig Extreme Low Water Level:

Not required for an ope 7ating unit.

This information shows that the NSWP flows are acceptable per Sections 4.19 and 4.20 and the diesel generator inlet pressures are acceptable per Section 4.30. Therefore,-the Non-Event Unit can handle all of the loads with no diesel s generator swapping and no NSWP run~out problems.

6.2.1.2.2 U145NE6 For this run (see Attachment 12), the initial set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 5500 gpm and RHRSW set at a flow of 4500 gpm. There are no initiating _ events or single failures for this run. The nuclear header. loads are RHRSW, RBCCW, lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Fander and up to four diesel generators. In the o to 10 minute phase, the following information is obtained:

Hiah Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 7585 (1.05) = 7964 gpm 7586 (1.05) = 7965 gpm 7965 <'9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 950 gpm @ 11.3 psig DG2 994 gpm 9 12.8 psig DG3- 1022(gpm 0 11.8.psig DG4 1080!gpm O_14.5 psig RHRSW pressure: 19.1'psig (OsW-0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 38 Rev. O Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 7482 (1.05) = 7856 gpm 7483 (1.05) = 7857 gpm-7857 < 9292 gpm Diesel Generator '

i flow & pressure: DG1 922 gpm 0 10.2 psig DG2 964 gpm 0 11.6 psig DG3 992 gpm 0 10.7 psig DG4 1049 gpm 0 13.2 psig RHRSW pressure: 16.7 psig Flood Level: (change a)

NSWP flow: "o36

< (1.05) = 8228'gpm 7837 (1.05) = 8229 gpm 8229 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator '

flow & pressure: DG1 1017 gpm-0 14.0.psig DG2 1063 gpm 0 15.7 psig DG3 1093.gpm 0-14.5 psig DG4 1156 gpm 0 17.6 psig RHRSW pressure: 24.9 psig s

Extreme Low Water Level: (change 7)

NSWP flow: 7446--(1.05) = 7818 gpm 7447 (1.05) = 7819.gpm 7819 < 8225 gpm '

Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DGl' 912 gpm 0.9.9 psig DG2 955'gpm 0 11.3 psig DG3 981 gpm 0 10.3 psig DG4 1037 gpm @ 12.8 psig RHRSW pressure: 16.0 psig This information shows that the NSWP flows are' acceptable per Sections 4.19 and 4.20 and the diesel generator inlet-pressures are acceptable per Section 4.30. Therefore,.the Non-Event Unit can handle all of the loads with no diesel generator swapping. However, for the Low Bay Level and Extreme Low Water Level conditions,

~

the RHRSW pumps will trip off due to low header.

pressure. This flow can be restored by operator action in the post 10 minute time frame of the event.

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Calc. r0SW-0048'

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Page'39 -

Rev.:0 4

6.2.2- Unit 2 '

6.2.2.1 QDe NSWP Operable Followina EventL l 6.2.2.1.1 U2123NE2 For.this run-(see Attachment 13), ~ the initial' set up has one NSWP operable with RBCCW set at?

a flow of 7200 gpm.- There are no initiating .;

events and no single failures for this run.;

The loads on the nuclear-headerfare-RBCCW, lube water flow, cross header leakage,- the Vital Header, and up to two diesel' generators. In the O to 10 minute phase, the following  ;

information.is obtained:.  !

Hich Bay Level: -(change 1) j NSWP flow: 8062 (1.05) = s8465 gpm-  :

8465 < 9552 gpm a Diesel Generator ,

flow & pressure: DG3 966 gpm @ 11.3Lpsig

  • DG4 864 gpm @ 14.1.psig  ;;

Low Bay Level: (change 3)-

NSWP flow: 7910 (1.05)L='8304 gpm~ l Diesel Generator ~ '

flow & pressure: DG3 942'gpm 0 10.4 psig DG4 842'gpm 9 13.1 psig- 1 Flood Level: (change.5)-

NSWP flow: 8384-(1.05) = 8803 gpm ,

8803 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator i flow & pressure:- 'DG3 '1032 gpm'9"13.8 psig .

DG4 922 gpm 0.17.1 psig i

i Extreme Low Water-Level:-  ;

Not required for an. operating unit..

This'information shows that:the NSWP flows?are' ,I*

acceptanle per Soctions14.19 and:4.20'andithe diesel _ generator inlet pressuresJare acceptable per Section-4.30. -Therefore,.the.Non-Event Unit can handle all of the loads withino-diesel ~- 3' generator swapping.

(Osv 0048.WP)  !

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Calc. OSW-0048 Page 40 Rev. O G.2.2.1.2 U245NE2 For this run (see Attachment 14), the initial set up has one NSWP operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 4000 gpm and RHRSW set at a flow of 2800 gpm. There are no initiating events or single failures for this run. The nuclear header loads are RHRSW, RBCCW, lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Header,'and up to two diesel generators. In the O to 10

minute phase, the following information is obtained

Hich Bay Levell (change 1)

NSWP flow: 8771 (1.05) = 9210 gpm 9210 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG3 813 gpm 0 6.0 psig DG4 726 gpm @ 8.0 psig

, RHRSW pressure: 2.8 psig Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 8607 (1.05) = 9037 gpm 9037 < 9292 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG3 789 gpm @ 5.2.psig DG4 705 gpm 0 7.1 psig RHRSW pressure: 1.5 psig Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow: 9128 (1.05) = 9584 gpm 9584- > 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure DG3 882 gpm @.8.2 psig DG4- 788 gpm 0 10.6 psig RHRSW pressure: 6.9 psig Extreme Low Water ~ Level: (change 7)

NSWP flow 8555 (1.05) = 8983 gpm 8983 > 8225 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG3 781 gpm 0 5.0 psig DG4 697.gpm @ 6.8 psig.

RHRSW pressure: 1.0 psig

-This information shows that the NSWP flows-for the Flood Level and the Extreme Low Water Level are unacceptably high. However, the RHRSW header pressure is also shown to be far below (OSW-0045.VP) l I

4

Calc.- 05W-0048 Page 41 Rev. O the trip setpoint of 18 psig. This will cause the RHRSW to isolate. This will reduce the required flow from the NSW header by approximately 2500 gpm. T.fis provides more than enough margin to' bring the NSUP_ flows into acceptable range. Also, the Non-Event Unit can-not handle all of the loads with no diesel generator swapping. Both of the Non-Event Unit diesel generators will-swap (on low pressure,.

not on low flow) to the Event Unit (except for Flood Level where only one diesel generator will swap). This is acceptable because.the Event Unit initially had two NSWPs operable.

The diesel generators from the Event Unit may 4 swap back to the Non-Event Unit. This is an acceptable condition because the Non-Event Unit diesel generators originally swapped due to low pressure and not low flow. Therefore, the diesel. generators would receive adequate flow even though the pressure is below the setpoint.

Following the initial ten minutes of the event, s

the operators can take action to restore RHRSW, isolate RBCCW, and reduce flow to the diesel generators.

6.2.2.1.3 U245NE14 -

For this run (see Attachment 15), the initial set up has two NSWPs operable <with RBCCW set at a flow of 5500 gpm and RHRSW set at a flow of 4500 gpm. There are io. initiating events for this run. However, a single failure of an E-bus is considered. The E-Bus' failure will disable 1 RERSW pump and leave l'RHRSW pump running. The remaining nuclear header' loads are RBCCW, lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Header, and up to-two diesel generators. In the O to 10 minute phase, the following information is obts.ined:

Hiah Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 9202 (1.05) = 9662 gpm 9662 > 9552 gpm Diesel Generator i flow &. pressure: DG3 _702 gpm 0 2.7 psig DG4 627 gpm @'4.2 psig RHRSW pressure: -2.9 psig (OSW 0048.WP)

4 Calc.- OSW-0048 Page142 Rev. O _.

k Low-Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 9036 (1.05) =;9488 gpm 9488 > 9292 gpm

_ Diesel Generator _ >

flow & pressure: DG3' 675 gpm 9-2.0 psig-DG4 603 gpm.0 3.4 psig RHRSW pressure:- -4.2 psig Flood Level: (change'5)' ,

NSWP flow: 9599 (1.05) = 10079 gpm 10079 >-9552 gpm.

Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG3 769 gpm-@i4.6 psig DG4 -687-gpm.@ 6.4 psig RHRSW pressure: 0.5 psig Extreme Low Water Level: .(change 7)

NSWP flow: 8980 (1.05) =:9429 gpm 9429 > 8225 gpm.

Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG3 665 gpm 0~1.7;psig-s DG4 595 gpm 9 3.1 psig-RHRSW pressure: ~-4.6 psig This information shows that the NSWP flows for all Levels are. unacceptably:high. However,-the RHRSW header pressure;is also.shown!to beLfar. ..

below the trip.setpointzof 18 psig. This will cause the RHRSW to-isolate. This will reduce-the required flow from the NSW header'by-approximately 4000 gpm., This provides more than enough margin to bring'the NSWP' flows into acceptable range. .=Also, the Non-Event Unit'can ,

not handle:all of the loads with no' diesel.

generator swapping. Both of.the Non-Event Unit diesel generators will swap'(on low pressure,-

not on low flow)--torthe. Event Unit. This is~

acceptable'because the Event Unit'initiallyEhad a NSWP operable. :The~ diesel generatorsMfrom the Event-Unit;may swap back to-the Non-Event.

  • Unit. This is.also an acceptable-condition' because the.Non-Event Unit-diesel generators 1 originally swapped due to. low pressure and not low flow. "Therefore, theldiesel generators ,

would receive adequate flow even though the-pressure'issbelow.the setpoint. Followingither <

initial ten minutes of.the event,.the. operators can take: action to restore"RHRSW, isolate:

RBCCW,~and reduce flow to'the! diesel generators..

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.Page 43

Rev. O  !

6.2.2.2 Two NSWPs Ocerable followina Event 6.2.2.2;1- U21233NE6

~ For this run (see

Attachment:

16) , .the initial .

set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW' set.at a flow of 7200 gpm.. There are no' initiating  !

events or single failures for this run. ' The. i nuclear header loads are RBCCW,~1ube water flow, cross header leakage,:the-Vital Header,.

and up to four diesel generators. In the o to t 10 minute phase ~,' the following?information is e obtained:

Hich-Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 5866 (1.05) = 6159 gpm:

-5866 (1.05) = 6159 gpm ,

6159 < 9552 gpm' Diesel Generator flow & pressure: .DG1 1001;gpm 0 24.9 psig ([

DG2 1046 gpm @.26.7.psig ,

s DG3 1176~gpm 9: 22.2'psig-  :

DG4 1110 gpm 0-29.9.psig; Low Bay Level: (change 3) -

NSWP: flow: 5780 (1.05) =.6069 gpm 5781 (1.05) = 6070 gpm- .

6070 <i9292 gpm Diesel Generator J flow & pressuret DG1 978 gpm @ :23.4 psig DG2. 1020 gpm 9 25.0:psig DG3 - 1148 gpm 0.20.8.psig .

DG4 1082 gpm 0-28.1 psig .

Flood Level: (change 5)

NSWP flow:- -6068 (l'.05)~=-6371 gpm;  ;

6068 ~ (1.~05)-= 6371 gpm-6371 <L9552;gpm Diesel Generator. '

flow & pressure: DG1 1061 gpm @ 28.8tpsig; -

DG2' 1108"gpm 0.30.7--psig.~

, :l DG3 - 1246 gpm 9"25.7Lpsig DG4 1175 gpm.9.34.4 psig

. Extreme Low Water Level:

Not required for anLoperating unit. [

This information~shows that the NSWP~ flows;are.

acceptable per Sections 4.19 and 4.20.and the'

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Calc. OSW-0048 Page 44 Rev. O diesel generator inlet pressures:are acceptable per Section 4.30. Therefore, the Non-Event Unit can handle all of the loads with no diesel generator swapping and no NSWP run out problems.

6.2.2.2.2 U245NE6 For this run (see Attachment 17), the initial-set up has two NSWPs operable with RBCCW set at a flow of 5500 gpm and RHRSW set at a flow of 4500 gpm. There are no initiating events or single failures for this run. The nuclear header loads are RHRSW, RBCCW, lube water flow, cross header leakage, the Vital Header, and up to four diesel generators. In the o to 10-minute phase, the following information is obtained:

Hich Bay Level: (change 1)

NSWP flow: 7396 (1.05) = 7766 gpm s

7396 (1.05)1= 7766 gpm 7766 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 841 gpm 0 15.5'psig DG2 878 gpm 0 16.8'psig DG3 988 gpm 0 13.6 psig DG4 931 gpm 0 19.0 psig RHRSW pressure: 18.8 psig Low Bay Level: (change 3)

NSWP flow: 7299 (1.05) = 7664 gpm -

7300 (1.05) = 7665 gpm 7665 < 9292 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 815 gpm 0 14.2 psig DG2 851 gpm 0 15.3 psig DG3 958 gpm 0 12.4 psig DG4 903 gpm 0 17.5 psig RHRSW pressure: 16.4 psig (OSV 0048.WP)

c- -

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i Calc. OSW-0048-Page 45 Rev. O t

Flood Level: .(change 5)

NSWP flow: 7630 (1.05) = 8012 gpm 7630 ( 1.' 05 ) . = 8 012 gpm -

8012 < 9552 gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DGl . 902 gpm.@ 18.9 psig DG2- 941 gpm: 9.20.3 psig DG3 1059 gpm 0 16.7 psig

~DG4 998 gpm 0.22.9 psig:

RHRSW pressure:

24.8 psig' Extreme Low Water Level: ..(change 7)'

NSWP flow: 7265 (1.05) =.7628 gpm 7265-(1.05) = 7628 gpm 7628 < 8225.gpm Diesel Generator flow & pressure: DG1 807.gpm 9 13.8 psig' j DG2 843 gpm @ 14'.9 psig.

DG3- 948 gpm-@ 12.0 psig-DG4 894 gpm @ 17.0 psig o

RHRSW pressure: 15.6 psig-This-information shows that the NSWP' flows are' acceptable per Sections 4 19 andE4.20 and the diesel generator inlet p1 assures are1 acceptable per Section 4.30. Therefore, the Non-Event' Unit can handle all of the loads with'no-diesel- -

generator swapping. For the1 Low Bay Level and Extreme Low Water Level conditions, the.RHRSW pumps will trip off due to low header. pressure.

After the initial 1O minutes of the event, they operators can restore' flow to the RHRSW.

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(0$W 0048.WP)

Calc. OSW-0048 Page 46 Rev. 0

7.0 CONCLUSION

S Using the flow restrictions from calculations G0050A-10 and G0050A-12, the Service Water System can meet its functional requirements ,

for all but the following conditions:

7.1 Event Unit Through the action of the diesel generators swapover logic, the Service Water system can meet all of the required flow conditions. For the cases where the~ Event Unit diesel generators swap to the Non-Event Unit due to low pressure at the diesel generator inlet, the Non-Event Unit diesels may swap back to the Event Unit. This is not a concern because, for these cases, the Event Unit can supply adequate flow to the diesel generators (the original swap to the Non-Event Unit ,

occurs due to low pressure not low flow).

7.2 Non-Event Unit s

Through the action of the diesel generators swapover logic, the Service Water system can meet all of the required flow conditions. For the cases where the Non-Event Unit diesel generators swap to the Event Unit due to low pressure at the diesel generator inlet, the Event Unit diesels may swap back to the Non-Event Unit. This is not a concern because, for these cases, the Non-Event Unit can supply adequate flow to the diesel generators (the original swap to the Event Unit occurs due to low pressure not low flow). The exception to this could occur when there are no remaining NSWPs on the Event Unit. However, examining the results of the calculation shows that when the Event Unit has no operable NSWPs, the Non-Event Unit can supply adequate flow at adequate pressure to prevent any diesel generators from swapping back to the Event Unit.

For the reasons described in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, the Service Water System can meet its design requirements (provided current flow restrictions are maintained) with the proposed changes to Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.

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OSW-0048 Att. 1, Rev. O Page 1 of 10 ATTACHMENT 1 This Attachment shows the possible combinationc of units under the proposed change to Tech Spec 3.7.1.2. Table 1 on page 2 shows the set j up for each Attachment. For situations where a case is beunded by '

another Attachment or where no NSWPs are available, no Attachment number is assigned or KYPIPE cases run. For the cases where there are no NSWPs available for a Unit, the other' Unit is assumed to carry all ,

four diesel generators in the analysis.

While Table 1 presents the set up and Event for each unit separately, pages 3 - 10 present the possible lineup combinations of both units under the proposed change to Tech Spec 3.7.1.2. It also lists the i KYPIPE runs that were used to evaluate the different scenario. If an attachment and change are listed in the tables, it fus in reference to Calculations G0050A-10 and G0050A-12 (which cover the majority of Event Unit conditions).

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PROPOSED TS 3.7.1.2 EVENT SCENARIOS EVENT UNtT MODES 1.2.3- NON EVENT UNrf kODES 1.2 3 (MWrMUM WATER LMt ts -6 0* MSL) t EVENT UNff - MODES 1.2.3 tRBCCW MAX. FLOW - 7200 GPMt NON-EVENT UNIT MODES 1,2,3 (ROCCW M AX. FLOW - 7200 OPM) 13Je . -

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