ML20046A335
| ML20046A335 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1992 |
| From: | Casey M, Prater G, Reynolds L CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046A307 | List: |
| References | |
| G0050A-12, G0050A-12-R05, G50A-12, G50A-12-R5, NUDOCS 9307270253 | |
| Download: ML20046A335 (100) | |
Text
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ATTACHMENT 3 BSEP 93-0112 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR-62 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST UNIT 2 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS (G0050A-12, REV. 5)
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ~
.P. O. BOX 1551 RALEIGH,'. NORTH CAROLINA 27602 ANALYSIS FOR BSEP UNIT NO. 2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATINC LIMITS FOR PCN C0050A - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DET ISSUES ANALYSIS I.D.
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ANALYSIS FOR
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SAFETY CLASSIFICATION:
SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION:
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VERIF1ED BY/
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Computed by:
Date:
Calculation ID:
Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A-12 1
Checked by:
Date:
P.
4 Rev_ 5 E
CALCULATION SITEET TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File:
PCNG0050A I
1 Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calcu;ation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status:
Prelim.
Final e Void LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Pace No.
-Revision i
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(U2CALCR4.WP)
Computed by.
Date:
Calculation ID:
Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A l'2 Checked by:
Date:
Pg.
5 Rev. 5 TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File:
PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System. Operating. Limits Status:
Prelim.
Final M Void LIST OF EFFECTIVE PACES (con't)
Pace No.
Revision 38 5
39 5
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b (U2CALCR4.W)
m Computed by:
Date:
alculation ID:
' Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by:
Date:
Pg.
6 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET' TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File:
PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues
~
Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status:
Prelim.{]
Finalem Void l
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PACES (con't)
Revision
- f. ace No.-
g3 Att. 1 Chk Pages) 5 Att. 2 (6 Pages) 5 Att. 3 (28 Pages) 5 Att. 4 (10 Pages) 5 Att. 5 (16 Pages) 5 Att. 6 (6 Pages) 5 Att. 7 (24 Pages) 5 Att. 8 (10 Pages) 5 Att. 9 (1 Page )
5 Att. 10 (1 Page )
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5 Att. 12 (1 Pages) 5 Att. 13 (14 Pages) 5 Att. 14 (17 Pages) 5 Att. 15 (13 Pages) 5 Att. 16 (16 Pages) 5 Att. 17 (1 Page )
5 Att. 18 (1 Page )
5 Att. 19 (12 Pages) 4 Att. 20 (10 Pages) 4 Att. 21 (2 Pages) 4 Att. 22 (3 Pages) 4 Att. 23 (5 Pages) 4 Att. 24 (2 Pages) 4 i
Att. 25 (1 Page) 4 Att. 26 (6 Pages) 4 Att. 27 (2 Pages) 5 (U2CALCR4.W) e r
Computed by:
Date:
alculation 1D:
Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A +
Checked.by:
Date:
Pg.
7 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File:
PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status:
Prelim.
Final n Void TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Eage Title Page 1
List of Effective Pages 4
Table of Contents 7
1.0 Purpose 10 2.0 Summary of Results 13 3.0 References 14 4.0 Assumptions 17 5.0 Computer Model Validation 26 6.0 Calculations 27 6.1 Normal SW System Configuration 27 6.2 Vital Header Aligned to the CSW Header 39
'6.3 RBCCW Not Aligned to the NSW Header 39 6.4 RHRSW 1solated From the NSW Header 39 I
7.0 Conclusions 41
-l (U2CALCR4.WP).
I
Computed by:
Date:
- """U Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A 12 Checked by:
Date:
Pg.
8 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET 4
PCNG0050A
?
Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status:
Prelim.
Final u Void TABLE OF CONTENTS (con't)
Section Title Pare Att. 1 Accident Analysis Results -
Power Operation Att. 2 Accident Summary Tables -
Power Operation Att. 3 Accident Analysis Results -
Outage Operation Att. 4 Accident Summary Tables -
i Outage Operation Att. 5 Accident Analysis Results -
Extreme Low Water Level Operation Att. 6 Accident Summary Tables -
Extreme Low Water Level Operation Att. 7 Accident Analysis Results -
Flood Operation Att. 8 Accident Summary Tables -
Flood Operation Att. 9 Deleted Att. 10 Deleted Att. 11 Deleted Att. 12 Deleted Att. 13 Data File for "U2 MOD 123" Att. 14 Data File for "U2 MODE 45" Att. 15 Data File for "U2XLOLVL" (U2CALCR4.WP) l 1
~
Computed by:
Date:
Calculation ID:
Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A 12 Checked by:
Date:
Pg.
9 Rev. 5
^
TAR /PID No 'PCN-G0050A File:
PCNG0050A-Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation.
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water. System Operating Limits Status:
Prelim.((} Final u Void Att 16 Data File for "U2 FLOOD" Att. 17 Deleted l
Att. 18 Deleted l
Atc. 19 Data File for "U2CALBN2" Att. 20 Data File for "U2MASTRl" Att. 21 NPSHA Calculations Att. 22 Cross-Header Leakage Evaluation Att. 23 Service Water Lube Water Flow Requirements Att. 24 CSW Pump Long-Term Cooling Capability.
Att. 25 Service Water System KYPIPE Model Flow Diagram Att. 26 RHR Pump Seal Cooler Evaluation Att, 27 Design Verification Forms l
}
T (U2CALCR4.WP)
Computed by:
Date:
alculation ID:
Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by:
Date:
Pg.
10 Rev. 5 TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File:
PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status:
Prelim.
Final u Void 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this calculation is to verify the design capability of the BSEP Unit 2 Service Water system.
Full design capability is established by satisfying the system functional requirements defined by the following two criteria:
1.1 The Service Water system design shall provide the required cooling flows to all. safety-related equipment aligned to the system.
These cooling flows shall be supplied under all credible system operating conditions, including the worst-case combinations of design basis events, single failures, and initial system parameters.
1.2 The Service Water system shall ensure full operability of all required safety-related equipment by operating within established equipment design limits.
Normal system operating lineups will be examined. Any design and/or operational limitations required to ensure full system design capability will be identified by evaluation of predicted Service Water system performance during the worst case design basis accidents and transients.
Service Water system performance will be simulated using a KYPIPE computer model of the U2 SW system for various. operating scenarios.
In general, the approach followed in this calculation is intended to ensure the worst case conditions for the Service Water system are analyzed. The design basis events for which the BSEP Service Water system must be designed are identified, primarily by review of UFSAR Chapter 12.
Those events which are most limiting with respect to SU-system performance are selected for simulation. Then, the functional requirements (component flows, equipment limitations, etc.) the SW system must satisfy during these events are established. The next step involves selection of the most limiting single failures which must be assumed to occur coincidentally with the design basis events.
- Finally, the initial (pre-event) configuration of the SW system and the specific process conditions which would be the most limiting following occurrence of an event are identified. All these factors are used to structure the computer simulations to represent the worst-case scenarios. The simulation results are chen used to verify the Service Water system is fully capable'of meeting the design criteria listed above.
1 (U2CAltR4.WP)
J
Computed by:
Date:
alculat n ID:
Carolina' Power _& Light Company.
C0050A-12 Checxed by:
Date:
Ig.
11 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No.:PCN C0050A File:
PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status:
Prelim.
Final te Void The evaluations of SW system performance will cover operation under the four operating scenarios listed below for normal system configurations:
l Power operation Outage / Shutdown operation Extreme Low Weter Level operation Flood operation System and equipment responses to design basis events (accidents and/or transients) are divided.into two time periods based on the ability of plant personnel to take manual actions to mitigate the consequences of the event. The two timc periods are the 0-10 minute phase and the after 10 minute phase. Each time period entails unique challenges to equipment and system parameters which must be evaluated.
General system-and equipment design requirements which will be verified are listed below for each phase. The specific quantitative values for these parameters are defined in the applicable sections of this calculation.
0-10 Minute Phase SW Pump NPSHR restrictions i
Ccmponent cooling loads e
l (U2CALCR4.W)
I s
Computed by:
Date:
Carolina Power & Light Company i Calculation ID:
l C0050A 12 Checked by:
Date:
Pg.
12 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File:
PCNG0050A-Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status:
Prelim.
Final M Void 110 Minute Phase Component cooling limitations Service Water system response during an event is also a function of system configuration prior to the event.
Positions of throttling valves and SW strainer pressure drop are two of the factors which can influence SW system performance. Accordingly, the initial system configurations from which the design basis events (DBE) are assumed to occur are a?so simulated. This ensures the worst-case SW system configurations are used for the DBE simulations.
i (U2CALCR4.WP) r
kG Computed by:
Date:
Calculation ID:
Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A 12-Checked by:
Date:
~5-Pg.
13 Rev.
^
^
PCNC0050A Project
Title:
. Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water. System Operating Limits Status:
Prelim.
-Final Na Void {))
2.0
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS The following paragraphs provide a general picture of the SW system capabilities for the stated configurations, Specific conclusions about flow restrictions, lineup restrictions, etc. are addressed in detail in Sections 6.0 and 7.0.
2.1 Normal SW System Configuration The SW system is capable of meeting its design bases requirements provided specific operating restrictions are observed.
Flow restrictions include maximum limits-for RBCCW and RHRSW to ensure acceptable post-DBA flow rates through the SW pumps.
During extreme low water level operating conditions, NSW header flow restrictions are tightened further because of the lower intake canal level.
2.2 Vital Header Aligned to the CSW Hender The SW system can meet its design bases requirements with the Vital header isolated from the NSW header provided normal SW system constraints are imposed.
Previous flow ano lineup restrictions are no longer required due to the implementation of modifications described in Assumption 4.36.
Certain operating restrictions still apply and are outlined in Section 6.2.
2.3 RBCCW Not Aligned to the NSW Header The SW system can meet its design bases with RBCCW isolated from the NSW header provided normal SW system constraints are imposed.
Previous system restrictions are no longer required due to implementation of modifications described in Assumption 4,36.
Certain flow restrictions still apply as outlined in Section 6.3.
2.4 RHRSW Isolated From the NSW Header The SW system can meet its design bases with RHRSW isolated from the NSW header.
(U2CALCR4.W)
Computed by:
Date:
Calculation.ID.
Carolina Power & Light Company w
C0050A-12 Checked by:
Date:
pg, 14-
- Rev. 5
^
PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Prelim.{]
Final n Void Status:
3.0 REFERENCES
3.1 Johnston Pump Co. Report, Johnston Job No. NA-6508, dated 6/26/89 (CP&L P.O. No. 556884C) 3.2 Calculation OSW-0032, Rev. O, Intake Canal Hydraulic Analysis, William G.
Daniel and Associates, dated 5/30/89 3.3 Calculation C0050A-20, Rev. O, " Hydraulic Analysis of Cooling Water Intake. Canal and Pump Intake Structure" 3.4 Syrtem Description SD 43, Rev 14 " Service Water System" l
3.5 Calculation PCN-C0050A-01, Rev. 2, "RHR' Room Cooler Allowable Service Water Inlet Temperature" 3.6 Calculation PCN-C0050A-02, Rev. 2, " Service Water Flow Rate Reduction Effect on Service Water Inlet Temperature for Core Spray Room Air Coolers" 3.7 Calculation No. G0050A-16, Rev. 1, "BSEP U1 and U2 Service Water Single Failure Analysi;"
3.8 Calculation C0050A-14, Rev. 1, "BSEP U1 and U2 Service' Water Systems Cross-Leakage Evaluations" 3.9 Calculation PCN-G0050A 11, Rev. O, "RHR Service Water Flow During Cold Shutdown" 3.10 Calculation C0050A-08, Rev. 1. " Resizing of Flow Orifices 2-SW-F0-1187 and 1-SW-FO-1188" 3.11 BFEP Calculation No. M-89-0008, Rev. O, " Heat Balance on DG #2 Jacket Water / Service Water HX", File No. 5110 3.12 Acceptance Test Results for Special Procedure 2-SP-89-021, Rev.-1,
" Unit 2 NSW System Flow Tests" 3.13 Acceptance Test Results for Special Procedure 1-SP-89-027, Rev.
1,
" Unit 1 NSW System Flow Tests."
(U2CALCR4.kP)
Computed by:
Date:
Calculation ID:._
Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A 12-Checked by:
Date:
Pg.
15 Rev. 5 TAE/PID No. PCN G0050A
~ CALCULATION SHEET File:
PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating _ Limits Status:
Prelim.
Final u Void 3.14 Acceptance Test Results for Plant Mod. No.89-075, " Replacement of FO-1187 to Restore Design Flow Rate" 3.15 Test Results for Special Procedure 1-SP-90-004, " Service Water System Hydraulic Performance Test" 3.16 EER-89-0166, Rev. 1, " Verification of Acceptable Service Water Flow to RHR for Worst-Case Expected LOCA Containment Cooling" 3.17 EER-89-0135, Rev. 1, "JCO f or Adequacy of Service Water System to Meet Design Bases Flow Requirements" 3.18 EER-89 0220, Rev. O, "JCO for Adequacy of Service Water System to Meet Design Bases Flow Requirements" 3.19 EER-89-0163, Rev. 1, " Revised Operating Lineup for SW System" 3.20 Plant Modification No.89-049, " Upgrade of SW Valve SW-V103 to Motor-Operated Valve - Unit 2" 3.21 Plant Modification No.89-051, " Unit 2'RHR SW Pumps Supply Header Pressure Switches" 3.22 Plant Modification No. 89 089, " Add LOOP Closure Logic to SW-V103 and SW-V106" - Unit 2 3.23 GE Letter from J. S. Mokri to E. A. Bishop, dated 7/19/89,.NED File No. PCNG0050A 3.24 Johnston Pump Company letter to Mr. Al Bishop from Mr. Mark D. Moon, dated September 1,1989, File No. BG0050A-AA A500 3.25 Telecon dated 11/10/89 between Mark Moon (Johnston= Pump Co.) and Michael Casey (CP&L), File No. BG0050A-DE-A543 3.26 Cameron Hydraulic Data, 16th Edition 3.27 Crane Technical Paper No. 410, 1982 3.28 BSEP Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (U2CALCR4.WP)
Computed by:
Date:
Calculation ID:
Carolina Power & Light Company
-G0050A-12 Checked by:
Date:
Pg.
16' Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File:
PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating. Limits Status:
Prelim.
Final [ Void [)) 3.29 BSEP Abnormal Operating Procedure No. AOP-013, Rev 8 " Operation 'l. During Hurricane, Tornado, or Flood Conditions" .j 3.30 Deleted. (Previously 3.29) 3.31 Deleted. (Previously 3.30) 3.32 Deleted. (Previously 3.31) 3.33 Plant Modification No. 90-009, " Service Water Valve V3 & V4 Valve Closure Logic Change" 3.34 EER 89-0334, Rev. O, " Evaluate Effect of Service Water Lube Water Pump Discharge Check Valve Failure" 3.35 EER-91-0450, Rev. O, " Unit 2 Service Water Operability" 3.36 Acceptance Test Results for Periodic Test Procedure 2-PT 24.6.4, Rev. 1, " Service Water System Hydraulic Performance Test" 3.37 BSEP Abnormal Operating Procedure No. AOP-18.0, Rev 7 " Nuclear Service Water System Failure" I 'l i JU2TEXTR5.5m) 1 )
computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 17 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /IID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. - Fina1{}} Void 4.C ASSUMPTIONS 4.1 Lube water flow rate is set for individual computer simulations based on interpolation of test data from Reference 3.12. 4.2 The maximum normal water level in the SW pump bay.is +2.0 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). t 4.3 The minimum normal water level in the pump bay is -6.0 feet MSL based on References 3.3 and 3.4 Reference 3.4 states the maximum circulating water _ flow rate is approximately 1,050,000 gpm. Reference 3.3 provides head loss curves for circulating water and service water in terms of intake canal level. A maximum SW flow of 50,000 gpm (25,000 per unit) is assumed for use with Reference 3.3. 4.4 A minimum SW strainer AP of 1.0 psid is assumed for the initial configurations f or maximum flow cases. The low AP is consistent with plant observations of low strainer AP during SW system operation and is conservative since it results in greater system / pump flow in the 0-10 minute phase of an event. The maximum strainer AP of 4.5 psid is used for-component cooling evaluations in the greater than 10 minute phase of an event since it minimizes pump flow. 4,5 The SW Strainer Backwash system operates during an accident to limit the maximum strainer'AP'to 4.5 psid. 4.6 Deleted. (Previously 4.6) l 4.7 SW inlet temperature is at the design maximum of 90*F. 4.8 No credit f or operator action is taken for the 0-10 minute phase of a design basis event. This applies to both the event and non-event units. 4.9 Operator action is assumed for the >10 minute phase of an event (subject to availability o.f equipment and accessibility to specific areas) to perform manual operations including: a) align a 2nd SW pump to one of the operating SW headers (U2TEXTR5.WP)
Computed.by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: P, 18 Rev, 5 CALCULATION SHEET ~ TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues \\ Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final u Void b) establish RHRSW flow I This assumption applies to both the event and non-event units. 4.10 For power operation (Modes 1-3), the accidents / initiating events to be considered are LOCA outside Primary Containment (HELB) and LOOP. These events will be evaluated in concert with the most limiting single active failure. Initiation of a LOCA signal causes the greatest number of component flow paths to be automatically aligned to the NSW header. The diesel generator supply valves for both units and the Vital header component isolation valves all open. Additionally, the standby NSW pump starts and any operating RHRSW pumps trip. Initiation of a LOOP signal causes the same actions as a LOCA signal, with the exception that the Vital header component isolation valves will not open automatically. These isolation valves are held closed following a LOOP by air from the emergency air compressors. These compressors are no longer safety-related and cannot be credited during a design basis event. However, when l having the component isolation valves closed is more limiting, the 't air pressure in the emergency air header is assumed not to decay and the isolation valves remain closed. For the maximum flow scenarios (0-10 minute phase), emergency air ] is assumed to fail, causing the Vital header component isolation valves to fail open. With the Vital header component flow paths open, the LOOP and LOCA events are equivalent. For the component cooling scenarios (>10-minute phase), these events are equivalent since Reactor Building access is no longer required to isolate RBCCW due to automatic closure of SW-V103 and SW-V106 on an accident signal. 4.11 The limiting single active failures listed below for power operation with normal system configurations have been applied in accordance with Ref. 3.7. Limiting f ailures for other scenarios are addressed in applicable sections of the calculation body. 4.11.1 For the 0-10 minute phase (maximum pump flow case), the emergency bus supplying one NSW pump fails. l (U2iEXTRS.WP) 6 i
Computed by: Dat'ei Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Lidd Company G0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 19 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. FCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. -2 Service Water-System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final u Void [)) 4.11.2 Deleted. (Previously 4.11.2) l 4.11.3 For the after 10-minute phase, one E-bus fails, preventing operator action to restart the associated SW pumps. 4.12 For outage operation (Modes 4 and 5), the following accidents / initiating events are considered: LOOP LOCA signal (not an actual pipe break) due to operator error or instrumentation failure The discussion under Assumption 4.10 regarding which event is bounding applies here, also, with the exception of the >10-minute phase. For the >10 minute phase during outage. operation, operator - action can be taken for both of the above events since an HELB is not assumed. 4.13 The limiting single active failures listed below for outage operation with normal system configurations have been applied in accordance with Ref. 3.7. Limiting failures for other scenarios are addressed in applicable sections of the calculation body. 4.13.1 For the 0-10 minute phase (maximum pump flow cases), two different situations exist. 4.13.1.1 When two NSW pumps are operable on the NSW header, the emergency bus supplying one NSW pump and the RHRSW pump throttle valve F068 l fails, resulting in unavailability of these components. 4.13.1.2 When one NSW pump is operable on the NSW header, the trip coil on one of the operating RHRSW l pumps fails, causing that RHRSW pump to restart l on re energization of the E-Bus (LOOP) or to continue running (LOCA). The F068 valve is assumed to stay open since the only time it goes closed is when both RHRSW pumps are off. For i 1 (U2TExtRS.WPhe tw
Computed by: Date: alculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 20 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating-Limits-4 Status: Prelim. Final u Void conservatism in the ar.alysis, both pumps are assumed to be on which will provide the most flow. 4.13.2 Deleted. (Previously 4.13.2) l 4.13.3 For the after 10-minute phase, one E-Bus fails, preventing operator action to restart the associated SW pump (s). } 4.14 During the 0-10 minute and after 10 minute accident phases, the conventional SW header (or nuclear header, in certain outage scenarios) is assumed to be depressurized. This maximizes cross-tie leakage. 4.15 Deleted. (Previously 4.15) 4.16 Service water specific gravity = 1.03. 4.17 The. initial SW system configurations assumed for the accident scenarios are those providing the most limiting conditions (consistent with system operating restrictions) upon initiation of the accident. For example: r 4.17.1 Deleted. (Previously 4.17.1) 4,17.2 For the maximum flow cases (power operation), the only loads aligned to the NSW header are Lube Water and RBCCW. Upon an accident signal, RBCCW is isolated by closure of valves V103'and V106. In the initial configuration, RBCCW is at the maximum flow consistent with a minimum 40 psig SW header pressure. SW header pressures lower than 40 psig would cause auto-start of the standby NSW pump, which is not as conservative as one pump in operation. With one pump in operation, all flow will go through one strainer. Consequently, a lower minor loss through the strainer will be required to maintain 1.0 psid. This in turn will cause accident flows to be higher and thus provide a limiting starting configuration. (U2TEXTRS.W) 2.
t 'l Computed by: Date: "IC"'** " I Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 21 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final u Void 4.17.3 For the maximum flow cases (outage. operation), RBCCW and RHRSW are at their maximum allowed flow rates which minimizes NSW header pressure and causes RHRSW throttle valves to be placed in a more open position. 4.17.4 For the comp-" nt cooling flow cases, minimum water l 1evel in the ' pump bay is assumed. Additional limiting assumptions for initial configurations are discussed in applicable sections of this calculation. 4.18 The only required cooling loads in the 0-10 minute phase are the DG jacket water coolers.and SW pump lube water. 4.19 The minimum pump bay water level during a hurricane is -8.63 feet MSL. This is based on information found in UFSAR Section 9.2.1.3. This value is the lowest and therefore the most conservative extreme low pump bay water level value. 4.20 The maximum flood water level is +22.0 feet MSL as stated in UFSAR Section 2.4.5. 4.21 Minimum submergence requirements for the SW pumps are satisfied at ) a water level of -8,63 feet MSL based on data in Reference 3.1. 4.22 The maximum allowable pump flow rate is 10,000 gpm per Reference 3.25. This flow rate assumes NPSHR requirements of the SW pump are satisfied. 4.23 The maximum allowable pump flow rate for extreme low water level' conditions is 8225 gpm based on NPSHR data contained in Reference 3.1. 4.24 The maximum allowabic flows given by Reference 3.24 will be used in lieu of the SW pump NPSHR curve to determine acceptable SW pump flows for accide.t scenarios run with SW pump intake bay water i levels of -6.0 feet MSL and +2.0 feet MSL. 4.25 Service Water pump operability requirements consistent with Technical Specification 3.7.1.2, as defined by current TSI's and/or operating procedures, have been assumed in this (U2TEXTR5.W) l i
~ Computed by: Date: Calculation 1D Carolina Power & Light. Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: r p, 22 Rev. 5 g ^ TAR /PID No'. PCN G0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System' Operating Limits f Status: Prelim. Final u Void calculation. These restrictions provide single' failure protection for both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems and ensure acceptable SW system and SW pump performance during all' operating conditions, including hurricane and flood. 4.26 Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires two NSW pumps operable'on l the applicable unit during Modes 1-3 and -three NSW pumps operable per site during Modes 4-5. With these requirements in place, no credible design basis event scenario can be postulated which requires one unit to supply all 4 DG's with only one NSW pump operable. A minimum of two NSW pumps per site will remain after a postulated single failure. These two pumps, coupled with the DC swapover logic, will ensure adequate supply to all four diesels. 4.27 Test data from 2-PT-24.6.4 (Ref. 3.36) verify the Unit 2 cross-tie leakage between the NSW and CSW headers is approximately 360 gpm at a dif ferential pressure of 40 psid. However, a leakage factor equal to the previously established Unit 1 leakage factor has-.been assumed in this calculation. For comparison, the assumed leakage factor results in approximately 950 gpm leakage at 40 psid. This. assumption provides SW system performance margin which can be used in the future to offset system and equipment degradation. 4.28 For many of the hydraulic analyses contained in this calculation, the flow rates through the.RBCCW and RHRSW flow paths'in the. initial configurations were limited to' ensure satisfactory system performance during any subsequent design basis event. The flow rates were limited by varying the minor' loss factors of the respective throttling valves for these flow paths. The final-minor loss factors were then carried through to the subsequent simulations. Two methods can be used with the KYPIPE program to. establish the appropriate minor loss factors for the throttling valves. The two methods produce equivalent results and both have been used in this calculation. The first method is straightforward, but can be very time-consuming. The second method offers the advantage of reduced time to run some simulations, but is more involved. The most obvious way to set a predetermined flow rate through the RBCCW and RHRSW flow lines is to vary the minor. loss factors.for (U2TEXTR$.WP) w
] Computed by: Date: "I""I*'5 " "* Carolina-Power & Light Company- -C0050A 12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 23 .Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System. Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final u Void the throttle valves in these lines until the desired flow rates are achieved. This method can require a lot of time when two flow. paths are being varied for the same simulation. The second method uses the' flow demand feature of the KYPIPE software package to set flow rates through RBCCW and/or RHRSW. First, the throttle valve-line segment is-closed. Then, the desired flow rate is removed from the SW system model at the inlet node of the throttling valve as a fixed demand, and returned to the model at the outlet node of-the throttling valve as a fixed input'. The KYPIPE program calculates pressures at the junction nodes based on this preset flow value. The pressure computed at the inlet node of the throttling valve minus the pressure at the outlet node (corrected for any node elevation differences) represents the pressure drop which must exist over the throttling valve to-generate the desired flow rate. This pressure difference is converted to an.equivale;t throttle valve minor loss factor using the following equation derived from standard head loss formulas: Minor Loss = 387 * (2.31
- AP) * (IDi 2
(Q ) * (Sp. Gr.) (ID
- inches; AP = psid; Q = gpm)
Subsequent model simulations employ the minor loss method rather than the fixed demand / input approach. 4.29 Deleted. (Previously 4.29) l 4.30 A spurious LOCA signal is considered during outage operation in a hurricane, even though a spurious LOCA signal at that time would be very unlikely. This signal would probably result from operator error or instrument failure, such as that caused'by a worker jarring sensitive reactor water level instrumentation. During a hurricane, operators would be more alert due to storm conditions; also no personnel would be working on or near, sensitive instrumentation. In any case, the' system response to a LOCA is identical to that for a-LOOP for most (maximum flow) scenarios. i 4.31 Deleted (previously 4.31). l i r (U2TEXTR5.WP)
Computed by: Date: Calculation ID: ' Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: P. 24 Rev. 5' E ' CALCULATION SHEET r TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
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BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final n Void n ;/ 4.32 Where RHR SW Pumps are needed, it is assumed that RHR SW Pumps "B" and "D" are used. This is realistic since they are the two pumps closest to the NSW Header. It is assumed that the behavior of the "B" and "D" pumps is identical to that of the "A" and "C" pumps - that is, the short length of piping on the RHR SW Pump inlet header causes no variation in performance between "A" Loop pumps and "B" Loop pumps. Calibration data suppcrts this assumption (Ref. 3.35). l 4.33 RHRSW pump suction header pressure switches have a trip setpoint range between 13.7 and 17.3 psig (Ref 3.4). Initial configuration results in this range and above (i.e. greater than 13.7 psig) are-acceptable. However, for accident analysis results, a conservative minimum trip setpoint of 18 psig must be maintained to ensure adequate NPSHR. 4.34 The worst-case single failure for scenarios that begin during Operational Modes 4 and 5 (shutdown) when one NSWP is operable is-failure of an RHRSW pump trip coil (see Assumption 4.13.1.2 for further explanation). In the KYPIPE scenarios that assume this type of failure, the RHRSW pump suction pressure.sometimes falls well below the 18 psig required to maintain NPSHR. In these cases, it is conservatively assumed the pump which experienced the. failure and subsequently restarted fails. However, the other RHRSW pump on that loop as well as the other loop's RHRSW pumps-and all normal and emergency power supplies remain to' supply RHRSW needs once RHRSW is required. 4.35 This calculation assumes implementation of the portion of Service Water Lube Water modificatons 82-220L and 82-221L which installs upgraded NSW pump motor thrust bearings. The new thrust bearings are sized for the thrust load at zero flow and thus eliminate the previous requirements for minimum RBCCW flow rate and one RHR pump room cooler in service. Additionally, restrictions on maximum allowable RBCCW and RHRSW flow rates can be loosened in the future j since full closure of valves SW-V103 and SW V106 (previously throttled on accident signal) is now possible. A minimum flow J rate-of 25 gpm is assumed to cool the pump shaft sleeve bearings. -l Since no credible system lineup will result in zero flow (i.e. all components isolated), a minimum flow of 25 gpm is assumed. This (U2TEXTR5 NP) -l
Computed by: Date: alculation ID: Carolina-Power & Light Company. G0050A-12 Checked _by: Date: Pg. 25 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final u voic minimum flow is achieved with as few as one component' aligned to the system. Therefore, no minimum flow calculations are. required. 4.36 The service water supply to the diesel jacket water coolers will automatically switch to the other unit on low service water pressure. The switchover setpoint is 10 4/- 1 psig (Ref 3.4). This switchover will occur only once i.e., if the primary unit supply pressure is low, the supply will switch to the other unit and remain there until the DC's are shut down. For conservatism, l the setpoint plus tolerance plus an additional margin of'20% will be used to determine when a swapover will occur. Therefore, whenever a value of 13 psig is reached, a swapover is assumedLto occur and the effects will be evaluateu. l 4.37 When establishing minimum SW header pressures in these analyses,. the nominal pressure value is used rather than the worst-case pressure considering instrument tolerance. This is considered reasonable since a conservative factor of 5% is being applied to the predicted system flow rates. Incorporating' pressure instrument tolerances would provide additional, unnecessary conservatism. Also, test results show pressures are relatively insensitive compared to flows for the SW-system (large flow changes cause relatively small pressure changes). An exception to this assumption is made for the RHRSW pump low suction pressure trip setpoint since RHRSW cooling is so critical for plant recovery following an event. i (U2TEXTR5.WP) 1
I Computed by: Date: alculation ID: Carolina Power E Light Company G0050A-12 Checked by: Date: p, 26 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SEEET-TAR /PID No. PCN-G0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final me Void 5.0 COMPUTER MODEL VALIDATION The U2 SW system computer model has undergone several revisions since it was first developed in 1989. The latest revision incorporated calibration changes made so the model results match test results from i Periodic Test 2-PT-24.6.4, which was run at the end of the BSEP U2 refueling outage.in November 1991. The calibration and its acceptability have been previously evaluated in Engineering Evaluation EER 91-0450, and will not be addressed in depth here. This EER created a final calibrated computer model file, "U2CALEN2", from which the file "U2MASTR1" was made. File "U2MASTR1" is the base file from which all analysis / evaluation files in this calculation were created. The latest calibration case should only serve to make the computer model more accurately portray the flows seen in the field; as such, the 15% accuracy previously applied to model flow results (although probably improved upon by the latest calibration) will continue to be used for model results. Likewise, as established previously, in the few places that model pressure results are addressed, the raw test results will be examined with no compensation for model accuracy. This is conservative because previous calibration testing has shown the model to be relatively accurate with respect to pressure readings (although the model is only specifically calibrated for flow, not pressure). Furthermore, the model is insensitive to pressure results with respect g to flow results (i.e., large changes in flow cnly cause minor changes in associated pressures). Finally, the vast majority of acceptance criteria of this calculation regards flow results, not pressure results. 5 (U2TEXTRS.WP)
1 )~ 1 mputed by: Date: alculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A-12 ) Checked by: Date: Pg. 27 Rev. 5 ^ ^ TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A Fi' PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues l Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim.((} Final Void 6.0 CALCULATIONS 5, " Service Water System KYPIPE Model Flow Diagram," is a useful reference when reviewing this section, This flow diagram identifies specific line and junction numbers used in the computer model and shows their relationships to individual components in the Service Water system. Minimum NSW pump flow requirements have been eliminated due to the installation of larger pump motor thrust bearings. See Assumpt ion 4.35. 6.1 No rma l SW System Conficuration 6.1.1 Power Operatirn 6.1.1.1 Initial Conficuration During normal power operation, the only loads aligned to the NSW header are lube water and RBCCW, Lube water changes with header pressure and cannot be used to provide a limiting initial configuration. RBCCW is i isolated at the start of an event and therefore is not used to establish a limiting initial configuration. To provide a starting point for evaluating maximum SW pump flow evaluations in both phases, one NSW pump operating at the lowest possible NSW header pressure is assumed in conjunction with alignment of tube water and RBCCW loads (Ref 4.17.2). 6.1.1.2 0-10 Minute Phase 6.1.1.2.1 SW Pumn NPSHR Restrictions i Since operator action is not credited in the first 10 minutes of an event, the SW pump flow resulting from the worst-case design basis event must stay within the limitations imposed by the maximum flow /NPSHR requirements of the SW pumps. The maximum allowable SW pump flow rates for the extreme normal operating pump bay water levels are (Reference 3.24): G12TEXTR5.W )
Computed by: Date: ~~ a culation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A 12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 28 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits 1 Status: Prelim. Final [2} Void +2.0 feet MSL: 9552-gpm -6.0 feet MSL: 9292 gpm The worst-case design basis event for maximum SW pump flow is a LOCA, since the LOCA causes the greatest n,ber of components to be aligned to the SW sye em. The worst-case single failure is the failure of one E-Bus since one NSW pump is lost. In addition, two diesel generators are { assumed to be aligned to 02 (see Assumption 4.26). The results of the computer simulations'are shown in Attachment 1, Changes 1 (maximum pump bay water level) and 3 (minimum pump bay water level). The resultant SW pump flow rates (plus 5% for program accuracy) are listed below and i are compared to the allowable maximum flow
- rates, s
+2.0 feet MSL: (5160) (1.05) = 5418 < 9552 gpm -6.0 feet MSL: (5050) (1.05) = 5302 < 9202 gpm Since the predicted flows are less than the allowable flows, operation in this scenario is-acceptable. Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in. Changes 1 and 3 are above the 13 psig minimum, therefore no swapover will occur, i Note: These results show all SW loads can be supplied by one NSW pump. Per Assumption 4.26, a second NSW pump would be available to share DC cooling loads. (U2TEXTRS.W )
Computed by: Date: Ca cu a Carolina Power & Light Company 0 Checked by: Date: Pg. 29 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final u Void 6.1.1.2.2 Comnonent cooling The most limiting cases for cooling water flows to individual components in the first'10 minutes are the maximum SW pump flow cases (Attachment 1, Changes 1 and 3). The SW system pressure is at its lowest value in these cases; therefore, component flows are at their lowest values. The resultant flow rates for these scenarios are tabulated and compared against required flow rates in Attachment 2, Tables 1 and 4 (maximum bay level) and Tables 2 and S (minimum bay level) As seen in the tables, all cooling loads are satisfied. 6.1.1.2.3 Minimum SW Pumo Flow Reauirements This section has been deleted. l 6.1.1.3 After 10-Minute Phase In the >10 minute phase, minimum pump bay level will provide the lowest SW system flow rate and the lowest flow rate to each. component. Therefore, only the minimum bay level scenario is simulated. I The maximum flow rate which can be supplied by the SW system in the >10 minute phase is limited by the RHRSW pumps Iow surtion pressure trip. Since the RHRSW pumps must be in operation for cooling of the RHR system, the SW system and RHRSW system flow rates must be such that the RHRSW pumps suction pressures remain above the trip setpoint. An 18.0 psig minimum RHRSW pump suction pressure has been used for this . calculation based on setpoint data contained in Reference 3.21 (also see. Assumption 4.37). (u2TEXTRS.WP)
f 5 L Computed oy: Date: a culation 1D. I Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 30 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final P.e Void If operators are unable to start a second NSW pump, a conventional SWP can be aligned to the Nuclear Header. This will enable the minimum RHRHX flowrate of 4500 gpm (Ref 3.16) to be maintained. The operators are also able to throttle back the DC's (Ref 3.37) to assist in maintaining the 4500 gpm. Results.of this simulation are given in Attachment 1, Change 4. The resultant flows are tabulated and compared against required flows in Attachment 2, Tables 3 and 6. Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in, Change 4 are above the 13 psig minimum, therefore no swapover will occur. As shown in the tables, all component cooling requirements can be met while maintaining an RHRSW pump suction pressure of 1 18.0 psig. 6.1.2 Outace Oneration 6.1.2.1 Initial Configuration For the maximum SW pump flow scenarios, the limiting initial configuration varies according to the number of operable NSW pumps, since the different numbers of operabic NSW pumps require different maximum limits on RBCCW and RHRSW flows. For the two operable NSW pumps scenario, the limiting initial configuration has two NSW pumps operating'with RBCCW and RHRSW at their maximum allowable values for two NSW pumps operable (see Section 6.1.2.2.1). This is more limiting than one pump onerating with reduced RBCCW.and RHRSW flows and a SW header pressure of 40 psig (the autostart setpoint for the other NSW pump) since the higher flow rates allowed with two pumps operable result in the RHRSW throttling valves being more open. These valves then allow more flow in the_ 0-10 minute phase. (U2TEXTR5.IP) f s W u
computed by: Date: " "" "Ei " " Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 31 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET i TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim.{}} Final u Void []} For the one operable NSW pump scenario, the limiting configuration is one pump operating with the mcximum RBCCW and RHRSW flows allowed for one pump operation (see Section 6.1.2.2.1). 6.1.2.2 0-10 Minute Phase 6.1.2.2.1 NPSHR Restrictions During outage operation, the most limiting event for the maximum SW pump flow cases is a LOCA signal (not an actual HELB) since the greatest number of components are aligned to the SW system. The most limiting single failure is a function of the number of operable NSW pumps. For one operable NSW pump, the most limiting failure is the failure of an RHRSW pump trip coil (Assumptions 4.13.1.2 and 4.34). The loss of the trip coil allows the RHRSW pump to continue running in the 0-10 minute phase (assuming a LOCA signal) or to restart following E-Bus re-energization (assuming a LDOP). The operating RHRSW pump then pumps a significant amount of flow through the RHRSW flow path, possibly causing NSW pump runout. For two operable NSW pumps, the most limiting failure is the loss of an E-Bus (Assumption 4.13.1.1). The E-Bus failure causes the loss of one NSW pump and loss of RHRSW Throttle Valve F068 motive power. The trip coil failure for l the two NSW pumps operable scenario is not as severe as an E-Bus failure since operation of i the second NSW pump can be credited when a trip coil is taken as the single failure. The specific simulation results for the maximum pump flow cases are given in Attachment-3, Changes 1, 3, 6, and 8. Resultant FSW pump flows are summarized below: (U27EXTR5.W ) 1 l
Computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina' Power & Light Company C0050A 12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 32 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A I Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Frelim. Final u Void F i Two NSW Pumns Onerable +2.0 feet MSL: (6315) (1.05) = 6631 < 9552 gpm l -6.0 feet MSL: (6182) (1.05) = 6491 < 9292 gpm One NSW Pumn Onerable +2.0 1eet MSL: (7178)-(1.05) = 7537 < 4352 gpm 6.0 feet MSL: (7056) (1.05) = 7409 < 9292 gpm As stated earlier, different flow limits apply to the different operable pump cases. The-results shown above are based on the following RBCCW and RHRSW flow limits: 2 NSW pumps operable'- 5500 gpm'RBCCW I 4500 gpm RHRSW t 1 NSW pump operable - 4000 gpm RBCCW 2800 gpm RHRSW The predicted flow rates are within the maximum allowable flow rates set by the vendor and are 4 therefore acceptable. Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in, Changes 1,3,6 and 8 are above the 13 psig minimum, therefore no swapover will occur. s (U2TEXTR5.WP) t )
Computed by: Date: "I""l*** Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date; p. 33 Rev. 5 g ^ TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final [] Void 6.1.2.2.2 Comnonent cooling As with power operation, the maximum SW pump flow cases are also the worst-case component cooling flow cases. The maximum pump flow cases are given in, Changes 1, 3, 6, and 8. The resultant flow rates are tabulated and compared against required flows in Attachment 4, Tables 1 thcoagh 4 and Tables 6 through 9. As can be seen from the tables, all cooling loads are satisfied. 6.1.2.2.3 Minimum SW Pumn Flow Reauirements This section has been deleted. l 6.1.2.3 After 10 Minute Phase A LOCA signal is the most limiting event in the after 10-minute phase of an event. The most limiting single l failure is the loss of an E-Bus since a second SW pump is unavailable and cannot provide additional cooling flow. As with the power operation case, RHRSW pump suction pressure must be 1 18.0 psig. The specific simulation results are given in, Change 4. The individual flows are tabulated and compared against required flows in, Tables 5 and 10. As shown in the tables, all component cooling requirements can be met, while maintaining an RHRSW pump suction pressure of 1 18.0 psig Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in, Change 4 are above the 13 psig minimum, therefor' no swapover will occur. (U2TEXTR5.WP) e
i Computed by: Date: Carolina Power & Light Company llCsiculationID: C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 34 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final M Void 6.1.3 Extreme Low Water Level Oneration ) 6.1.3.1 Initial configuration l The initial configurations for the extreme low water l 1evel scenarios are the same as those for the outage I operation scenarios, with the exceptions of SW pump intake bay water level and minimum allowable SW header pressure. The minimum bay water level for the extreme low water level cases is taken as -8.63 feet MSL as stated in Assumption 4.19. BSEP Prc.cedure AOP-13 requires the circulating water pumps to be secured at -7.5 feet MSL in order to maintain bay level above -8.63 feet MSL. The minimum allowable SW header pressure is taken as the highest header pressure seen in the initial configuration runs. The pressures in the initial configurations ensure adequate header pressure during accident conditions. Also, AOP-013 specifically requires the SW header pressure to be maintained abovt 63 psig whenever pwnp bay water level falls to -5.0 feet MSL or below. Based on model results, the minimum allowable SW header pressure is 56 psig, therefore current AOP restrictions are acceptable. 6.1.3.2 0-10 Minute Phase 6.1.3.2.1 NPSHR Restrictions The limiting assumptions, events, etc., applied to the maximum SW pump flow cases for outage operation also apply to extreme low water level operation. Specific simulation results are given in Changes 1 and 4. Resultant SW pump flows are summarized-below (these results assume 2 DGs per Assumption 4.26): (U2TEXTR5.W)
computed by: Date: Calculation ID: I Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: .Date: p,, .? 5 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: TCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final m Void 2 NSW Pumns Onerable -8.63 feet MSL: (6138) (1.05) = 6445 1 8225 gpm l (ref. Assumption 4.23) P 1 NSW Pumn Onerable -8.63 feet MSL: (7015) (1.05) = 7366 1 8225 gpm l (ref. Assumption 4.23) These results are valid assuming the following: a) a 56 psig (minimum) SW header pressure l is maintained; and b) the maximum outage-related limits on RBCCW/RHRSW flows are not exceeded. The outage-related flow limits are: RBCCW = 5500 (2 pumps), 4000 (1 pump), and RHRSW = 4500 (2 pumps). 2800 (1 pump) The SW header pressure in 6.1.3.2.1.a above is bounded by the higher header pressure in AOP-013. Therefore, the 63 psig value in AOP-013 is still acceptable. Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in, Changes 1 and 4 are above the 13 psig minimum, therefore no swapover will result. 6.1.3.2.2 Comnonent Cooling As with the outage operation cases, the maximum SW pump flow cases are also the worst-case scenarios for cooling-flows. Accordingly, the l results of the maximum pump flow cases in i Section 6.1.3.2.1 are tabulated and compared.to (U2TEXTRS.WP) u e---r M w w
.=, Computed by: Date " #"I*'5 " Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 36 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID Nr. PCN G0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
- Service Water System DET Iasues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final u Void required cooling flows in Attachment 6, Tables 1 and 4 and Tables 2 and 5. As shown in the tables, all cooling requirements are satisfied. 6.1.3.2.3 Minimum SW Pumn Flow Recuirements This section has been deleted. l 6.1.3.3 After 10 Minute Phase Specific results for extreme. low water level operation are shown in Attachment 5, Change 2. These results are tabulated and compared to required flows in Attachment 6, Tables 3 and 6. The results in Tables 3 and 6 show sufficient cooling can be supplied. Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in. Change 2 are above the-13 psig minimum, therefore no swapover will result. 6.1.4 Flood Oneration A higher bay level will result in greater flows, which l can result in SW pump runout. Therefore, the maximum SW pump flow cases must be evaluated to determine if additional operational restrictions are required to guarantee acceptable maximum SW pump flows during the worst case flood scenarios. For SW system operation during' flood conditions, both normal and shutdown operating modes must be analyzed. BSEP Procedure A0P 13 requires plant shutdown prior to reaching an intake canal level of +20.0 feet MSL. Since the analyses for normal operation (Attachment 1) used +2.0 f eet MSL for a-maximum level, additional analyses at +20.0 feet MSL are needed. For (U2TEXTRS.W )
~. Computed by: Date: a cu ation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Dtte: Pg. 37 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service-Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits j Status: Prelim. Final u Void conservatism, these analyses are run at +22.0 feet MSL. Analyses for shutdown / outage operating modes are also. required. Since the number of operable NSW pumps can vary in shutdown (can be 1 ar 2), analyses for both cases are necessary. These analyses are run at +22.0 feet MSL per Assumption 4.20. NOTE: Though cooling flows are considered acceptable l by inspection, they are tabulated in for completeness. 6.1.4.1 Initial configuration With the exception of pump bay level, the initial system configurations for flood conditions use the same assumptions as for the high bay level cases analyzed for normal and outage conditions (Sections 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.2.1, respectively). 6.1.4.2 0-10 Minute Phase 6.1.4.2.1 SW Pumn NPSHR Restrictions t The limiting maximum SW pump flow scenarios for flood conditions use the same assumptions as the respective cases for power and outage operation. 6.1. 4. 2.1.1 Power Onerating Modes Specific simulation results are given in, Change 1, and.are summarized below: +22.0 feet MSL: (5427) (1.05) = 5698 gpm 1 9552 gpm l The resultant flow rate of 5698 gpm is l 1ess than the 9552 gpm allowed for (U2TEXTR5.W)
Computed by: Date: "'C"I"* Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 38 Rev. 5 TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status-Prelim. Final u Void operation at +2.0 feet MSL (Reference 3.24) and is considered acceptable. 6.1. 4. 2.1. 2 Shutdown Onerating Modes Specific simulation results are given in, Changes 4 and 6. SW pump flows are summarized below: +22.0 feet MSL, 2 NSW Pumps: (6633) (1.05) = 6965 gpm 1 9552 gpm +22.0 feet MSL, 1 NSW Pump: 7841 gpm 1 9552 gpm (7468) (1.05) = These resultant flows are less than the 9552 gpm value allowed by the vendor (Ref erence 3.24) for a +2.0 f eet MSL pump bay water level. Therefore, these flows are acceptable. Diesel Jacket Water Cooler inlet pressures in Attachment 7, Changes 1,2,4,6 and 7 are above the 13 psig minimum, therefore no swapover will occur. If operators are unable to start a second NSW pump, a conventional SWP can be aligned to the Nuclear header. This will enable the minimum RHRHX flowrate of 2500 gpm to be maintained. The operators are also able to throttle back the DC's to assist in maintaining the 2500 gpm (Ref 3.37). (U2TEXTRS.VP)
E computed.by: Date: alculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 39 Rev.'5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation litle: BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. - Final u Void 6.2 Vital Header Aliened to the CSW Header Two operating restrictions are specified for this abnormal lineup. The first restriction is necessary to ensure NSW header operability. The NSW header supply valve to the Vital header, SW-V117, opens automatically.on a LOCA signal. With the CSW header supply valve already.open, NSW pump runout.is practically assured since a significant amount of service water will be flowing from the NSW header to the CSW header. To prevent this, the NSW header supply line to the Vital header is required to be closed. The second restriction is necessary to ensure operability of the RHRSW system in the long-term cooling phase of an event. If the NSW header is not available to supply RHRSW and a failure of the power supply to valve SW-V101 (the supply valve to RHRSW from the CSW header) is assumed; cooling of RHRSW cannot be accomplished'in those situations in which an HELB makes the Reactor Building inaccessible for operator action. Opening and disabling SW-V101 while the Vital header is being supplied from the CSW header precludes this situation. Analysis for this abnormal lineup is bounded by normal lineup analyr; due to the additional flows seen in normal operation and the absence of minimum flow restrictions. 6.3 RBCCW Not Aliened to the NSW Header RBCCW alignment to the NSW header is no longer required due to modifications described in Assumption 4.35. Analysis for this-abnormal lineup is equivalent to normal operation analysis since RBCCW is now isolated upon an accident signal. 6.4 RHRSW Isolated From the NSW Header Previously, operation in this abnormal system lineup had not been allowed due to a common mode failure mechanism which could have resulted in the loss of all CSW pumps and, consequently, all RHRSW cooling. Specifically, if.one of the TBCCW isolation valves.(SW-V3 or SW-V4) failed closed spuriously, the-TBCCW flow path would be. lost. Since.TBCCW accounts for essentially all of the CSW header flow demand, the subsequent low flow condition on the CSW header would result in failure of all the CSW pumps due to -inadequate pump flow. An additional concern had been the possibility of CSW pump runout following an E bus failure and loss. (U2TEXTRS.WP) 9
lomputed by: Date: alculati n ID: Carolina Power.& Light Company. C0050A-12 Checked by: Date Pg. 40 Rev. 51 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final u Void of one CSW pump. Since no automatic throttling or isolation of flow paths on the CSW header would occur in this scenario, the remaining pump (s) could exceed the maximum flow limit. Operating with one CSW pump in standby eliminates this concern, but does not correct the potential minimum flow problem. To eliminate these failure mechanisms and allow operation with RHRSW on the CSW header, Plant Modification 90-009 was implemented. This modification made two changes to TBCCW valves SW-V3 and SW V4. First, a low CSW header pressure closing circuit was added to each' valve. Second,' limit switches were installed in the closing direction to stop the valves in a partially closed position. The closing circuit prevents pump runout by sensing low header pressure and closing the valves to their throttled positions. This throttled position is. chosen to prevent pump runout following an E bus failure (with the loss of one CSW pump) and to ensure adequate minimum pump flow following spurious movement of V3 or V4 (regardless of the number of CSW pumps aligned to the CSW header). Thus, the CSW pumps will survive these failure scenarios, and a source of supply is ensured for RHRSW cooling when it is isolated from the NSW header. No additional operational restrictions or constraints need be placed upon the CSW or NSW header while RHRSW is isolated from~the NSW header for the SW. system to meet its design basis functions. p (U2TEXTRS.WP)
Computed by: Date Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company C0050A-12 Checked by: Date: ~ A CULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water-System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
- BSEP Unit llo. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final ke Void t
7.0 CONCLUSION
S The BSEP Unit 2 Service Water System can satisfy its design basis functional requirements under all operating conditions provided the following operational restrictions are implemented. Restrictions are grouped by system configuration to correspond to the specific groupings in Section 6.0. 7.1 Normal SW System Confieuration 7.1.1 Deleted. -l 7.1.2 Deleted. l 7.1.3 RBCCW flow shall not be increased above 7200 gpm during any operating mode. i 7.1.4 During outage / shutdown operation, the'following maximum flow restrictions on RBCCW and RHRSW shall' apply: 7.1.4.1 With two NSW pumps operable, RBCCW flow shall not exceed 5500 gpm and RHRSW flow shall not exceed 4500 gpm. 7.1.4.2 With one NSW pump operable, RBCCW flow shall not exceed 4000 gpm and RHRSW flow shall not exceed 2800 gpm. 7.1,5 Cross-header leakage must be limited to a maximum' value of 947 gpm at'a pressure differentia 1'of 40 psid between the NSW and CSW headers to ensure the accuracy of the analyses in this calculation. Allowable-leakage flows at other header APs are given in 2. 7.1.6 During extreme low water _ level operation, the following restrictions shall be observed. l 7.1.6.1 At a SW pump _ intake bay water level of -6.0 ft MSL or lower, maintain either: (U2 TEX 1RS.WP) l i i
k 2Puted by. Date: Calculation ID. Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A*12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 42 Rev. 5 CALCULATION SHEET TAR /PID No. PCN G0050A File: PCNG0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final PA Void a) a pressure of at least 56 psig in the NSW header; or b) the maximum allowable flow rates for RBCCW and RHRSW specified ir. Conclusions 7.1.4.1 and 7.1.4.2 above, provided the resultant NSW header pressure is 1 56 psig. If NSW header pressure is < 56 psig, reduce RBCCW and/or RHRSW flows as needed.to bring SW header pressure up to at least 56 psig, j 7.1.6.2 Reduce all-circulating water flow to maintain SW pump bay water level above -8.63 feet MSL. 7.1.6.3 Consistent with Conclusion 7.1.6.2 above, minimize all service water flow paths when the SW pump bay water level decreases to -6.0 feet MSL. 7.1.7 During flood operation, observe the maximum flow rate limitations on RBCCW and RHRSW established for power and outage / shutdown operations. 7.1.8 When a BSEP unit is in Mode 4 or 5 with less than two NSW pumps operable, the other BSEP unit must maintain two NSW pumps operable to ensure SW system design capability (Ref 4.26). 7.2 Vital Hender Aliened to the CSW Headgr The operational restrictions in Section 7.1 apply to this system configuration also, excent as revised below. 7.2.1 Deleted. 7.2.2 Deleted. 7.2.3 Valve SW V101 must be fully open and disabled. (U2TEXTRS.W)'
Computed by: Date: Calculation ID: Carolina Power & Light Company G0050A 12 Checked by: Date: Pg. 43 Rev. 5 ^ TAR /PID No. PCN C0050A File: PCNC0050A Project
Title:
Service Water System DET Issues Calculation
Title:
BSEP Unit No. 2 Service Water System Operating Limits Status: Prelim. Final PA Void 7.2.4 The SW supply to the Vital header must be. isolated. Therefore, either valve SW-V116 or valve SW-V117 (with power disconnected) must be closed. 7.2.5 Deleted (previously 7.2.5). 7.3 RBCCW Net Aliened to the NSW Hender No additional constraints are imposed for this operational alignment. 7.4 RHRSW Isclared From the NSW Header No additional constraints are imposed for this operational alignment, l (U21EXTR5.WP) m m s e w m- +
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 02, Rev. 5 Page 1 of 6 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES POWER OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02, TABLE 1 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MOD 123 / 01 I The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish rinimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 525.22 551.48 498.96 Loop A Vital Header 562.44 590.56 534.32 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,422.63 1,493.76 1,351.50 DG 4 HX 1,270.76 1,334.30 1,207.22 Lube Water 190.00 199.50 180.50 Cross-tie Valve 1,188.85 1,248.29 1,129.41 Leakage Total Pump Flow 5,159.89 5,417.88 4,901.90 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) N/A feet (See Assumption 4.24) = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +2.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 45.1 feet =
- See Table No.
4 for Component Cooling Evaluation
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 02, Rev. 5 Page 2 of 6 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES POWER OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02. TABLE 2 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MOD 123 / 03 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within iS%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 513.47 539.14 487.80 Loop A Vital Header 549.54 577.01 522.06 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,392.64 1,462.27 1,323.01 DG 4 HX 1,243.98 1,306.18 1,181.78 Lube Water 186.00 195.30 176.70 Cross-tic Valve 1,164.23 1,222.44 1,106.02 Leakage Total Pump Flow 5,049.86 5,302.35 4,797.37 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) N/A feet (See Assumption 4.24) = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -6.0 feet (from Attachment-21) 37.1 feet = 1
- See Table No.
5 for Component Cooling Evaluation
1 Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 02, Rev. 5 Page 3 of 6 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES POWER OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02. TABLE 3 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MOD 123 / 04 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased to add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 493.87 518.56 469.18 Loop A Vital Header 529.32 555.79 502.85 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,350.46 1,417.98 1,282.94 DG 4 HX 1,206.30 1,266.61 1,145.98 Lube water 180.50 189.52 171.48 RHR HX Flow 5,000.00 5,250.00 4,750.00 RHR Pump Motor 145.30 152.56 138.03 Coolers Cross-tie Valve 1,133.54 1,190.22 1,076.86 Leakage Total SW Pump 10,035.81 10,537.60 9,534.02 Flow RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be more than 15.5 i 1.8 psig per PM 89-051): 37.46 psig Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) 10 feet = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -6.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 37.1 feet =
- See Table No.
6 for Component Cooling Evaluation
i Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 02, Rev. 5 i Page 4 of 6 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES POWER OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02. TABLE 4 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MOD 123 / 01 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75,F 80,F 85,F 9 0,F Two Diesel 2,558.72 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 180.50 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95.gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2,739.22 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm i l i 1
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 02, Rev. 5 Page 5 of 6 i ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES POWER OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02, TABLE 5 LQDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MOD 123 / 03 1 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75,F 80,F '85 F 90,F Two Diesel 2,504.79 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 176.70 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm O gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2,681.49 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm i i l ) 1
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 02, Rev. 5 Page 6 of 6 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES POWER OPERATION ATTACHMENT 02. TABLE 6 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MOD 123 / 04 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 8 0,F 85,F 90,F 2 RHR Rm 772.46 <164 gpm 164 gpm 216 gpm _372 gpm Coolers 2 CS Rm Coolers 135.25 27.4 gpm 34 gpm 47.4 gpm~ 94 gpm 4 RHR Seal 64.49 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Coolers RHR HX* 4,750.00 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm 2 Diesel 2,428,92 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 171.48 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 2 RHR SW Pump 138.03 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm Motor Coolers RBCCW (Non-0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Safety Load) Total 8,460.63 <5,562 gpm 5,569 gpm 5,634 gpm 5,837 gpm oRequired RHR HX Flow is 4,500 gpm during Modes 1 through 3 (Reference 3.16) 6 t
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 1 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 1 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE. PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MODE 45 / 01 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 5%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5%.to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 474.55 498.28 450.82 Loop A Vital Header 507.40 532.77 482.03 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,297.73 1,362.62 1,232.84 DG 4 HX 1,159.20 1,217.16 1,101.24 Lube Water 173.00 181.65 164.35 Cross-tie Valve 1,087.25 1,141.61 1,032.89 Leakage Total Pump Flow 6,314.74 6,630.48 5,999.00 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) N/A feet (see Assumption 4.24) = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +2.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 45.1 feet =
- See Table No.
6 for Component Cooling Evaluation
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 2 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04, TABLE 2 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MODE 45 / 03 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 463.39 486.56 440.22 Loop A Vital Header 495.49 520.26 470.72 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,270.21 1,333.72 1,206.70 DG 4 HX 1,134.62 1,191.35 1,077.89 Lube Water 169.00 177.45 160.55 Cross-tie Valve 1,064.67 1,117.90 1,011.44 Leakage Total Pump Flow 6,181.96 6,491.06 5,872.86 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) N/A feet (see Assumption 4.24) = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -6.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 37.1 feet =
- See Table No.
7 for Component Cooling Evaluation
p Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 3 of.10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04. TABI.E 3 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MODE 45 / 06 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be' accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 426.07 447.37 404.77 Loop A Vital Header 452.34 474.96 429.72-Loop B DG 3 HX 1,176.45 1,235.27 1,117.63 DG 4 HX 1,050.87 1,103.41 998.33 Lube Water 139.00 145.95 132.05 Cross-tie Valve 988.96 1,038.41 939.51 Leakage Total Pump Flow 7,178.00 7,536.90 6,819.10 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) N/A feet (see Assumption-4.24) = Available NPSH with Pump' Bay Level of +2.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 45.1 feet =
- See Table No.
8 for Component Cooling Evaluation i i
Calc. GOO 50A-12' Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page-4 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04, TABLE 4 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MODE 45 / 08 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test-data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 413.68 434.36 393.00 Loop A Vital Header 439.48 461.45 417.51' Loop B DG 3 HX 1,147.16 1,204.52 1,089.80 DG 4 HX 1,024.71 1,075.95 973.47 Lube Water 129.00 135.45 122.55 Cross-tie Valve 965.00 1,013.25 916.75 Leakage Total Pump Flow 7,055.36 7,408.13 6,702.59 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) N/A feet (see Assumption 4.24) = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -6.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 37.1 feet = i ~
- See Table No.
9 for Component Cooling Evaluation - ~ - ---u------x-m- - - - - _ - _ - - - - -, - - - - _ + - - - - - - - - -
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 5 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION { ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 5 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MODE 45 / 04 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased to add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate minimum cooling flow to the components. _, Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0.00 0.00 0.00 Vital Header 395.73 415.52 375.94 Loop A Vital Header 421.14 442.20 400.08 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,106.34 1,161.66 1,051.02 DG 4 HX 988.25 1,037.66 938.84 Lube water 115.00 120.75 109.25 RHR HX Flow 2,922.34 3,068.46 2,776.22 RHR SW Pump 121.99 128.09 115.89 Motor Coolers Cross-tie Valve 931.75 978.34 885.16 Leakage Total SW Pump 7,002.53 7,352.66 6,652.40 Flow RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be more than 15.5 i 1.8 psig per PM 89-051):
18.55 psig Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) 14 feet n Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -6.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 37.1 feet =
- See Table No.
10 for Component Cooling Evaluation
l l i i Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 6 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 6 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MODE 45 / 01 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75 F 8 0,F 8 5,F 90,F Two Diesel 2,334.08 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 164.35 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gym RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm O'gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2,498.43 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm
Calc. G0050A Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 7 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 7 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: MODES 4&5 / 03 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75,F 8 0,F 8 5,F 90 F Two Diesel 2,284.59 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 160.55 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0-gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2,445.14 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm l I i
. Calc. G0050A-12 j Att.-04, Rev. 5 'Page 8 'of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04. TABLE 8 I HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE 1 File / Change No.: U2 MODE 45 / 06 REQUIRED SW FLOW' RATES'FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS 'l Required' Flow Versus SW Temp. I Component (s) Available I Flow (gpm) 75,F 80,F 85,F 90 F Two Diesel 2,115.96
- i00 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm-700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 132.05 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0
0 gpm 0-gpm 0-gpm -(Nonsafety Load) ~ =0:gpm Total 2,248.01 795 gpm 795.gpm 79S gpm -795-gpm-i ~j 'l 20
Calc. GOO 50A-12 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 9 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION bTTACHMENT 04. TABLE 9 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MODE 45 / OB r REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available o o Flow (gpm) 75 F 80 F 85 F 90 F t Two Diesel 2,063.27 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm' 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 122.55 95 gpm-95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety 1 ad) Total 2,185.82 795 gpm 795 gpm. 795 gpm 795 gpm
Ca33. GOO 50A-12 Att. 04, Rev. 5 Page 10 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES OUTAGE OPERATION ATTACHMENT 04, TABLE 10 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 MODE 45 / 04 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75 F 80 F 8 5,F 90 F o 2 RHR Rm 616.81 <164 gpm 164 gpm 216 gpm 372 gpm Coolers 2 CS Rm Coolers 107.91 27.4 gpm 34 gpm 47.4 gpm-94 gpm-4 RHR Seal 51.31 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Coolers RHR HX* 2,776.22 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2 Diesel 1,989.86 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 109.25 95 'j pm 95 gpm {,9 gpm 95 gpm 2 RHR SW Pump 115.89 To gpm 76 gpm 7 t, gpm 76 gpm Motor Coolers RBCCW (Non-0.Os O gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Safety Load) Total 5,767.25 <3,562 gpm 3,569 gpm 3,634 gpm 3,837 gpm 0 Required RHR HX Flow is 2500 gpm during Modes 4 and 5 (Reference 3.9) l l l l
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 1 of 6 ACCIDENT-
SUMMARY
TABLES EXTREME LOW WATER LEVEL OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06, TABLE 1 liYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2XLOLVL / 01 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeleo flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 459.68 482.66 436.70 Loop A Vital Header 491.53 516.11 466.95 Loop B DG-3 HX 1,251.08 1,324.33 1,198.03 DG 4 HX 1,126.46 1,182.78 1,070.14 Lube Water 168.00 176.40 159.60 Cross-tie Valve 1,G57.18 1,110.04 1,004.32 Leakage Total Pump Flow 6,137.75 6,444.64 5,830.86 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) 30.0 feet = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -8.63 feet (from Attachment 21) 32.0 feet =
- See Table No.
4 for Component Cooling Evaluation
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 2 of 6 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES EXTREME LOW WATER LEVEL OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 2 HYDRAULIC ANALyfIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2XLOLVL / 04 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow
- rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components.
l Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 408.64 429.07 388.21 Loop A Vital Header 435.00 456.75 413.25 Loop B I DG 3 HX 1,137.07 1,193.92 1,080.22 DG 4 HX 1,015.70 1.066.48 964.91 Lube Water 12/.00 133.35 120.65 Cross-tie Valve 956.76 1,004.60 908.92 Leakage Total Pump Flow 7,015.35 7,366.12 6,664.58 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) 30.0 feet = j l Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -8.63 feet (from Attachment 21) { 32.0 feet =
- See Table No.
5 for Component Cooling Evaluation _j 'l J i l
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 3 of 6 ACCIDENT BUMMARY TABLES EXTREME LOW WATER LEVEL OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 3 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2XLOLVL / 02 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased to add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate minimum cooling flow to the components. , Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0.00 0.00 0.00 Vital Header 392.91 412.56 373.26 Loop A Vital Header 418.17 439.08 397.26 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,099.49 1,154.46 1,044.52 DG 4 HX 982.13 1,031.24 933.02 Lube water 113.00 118.65 107.35 RHR HX Flow 2,887.39 3,031.76 2,743.02 RHR Pump Motor 121.12 127.18 115.06 Coolers Cross-tie Valve 926.12 972.43 879.81 Leakage Total SW Pump 6,940.33 7,287.35 6,593.31 Flow gj RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be more than 15.5 i 1.8 psig per PM 89-051):
18.08 psig Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) = _J 6 feet Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of -8.63 feet (from Attachment 21) 32.0 feet =
- See Table No.
6 for Component Cooling Evaluation
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 4 of 6 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES EXTREME LOW WATER LEVEL OPER7gTION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 4 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2XLOLVL / 01 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 80 F 8 5*F - 90 F o Two Diesel 2,268.17 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 159.60 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm-O gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2,427.77 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm -l .i
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 5 of 6 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES EXTREME LOW WATER LEVEL OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 5 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2XLOLVL / 04 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 8 0,F 85 F 9 0,F Two Diesel 2,045.13 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 120.65 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2,165.78 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm I
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 06, Rev. 5 Page 6 of 6 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES EXTREME LOW WATER LEVEL OPERATION ATTACHMENT 06. TABLE 6 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2XLOLVL / 02 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available o Flow (gpm) 75 F 80 F 85 F 90 F 2 RHR Rm 612.45 <164 gpm 164 gpm 216 gpm 372 gpm Coolers _2 CS Rm Coolers 107.15 27.4 gpm 34 gpm 47.4 gpm 94 gpm 4 RHR Seal 50.94 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0-'gpm Coolers RHR HX* 2,743.02 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 E 2 Diesel 1,977.54 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 107.35 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 2 RHR SW Pump 115.06 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm Motor Coolers RBCCW (Non-0.00 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Safety Load) Total 5,713.51 <3,562 gpm 3,569 gpm 3,634 gpm 3,837 gpm ORequired RHR HX Flow is 2,500 gpm during Modes 4 and 5 (Reference 3.9)
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 08' Rev. 5 Page 1 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08, TABLE 1 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE m PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 FLOOD / 01 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 554.18 581.89 526.47 Loop A Vital Header 593.39 623.06 563.72 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,494.80 1,569.54 1,420.06 DG 4 HX 1,335.22 1,401.98 1,268.46 Lube Water 201.00 211.05 190.95 Cross-tie Valve 1,248.16 1,310.57 1,185.75 Leakage Total Pump Flow 5,426.74 5,698.08 5,155.40 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) = _ 11 feet Available NPSH with Pump Bay Leve] of +22.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 65.1 feet =
- See Table No.
6 for Component Coc'ing Evaluation
Calc. G0050A-12' Att. 08, Rev. 5 _ Page 2 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLE 8 FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 2 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE FHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 FLOOD / 04 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within iS%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess. NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow t'o the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0-Vital Header 501.42 526.49 476.35 Loop A Vital Header 536.08 562.88 509.28 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,364.20 1,432.41 1,295.99 DG 4 HX 1,218.57 1,279.50 1,157.64 Lube Water 182.00-191.10 172.90 Cross-tie Valve 1,141.84 1,198.93 1,084.75 Leakage Total Pump Flow 6,632.57 6,964.20 6,300.94 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) 14 feet = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +22.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 65.1 feet =
- See Table No.
7 for Component Cooling Evaluation
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 3 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 3 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS 10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 FLOOD / 06 The current computer hydraulic model has been calibrated against test data and is assumed to be accurate within 15%. To assess adequacy of the results, the modeled flow rates will be increased by 5% to assess NPSH adequacy and decreased by 5% to establish minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 F Vital Header 455.63 478.41 432.85 Loop A Vital Header 483.66 507.84 459.48 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,247.92 1,310.32 1,185.52 DG 4 HX 1,114.71 1,170.45 1,058.97 Lube Water 165.00 173.25 156.75 Cross-tie Valve 1,047.47 1,099.84 995.10 Leakage Total Pump Flow 7,468.49 7,841.91 7,095.07 Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) 27 feet = Available,NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +22.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 65.1 feet =
- See Table No..
8 for Component Cooling Evaluation
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 4 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 4 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2FLDOD / 02 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased to add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0
0 0 Vital Header 503.28 528.44 478.12 Loop A Vital Header 527.28 553.64 500.92 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,375.78 1,444.57 1,306.99 DG 4 HX 1,228.91 1,290.36 1,167.46 Lube water 185.00 194.25 175.75 RHR HX Flow 7,146.27 7,503.58 6,788.96 RHR Pump Motor 151.20 158.76 143.64 Coolers Cross-tie Valve 1,156.89 1,214.73 1,099.05 Leakage Total SW Pump 12,274.62 12,888.35 11,660.89 Flow RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be more than 15.5 1 1.8 psig per PM 89-051): 37.15 psig Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) 12 feet = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +22.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 65.1 feet =
- See Table No.
9 for Component Cooling Evaluation
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 5 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES FLOOD OPERATION-ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE E HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - >10 MINUTE PHASE PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 FLOOD / 07 As stated for the 0-10 minute phase, model results will be increased to-add conservatism to NPSH evaluation and decreased to evaluate minimum cooling flow to the components. Component Model Results +5% for NPSH -5% for Cooling
- RBCCW 0.00 0.00 0.00 Vital Header 396.51 416.34 376.68 Loop A Vital Header 420.08 441.08 399.08 Loop B DG 3 HX 1,109.42 1,164.89 1,053.95 DG 4 HX 991.00 1,040.55 941.45 Lube water 117.00 122.85 111.15 RHR HX Flow 3,916.27 4,112.08 3,720.46 RHR Pump Motor 120.96 127.01 114.91 Coolers Cross-tie Valve 935.26 982.02 888.50 Leakage Total SW Pump 8,006.50 8,406.83 7,606.18 Flow RHR Pump Suction Pressure (Must be more than 15.5 1.8 psig per PM 89-051):
18.36 psig Required NPSH for Service Water Pump (from Reference 3.1) 35 feet = Available NPSH with Pump Bay Level of +22.0 feet (from Attachment 21) 65.1 feet =
- See Table No.
10 for Component Cooling Evaluation
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 6 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES FLOOD OPERATION 1 ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 6 liYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES I PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 FLOOD / 01 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available o o Flow (gpm) 7 5,F 80 F 85 F 90 F Two Diesel 2,688.52 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 190.95 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2,879.47 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm 1
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 7 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 7 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUT_ES E PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 FLOOD / 04 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available o e o o Flow (gpm) 75 P 80 F 85 F 90 F Two Diesel 2,453.63 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 172.90 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2,626.53 795 gpm 795_gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm l
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 8 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 8 HYDPAULIC ANALYSIS - FIRST 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 FLOOD / 06 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available o o o o Flow (gpm) 75 F 80 F 85 F 90 F Two Diesel 2,244.49 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 156.75 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm RBCCW 0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm (Nonsafety Load) Total 2,401.24 795 gpm 795 gpm 795 gpm-795 gpm 1 1 I
i 'l Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 9 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 9 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 FLOOD / 02 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available o o o o Flow (gpm) 75 F 80 F 85 F 90 F 2 RHR Rm 778.14 <164 gpm 164 gpm 216 gpm 372 gpm Coolers 2 CS Rm Coolers 136.11 27.4 gpm 34 gpm 47.4 gpm 94 gpm 4 RHR Seal 64.77 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Coolers RHR HX* 6,788.96 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm 4,500 gpm 2 Diesel 2,474.45 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 175.75 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 2 RHR SW Pump 143.64 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm Motor Coolers RBCCW (Non-0 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm O gpm Safety Load) Total 10,561.82 <3,562 gpm 3,569 gpm 3,634 gpm 3,'837 gpm oRequired RHR HX Flow is 4,500 gpm during Modes 1 through 3 (Reference 3.16) e 1
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 08, Rev. 5 Page 10 of 10 ACCIDENT
SUMMARY
TABLES FLOOD OPERATION ATTACHMENT 08. TABLE 10 HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS - AFTER 10 MINUTES PIPEDATA/KYPIPE File / Change No.: U2 FLOOD / 07 REQUIRED SW FLOW RATES FOR SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Required Flow Versus SW Temp. Component (s) Available Flow (gpm) 75*F 8 0,F 85 F 9 0,F o 2 RHR Rm 616.62 <164.gpm 164 gpm 216 gpm 372 gpm Coolers 2 CS Rm Coolers 107.85 27.4 gpm 34 gpm 47.4 gpm 94 gpm 4 RHR Seal 51.29 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpm Coolers RHR HX* 3,720.46 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2,500 gpm 2 Diesel 1,995.40 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm 700 gpm Generators SW Lube Water 111.15 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 95 gpm 2 RHR SW Pump 114.91 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm 76 gpm Motor Coolers RBCCW (Non-0.00 0 gpm 0 gpm 0 gpn O gpm Safety Load) Total 6,717.68 <3,562 gpm 3,569 gpm 3,634 gp,m 3,837 gpm 0 Required RHR HX Flow is 2,500 gpm during Modes 4 and 5 (Reference 3.9)
Calo. G0050A-12 Att. 21, Rev.-4 Page 1 of 2 NPSKA CALCULATIONS PURPOSE The purpose of this attachment to Calculation G0050A-12 is to determine the NPSH available at the SW Pumps' intakes for various pump bay water levels. CALCULATION NPSHA will be calculated for the following bay levels: - 8.63 feet 6.00 feet + 2.00 feet +22.00 feet The above elevations are referenced to Mean Sea Level. From Reference 3.25, NPSHA = H, + Hn - H, - He where H,
Atmospheric Pressure Head Hn = Static Head above impeller center line H,
Vapor Pressure He = Friction Loss From Reference 3.1 (p. 4), impeller center line = -11.76 feet MSL. g e From Reference 3.17 and Assumption 4.7, H, = 1.6 feet MSL. From Reference 3.27 (Section 2.4.5.1), the worst-case barometric pressure is during a hurricane and is 26.86 in. Hg or 26.86 x 1.13 5 = 3 0. 5 f eet H 0. 2 For normal atmospheric conditions, H, = 3 2. 9 feet H O based on: 2 H (14,7) (144) = 3 (62.4) (1.03) Since velocity approximately equals O fps, Hr = 0
Calc. G0050A 12 Att. 21, Rev. 4 Page 2 of 2 'NPBEA CALCULATION 8' For -8.63 feet: Use H, = 30.5 feet since -8. 63 feet corresponds to a harricane condition. (-8.63) - (-11.76) Hg = = 3.13 feet and NPSHA = 30.5 + 3.13 - 1.6 - 0 = 32.0 feet For -6.00 feet: (-6.0) - (-11.76) Hg = = 5.76 feet and NPSHA = 32.9 + 5.76 - 1.6 - 0 = 37.1 feet For +2.00 feet: (+2.0) - (-11.76) Hg = = 13.76 feet and NPSHA = 32.9 + 13.76 - 1.6 - 0 = 45.1 feet For +22.00 feet: (+22.00) Hg (-11.76) = = 33.76 feet and NPSHA = 32.9 + 33.76 - 1.6 - 0 = 65.1 feet
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 22, Rev. 4 Page 1 of 3 CROSS-HEADER LEAKAGE EVALUATION Purpose The purpose of this attachment is to quantify the cross-header leakage flow rate assumption used in the BSEP Units 1 and 2 SW System computer models. The leakage rate quantities identified in this attachment will define the leakage rates for which the SW Systems are able to maintain full design capability. Leakage rates above those identified in this attachment will prevent the SW Systems from meeting all design functional requirements. Summary of Results The Units 1 and 2 SW Systems can meet all design functional requirements assuming the leakage rates identified in this attachment are not exceeded. Calculation In the computer models, cross-header leakage is modeled as a 20" line with an equivalent "K" factor which represents resistance to leakage flow. The "K" factors originally selected for the models were based on Unit-specific leakage test data collected during special test procedures performed for this purpose. Based on the test data, the Unit 2 leakage was calculated to be approximately twice that of Unit 1. Preliminary analyses indicated the U2 SW System would not meet all its design requirements under the worst-case accident scenarios with the leakage rates determined from the test data. Accordingly, a more restricted cross-header leakage rate was assumed for the final U2 analyses. Unit 1 analyses had shown full SW System design capability could be maintained with leakage rates equal to those determined from U1 test data. Therefore the U1 leakage rate assumption was used as the leakage assumption for U2 as well. Following is a discussion of the specific leakage criteria i used for the Ul and U2 SW System computer models.
Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 22, Rev. 4 Page 2 of 3 CROSB-HEADER LEAKAGE EVALUATION The formula used to calculate an equivalent "K" factor for input into the models is: (387) (2.31) (AP) (ID)' K= Q (Note: This formula can be derived from formulas in Crane technical Paper No. 410) All leakage from the system was assumed to be flowing through one 20" line for the purpose of representing leakage in the models. Therefore, the assumed ID is 18.63" -( 2 0 " cement-lined pipe). The U1 data collected by Special Procedure No. 1-SP-89-024 supported a calculated equivalent "K" factor of 4800. Using the above formula and this "K" value, leakage flow rates for specific NSW Header to CSW Header AP's can be determined. These calculated flow rates then represent the leakage flows above which the SW Systems cannot be assumed to' meet their full design requirements. (Note: These leakage rates are most representative of actual system leakage at higher header AP's since the 4f10 "K" factor is a limiting value as header A('s increase. At lower header AP's, the calculated "K" factor based on test data is less than 4800. Therefore, the actual system leakage will be greater than predicted. This is a conservative treatment of leakage at low header AP's.) 1
o 4W> Q s. o v, ,% y IMAGE EVALUATION '// / ,<.p'V pg Q, t, 9 V O \\ ///7 ] ' $ M ' j 1 TEST TARGET (IAT-3) $( ' \\k/ NN ff \\/+ j, 1.0 if $ M u "m-g u = hkb l,l 'l I.8 !!sas 1.25 1.4 i.6 = l - 150mm 4 6" d 5 4 '% */j*\\ Nr#; 4 A f> + Afy/ ;g- $ 7 4f+/ , Q g 4y '*e oh <t.
- e+-
m, in$has
,e - tk~ +f'%h*e l l0 4 '+q, v %C',., e &'p IMAGE EVALUATION 6 *[+4,, v O \\ /// \\ [ % k/ </ TEST TARGET (MT-3) 4 j gy // g, r + 1.0 F EH Er'i $ M $M u: m E 1% l@i=S 1.1 e i.s 1.25 1.4 1.6 4 6" b f.k# 4x777
- f,,,4
.o,,, ,/ -,s ,+,p,p+ 4,4 %y n e, r ~;; g +p(& o y 6 !N ikuu a u w n d$ $;- -. l w c--..
m g c.g,fg M. t P Yo eO IMAGE EVALUATION f4 O x \\///77{ g?/ b j g4 e TEST TARGET (MT-3) gY//// gj \\\\,ff I 7 + l.0 l2 M M e Eli l*lll!2.2 L f36 L. Em b F2 l2e 1.1 e. l.8 i ' l.25 1.4 1.6 l ) 4 4 150mm i 4 6" 'l A*>4Sf 4+ ----os s /4 " +4y $>p;gr~ - =4 4)}p}4V .,>07 p / pm (& 4 n +.7,....A._...__.~..- S Ki US? ? SA 3ANL ~ 'fdh SS "b ,... s*NMA. t. s.
d . & 'b &o g, Ap g.'ge 4, tRW IMAGE EVALU ATION // \\//g// "q ilkf TEST TARGET (MT-3) +% ,f g, t &+gy}E' $b/q sytt ~ ek I.0 lf: a m t- - IM l}i2.2 E ilt '~ 'l,l i-D' l.8 f 1.25 1.4_ l 1.6 l 150mm 4 6" 4 __. b
- %r4
- e r+\\
4;g / yN\\ // gg4 ;{n//fx hf ,y, /,- <e+h v o c i n E .,a
o. 1 i Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 22, Rev.,4 Page 3 of 3 l CROSS-READER LEAKAGE EVALUATION Specific leakage flows and header.AP's are given below: Header AP (osid) Leakace Flow (com) 5 335 10 474 15 580 f l [ 20 670 25 749 30 820 35 886 40 947 45 1005 50 1059 t conclusion In order to maintain full SW System design capability, SW System cross-header leakage limits, as defined by the calculated values above, must not be exceeded. i 7 ON .a
g 3EMCENTER bBE OM bLd "DN gq _m Aris,Tuf b ATTACHMENT 23 T I CF E SERVICE WATER LUBE WATER Service Water Lube Water Flow Distribution adoquacy has been considered. Flow rates from the SW Nuclear Header were recorded during the implementation of special procedure SP-89-021, Nuclear SW System Flow Tests, on April 26, 1989. Durir.g high system flow conditions Lube Water flowrate was reduced to 119 gym, this flowrate was assessed at approximately rated flow for a SW pump. The SW Lube Water is branch-supplied to each SW Pump from a single header. Each branch supply is routed through a cyclone separator (
Reference:
Design Drawing, 0-FP-82596). The cyclone separator is designed to provide a 20 gpn capacity, based on 40 psig pressure drop across the separator. A supply pressure greater than 40 psig to the cyclone separator can be ensured, even at lowest SW header pressure, i.e., 35 psig (calculated worst-case), with assistance from the Lu'n Water Pumps. These pumps are o safety-related and powered from separate divisions. Rated flow for one Lube Water Pump is 150 gpm @ 175 TDH. Single pump operation can adequatelv maintain cooling supply to each SW pump assembly. ThefollowinganskysisassumesasingleLubeWaterpumpisoperating,a .) calculated worst-case Nuclear Service Water header pressure of 35 psig (including cross-tie Leakage between the Nuclear and Conventional headers), and a' Lube Water system supply flowrace of approximately 95 gym (a realistic value, based upon flow test data from 2-SP-89-021): 1. Nuclear SW header pressure is 35 psig. 2. For a Lube Water System flowrate of 95 gpm. The Lube Water Pump performance curve indicates a head (TDH) of 205 feet: (gd. %-43) 205 feet 92 PSIC = 2.24 feet /PSIG Thus, the total discharge pressure of the Lv.se Water pu=p will be% psig + 35 psig, or 127 psig. 3. Static losses (elevation differences) = 10 psig 4. Friction losses are negligible. 5. From (2) and (3), above, the inlet pressure to the cyclone separator is 127 psig - 10 psig = 117 psig. 6. Maximum cyclone separator pressure loss is 40 paid. 1 DOCUMENTATjl N SUPPORTING A QA RECr
- J?f catn @3l A Z-
"i
6cos24-12 bW23 h I ,,,, _ g R 2 - s-7. From (5) and (6), above, the cyclone separator outlet pressure is 117 psig - 40 psig = 77 psig.
== Conclusion:== Since the require supply pressure range for pump flushing is 55 to 75 psig, 77 psig is acceptable. As the cyclone separator is rated for a 20 gym overflow to pump and pump motor cooling loads, the required flowrates will be assessed: The SW Pump Motor upper thrust beartag cooler requires 2 gpm cooling water flow at 95 degrees F (maximum SW inlet temperature). The original thrust bearing rated capacity (continuous downthrust) was 8100 pounds. The thrust bearing capacity has been revised upwards to 13,000 + pounds., and accepted by the General Electric Company. GE has accepted the increase in bearing load as long as the 2 gym Lube Water suoply la continuously maintained. The higher bearing thrust loads occur at minimum flow conditions, i.e., 2200 gym. SW header pressures are high during reduced-flow system operation, and adequate Lube Water Flowrates are, therefore, assured. During rated flow conditions with the SW header, system pressure is relatively low. Although the flowrate to the Lnbe Water system is reduced at low header pressures, (as documented in Spweial Procedure 2-SP-89-021), adequate flow (2 gpe) is provided to the SW Pump Motor Cooler. This is because motor thrust bearing loads are dec: eased towards 8100 pounds (original deaign rating) at higher flows. This value is well below the low SW system flow condition thrust value of 13,000 + pounds. The design drawing for the pump (0-FP-81518) indicates that Lube Water is supplied for the tube nut and column bearings. The required pump flushing is 15 gpa, maximum, and 8 gym, minimum. The required pump flushing supply pressure is 65 psig, minimum, and 75 psig, maximum. The overall required flow for SW pump motor cooling and the pump tube nut and column bearings is a maximum of 17 gpa (2 to the motor bearings plus 15 for flushing). The cyclone separator is rated for 20 gpm overflow supply, which will meet ebase requirements.
F 4iposba-12.-_ ArfkM. 23 - Ar13 Mw./- R $ orc T = RECttVCtT \\ . ENGINEERING SERVICSS NEBO.mnu v,, [ Plant Equipment and Cesign l l APR 2 6 w L April 23, 1988 To: Wanda Yee Ad. h 1 FRON: M.E. Nussbaua SUR7ECT: Service Water Pu.np Motor coeling water modification..
REFERENCE:
(1) latter: S.F. Stidham (CP&L) to W.
- Yes, received 4/13/es.
our analysis. cf :ne :squested enanges ta une Brunsw
- .o esport the conclusiona of Water pump acter (Model No. 5X632SXC279A) cooling water flow outlined in reference (1). The.Laelysis and calculations are sa included in DRF E00-00170.
requirements of WA XS32050230,This latter completes'the Change Crder No. 2. The information requested included the followings i " Perform analysis of acceptability of using water ~from the discharge of the Service Watse pumps for coolin the pumps' motor bearing oil. This analysis shall g include the following considerationes. -1 Marianza temperature of the cooling water will he a. 105F. b. Cooling water flow shall be non-continuous; e.g., no cooling water will flow when the associated-pump is not running, allowing a draining of cooling water piping. All pump operation acenarios snould be considered, c. suoh as restart of a recently de-energised pump.. Furthermore envelopes wo,rst operating conditions, theto ensure this s following input data shall-be dsed. Maximum actor stator running temperaturet 2 4 4'T - Maximum anhient temperature: 104F Maximum down-thrust 15,363 lbs." -(at the hearing). 4
/)rnkof 25 CnoGro4-12. hw2%,RW _I considerations and conditione employed wit 'R Aws i nestema denskthruet requirement. the above eue en theeasser outline drawingessende e msep naview shaw.d that this v lathe bearing is ehtained by adding the a The speettied load at therust of 4 end-of-shaft lead rotor weight to the investigation showe(d that the 1$,383 1h 1o75 1he + s100 1he = tits ibe) the rate'. capacity of the motor Further e down-thruet m at a bath temperature of 120F. upper thrust bearing (ise exceeds on a maximum down-thrust of 13,300 1he at thThis analysis was theref 13,300 lbs that the bearing is not overloaded e bearing to aneure oemhinetten of analysing existing toThe metPod of similar type, and performing theoreticalmt data for a sotar et s study was a this test data and input data outli calculations based on obtained from the test data included:- ned above. The information coefficient,-An eatinata of the cooling coil over ll (UA)cc. a heat tranafar transfer coefficient,-An estimate of the upper act (UA)es. ng overall heat temperature. hearing performanoe iThe critical para temperature s the oil both so by solving for it s a complea function er this parameters c,an be evaluated. Major, factor the effect of changing other temperature in this attua*4asi seeling water inlet temperature, 3) inelue., 1) s affecting oil bath .f the oil. a.A.ns ses.p.n.mi.e., upper actor housing that included these factThis ene heat transferred into and out 23 ng a nosel of the ors. the bearing oil from the journal guidcalculations w calculations were based on standard equati nput into e bearing. These bearing geeretry from this noter the bearing manufacturer for the dload and heat ons and utilized the Input, which included rated at a range of oil both temperatures. A notearing, was obta i operating the thrust bearing at the request described 15,383 lbs was aise included.- e of caution concerning e rated load of "que heat inputs were incorporat d of a for the upper motor housing. into the formulation losses into the oil e The formulation $nge, from the bearings, heat losses frem the oi to the surround was then solved for the oil bath temper function of the nahient temperature temperature thrust load , cooliner water inlet as a employed to determinevarious inpu,t data was en,tered a and specific beer: operating conditions. the oil both temperature at the ' appropriate x ve technique was i j j
'~ ~ - ~ ~ q gg m s1 j Air 2.3 - p s e$ / y', er p 1*. The conclusions reached fr . conditiene outlined -above, are:om the analysis, bascd on thei-1) circumstances withThat the motor can safely operate un cooling-water (e.g.a non-continuous supply of when the associated pump is not running),, ne coolin maximum inlet temperature of 1057, and a maximu a ambient temperature of 104F, down= thrust-le 9175 1ha-drawing., as specifled on(down=providing th veight) thrust ~+ rotor .the motor outline i 2) That the motor should.he'able to safely op under-all circumstances with a non-continuous erate supply of cooling water-(e.g., no cooling water Will flow when the associated pump is n a eaximum inlet temperature of 10SF, ot running), ambie down nt toeparature of 104F, and a maximus mum a maxi thrust of 13,300 iho (down-thrust + roto weight) es.the meter bearing oooling requiremente are. concerned. All motor indicatione and alarme should be sonitored closely to. ensure that other motor parametere, not addressed here, do not ascoed specified values. 3 t s) It increase of maximum load to 15,ss3-las le. required, additional test data'must be-'taken and further analysis performed utilising this test - s data to evaluate'the bearing at the higher load. It there are an conclusione reacnee,y questione.concerning this analysis or the please reel free to call. ,arfore, h,., M t/n/sv ~ Nert E. 1Plaabeus, Engineer 4 Heat Exchanger & Pump _Deeign verified by: d/3.L$f ff Nebinson, Engineer West Exchanger & Pump Design i concurradr ] 3,kM" ~ ..s. Mehrt, Toonnical.imadeTr I Heat Exchanger & Pump Design a e .-m
e Calc. G0050A-12 Att. 24, Rev. 4 Page 1 of 2 CSW PUMP LONG-TERM COOLING CAPABILITY Purpose The purpose of this attachment is to verify a CSW pump can supply required cooling flows to safety-related components after the first 10 minutes of a DBE. Summary of Results One CSW pump can supply RHRSW and Vital header cooling after the first 10 minutes of a DBE. References 1. Calculation G0050A-14, Rev. 1, "BSEP U1 and U2 Service Water Systems Cross-Leakage Evaluations" 2. Calculation PCN-G0050A-11, Rev. O, "RHR Service Water Flow During Cold Shutdown" 3. Acceptance Test Results for Special Procedure 2-SP 021, Rev. 1, " Unit 2 NSW System Flow Tests" Assumptions 1. A SW pump flow rate of 7000_gpm results in sufficient suction pressure in the RHRSW pump suction header under all system conditions. 2. Chlorination and CW pump bearing water flows can be isolated by operator action after the first 10 minutes of a DBE. 3. Vital header flow is approximately 1000 gpm at these system pressures and SW pump flows. 4. Leakage from the CSW header is 1000 gpm at a header pressure of 40 psig. Calculation During the long-term cooling phase following a DBE with the unit in Mode 1, 2, or 3, a second SW pump must be placed in operation. If the second SW pump is a CSW pump and either the Vital header or RHRSW is isolated from the NSW header, then all safety-related cooling other than the DG's must be
5 l . Calc.'G0050A-12 Att. 24 i Rev.-4' g Page 2 of 2 j CBW PUMP LONG-TERM COOLING CAPABILITY i supplied by the CSW. header and CSW pump.. This is.necessary due to the high. flow rates on the NSW header due to the-4 nonsafety-related RBCCW flow. Previous revisions to ~! Calculation G0050A-12 have assumed a CSW pump is capable of providing tnis cooling based on similarity to the NSW pumps ~ and the NSW neader. The limiting parameter in the long-term cooling phase ~is the RHRSW pump suction pressure. As discussed in the body of Calcular'on G0050A-12, a' minimum of 18.0 psig must be maintai ed or the RHRSW pumps will trip.'.The computer simulations in G0050A-12 show an 18.0 psig RHRSW pump suction pressure can be maintained as long'as SW pump flow remains belov 7000-7200 gpm (the specific valuefin this range depends on system configuration). 'At SW pump flows of 7000-7200 gpm, minimum SW header pressure'is approximately 41 psig. + f e After the first'10_ minutes of a DBE,' operator: action can bei taken to1 isolate nonsafety-related. flow paths on thelCSW- - 1 header. Accordingly, the only flow paths which must be-supplied by;the CSW pump after 10 minutes are RHRSW,_the N Vital header, and possibly SW pump lube water._ In' addition, the maximum anticipated leakage fromLthe CSW-header must be-included as a flow path. If all these : flow paths add up to a total CSW pump. flow rate-of 7000 gpm or less, then the CSW pump and header are' capable of adequate'long-term cooling. The minimum required RHRSW cooling to shut down the unit from Modes 1, 2, or 3 is 4500~gpm (Ref. 2). Taking~into; account computer model accuracy, the'RHRSW flow rate'in.any_ KYPIPE analyses must be 4737gpm (4500 + 0.95) to ensure at. least 4500 gpm to RHRSW. The total Vital header cooling-flow rate at a SW header pressure of 41 psigiis less'than 1000 gpm (from analyses in Calculation G0050A-12)._ The maximum CSW header leakage calculated in Reference l'for a i SW header pressure of.40 psig is,slightly11ess than 1000 gpm. Lube water flow will be no more than 200 gpm. Adding' these flows gives: 4737 +.1000 + 1000 + 200 = 6937_gpm Since this value is less than 7000 gpm, the capability of the CSW pump and header to supply required long-term cooling is assured. t t s. ,e n
I TdR ibp Seat Cmtex EhvAmd 6"C 2-Ar 26,78/4 b I dF lo ATTACHMENT 26 MR PLHP SEAL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS The RER pump seal coolers are Borg-Warner heat exchangers for mechanical seal cooling. Reviews of recent flow testing perf omed by SP-89-021, Nuclear SW System Flow Tests, indicated that service water flovrates through the se 1 coolers were less-than design values. The desigu flowrate is 15 gpm per cooler. A review of design information by General Electric (see attached) indicates that the seal coolers perform a safety-related mechanical function. This function is to maintain service water and RHR system pressure boundaries; pressure integrity failures can cause a spray that may damage other vital equipmenc. However, the function of the seal cooler is not required during accident modes of RHR operation (LPCI, Containment Cooling, Suppression Pool Cooling). The RHR system fluid temperature does not exceed the design temperature limits of the pump mechanical seal. Therefore, the reduced flows through the RER Pump Seal Coolers recorded in SP-89-021 do not degrade Nuclear Safety, e- [ 2-I ~ m e
g,'. g' Arfkr/mour 26 ? g m -,2. 7-4 Pne i Air 26, fg4 I ../ ? 2. ce= (a j 84F317 331A7:3 class!PICATION Ra?IEW CE 1 3ar shaser: A00-02710- f3 d[O q Part Nueber: 8Ibb28% bMM &7: '&h I i gdd/dikt" ~ A (as applisable) AR Teen No.:- d. l O O /j cna.,,11.ast Part
Description:
"S/7' [I b /M/ b M (ct use only)_ Nb _ Plant Ceda Functional Classification of Part(Q/W/S): _ ~ /?)$4 caAfe'af KFL Application: _ (parent equipment ID) dll~~ d O C 2 pef /eleecan 1 4IS G. AameK (/1/n Basis for Classification of Part: && f~ DIRICTLY PERFORMS $AFETY RE \\
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FUNCTION l gimotAny aun c-anetem Eased en the research filed in the referenced DRF for the identified part have been given Safety.Relat d. the application elassifications. e 1 have reviewed all of the applications identified abov that: and have determined X All of the appliestions listed above are safety R review Page 3 2) ated (see application-O None et tho' applications listed above are Safety R l e ated (see Page 3 7). O
- Sees of the applications listed above are 8af t follows:
(see applicatien review page 8 2). e y Related and are listed as. i ')( rart r..uentift..ti is re perfer.or: A ' ' m m,e / ired c..e ser n.lo.oo, Inter.han eediu .at.:4-#-87 I have reviewed this safety.Related Classification Revi 1 verified that the .c fety.Related classifiestion assigned above is apprs i ew Checklist and have-for the liste i cat ens based on the information sentained in t Verifier: d t SA V Manager: Date: '"~ .c s Date: _'k-(7.'N
- If this device:La used cations, a separate checklist -ta required for eneh applicmultipl ation.
- 3 645 -(9no/aas I i
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- - ' 2-P. s a SAPITT.R11ATED CIAESIFICATION SKTIEW CMECK1.!ST (continued) 405'b ser m=6. : aco-om o.
M '605-f/F f .rart wu.b.r: (The Imad Systes Engineer (1.It) signature la only required if the item being reviewed is a syssee MPL ttoa.) I have reviewed this safety.Ratated Classification Review Checklist and concur vit.h the safety.Related classification assigned. Systen LSE Date Ass 1featien Review 1. a. Is the part applied in a system er eenpenent classified as nonsafety.related in accordance with this procedure? Yes __. Ce to 7 Ne X ce to 1.b b. Does the part have an appliestion in at least one system or component aeating the criteria of paragraph 2.7.1 of E0P 65 2.10. Yes I List components and/or systems in 2. and 5' ** 3. No Ce to 7 2. Applicable cooperwat or systea (required to be completed): Part Number er Model Number /V X Description C8M72/bMMd /MMb3 Part Ramber er Nedel Number Description Fart Number er Model Ntaber Description 3D.04y9/30/88) Page 3 2 (these 2 of 8)
~ y~ .h. &ggyQ, g-W ~l 2-g_. I kw 24 'ME/.I j - D 'j"?4o,,.6-r SAFETT.R8tATES CIASSIFICATIM RET 2W CNBCELIST (eentinued DRF Amber: A00-02710- ^ ,.rt fu.ser: - #Y-c62S-FWf 3. Neehanical Review: 4 Isa EL f Is the part function relied upon to saintain the reactor coolant a. primary pressure boundary inteerityt b. Is the part required for the system to seeeeplish a Safety Related funetteet Vould mechanical or structural failure er malfunction of the part j c. have the potential to prevent er inhibit the operatten et a safety i Related function of its systes or oeopementt*. d. Is the part relied upon to maintain the containment boundary sateatteyt 1 t Ra.1 for aesponse: 4 // T / 4 7.- d / i v A! E cA,v c4t JE: / (i (required to be e pieted)' 56'd Y 7WA7' .4My' .14A M G E 87NAZ .EQJiPMEA/r /-Mb Rsx dF CCOL./McC, MJATEA.
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Notas: tr aar et the oue. tion.. throush d are.neveres w.. se t. s. < ~ If questions: a throush e are all, answered *ne*, se to 4 If answered yes, provide sepy of 'seepleted cheektist/evalusties'fors' to Licensing and Censulting Programs. 89 065 (9/30/88) Page 8 3. (Sheet 3 ' of - 8) m ne m,....
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q- )g. y q Ar2s9v.c Q. t. P se,4:, umr.inum eunierunes mm essa:= (.enti.e.d> + gay m A00-027:0 b,. ~ L' Part 3habert #1 ~o - F 6(/ ~ 7. Does the part (including its redundant eeunterparts's. provide any Safety.Related funettons either direetly by the function it performs or Ladtreetly due to interfasse with Safety.Related systese? Tes So to 8. 'i No Classify noneafety related. attach explanation, if i P 5 warranted. Go to 11. 8. Declare the part safety.Related, state the criterien fres i attachampitfiedexplanation.-ifwarranted,andgoto9.h4.?S.6.er7 Mechanical 9. Can the part be provided by ct as safety.Relatet under current part Identity? Ye s,,,y_. Step. l 56 .I de to 10.
- 10..Does the part meet the requirements for 'Ceesercial.Crade* in 10CFR217 I
{g (Refer to. EOF 65 2.20) Yes-Funettenelly classify ^. Fare reidentiftention will be. required. ~ Ne Further twestigation is indicated.. East classiftsatten }f presses.
- 11. Does the part funettenally classified W have any special regulatory functions er rep irementet Yes Attach list of special requirements, elas'ify 8.
Step. s No-Classify N. Atop. .i ? ') ) l 80 043 (9/30/88) Pese 3 7 (8h*et 7 *f 8) o (04580627.8DF) -i
F '.*l[ g' q 425Z4-12 w% % ' [' 26 c GAFRTT.32LATES CIAS$1FICAY205 RET!tif CMICELIST (contitwed) ' 38.7 haberg A00-02710 Part Number: N b 'h AFFL1CAllt REVIIV DOCUMENTI (List only these documents actually used in the review, including revisten of documents and entstandine ECNs and FDDRs) 1. PURCHASE DOCUKEFTATION FURCHA$5 FART DRAVING REV. A35tM3LY DRAVINC REV. SELECTED ITEM DRAVING REY. FURCHASE SPECIFICATION REV. VENDOR FRIFT FILE (VPF) ][ ~f) CRAVING 2-77/o 2-uxu tm m. MATERIAL LIST REV. 2. MASTER FAJLTS LIST (NFL) 3. FIFING AND INSTRihtEN. TATION DIACIAN REV. 4. INSTRUKENT AND ELECTRICAL DIACRAM REY. 5. ELEMENTARY DIAcaAn REV. 6. FUNCT100lA1. CONTROL DpAv13g RIV. 7 INTER 1DCE Elecx REY. - DIACRAM 8. OTHER (LIST DOC. TrFE) RIV. __ REY. __ ,}% dh@H I MO
- U
=- .=. - EEV. SD 045 (9/30/88) Page 3 3 (thest I of 8:
g caja. eooso A-11 A#c27, Rev 5 77 / af 2-DISCIPLINE DESIGN VERIFICATION RECORD Page 1 I. Instructions to Verification Personnel Plant b3 0 (Class A) Project 6 C O S O C. Q I] Seismic (Class 8) File No. 3C)ooroc. - DE - A 5'4 3 Level ( ) Fp.Q'(Class D) Doctsnent No. ' 6 00 5o A -/2-Rev 6 ( ) Other i Design verification should be done in accordance with ANS! N45.2.11, Section 6, as amended by Regulatory - Guide 1.64, Rev. 2. i Special Instructions: lA fi il, f) ./ Discipline Project Engineer / / l/4M_4d'[/[ (M/ ' v ,/ - () II. Verification Docuatritation Applicability Discieline Disciotine Mechanical M Civil Structural IJ HVAC [] Seismic Equip. Qual. [] Electrical (3 Civil Stress [] 1&C I] Fire Protection I3 Environmental Qualification () Hunan Factors I1 Materials !J !3 Other [] Verification Methods Used: M Design Review [ ] Alternate Calculations [ ] Qualification Testing Design Doctstent Acceo able: Yes [ g No M
- coments attached.
/ Design Verifier .. ( % M VA Date 2M/ A y i Acknowl ^ emiint of V t' (D'PE ) /NM / Date Y ll L ./ g III. Resolution of rr==mants: Comnents Resolved (See Attached : -M (RE) I hte If 24 I Date "2b b Action taken makes. sigk Doctsnen* Acc tables Desig M fler W' Date )/ (DP ) fiate U / / i Proc. 3.3 i Rev. 38 1 .a b-
~ b Cade-GooscA-tz . A tt 21 : RevG ft 2 of 2 ~ Page"2 DISCIPLINE DESIGN VERIFICATION RECORD COMMENT SHEET 3bM PLEnt Projsct hcOfo C File No. 0600GCC-W- As4 3 (CO TON-/~2.gey $ Doctanent ho. This sheet is only recuired when coninents are being made. Cocunent Resolved No. Conrnent Resolution Initial /Date (a nv f leff %d awt<3m bar s -to / y tet %d. (' m a t f ':'Mfl [7-2M2-Alf.fCH.O imurvultlyro W /2H12RH 2 C0046 L 4 S&oujs vt1AL HOS Flou). fytta ) lbNlf7-22.~97. 4,to 24 W -Ce"lA'.tlatnd Q 3 cm o sv a - t o kebmic4J,4%t / 7-2.4 4.11. 2 ~ 10lA ~ Q &. [m ( Wfdk l9-7? 02-4.l7.~6 - T2.6C4to d[A. $4 [m h) M [7-27
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g Goosbwn is cove) b.4 c& M n { S L.& w Goo s A-t a. Gooss-to Jh chu) XJpc /y.ze.qq '3 CuJhd ?Cht /h-p 92 G.t.t. s ~ ck:f.t. csaw M 4v 6 e.b gpg / 7-zt.92. q AWw Aft.t - cu.2*- eea to a wik M,caenus- - M[7-7 %yL /0 72o0. Mt.1 ch.4 - RHf2pw.fL, dan 0;% & a y ~4 A L L ia4 i 9 ~l. L 253 /.4,,, A ') I#f.f 7-24-12 A4. 3. c47.- earesw o w -a ,7 " h i 5 ^ +m u cmAe ihn. h-14-12 /.3 E' Y S&oW " W Y Cevac.LI dit l7-27-92 ,g AB. 5 cv.3 - gucto >4000. Q gj 2-z9-92 (z Hesw g<c*s 4 l %- Proc. 3.3 Rev. 40}}