ML20044D107
| ML20044D107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1993 |
| From: | Patel T FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044D106 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9305170236 | |
| Download: ML20044D107 (100) | |
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ELECTRCAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA
" 98 ' ' 5' Revision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION NUCLEAR SAFETY REL ATED !
i f f FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION NUCLEAR ENGINEERING Dt!PMTMENT CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 REVIEWED AND ACCEPTED BY: tr.it= ddzM I b[*4 cit. 443-13
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Revise criteria for internal panel wiring other than IE ~ M .@ pg , to IE and enhancement d - (3-9 3 4 T3 9'33/f5 Added SILTEMP as a Thermal T.D. Patel D.A. Rhoads R.P. Cronk 1 Barrier and Enhancement 6-18-92 6-18-92 C.G. Kramer 6-18-92 Combined and added new S.M. Cisek R.B. Porter R.P. Cronk 0 criteria for both inside and T.D. Patel R.G. McNabe C.G. Kramer outside of rack, panel, etc. Rev. Description Prepared By Verifier Approved I 9305170236 930506 PDR ADOCK 05000302 PDR B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 l
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 2 om Revision 2 i I I DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING ogi,4j33fg3 ; i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
- 1. Scope ............................. 6
- 2. Definitions .......................... 8
- 3. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 4. Electrical Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 A. For Outside of Panels, Cabinets, and Racks ........ 14
- 1) General Considerations ................ 14
- a. Routing location ................. 14
- b. Physical Space and Functional Limitations .... 14
- c. Classification of Electrical Cable Trays .... 15
- d. Exceptions .................... 16
- 2) Specific Circuit Separation Criteria . . -. . . . . . . .
17
- a. Safety-Related Circuits ............. 17
- b. Associated Circuits ............... 18
- c. Non-Safety-Related Circuits ........... 18
- d. Separation by Voltage and Cable Type ....... 19
- e. Vendor Supplied Cable .............. 19
- 3) Safety-Related Raceway Routing in Hazardous ..... 19 Areas and Common Fire Areas
- 4) Separation Barriers .............. .. 19
- 5) Permanent Markings ............... .. 20
- 6) Splices ....................... 21
- 7) Channel Separation .................. 21
- 8) Redundant Safety-Related Cable Groups ........ 21 B. For Inside IE Panels, Cabinets, and Racks ......... 22
- 1) General Considerations ................ 22 B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5
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"^9' ' S' 2
i AND CABLE TRAY LOADING- $$5k"33/93 f i i l TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page !
- 2) Internal Wiring Color Code 23 f
- 3) Separation Distances and Barriers .......... 24 l
- a. Components and Wiring ......... .... 24
- b. Generic Deviations ................ 27 ,
- c. Mounting on Barriers ............... 29
- d. Barrier Materials ................ 29 l
- 4) Incoming Field Cables ................ 30
- a. Cable Entrance / Terminations ........... 30 i
- 5) Isolation ...................... 31 i
- a. Devices ..................... 32 4
- b. Fuses ...................... 33 J
- c. Terminal' Wiring ................. 33
- 5. C a bl e T ray Lo ad i ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 A. 6900 V Power Cabl e Tray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 }
B. 4160 V Power Cable Tray ................... 34 : C. 480 V, 120 V and DC Power Tray .............. 34 i D. 120 VAC and 125 VDC Control Cable Tray .......... 34 l l E. Instrument Cable Tray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
- 6. Cable and Wire Applications .................. 35 !
1 TABLES -I Table A'. Allowable Raceway / Cable Grouping and Color Code ... 36 Table B. Color Codes for Internal Control Board and . Relay Rack Wiring ......_............ . 38 fi Table !. Redundant Raceways Separation Criteria For IE i External Raceways and Wiring . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 . . l t Table D. Separation Criteria for Internal IE and IE to ! Non-1E Panel Components and Wiring ..........40' I i i 1 B:\EDCREV\ECP2'WP5 ELE m e.AL. _
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Page 4 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ! ELECTRICAL R DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING dan /b "13/93 ; i TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) ! l Page j Table E. Raceways . Separation Criteria for IE to Non-lE . ! External Raceways and Wiring ..... ....... 41 l l Table F. Recommended Separation Distances Between i External Raceways of Different Voltage i Level and Cable Type ................. 42 l FIGURES ! Fig. 1 Separation Requirements Utilizing One Barrier .... 43 : Fig. 2 Separation Requirements Utilizing One Barrier .... 43 l Fig. 3 Separation Requirements Utilizing One Barrier .... 44 ! Fig. 4A Intentionally left Blank ............... 45 i Fig. 4B Separation Requirements Utilizing One Barrier .... 46 I i Fig. 4C Separation Requirements Utilizing One Barrier .... 47 l i Fig. 5 Separation Requirements Utilizing Two Barriers .... 4B i Fig. 6 Termination Method for Multi-Conductor Cable ..... 49 l i Fig. 7 Isolation Device Application in Control and l Instrumentation Circuits .............. 50- ; Fig. 8 Isolation Device Application in Control and ! Instrumentation Circuits ..............51 l Fig. 9 Isolation Device Application in Control and Instrumentation Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 j i APPENDICES -l r Appendix 1, Basis for Redundant and IE to Non-1E Circuit Separation i Criteria : i Appendix 2, Circuit Number 3rd Letter Code j Appendix 3, Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) Electrical i Separation Considerations I
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i Page 5 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN
-l CRITERIA i
ctecmCAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION RWision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 i i L ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Separation Criteria Exceptions !
- 2. Separation Criteria Exceptions Evaluation Form -l i
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYJICAL SEPARATION Page 6 of 51 Revision 2 li DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93
- 1. SCOPE '
The purpose of this document is to establish separation criteria applicable i to wiring and components located in Class lE enclosures as well as for j electric cable and raceway which are routed outside of Class IE enclosures. 1 It also establishes separation criteria for IE to non-1E wiring, components - and raceways. In addition, this document establishes the criteria for cable ! tray loading and cable application for electrical power, control, and instrumentation cable and raceways which are routed to safety-related . equipment. The criteria contained herein is applicable to existing as well ! as new construction for Florida Power Corporation, Crystal River Unit 3. l The criteria identified in Section 4.A of this document applies to external ! field cabling and raceway starting at the opening where a cable or raceway . j enters / leaves equipment or enclosures. l- l The criteria identified in Section 4.B of this document applies to all i internal cabling and wiring starting at the opening where a cable enters an j enclosure such as control boards, equipment cabinets and relay racks. It includes, but is not limited to construction and wiring practices. The panels and relay racks which are governed by this document are the following: i
- 1) Main Control Board in Control 12) Transmitter Power Supply ;
Room (All Sections) Cabinet (TPC) -
- 2) RR1 13) Nuclear Sample Panel NS l
- 3) RR2 14) RRPSA i
- 4) RR3 15) EFIC A, B, C, & D Cabinets !
- 5) RRIA/RR2A 16) EFI? A & B Aux. Cabinets .j
- 6) RRIB/RR2B 17) EFIl _ C & D Relay Boxes j
- 7) RRIAB/RR2AB 18) RSP VRSP AB/RSP B; i 8)_ RR3A/RR3B 19) RSP-JAA/RSP-RRAI ,
, 9) RR4A/RR4B 20) RSP-RR6/RSP-RRBI- ;
- 10) RR5Bl/RR5B2 21) RSP A & B Aux. Equipment Cabinets i 8
- 11) RRHV 22) RCITS.A & B Cabinets !
The separation criteria for Engineered Safeguard Actuation cabinets (4A,4B, . 4C, 4D, 5A, 5B, SC & SD) and Engineered Safeguard Channel cabinets (1, IA, ~l IB, 2, 2A, 2B, 3, 3A & 3B) are. considered in ^ppendix 3 of-this design , criteria. The fire service panel is a Non-Class IE panel and even though the power to : this panel is fed from safety related buses, it has been isolated by a . Class IE isolation device in the distribution panel. Therefore, the- fire _ service panel is not governed by this- separation criteria. , B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 ;
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 7 of 51 Revision 2 t DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING o,1,4j,3jg3 [ l [ The radioactive waste disposal panel is a vendor supplied Non-Class IE ! panel. It is not governed by this separation criteria since separation . requirements were not imposed on this panel during procurement and construction. All wires inside the radwaste panel are gray with the ! exception of two brown conductors connected to Non-lE relay (device VG). ! This circuit with brown conductors is fed from Class 1E power source, ! however, it has been isolated by a Class lE fuse at the MCC. Also in the ; radwaste panel, wiring has been routed in the flex conduit up to device VG ; to maintain separation from other Non-1E circuits.
]i Any work performed as a maintenance activity on a circuit located inside or t outside of an enclosure listed above must be performed in accordance with !
this criteria as applicable. Any future design activities to the above ! listed enclosures shall also observe these requirements unless otherwise ;
- justified by analysis as identified herein. !
The requirements of the following documents for electrical circuit physical [ separation are incorporated in the design criteria: l i - Draft I dated 10/20/71, Section 8.0 of the proposed Guide for the i Design and Installation of Cable Systems in Power Generating Stations, ! (Ref. 3R). j
-1 Criteria Relating to Electrical Circuit Physical Separation and Cable !
Tray Loading dated January 24, 1977 (Ref. 3C) l FSAR Separation Criteria (Ref. 3E) : E-91-000), Rev. O, Electrical Separation Criteria for Class IE Control ; Boards, Equipment Cabinets and Relay Racks (Ref. 3A) ; Control Board and Relay Rack Engineered Safeguard Separation Criteria l Report, Rev. 9, May 1975 (Ref. 3W) l
- IEEE 279-1968, Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant- Protection Systems i
Guidance on the use of barriers for fire protection is provided in the l Crystal River Unit 3,10CfR50, Appendix R Fire Study. Circuits that are ! required for safe shutdown in the event of a fire are identified on the i E-213 series of drawings and in Section 7 of the 10CFR50 Appendix R Fire i Study Report. 1 I i t B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5
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Page 8 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA : ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Revision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date @3/93 I i i
- 2. DEFINITIONS ;
To clarify terms used within this document, the following definitions shall apply: j ; A. Associated Circuits - Non-Class IE circuits that are routed with ! Class IE circuits and are not separated from Class IE circuits by j acceptable separation distance, barriers or isolation devices. } (NOTE: Crystal River Unit 3 does not use associated circuits as defined j by IEEE 384. When used in this document, the term is to define ! non-class 1E circuits routed with Class IE circuits.) B. Barrier - A device or structure interposed between redundant Class IE l equipment or circuits, between Class IE and Non-Class IE equipment or i circuits, or between Class 1E equipment or circuits and a potentia' ; source of damage to limit damage to Class IE systems to an acceptable level. j C. Channel - The designation applied to a given system or set of ! components that enables the establishment and maintenance of physical, electrical, and functional independence from other redundant sets of . components. The terms division, train, channel, separation group,. and l safety group are interchangeable in the context of this document. l D. Class IE - The safety classification of the electrical equipment and ! systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment ! isolation, reactor core cooling and containment and reactor heat j removal, or are otherwise essential in preventing a significant release l of radioactive material to the environment. This classification i includes, but is not restricted to the reactor protection, engineered l safeguards and EFIC systems. l E. Class IE Cabinet - A rack, panel, switchboard, or similar enclosure : fitted with Class IE equipment. As used within the context.of this , document, the cabinet can be open (i.e., a frame structure without jl sides or doors) or closed (i.e., a complete enclosure). Note: - Even though the Main Control Board was built by assembling i many individual sections (some safety and- non-safety , related), the Main Control Board is considered as one ! enclosure for the purposes of this document. Equipment racks -i located inside the Main Control Board are considered as ' separate Class IE cabinets, and as such, each is to satisfy
- the requirements of this criteria document. 1 MCC's, switchgear and HVAC cabinets also meet this i definition, but are not governed by this separation criteria I
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 9 of 51 Revision 2 i
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l DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING o,1,4jufg3 l l J j i since separation requirements were not imposed on this ! equipment during procurement and construction. [ F. Control Circuits - Low Voltage Control Circuits utilizing relatively I low-current levels or used for intermittent operation to change the ! operating status of a utilization device of the plant auxiliary system. l G. Desian Basis Event - A postulated abnormal event used in the design to l establish the acceptable performance requirements of the structures, ! systems, and components. i H. Enaineered Safeauard System - The equipment, instrument cb ' , power ! supplies, actuation logic and manual controls that compr: . L s3 stem j which takes automatic action to prevent or mitigate the effects of a design basis accident. j I. Flame Retardant - Capable of limiting the propagation of a fire beyond l the area of influence of the energy source that initiated the fire. j t J. Independence - The state in which there is_no mechanism by which any j single design basis event can cause redundant equipment to be ; inoperable. ; t K. Instrumentation Circuit - A low energy circuit used for transmitting ! variable current or voltage signals (analog) or those used for ! transmitting coded information (digital). ! L. Isolation Device - A device in a circuit which prevents malfunctions ! in one section of a circuit from causing unacceptable influences in j other sections of the same circuit or in other circuits. l M. Limited Hazard Areas - Limited hazard areas are those plant areas other ! than cable spreading room and control room from which potential hazards j such as missiles, exposure fires, and pipe whip are' excluded. i N. tow Eneroy Circuit - Low energy circuits are those circuits that either are inherently limited requiring no overcurrent protection or limited f by a combination of a power source and overcurrent protection (NEC Article 725-31 for Class 2 and Class 3 circuits). They are comprised ! of analog and digital circuits used for transmitting: , , a. Variable current or . voltage signals for the control and/or instrumentation of plant equipment and systems. . i
- b. Coded information signals, such as those derived from the output )
of an analog-to digital converter or the coded output from a . digital computer or other digital transmission terminals. l 1 B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 l
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ELECTR" DEPARTMENT ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 10 of 51 Revision 2 i l' AND CABLE TRAY LOADING oate 413/93 i For CR3, low energy circuits are defined as those having the ' l following nominal characteristics:
- 32-160 mV e 0-10V DC
- 28V DC
- 24V DC !
- 4-20 mA
- 24V AC !
- 10-50 mA * -10 to +10V DC i
- l-5V DC
- 125V DC high impedence current limited i annunciator logic loops !
( 125 VDC annunciator circuits are digital circuits which are routed in control cable tray or conduit. Since they are connected to a ; high impedance source (60 K), the current is limited in these : circuits to qualify them as low energy circuits. The cable i insulation for annunciator circuits is rated at 600 volts. l
- 0. Low-Voltaae Power Circuit - A circuit which supplies power to utilization devices of the plant auxiliary systems rated at 600V or j less. !
P. Medium-Voltaae Power Circuit - A circuit which supplies power to utilization devices of plant auxiliary systems rated at 601 V to ; 15,000 V. Q. Non-Hazard Areas - An area meeting the following requirements may be ; designated as a nonhazard area (cable spreading room and control room l only), i (1) The area shall not contain high energy equipment such as ( switchgear, transformers, rotating equipment, or potential sources of missiles or pipe failure hazards, or fire hazards. ; (2) Circuits in the area shall be limited to control and instrument i functions and those power supply circuit cables and equipment : serving the equipment located within the area. - (3) Power circuit cables in this area shall be installed in enclosed ! raceways. r (4) Administrative control of operations and maintenance activities i shall control and limit introduction of potential hazards into the j area. R. Protection System - The protection systems, which consists of the : Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Engineered Safeguard Actuation ! System (ESAS), perform important control and safety functions. The i protection systems extend from the sensing instruments to the final. j B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 11 of 51 Revision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING o,1,yi3fg3 j i actuating devices, such as circuit breakers and pump or valve motor contactors. , S. Raceway - Enclosures such as conduit, cable tray, ducts, wireway ! penetrations, etc., which provide a method of routing support, and ; physical protection for the electrical cable system. ! T. Reactor Protection System - The overall compliment of instrument channels, trip logic and wiring which make up redundant channels to i form a matrix to generate a reactor trip signal. { U. Redundant Circuits. Eauipment or System - Circuits, equipment or . systems that duplicate the essential function of another piece of l equipment or systems to the extent that either may perform the required l function regardless of the state of operation or failure of the other. V. Safety-Related (Class IE) - The safety classification of the equipment f and systems that are essential to assure the integrity of the Reactor
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Coolant System boundary and the capability to shutdown the reactor, to maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite ; exposures comparable to those referred to in 10CFR100.11. : W. S_ecaration Distance - Space which has no interposing structures, ( eqaipment, or materials that could aid in the propagation of faults or i that could otherwise disable safety-related systems or equipment. ! X. Sinale Failure Criteria - The single failure criteria as defined in j IEEE Standard No. 279-1971 states: "Any single failure within the ' protection system shall not prevent proper protective action at the ' r system level when required." This is applied to all systems that have safety related functions.
- 3. REFERENCES !
The design basis for internal and external separation requirements of safety j related circuit.s stated in this document is provided in Appendix 1. The use j of the references in the preparation of this document does not imply FPC l commitment to the referenced document. l A. E-91-0001, Rev. O, Electrical Separation Criteria for Class IE Control f Boards, Equipment Cabinets and Relay Racks (To be. superceded by this criteria). 1 B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 .
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION e ge 12 of si Revision 2 i DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 [ i i B. Crystal River Unit 3,10CFR50, Appendix R Fire Study. , C. Criteria Relating to Electrical Circuit Physical Separation and Cable , Tray Loading dated January 24, 1977 (To be superceded by this ! criteria). l D. Electrical Design Criteria - Cable Tray and Conduit Fill and Weight ! Limitations. E. CR3 Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 7, paragraphs 7.1.1.1 to 4 : and 7.1.3.15 and Chapter 8, paragraph 8.2.2.11 to 13. l F. Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 2: Physical Independence of Electric f Systems. ! l G. IEEE 384-1974, IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class IE . Equipment and Circuits. l H. IEEE 420-1982, IEEE Standard for the Design and Qualification of l l Class IE Control Boards, Panel s, and Racks Used in Nuclear Power i Generating Stations. ; I. IEEE 690-1984, Cable Systems for Class IE Circuits in Nuclear Power l f Generating Station. l i J. R0-3065, Addendum G: Requirement outline for Engineered Safeguards ; Actuation Relay Cabinets. I K. R0-3138, Addendum M: Requirement Outline for Main Control Board, and l Control Cubicle. i L. Drawing E-214-061, Miscellaneous Cable Tray Details. ! M. Drawing S-520-001 thru 013, Standard Appendix R Fire Wrapping Details. N. Electrical Design Criteria - 10CFR50 Appendix R Compliance Review : Criteria.
- 0. Electrical Design Criteria - Cable Ampacity Sizing.
i P. IEEE 384-1992; IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class IE ! Equipment and Circuits. , Q. IEEE Paper 71 TP 83-PWR; Working Group Report for Design and Installation of Wire and Cable Systems in Power Generating Stations l [First draft to IEEE 422. NOTE: This document is committed in FSAR i Chapter 8, Section 8.2.2.12). i i f B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5
l Page 13 of 51 4 ELECTR! CAL DESIGN CRITERIA i ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION w si n 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 r j I R. IEEE 422; Guide for the Design and Installation of Cable Systems in l Power Generating Stations. : 1 S. IEEE Paper 90 WM 254-3 EC; Cable Separation - What Do Industry Testing Programs Show? ; T. IEEE Paper CH2040-4184/0000-0108501.00; Arcing Fault in Metallic i Conduit at 120 and 240 volts. . U. Crystal River Unit 3, Fire Hazard Analysis. V. RP-5515-096-1.00-CS, Rev. 0; Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Electrical Separation Considerations. l l W. Control Board and Relay Rack Engineered Safeguard Separation Criteria l Report, Rev. 9, May 1975. ! t X. IEEE 279-1968; Proposed IEEE Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems. Y. E91-0052, Rev. 0; Evaluation of SILTEMP as a Thermal Barrier for _i Separation. Z. Test Report - Design Verification for Internal Panel Control Wiring l Separation Criteria by Philadelphia Electric Company, Report No. 48503 j dated September 1, 1982. ; < AA. Test Report - Electrical Separation Verification Testing for Duquesne Light Company's Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit 2, Report No. 17666-02 dated April 19, 1985. , AB. Test Report - Electrical Separation Verification for South Texas Project Electrical Generating Station Units, Report No. 53575 dated -! February 12, 1987. { AC. Test Report - Electrical Separation Verification Testing for Northeast ! suclear Energy Company's Millstone Power Station - Unit No. 3, Report i No.'47506-02 dated March 11, 1985. l AD. IPCEA Publication No. P-46-426, Power Cable Ampacities, Volume 1 - ! Copper Conductors (American Institute of Electrical Engineers,1962). AE. IEEE-383-1974; IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, l Field Spices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. j
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 14 e st Revis. ion 2 3 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93
- 4. ELECTRICAL SEPARATION ,
A. FOR OUTSIDE OF PANELS. CABINETS. AND RACKS ,
- 1) General Considerations ,
- a. Routing Location Whenever possible, raceways carrying safety-related circuits ,
shall be routed through non-hazardous or limited hazard ) areas. In non-hazard or limited hazard environment, separation distances are based on hazards being limited to fire and-faults or failures internal to the cable. Internal failures are such occurrences as short circuits, open circuits, and grounds and include raceway interaction during a seismic event. ; Where raceways with safety-related circuits are located in I a hazard area, they shall be analyzed such that the defined ' hazard will not cause a common failure of both redundant . safety-related systems. Therefore, the effects of external . hazards such as pipe whip, jet impingement,. water / chemical ! sprays, flooding, radiation, pressurization, elevated ! temperature or humidity and missiles shall be considered. l However, where such a location is unavoidable, either protective shielding is provided for redundant Class IE ! raceways or only one Class IE channel raceway is allowed to l occupy the area. I
- b. Physical Space and Functional Limitations The preferred method for achieving independence is to -
physically and electrically separate redundant systems of , safety-related cables and raceways from each other Physical ' space and functional limitations and considerations - may , warrant the grouping of Safety-related and Nonsafety-related ; cable within the same raceway. Where this condition occurs, the specific circuit separation criteria defined in ; subsection 4.A.2 below shall be met. ; o i l 8:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 !
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ~ ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 15 of 51 Revision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY. LOADING Date >/13/93 I
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- c. Classification of Electrical Cable Trays ,
t In the original plant design, cable trays at CR-3 were designated as safety classification A, B, AB, and X. Intersection between A and X or B and X was permitted. ; Cables classified as X were allowed to route 'in either A or B trays but not both. Separation was assured as a result of : the non intersection between selected combinations of cable trays. These consisted of A and X, B and X and X alone. In- ! 1984, the CR-3 cable routing program was updated to utilize t G/C's CKS cable routing program. Due to additional restrictions placed on classification intersections (i.e. A : and X were not allowed to intersect), X trays intersecting with A trays were-. redesignated as XA. Similarly X trays , intersecting with B trays were redesignated as XB. Trays j designated as X that did not intersect with any other ' classification of tray remained c;assified as X and contained. , only non-safety circuits. Circuit classifications were also ! changed to match this approach. Due to the fact that the i plant was' fully constructed and these changes only affected non-safety related cables and trays, the Geld identification ! (color id #'s) of the cable trays were iot changed. This ! resulted in all X, XA and XB cable trays being identified ; with white numeric markers. l Note: MAR NO. 88-10-20-01 created a case that ; necessitated the creation of an XX classified tray l that connects an XA tray and an XB tray. This MAR , was prepared to install the Non-lE 250/125 VDC battery . in the CR-3 Turbine Building. This MAR t required an XX tray (#61) to route power cable from . the Non-lE main distribution panel to the existing ! Non-lE subpanels. This is the only XX tray at CR-3. The cables routed within this . tray --are all- ! Non-Safety related and classified as XX. The CR-3 I' cable routing _ program is restricted such that.XX cables are not allowed to route in any safety ) related tray system. As' a - result, XX cable can l never provide a bridge between the redundant tray- -! systems within the plant. Therefore, the cables i routed via this MAR are isolated from the class IE system and satisfy the- CR-3 separation ~ criteria. I
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ELECTRICAL DESIGN " 9' '8 ' 5' CRITERIA i' ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Revision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING oate4fi3fg3 , Based on the above the following routing combinations are i permitted _, Cable Trav Circuit Classification ; A A, XA 4 B B, XB AB AB ; XA XA, XX } XB XB, XX l X X, XX XX XX l As a result of this reclassification effort, cable trays routing control cable within the Control Complex are A, B, ! AB, or XB with the exception of trays 125,126, and 127 which i contain only circuits routed to the Control Rod Drive ! equipment and are classified as X. Therefore any non-safety ; cable entering cabinets (other than the Control Rod Drive .i Cabinets) within the Control Complex routed via non-safety ; cable tray can be considered as XB and shall adhere to the ! separation limitations imposed on the XB cabling. {
- d. Exceptions
.f F Exceptions to this criteria should be strongly_ discouraged. ;
However, for those cases where the criteria are found to be i physically impractical or unduly restrictive, relaxation of , the requirements may be considered. The individual ; considering the exception to this criteria shall fill out the
" Separation Criteria Exception Evaluation Form" l
(Attachment 2) and forward it to _the N0E supervisor of Nuclear Engineering (Electrical) to maintain as part of the ! plant records. Any deviation or exception to these design ! criteria shall be justified ~ and approved by the N0E .! Supervisor of Nuclear Engineering (Electrical) . All ! exceptions shall be included in Attachment 1 of these design criteria. ; I I
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA Page 17 of 51 Revision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 ,
- 2) Specific Circuit Separation Criteria :
- a. Safety-Related (Class lE) Circuits !
In order to assure safety function integrity, a - safety-related circuit of one channel shall remain independent of any other channel. The independence can be , achieved by running the circuits of one channel in raceways ' and penetrations that are physically separated by some distance from the raceway; and penetrations used by circuits of a redundant channel. If routed in cable tray, safety-related cables are designated as either train A or ; train B and are only permitted to route in their respective A or B cable tray. Where the minimum physical separation distance cannot be ; maintained between redundant channels and Class IE to Non-Class IE Raceways / Cables, a separation barrier shall be provided [ Refer : to Subsection 4.A.4].
- i. Minimum separation distance between redundant Class IE !
Raceways / Cables in the field and at the Reactor Building Penetrations shall be as defined in Table C. l Note that AB cables are to run separately from A train and i from B train cables (reference Table A). For valves MUV 23 ; and 24, their cables are train AB but are to be run : separately from the cables for valves MUV 25 and 26 which are also train AB. The reason being valves MUV 23 and 24 ; are redundant to valves MUV 25 and 26. , I ii. Minimum separation distance between Class IE to i Non-Class IE Raceways / Cables in the field and at the 'l Reactor Building Penetration shall be as defined in i Table E. ; iii. ' Distances between external raceways carrying circuits of ! the same separation group but of different voltage level ! and cable type should be as defined in Table f. The recommended separation distances given in Table F are ; based on industry accepted installation practices and the - r need to reduce noise in analog circuits run in ~ close i proximity with power circuits. j i h B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 l
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA
- ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 18 of 51 Revision 2 l
l i DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 l
- b. Associated Circuits !
Associated circuits as defined in Section 2 " Definitions" refers to nonsafety-related circuits routed along with l safety-related circuits. If these associated circuits are ! routed in cable trays, they shall be given XA or XB ! designation and are only permitted by computer program to route in A, XA or B, XB cable trays. These circuits do not perform a safety function and once a nonsafety-related circuit has been routed with a safety-related circuit, the ' nonsafety-related circuit shall be treated as the same channel as the safety-related circuit to which it has been i grouped. These associated circuits shall not be routed with i safety-related circuits of a redundant channel [ Refer to : subsection 4. A.8 for redundant cable groupings]. l 4 :
- c. Nonsafety-Related Circuits !
- i. Nonsafety-related circuits shall not ' be routed along l with safety-related circuits except when defined and i installed as " associated" (Refer to subsection 4. A.2.b :
above). ! ii. Nonsafety-related power cables from redundant ! safety-related equipment shall not be routed in a j common nonsafety-related cable trays. iii. Non-safety cables that are inputted to the cable i routing computer program as 'xx' shall.be run in trays i XA, X, XB, XX. They shall not be run' in raceways l ! carrying safety related cables. This does not violate i separation criteria as associated trays were created to : allow the intersection between safety and non-safety l related trays. (NOTE: CR3 is not licensed to meet the i requirements of IEEE 384 regarding the separation of ' associated circuits). ! t Note: Refer to Note in Section 4.A.1).c l. j t iv. Non-safety cables that are inputted to the computer as !
'X' shall be only allowed to run in non-safety trays I
'X' and 'XX'. -
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i Page 19 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ; ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION ReMon 2 j DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 7 f i
- d. Separation by Voltage and Cable Type Circuits shall be separated by nominal circuit voltage and I cable types and routed within separate raceways as detailed in Section 5. ,
i
- e. Vendor Supplied Cable Cables classified as EK-X shall not be run in tray unless ,
acceptable fire propagation as defined by IEEE 383 is , assured when using vendor cable.
- 3) Safety-Related Raceway Routina in Hazardous Areas and Common Fire .
Areas ! Missile producing or high energy line break areas and common fire areas should be avoided when locating redundant safety-related i raceways whenever possible. However, where such a location is ; unavoidable, protective shielding or Appendix "R" fire wrapping (Reference 10CFR50 Appendix R Fire Study, Appendix R 213 Series t Drawings and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA)), as applicable, shall be provided to assure functional capability is maintained. ; i i Appendix R fire barriers shall be installed using the typical fire : wrapping construction details shown on drawings S-520-001 through -013. To determine if a raceway requires Appendix "R" ! protection, refer to electrical design criteria - 10CFR50 ! Appendix R Compliance Review Criteria - Reference 3.N. j
- 4) Separation Barriers l Separation barriers (non-Appendix R application) can be used as f follows when the separation distances cannot be maintained
- a. Rigid, flexible metallic conduit. and armored cable are considered barriers. When these are used as a barrier, the ;
minimum separation distance shall be as defined in Tables C . and E for conduit. j
- b. Separation barriers for cable tray shall be as shown per Drawing E-214-061 to maintain the acceptable separation distance and structural and mechanical integrity of the cable tray and supports. 1 The use of asbestos materials for separation barriers is not -i allowed. Existing installations using asbestos need not be .
replaced; however, new installations or individual .l, B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5
L Page 20 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA : ettemcAt ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION g,v ,,on , , DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 i replacements should utilize a non-combustible asbestos free, ; mineral fiber material as shown on Drawing E-214-061.
- c. Metal Square "D" Duct is considered a barrier. When these are used as a barrier, the minimum separation distance shall ;
be as defined in Tables C and E for conduit. ! I
- d. The metal enclosures of the panel or cabinet. When these :'
are used as a barrier, the minimum separation distance shall be as defined in Tables C and E for conduit. NOTE: The following non-metallic barriers are only used when none of the above barriers are feasible. The i use of non-metallic barriers is limited to instrumentation, control and power circuits operating at less than 600 volts. i
- e. SILTEMP 188 CH (100% overlap) or SILTEMP WT-65 (50% overlap) -
with 3M No. 69 glass tapes (50% overlap) shall be considered ; appropriate thermal insulation for cables with a minimum 3/8 inch separation between the wrapped and unwrapped' cable. + The wrap may be applied to either cable. ;
- f. SILTEMP WT-65 (50% overlap) with 3M No. 69 glass tapes ;
(50% overlap) form appropriate thermal barriers between conduit (flexible or rigid) and cables (power, control or - ' instrumentation) in free air with zero inch separation when . 2 the conduit is wrapped in the SILTEMP. This requirement is i limited to a conduit containing 120 VAC/125_ VDC. power, ; control 'and instrumentation cables only. , 5)' Permanent Markinos {
- a. Raceways shall be identified using permanent markings. The ;
purpose of such markings is' to facilitate cable routing i identification for future modifications or additions. Refer to applicable maintenance procedure for details.
- b. The permanent identification of cables and conductors shall ,
be made at the terminal points. Refer to applicable 1 maintenance procedure for details. : 1
- c. The color coding for permanent markers for raceway and l cables is shown on Table A. {
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ELECTRICE ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 21 of 51 Revision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 f i I i
- 6) Solices ;
Cable Splicing within raceway, except for specifically identified l l splice boxes, is not allowed. ;
- 7) Channel Separation Refer to Table A for channels requiring separation.
1
- 8) Redundant Safety-Related Cable Groups !
There is four channel separation for the reactor protection and ! three channei separation for the engineered safeguard circuits. i This separation is maintained from the sensor through the analog ! racks to the logic or relay cabinets. Where wiring .in two or more ! cables is joined for a common alarm or events recorder point, the ! cables concerned are not routed in more - than one engineered l safeguard channel. tray where routing through engineered safeguard : tray is used for necessity. l t For a detailed breakdown of the allowable cable groups and color l coding, refer to Table A. The following is a generalized- ) description of the systems included within the redundant ! safety-related channels. .j
- a. Reactor Protection System-Channel I (RPS I) !
Engineered Safeguard-Channel A (ES A) j Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control-Channel A (EFIC A) , Associated-Channel A- -l Vital Bus-Channel A ! I
- b. Reactor Protection System-Channel II (R_PS II) l Engineered Safeguard-Channel B (ES B) j Emergency feedwater Initiation and Control-Channel B i (EFIC B)
Associated-Channel B ^ Vital Bus-Channel B
- c. Reactor Protection System-Channel III (RPS III) i Engineered Safeguard-Channel AB (ES AB) -l Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control-Channel C- 1 (EFIC C) - Instrumentation cable only l Associated-Channel AB j Vital Bus-Channel III-B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 i 1
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ELECTRICR ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 22 of 51 Revision 2 { I l DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 l l i
- d. Reactor Protection System-Channel-IV (RPS IV) .
.l Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control-Channel D ;
(EFIC D) , Vital Bus-Channel IV l r
- e. Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control-Channel C l (EFIC C) - Control cable only ;
- f. Nuclear Instrumentation & Protection (NI & P) System f Nuclear Instrumentation and Protection cables for channels 1 .
through 4 shall be contained in four, physically separate ! groups of conduit runs. Channels 12, 13, 14, 23, 24 and 34 l are designated to provide interconnections between NI & P t system sub-assemblies A, B, C and D. The specific cable and ( conduit color identification requirements are given in i Table A, page 2 of 2. !
- g. EFIC Logic Cabinets Interconnections [
The specific color identification requirements for conduits ! interconnecting EFIC cabinets are given in Table A, page 2 l of 2. : B. FOR INSIDE 1E PANELS. CABINETS AND RACKS ,
- 1) General Considerations
- a. Physical separation of redundant circuits, devices, and ,
components is to be provided within sections of Class IE ! panels, cabinets and racks-listed in section 1.0 so that no i single credible event as defined in the FSAR can prevent the ! proper functions of the safeguard or protection systems as ) identified in IEEE 279-71. i
- b. Engineered -Safeguard channel circuits for safe plant i shutdown are defined as those circuits which run separately {
to form two redundant actuation trains. "A" train which is I color coded red and must be separated - from the "B train which is color coded green. Likewise, the "B" train which is green is similarly separated. The AB actuation which is' , yellow, is not a train but a combination of A and B trains, [ either of which causes an AB actuation. The AB actuation ! must be kept separate from the A & B channels and trains j except at the point of origin where reasonable isolation is ! required. j c .. Inside a Class IE panel, cabinet, or rack separation is _ required between the separation groups defined in Table B. l B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 l
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ELECTRCAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 23 of 51 Revision 2 t DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING 031,4fi3fg3 l
- d. Whenever a case arises in which there is a question as to l whether the separation criteria has been satisfied, the case !
will be resolved by Nuclear Engineering via REA. Some l examples would include: [ t
- i. Any cable running between the RPS, ES, or EFIC I cabinets or internal wiring for these cabinets where j two different color wires terminate on the same 6 device, with one or more of these colors indicating '[
Class lE wiring. ; ii. Cases when a non-Class lE circuit is reassigned as a Class IE circuit or vice verse. l t iii. Any unusual wiring problems such as control switches r and selector switches which are in circuits operated , from a power source different from the indication, or i switches containing power feeds different from the ! indicating lights. l t
- e. Exceptions-to this criteria should be strongly discouraged. i However, for those cases where the criteria are found to be !
physically impractical or unduly restrictive, relaxation of -[ the requirements may be considered. The individual , considering the exception to this criteria shall fill out ! the " Separation Criteria Exception Evaluation form" l (Attachment 2) and forward it to the N0E supervisor of ' i Nuclear Engineering (Electrical) to maintain as part of the plant records. Any deviation or exception to these design ; criteria shall be justified and approved by the N0E' i Supervisor o_f Nuclear Engineering (Electrical). .All exceptions shall be included in Attachment 1 of these design criteria. i i
- 2) Internal Wirina Color Code .
Wiring inside Class IE cabinets listed in section 1.0 shall be identified by use of color coding as described in Table B. Under , special circumstances where the entire cabinet is of one separation group, the cabinet may be designated as that _ channel, ; and internal color codes do not need to be applied. The internal ' wiring drawings for Class IE cabinets shall be marked to show wire I color codes at devices or terminal boards. Gray wire will- not I show an identification color code. i l 1 i B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 .j
i l i Page 24 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN e ecmen CRITERIA l DEPARTMENT ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION AND CABLE TRAY LOADING $ab/13/93. i
- 3) Separation Distances and Barriers i
Separation by distance is the preferred method to be considered ; for a given design as follows:
- a. Components and Wiring Class IE redundant components and wiring should be separated to the maximum practical distance in the cabinets in which they are located. The minimum separation distance between redundant Class IE components and wiring shall be 6 inches.
The minimum separation distance for the wiring between the : following combinations is 1" (Ref. Table D): Class IE to Redundant Associated , Class 1E to Non-Class IE { Associated to Non-Class IE f Associated to Associated (i.e. XA to XB) ; 5 Exceptions to the above requirements are identified in ,~ subsection 4.B.3.b below and Appendix 3. Inside Class IE cabinets, it is acceptable to have- [ Non-Class IE wiring not separated from Class IE wiring or : associated wiring by the minimum separation distance of . 1 inch or by a barrier as long as Non-Class IE wiring or l ! cable is not routed with redundant Class IE wiring and/or its associated circuits. , Components shall be located to maintain this minimum i separation requirement. In the case where a device is in a ! group or surrounded by redundant wiring or devices it may I not be possible to maintain this distance. If the minimum , air space separation distance cannot be maintained, a ! barrier shall be installed between the components or wirino ! reauirina separation. Barriers to use within cabinets i requiring separation are.
- i. Barriers between redundant components or wiring - l
- a. A single sheet of 16 gauge (minimum). metal !
separated by at least one inch air space between _l l i B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 ; i
i Page 25 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION ! EtecmcAt au. .si n 2 ; DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 i I i the nearest redundant Class lE component or I wiring. Where one inch of air space between i redundant Class lE components cannot be achieved, l a fire retardant material equivalent to one inch ! of free air space shall be attached to the metal sheet which: (1) extends at least one inch beyond ; the edge of the larger device or wire bundle; or ; (2) where the difference in device depths is six inches or greater extends at least one inch beyond the edge of the small device (Refer to Figures 1, [ 2 and 3). For new construction or modifications, :' a barrier with fire retardant material attached is recommended. In lieu of 1" air space on both sides of the metal sheet,1/4" Marinite on both sides is acceptable or a minimum 1/2" thick Marinite on either side of the metal sheet as shown on Figure 48 is acceptable based on analysis ; in Appendix 1, Section 8.0. , I
- b. Two sheets of 16 gauge metal (minimum) separated by a minimum of one inch air space between the 1 metal pieces which: (1) extends at least one inch beyond the edge of the larger device or (2) where t the difference in device depths is six inches or greater extends at least one inch beyond the smaller device. Refer to Figures 1, 2 and 5.
ii. Barriers between IE and Associated or IE and Non-lE or Associated and Non-lE or Associated (XA) and Associated (XB) , A single sheet of 16 gauge (minimum) metal with a minimum 1/2" thick Marinite on either side of the metal sheet as shown on Figure 4B is acceptable based on l analysis in Appendix 1, Section 8.0. iii. Rigid or flexible metallic conduit shall be considered ; a barrier. When conduit is used as a barrier, the minimum separation distance between conduits shall be as defined in Table D. j iv. Crossover of redundant Class IE circuits shall be enclosed in conduit for a length of six inches on either side of the crossover point or a barrier shall ! be installed. Crossover situations will be avoided wherever possible. { h B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5' i
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ELECTRl CAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA P ge 2s of si Revision 2 i otr^amem AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 l Note: The following non-metallic barriers are only l used when none of the above barriers are , feasible. The use of non-metallic barriers is limited to instrumentation, control and power ' circuits operating at less than 600 volts.
- v. SILTEMP sleeve with 3M No. 69 glass tapes (50% overlap) ,
shall be considered appropriate thermal barriers with l zero inch clearance between two cables. For Class IE to Class IE cable separation, both Class IE cables shall : be covered with SILTEMP sleeves and tape. . For Class IE - to Non-Class lE or Class IE to redundant associated , cable separation, the Non-Class IE_ or' redundant ! associated cable shall be covered with the SILTEMP sleeve and tape. For associated (XA)- - to ' associated (XB) cable separation, either XA or XB cable shall be covered with the SILTEMP sleeve and tape. i vi. SILTEMP 188CH (100% overlap) or SILTEMP. WT-65 , (50% overlap) with 3M No. 69 glass tapes (50% overlap) ! shall be considered appropriate thermal barriers with ~l zero inch clearance between wrapped cables (i.e., wrap shall be applied to both cables). vii. SILTEMP 1880H (100% overlap) with 3M No. 69 glass tapes- l (50% overlap) shall be considered an appropriate thermal barrier with 1 inch clearance between two i cables of different channels. , i viii. SILTEMP WT-65' (50% overlap) with 3M No. 69 glass tapes ! (50% overlap) shall be considered an appropriate :! thermal barrier with 1/2" clearance between two cables of different channels. l
- . 1' ix. The SILTEMP WT-65 (50% overlap) with 3M No. 69 glass tapes (50% overlap) shall be considered an appropriate
, thermal barrier between flexible conduit and cable in free air with zero. inch separation when the flexible . conduit is wrapped in the SILTEMP. Specifically designed cabinets / components with more than one i redundant Class IE channel entering shall have barriers to ~ effectively create separate channels (e.g. , reactor trip ; switch, RC pump power monitor). I l B:\EDCREV\ECP2'.WP5 l
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etecmca ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION P ge 27 of si aevisi n 2 DEPARTME a AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 - I
- b. Generic Deviations i 1
- i. Control Board Indicators - Devices such as electronic indicators which have a power source separation :
requirement different from the associated signal shall - have the field cables terminated on their respective terminal boards according to the separation criteria ; outline herein. The power side shall be jumpered to i terminals adjacent to the signal circuit terminals. i The multi-conductor cable to the device shall be : terminated at that point. (Reference Figure 6). ' According to the design criteria 4.B.3.a, redundant i Class IE or Non-lE circuit routed with Class IE of redundant divisions shall not be run in a common i multiconductor cable. However, based on analysis i performed in Appendix 1 of this document, the use of i multiconductor cables with different separation groups for Bailey RY indicators is acceptable. ii. Non-Class IE Low Energy Circuits - Incoming field cable l satisfy the criteria of entering cabinets shall Section 4.B.4. The only exceptions to these criteria t which will be allowed will be annunciator / events ; recorder and RECALL circuits. Due to the very low energy levels in these circuits, it is not probable that faults will be transmitted back into two different , trains. Consequently, the following rules shall apply , exclusively to these circuits, which are all identified l either by having a "K" in the third letter of the l 4 circuit number (e.g. AHK-296) or by having "EMR" as the letter prefix of the circuit number. . [ Refer _ to ; Appendix 2 for Circuit Number 3rd Letter Code). : I EMR and "K" circuits running in non-Class 1E trays ! entering safety related cabinets through ! non-Class IE openings will be allowed to run internally to the cabinet with either Class IE train A or train B wiring but not both. ; EMR and "K" circuits running in Class IE trays entering the control board through Class IE floor ! openings will be allowed to run with non-Class IE i circuits internal to the control room. '
"K" circuits below and adjacent to holes 29 !
through 36 and 135 for the events recorder-will be l B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 j
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL'CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 28 of si Revision 2 l i DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4h3/93
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I allowed to run through holes 29 through 36 and 135 , without requiring separation. However, separation shall be achieved as soon as possible after exiting the floor opening. For detail analysis of EMR and K circuits refer to . Appendix 1 of this document. ; iii. Terminations on Devices - For circuits that require separation and which terminate on the same device, the : separation of the wiring may be less than the required j distance identified in Table D providing the following ; practices are followed:
- a. On small devices such as grouped indicating ,
lights, selector switches, dual indicators or i relays, the wires to be separated should be , brought to the terminals from different directions to achieve the maximum possible separation. ;
- b. The minimum wiring . separation shall not be less .
than the distance between the terminals, i j r
- c. Where possible an extra stage should be added to the switch or a barrier inserted between stages. j
- d. Thermocouple wires run directly to the device and !
.do not terminate on intermediate terminal blocks.
i
- e. For circuits that require separation within the ;
Motor Operated Valve (MOV) housing, the separation j may be less than the required distance as specified in 4.B.3 provided that the wires to be separated are brought into the MOV housing through r separate conduits which enter from different i directions to achieve the maximum possible i separation. f i
- f. Circuits of two different channels that are connected to Solenoid Operated Valve- (SOV) limit switch contacts are allowed to run together from a junction box near the 50V to the limit switch contacts without requiring separation. Separation L is to be maintained after the junction box. ,
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Page 29 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION ' Redsion 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING oate 413/93 i c
- c. Mounting on Barriers Components and wiring shall not be physically mounted on the barriers. However, barriers can be used to support the !
components other than those requiring separation for which i the barrier is installed as long as the structural integrity ; of the barrier is maintained. ; Where new runs of flex are to be installed, the flex may be secured to any: l i Structural support (including raceway supports) 3 Existing flex that is properly supported 3 Raceways (conduit, wireway, unistrut, trough) , Flex may not be attached to any: 3 Wire bundles Cables ; Barriers (however, flex conduit may terminate to j barrier if wires enter barriered area) j
- d. Barrier Materials :
The use of asbestos materials for installation of new -l separation barriers is not allowed. Existing installations i need not be replaced. However, new installation or ! individual replacements of- existing barriers must utilize a non-combustible, asbestos free, mineral fiber material. The ; following are considered as suitable fire retardant : materials. j
- i. Babcock and Wilcox - M-Board .
ii. Johns Manville - Marinite 'i iii. Other equivalent materials as specifically approved f by Nuclear Engineering. j iv. Janos Industrial Corporation SILTEMP sleeve, WT-65 ! wrap and 188 CH or HT188 CH wrap. i l To insure- that a barrier design using fire. retardant I material will be constructable, the thickness of the ! material shall be considered in the design. For barrier l details, see drawings'E-201-182 thru -184. j B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 j
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Page 30 of 51 j
-ELECTRICAL DESIGN ,
CRITERIA ! ELECTRICAL " DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING $"[f13/93
! i i
Teflon sleeving is not an acceptable material for safeguard ; wiring separation. Circuits identified by a on 210-series internal wiring drawings- indicates . teflon sleeving i installed. The cases with teflon installed prior to April 1974 were reviewed and determined to satisfy. the , criteria without reliance on additional qualities added by ! teflon sleeving. Teflon sleeving shall not be used to maintain separation if these circuits are rerouted or i relocated.
- 4) Incomina Field Cables l
- a. Cable Entrance / Terminations l Separate cable entrances, wireways and terminal points shall l be provided for: l redundant Class IE and associated circuits Non-Class lE circuits. l
-t Incoming cables from the field arrive at the Class lE ;
cabinets either by tray systems or in conduit. The control i room on elevation 145'-0" has floor openings through which ! cable can enter the relay racks or Main Control Board. For ! floor opening assignments of incoming cables to this ; elevation, refer to 201-156, 201-310 and 224-103 series j drawings. The EFIC _ and relay rooms on elevation 124'-0" i I also use floor openings for cable access to Class lE cabinets. Where floor openings are used, the opening shall ! be considered equivalent to a conduit or channel opening. j Barriered floor openings are to be used to maintain I separation through the floor into the control boards, panels i or relay racks. l t
- i. Class IE and Associated Circuits i (1) Class lE cables entering the control board or i relay rack from a tray or through a conduit of a >
specific engineered safeguard train (A, B or AB) : or reactor protection channel (I, II, III or IV)_ ; shall enter through an opening dedicated to that ! channel and maintain the same internal separation. ! Non-Class IE cables - run in Class lE trays ] (associated circuits) shall be _ bundled with the Class lE cables of that channel. The cables shall B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5
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t Page 31 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN {
- CRITERIA !
ELECTRICAL ELECTRIC'AL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION i Revision 2 ! DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 413/93 f t retain their respective separation group ! identification at the cabinet opening and at the , terminal points. Separation internal to the control board or relay rack (including the ! opening) shall comply with 4.B.3. ! (2) Class IE cables of a particular~ channel or .} associated circuits shall terminate only on i terminal boards or components associated with that ! train or channel and shall be separated from the terminal boards of redundant trains / channels and Non-Class IE channels as noted in 4.B.3. i i Where this separation becomes impractical, a J barrier shall be installed on the terminal board i or the following distance shall be maintained: .[ Class IE to Class IE trains / channels- 6" l t Class IE/ Associated to Associated /Non-Class lE- 1" l ii. Non-Class IE Circuits j Non-Class IE cables shall enter Class IE cabinets via ; non-Class IE raceways physically separated from any ' engineered safeguard train or reactor protection channel and shall be terminated on Non-Class IE terminal boards physically separated or barriered from ' terminal boards containing Class IE circuits. : Exceptions to this are the non-class IE low energy circuits (Refer to Subsection 4.B.3.b(ii), Generic ; Deviation).
- 5) Isolation ;
Electrical isolation methods shall be used to maintain the I independence of redundant circuits such that required safety ! functions can be accomplished. This electrical isolation shall- ! be achieved through the use of Class IE isolation devices applied : to the interconnection of: l Class IE and Non-Class IE j
- Associated circuits and Non-Class IE circuits, or
- Class IE logic circuits of redundant channels. (Reference Figures 7, 8, and 9.)
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i t Page 32 of St. ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ! ELECTRICAL Revision 2 DEFARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING o,1,4j,3fg3 J Any device used for isolation shall be qualified for its intended i function and shall be considered a part of the Class IE system. ,
- a. Devices ;
Isolation devices must be demonstrated by a product class ; test that - ! the maximum credible voltage or current transient applied to the device's Non-Class lE side will not degrade the operation of the circuit connected to the device's Class lE or associated side below an , acceptable level, and ; shorts, grounds or open circuits occurring in the f Non-Class IE side will not degrade the circuit connected to the Class IE or associated side below an acceptable level. . The following devices when properly applied and qualified can be used for isolation:
- i. Amplifiers
, ii. Control Switches iii. Fiber Optic Couplers , iv. Photo-optical Couplers
- v. Relays I i
vi. Transducers i vii. Power Packs l viii. Current Transformers , ix. Circuit Breakers l l t l 1 B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 i
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION
""9*
Revision 2
'5' l
I i oe m m ENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 [ t i
- b. Fuses ,
I fuses may be used as an isolation device to isolate Class 1E ! circuits from Non-Class lE circuits if the requirements in ! subsection 4.B.5).a and the following additional requirements l } are met:
- 1. Each fuse shall be tested (i.e. resistance measurement ,
to verify overcurrent protection as designed). ii. Fuses shall provide the design overcurrent protection ! capability for the life of the fuse. { t iii. The fuse time-overcurrent trip characteristics for all t current faults shall cause the fuse to open prior- to 'l the initiation of opening of any upstream interrupting i device. I iv. The power sources shall be capable of supplying the ! necessary current under fault conditions to ensure the , proper coordination without loss of function of Class IE loads. i Note: Fuses shall not be used to isolate redundant channels, i 1.e. Channel A & Channel B. ,
- c. Terminal Wiring .
The separation of the wiring at the input and output terminals of an isolation device may be less than one inch l provided that it is not less than the distance between the input and output terminals.
- 5. CABLE TRAY LOADING {
A. 6900 Volt Power Circuits Cable Trav j
-1) No other type of cable other than 8KV cable shall te routed in the !
same tray with 6900 volt power circuits cable. l l
- 2) There shall be only one layer of cable in a tray.
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Page 34 of 51 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION [ tucmen. RwMon 2 ; DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 i l, I B. 4160 Volt Power Cable Tral
- 1) No other type of cable other than SKV cable shall be routed in the i same tray with 4160 volt power circuits cable. l
- 2) There shall be only one layer of cable in a tray.
)
C. 480 Volt. 120 Volt AC and 250/125 Volt DC Powcr Circuits Cable Tray l
- 1) No other type of cable other than 600V or IKV cable shall be mixed in the same tray carrying 480 volt,120 volt AC and 250/125 volt ,
dc power circuit cables. [
- 2) Tray loadings of 50% maximum physical fill is the design !
objective. However, in certain areas where physical limitations : govern, the tray fill may exceed 50%. In all_ cases, however, : thermal loading shall be considered based on the derating factors l for 40*C and 50*C ambient temperatures. (Refer to " Electrical l design Criteria - Cable Tray and Conduit Fill and Weight l Limitations" for specific guidance - Reference 3.D and Electrical l Design Criteria - Cable Ampacity Sizing - Reference 3.0). -' D. 120 Volt AC and 125 Volt DC Control Cable Trav > In general, control cable tray loading of 50% maximum physical fill is t the design objective. However, in certain areas where physical limitations govern, the cable fill may exceed 50%. In all cases, ! however, thermal loading shall be considered. (Refer to " Electrical ; Design Criteria - Cable Tray and Conduit fill and Weight Limitations" for Specific Guidance - Reference 3.0.) l NOTE: 480 volt, 120 volt AC and 125 volt DC power cables sized No. 8 AWG and smaller may be placed within control cable l trays. ; E. Instrument Cable Tray
- 1) In general, instrument cable tray loading of 50% maximum physical l fill is the design objective. However, in certain areas where l physical limitations govern, the cable fill may exceed 50%. 1 (Refer to " Electrical design Criteria - Cable Tray and Conduit l Fill and Weight Limitations" for specific guidance - Reference )
3.D.) j
- 2) There shall not be other types of cables mixed with I instrumentation cabling except alarm, telephone, low level paging circuits and low energy inputs to computer.
B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5 j
i
/
etecm en. ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 35 of 51 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING gee,i[13/93 Da i f
- 6. CABLE AND WIRE APPLICATIONS !
A. The application and routing of power, control and instrumentation i cables shall be such as to minimize their vulnerability to damage from ; any source. All cables shall be selected using conservative margins ; with respect to their current carrying capabilities, insulation properties and mechanical construction. t Cable ampacity with respect to various installation conditions such as ! routing and environment temperature shall be determined in accordance i with the Electrical Design Criteria - Cable Ampacity Sizing ! (Reference 3.0). ; Power cable shall be rated at 90* C with the 600V or hi l The cable jacket may be made of neoprene or Hypalon.gher insulationThe cable m' also have an overall interlocked - armor for additional mechanical protection or for non-flame retarding purposes. Interlocked armor is acceptable as a barrier for separation purposes. However, interlocked ; armor cable shall not be used in the Reactor Building in order to , minimize the quantity of zinc so as to avoid problems with chemical , spray. ; Instrumentation cables shall be twisted and shielded as appropriate to ' minimize the effects of induced voltage and magnetic interference. ; B. Wire and cables that are classified as Class IE shall be routed and I installed to maintain the integrity of their redundant trains or ' channels in accordance with the requirements of Section 4.A and 4.B of ' this criteria. l Wire and cables shall be permanently marked (color coded) in accordance : with Sections 4.A.5 and 4.B.2.
\
C. Fire barriers shall be used where cable trays and cable runs enter or leave Class 1 areas, enter or leave the control and auxiliar buildings and where vertical trays pass through floor openings. y(Refer to ! drawing E-214-061 for details.) ! i D. Power and control cable trays shall be ladder type. Where there are ; horizontal trays passing under grating or hatches, the top tray shall ! have a solid cover which is spaced (if required due to heating of the ; cables) above the tray for ventilation. Covers shall be installed for i protection where a tray has a vertical rise near a walkway or goes through a floor (Refer to E-214 series drawings). i B:\EDCREV\ECP2.WP5
Page 1 of 2 a, TABLE A i# M.LOWABLE RACEWAY / CABLE GROUPING AND COLOR CODE 8n OROUP MO. (COLOR CODE . SEE NOTE ,) Y w (NSTRUMENTAftON CONTROL POWER (BLUtp (ORitN) (WHtif) (CREfM) (YELLOW) (StVE) (WHITE) OtD) (G RE EN) (YELLOW) (WHtTE) (RED) PELLOW) (BLUE) (VTOLET) (RED) Rest RPs e Arse nPSev - - - - - - - - EQ A ES B ES AB - - - - - - EFCC A EFC B EFC C EFC D - EFC A EFC B - ErC o ErC C - - - Deeoc. 4 tgee. Assoc. - See Aesoc. Assoc. Assoc. - - See Assoc. Assoc. Assoc. - See Ch. A Ch. 9 Ch, 49 Note 1 Ch.A Ch. B Ch.A9 Note t Ch.A Ch. 8 Ch A9 Nes e i tch CRher Oboe - - - Ohe Oher Dher - - Oher Other Oher - - Sa'Wy Sa'ey Sa'e9 Se8My Setey Se'cy Sa'Wy Sa'ety (J, Rotwed Petmed M*8eted N8Med Related f%+tWed Remed RMated Ch.A Ch. B Ch.A Ch. 8 Ch. AS Ch.A Ch. 8 Ch.A9
- - - - Non- - - - - Non. - - - - Non-Sa'ety Sa'e'y Sa'e9 Rotened RWated Nisted
- - - - - - wu w. w. wet But Bus Bus Ove Ch.A Ch. 9 Ch. 81 Ch N
. - - - - - - - Ni&P Ni&P Ni&P f*&P -
NOTES:
- 1. Associated circuits are also routed in white cable trays. For clarification, refer to Section 4.A.1).c; Classification of Electrical Cable Trays.
- 2. Color code given below each group number refers to the raceway color.
- 3. For specific raceway identification requirements, see page 2 of 2 of this Table.
(REF. SECT. 4.A.8)
n Pag 3 2 of 2 TABLE A ALLOWABLE RACEWAY / CABLE GROUPING AND COLOR CODE SPECIFIC RACEWAY IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
- 1. NI & P SYSTEM CHANNEL CABLE COLOR CONDUIT COLOR 1
RED RED OR BLACK (IN CONDUIT) CHANNEL 1 CHANNEL 4 2 GREEN OR BLACK (IN CONDUIT) GREEN 3 YELLOW OR BLACK (IN CONDUIT) INPUTS m CHANNEL 14 m INPlfTS . 4
" ' BLUE OR BLACK (IN CONDUlT)
OUTPUTS SUB- SUD- OUTPUTS 12 DLACK ASSEMBLY > ASSEMBLY 13 DLACK A D RED OW POWER _. m 2 POWER 14 BLACK RED / BLUE VBDP-3 u CHANNEL 13 w VDDP-6 23 BLACK GREEN / YELLOW Jk Jk 24 DLACK GREEN / BLUE 84 BLACK YELLOW / BLUE CHANNEL 12 .-<) <) - CHANNEL 34 "U o> CHANN 1.3 V V . NOTE: Channels 1 through 4 are part of the reactor N INPUTS m CHANNEL 24 2 INPUTS protection systern. Channels 12,13,14,23,24 and
^ '
o OUTPUTS SUB- SUB- OUTPUTS 34 represents interconnections betww NI & P systern ASSEMBLY 40 > ASSEMBLY sub-assemblies A, B, C, and D.
$ POWER m B
CHANNEL 23 C 2 POWER VBDP-4 . a w VBDP-5
- 2. EFIC SYSTEM ,
Red wfth green stripe EFIC 'A' to EFIC 'B' Logic Cabinet Red wfth yellow stripe EFIC 'A' to ERC 'C' Logic Cabinet Red with blue stripe EFlc 'A' to EFIC 'D' Logic Cabinet Green with red stripe ERC 'B' to EFIC 'A' Logic Cabinet Graan with yellow stripe EFIC 'B' to ERC 'C' Logic Cabinet Green with blue stripe EFIC *B* to EFIC 'D' Logic Cabinet Yellow with red stripe EFIC 'C' to EFIC 'A' Logic Cabinet Yellow with green stripe EFIC 'C' to EFIC 'B' Logic Cabinet Yellow with blue stripe EFIC *C' to EFIC 'D' Logic Cabinet Blue with red stripe EF1C 'D' to EFIC 'A' Logic Cabinet Blue with green stripe EFIC *D' to EFIC *B' Logic Cabinet Blue with yellow stripe EFIC 'O' to EFIC 'C' Logic Cabinet (REF. SECT. 4.A.8)
TABLE B COLOR CODES FOR INTERNAL CONTROL BOARD AND RELAY RACK WIRING
- 1. Red (R) wire for engineered safeguards train "A", reactor protection channel I, or EFIC Channel "A".
- 2. Green (G) wire for engineered safeguards train "B", reactor protection channel II, or EFIC Channel "B".
- 3. Yellow (Y) wire for engineered safeguards train "AB", reactor protection channel III or EFIC Channel "C" analog.
- 4. Blue (BL) wire for reactor protection channel IV, or EFIC Channel "D".
- 5. Brown (B) wire for non-safety related circuits running in raceway classified as "A" or "XA" and isolated from all other circuits. These circuits are considered associated XA.
- 6. Orange (0) wire for non-safety related circuits rut.ning in raceway classified as "B" or "XB" and separated from all other circuits. These circuits are considered associated XB.
- 7. Black (BK) wire for non-safety related control circuits running in raceway classified as "AB" and separated from all other circuits. These circuits are considered associated XAB.
- 8. Gray wire for non-safety related circuits arriving at the control board or rack in a non-safety related tray.
- 9. Violet (V) wire for EFIC Channel "C" control.
- 10. Black and white small gauge wires (#22AWG) appear on miniature devices for low voltage circuits entirely within the control board. These wires are not safeguard related; therefore, no separation is required.
- 11. If manufacturer's supplied multiconductor, multicolored cables are used, the color coded wire will be referred to in the manufacturer's connection drawings and the colors have no safeguard implication.
- 12. Bare /uninsulated wires are ground wires.
B:\EDCREV\TABLEB.WPr Page 38 of SI
TABLE C REDUNDANT RACEWAYS SEPARATION CRITERIA FOR * .co IE EXTERNAL RACEWAYS AND WIRING N f g .d . .d.e c ,. -~ - - ~ ~ - - tv ro. = circuss e ah cow. re
- Soo
- ;r,--
Non Herardove llenned Harned Non-Harardous Limited Hareed Non,Haierdove Umned Hasard Nem Maserdove tim 4+d Harend 0 inches
- O Inches
- Nee 1 Neee 1 h
p Cond'A to Caeduit Honrental ve.fic w 0 inches e inche. 0 inchet Oinche, 0inchee O inche, 0 inches o whe. o inche,8 0 inche e y,,, y,,, Conduit to Trey / Cat 4e Hostrordal oinches o inches Nde2 Note 2 1 inch 1 inch t ench imch ut ve.c., 0inche, oinche, , ench , anch , inch 1 inch , anch t inch Catde to Cebie/ Trey Hoeirontel 1 inch 1 mch 1 inch tinch tInch einch 1 inch 3 feet
?
Venical 3 inch 3 inch 3 inch 3 inch 3 inch 126nch Sinch S feet Horitordai t foot 3 feet 1 fact 3 feet 1 foot 3 feet 1 foot 3 feet Trey to Trey Veoleal 3 bet Berriers 3 feet Betriers 3 ket Barriert 3 feet Bame's S feet 3 N/A S feet 3 N/A 5 feet 3 N/A $ feet 3 neoctor Buildmg Hoetroedel N/A Verttel 3 feet 3 N/A 3 feet 3 N/A 3 feet 3 N/A 3 feet 3 Penestations N/A NOTES: I An air gap (minimum 1/16") to minimize heat transfer between the conduits. Conduits may have 0 inch 3 to separation at condulet bodies only.
- 2 An air gap (minimum 1/16") to minimize heat transfer between the tray / cable to conduit.
3 Measured between centers.
~
4 All spacings shown are edge to edge of the raceway / cable and do not include attachment hardware. 5 If the two circuits are of a different voltage level, the more stringent separation criteria shall apply. Circuit spacing should also take into account installation and electrical noise concerns (Refer to Section 4.A.2.c.) 6 Conduit to conduit zero inch separation of " low voltage power circuits with cable size < 500 MCM" means that it is only acceptable for conduit to touch for a minimum amount of length (<2 feetJ as follows: A. Conduits crossing each other B. Condulet bodies touching 7 The horizontal and vertical separation distances are for non-armored cable sizes 2/0 AWG or less. If a tray contains non-armored cable sizes greater than 2 distances should be 3 feet and 5 feet respectively. /0 AWG, then the horizontal and vertical separation (REF. SECT. 4.A.2.1)
TABLE D SEPARATION CRITERIA FOR INTERNAL 1E T01E AND_1E TO NON-1E p PANEL COMPONENTS AND WI3ING 9 Edge to Edge L w Energy Control k Spacing 3 R IE to IE lE to Associated or Component to IE to IE lE to Associated or Component or IE to Non-lE or IE to Non-lE or h Associated to Non-lE Associated to Non-lE Comp. To
- or Associated XA to or Associated XA to Wire / Cable X8 or XB Cable to Cable liorizontal 6 inch 1 inch 6 inch 1 inch Vertical 6 inch 1 inch 6 inch 1 inch Wire to Wire or Wire to Cable
? Conduit to Horizontal 0 inch 0 inch Conduit Vertical 0 inch 0 inch $ Conduit to Horizontal 0 inch Note 1, 2 o Cable / Wireway / Vertical 0 inch 1 inch, Note 2 Wire NOTES: I An air gap (minimum 1/16") or an insulating barrier to prevent thermal conductivity between the conduits. 2 If wireways are enclosed, the wireway is considered an enclosed raceway and is equivalent to a conduit (enclosed raceway). 3 All spacings shown are edge ta edge of the raceway / cable and do not include attachment hardware. (REF. SECT. 4.B.3.a)
TABLE E - A B_A.CEWAYS SEPARATION CRILEBJA FOR lE_TO . ,e NON-1E EXTERNAL RACEWAYS AND WIRING O Edge to Edge Spect"98 C e
> Non-Herordous Limmed Harmed Non-Herardoue (Ireated Harord Non Harardous limited Harerd Non Hereedoue Limmed Haseed 0 inches' 0 bebes' Note 1 h
fT1 Condue to Coedult Horirontal Veereel 0 inches 0 inches 0 triches e inchos 0 inches 0 inches 0inchee 0 Inchas 0 laches' Oinches e Nose t Note 1 Note 1 Condue to Troy / Cat >te Heritontel 0 inches 0 inches Nate 2 Note 2 1 inch 1 inch tinch 1 inch Verteal 0 inches 0 inches 1 inch 1 inch 1 inch 1 inch t inch 9 inch I CeNe to Cable / Troy Heeirontal tinch tinch t hch 1 inch 1 inch 8 inch t inch 3 bet vowei 3 heh 3 Inch 3anch 3Inen 3 Inch 92 inch I 3meh 5 ket Trey to Trey Hontental tinch 1 inch 1 inch 1 inch tInch 6 Inch I 1 inch 3 bet I Ye4*c el 3 Mch 3 inch 3 bch 3 inch 3 Inch 13 inch 3 inch S feet Aenciar Buddiag Hoarer*lat N/A S feat 3 N/A S bet 3 N/4 S feet 3 N/A S feet 3 Pene4retiens ve% el N/A 3 feet 3 N/A 3 feet 8 N/A 3 feet3 N/A S teet 3 HOTES:
;y I ap
'g Anair$ona(minimum separat t condulet1/16")tominimizeheattransferbetweentheconduits. bodies only. Conduits may have 0 inch 2 i O An air gap (minimum 1/16") to minimize heat transfer between the tray / cable to conduit.
- 3 Measured between centers.
v,
- 4 All spacings shown are edge to edge of the raceway / cable and do not include attachment hardware.
5 If the two circuits are of a different voltage level, the more stringent separation criteria shall apply. Circuit spacing should also take into account installation and electrical noise concerns (Refer to Section 4.A.2.c.) 6 Conduit that it isto conduit only acceptable zero inch forseparation conduit tooftouch " low forvoltage a mi bowerimum circuits amountwith cable size of length < 500 as (<2 feetT MCM" follows: means A. Conduits crossing each other B. Condulet bodies touching 7 The horizontal and vertical separation distances are for non-armored cable sizes 2/0 AWG or less. If a tray contains non-armored cable sizes greater than 2 distances should be 3 feet and 5 feet respectively. /0 AWG, then the horizontal and vertical separation (REF. SECT. 4.A.2.a.ii)
TABLE F ' '
, RECONNENDED SEPARATION DISTANCES BETWEEN EXTERNAL _ ,,. RACEWAYS OF DIFFERENT VOLTAGE' LEVEL AND CABLE TYPE - .g. '8 .
Horizontal Vertical , 'g Tray to Tray 6" (Note 2) 9" (Note I) .t M' Tray to Conduit 1" 1" !
'h Conduit to Conduit 1" 1" u
i NOTES: i 1 The distance between the bottom of the upper tray and top of the lower tray. , 2 The distance between the adjacent sides. 3
., The recommended. separation distances in above table are to minimize noise in analog circuits run in *
- g. close proximity with power circuits.
4 (REF. SECT. 4.A.2.a.iii) 2, i E: l L A
.1 I . . .. .E --.--.,--+e..,,.-.4o~..-,.--~
. . . . . - - , . .. - - - , - , . .~.....Mm..E*,-.---.m-.,.,-+..---..v.~,----E---,~,,L~-,-_-~m.. - , - - , - . --~,..--,r-.,.w--- - , - - - . -. m.---L-..,1
I t i A BARRIER , 4 >! (TYP.) i
~ i ik l
3 lnl p [ V !$ is l CLASS ff ra REDUNDANT IE M CLASSlE SYSTEM # SYSTEM r
? l
^ 6 1* % l V __
=i (R EF. S ECT, 4.B.3.a.1)
^ FIGURE 1 NOTE 1.There is no minimum ' dimension for "A" where ! thermalinsulation
$@7 materialis usedin the G barrier. i b
a CLASS :. g ' IE 2. In the case where a component is in a
- SYSTEM !
group or surrounded by ;
; components or wire of i
_ / a different separation channel, an enclosed i i n /
, 33 A box can be used to l x-g maintain the required gp ,
1* separation. ; gt , , .:' h REDUNDANT CLASSIE
!$ i
![f SYSTEM u
(R EF. S ECT. 4.B.3.a.1) 'j FIGURE 2- i l Page 43 of 51 l il
i i i When barrier is not continuous, a 6" minimum line of sight must be maintained. i
- 2.#' '
c
, a 6* m T
v;: I
/
b
"- t 8..
I ;
/
A k ' '
> f >
au k A , f5 G: s se. CLASS 1E WIRING ('g y REDUNDANT CLASS 1E WIRING , h ' se ! E 2
)L AIR GAP- -
AIR GAP ,
~
1 INCH 1 INCH MINIMUM MINIMUM 16 GA,(MINIMUM) SHEET METAL , (REF. SECT 4.B.3.a.i.a) I l , FIGURE 3
.r Page 44 of 51 >
i f This page is intentionally left blank r i FIGURE 4A Page 45 of 51
i
. 1
- When barrier is not continuous, a 6" minimum line of sight for Class 1E to Class 1 E and a 1' minimum line of sight for Class 1E to Non-Class 1E must be maintained. l
- w
- i
' g@$ .
?fl i@. Mi
$$ 'Al ii $
sN
%s .
jk ~d O'$ :' +: j'.g b W ?4f'
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% fE ,
i a >
% f%
.& MfM
$hi pN {#z y$
e r ! l'kh vir @e! , te a:r, CLASS 1E OR ASSOCIATED WIRING Y2h* its REDUNDANT
$$ b CLASS 1E OR ASSOCIATED kN if WITH REDUNDANT TRAIN l E 9 OR NON-CtASS 1E WIRING !
Kt .M j t NO A A
- SEPARATION REOUIRED i
1/2' THICK MARIN!TE BOARD OR EQUAL N WTIM M E , i 16 GA. (MIN! MUM) SHEET METAL (REF. SECT. 4.B.3.a.i.a) FIGURE 4B Page 46 of 51 l
i i t CAUTICN: DO NOT USE THIS CONMGURATION FOR NEW f INSTALLATIONS SINCE ASBESTOS MATERIALIS NO LONGER ALLOWED TO BE USED. l 1/8" THICK [ ASBESTOS a 6* m L m J_ 1 13 3 s / s y% ' s 3 NOTE: This figure is forInformation
,E only to show some of the '
s\ existing plant configurations. s N /
, Og 7g, ? s R$
s
'w I s !
Ai M:
- x en s D
'1 s e'3 s M, .
N b , my : y , sx ;
/
f;ff [s CLASS 1E OR ASSOCIATED CLASS 1E OR ASSOCIATED WIRING t' WITH REDUNDANT TRAIN
/ .
OR NON4 LASS 1E WIRING
, N 7 y .
NO -- SEPARATION N REOUIRED NO SEPARATION REQUIRED l 15 GA. (MINIMUM) SHEET KETAL FIGURE 4C ; Page 47 of 51 ;
i i i r r i When barrict is not continuous, a 6" minimum line of sight must be maintained. i 5 f 6
+
16" t Tl ;? l N'I' / i
% E i
3Me A hl ! B lg l th h- ($
'h'- h.,
f 6 ' i i
.s >
r4 g . g sg
.n ,:5 6 e; -i g 3
# a l Tf !
a ?$- :
.a
- 11; y
hs - NT 3 I$ ($j f $ y g 4 k k. ., . !
,s t r a
- n,,
g , a- ,
- A B W f5;
{ e ,
$at, Q.
CLASS 1E WIRIN j:,i 'E' REDUNDANT CLASS 1E ,
& % WIRING t f h .i d A i i
t NO AIR GAP REQUIRED HO AIR GAP REQUIRED [ 6 16 GA. (MINIMUM) SHEET METAL" 16GA.(MINIMUM) SHEET METAL 1
- AIR GAP 1 inch MINIMUM !
(REF. SECT. 4.B.3.a.i.b) l 1 i FIGURE 5 1 Page 48 of 51 ;
- -~ ..-_. ~ . _ . ..
+
t i l i t
.... 4 ) .....
Te ! NON CLASS IE -- l INDICATOR]V 'i TR ANS MITTER 1[ f { t Z p\ Z NL !
- r -
i
^\ !
i C:3 - NON CLASS IE l RUN WITH -I CLASSIE SEPARATED l PER j CRITERIA j CLASSIE v. ,
-- l FUSES POWER SUPPLY l )' -
(ISOLATION DEVICE) - INVERTER l i FIELD q y BOARD-l M AIN QQlflBQL,gg3BQ,ltjpjQ61QR_ WIRING ;} (REF. SECT. 4.B.3.b.i) FIGURE 6 ! l i r i Page 49 of 51-s
RELAY ISOLATION r------------ 7 I I I I , I I I I I I I I I I I I L__ _ ____ _ __..- _J 3 l l l ! I I TO IE DEVICE TO NON lE OR SYSTEM DEVICE OR SYSTEM (REF. S ECT. 4.B.5) FIGURE 7 , 1 h Page 50 of 51 8
TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY ( ROfA
- IE OR ASSOCIATED BISTABLE ISOLATION NON-lE V
TO NON-lE DEVICE OR SYSTEM (REF. SECT. 4.B.5) FIGURE 8 E g TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY IE I
- IEOR ASSOCIATED ONE S ENSOR B! STABLE CHANNEL lE v
4 8 O L AT 10 N 88 OL ATION ACTUATION CHANNELS 2/4 LOGIC 2/4 LOGIC y DIVISION A DIVISION B FIGURE 9 (REF. SECT. 4.B.5) Page 51 of 51
Appendix 9 Page 1 of 20 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL El_ECTRICAL CIRCWT MSICAL SEPARATION nevision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 BASIS FOR REDUNDANT AND IE TO NON-1E CIRCUIT SEPARATION CRITERIA .
1.0 BACKGROUND
This appendix to the Separation Design Criteria provides the basis for separation distances found in Tables C, D and E to the Separation Design Criteria. This appendix addresses both the separation distance, for IE raceways and cable external to panels and IE internal panel components and wiring. For external panel raceway and cables, this justification is limited to the Non-Hazardous (cable spreading room) area and the Limited Hazard area (outside cable spreading room but not Hazardous Areas) where the only energy available to damage electrical circuits is that energy associated with failure or faults internal to electrical equipment or cables within the area. Separation for external sources of energy (e.g. exposure fires, pipe breaks, missiles, etc. in a Hazardous Area) is not included in this Appendix (Reference IEEE-384-1974). FSAR Section 7.1.3.1.5 addresses the separation criteria internal .to the control board and racks. FSAR Section 8.2.2.12 includes separation requirements for external raceways in accordance with Draft 1, dated October 20, 1971, Section 8.0 of the proposed guide for the Design and Installation of Cable Systems in Power Generating Stations. These are the commitments before CR-3 was issued an operating license. The new design criteria still meets these requirements and commitments. The criteria given in this document, in part, are based on the IEEE paper entitled " Cable Separation - What Do Industry Testing Programs Show?" (Paper No. 90 WM 254-3 EC presented at IEEE/ PES 1990 Winter Meeting). The following discussions provide basis to envelope CR-3 installation by the test results presented in the IEEE paper: CABLE The cables in nuclear generating stations utilize single or multiconductor construction and contain at least a conductor, insulation and a protective jacket. The typical of power and control cable used at CR-3 was manufactured by The Vserite Company. The Kerite Power cables have standard stranded copper conductors, insulated with a minimum of 3/64" high temperature R\CEREvgAPPENDDtt.WP$
Appendix 1
/
ELECT RICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL _ SEPARATION Page 2 of 20 nevision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 (HT) oil base compound insulation and covered overall with a minimum of 3/64" flame-retardant (FR) jacket. The Kerite control cables have standard stranded copper conductors, insulated with a minimum of 3/64" fR insulation and covered with a minimum of 3/64" FR jacket. FR jackets were developed by the cable industry for flame resistance. The Kerite cables used at CR-3 have been qualified for use in nuclear generating stations in accordance with IEEE-383-1974. Similarly the class IE instrumentation cable has been qualified in accordance with IEEE-383-1974. The insulation of all power, control and instrumentation cables is rated for 600 volts or higher. All the tests presented in IEEE paper, " cable separation - what do industry testing programs show?" were conducted using cable qualified in accordance with IEEE Standard 383 with the exception of that utilized for internal panel wiring where compliance with IEEE 383 is not a requirement. Various sizes of cables were tested which envelope the size of cables at CR-3. The wires used at CR-3 for internal panel wiring are type SIS. The wires used for control applications are rated for 600 volts. The wires used for instrumentation application are rated for either 600V or 300V. PROTECTIVE WRAP FPC has prepared an independent analysis (E-91-0052) to support the use of SILTEMP as a thermal barrier for CR-3. The purpose of this analysis was to demonstrate the acceptability of SILTEMP sleeve and SILTEMP wrap (188CH and WT-65) products to protect safety related cables, which do not satisfy the electrical separation criteria in free air. The conclusion of this analysis is presented in the criteria document; Section 4.A.4, for externally routed circuits and Section 4.B.3).a for internal panel wiring. BREAKER AND FUSE CURRENT PROTECTION Selection of the cable and current combination in the IEEE paper was based on providing a combination which produced the most severe effect on the configuration. The combination produced the worst-possible internally generated electrical fault current, and any successful test with this combination would envelope all other cable sizes and fault-current combinations. B:\f:DCT/gtJ* PLOW 1 WM
I Appendix 1
/
RECMCAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 3 of 20 Revision 2 f DEPARTMEta AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 i The test current values selected in the IEEE tests are based on the t following assumptions: l t
- A fault occurs in the electrical system which is not detected by i the primary overcurrent device. !
- The fault current is assumed to adjust itself to compensate for i the changes in circuit impedance as the cable heated. (Note: In :
reality, as the conductor heats the circuit impedance increases ; and the current decreases). ! No additional loads are assumed to actuate which will increase the fault current level. . 1 At CR-3, cables are protected by overcurrent protective devices such > as fuses and circuit breakers. In 1992 FPC completed an AC/DC ! calculation review which provides plant coordination in terms of l protecting individual circuits from overload conditions. ! As a part of FPC's electrical system review, calculations have been i performed to review cable sizing with derating based on : IPCEA requirements, circuit breaker and fuse sizing to assure cable , protection and coordination of protective devices for. all , class IE circuits including DC and vital bus circuitry. In all cases the i 2t of the related cabling exceeds that of its primary protective , device. All calculations invoked standard industry practices and 4 identified discrepancies have been corrected. These calculations are maintained up to date through procedural requirements delineated in , the Nuclear Engineering Procedures (NEP's). The test current values utilized in the paper are presented as i enveloping those of normal plant design. Since CR-3 meets or exceeds j industry methodology for the selection and application of cable and ; protective devices, the results listed in the paper are appropriate for use in the design at CR-3 and as a basis for this criteria. 2.0 DEFINITIONS OF CABLE VOLTAGE LEVELS ! 2.1 LOW ENERGY CIRCUITS Low energy circuits are those that satisfy the definitions found in l Section 2.0 of the Design Criteria. i f f RiEDCRLYgMY'EtOX1.WP5 r
Appendix 1 Page 4 of 20 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ctecmCAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION aevision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 2.2 CONTROL CIRCUITS Control circuits are those that satisfy the definitions found in Section 2.0 of the Design Criteria. For CR3, these are the 120V AC and 125V DC control circuits. 2.3 LOW VOLTAGE POWER CIRCUITS Low voltage power circuits are those that satisfy the definitions found in Section 2.0 of the Design Criteria. For CR-3, these are the 480V AC, 250V DC,125V DC and 120V AC power cables. 2.4 MEDIUM VOLTAGE POWER CIRCUITS Medium voltage power circuits are those that satisfy the definitions found in Section 2.0 of the Design Criteria. For CR-3, these are the 6900 and 4160V power circuits. (The 6900V power circuits are all non-lE.) 3.0 SEPARATION DISTANCES FOR REDUNDANT 1E EXTERNAL RACEWAYS AND CABLES This section provides the justification for the separation distances shown in Table C for redundant IE raceways and cables external to panel s. 3.1 IE CONDUIT TO CONDUIT SPACING 3.1.1 Low Energy Circuits Should a low energy circuit fail, there will be insufficient fault current to heat the cable to a temperature which will damage or ignite the cable. Therefore cables in a redundant conduit that touch the conduit with the faulted cables will not experience degradation from heat transfer such that they will fail to perform their safety function. A conduit to conduit spacing of 0 inches is acceptable for circuits defined as low energy based on the above justification. 3.1.2 Control Circuits and Low Voltage Power Cables Less Than or Equal to 500 MCM The concern relative to conduit spacing is that the heat due to failure of a cable in one conduit is not transferred to cables in another conduit such that its cables are degraded to a condition that they are unable to perform their safety function. B'\EDCREWAPPENDM1.WP5
. -_ - . . . .~ .. ,
Appendix 1 f
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL _ CIRCWT PHYSICAL _ SEPARATION Page 5 of 20 Revision 2 l i DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 i The results of industry testing to determine distances needed to meet cable separation have been compiled in an IEEE paper entitled " Cable Separation - What Do Industry Testing Programs Show?" (Paper No. 90 l WM 254-3 EC presented at the IEEE/ PES 1990 Winter Meeting). t This paper was a factor used in reducing separation distance criteria i as proposed for the 1991 revision of IEEE 384, Standard Criteria for ! Independence of Class IE Equipment and Circuits. j l The paper discusses the test methods and results of specific cable and i i raceway configurations, one being conduit to conduit. The test l configurations used both rigid and flex conduit, aluminum sheathed l cable, metal clad cable and armored cable and found no observable , difference between them. Also the Fire Hazards Analysis, Section 3.3 . states that interlocked armor cable is not included as a combustible since it is considered equivalent to a flex conduit. The test : approach was to determine the cable type and size and current i 4 combination that produced the maximum amount of heat released to the environment as a result of fault current. This combination produced , the worst-possible internally generated electrical fault, and any ! successful test with this combination would envelope all other sizes ; and fault current combinations. The tests showed no failures up to 500 MCM cable with a 0 inch separation between conduits. , A conduit spacing of 0 inches for control and low voltage power cables ; less than or equal to 500 MCM is acceptable based on the results of the industry testing performed to date. However, it is physically i impossible for long runs of conduit to touch each other due to couplings (at most every 10 feet) and conduit clamps holding the i conduit in place. For conservatism FPC has chosen to apply this justification on a limited basis. Conduit to conduit zero inch ' separation of " low voltage power circuits with cable size s 500 MCM" - means that it is only acceptable for conduit to touch for a minimum l amount of length (< 2 feet) as follows: - A. Conduit crossing each other ; B. Condulet bodies touching j 3.1.3 Low Voltage Power Cables Greater Than 500 MCM and All Medium Voltage ! Cables > The concern relative to conduit spacing is that the heat due to failure of a cable in one conduit is not transferred to cables in a redundant conduit such that its cables are degraded to a condition i , that they are unable to perform their safety function. l l nwnn- l
Appendix 1 Pagee r20 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECT RICAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL _ SEPARATION Revision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 The industry test results described in the paper noted previously in paragraph 3.1.2 showed that a 750 MCM low voltage cable in a conduit did cause a failure in another conduit when there was 0 inch separation. However, a second test with a 750 MCM cable with a spacing of 1 inch did not cause the cables in the other conduit to fail. Therefore, a conduit spacing somewhere between 0 inches and 1 inch will be acceptable. The results of the other cable tests noted below was used to determine what may be an acceptable distance. The remainder of the cables in conduit in the test (from No.12 AWG to 500 MCM) did not cause a cable failure in the other conduit when the separation was 1/4 inch or less. Therefore any air gap is acceptable separation so as to break the conductive heat transfer from the faulted cable. Based on the results of the No.12 AWG to 500MCM cables coupled with the tests performed on 750MCM cables, an air gap to break conductive heat transfer from the faulted cable is acceptable for low voltage power cables greater than 500MCM. No specific tests were run for medium voltage cable in conduit. For the CR3 IE electrical auxiliary distribution system, the 4160V (medium voltage) and 480V (low voltage) systems are resistance grounded. For the large majority of faults which are line to ground, the fault current will be limited to 600 amps. This is well below the current passed through the tested 750MCM cable. The 3 phase fault currents of the two systems are of a similar magnitude (30,000 amps for the 480V system and 35,000 amps for the 4160V system. In addition the proposed IEEE 384 revision, Table I lumps medium voltage power cables with large low voltage power cables for separation distances in a Limited Hazard Area. Therefore as for the low voltage cables an air gap is acceptable separation for the medium voltage cables so as to break the conductive heat transfer from the faulted cable. Condulet bodies only are allowed to have 0 inch separation given the following: A. The conduits to which the condulets are connected will act like radiators thus cooling off the conduit and the condulet itself. B. The condulet has a larger surface area subject to cooling and thus should be at a lower temperature than the conduits in the industry tests. , C. The possibility of the cable failing (igniting) in the condulet vs. some other point in the conduit run is remote. escannmr.mm
I Appendix 1 J
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA El ECTRICAl CIRCUIT PHYSICAL _ SEPARATION eage 7 1 20 sevision 2 j I DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 i l Therefore, based on the preceding discussions, a visible air gap or an ! insulating barrier to prevent thermal conduction between the conduits ! for low voltage power cables greater than 500 MCM and for medium i voltage power cables is acceptable based on the results of the ! industry testing performed to date. Conduit runs may touch only at a l condulet. l l 3.2 IE CONDUIT TO TRAY / CABLE ; l 3.2.1 Low Energy Circuits i A conduit to tray / cable spacing of 0 inches is acceptable for circuits ! defined as low energy based on the justification provided for conduit to conduit spacing for low energy circuits in Section 3.1.1. i a 3.2.2 Control Circuits , i The test results in the IEEE paper noted in Section 3.1.2 of this ! Appendix are for power cables. The test results for the power cables ! are overly conservative for determining control circuit separation requirements. Control cables do not have the high fault energy i" available as do power cables since they have smaller power sources (less kVA and higher impedance), smaller conductor size (higher l circuit impedance) and overcurrent protection generally limited to ! < 15 Amp fuses or breakers. The test results in the IEEE paper state that for the conduit to cable tray configuration, the one test performed with a 0 inch horizontal ; separation was successful. The test results for the conduit to cable ! in free air configuration showed all tests were successful for ! horizontal separation distances between 0 and 1 inch. t o , The test results in the IEEE paper noted in Section 3.1.2 of this ! Appendix state that for the conduit to cable tray configuration, six 4 tests performed with a vertical separation between 0 and 1 inch were i successful. The test results for the conduit to cable in free air configuration showed all tests were successful for a vertical ; separation distance of 0 inches. l Given the fact that control circuits have more fault current available than low energy circuits, a separation distance greater than 0 inches would be appropriate. However control circuits have less fault current i available than low or medium voltage power cables and therefore a l , separation distance less than 1 inch would be appropriate (see the ! following Section 3.2.3 for low and medium voltage power cable - separation distances). l B.;LDCHLVAPPENDlX1.WP5
Appendix 1 Page 8 of 20 ; ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL CIRCWT PWSNL SEPARATION nevision 2 DEPART tAENT AND CABLE TRAY 'fWING oate 4/13/93 To break conductive heat transfer between the faulted cable in a conduit and the tray / cable, a visible air gap or an insulating barrier to prevent the conduit having 0 inch separation with the tray / cable should be used for horizontal spacing. To break conductive heat transfer between the faulted cable in a , conduit and the tray / cable, and to minimize heat transfer to a ctMuit if cables are run beneath a conduit, a conservative separation distance of 1 inch should be used. A horizontal spacing being a visible air gap or a barrier to prevent the conduit having 0 inch separation with the tray / cable and a vertical spacing of I inch is acceptable based on industry testing to date and the above justification. 3.2.3 Low Voltage and Medium Voltage Power Cables As noted in the previous Section 3.2.2, the test results in the IEEE paper state that for the conduit to cable tray configuration, the one test performed with a 0 inch horizontal separation was successful. The test results for the conduit to cable in free air configuration showed all tests were successful for horizontal separation distances between 0 and 1 inch. The paper recommends a 1 inch horizontal separation for conduit to trays in a non-hazard area and 1 inch horizontal separation in all areas for conduit to cable in free air. Also as noted in the previous section 3.2.2, the test results in the IEEE paper noted in Eection 3.1.2 of this Appendix state that for the conduit to cable tray configuration, six tests performed with a vertical separation between 0 and I inch were successful. The test results for the conduit to cable in free air configuration showed all tests were successful for a vertical separation distance of 0 inches. However for certain test cases with 0 inch separation, the tested cable's jacket was damaged. For one test the jacket wras severely damaged. Another IEEE paper addresses tests done on faulted power cables in conduits (Reference T). The paper states that if the conduit becomes ' a ground return path for the fault current, the conduit may heat up to the point that a combustible material touching the conduit could ignite. Therefore a cable having 0 inch separation with a conduit that has a faulted power cable may be damaged to the point of becoming inoperable. To assure the cable remains functional, there should be separation between the cable and the conduit. No specific value was provided in this paper. It is recommended that 1 inch be used in accordance with the recommendation provided in the IEEE paper noted in Section 3.1.2 of this Appendix. 1 evrcruYAM NEMXtWF5 l
e Appendix 1
/ ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCWT NSICAL SEPARATION Page 9 of 20 Revision 2 ELECTRICAL DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 No specific tests were run for medium voltage cables. Given the high !
energy (fault currents) available for the tested low voltage power , cables, the test results for medium voltage cables are expected to be similar to those for the low voltage power cables. This is based on the test method used to determine the worst case cable / current combination as previously defined in 3.1.2 of this Appendix. A conduit spacing of 1 inch in both the horizontal and vertical directions between a conduit and a tray / cable is acceptable for low vcitage and medium voltage power cables based on the results of the industry testing performed to date. 3.3 CABLE TO CABLE / TRAY 3.3.1 All Voltage Level Circuits l The separation requirements for cable to cable / tray spacing as shown ! in Table C are taken from the proposed 1991 revision to IEEE 384-1981. This revision is partially based on the IEEE paper noted previously in Section 3.1.2 of this Appendix. The values are conservative relative to the test data in the referenced paper but are adopted in full. ! 3.3.2 Non-Class IE Low Energy Circuits Analysis j Deviation from the physical separation or electrical isolation ; requirements is permitted for the "EMR" and "K" Non-Class IE low level instrumentation signals provided that (a) the Non-Class lE circuits are not routed with associated circuits of a redundant division, except through floor openings 29 through 36 and 135, and (b) the Class lE circuits are analyzed to demonstrate that they are not degraded below an acceptable level as described below-
- 1. Annunciator and instrumentation circuits are low energy circuits.
The annunciator circuits operate from a 125V dc high impedance (approximately 60 Kohm) source. The instrumentation systems operate on 1-SV dc or il-10V de signals in high impedance , circuits or 4-20 ma signals in low impedance circuits. ] All low voltage power and control cables have fire retardant , insulation rated at 600V. Instrumentation cables have either : 600V or 300V insulation and have grounded shields. Raceways are l of fire retardant material. Instrument trays contain only l instrumentation cables or telephone and low level paging i circuits. Only voltages of these levels are present in control i boards and relay racks. EMEDC&WAPPt.ND:xt WP5 l l I
Appendix 1 Page 10 of 20 ELECTRICAL DESIGN ; CRITERIA ELECTRIC 4 ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PWSICAL SEPARATION Revision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 i Since only low energy can be derived from instrumentation circuits, it is not probable that these lion-Class lE circuits ! will provide a mechanism for failure of redundant Class lE circuits inside Class IE devices or enclosures. These : fion-Class lE circuits can be exempted from separation ; requirements only within the same channel / division with which the , circuits are connected for their inputs.
- 2. Low energy fion-Class lE circuits which are not separated from :
Class lE circuits at the input device can be shown not to provide a credible mechanism of failure of the Class lE system. The general approach is to demonstrate the low probability of occurrence of a failure mechanism. To summarize this failure mode the following conditions must occur at the same time.
- a. The low energy fion-Class lE circuit is shorted to the highest voltage circuit conductors (125V dc/120V ac).
- b. The highest voltage circuit conductors are not short circuited or grounded.
- c. The highest voltage circuit protective device (breaker or '
fuse) fails to perform its intended function.
- d. The low energy fion-Class lE cable is also shorted to the i redundant Class IE circuit.
- e. The fault current is greater than the rating of the cable ,
insulation. t In order for the redundant Class IE protection system to fail ! several independent low probability events must happen simultaneously which is considered extremely unlikely.
- 3. Low energy fion-Class IE "K" circuits are allowed to run through holes 29 through 36 and 135 and in the immediate vicinity below without requiring separation. All circuits below and in the immediate vicinity of holes 29 through 36 and 135 are '
fion-Class IE circuits consisting of low energy 125V DC high impedence events recorder circuits and 120V AC power circuits. 120V AC power circuits, ERF-2 and ERF-6, are routed through hole 29. Low energy events recorder circuits are routed in either A, XA, B, or XB control trays and holes 29 through 36 and l 135. It is not probable that rion-Class IE or associated low energy circuits will provide a mechanism for failure of redundant Class lE circuits in the Class IE control trays as described in paragraph I and 2 above. Due to the inherent low energy B \EDCRE4APFtNDIK1.WP5
Appendix 1 !
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Page M of 20 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL LECTRICAL CIRCUlT NSICAl_ SEPARATION nevision 2 ! DEPARTt/ENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 [ 4 capabilities of 120V AC power circuits and the normal overcurrent protection provided for these 120V AC circuits, a cable to cable j failure in this area is not considered credible. ! 3.4 TRAY TO TRAY 3.4.1 The separation requirements for tray to tray as shown in Table C are ' based on those presently shown in the FSAR Chapter 8. These in turn , were based on an interpretation of the first draft to the proposed IEEE _ standard for the design and installation of wire and cable ' systems in power generating stations (now IEEE 422). 3.5 REACTOR BUILDING PENETRATIONS I 1 3.5.1 The physical separation of the penetration cartridges t within the particular area is determined by the reactor building l ter. don spacing. The 12 inch diameter penetration sleeves are on a , i minimum vertical spacing between centers of 3'-0". Minimum horizontal -
- spacing of redundant safeguards penetrations is 5'-0" outside ,
4 containment. - 4.0 SEPARATION RE0VIREMENTS FOR COMPONENTS AND WIRING INTERNAL TO PANELS This section provides the justification for the separation distances l shown in Table D for components and wiring internal to panels listed ? in Section 1, Scope of Criteria document. l 4.1 INTERNAL PANEL 1E CONDUIT TO CONDUIT SPACING I -l 4.1.1 Low Energy and Control Circuits A conduit to conduit spacing of 0 inches is acceptable for circuits defined as low energy _ and control. This is based on the justification ; previously provided in Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 for conduit to conduit j spacing of IE redundant circuits external to panels. l 4.2 INTERNAL PANEL IE CONDUIT TO CABLE / WIREWAY / WIRE l l 4.2.1 Low Energy Circuits ; A conduit to cable / wireway / wire spacing of 0 inches -is acceptable for l circuits defined as low energy. This is based on the justification .l previously provided in Section 3.2.1 for conduit to cable / wireway / wire i spacing of IE redundant circuits external to panels. i i i t t B:\EDCREViAPPENDiX1 WP5
Appendix 1
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA El_ECTRICAL CIRCUIT PWSICAl_ SEPARATION e ge 12 of 20 Revision 2 q l DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 i I 4.2.2 Control Circuits ; A conduit to cable / wireway / wire vertical spacing of 1 inch and a ! horizontal spacing which is a visible air gap or an insulating barrier { to prevent thermal conduction between the conduit and the ! cable / wireway / wire are acceptable for control circuits. This is based ; on the justification previously provided in Section 3.2.2 for conduit to cable / wireway / wire spacing for lE redundant circuits external to - panels. ;
)
If the wireway is enclosed, it is considered an enclosed raceway and ! is equivalent to a conduit. Therefore the conduit to conduit spacing l criteria can be used. This is based on the definition of enclosed ; raceways as provided in the 1991 proposed revision to IEEE 384-1981. ! 4.3 INTERNAL PANEL CABLE TO CABLE, WIRE TO WIRE OR WIRE TO CABLE l -{ 4.3.1 1E to IE Low Energy or Control Circuits f The separation requirements of 6 inches in all directions are those ! presently shown in the FSAR Chapter 7. These were based cr. industry l practice and IEEE Draft Standards at the time of plant design. l 4.3.2 1E to Associated, or IE to Non-1E, or Associated to Non-lE, or Associated XA to Associated XB Low Energy or Control Circuits i The separation distance of 1" as shown in Table D is based on results ; of testing completed by members of the nuclear industry for internally ! generated electrical faults. The results of industry testing have i been compiled in an IEEE paper entitled " Cable Separation - What Do Industry Testing Programs Show?" (Paper No. 90WM 254-3 EC presented at the IEEE/ PES 1990 Winter Meeting). In this paper there are six test results presented (Table 7 of IEEE paper) for internal panel wiring . which were conducted in free air with 1" horizontal and vertical distance separation. All six tests used electrical continuity as a l pass / fail criteria. In all six tests, the target cable passed the j continuity test. j i At CR-3, the power inside the panel comes from three primary sources ! which have been evaluated under calculation E-91-0052 for worst I possible fault current that could be experienced by internal panel 3 wiring. These primary sources are briefly described below: i 120 VAC Distribution Panel: For conservatism the breakers within ! the distribution panels are treated as primary protective devices 'j even though some circuits have overcurrent protection within i their panel. The secondary protective device is a upstream i { 4 B:\EDCRLMAPPE NDEK1.WP$
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Appendix 1 ; Page 13 of 20 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL LECTRICAL CIRCW MSIN WMATM nevision 2 ' DEPAR W ENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 I breaker or fuse feeding the distribution panel. The worst case i sustained current available from 120 VAC iistribution panels is ! 300 amperes based on the assumption that the primary protective ! device in the distribLtion panel fails to operate under fault ! condition. [ 125 VDC Distribution Panel: For conservatim the fuses within the i distribution panels are treated as primary protective devices even though some circuits have overcurrent protection within , their panel. The secondary protective device is an upstream fuse ! feeding the distribution panel. The worst case sustained current ! available from 125 VDC distribution panels is 300 amperes based on the assumption that the primary protective device in the i distribution panel fails to operate under fault condition.. ! 120 VAC from Control Power Transformer (CPT) in MCC's: Fault current available from these types of circuits is limited by the j CPT internal impedance. The worst case at CR-3 is the 750 VA CPT l which can produce a maximum current of approximately 250 amperes. : i Based on the above sources, the highest magnitude of sustained fault l current that can be experienced by conductor inside the panel at CR-3 l is 300 amperes. [ The worst case failure of internal panel wiring is a sustained overcurrent condition where the magnitude of the fault current is just below that which will cause the wire to fuse open. Three tests were . performed by Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO), Report No. 48503 l dated September 1 1982, to determine the maximum current which various ; size conductors could carry continuously, thereby maximizing the heat l generated by 12 R effects which could damage adjacent wires. These i tests were performed using General Electric Vulkene SIS wire sizes No. 6, No.10, and No.14AWG. The following is a sumary of tests results:- I max. COtmNUOUS CONDUCTOR TEST CURRENT USED CURRENT TO PRODUCE ; StZE AMPERES PEAK TEMP. AMPERES 'l NO. 6 AWG 150. 200 & 360 360 NO. to AWG 100,150,175 & 200 175
- l NO.14 AWG So,75,90 & 100 90
- i
- Test current greater than those determined to produce the peak !
temperature resulted in fusing of the wire prior to reaching the peak i B-\EDCREY,APPENDX1.WP5 J I 1
Appendix 1
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accmen ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 14 of 20 Revision 2 i l DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 I i temperature therefore were not considered worst case, i.e. 200 and 100 ; amperes. l Test results by PECO concluded that the heat generated by a sustained overcurrent condition for wire sizes (#6 AWG 'and smaller) used in internal panel wiring is not sufficient to damage the adjacent conductor as long as any size air gap exists between the two , conductors. This conclusion was supported by several tests which were ; performed to determine the spatial separation that would be required ; to prevent propagation of failure to an adjacent conductor. The only ; concern noted in PECO testing resulted from sagging of the faulted ! wire due to conductor heating. This sagging was experienced during the j testing on a six foot free standing horizontal conductor which is not [ representative of CR-3's control panel wiring configurations. CR-3 j . atilizes frequent support points (6-12"). In most cases wires are- ; bundled, which per PECO test conclusions, provides additional support ! to the faulted conductor. Therefore wire sagging is not a concern for { CR-3 internal wiring. l l
~
As additional support for the above basis a Duquesne Light Company (DLP) test report provides the results of their testing on SIS wire. j A test was performed with a 1/C No.12AWG SIS faulted cable unwrapped i and in contact with a No.12AWG SIS target cable wrapped with SILTEMP l 188CH. A second unwrapped 1/C No.12AWG SIS cable was mounted one inch ! away from the faulted cable. This tested configuration provides j results of 1" separation between a faulted cable and a target cable. ! A fault current of 150 amperes was used. The results of this test are summarized below: ! Fault Current Test Duration { 150 AMPS 26.9 MIN ! The target cables successfully completed the. Post-0vercurrent Test j 4 Functional Test. ! In the test reports by PECO and DLP, no credit is being taken for l protective devices to operate and clear the fault condition. ! Therefore, time-current characteristics of the breaker or fuse have no .j implication on this analysis. , 1.ie results of these tests indicate that the maximum continuous ' current to produced peak temperatures are within the maximum current available at CR-3. Therefore the results obtained from the testing are applicable for CR-3. . ! I e \toCFEV\APPDCtXtWP5 i
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I Appendix 1
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ELECTntCAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 15 of 20 sevision 2 l l l l l DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 l .i ! : t i l Control wiring inside panels at CR-3 consist of #14 and #12 AWG SIS , I wires rated at 90*C which is consistent with industry practice and l l similar to that used in the reference testing. 0ff gassing and ? subsequent ignition is not a consideration for wiring within CR-3 l panels since these small conductors cannot sustain elevated ! temperature long enough to allow sufficient concentrations of gas to i accumulate and cause ignition. ! s In addition, PECO test report concluded that with no separation between two cnnductors, damage to an adjacent conductor occurs only when unusually high current levels are maintained in a failed cable for a prolonged period of time, usually between five and twenty j 2 minutes. For this to occur, the primary overcurrent protective l device, i.e. the internal panel fuse or circuit breaker in the i distribution panel, must fail to clear a high impedance fault. l 1 If the primary protective device fails to operate and a very high r current such as 300 amperes is experienced, the wire will be fused .[ open and the temperature of conductor adjacent to the faulted wire 1 does not have time to increase significantly. i i Therefore, a separation distance equal to or greater than 1" between l Class IE wiring and Associated wiring, between Class IE and Non-Class j wiring, or between Associated and Non-Class wiring is sufficient to ! provide adequate independence of Class IE circuits. j l i i 5.0 SEPARATION DISTANCES FOR 1E (INCLUDING NON-lE CIRCUITS THAT ARE ROUTED WITH CLASS 1E CIRCUITS) TO NON-lE EXTERNAL RACEWAYS AND CABLES l This section provides the justification for the separation distances i shown in Table E for 'IE to non-lE raceways and cables external to i panels. l 5.1 CONDUIT TO CONDUIT '! [ 5.1.1 The separation requirements are the same as for the redundant IE ' l conduit to conduit circuits. The justification is therefore the same l as previously provided in Section.3.1 of this Appendix. l
- - 5.2 CONDUIT TO TRAY / CABLE l 5.2.1 The separation requirements are the same as for the redundant IE conduit to tray / cable circuits. The justification is therefore the !
same as previously provided in Section 3.2 of this Appendix. l 4 ! , t j ! R\0DCFIEYiAPfTNDiX1 WP5 , i i !
..C - _ . _ _ __
m ,,
1 Appendix 1 Page 16 of 20 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA I ELECTRICAL Revision 2 DEPART MENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 ] I i 5.3 CABLE TO CABLE / TRAY : 5.3.1 The separation requirements are the same as for the redundant IE cable l to cable / tray configuration. The justification is therefore the same : as previously provided in Section 3.3 of this Appendix. ; 5.4 TRAY TO TRAY ) 5.4.1 The separation requirements for tray to tray are taken from the ' proposed 1991 revision to IEEE 384-1981. This revision is partially based on the IEEE paper noted previously in Section 3.1.2 of this. 1 t Appendix. 5.5 REACTOR BUILDING PENETRATIONS l 5.5.1 The separation requirements are the same as for the redundant IE i reactor building penetrations. The justification is therefore the , ! same as previously provided in Section 3.5 of this Appendix. t 6.0 SEPARATION DISTANCES FOR IE (INCLUDING NON-lE CIRCUITS THAT ARE ROUTED , WITH CLASS lE CIRCUITS) TO NON-lE COMPONENTS AND WIRING INTERNAL TO - , PANELS ,
+
This section provides the justification for the separatiori distances , shown in Table D for 1E to non-lE components and wiring internal to panels. ; 4 i 6.1 CONDUIT TO CONDUIT i 6.1.1 The separation requirements are the same as for the redundant IE ' conduit to conduit configuration. The justification is therefore the same as previously provided in Section 4.1 of this Appendix. i 6.2 CONDUIT TO CABLE / WIREWAY / WIRE ! 6.2.1 The separation requirements are the .same as for the redundant IE ~! conduit to cable / wireway / wire configuration. The justification is i therefore the same as previously provided in Section 4.2 of this - Appendix.
]
6.3 CABLE TO CABLE, WIRE TO WIRE, WIRE TO CABLE, COMPONENT TO COMPONENT OR -l COMPONENT TO WIRE / CABLE 6.3.1 The separation requirements are the same as for the redundant 1E cable i to cable, wire to wire or wire to cable configuration. -The justification is therefore the same as previously provided in Section 4.3 of this Appendix. l
.emm-- ,
. _ . - - - ~ - _ - . . ._
Appendix 1 Page 17 of 20 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECMCAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Revision 2 DEFARTMEm AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 7.0 CONTROL BOARD INDICATORS - HULTICONDUCTOR CABLES CONTAINING MORE THAN ONE REQUIRED SEPARATION CIRCUIT 7.1 CIRCUIT ANALYSIS , The power sources to the Bailey RY meters on the Main Control Board are supplied from the Class IE inverters. The Bailey indicators require both an input signal (-10 to +10 V) and a 120 VAC power source. Each indicator has an internal transformer which reduces the input voltage to the vorking level required by the indicator. The only credible fault that can be postulated is 480V to the input side of the inverters. For this fault the inverter transformer output will saturate and limit the voltage to the indicator to 120 VAC. The routing for this circuit is through seismic tray from seismic racks; , hence no other fault can be imposed between the inverters and the control board. The input signals are routed in instrument tray or conduit that contain only low level circuits (Section 3.3.2 of this Appendix) and ' use 600 V insulation. This insulation level would prevent the maximum voltage which can be postulated from generating any " flash-over" from one cable to an adjacent cable. Additionally, the power supply wires are fused. Therefore, any potential fault within the indicator or input signal is isolated from the lE inverter source. Since there are no credible events that can impose excessive voltage or current levels on the analog or power . supply cable and the cable insulation is adequate to prevent
" flash-over", the use of multiconductor cables with different separation groups for Bailey RY indicators is acceptable.
8.0 BARRIERS Marinite Barriers On April 20, 1972 in a meeting between GAI and FPC, it was established that a suitable separation barrier would be 16 gauge metal wrapped on both sides with 1/8 inch asbestos tape constituting 1/4" thickness as a thermal barrier (Reference Figure 4C). This was incorporated into the Engineered Safeguards Criteria (ESC) which was issued on May 18, i 1972. In Feb.1974, Mr. Bower, inspector for the Atomic Energy Commission : (AEC), inspected the control boards and specified changes to the ESC l B iEDCRD", APPENDIX 1.WPS
Appendix 1 Page 18 of 20 ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL LECTRICAL CIRCWT M9 CAL SPARATION sevision 2 DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 , to satisfy his inspection (ref. Mar. 7, 1974 letter FPC to gal). Pending those revisions, the control boards and report were to be accented via a return visit by Mr. Bower. Figures 3, 4A, 4C and 5 reflect the as-built conditions as specified by the ESC issued May 18, 1972. Due to concern associated with asbestos, the use of asbestos as a fire retardant material was discontinued. A suitable barrier was defined as 16 gauge metal with the asbestos replaced with 1/4 inch thick marinite on either side of the sheet metal. Marinite-ML structural insulation is a non-asbestos non-combustible material which provides structural strength and high thermal insulating values. Because of its machinability, it can be readily fabricated into various sizes and shapes. It is designed to be used in fire prevention applications such as fire stops, fire walls, cable trays, etc. and provides an ideal, non-combustible base for melamine veneers. Marinite being self supporting eliminates the need for through metal supports, thus reducing heat transfer through barriers from the metal supports and prevents localized " hot spots". Because Marinite is self-supporting, it requires a minimum number of bolts to hold it to the barrier (minimum of No.16 gauge sheet metal for CR-3 application). Marinite is a commercially available product in minimum thickness of 1/2". Therefore, based on the above discussions and engineering judgement, 1/2" thick Marinite has been chosen as a substitute for 1/8" asbestos (Reference Figure 4B). SILTEMP Barriers An analysis of different thermal materials was performed for Crystal River Unit 3. Based on this analysis presented in E-91-0052 (Reference Y), SILTEMP sleeve and wrap (188CH and WT-65) are considered as acceptable thermal barriers for redundant wiring. The installation guidelines for SILTEMP are addressed in Maintenance Procedure MP-405A. JUSTIFICATION TO USE SILTEMP ON RIGID CONDUITS CONTAINING-120 VAC/125 VDC POWER, CONTROL OR INSTRUMENTATION CABLES The use of SILTEMP wrap as a barrier between a rigid conduit containing 120 VAC/125 VDC power, control or instrumentation cables and external low voltage power or control cable with the SILTEMP B:\l:DOREVA8TTTOiX1 WP5
l Appendix 1 f
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCWT PWSICAL SEPARATION P ge 19 t 20 nevision 2 l l l DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 >
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i l applied to the rigid conduit with 0" spacing is considered acceptable i based on the following analysis: l Test report No. 47506-02 dated March 11, 1985 for Northeast utilities l describes tests that were performed using SILTEMP as a barrier between ! two cables. The tests were performed using a No. 8 AWG triplex cable j form the Kerite Company as the faulted cable. This was considered to ! be the worst case cable for generating the maximum heat. There were j two tests performed using SILTEMP 188CH as the thermal barrier between i the cables. A test current of 1200 amperes was selected based on the ! ' worst fault current that No. 8 AWG cable could experience in the ! pl ant. In the first test the faulted cable was wrapped while in the ! second test the target cables were wrapped. The results of these test j demonstrate that a faulted cable inside' or outside of 5 SILTEMP 188CH blanket does not affect adjacent cables with zero-inch separation. A test performed for Duquesne Light Company (Report No. 17666-02 dated i April 19, 1985) supports the use of SILTEMP WT-65 as an acceptable l thermal barrier between two cables in free air with zero inch ! separation. Half of the faulted cable was wrapped in SILTEMP WT-65 ! and half in SILTEMP 188CH. The target cables were in contact with the outside of the wraps. For this configuration a fault current of i
- 316 amperes was applied for 8.4-minutes and 600 amperes was applied i i for 4 seconds. The maximum temperature on the target cable adjacent
- to the SILTEMP WT-65 was 291.5'F, while the maximum temperature on the -
target cable adjacent to the SILTEMP 188CH was 887.l'F. The test ! results indicate the target cables met the acceptance criteria. l HL&P tested flex conduit wrapped with SILTEMP WT-65 (Test , Report No. 53575 dated February 12,1987). The fault cable was inside ) the flex conduit and the target cables were in contact with wrapped ! conduit. A test current of 600 amperes was applied to a 3/C No. 4 AWG : cable inside the flex conduit. The maximum temperature recorded on , the target cables which were in free air was 138'F. The majority of the low voltage power and control cable at CR-3 are- I manufactured by The Kerite Company. Cables at CR-3 have flame i
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retardant insulation jacket and are qualified to meet the requirements-
- of IEEE-383. The control trays at CR-3 contain 120 VAC and 125 VDC -!
control cables. The most common control wire size utilized at CR-3 is !
#14 AWG insulated to a minimum of 600 volts. However. to facilitate i
installation, 480 volt,120 volt AC and 125 volt DC power cables size ! no. 8 AWG and smaller are allowed to route in the control cable trays. 1 Based on FPC calculation E-91-0052, the No. 8 AWG power cable was selected as a worst power cable for CR-3 since it can produce the l highest cable surface temperature. Calculation E-91-0052 has also eattent.wetworxtwes l 1 I
Appendix 1 !
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA El_ECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION e ge 20 of 20 nevision 2 .! l DEPARWENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 I, i established 1200 amperes as the maximum current that a No. 8 AWG cable ; could experience at CR-3. Therefore, conditions at CR-3 are similar l to those tested for Northeast Utilities. Based on the results of Duquesne Light Company as mentioned above the ! SILTEMP WT-65 is a better thermal barrier over SILTEMP 188CH due to . the high temperatures observed on target cables which were in contact t with SILTEMP 1880H. i i Based on the above it is evident that SILTEMP WT-65 wrapped conduit is ; an acceptable separation barrier between a rigid conduit containing - 120 VAC/125 VDC power, control or instrumentation cables and an ! external low voltage power or control cables. ! t i i l
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PWSICAL SEPARATION P 9' ' nevision 2 l' DEPART MENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 . t CIRCUIT NUMBER 3RD LETTER CODE - A Computer B Video ; C Motor Control Centers.(Pwr & Cont) } E D.C. Circuits l F A.C. Circuits (A.C. Dist. Pnis) ! G Turbine-Generator-Exciter H Reactor Protection (Circuits which trip the Reactor; low level Circuits 1 which initiate safeguards logic) , i K Events Recording ! t L 480 V Switchgear , M 6900 V & 4160 V Switchgear , P Communications : R Reactor Plant ! 3 S Secondary Plant . T Transformers l U 230 KV i V. 500 KV ! W Fiber Optics l
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ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL SEPARATION Page 1 of 21 nevision 2 1 I DEPARTMENT AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 l ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESAS) ? ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CONSIDERATIONS' l, i SEE ATTACHED ANALYSIS l l i i i t i i l f l I i l i t i l awcemww.xam -
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. - EkectricalcircuitPhysicalSeparationAndCableTrayLoading Appendix 3. Paga 3 of; '
ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM
- ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CONSIDERATIONS 1.0 INTROD UCITON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 i
2.0 ESAS ACTUATION CHANNELIZATION REQUIREMENTS .......... 3 u 3.0 SEPARA'IION CRITERIA .....................................J')
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~4.0 ESAS POWER SUPPCY REQUIRF3ENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.0 DISCUSSION OF SELECTED SEPARATION FEATURES AND DESIGN ;
IMPLEMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - MARGINS IN MEETING THE SINGLE FAILURE I 6.0 EXCESS REQ UIR EMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.0 REFF.REN CES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 , ( 8.0 DEFINITIONS .......................................... 18 l t e s
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. Electrical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray Loading Appendix 3. Paga 4 of 21 !
t Engineered Saf'eguards Actuation System C Electrical Separation Considerations , LO INTRODUCTION , De Engineered Safeguard Actuation System (ESAS) provides the signals required to actuate two redundant trains of safety related plant auxiliaries. The ESAS monitors both reactor coolant pressure and reactor building pressure to provide actuation should a preset value be reached. Reactor coolant pressure is monitored by pressure trnmmitters which provide i
. - analog signals auctionered by bistables to provide a digital signal when a preset level is reached. Reactor building pressure is monitored by pressure switches !
which provides digital signals when the pressure exceeds preset values. ; For redundancy, reliability and testability. each of the plant parameters monitored for ESAS ac:uation use multiple instrumentation channels arranged in a logic based on an enhanced two-out-of-three voting redundancy. The enhanced portion , of the two-out-of.three logic is applicable only to the digital portion of the ESAS. It provides the features of a two-out-of-three-taken-twice logic. An actuation . l' j matrix made of two-out-of-threc logic is provided for each actuated component. {'
. This approach, while providing significant margin against the consequences of l postulated single failure, increases the complexity of the application of separation !
criteria. t 1 (' He reactor coolant pressure is monitored by three transmitters and the reactor building pressure is monitored by six pressure switches. The integration of three l reactor coolant analog instrument channels into two ESAS actuation trains (each l i composed o'f a two out of three logic) creates separation and channel identification difficulties. The source of these difficulties can often be traced to ' situations where redundant channels are combined for logic purposes. This situation is recognised in IEEE 279 " Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Protection ' Systems" which states that "A channel loses its identity where single action signals are combined.". ,
. De purpose of this document is to identify the featurcs included in the design of ESAS needed to assure that the separation requirements are met.This document ,
also includes considerations relativ: to power supply requirements and impact of : the single failure requirement. i ( -
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Ektetrical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray Loading Appendix 3. Pags 5 of 21 -
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The considerations provided in this document are applicable only to the internal ( and intercabinet wiring of the ESAS cabinets. . The ESAS separation and isolation features also provide significant excess > margins toward meeting the consequences of postulated single failures.These margins are not totally taken credit for in the Plant Technical Specifications and could be used to justify potential LCO. N e Cs ! i e
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.. Elecerical Circuie Physical Separation And Cable Tray Loading App 2ndix 3. Paga 6 of 21 i 2.0 ESAS ACTUATION CHANNELIZATION REQUIREMENTS The channelisation requirements of the ESAS are defined in part by the number of channels required to meet the single failure criteria and by the way these channels are interfaced to generate the output signals required to actuate both train of equipment. A. Number of channels He ESAS monitors both reactor coolant pressure and reactor building pressure to provide actuation of redundant safety related plant, auxiliaries ;
,e 2 at a preset value.
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. t
- - ~ ne acmation logie selected is based on a two-out-of-three logic to provide
. - reliability, testability and capability to meet the single failure criteria in accordance with the design requirements of rFFE 279.
r A two-out-of-three logic scheme requires that the selected parameters be monitored by a minimum of three sensors. When only three sensors are used (as for the reactor coolant pressure), the scheme does not have any excess margin toward meeting the single failure criteria. This is because if one sensor fails in an unsafe mode, the remaining sensors must actuate properly to provide a two-out-of-three output. Therefore each of the input ( signal to a two out of three logic must be kept independent. IEEE 279 requires that sensors be testable during normal plant operation. i Testing can be performed by either perturbing the. monitored process parameter or by comparing the output of redundant sensors against each other. Since any sensor monitoring the reactor coolant pressure must be located inside the reactor building and is not readily accessible for testing during i normal plant operation, pressure transmitters are used. The transmitters
. provide the capability for cross checking the pressure readings from the control room and thus provide on line testing capabilities. .
Because the amount of hardware required for a transmitter loop is .' significantly greater than for a measurement utilizing a pressure switch. only three transmitters are used to produce the two redundant two out of three logic. ! l
- Reactor building pressure can be monitored by sensors located outside the l reactor building. The sensnrs selected are pressure switches with sensing lines which penetrate the reactor building wn!!.
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,. Eiccerieni Circule Physical Separacion And Cable Trny Loading Appendix 3. Pag 2 7 of 21 Since accessibility to the' pressure switches is possible during normal plant ( operation, testing can be done by perturbing the process variable. Also, because the amount of hardware needed to implement a measurement using pressure switches is limited, reliability can be increased by providing three sensors, in a two out of three configuration, for each of the two trains of actuation. B. Channel to Actuation Interface The on-line testing requirements of IEEE 279 states in part that
" Capability shall be provided for testing and calibrating channels and the '
devices used to derive the final system output signal ". His requirement is
- . further clari5ed to indicate that capability should be provided for testing
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during power operation. His last requirement brings the concern that testing could cause an inappropriate actuation of the final actuated device with potential negative impact on plant operation. This concern is the major design consideration which decided the basic feature of the ESAS actuation scheme whereby the two out of three logic is performed as the last logic element prior to actuation of the final devices. His preserves the testing capability afforded by the two out of three voting redundancy. Figure 1 shows a simplified scheme of one channel of RC pressure and one channel of RB pressure for both A and B actuation. C. Referring to figure 1, the reactor coolant pressure is measured by a pressure trarsmitter located in the reactor building. The pressure signal is monitored for HPI actuation by a bistable (test and buffer modules omitted for simplicity), the output of which is equipped with two relays wired in parallel. One relay is assigned to Train A actuation and the other is' assigned to train B actuation. The bistable is located in channel test cabinet 1 and feeds train A and B digital signals to auxiliary relays located in channel cabinets IA and 1B. ; 1 C.mee<Come== 4 l i
i ,. Eicetrical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray Loading Appendix 3. Pag 2 8 of 21
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( ESAS CHANNELIZATION 40 A l 24 PS CHANNEt. gg gg CAB. 1A gg
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JPT3 ACTUATION CAB.
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BS B CAB. IB SD , FIGURE 1 - The reactor building pressure is monitored by pressure switches. One pressure switch is assigned to Train A, providing a signal to channel - : cabinet IA and another is assigned to train B, providing a signal to channel cabinet IB. De digital signals from the pressure switches are functionally equivalent to the digital signals from the bistables. It is important to note that the analog
. signal from the transmitter to the bistable must be kept separated from the
- bistable's digital signals and the signals from the pressure switches. This is i
because the analog signal is actually an A or B signal as far as actuation is concerned. i The output of the channel cabinets IA and 13 are directed to the ' redundant actuation cabinets 4 and S. Each of the actuation cabinets is ; segregated into four compartments identified as A,B,C.D.Two out of three logic matrices, one fo. each plant auxiliary to be actuated, are made from relay contacts located in the A,B,C compartments of each actuation cabinet. ( m- . _ _ _ 5
,- blectrical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray Loading Appendix 3. Page 9 of 21 j
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I As represented in fig.1, one reactor coolant pressure measurement and a ; C - set of two redundant pressure switches constitute, via the channel cabinets, one input to both the A and B actu: tion cabinet. Since three separated inputs are required to form a two out of three matrix, a total of three reactor coolant pressure and three sets of two redundant reactor building pressure measurement is required to complete the actuation system. ,
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T eetrical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray I.cading Appendix 3, Page 10 of 21 f 3.0 SEPARATION CRITERIA ( Electrical separation or isolation are design features which assure that IE 1 equipment performing redundant functions are kept independent. Independence of redundant equipment is required to meet the single failure criteria. t Electrical separation can be provided by physical distance of circuits or when it cannot be provided by electrical isolation. The level.cf electrical isolation required is determined by the maximum credible fault which can be postulated. l Since power plant wiring is segregated by voltage levels (eg,480 volts and 4160 volts), the highest fault voltage level credible for control circuits is 480 volts. 'Ihis ' correspond to the since the level of voltage which exists in motor controi centers
- .,[, l and that could be imposed onto the.120 volt control wiring in that MCC.
.y .
- To assure adequate eleenical separation, the assigned separation grouping must be identifiable. Color coding is used for that purpose.
.i I Assigning color coding to define separation groups for actuation systems like the ESAS is a comprornise between the need to accurately identify the separation 1 grouping of the different electrical components performing redundant functions
- and the practical aspect associated with implementing a color coding which truly represent the complexity of the two-out-of-three-taken-twice logic. A color code truly adapted to the channelization of the ESAS would require three colors for
( the analog input sign:ls plus six colors for the pressure switches signals and two additional colors for the actuation signals for a total of 11 colors. Such color code ' could not be pmetically implemented. As a result, only three basic colors have been used for the ESAS. These colors are red, green and yellow. This selection is consistent with separation requirements on , the fo!!owing basis: A. Input signals 4 . ; i Tne input signals (analog) from the reactor coolant pressure transmitters to the ESAS must be kept separated from the digital signals of the reactor building pressure switches since each analog signal actually generates a channel A and channel B digital output. , l l 1 7
Electrical Circuit Physical Separatica And Cable Trsy Loading Appendix 3. Paga 11 of 21 , Separation of analog transmitter signals and pressure switch digital signals ( is accomplish by maning the analog signals in separated instrument trays or conduit. Channel A and B are run in instrument tray while channel C is ntn in conduit. De input signal from the reactor building pressure switches are run in individual conduits. The signals from the pressure switches are considered to be control voltage. Therefore, the analog input signals (transmitters) are kept separate from - the digital input signals (pressure switches) because of the voltage level associated with these circuits. His allows to use the same color coding and ehmel assignation for the analog signals (ie A,B,C) and for the digital signals (ie,A,B,C) when in fact these are kept separate by their routing. ,
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B. Signals from the b! stables to the channel cabinets
. The digital signals from the bistables to the channel cabinets consist of two signals, one assigned to train A and the other to Train B actuation.
However, the three digital signals (one per bistable) assigned to the Train A actuadon must be kept separate from each other since the two-out-of-three voting is performed in the actuation cabinet. The same reasoning requires that the signals assigned to Train B actuation be kept separate from each other. Tais requirement would imply the need for six different channels. This was implemented ntnning the signals from the bistables to l (. the channel cabinets internally within the test cabinets or in individual conduits.Therefore, they are kept separate from the redundant channels. C. Signals from the pressure switches to the relay cabinets l Similar to the digital signals from the bistables, the signals from the , pressure switches must be kept separate from each other. This requirements require in effect 6 channels and has been implemented by routing the wiring for each pressure switches wiring in individual conduits. l i Bree of the conduits are labelled A and the other three conduit labelled ; B. > D. Signals from the channel cabinets to the actuation cabinets l
\
ne signals from the channel cabinets to the actuation cabmets are an
. extension of the input signals and must be kept separate from each other. l
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. $lectrical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray Leading Appendix 3, Page 12 of 2( :
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He signals from the separate relay cabinets are run in conduit directly to ( the corresponding compartments of the actuation cabinets and; therefore are kept separate from each other. ; ' D. Wiring associated with the two out of three matrices He two-out-of-three matrices are formed in a separate compartment at the , back of the actuation cabinets. Wiring from the output relays located in the separate compartments located in the front of the actuation cabinets is routed through openings located at the bottom of the compartments.This l wiring is terminnted on terminals located in the back compartment where !
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field wiring also terminates. _ : This armngement m'imnim the separation of the three channels while ' combining them to form a two-out-of-three logic. i i
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l Appendix 3. Pcg3 13 of 21- > Eh.ectrical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Trsy Loading 4.0 ESAS POWER SUPPLY REQUIREMESTS i (. The ESAS system is a basic two-out-of-three de-energize to actuate system. The l' power to the system is derived from the inverters which are backed-up by redundant 250 Volt batteries. A single failure of a 250 volt battery will result in the loss of the two associated inserters. This results in the potential for a simultaneous two-out-of-three acmation of both train of the ESAS. i A major requirement of the ESAS is to provide a timely loading of the emr .tery7ncy ! diesel generators during a loss of off-site power. In the event of postulate sf the ; failure in one train coincident with a loss of off-site power, a timely leai i diesel generator associated with the redundant train must be provided.To . i perform this requirement, the power supply to the ESAS timers is distribut
- the 4 inserters. Ibis assures that power is avniinhle to reset the timers associated l
' with the redundant diesel generator and provide timely loading. Distributing the timers among the 4 inserters creates an appearance of inadequate separadon but lI is acceptable when postniated single failures are'analyaed.
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Appendix 3. Pagel4 cf 21 ;
,. [.lecericalCircuitPhysicalSeparationAndCableTrayLoading S.O DISCUSSION OF SELECTED SEPARATION FEATURES AND DESIGN
( IMPLEMENTATION The ESAS is con 5gured in such a manner that significant separation features exist, they are portrayed on figure 2. ESAS Separot ion - Figure 2 02A TEST CAB 2 CEB 03A TEST CAB 3 039 01 A TEST CAB 1 013
' ' ' i 1 1 1 T I T T T I -
B! STABLE B! STABLE f i B! STABLE f CUTPUT CUTPUT ( CUTPUT 8 i t
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RELAYS 7 f B1 A3 52 33 ; Al A2 I /
/ l SD g 4A 44B g 4C 40 45A g 55 g SC
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- 2 CUT CF 3 OUTPUTS
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The following provides an overview of some of the major features which assures that the ESAS complies with the single failure criteri_ . A. Separation betwer.n actuation trains Train A and Train B outputs from the ESAS are formed separately in i actuation c:binets 4 and 5, respectively. A significant amount of separation I exists between the actuation trains since the actuation cabir. cts are physically separated enclosures. l i I
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l C. cm.arcesaa - l 11 l
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, - diectrical Circu1*. ihysical Separacion And Cable Tray Leading Appendix 3. Page 15 of 21 i
B. Separation within the actuation cabinets (. Actuation cabinets 4 and 5 are designed to provide separate enclosures for , each of the three channels required to form the two-out-of.three matrices. l The general color coding used for the wiring inside cabinet 4 is red and ; green in cabinet 5. Some of the matrices are used to actuate "A/B* ! componems (i.e., such as the third Reactor Building Cooling Unit). The color coding for these components is yellow. It was perceived at the original design stage that changing wire color from yellow to red or green across ter::dnal blocks would create potential confusions therefore some of ' the contacts of output relays were wired with yellow wiring to assure a color match between the Ee!d wiring landing at the back of the acmation i V cabinets and the matrices wiring.
- Following the TMI-2 accident, major wiring modifications were recuired inside the actuation cabinets to implement required changes associated with diverse Reactor Building isolation. As a result and for practicality, the separation between red colored wiring in cabinet 4 (green in cabinet 5) and :
yellow wiring could not be maintained. It is important to note that the segregation of yellow and red wiring inside acmation cabinet 4 and yellow ' and green inside actuation cabinet 5 was not required to meet a separadon requirements but to assure that a match in color coding would exist between cabinet wiring and field wiring. C The yellow field wiring can actually taop from one actuation cabinet to the other. This is acceptab!c since the m:aimum fault voltage is within the j rating of the insulation of the components selected and the theory of the
' hot wire'is not applicable when only safety related wiring is under .
consideration. Tne semation cabinets are designed such that a localised ' fire will not ptopagate frcm one compartment to rn,ther. i ne color of wires inside the different compartments of an actuation cabinet is kept as either red or green for practicality. Non-safety wires used for indicating lights and alarms are run with the safety related wires and color coded brown (A) or crange (B) to identify their channel associations. 4 Since the m:uimum volta;;e ir. side the compartment is only 480 volts (see section B), separation between wiring associated with the coil and the contacts of the relays located in the ac-aation cabinets is not required. l I i J > ~- . 12
Appendix 3. Faga 16 of M .. bccerical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray Loading, a . C Separation between actuation cabinets and channel cabinets The channel cebinets act as buffer between the bistable output relays and the actuation cabinets. The channel cabinets are designated as IA,2A and 3A for A train and IB,2B and 3B for B train. ~Ihe field wiring between the compartments of the actuation cabinets and the channels cabinets is kept separate from each other even that they are color coded red or green. Tne separation is assured by independent conduits shown on figure 2 as A1,A2,A3 and B1, B2,B3. . This separation and isolation capabilities of the channel cabinets is required because a fault voltage of 480 volts mnnt be accommodated by the bistable output relsyr, Without this isolation, a 480 voit fault
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originating in a compartment of cabinet 4 (e.g,4A) could be trnnsmitted to a compartment of cabinet 5 (e.g 5A) and would not be in accordance with the design requirement for % ESAS that a fault in one train may not reduce the reliability of the B train. , D. Separation of the channel cabinets
- The channel cabinets are seriarate compartments of an enclosure which also contain the test cabinets. Each channel cabinet is physically and electrically separated from its counterpart (i.e,1A from IB) and from
( channel cabinets associated with the other redundant channels (i.e.,2A & 2B,3A & 3B). E. Isolation between the channel cabinet and the bistables. . As indicated, the channel cabinets act as buffers between the bistables and the actuation cabinets by providing coil to contact isolation with an ' isolation capability of 600 volts (e.g., insulation rating of the wires). They also assure that a fault voltage r.o greater than 120 volts A.C can be ' imposed on the bistable output contact and its wiring.120 volts A.C. voltage is within the rating of the bistable contac:s and associated wiring. This t - ' M because the bistable is the common link between Train A
- .ruation.
and T ( . we - 13 :
ticetrical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray Loading Appendix 3. Page 17 of ', D. Signal segregation at the bistable level. At the.: bistable level, the cutput relays are assigned to Train A ac:ustion l and Train B acn:stione No separation between Train A and Train B can be provided inside the test cabinet. ; i7. . .
+
e ( ! O e e e I e e ! O I ( - d M I .t
,. Y.ltetrical Circuie Physical Separation And Cable Tray Londing Appendix 3, Pag 2 18 of 23 6.0 EXCESS MARGINS IN MEETING THE SINGLE FAILURE REQUIREMENT r The ESAS has separation and isolation features which provide significant excess margin in meeting the single failure criteria. The excess margin exist mostly because the system logic is essentially a two-out-of-three taken twice. The following is a discussion of some of these featurest A. Outputs of the ES
- u Except for low energy applications such as alarm and indicating lights,
- matrices are not used in non safety applications. Therefore, for a fault voltage in excess of the normal 120 volt control voltage to be seen at the ESAS actuation cabinets, a single failure of IE component must be postulated outside the ESAS cabinets. An example of such a failure could be the failure of a control transformer in a Motor Control Center. Since '
these circuits are fused below the rating of the wire used, no " hot wire" can be postulated. On this basis, no further failure needs to be postulated in the ESAS cabinets.Thus assuring the availability of the other outputs on the same *. rain as the fault and the complete other redundant train is assured. ( B. Actuation cabinets Should a localised fire be postulated in a compartment of an actuation
. cabinet as an extreme interpretation of the single failure criteria, all equipment and wiring located in the affected compartment can be postulated to fail. This includes the postulation of short circuits which
' impose the highest voltage available in th- :ompartment on all wires connected within the compartment.
Should a localised fire occur in the back of an actuation cabinet, the loss of a complete train of actuation may be postulated since this is where the output connections are located.This fai!ure would not impact the redundant train because of the physical separation of the redundant cabinet. t IS
,. Nocerical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray Loading Appendix 3. Pege 19 of 21 A localized fire in any other compartment (i.e the front compartments) . g will result in the loss of the equipment in that compartment only. This does ( - not preclude the system to s*ill be capable to meet the single failure. This excess margin is significant and is not reflected in the technical speci5 cation. C Channel cab' mets A localised fire in a channel cabinet does not prevent the ESAS from meeting the single failure criteria. Only the reliability of the affected train t is reduced to a one-out-of-two or two-out-of-two logic. Note: Reducdon to one-out-of-two or twuaut-of-two is dependent on the failure mode
- . postulated ( open circuit versus short circuit).
~
This excess margin is not reDected in the technical snecifications. However, it can be used to justify potential LCO. D. Test cabinets. A localised fire in a test cabinet will prevent the system to meet the single failure criteria for actuation on low Reactor Pressure. Actuation on High i Reactor Building Pressure is not affected. This excess margin is not reflected in the technical specification. (
=
i s t P n 1 9
+
(. 16 ,
,. ile=tricci Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray Loading Appsudix 3. Paga 20 of 21
~
7.0 REFERENCES
TFFF 279 Proposed Standard dated August 30,1968
- Proposed IEEE Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems". .
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e 4 e e e 17
, .l$lectrical Circuit Physical Separation And Cable Tray 1.oading Appendix 3. Pag: 21 of : '
8.0 DEFINITIONS C ('bnnel: An arrangement of components and modules as required to generate a single protective action signal when required by a plant condition-(IEEE 279). Train: A train is one of the redundant set of " actuated equipment
- Actuated Equipment: Tne assembly of prime movers anc' driven equipment used to accomplish a protective acnon (IEEE603).
f O 4 O O e O i
. 3 L '
ec . l N ^ l
Attachment 1 Separation Criteria Exceptions Equipment Dwa. Nos. Analysis No. Ho, Case or Exception I.D. I 1. RCM81 IS AN ASSOCIATED (BROWN) MCB 210-383 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum CABLE TERMINATING ON TB4-7. ECN-3421 ICSAR 210-384 J.B. Hanelko/R.E. Miller TERMINATED A GRAY WIRE ON TB4-7 WHICH Dated August 18, 1976. IS INTERNALLY JUMPERED TO A NON-lE TERMINAL BLOCK. ' ADJACENT TERMINATIONS TO TB4-7'ARE ALSO BROWN.
- 2. RCM19 IS AN ASSOCIATED (ORANGE)
CABLE TERMINATING ON TB16-25. ECN-3421 TERMINATED A GRAY WIRE ON TB16-25 WHICH IS INTERNALLY JUMPERED TO A.NON-lE TERMINAL BLOCK. ADJACENT TERMINATIONS TO TB16-25 ARE ALSO ORANGE (REFERENCE CASE 39, ESSE-CB & RR). 2 ACF62 IS AN ASSOCIATED (BROWN) CABLE RR3 210-601 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum TERMINATING ON A NON-lE TERMINAL BLOCK 210-600 J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller Dated March I, 1976. AT TB8-29 AND TB8-30. ALL INTERNAL WIRING FOR THESE POINTS IS NON-lE (REFERENCE CASE 38, ESSE-CB & RR). 3 CONTROL SWITCllES (DEVICES AB3 AND AC3 MCB 210-501 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum ON EC-210-S01) HAVE ASSOCIATED WIRING liv SECTION J.B. Ilaneiko/R.E. Miller Dated February S, 1976.
'0F REDUNDANT CHANNELS (ORANGE AND BROWN)~ TERMINATED LESS THAN 6" APART.
THE EXTERNAL WIRING FOR THE SWITCHES IS PART~0F ALARM CIRCUITS CIK21, CIK22, CIK23, AND CIK24. THESE EXTERNAL CIRCUITS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH SAFEGUARD CHANNEL "A" ONLY (REFERENCE CASE 37, ESSE-CB & RR).
- Gibert/ Commonwealth, Inc. - Page No.1
_ . - . _ _ . . _. .-, .-_ - ~ . ._ .
Attachment 1 S:paration Criteria Exceptions Case or Exception Equipment 'Dwa. Nos. Analysis No1 No, 1101 4 ORANGE AND GRAY WIRES ARE TERMINATED MCB 210-144 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum ON TB46-23. THE GRAY WIRE IS ESB J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller Dated February 5, 1976. INTERNALLY JUMPERED TO 1845-3. A YELL)W WIRE IS ALSO TERMINATED AT TB45-3. THE EXTERNAL SIDE OF TB45-3 IS PART OF 28V INDICATING LIGHT CIRCUIT MUF253 (REFERENCE CASE 36, ESSE-CB & RR). AK, AM, AP, AND AR ARE SPARE RELAYS IN RR3 EC-210-597 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum 5 RR3. SINGLE GRAY WIRES TERMINATED ON EC-210-600 J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller Dated February 2, 1976. THE RELAYS ARE INTERNALLY JUMPERED TO A NON-1E TERMINAL BLOCK AT POINTS TB16-21, 24, 27, AND 30. ALL OTHER RELAY TERMINATIONS HAVE ORANGE WIRES (REFERENCE CASE 35, ESSE-CB & RR ). 6 ITEM CZ ON EC-210-157 CONTAINS A FUSE MCB 210-157 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum WHICH HAS ORANGE AND BROWN WIRES ES SECTION J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller AB Dated September 24 TERMINATED AT THE SAME POINT (REFERENCE CASE 34, ESSE-CB & RR). 7 JCll IS AN INDICATING LIGHT WITH MCB 210-089 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum ORANGE WIRE TERMINATIONS. THE ORANGE ICS J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller WIRES ARE LESS THAN 6" APART FROM GRAY Dated September 10, 1975. i WIRES ON OTHER INDICATING LIGHTS (REFERENCE CASE 33, ESSE-CB & RR). B ED3 IS AN INDICATING LIGHT WITH ORANGE MCB 210-081 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum WIRE TERMINATIONS. THE ORANGE WIRES ICS J.B. llanelko/R.E. Miller Dated September 10, 1975. ARE LESS THAN 6" APART FROM BROWN AND GRAY WIRES ON OTilER INDICATING LIGilTS (REFERENCE CASE 32, ESSE-CB & RR). Page No. 2
-Gilbert / Commonwealth. Inc. -
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Attachment 1 Separation Critcria Exceptions Case or Exception E_q_ui pment Dwn. Nos. Analysis No. No. I.D. 9 GRAY WIRING IS TERMINATED WITH MCB 210-094 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum ASSOCIATED WIRING (ORANGE) ON TB23-43 ICS J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller AND TB23-44. IN ADDITION, THE Dated July 11, 1975. PHYSICAL SEPARATION BETWEEN THE ORANGE AND GRAY WIRES IS LESS THAN 6" (REFERENCE CASE 28, ESSE-CB & RR). 10 Teflon sleeving installed on MCB MCB 210-007, -021, Teflon Sleeving Inspection wiring to provide safeguard wiring -046, -050, Report For April-May 1990. separation. (Reference Case 4, Calc -111, -300, E91-001, Table C and Teflon Sleeving -341, -370, inspection Report dated Apri' '" -379, - ALL 1990) 210-SERIES DWGS COVERED BY NOTES ON DWGS. 11 Device AL is a lockout relay with SSTR EC-210-328 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum green and gray wires terminated less J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller than 6 inches apart. (Reference Case Dated April 15. 1975 3, Calc E91-001, Table C)' Analyzing Similar Existing Exception. 12 Wire color changes from safeguards "A" ES CAB A EC-210-473 1-89-0047 to "B" across a fuse in Engineered EC-210-478 Safeguard Channel Cabinet 3A. (Reference Case 1, Calc E91-001, Table C) 13 Grange and gray wires are terminated RR2 EC-210-401 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum I?n e than 6 inches apart on TBIO. J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller (Reference Case 1, ESSE-CB & RR) Dated February 19, 1975.
- Gilbert / Commonwealth. Inc. - Page No 3
Attachm:nt 1 S:paration Criteria Exceptions Case or Exception Eguipment Dwa. Nos. Analysis No. N% 1.D. 14 Devices Al and El contain terminal MCB EC-210-492 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum blocks which have orange and gray HVC SECTION J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller wires terminated on adjacent points. Dated February 19, 1975. (Reference Case 2, ESSE-CB & RR) 15 Device BN6 is a control switch with MCB EC-210-495 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum orange and gray wires terminated ilVC SECTION J.B. Ilaneiko/R.E. Miller across the same contact. (Reference Dated February 19, 1975. Case 3, ESSE-CB & RR) 16 1. Device AQ is an auxiliary relay RRHV EC-210-520 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum with orange and gray wires terminated J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller less than 6 inches apart. Dated February 19, 1975.
- 2. Device BG is an auxiliary relay with orange and gray wires terminated less than 6 inches apart. In addition, the orange and gray wires are terminated across the same contact. (Reference Case 6, ESSE-CB &
RR) 17 1. AHF748 AND AHF751 ARE ASSOCIATED MCB EC-210-514 Ref. G/C Inc.-Memorandum CIRCUITS OF REDUNDANT CHANNELS. IllESE IIV SECTION EC-210-515 J.B. Ilaneiko/R.E. Miller CIRCUITS TERMINATE ON TB3-1, -2,--26 Dated June 11, 1975. THRU 30. NO BARRIER EXISTS BETWEEN THE BROWN AND ORANGE TERMINATIONS.
- 2. ITEM CU IS A DUAL PANEL METER WITH \
INPUTS SUPPLIED BY CIRCUITS AHF748 AND AHF751 RESPECTIVELY. THE CONDUCTORS OF BOTH CIRCulTS ARE ROUTED IN ONE VENDOR CABLE TO Tile PANEL METER. PHYSICAL SPACING IS LESS THAN 6" AND THE CONDUCTORS ARE NOT ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED. (REF. CASE 5A, ESSE-CB & RR)
- Gilbert / Commonwealth. Inc. - Page No. 4
Attachment 1 S:paration Criteria Exceptions No, Case or Exception Eguipment Own. Nos. Analysis No. I.D. 18* ITEM R ON THE SUBSTATION MISCELLANEOUS MCB EC-210-332 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum ~ WIRING BOARD IS A LOCKOUT RELAY WITH MISC /SSTR J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller RED, GREEN AND GRAY WIRE TERMINATIONS Dated April 15, 1975. LESS THAN 6" APART. (REFERENCE CASE 11, ESSE-CB & RR) 19 1. VBF27 IS A NON-lE CIRCUIT MCB EC-210-576 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum TERMINATING ON TBAl-1, 2, 3, 4 TPC CAB. A & EC-210-580 J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller ADJACENT TERMINATIONS AT TBAl-5, 6 ARE B Dated April 4, 1975. FOR SAFEGUARD CIRCUIT VBF30 (RPS CHANNEL III).
- 2. VBF28 IS A NON-1E CIRCUIT TERMINATING ON TBB1-1, 2, 3, 4 ADJACENT TERMINATIONS AT T881-5, 6 ARE FOR SAFEGUARD CIRCUIT VBF29 (RPS CHANNEL IV). (REFERENCE CASE 10, ESSE-CB & RR) 20 Device API is a control switch with MCB EC-210-502 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum brown and yellow wires terminated less llV SECTION J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller than 6 inches apart (Reference Case 4, Dated February 19, 1975.
ESSE-CB and RR). 21 Circuit AHC-951 is a Channel "B" 209-005 Refer to MAR 89-10-07-01, safeguard power feed. This cable- All-030 FCN 3. supplies 480V power to Emergency Diesel Generator Room Air Handling Fan Motor AHF-22C. AHC-951 is a #4AWG cable routed in the control tray system (Reference FCN 3 to MAR-89-10-07-01).
*' Installation of MAR 91-03-23-01, BEST TRANSFORMER, will remove-this exception. .
l
- G;ibert/ Commonwealth. Inc. - Page No. 5
y . _. . _ .m Attachment l' Separation Criteria Exceptions
'!Lh . Case or Exception. [quipment Owg. Nos.
Anal.Ysis _No. I.D.
.22- Devices L, M and N are isolation RS RELAY EC-210-726 Wiring Analysis NDB9-1.
relays in Remote. Shutdown Relay CAB. A &~B EC-210-736 Cabinet A. Redundant devices L, M, and N are .in the Remote Shutdown Relay Cabinet B. The Cabinet A relays are
. Channel "A" (red)' powered and'the Cabinet "B" relays are Channel "B" (green) powered.' Violet wires terminated on the "A" relays are less than 6" apart from red wires. Blue wires terminated on the "B" relays are (less than 6" apart from green wires.
(Reference Wiring Analysis ND89-1, Item 2).- Also' relays P & Q in Relay Cabinet 23 The Remote Shutdown Auxiliary Cabinets RS' AUX. CAB. .EC-210-747, Wiring Analysis ND89-1. contain Class'IE and non-lE circuits A &.B -750,'-746, routed in.the same wire burdle. The -749 ' non-lE circuits terminate on non-lE
' terminal- block TB3. .(Reference Wiring Analysis NDB9-1, Item 1) - .24 Device D contains two terminal blocks. MCB- EC-210-502 'Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum iYellow and gray. wires are.-terminated HV SECTION J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller-on adjacent points. (Reference Case 4, Dated February 19, 1975 ESSE-CB & RR)
L
- Gilbert /Cw n. .va. ealth. Inc. --- Fege No. 6
Attachment 1 5:paration Criteria Exctptions No, Case or ExceDtion EauiDment Dwa. Nos. Analysis No. 1.D. 25 1. Fuses DL1, DL2, DL3, DL4, DL5, DL6, RR1 EC-210-388 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum by DL7 and DL8 have brown and orange, and EC-210-392 V.H. Willems Dated' March gray and orange wires terminated less 20, 1973. than 6" apart. In some cases, these Similar wires are jumpered on the same exceptions on terminal -point . (Reference GAI Dwg. Memorandum from V. H. Willems dated EC-210-411, Mar:h 20, 1973). 421, 422, 441,
- 2. fures DM1, DM2, DM3, DM4, DMS and 446, 457, 462
^~.o have brown and gray wires terminated less than 6" apart. In some cases, these wires are jumpered on the same terminal point. (Ref. GAI Memo from V. H. Willems dated March 20,1973). Similar to this exception is shown on various drawings.
26 Various separation violations exist VARIOUS VARIOUS Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum by between associated wiring and non-lE V.H. Willems Dated March wiring (Reference GAI Memorandum from 20, 1973. V. H. Willems dated March 20,.1973). 27 DEVICES JY AND JZ ARE CONTROL SWITCHES MCB 210-104 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum IN THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY AUXILIARY PSA J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller SECTION OF THE MCB. TiiE ORANGE, Dated July 11, 1975. BROWN, AND GRAY WIRES TERMINATED ON THE SWITCHES ARE LESS THAN 6" APART (REFERENCE CASES 29 & 30, ESSE-CB & RR). 28 Device AG is a lockout relay with red SSTR EC-210-328 Ref. G/C Inc. Memorandum and gray wires terminated less than 6 J.B. Haneiko/R.E. Miller inches apart. (Reference Case 2, Calc Dated April 15, 1975 E91-001, Table C) Analyzing Similar Existing Exception.
- Gilbert / Commonwealth. Inc. - Page No. 7
ATTACHMENT 2 l ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA, ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT PHYSICAL : SEPARATION AND CABLE TRAY LOADING SEPARATION CRITERIA EXCEPTIONS EVALUATION FORM l MAR No. Other initiating document The following guidance criteria is to be used when evaluating potential i deviations or exceptions to this document. This attachment should only be used when all possible methods of complying with the criteria have been exhausted. The first 3 questions are asked to insure that an alternative has not been ' missed. . Is the proposed exception due to a situation where ALARA, industrial safety or other reason makes the exception the best choice? Describe all that . apply below. t Have all the different alternatives provided in the criteria been explored? Consider the use of Siltemp and other barriers available, and generic exceptions such as low energy circuits (annunciator, etc.). O Yes D No a Based on the above questions, is the exception due to a situation where it i is physically impossible to install in accordance to this criteria? , D Yes D No . Document the location of the proposed exception. Building / Elevation / Room Panel # Relay Rack # Tray (s) #
- Description of the exception, include physical arrangement;
L i 1 2 . The exception occurs between which safety channel: , Identify the first " GROUP" of Conductor (s), Cable (s) Device (s) in the . exception. Safety channel (A, B, AB) or associated (XA, XB, XAB) or non IE (XX) Nominal circuit voltage Energy level, (Power (P), Control (C), or Instrumentation (1). Other Describe The above is an exception with: Conductor (s), Cable (s) Device (s) in violation. , Safety channel (A, B, AB) or ' associated (XA, XB, XAB) or [ non IE (XX) , Nominal circuit voltage ; Energy level, (Power (P), Control (C), or !' Instrumentation (1). Other Describe , a Provide the maximum credible voltage or current transient; I Volts or Amps Note: The maximum credible voltage is the highest circuit voltage available among the cables involved in the request for exception. The . current transient is the highest normal current interruption setting of the l secondary protective devices for the cables involved in the request for exception.
- Flame retardant characteristics of the installation, including insulation and jacket material; Cable Cable Group 1 Group 2 Type of cable insulation:
Type of jacket insulation: i
- Applicable drawing (s) for this exception (Layout (201), connection (210), elementary (209), etc.) . Type of protection in the circuit; D Fuses protection D Breaker protection D Isolators D Other Describe . Are the circuits involved mutually redundant? Mutual equipment or systems counterparts (i.e., HPI pump A motor and HPI pump B motor and motor controls.) must maintain separation per criteria. Non-redundant equipment may be analyzed as long as a fault in one train cannot disable the same equipment / system in another train. Document the drawing and or method used to verify the system functions are not mutually redundant.
- Circuit power suoplies (source of energy) must be analyzed such that redundant equipment is not disabled. Document the drawing and or method used to verify the source (s) are not mutually redundant.
Are the circuits redundant based on question and above? O Yes D ho (answer must be N0 for a valid exception)
- Summary Analysis of why this exception is acceptable (attach separate sheet if required.
l I-
- Document the method used to incorporate this exception into the _FPC ;
documentation system. The documentation must cover the revision of i connection drawings to i& ntify the exception and the. engineering l document (s) that Justify this exception. Drawing revised via MAR, FCN or DCN, identify document type and number: { l Engineering justification documented via MAR (SE & DIR), or other ! engineering document, identify document type and number: l l Originator: / i Name / Date ; Approved: /. _. ; Supervisor of Nuclear Engr. (Electrical) / Date l. l i i i f i i i i
-[
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ELECTRICAL DEPARTME'" ELECTRICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ELECTRICAL CIRCUlT PHYSICAL SEPARATION sevision 2 t
.l i
I AND CABLE TRAY LOADING Date 4/13/93 I
?
i Supporting Documents for Attachment 1 l r t e f f i r i I i
,i I
-6 Y- e.,,
I l
, anemorandum g siibert/ Commonwealth ,
August 18, 1976 4
.' to: R. E. Miller - GIII SIN '
4 trtsn: J. B. Haneiko c V.. ! subget: Engineered Safeguard Separation Exception
- Control Boards & Relay Racks - Case 39 ,
- ECN 3421 Crystal River Unit No. 3 -$$.fNNN-h)$(eb.'
gMM5#s4fMM. ' . The condition described in your ce=o of August 16, 1976, j has been reviewed and found acceptable as shown. No single
. failure will prevent the operation of redundant E.S. equip-cent or negate the operation of more than one E.S. power i i
(%. supply. p i
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/JohnB.Haneiko Project Instrunent Engineer f JBH:dre ,
cc: E. R. Hottenstein (2)
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;, to: R. E. MILLER - 3E March.1, 1976 3.[ ,. 'M* J. B. Haneiko
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9,* su$iect: .ENCliiEE'N ED SAFEGUARD SEPARATIONS EXCEPTIONS
. r. " CONTROL BOARDS & RELAY RACKS - CASE 38 .
ECN 2924A ..~
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- m~ . . . . .-w CRYSTAL--RIVER UNIT NO. 3 l
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In response to your memo of February 26,.1976, the following exception to the l
.T S. separation criteria has been reviewed. s i
t 7 ! CASE 38: -EC-210-601,' TB8-29-30 - . . 2 DESCRIPTION: Non E. S. circuit routed in red tray terminates on non E. S. .
- terminal board (gray). Although there is no color violation !
~ vithin the control board, this is essentially the'same case
-- as a brown and gray wire not having the required 6" separation.. j The case as you describe it is acceptable by definition, since l
CONCLUSION _: ; it is not a violation of the E. S. control board criteria. Nowhere in the criteria does it state that gray cannot mix , with brown or orange. Furthermore, you have stated that this i
..I
- gray wire does not mix with orange or Creen anywhere'in RR3.
- Therefore, no possible violation exists.
Ple'ase-~notei that"the-38 cases Teviewed to date do not all constitute violations. > Several, such as cases 37 and 38, do not violate the basic criteria but were written up since possible confusion could otherwise result. The "ESX" notation
- should still be put on the drawing at.the appropriate place. The "ESX" on !
drawings indicates (a) there is no violation although it may appear to be one,
. or (b) there is a violation and it has been reviewed and found to be acceptable, j i
('c l /J.2 d d l. ; JBH:ces John B. llanciko xc: E. R. Hottenstein (2) . J. B. Haneiko (2) 1 J' l (# {, t I
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'I 22' - E950Pandum c(m Gilberdssociates, Mc.
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comnawua i q h- : Q%"** } I i, to: R. E. Miller
. from: J. B. Haneiko ,
. b subject: Engineered Safeguard Separation Exceptions .
Control Boards and Relay Racks - Case 37 l CAI Field Change 76-668 February 5, 1976 iT;Qd{ fishi.f;jf$ Crystal River Unit No. 3 - !
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- s
.;' i The following apparent exception to the standard CR3 separation procedure was reviewed... . _ . . . .
5 :
. Case"37: EC-210-501, ~dev' ices'AB3 and AC3
~
Descriotion: Orange and brown wires exist on the sane control' switch on the HV section of the main control board. This does not show up as a. violation on the appropriate elenentaries (B-208-077, _
.t sheets CI-18 and Cl-19) since they are part of two -alarm circuits.
C'.J. . There is no E.S. violation of any sort in this case. The power i Conclusion _:
..A. source involved is the events recorder source. The circuits !
involved, CIK-21, 22, 23 and 24, are all alarm circuits and - l therefore are not even covered by the separation criteria. :
- However, this memo is presented as justification for the apparent ;
', :. , --. .-.-violation on HV section of the control board, since the sires - -.
~'
are not identified there as being part of an alarm circuit. ci 0 ff . John B. Haneiko t JBH:vjk xc: E. R. Hottenstein (2) J. B. Ihneiko (2)
)
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Gilbert / Commonwealth l r% 1110m0Pandum - . I to: .R. E. MILLER - 3E February 5, 1976 { from: J. B. Haneiko . subie:t: ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SEPARATION EXCEPTIONS CONTROL BOARDS AND RELAY RACKS - CASE 36 GAI FIELD CHANGE 75-662 , p g' qpy,Wy,pyupCKYSTAL . RIVER UNIT NO. 3 e g~.w w ..< -- An exception to the standard CR3 separation procedure was reviewed in relation
- to the field change on MUV-64. s
- CASE 36: B-208-028, sheet ES-AB07 ,
B-208-041, sheet !G 55 EC-210-144, TB 46-23 DESCRIPTION: Crange and gray wire exist on the same terminal because they
" must be tied together. The normal power feed is from VBDP-3, j BKR. #7 (120 VAC) through a transfor=er to 28 volts. However, it may alsq be fed from VBDP-4, BKR. i7, since this is an AB ' l
- f. -
bus.. -i L' '
.i CONCLUSION: These are 28 volt indicating light circuits, and do not affect i any safety related equipment. Identical. exceptions were pre-
- viously reviewed in case 34 and case 4 See memo for case 4 l
- dated February 19, 1975 for further discussion. l
"' Please note that fuse "BZ" also added on this field change on drawing IC-210-
,157 does not require an "ESX" notation on the drawing although the wire color. !
changes from orange. to gray through the fuse. This case is'not an exception
- to the standard separation criteria report since an even more stringent case !
is covered on page 1 of the report under section 3A: "The AB actuation must ! be kept separate from the A & B channels and trains except at the point of origin where reasonable isolation is required." Drawing ES-AB07 is a point 1 i
** of origin where the A and B power sources may both be used, and consequently apparent violations vill appear on this drawing by. definition. No further l reviews of apparent exceptions to the separation criteria will be required l on drawing B-208-028, sheet ES-AB07.
'l *I"j n ,ji M(:.c +
JBU:eas I xc: E. R. Hottenstein (2) / JOHN B. HANEIKO J. B. Haneiko
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February 2, 1976 to: R. E. MILLER - 3E
- frm: J. B. Haneiko ;
subie:t ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SEPARATION EXCEPTIONS CONTROL BOARDS AND RELAY RACKS - CASE 35 . GAI FIELD CHANGE 76-667 - l 3 jiv e . .i. ..vh.
. .a. .M.y: t.e4Wi..,,
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO.. . - n.?fkbybBQL:4CU.<O.}bt; pay:,9 s !
# An exception to the standard CR3 separation procedure was dis-cussed with T. V. Garbini today relating to GAI FCN 76-667. [
The items affected are as follows. ;
)
I B-208-039, sheets MS-18 and MS-19 CASE 35: *
-EC-210-597, items AK, AM, AF, AR EC-210-600, TB16-19 through TB 16-30 s
DESCRIPTION : ~ (.9. ~ - Orange and gray wire exist on the same relay and . l
~
opposite each other on the same terminal board, f The power feed is 125VDC from DPDP-8B, an engineered j safeguards power source. CONCLUSION _:
.- These exceptions to the CR3 separation criteria are
- acceptable since no single failure, such as a. random i ground, open circuit or short circuit, will negate the :
operation of more than one E. S. power supply. In '
.. fact, no single electrical failure will negate the proper operation of the main steam isolation valves, !
- which are the pieces'of equipment directly relating to these exceptions. -
& L . M L .:A
^
JBH: ems JOHN B. HANEIKO .; xc: E. R. .Hottenstein (2) - J. B. Haneiko (2) l
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O lIl2))]QP8))d!,!!)) ( [3 Gilbert Associates, Inc. w - h .a _( ~ , ( ) September 24, 1975 L3: R. E. MILLER - 3E . trem: .7. 3. Haaeiko
's tie:t: ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SEPARATION EXCEPTIONS CONTROL E0ARDS AND RELAY RACKS - CASE 34 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 b: .Wih w 7
.-3.c.M.:;C9e, .c~e .?:,Z:"
;. im..-"~4.
!.27Ed .h.'inother exception to the standard CR3 separation procedures was discussed .
,vith T. V. Carbini today relating to ECN 24R8 and its "A" revision.
The
- items affected are as follows:
CASE 34: B-208-028, sheet ES-A307 (Ita= CZ)
.- EC-210-157
- This exception has been reviewed and it does not ce= promise the. saf e functioning of any safety-related equipment. The same explanation given for In E. S.. exception case 4(reference 2/19/75 memo to you) applies here also.
addition, low voltage signal levels (28 volts) are involved. ECN 2428 vill C '.,J therefore be approved as it is. ht N -
~.~ g, JOHN 3.HISEIKO
'- ~~~
JEH: ems
., cc: E. R. Hottenstein (2)
J. B. Haneiko (2) e , e 4 e
'e
L
' WEm0Pandum Gilbert Associates,Inc.
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twr=s j Septenber 10, 1975
~
to: R. E. MILLER - 3E e ' frorn: J. B. Haneiko
". subject:
ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SEPARATION EXCEPTIONS CONTROL BOARDS AND RELAY RACKS - CASE 32 CAI FIELD CHANGE 75-642
.. . . . ' . . ' . . CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3
^
~~'
b i .
Two exceptions to the standard CR3 separation procedure were discussed with
#T. V. Carbini today relating to the following drawings:
CASE 32: IC-210-081, item ED3 (ICS) B-206-047, sheet RC-05
- CASE 33: IC-210-089, item JC11 (ICS) .
B-208-032, sheet FtJ-38 Both cases involve an orange wire less than the required physical distance from brown and gray wires. Both of these cases have been reviewed and are acceptable (% from a separation standpoint. These are low voltage circuits (24 volts) fed ^ from a non-safety related power source (ACDP-51, breaker 25). No system fault
, in these indicat'.ng lights vould violate the integrity of any E. S. power source.
p
. ., ,s .
*- .n e M : ems /JOICI B. HANEIKO cc: E. R. Hottenstein (2)
I -
~
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C M 11*1114
MEMORANDUM ' F. - 1
/ CI L B E R T A SS O CI A T ES. I NC L -l t To: ' R. E. Miller [
news J. B. Haneiko July 11, 1975 l suan cT: Engineered Safeguard Separation Exceptions Control Boards and Relay Racks - Cases 12 Through 30 . GAI Field Change 74-550 (Feedwater Backfic). i
;- c ,. . . . . %
IMYh ;V.S .%TIIjT. Crystal River Unit No. 3 - s
.f'$?lfb?lk$5.$:$?~.'.. : .. - . ..
s The following E.S. exceptiens resulted from preparation of CAI field change 74-550, and results of the review together with all affected drawings are listed below. H. M. Snyder reviewed the exceptions with me on July 9 and 10. .
- Elementary Circuit No. .
1 WC151 EC-210-620, 623, 625 . Case 12 W-11 Relay Rack items AA, ,Z, L, M l ) f, WC153 EC-210-622, 627, 629 Case 13 W-12 - Relay Rack items N. AB, AC, P. . %* 'd ' EC-210-620, 623, 625 Case 14 W-13 WC155 RR items AA, M, Z, L WC157 EC-210-622, 627, 629
~
. Case 15 W-14 RR items AB, AC, P N WC159 EC-210-620, 622, 625, 627, 629 Case 16 W-19 RR items AA, AB, M, N Z, L AC P WC161 EC-210-620, 625, 629
, Case 17 W-22 RR items AA, M, Z, L e
WC163 EC-210-622, 625, 627 ; Case 18 W-23 RR items AB, AC, N, P WE141 EC-210-620, 623, 625 . Case 19 W-28 RR items AA, M, Z, L WE143 EC-210-622, 627, 629 Case 20 W-29 RR items AB, AC, N, ? WE145 EC-210-620, 623, 625 Case 21 W-30 RR items AA, M, Z, L WE147 EC-210-622, 627, 629 Case 22 W-31 RR items P, N. AC, AB WE149 EC-210-620, 625, 629 Case 23 W-49 RR ite=s AA, M. Z, L WE151 EC-210-622, 623, 625 Case 24 W-50 RR items AB, N, AC, P
/
a.- , c...w I
i i ?:,. <O July 11, 1975 R. E. Miller DEN ' d,,b - Circuit No. Elementary
- EC-210-589 -
Case 25 W-19 RR item AS t
- EC-210-397 Case 26 W-22 RR items AJ, AK
' - EC-210-397
' - Case 27 W-23 RR items AJ, AK
- EC-210-094 Case 28 (Terminal block jumpers)
- EC-210-106 Case 29 W-47 RR items JY, JZ
.,..w._. EC-210-106
, g A- g s o:+ . - J-M;;W-48 n-44 g Ztase 30
- b. . 6;. L.:. . cre . J.-l , q t- n .-
RR ite=s JY, JZ cases 25, 29, and 30 involve separation "A" violations between cable tray versusseparate relay-viring from-contacts whose viring originates in an ES There is electrical separation (isolation) between the an ES "B" tray. This has been orange and brown vires, but not 6" physical separation.All other cases] (12-24 an reviewed and is acceptable. d . violations between nossafeguard vires in non E.S. tray and non,safeguar c vires in E.S. tray (one channel only). Each of these has also been reviewed on a case by case basis, utilizing all affected drawings which utilizing No violations of E.S. system integrity exist, are listed above.
. C';.- review methods discussed 'in previous E.S. e:cteption memorandums. f
. tk w- --
. ! ohn J B. Haneiko JBH:in cc: E. R. Hottenstein (2) '
.- R. P. Cronk ;
J. B. Haneiko (2) ,
- e e .
e e
. l f
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g.. s .,y MEMORANDUM , i
- r C I L D E R T A S S O CI A T E S, I N C. l i A' April 15, 1975 i
..;~- i
. " Toi R. E. MILLER E i,
= ' ' - rnous- J. B. Haneiko I sussect: ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SEPARATION EXCEPTICNS CONTROL BOARDS 7
RACES - CASE 11
.i- M M Ny S 3p'g6 /. CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 Were q:e.u .
YfiMM;as, . ..Ein $irpense to your me=o of Apr1115,197'S regarding another exception to
, the E. S. separation criteria, the following justification is offered: l Case 11: Reference GAI INgs. EC-210-332, EC-229-107, and B-208-040, ./ -
sheets MI-09 and Mi-10. Lockout relay E6BU/PL4(item R on MISC /SSTR board) is the item in question, and the question ! resulted b % ause of CAI field change 75-555. The conclusion of my review is that the condition described (red and green wires on relay item "R") is acceptable, because it reflects ' the design intent and does not impair safety.
.: This relay cus't interlock into both the 4160 volt E. S. "A" bus and the 4160 volt E. S. "B" bus, because both busses are
.n ,
fed from the 230 kv substation and both must be tripped if a - fault occurs at the substation. This is a similar situation to that existing for the CR3 startup transformer. Such a trip does not negate operation of E. S. equipment because of the backup provided by the diesel generators, {:, > l
'I A short circuit on relay 863U/PL4 could cause a false trip '
/, .: .
' of the 4160V E. S. busses. An open circuit could prevent a trip, but then there is still backup relay protection to initiate it. A spurious ground anywhere in this circuitry s-vould be protected by the overcurrent relays. All ofand these so the conditions are acceptable from a safety standpoint, !
' - E. S. exception described is acceptable as it is. ,
.m .,.
JOHN B. HANEIKO JBH: ems cc: E. R. Hottenstein (2) R. P. Cronk : M. A. Cerhard M. E. Ober l J. B. Haneiko (2)
.k... " .
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MEMORANDUM c i t. n E n T A S S O C I A T t S, I N C. ./~1
\~ .
February 19, 1975 To R. E. MII1ER - 3 7 raom J. B. Haneiko
, susxcri ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SEPARATION EXCEPTIONS GAI FIELD CEANGE 74-513 .
t CRfSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 . $$. .. .EY . 4%'y/ M'" t ?lh!5@S*$.,i~ c' Exceptions to standard CR3 , .separation
. procedures were discussed with T.
'Carbini on February 18 relating to the foilowing ele =entary and viring
?r- s O drawings:-
Elenentarv Wirine Drawinc , c c ._-
' 1 .! - Case 1 /R-131 EC-210-401 7- Case 2 12-20 EC-210-492 Case 3 AH-48 EC-210-495 ,
Case 4 AH-90 EC-210-502
- Case 5 AH-131 EC-210-514 ,
Case 6 AH-15 EC-210-520
)-
. All six (6) exceptions to normal separation criteria are acceptable as
. they are without barriers, since they do not conpromise the safe functioning of any safety related equipment or power sources. Case 4 is unique in that
^
it is a non-safeguard device receiving power fron an ES(AB) power source, J. but this is not a concern because of the =anual transfer feature of this
, bus. A fault which occurs when the manual transfer switch is fed frcm the "A" bus vill not be transferred to the "B" bus. It was verified with the 4- -
electrical engineering depart =ent that the for=erly naned AEC had accepted
,;., e the scheme of non-safety devices powered fron this safety grade bus without
- w. . circuit isolation at this icw voltage level.
L* .
. " . .G: .
~
0 / Y - e- ; JEH:c=s J011N B.11ANE1F0 cc: E. R. Hottenstein (2) R. P. Cronk J.' B. Haneika (2) i Q1 . l l l c * = 5s ci-
i T
^ _s 3
MEMORANDUM ! 5 s ~' G I L B E R T A S S O C I A T E S. I N C.
^
t
'i To:
Mr. R. E. Miller - LA-3'J
- rnous J. B. Haneiko i susstet: Engineered Safeguard Separation Exceptions !
Control Boards & Relay Racks - Case SA June 11,1975
<..'- - - Crystal River Unit No. 3 ;
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* ' In response to your memorandun of May 28, 1975, regarding the change to
, . previously reviewed exception #5, this revised exception will be designated -
as case SA. Conclusions are as follows: t
. Case SA:
The drawings affected are the same as those discussed for case 5 i
- (See February 19,1975 nemo) . The exception for case SA is not significantly different from case 5 and is thereford also ;
acceptable from a safety standpoint. C.' .~. ' .
~
(* ll _ }l.,,, '
. ohn B. Haneiko r r
i t
'. JBH:pam
. ec: E. R. Hottenstein (2)
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enseFe associetes, inc. r_. memorandunM- c~ \ k ) April 4, 1975 ta: R. E . MILLER'- 3E hom:. J. B. Haneiko
. subject: ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SEPARATION EXCEPTIONS CONTROL BOARDS & RELAY RACKS - CASE 10 .
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NNNf .-e. .wrm . , m,- 31~, 1975 regarding another ex-
- c+sg.pkNM:Eh!%
,ception to the E. S.
swr,%.6.r* *.c W IIn responsecto you
. cation is offered:
The Case 10 : Reference GAI Dwgs. EC-210-586 and EC-210-587. circuit numbers involved with this_ separationThe ex-ception are VBF27, VBF28, VBF29, . and VBF30. conclusion of my review is that the condition de- ' scribed in your memo is acceptable.
- A single failure analysis was performed.to see if any of the f~ollowing conditions would endanger two- .C 5 - . ,
(2) E. S. power-sources simultaneously: .
- 1) random short circuit
- 2) randem open circuit 3 )- random system ground
~ It was determined that none of the system faults in-vestigated would violate The the integrity existing of more than situation is
' - - one E. S. power source.
therefore acceptable from a safety standpoint.
.- / .d ~
./ John ' B. Hanciko
~
-JBH: ems cc: E. R. Hottenstein (2)
R. P. Cronk J. B. Haneiko (2) C AS.3s.821e
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17 ,[ MEMORANDUM
. .x . ;. .
C I L D E n T A S S O C I A T E S. I N C.
'Q.'
March 20, 1973 .
- To MR. T. C. PIITZ
'-raca V. H. Willems
.susJccT FLORIDA 70WER CORFORATION Crystal River 3
~
Exceptions to the Control Boards Scoaration Criteria ! i f. !'i
:'n'cy:The exceptions to the separation criteria, as marked up on the attached -
. T elementaries, vere reviewed for their acccatability.
~
_'A portion of the circuits indicated as possible exceptions have been t f identified as 'NON-ES circuits whcrc parts of the circuits were run in
~
E. .S. . trays..and the balance .in NON-ES trays. -.The 1:0N-ES cabics run in
', ES trays are color coded, brown, orange or black, in accordance with the separation criteria report, while the cable run in NON-ES trays are gray color resulting, at the ter=inals whera they scet, in exception to
- the criteria. . . _ , ..
. . at
.W The balance of the circuits indicated as exceptions are power feed
. _to E. S.. actuation relays cabinets and therefore E. S. circuits. Pouer
. - to the E. S. cabincts is obtained frc= the 4 inverters. The cabics associated with the inverters are color coded red, green, yellow and blue. While .
. the viring in the actuation cabinets is cither red (A train) or grnen (B train).
- -- The viring associated with' cach ' inverter is kept se'parated from each other within each7f th'e'ETS7actuatTon cab'iniit ~therefore separation between
~
redundant function is preserved. .
~
The results of the review indicates thatofno/. the circuits failure referenced above negates the separation of E. S. circuitry and are acceptabic as they . arc. .
. i / .
f) !,/ . C* ek. . Attachment VHU:c=s V. II. UILL12IS cc: W. J. Kcrchner(v/o enc) G. K. Ucury (w/o ene) R. E. Miller (w/o enc) 4 L./ - 4 l i l C A 8. P. g.
-~
eg, i
'd.1 ' LIST OF ELD:E: CARIES REVIE*.!ED w .
**s, REVISIO:; ELDiccARY REVISIO?i
. . ELDitCARY .
0 CT-09 3 Tk'-33 CD-02 6
. Im-34 2 1
1m-35 2 TE-21 RC-25 1 .
, }m-47 2 ES-A63 0
*. Im-52 .1 ' ,
l
. SW-07 0 ES-E22
- O * -
~
0 ES-B21
- 0 .
SW-28 TD-01 3 ES-337-* O , ESJB36
- O -
. '- Dil-24 3 ,
3 $ @ h g p - u rs .. SU-08 0 . ES-346
- O ES-B45
- 0
- 3 1!S-12 1 -
1,%q-e7@-//y .. .'pIh yg_44 A?"~.:. ftN : 2-ES-363 0 - y .MU-43 2
' ES-A22
- O
~
. . . 13 -01 . 3 ES-A21
- O
- - .~ --
SC-07 2_ ES-A37
- IS-A46 *
*O O
., --1m-3 3 . -- ..--- *2 ES-A45
- O 6'* ,
1 ES-AE05 0
. CF-07 * '
. - CI-23 '. 1 - ES-AE07 O CD-07 6-
. SR-06 0
(.' - _
. Elementeries with an asterisk (*) have E.S. circuits
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ACCELERATED DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM g' REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) (ACCESSION NBR:9305170235 DOC.DATE: 93/05/06 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET # FACIL:50-302 Crystal River Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power Co 05000302 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BEARD,P.M. Florida Power Corp. RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION p Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forwards Rev 2 to " Electrical Design Criteria Electrical I Circuit Physical Separation & Cable Tray Loading," per 921117 meeting w/NRC,util design control program & util C commitment to ANSI N.45.2.11. DISTRIBUTION CODE: A001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: OR Submittal: General Distribution ENCL SIZE: /b
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NOTES: A RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE /NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE /NAME LTTR ENCL g PD2-2 LA 1 1 PD2-2 PD 1 1 SILVER,H 2 2 E INTERNAL: ACRS 6 6 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/ DORS /OTSB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 S NRR/DSSA/SCSB 3 0 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 ' NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 OC/LFMB 1 0 OGC/HDS1 1 0 REG FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 R 1 E S
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p L L NOTE TO ALL ' RIDS
- RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, I ROOM Pl 37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED! TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 22 ENCL 19}}