ML20043B674

LER 90-008-01:on 900209,latching Mechanism for Door Entering Containment Encl Bldg Failed,Rendering Air Cleanup Sys Incapable of Producing Negative Pressure.Latching Mechanism Repaired & Mods to Doors/Hardware planned.W/900523 Ltr

ML20043B674
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/23/1990
From:	Belanger R, Feigenbaum T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-008, LER-90-8, NYN-90114, NUDOCS 9005310108
Download: ML20043B674 (5)

Text

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.New Hampshire ,a c. e. _ . -

L Senior Vice President and 3

Chief Operating Officer NYN-90114 May 23, 1990 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-Attention: Document Control Desk

References:

(a) Facility Operating License No. NPF-67, Docket No. 50-443 (b) Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 Docket No. 50-443 (c) N!!Y Letter NYN-90063 dated March 18, 1990, ' Licensee Event Report (LER) No.90-008 00: Initiation of Plant Shutdown due to' Loss of Both Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems', 7. C. Feigenbaum to USNRC

Subject:

Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-006-01: Initiation of Plant Shutdown due to Loss of Both Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems Gentlemen Enclosed please tind Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-006-01 for Seabrook Station. This nubmittal supplements LER 90 008-00 which documents an event which was identified on February 9,1990, and was reported pursuant to 10CPR50.73(a)(2)(1).

Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Richard R. Belanger at (603) 474-9521, extension 4048.

Sincerely yours, fdM Ted C. Feigenbaum TCF/RRBidma Enclosures NRC Forms 366, 366A fh khCI [

New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire P.O. Box 300

• Seabrook, NH 03874

• Telephone (603) 474 9521

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.esinACT ev at r, oa w...u . .na..~rerv om... no. om em.mr . ><... o si On February 9, 1990, at 8:47 am EST. the latching mechanism for a door entering the Containment Enclosure Building failed, rendering the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System incapable of producing the negative pressure required by Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.lb.2d.4.

Therefore, both trains of the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System were determined to be inoperable and a plant cor'down was initiated at 9:00 am.

The latching mechanism for the door was repaired and ti door was returned to service at 9:26 am, restoring compliance with Technical Specification 3.6.5.1.

The root cause of the noncompliance with Technical Specifications is the failure of the door latching mechanism. This door opens into the Enclosure -

Building from the Main Steam and Feedwater West Pipe Chase, therefore the differential pressure between these areas creates an opening force on the door. This force, combined with normal wear, resulted in the failure of the latching mechanism.

There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The l Anoperability of the Containment Enclosure Air Cleanup Systems did not i adversely affect the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel.

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,. nrne - . we am..nm On February 9, 1990, at 8:47 am EST, the latching mechanism for a door ,'

entering the Containment Enclosure Building failed, rendering the door incapable of being maintained closed. With this door. inoperable, the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System was not capable of producing a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.25 inch water '

gauge within the containment enclosure annulus as. required by Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.lb.2d.4. Therefore, both trains of the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System were determined to be inoperable.

Seabrook Station Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 requires that two Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems be OPERABLE in HODEs 1, 2, 3 and 4. The ACTION associated with this specification does not address the condition of both systems being inoperable, therefore, a plant cooldown in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.0.3 was initiated at 9:00 am.

ROOT CAUSE The root cause of the noncompliance with Technical Specifications is the failure of the door latching mechanism. This door opens into the Enclosure .

Building from the Main Steam and Feedwater West Pipe Chase, therefore the differential pressure between these areas creates an opening force on the door. This force, combined with normal wear, resulted in the failure of the latching mechanism.

CORRECTIVE ACTION The latching mechanism for the door was repaired and the door was returned to service at 9:26 am, restoring compliance with Technical Specification 3.6.5.1. The plant cooldown was terminated at this time. Revisions to Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 to provide an ACTION requirement addressing

, the inoperability of two Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems due to the lack of enclosure building integrity are being evaluated.

l A total of five doors (EF-102 EF-207. P-415. P-902, and EM-409) exist which ,

open into the Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area (CEVA), resulting in undue stress on the latching mechanism. The potential for the premature failure of the latching mechanisms for these five doors had been previously recognized by New Hampshire Yankee. To correct this concern, modifications to the doors and latching hardware are planned. A Design Coordination Report was initiated to modify these doors such that the door swing would be out of the CEVA, thereby removing the excess force on the latching mechanism.

Additionally, a potential modification to the latching mechanism for the CEVA doors is being evaluated. This potential modification is currently installed as a temporary modification on a different door, in order to allow evaluation of the latching mechanism without potential Technical Specification impact.

This modification consists of a different type of lockset utilizing a deeper, electrically activated strike which will increase the reliability of the latching mechanisms. This evaluation is anticipated to be completed by September 30, 1990.

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0l1 0l3 0F 0 l3 vari, . nao-amamm SAFETY CONSEOUENCES There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems function to ensure that, during LOCA-conditions, leakage into the annulus is filtered through HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to release to ensure that site boundary radiation doses remain with the limits of 10 CFR 100. At the time of this event, the unit had been. shutdown since June 22, 1989, following a total of j 19.2 effective full power minutes of operation. Therefore, the inoperability of the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel.

This is the first event of this type at Seabrook Station.

At the time of this event, Seabrook Station was in MODE 4 with the Reactor Coolant System [AB) at 333 degrees Fahrenheit and pressurized to 925 psig.

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