ML20043B355

LER 90-013-00:on 900419,discovered That Containment Personnel Hatch Unsecured for Approx 28 H.Caused by Installation of Locking Plate Upside Down & Placing Lock Through Only 1 Eyelet.Instructions posted.W/900521 Ltr

ML20043B355
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/21/1990
From:	Belanger R, Feigenbaum T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-013, LER-90-13, NYN-90112, NUDOCS 9005290177
Download: ML20043B355 (5)

Text

__ . - - _ . . . . - . . - . . . _ , - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , . . . , , . . . , .

g< .~

= Nsw H, ampshire Ted C. Feigenbaum '

1- - Senior Vice President and -

q  :

s.-

_ - - - - ' Chief Operating Officer ,

s

i >

NYN-90112 i

May 21, 1990-United States-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attentions Document Control Desk

Reference:

-(a)

Facility Operating License NPF-86 Docket No. 50-443

Subject:

Licensee Event Report (LER) No.90-013 00: Noncompliance.with Technical' Specifications - Unsecured High Radiation Area s

Gentlemen Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-013-00 for Seabrook Station. This submittal documents an event which occurred on April 19, 1990, and;.is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Richard R.-Belanger at (603) 474-9521, extension 4048.

Very truly yours,

[g G Ted C. Feigenbaum-

Enclosures:

NRC Forms 366, 366A 5 ,

y 9005290177 900521 PDR n

ADOCK 03000443 S PDC 3

$/

New Hampshire Yonkee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire ,

P.O. Box 300

• Seabrook, NH 03874

• Telephone (603) 474 9521 i

c -a .

.n 6.

^  ; *,- '

g 7, . . j l

United States Nuclear, Regulatory Comission. ,

May 21,'1990

= Attention: ' Document Control Desk: Page two- q i

>;=

3

. cci Mr. Thomes.T. Martin  !

C1 . Regional' Administrator .

I c

United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission D Region-I l M(/

475 Allendale' Road i.' King'of Prussia,'PA 19406

~

[' _

1 Mr. Noel Dudley NRC Senior Resident Inspector

'P.O. Box 1149 l Seabrook, NH' 03874 G <

INPO

b. Records Center y

1100 Circle 75 Parkway ,

JAtlanta, GA 30339.

t b: 7

. i ? .'

l I

s i-i r

i k

1' l'  ;

1 l

t

_ . . . _ _ . . __..___._____._._.____i.___________.m.__

.- m ,

t*

NRC Perm 306. U.S. NUCLE A5 RE;ULC TORY COMMi$$40N 19431.

A7 PROVED OMS N131000104 y' 3. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) milt *1'*'o f ACILITY NAME tu DOCKET NUM9tR (2) PAGE (3, Seabrook Station- o 15 l 0 lo l 0141413 1!OFl013 r TITLE 14l Noncompliance'with Technical Specification - Unsecured High Radiation Area

. EVENT DATE tli LER NUMetR (6) REPORT DATE (7i OTHER F ACILITit$ INVOLVED 14)

MONTH DAY YEAf; YEAR -

88,0

, s 7,*,Q MONTH OAV YEAR F ACI(37Y NAMas DOCKET NUMBERill 015l0toI0l l=l

~

0l4 1l9 9 0 '9l0 0l 1l3 0l0 0l5 2l1 9l0 0'j510 1 0 1 0 1 I l

, ,,,,,,,,, THis REPORT is susMiTTto rVRauANT To THE RE0uiREMENT: 0, i0 C,R i: <C . ., ..,. .< ,a. i. , r ,i sin MODE 19) 20.406tel

$ 20 4021t4 60.73(ent210v) T3.7)(61 20.40si. Hum 30x.Hu so.tu.ius.i ts.ru.i 110) ' 01019 80.405hH1Ha 5m*H2) 50.73wu2Hviii OTHE R r3ae<'*r ,a e*>

60,73all2H3)

~

bet.w and m Test. form MFC'r***

s ,s .

20.406(sit 1 Hell) 1 _

50,73 aH2HMHAl Jd6AJ ge . , , . 20 40swHuw so.72winHa so.) wluHetsi sp fg ss sh ' 20.406teH1Hv) 50.72(aH2H3411 60.73(all2HH LICENSEE CONTACT POR THl$ LIR 112)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER -

Richard R. Belanger, Lead Engineer - Compliance, Extension 4048 ^ " ' ' ' '

61013 41 714 1-19 15 1211 COMPLETE ONE LINT FOR E ACH COMPONENT F AILURE DISchistD IN THIS REPORT (13)

1. " MAN CAUSE SYSTE M COMPONENT T O NPR $ CAU$t $YSTEM COMPCNENT C- REPORTA E p

g s

s s . r i s

' ss s -:w N

' ' 's#

l t l l l l l s I -l l l l -l l 30i s ]j l l l l l l l l l l l l l-l M' SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT EXPtCTED tidi MONTH CAY YEAR

. $Usuis310N YE$ ili yes. semplere EXPECTEO SV8 MISSION DA TEl ko '

l l l-i- a:TRACTe m er.,m o u u. . ,.., ,,,,,, .-,. . orv - ,re.. u..iiisi On April 19, 1990, at 5:18 p.m. EDT, it was discovered that the containment

{

personnel hatch was unsecured and had been unsecured for approximately twenty-eight _ -;

hours. This occurred contrary to Seabrook Station Technical Specification 6.11.2. I 1

i The' lock was removed on April 18, 1990, to allow operation of the-personnel airlock. At 1:30 p.m. of that day the locking plate and lock were replaced on the controls for the hatch. A second individual verified that the lock was secure.

The controls are locked by sliding a plate in front of the box that encases the q hatch controls. The box and plate each have an eyelet in one corner. With the two 4 eyelets aligned, the plate is secured by placing a lock through both eyelets.  ;

On this occasion the plate was installed upside down. When the locking plate was '

in front of the controls, the lock was placed through only one eyelet. The individual who verified that the lock was secure did not recognize that the lock was placed only through one eyelet.

The root cause of this event was personnel error involving a lack of attention to detail.

There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event.

The event and its consequences were discussed with all Health Physics operations technicians. Instructions for locking the hatch will be posted at the personnel hatch location.

I\

N..C perm 346

$441)

y 8

f NAC 9een astA U.S NUCLLAR 980VLATOAV COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CON 11NUATION Anaono ous NoL mo-oio. -

(XPIAES. 6/3110s i PACILITV hA484 til DOCall NUMSIR 62) LIR NUMOER ISI PAGE tal vsaa H g,Q," b -

..7J,8,y," d TEXT & aisse ausse e susise6 ear aststeer NAC perin MsA (17) 015]ololol4l4l3 9l0 -

0l 1l 3 -

0l0 Ol2 OF 0l3 On. April 19, 1990, at 5:18 p.m. EDT, it was' discovered lthat the containment t

' personnel hatch was unsecured and had been unsecured for approximately twenty-eight' f hours. .This occurred contrary to Seabrook Station Technical Specification 6.11.2, which' requires High Radiation Areas, which are areas accessible to personnel with' ,

radiation levels greater than 1000mR/hr at 18 inches-from the radiation pource, be +

locked to prevent unauthorized entry. t

Background

On. April 18, 1990, at 12:40 p.m. the containment personnel hatch controls were' unlocked to allow operation of the personnel airlock for a containment entry. At '

1:30 p.m. of_that day the locking plate and lock were placed on the hatch _ controls.

A second individual then verified that the lock was secure.

The containment hatch controls are secured by sliding a square plate, with an eyelet in one corner, in front of the box encasing the hatch controls. This box ,

also has an eyelet in one corner. With the two eyelets aligned, the plate'is secured by placing a' lock through both eyelets, rendering the controle inaccessible.

However, on this occasion the plate was placed in~the sliding track upside down.

When the-locking plate was in front of the controls, the eyelets did not match and the lock was placed through only one eyelet. The individual who verified the plate was secure had not recognized the lock was.only through one eyelet and the plate could be moved and the hatch controls exposed without removing the lock.

Root Caus2 The root cause of this event has been determined to be personnel error involving a lack of attention to detail. The individual verified that the lock was in place,  ;

but did not attempt to move the plate and therefore did not realize that the

-containment personnel hatch controls were not secured.

Safety consecuences Although the controls to the containment personnel hatch were unsecured, all inner doors were still-locked and controlled separately. Therefore, controlled access to containment was maintained. The reactor cavity was the only potentially accessible area within containment with elevated dose rates. A total dose rate of 1670 mR/hr was determined to exist at 18 inches from the neutron shield.

For the twenty-eight hour period that the containment personnel hatch was unsecured, the breaker that operates the hatch controls was tagged out. There were no hatch entries recorded by the security system and no personnel entered the containment building during the time the hatch was unsecured. There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event.

Ed'u""" '"' .u s oeo iese.o e2+sw4s

ef4C fore heA U 5 NUCLtJ.2 F.00VLit0RY COnndigBION

• . ' . d' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION uProvgo onie No siso-eio4 -

EXPimtt; 8/31/m 8 AttLITY esAME 11) Docnti Nues0ER (21 LER NVh0SER ($1 PAQt (3) viaA 8E yu'h* b E7w*aN  ;

Seabrook Station oF 0 5 010 l o l 414 3 910 -

Ol 113 -

010 013 Ol3 TENT W asers apses e assisust ans eslistener Nnc w miij gin Corrective Actions To prevent recurrence.of this type of event, a meeting was conducted with all Health Physics operations technicians to discuss the event and its consequences. A

. memo was also issued to the technicians to reinforce the discussion. Furthermore, Li those technicians unfamiliar with the operation and locking of the hatch went to l the personnel airlock and were instructed on the proper locking of the hatch.

i The technician involved was counselled on the event and the need for increased attention to detail. 3 In addition, a sign with instructions for proper operation of the personnel hatch locking mechanism will be located at the site of the controls.

Plant Conditions At the time of this event, the plant was in MODE 1, Power Operation, at approximately 9 percent power, with Reactor Coolant System (AB) temperature at 562*F and-pressure at 2235 psig.

I This was the first event of this type at Seabrook Station.

l l^

l .;

L 1

l l

e U S GPO1986-0 624 636/466 4I