ML20034F296

Notice of Violation from Insp on 930209-11.Violations Noted: Licensee Failed to Identify That Check Valves Had Safety Function in Closed Direction

ML20034F296
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	02/26/1993
From:	Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20034F295	List: ML20034F296 ML20034F298
References
50-254-93-05, 50-254-93-5, 50-265-93-05, 50-265-93-5, NUDOCS 9303030003
Download: ML20034F296 (2)

Text

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NOTICE OF VIOLATION Commonwealth Edison Company Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265-Quad Cities Nuclear Plant License Nos. OPR-29; DPR-30 Units 1 and 2 During ar. NRC inspection conducted on February 9-11, 1993, three violations of NRC requirements were identified.

In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix -

C (Enforcement Policy) the following violations were identified:

A.

10 CFR 50.55a, Inservice Inspection Requirements, requires, in part, that ASME Code Class 2 valves meet the requirements applicable to the Code. Subsection IWV (IWV-1100, Scope) of Section XI of the ASME Code requires, in part, that check valve safety function be identified.

Contrary to the above, as of February 9,1993, the licensee failed to identify that check valves 1-2301-39 and 2-2301-30, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI suction check valves from the torus, had a safety function in the closed direction.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).

B.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed.

Contrary to the above, as of February 5,1993, check valves 1-2301-39 and 2-2301-9, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI suction check valves from the torus, were not tested to assure the valves performed satisfactorily in service.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1).

C.

10 CFR 50, Appenuix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances.

In addition, instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria.

Contrary to the above, QCMMS 2300-1, "HPCI Torus Suction Check Valve (1-(2)-2301-39) Disassembly and Testing - Test Every Third Refueling Outage, Rev 0", dated October 3, 1991, did not include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria to assure the check valves were adequate'y reassembled following maintenance.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1).

9303030003 9302,76 PDR ADOCK 05CP,0254-i J

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I Notice of Violation 2

i Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Commonwealth Edison Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington D.C.

20555 with a copy to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, Illinois, 60137, and a copy to the NRC Resident l

Inspector at the Zion facility within 30 days of the date of the letter 3

transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).

This reply should be clearly i

marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation:

(1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.

If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.

Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Dated at Glen Ellyn, Illinois

[OMcb this le t> day of reseu4RV, 1993 T. 0.' Martin, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety

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