ML20010C135

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Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Re Emergency Planning Issues
ML20010C135
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/13/1981
From: Adler R, Straube M
PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
References
NUDOCS 8108190168
Download: ML20010C135 (78)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCEAR REGUIATORY COMISSION BEFORE HIE ATQ4IC SAFETI AND LICENSING BOARD In s;.a Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, )

) Docket No. 50-289 ~

(1hree Mile Island M' clear ) (Restart) de q, Station, Unit No. 1) ) -~

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AUG 141981 > h Orfin of the Secretary Ccchtig & Service 6 Eranch 8

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C0f0&'FALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCUJSIONS OF IAW ON EMERGENCY PL W G E ISSUES p e7* I f, b 8 ) D 3 5 AUL 181981 > --

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47Tf5" ROBERT W. ADLER MICHEE STRAL3E Attorneys for the Cotters;ealth 505 Executive House i

P.O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Telephone: (717) 787-7060 Q[O8kpock0$0 0

. - t TABLE OF CONIEITIS Page INIR0DUCI'I OI I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 1 PROIEED FIIDItUS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF IR. . . . . . . ............ 4 I. Legal Standards on Dnergency Planning Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 A. Application of the new energency planning rule. . . . . . . . 4 B. Status of Licensee in this proceeding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 C. NUREG-0654............................................ 12 D. NRC/ FINA Relationship . . . . . . . . . / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 II. Emergency Operations Facility Staffing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 III. 11unicipal Plans.......... ................................. 31 IV. School Plans............................................... 40 .

V. Emergency kbrkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A. Dosimetry............................................. 48 B. Equipment Training......... ........................ . 51 C. Po tass ium Iodide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. ..... 53 VI. Public Educa tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 VII. t btification to Transients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 VIII. Access Control............................. ............... 66 LX. Siren tbtification Systen. . . . . .................... ....... 68 X. Itiscellaneous Cotmunwealth Conmitments. . .. .. ........... 70 A. Public Information Coordination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 B. Connunications Drill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 C. th rional Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 D. Protection of Fanners. .. ........................ 74

UNIED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIATORY (DMISSION BEFORE 'IHE ATIMLC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON CCNPANY, )

) Docket tb. 50-289 (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)

Station, Lhit No. 1) )

CCMONWEAL'IH OF PENNSYLVANIA'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACI AND CONCLUSIONS OF IR ON EMERGENCY PLANNING ISSUES INIRODUCIION h Carmonwealth's approach to proposed findings and conclusions on emergency planning issues is similar to that stated in the "Cn,mrrealth of Pennsylvania's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on

'.hagment Issues". h Como mealth elects to exercise ts right to

"" advise the Cocnission" only on the discrete emergency planning issues set forth below. 42 U.S.C. 52021(1); 10 C.F.R. 52.715(c). The Camenwealth assumes tha.t the Staff and the adversary parties will submit comprehensive proposed findings and conclusicns on the r enining emergency planning issues (including individual contentions) to assist. the Board in its decision. h Connotraalth does not adopt specific findings and conclusions proposed by any other party. Fbreover, the Cocmatreealth reserves its right to participate as a full party on all issues on appeal. Gulf State Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2),

AIAB-317, March 4,1976, 2 NUC. REG. REP. (CCH) 130,053.

In preparing its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Ima, the Cocremealth has only focused on those unresolved areas of mergency planning which it fmis are of particular importance, or which cerit

E 8 special consideration. The discussion is presented in the context of the energency planning rule exi NUREG-0654; wherever the subject matter is also covered by a specific contention, the contention is referenced.

The Board should not conclude from this approach that the Cecrouwealth has ignored the specific deficiencies identified by FH G, or that it feels improvements to the plans are unnecessary. Rather, the Conuxnealth's coumitment to upgrade emergency planning in the HE-1 area is a more generic one.

In the area of emergency planning, the Board is in the unique and admittedly difficult position of reviewing plans which are in a constant state of change and upgrading. During April, the Conmotraalth presentJ its own plan and the rest recent draft of the 5 risk county plars, as well as witnesses to answer any questions about the level of pinming and preparedness at that time. In July, the NRC Staff presented the FHR review of those plans to the' Board, together with FiMA's report based on the June 2 exercise of the DE-1 ares emergency response plans.

Staff Ex. 20 and 21. Both doctrents identified weaknesses in planning i and in the level of preparedness, and included recmmendations for consideration by the Cotrouwealth. As stated by Connorraealth's counsel on July 8, 1981 (Tr. 22, 834-35), the Gmmorraealth welcomes the assistance and guidance given by FDR and has cocmitted to address the deficiencies listed.

PER* is in the process of revising the Canonwealth's Disaster Operations Plan, Annex E (Cocro:raealth Ex. 2). Once the state plan has l

Pa. Emergency Management Services Code, 35 P.S. 57311, et sea. ; Tr.17, 967 (Iothrop). It also provides energency direction arTcontrol of Cocoonwealth and local emergency operations during any emergency situation. 35 P.S. 57313(7).

been .mpleted, Pa% will turn its attention to revising the 5 M-1 risk county plans. Both the state and county revisions will attempt to resolve each of the deficiencies identified by FDR. Pan hopes to be able to formally subnit the state and county plans to FER by Novenber 1,1981.*

PER is in constant contact with the FDR regional representatives, and informal discussions regarding the revisions to the various plans are ongoing. '1hus, PDR hopes that the revisions made to the plans will be acceptable to Fan and will support a formal finding and determination of adequacy. Nevertheless, the Cmnrnwealth assumes that any outstanding deficiencies identified after the formal subnission of the pians will be cocmunicated by FHM directly to the Cocc:ission, through the NRC Staff.**

  • Formal suhnission will be pursuant to the provisions of 44 C.F.R.

$350. 7(a) .

    • It should be noted that the NRC Staff's testirony indicates that an identification of outstanding deficiencies will be requested as of January 1, 1982. Tr. 22, 924 (Chestnut).

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACI AND CDNCLUSIONS OF IM I. Imgal Standards On Fmergency Planning Issues

1. 'Ibe need to upgrade emergency planning and preparedness around

. comercial nuclear power plants was one of the major lessons learned from the 'IMI-2 accident. See Order and Notice of Hearing (August 9, 1979), Slip co. at 4-5. Energency planning was included as both a short-term and a long-term item in the Comission's Order and Ibtice of Hearing.* In addition, emergency planning was the subject of a large number of contentions filed by intervmors, and consumed approximately 4 months of hearing time.

A. Application of the new emergency planning rule

2. As we pointed out in car March 23, 1981 M morandum and Order
  • Short-term order iten 3 reads: .
3. '1he licensee shall improve his emergency preparedness in accordance with the following:

(a) Upgrade emergency plans to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.101 with special attention to action level criteria based on plant parameters.

(b) Establish an Emergency Operations Center for Federal, State, and local Officials and designate a location and an alternate location and provide e - mications to plant.

(c) Upgrade offsite conitoring capability, including additional thernoluminescent dosimeters or equivalent.

(d) Assess the relationship of State / local plans to the licensee plans so as to assure the capability to take emergency actions.

(e) Conduct a test exercise of its energency plan.

Iong-term order item 4 reads:

4. improve energency preparedness in accordance with the following. ,

l (a) modify emergency plans to address changing capabilities of plant instrumentation, (b) extend the capability to take appropriate energency actions for the population around the site to a distance of ten miles. .

on Effect of New Emergency Planning Regulations [ hereinafter March 23 Order], the litigation of emergency planning issues in this proceeding was complicated further by the Comission's promulgation of the new energency planning mle. 45 Fed. Reg. 55, 402 (August 19,1980) (ndaing 10 C.F.R. 5550.47 and 50.54(q)-(u); amending 10 C.F.R. 550.33 and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, app. E) . De Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law are founded, as they must be, on the application of this new rule. It is necessary, therefore, to explain the manner _in which the rule is applied to the many ded.iled and cocplex findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth below. Bis is particularly important in light of the lack of Comission case law regarding the application of the new rule.

3. ne effect of the new energency planning rule on this proceeding was the subject of a protracted debate among the parties. See March 23 Order, stora, at 1-2. We primary result of this debate was an agreenent by the Board and all of the affected parties with the seemngly obvious, yet deceptively sirple, conclusion that the Licensee's and the state and local energency plans must conply fully with tba requirements of tba new rule prior to restart. March 23 Order, suora, at 2-3. Joint Statement by the Cocmonwealth of Pennsylvcnia, the NRC Staff, and Licensee on Energency Planning Requirements (March 6,1981), at 1; Statenent of ENCP, Newberry Township 'IMI Steering conuti.ttee, 'IMIA and Aamodt Family on Energency Planning Requirements (thrch 11, 1981), at 2.* Le new rule includes specific substantive standards which, as is true for any final IE mle or regulation, bear the full force and effect of law.
  • Literalle, the Joint Statenent by tne intervenors requires compliance with the requirements of NUREG-0654 prior to restart. Be difference betimen compliance with the rule and cocpliance with IUREG-0654 is addressed infra.

See, e.g., & ran Bros., Inc. v. United States, 346 F.2d 590 (1965).

Thus, compliance with these stancards is the first, last, and foremost consideration of the Board in judging the adequacy of energency plans and preparedness around 'IMI.

4. h basic standard for cocpliance with the emergency planning rule is a finding by the IRC "that the state of emergency preparedness provides* reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiologicel emergency." 10 C.F.R.

S550,47(a)(1); 50.54(s)(2) (e::phasis added). The Board wishes to emphasize at the outset that its primary consideration in judging the adequacy of both onsite and offsite emergency p: ning is the capabil'ly to imolenent adequate protective measures.

5. Taken alone, this broad standard m uld afford this Board little guidance in judging the adequacy of emergency planning. Fortunately, the rule also contains nore precise standards sd11ch must be met in order for a plan to be found adequate. The rule sets forth sixteen specific planning standards,10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(1)-(16), as well as additional requirements in Appendix E to 10 C.F.R., Part 50. Absent the specific alternative finding noted below, the Board insists on a clear de onstration that each of these standards will be met prior to restart. The burden of proof on energency planning issues lies with Licensee, as it does for all other issues in this procee"ng. 10 C.F.R. 52.732; see [Camenwealth's Proposed Plant Design Findings (First Set),111-3] .
6. Finally, the emergency planning rule provides flexibility in the event that some of the above-cited standards are rot met. h rule provides an applicant or a licensee the " opportunity to deconstrate to

i

.. - . . . _ _ _ ~ . _.

the Consission's satisfaction that the deficiencies in the plan are not

. significant for the plant in question, or that adequate interim ccx:pensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other cocpelling reasons for continued operation." 10 C.F.R. 550.54(s)(3); see also 10 C.F.R. 550.47(c)(2).* The Board has already forerarned the parties that reliance on this flexibility nust be based on a specific deaonstration, on the record of this procWhg, that waiver of the standard in question is warranted. March 23 Order, suora, at 4. 'Ihe Board notes parenthetically that no evidence has been produced which would indicate "other compelling reasons for continued operation."

Waiver of a specific standard, therefore, requires a demonstration supported by the record that either the deficiency in question is not significanc or that adequate interim ccrapensating actions have been or will be taken prior to restart. In rendering these judgments, the Board l

will fall back on the basic and essential requirement of the emergency ,

t l planning rule--reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures i

l can and will be taken.

7. Having thus set forth the basic standards required by the new emergency planning rule, the Board still needs to deal with a number of additional nuances and couplexities arising from the nature of this proceeding, the nature of the energency planning guidance document 1

) entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological

Emergmcy Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654/FDR-REP-1, Rev.1) (1980) [ hereinafter NUREG-0654**],

operating licenses, differs slightly from the eguage l quoted above, but is substan~ively identical in terms of the three means of permitting operation notwithstanding failure to meet one of the ecergency planning standards.

    • NUREG-0654 was admitted into evidence in this proceeding as Staff Ex. 7.

and the IRC/FD4A* relationship.' All of these issues arose in the context of the proceeding and are dealt with sequentially below.

B. Status of Licensee in this proceeding

8. At the tine of issuance of the Board's March 23 Order, there was still room for argument over whether Licensee should be treated as

, an operating reactor for purposes of cocpliance with the emergency plarning rule. See March 23 Order, suora, at 2-3. All roan for doubt on this issue was eliminated by an Order issued by the Comission the same day, which instructed that "The Commission believes that thit One should be grouped with reactors which have received operating licenses, rather than with the units with pending operating license applications.

It en:phasizes though that it expects the Board to find to the contrary when the record so dictates." Metrooolitan Edison Co. , (Three Mile Island hbclear Station, Lhit Ib.1), CLI-81-3, March 23,1981, Slip op.

at 7.

9. In any case, the Board has already noted that tra differences between operating reactors and operating license applicants for purposes of substantive compliance with the arergency planning rule is moot.

March 23 Order, suora, at 2-3. Both classes are required to meet the standards set forth in 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b) and Appendix E. Iba differences between an applicant and a licensee are procedural. As noted in our March 23 Order, one possible distinction is the provision in the section of the emergency planning rule applicable to operating reactors of a four-nonth " grace period" for the correction of deficiencies prior to shutdown. 10 C.F.R. 550.54(s)(2). However, as noted in our earlier ruling, the Board has serious difficulties with applying the

" grace period" concept to the instant case. First, it is elenentary that the specific provisions of the Order and Ibtice of Hearing in this case override the generic provisions of the anergency planning rule with respect to the procedural treatment of this licensee. Second, there is no need for the Board to find record evidence of a need to treat DE-1 differently from other operating reactors for purposes of applying the emergency planning rule. The Cocmission already found in its Order and tbtice of Hearing that there were " recognized deficiencies in energency plans and station operating procedures." Slip op. at 5. 'Ihird, TMI-l requires no grace period to achieve compliance with the emergency planning rule. DE-1 bas been shutdown for over two years, during which time substantial efforts have been made to upgrade the ctatus of energency planning at all levels. For iis analysis, 'IMI-l is more closely analagous to a near-term license applicant than to an operating reactor. In fact, even after the issuance of this decision, the Licensee and the state and local gove:mments will have a number of acnths prior to restart to correct any deficiencies noted herein. Finally, we stated at the outset that the Board and all of the parties agree to the fundenental principle that compliance with the provisions of the emergency planning rule is a prerequisite to restart. It would be disingenious to establish this principle at the outset, only to destroy its effect by applying a grace period which would c,. .end beyond the date of restart. The Board, not the Staff,* has been vested with the responsibility to determine what actions with respect to emergency planning are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that DE-1 can be operated wi&out endangering the health m d safety of the public. The Board concicdes as

_g_

a matter of law that coupliance with the energency planning rule prior to restart is necessary to provide such reasonable assurance.

10. A second potential procedural distinction between operating reactors and operating license applicants is the degree of weight to be afforded to the findings and determinations of FafA with respect to the adequacy of offsite energency planning. As we noted in our March 23 Order, 550.47(a)(2) (new operating licenses) states that "In any NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on a question of adequacy." Section 50.54(s)(3) (operating reactors) does not refer at all to either licensing proceedings or a rebuttable presumption. See March 23 Order, suora, at 10 n. 4. At that point, we merely noted the anomaly in the rule, and questioned whether it would become irportant in this proceeding. M. It is now apparent that there are evidentiary disputes between the parties regarding FDR's findings and determinations in this case. It is necessary, therefore, to discuss this issue in greater detail.
11. As a preliminary ratter, the Board notes that the re'outtable presumption given to FDR findings and determinations does not shift the burden of pursuasion in this proceeding, which rests with the Licensee.

'Ihe concept of rebuttable presumption is a legal concept with varied meanings in different forums and jurisdictions. See, e.g., McCormick, Evidence S$342-345 (2d ed.1972). It is necessary, therefore, to determine the precise legal meaning of rebuttable presumption for the purposes of this litigation. Rebuttable presunption is not defined in the NRC Rules of Practice. We turn next, then, to Federal Rule of Evidence 301, which states:

In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or I

by these rules, a presugtion imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with eviden.:e to rebut or meet the prestmtion, but does not shift to such party the xrden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which renains throughout the trial upon the party on sdxxn it was originally cast.

Therefore, even if the rebuttable presumption rule is applicable to this proceeding, it shifts only the burden of going fonard with evidence (burden of production), and not the ultimate burden of persuasion.

As long as there is some reliable and probative evidence on the record to rebut or meet a particular FEMA finding and determination, the effect of the rebuttable presumption on that issue dissolves.

12. Turning next to the question of whether the rebuttable presumption rule applies to this proceeding, the Board perceives thrw possible explanations for the apparent anomaly in the emergency planning rule.

First, as we noted earlier, the difference in treatment between license applicants and operating reactor licenses may simply by a mistake. A completely literal reading of the rule, of course, txnild require us not to afford a rebuttable presumption to the FEMA findings and determinatices.

Second, the Comnission may purposely have intended to give FEMA findings and deteminations less weight for operating reactors than for applicants.

This Board can see no logical reason for such a distinction, hotever, and therefore dismisses this theory. The nost logical explanation appears to be that the authors of the rule sinply did not consider the possibility of holding a hearing with respect to an operating reactor.

For a near-term license application, on the other hand, it is virtually certain that a hearing will be held, and that the evidentiary weight of FEMA findings and determinations should be set forth.* This hypothesis

  • Bis explanation, of course, still leaves an cxnission in the rule with respect to show cause proceedings. This issue, hocever, need not be addressed here.

is supported by the language of $50.47(a)(2), which reads: "In any IEC licensing proceeding, a FDR finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on a question of adequacy." (mphasis added). Therefore, the Board believes that the strongest arguments weigh in favor of applying the rebuttable presumption rule in this proceeding, as defined by Rule

! 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. .

i C. NUREG-0654

13. Another pervasive emergency planning issue in this proceeding has been the nature of NUREG-0654. See, e.g., TR. 4231-33. As we noted in our earlier ruling, the Board is not prepared to cloak IUREG-0654 with the mantle of a regulation, despite the footnote references to NUREG-0654 in the emergency planning rule. March 23 Order, supra, at 5.

NUREG-0654 has not been approved by the Cmnission, nor was it e. :n published in its present form at the time the mergency planning rule .

was promulgated.* ,

14. Rather, the Board treats NLRFS-0654 as more in the nature of a regulatory guide. As such, NUREG-0654 represents one possible means of meeting the standards of the emergency planning rule; but alternative means of meeting those standards are also possible. See Tr. 15, 010 (Grimes). Such alternative means of compliance, of ccurse, must be supported on the record. Conversely, a party nny also be permitted to deonstrate that corpliance with NUREG-0654 alone is not sufficient to cocply with the emergency planning rule. See Gulf States Utilities Co.

(River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), AIAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 772 (1977).

This principle may be applied separately to each individual planning standard in the energency planning rule. For each of the 16 standards, NUREG-0654 provides a set of " evaluation criteria." Staff Ex. 7, at

The current version of NUREG-0654 is dated Noveber,1980. Staff Ex. 7.

r$

31-79. Compliance with the evaluation criteria may constitute one means of complying with the applicable planning standard. But tFa necessity

, and sufficiency of those criteria to caply with the applicable standard is open to attack based on reliable and probative evidence on the record.

15. The Board wishes to sphasize, however, that it will not view a challenge to NUREG-0654 lightly. In general, regulatory guides are entitled to " considerable prima facie weight." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809, 811 (1974). More importantly, NUREG-0654 clearly has been the foundation on which those responsible for upgrading emergency plans have relied throughout this proceeding. See Tr. 4232 (McConnell). The Cocronwealth stated early in the proceeding that NGEG-0654 was tba standard by which they expected their plans to be judged. Tr. 4240-41 (K. Carter). This reliance on the part of the Cocronwealth :as also ,

stated in the Co m valth's testimony:

Now, prior to Noveber of last year, our planning effort was somesat splintered because 1 we received varying guidance. It was not until we received new Regulation 0654, FEMA Rev. 1 ...

that we had a document which we could rely upon and hopefully is not going to change, at least for some time, in oar planning efforts.

Tr. 20, 955 (Belser). This concept was confirmed by both IRC Staff and FDR witnesses. Chestnut & Bath, ff. Tr. 19, 626, at 19; Tr. 18, 969-70 (Adler); Tr. 22, 531 (Dickey). See also Staff Ex. 7, at 1(Forsvard).

In short, the Board does not believe that a noving target would serve the ultimate purpose of improving mergency plans arzl preparedness to the maMmm degree possible.

D. NRC/ FEMA Relationship

16. The role of FDR in the IRC licensing process is outlined in the mergency planning rule: "The NRC will base its finding on a review i

l .

of the WA findings and determinations as to whether the licensee's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented." 10 C.F.R. 550.54(s)(3) . The relationship between NRC and M A is also the subject of a "Menorandum of Understanding Between IRC and FDR Relating to Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness" [ hereinafter NRC/FDR h0U].* This relationship was explained to the Board and the parties on numerous occasions throughout the proceeding. E.g., Tr. 4231-32 (McConnell); Tr. 22, 525-31 (Dickey). Essentially, the NRC is responsible for evaluating the adequacy of onsite (Licensee) anergency planning; FWA is responsible for providing NRC with " findings and determinations" regarding the adequacy of offsite (state and local) anergency planning; and the NRC has the ultimate responsibility for detemining the overall state of energency planning around the site.

17. The Board wishes to make one critical point abundantly clear in this regard. FDR makes initial findings and determinations with regard to offsite emergency planning due to its expertise in this area and due to its role as the lead federal agency for civil emergency planning and assistance. NRC/FDR FDU, at 1. The NRC, however, is vested with the ultimate statutory responsibility under the Atanic Energy Act for the radiological health and safety of the public. Power Reactor Develotnent Corp. v. International Union of Electrical Radio and Fhchine Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961). This is expressly recognized by the NRC/FDR FOU, at 1, 3. Nor for that matter, could such an FDU transfer a statutory duty from one agency to another.
18. The Occmission, of course, recognized this responsibility in the emergency planning rule, which provides: "the Ccnmission will determine whether the reactor shall be shutdom until such deficienc3es
  • 'Ihe Board took official notice of the NRC/FWA FOU.

. . . . . - - . - . . - - . - - .. .~

i . .

are reedied ... the Comission shall take into account, among other factors, diether the licensee can deonstrate to the Catmission's satisfaction . . . ," etc.10 C.F.R. 550.54(s)(2) (mphasis added). An M)U signed by the Executive Director for Operations cannot alter the effect

of the rule. In other words, the Comission will afford a rebuttable presucption (as discussed earlier) to FD!A's findings and detemination as to whether state and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being impleented according to the 16 planning standards set forth in the rule. Once particular deficiencies are identified, the enmrission will make the ultimate public health and safety detarm% tion regarding 4

the effect of those deficiencies on the licensing process.

II. F2nergency Operations Facility Staffing

.19. The staff found licensee's offsite mergency response organization

deficient due to insufficient staffing of the offsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) during the early hours of an accident. This finding 1

) generated a controversy between the licensee on one side and the staff 1

and the Caumanwealth of Pennsylvania on the other. All three parties

- produced direct evidence on this issue.

j 20. The NRC staff testified from the outset that Licensee cust I

staff the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) with a senior manager ac. ting as EOF Director withinin one hour of declaration of an emergency in order to couply with NURm-0654. Although many of the discrete

. functions performed by the Emergency Support Director (Licensee's EOF I

director) can be perfomed by other personnel on Licensee's mergency staff, the Staff's position is based on the need to have "a senior manager who can speak with authority to other emergency organizations on radiological or operational matters ..." Chesnut, ff. Tr. 15,007, at 23-24.

21. The Board does not underestimate the importance of either the EOF or the Energency Support Di;.ator. Licensee's testinony refers to the EOF as the " central point for: (a) providing overall corporate managanent and direction in responding to an emergency, (b) coordinating administrative and logistical support, (c) interfacing with state and county representatives, and (d) establishing the basis for lang, term recovery efforts." Rogan, et al., ff. Tr. 13, 756, e 21-22; see also, Licensee Ex. 30, at 7-3; Staff Ex. 8, at 16-24. The importance of the l

Emergency Support Director is set forth in Licensee's emergency plan:

1. The Emergency Support Director will be responsible for activating and directing the offsite energency support organization and ensuring that the functional groups provide a coordinated response in su port of the onsite emergency organization. Tae Emergency Support i Director will serve as the senior managenent representative at or in the vicinity of the M site. As such, during emergency operations, the Emergency Support Director will direct all 4

emergaicy efforts and policies; the Energer 7 Director, however, will maintain responsibil ?

l for the operation and control of the plant. In i

the absence of the Emergency Support Director, the senior nest M -1 operations person will

assune his responsibilities. As energency I situations tend to stabilize, the Emergency Support Director may relieve the Emergency

, Director of nere and more accident managenent responsibilities. This will provide a controlled means of shifting to a recovery organi::ation should that type of organizational arrangement be desned necessary.

Licensee Ex. 30, at 5-16 to 5-17. Once the emerger- support director arrives at the EOF, he assute the responsibility for making protective action rec-Antions to the Connonwealth's Bureau of Radiaticn Protection (BRP). Tr.14, 779 (Rogan); 14, 781 (Giangi).

22. An analysis of NUREG-0654 and the en gency planning rule

! proves Mr. Chestnut to be correct. Two planning standards apply to the 1

issue at hand. First, planning standard 8 reads: " Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the mergency response are provided and maintained." 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(8). As interpreted by NUREG-0654, there are two pertinent EOF requirenents:

2. Each licensee shall establish an Emergency Operations Facility from which evaluation and coordination of all licensee activities related to an mergency is to be carried out and from which the licensee shall provide information to Federal, State and local authorities responding to radiolegical mergencies in accordance with NUREG-0696, Revision 1.
4. Sch organization shall provide fuc Linely activation and staffing of the facilities and centers described in the plan.

Staff Ex. 7, at 52 (anchasis added). NUREG-0696, Revision 1, states, in pertinent part:

The EOF shall be staffed to provide the overall managenent cf licensee resources and the continuous evaluation and coordination of licensee activities during and after an accident.

Lbon EOF activation, designated personnel shall report directly to the EOF to achieve full functional operation within one hour. A senicr managenent person designated by the licensee shall be in charge of all licensee activities in the EOF. The EOF staff will include personnel -

to manage the licensee onsite and offsite radiological ronitoring, to perform radiological evaluations, and to interface with offsite officials. The EOF staff assignments shall be part of the licensee's energency plan. The specific number and type of personnel assigned to the EOF may vary according to the mergency class. The staffing for each energency class shall be fully detailed in the licensee's mergency plan. Operating procedures and staff zaining in the use of data systems and instrumentation shall contain guidance en the limitations of instrumentation including d ether the information can be relied upon following serious accidents.

Staff Ex. 8, at 19 (emphasis added).

23. Second, planning standard 2 states:

On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to 3rovide initial facility accident response in my functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augpentation of response capabilities is available, and the interfaces anung var 2.ous onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(2) (emphasis added). Compliance with the H=liness elements of this standard are defined by Table B-1 of MJREG-0654, which requires a senior manager to serve as EOF Director within 60 minutes.

Staff Ex. 7, at 37.

24. Bird, Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 requires that:

" Adequate provisions shall be made and described for energency facilities and equipment, including .. 8. A licensee onsite technical support center and a licensee rear-site energency operations facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised during an energency."

(enphasis added).

It is difficult for the Board to interpret "during an energency" as precluding the first four hours of an energency.

25. The Board explained in the introduction to the emergency planning section of this decision that compliance with NUREG-0654 constitutes but one means of _apliance with the planning standards cf the energency planning rule. %e bottom line is compliance with the two planning standards and the appliedle portion of Appendix E, quoted above. he burden of proof is clearly on Licensee to demonstrate on the basis of firm record evidence the workability of an alternative means of compliance.
26. he Staff reiterated its pos: don on H)F staffing requirenents

. - -- - - . . . - _ . . . - - - - ~_ . . - -

~

later in the hearing. In Supplement 1 to the Staff's Energency

! Preparedness Evaluation for 'IMI-1 (NUREG-0746), the Staff indicated that i

full staffing of the EOF within about one hour of an emergency declaration was necessary for compliance with both NUREG-0654 and NUREG-0696. This

~

! da-nt further indicated that " staffing falling below the minime I

staffing guidelines of Table B-1 to NUREG-0654 should, by Septenber 1, 1981, be capable of being augmted within 30 minutes and that deficiencies should be fully re m ved by July 1, 1982." Staff Ex. 27, at 11-13 to II-14.

The Staff's view is essentially that there is a:

need to have a separate individual responsible for making protective action recomendations and performing scxne of those nonplant related

functions, and that he should be renoved from the control room to eliminate some of the confusion that exist.s . . .

Tr. 22, ,971 (mesnut) . Thus, the Staff suggests a separation of functions i between operation tasks to be performed on the control room and non-operational tasks, such as protective action re % tions.

27. The Licensee's primary objection to this separation of functions l

concept, as represented by Licensee's counsel, is that the separation of i

! functions may result in a less senior corporate official in the EOF than in the control room. Tr. 22, 972-73 (Zahler). See also, Tr. 23, 074-75 (Rogan) . The Board understands Licensee's concern. However, in a large sense, Licensee's concern is contradicted by Licensee's own testimony scattered throughout the record that indicates that a mititude of 'IMI-1 officials are trained and qualified to make protective action rchtions, down to the level of shift foreman. EA , Rogan, et al., ff. Tr. 13, 756, at 26-27; License Ex. 30, at 5-6 to 5-7.

28. Licensee's first two choices for emergency support director i

19-

,a-e -,,,_._,ce,.-,_-_,.g

,sn,r-- . .- ym, _-,rw.,--y==-c-

4 are &. Arnold and W. Clark.* Both of these officials are located at GPU's corporate offices in Parsippany, New Jersey, and therefore may not be available during the early phases of an mergency. Licensee acknowledges, however, that there are other officials who would be well-qualified to t serve as emergency support director until the arrival of &. Arnold or Mr. Clark. Tr. 23, 039-40 (Rogan). The Cocnnnwealth would not object to such substitution. Tr. 23, 016 (Dornsife) . Ibr would the Staff, Tr. 22, 973-74 (Chesnut).

l j 29. Previously, &, Rogan had identified four possible candidates

for Emergency Support Director
&. Arnold, &. Clark, &. Herbein and

&. Hovey. 3hese individuals all will rece2.ve the same trnining in making protective action recocoendations as all of the m ergency directors.

Tr.14, 784-85 (Rogan) . Mr. Chesnut had also testified earlier that the EOF Director function could be filled by any " senior site or corporate manager who could arrive and who had knowledge of the plant's procedures."

i Tr.15, 022 (Chesnut) . See also, Tr.15, 024 (Grimes); Tr. 22, 964 (Chesnut); Tr. 22, 974 (Chesnut) (acceptability of Frergency Directors as Fmergency Support Directors). It is not clear why the insertion of one of these officials as an interim mergency support director for purposes of making protective action recocmendations during a three-hour period early into an accident would be detrimental to public health and safety.

30. Licensee's position on EOF staffing was elicited first through suppleental direct testimony. Licensee believes that the functions required to be performed of the EOF Director, as described in Table B-1 '

to NUREG-0654, are performed in other ways. Radiological assessment,

  • &. Arnold is the Chief Executive Officer of GPU lbclear Corporation; &. Clark is his deputy. Arnold, ff. Tr. 11, 434, at 7-10, Figure 1.

operational assessmmt, and fontulation of protective action recomendations

% all be perfonned in the control room. Tr.13, 763-64 (Giangi) . At this point, Licensee comitted to have the EOF Director report in six hours. Id_. at 13, 765. Apparently, Licensee's major difficulty with full staffing of the EOF early into an accident involves the logistics of senior licensee managers arriving at the EOF in short time periods.

Tr. 14, 592-94 23, 081-82 (Rogan).

31. Licensee reiterated its position in a letter from Robert E.

Zahler (counsel for Licensee) to Joseph Gray, Esquire (counsel for the IRC Staff), dated July 8,1981. However, the Licensee did comit in

this letter to activate the EOF earlier than envisioned in its Emergency l Plan. Licensee cocmitted to activate the EOF within one hour of declaration of a site area emergency, staffed with a minimm of six " key personnel." The Licensee connd.ts to the arrival of the Emergency .

Support Director within four hours after declaration of a site mergency.

, The key to Llicensee's position continues to be that "pending arrival of r 'esignated Fr.ergency Support Director, the Emergency Director will retain decision-making authority and will function as the Senior Corporate hhnagement spokesman from the Control Room." Licensee Ex. 58, at 1-2; Tr. 23, 084-85 (Rogan).

32. FE. William Dornsife testified on this issue on behalf of the Comotwealth of Pennsylvania. Mr. Dornsife is the supervising Nuclear Engineer of the Pennsylvania DepartInent of Environmental Resources, Bureau of Radiation Protection. 'Ihe Board notes, among Mr. Dornsife's other qualifications, that he is extranely fnmilinr with the TMI site.

In addition to 'IMI review wk merformed for the Cottonwealth, Mr.

Dornsife spent four years at Bur,u & Roe, Inc. , performing engineering

liaison and coordination functions at M-2. Biographic Information of William P. Ibrnsife, P.E. , ff. Tr. 23, 011. 'Ibe Board was extremely impressed with &. Dornsife's technical expertise and judgment throughout the hearing, although his participation mainly involved cross-examination rather than direct testimony. h Board holds W . Dornsife's judgment in high esteen.

33. &. Dornsife is responsible for cocmunicating with Licensee to determine the operational status of the facility, in order to provide insight into protective action recocmendations based on operational factors. W Cocmonwealth has determined, through drills at M and at other plants, as well as during the M-2 accident, that operational information is a critical input into the protective action recocmendation. .

In order to perform this function, &. Dornsife will report initially to the state headquarters in Harri. burg, and later, to the EOF when the EOF is nunned. Tr. 23, 012; 23, 014 (Dornsife). .

34. Originally, it was envisioned that &. Dornsife could satisfactorily obtain the necessary operational information by retaining at BRP headquarters. During drills conducted in preparation for the M-2 exercise, however, the Cocronwealth determined that it was difficult to obtain the necessary operational information through the radiological line. Significantly, based on this deficiency in information flow, it was Licensee who recocuended that W. Dornsife be dispatched to the EOF as soon as possible. Tr. 23, 013-14 (Dornsife) . The Staff witness also agreed with this conclusion due to his observation of the June 2 exurcise.

Tr. 23, 062 (Chesnut) . Another alternative would have been to provide for direct telephone conversations betwen the BRP nuclear engineer and the emergency director in the control room. Licensee cFose the EOF l

i

alternative, however, since the emergency director's workload might prevent imadiate camunications with the BRP representative. Tr.

23, 035 (Dornsife). 'Ihe Board attributes added weight to Mr. Dornsife's opinion on this issue, since it was based on actual experience--a ,

process of trial and error--rather than more speculative judg: rant. See Tr. 23, 014 (Dornsife).

35. h Board notes parenthetically that the inadequacy of information flow to offsite response organizations, including BRP, was one of the major lessons learned frcxn the TE-2 accident. An investigation into information flow during the TE-2 accident, conducted by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforement, concluded that "information was not adequately transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission or the Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) . . . The predominant factor was the absence of an effective ensite systs to accimilate, evaluate and disseminate information." Staff Ex. 5, at 10; see also id. at 10-11 (Conclusions 1, 2, 4 and 8). In light of these conclusions, the Board cannot view the Comanwealth's concerns lightly.
36. Mr. Dornsife's view is also supported by the Staff. The Staff's views regarding interface with offsite agencies was based, in part, on the assu:ption that the state nuclear engineer would report to the EOF. Tr.15, 523 (Chesnut). (As just noted, the Comamealth has since decided to dispatch a nuclear engineer to the EOF as soon as possible during an accident.) Mr. Chesnut testified that:

! ... one function the staff considers important l

is that of interface in coordination with other offsite agencies as well, and scra coordination of the overall mergency offsite response.

Several other agencies will be responding to an emergency at Ihree Mile Island thit 1,

o .

and they in many cases will report to the energency operations facility. Staff i believes that this function should be l available within one hour of the declaration of an energency.

Tr.15, 013 (Chesnut). See also Tr.15, 036 (Grimes).

37. Mr. Dornsife explained further that, during drills conducted prior to the June 2 exercise, the status boards and other technical and radiological infonnation available at the EOF was behind real time, and was not necessarily consistent with information actually used to fonmlate protective action reccomendations. Critical real time information was obtained through direct commications between the arergency director and the emergency support director. Mr. Dornsife expressed doubts as to whether such infouration would necessarily be transmitted to the EDF without the presence of the Emergency Support Director. Tr. 23, 014-15 (Dornsife) . Given the critical need to allocate personnel resources in the heat of an energency, the Board finds this concern to be well-founded. Moreover, Mr. Dornsife opined that face-to-face contact between the state and the energency support director was "very important not only for us directly understanding what the protective action considerations were, but for us being able to provide our input into that protective action recor:mendation prior to it being made by the licensee." Id.

at 23, 016; 23, 045-35.

38. Mr. Dornsife's view that the attention devoted to the EOF staff will diminish in the absence of the Emergency Support Director also appears to be supported by Licensee's emergency plan:
2.  % e Emergency Staff Support located at the EOF will assist the Emergency Support Director by interfacing with the offsite energency support organization leaders and providing status reports to the Emergency Support Director. In the absence of the Emergency Support Director the Emergency Staff Stnport will not assume mergencv responsi]ilities rather it will be the cost senior 211-1 operations person (i.e. :

VP-Dil-l) .

L u.ensc - Ex. 30, at 5-17 (emphasis added) .

39. 'Ihe Carmonwealth's view is also supported by the manner in which the June 2,1981 cocprehensive exercise was conducted. When Mr.

Dornsife arrived at Licensee's EOF, approximately one half-hour after declaration of site emergency, the EOF was fully manned, including the anergency support director. Tr. 23, 015 (Dornsife). 'Ihus, the exercise can be used only for the proposition that Licensee's emergency response organization can function efficiently, including adequate interface with BRP, with the EOF manned and the e:ergency support director present early into the accident sequence. In fact, the Board has difficulty understanding why the exercise was conducted with the energency support

. director artifically present three and one-half hours earlier than called for in Licensee's erergency plan.

40. Mr. Rogan was not aware of any drills conducted at DII-l that did not involve activation of the EOF when the exercice was carried through to making protective action remmndations to the state.*

'Ihus, there is no demonstrated capability to interface with the state in terms of transmitting protective action reemmn4tions absent full activation of the EOF.

41. Mr. Dornsife also dmonstrated, by using an example from the June 2 exercise, that some types of operational status information are not available through the neraal CRTs and display panels available at the EOF. Tr. 23, 022-24 (Dornsife) . Indeed, numerical parameters alone
  • Mr. Rogan is the Manager-Emergency Preparedness for GPU Nuclear.

Rogan, et al., ff. Tr. 13, 756, at 1.

could not possibly convey a uccplete and accurate depiction of the operational status of a facility as cocplex as a comercial nuclear power plant. Again, Mr. Dornsife expressed doubt. as to whether such information would be conveyed to the EOF without the presence of the mergency support director. Id. at 23, 023-25. The burden of proof is on Licensee to dmonstrate the workability of its cr.ergency plan. Since Licensee conducted the June 2 drill with the EOF manned as envisioned by the Staff and the Cottonwealth, the Licensee deonstrated the workability of the Staff's and the Conronwealth's concept of operations, rather than their own.

42. h Cocrotwealth's position, however, transcends the need to obtain raw operational data. h Connotwealth's preference is to cmmunicate directly with the official actually responsible for making protective action recoccendations. Tr. 23, 053-56. As explained by counsel or the Ccuroiwealth, the Cocronwealth views the interface between Licensee -

and the state for the purpose of conveying protective action recamendations as an overriding consideration in emergency planning. Tr. 22, 982-83; 23, 063 (R. Adler). h Board is inclined to agree with this perspective.

h focus of the emergency planning rule is " reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken ... " 10 C.F.R.

~

550.54(5)(2). h transmission of protection action recommendations l from Licensee to the state is the initial, and hence a critical step in I the process of taking appropriate protective measures to safeguard the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological eraergency.

h importance of this initial interface, therefore, canrot be understated.

43. Licensee, apparently, does not disagree completely with the Cmnonwealth's reasoning. On cross-examination, Mr. Rogan agreed with

3

d. Dornsife that the adequacy of comunication of protective action re- adations is a valid concern. Mr. Rogan stated that:

"'Ibe whanical process of connunicating is an essential elment of making the recomendation to the state. In tems of cocmunicating the basis for that reconmendation certainly the more infomation that was made available to the state the more of an appreciation they sculd have of the licensee's reasons for making the recomendations and, therefore, I presume,seuld be in a better j posture to detemine whether to accept or reject 1 that reconmendation. 1 Tr. 23, 086-87 (Rogan).

It. fact, earlier in the hearing, Mr. Rogan recognized the 44.

benefit of face-to-face contact between the BRP representative and the 2

m ergency support director:

3 upon activation of the emergency offsite facility, a representative of the BRP is stationed in that facility and will be aware .

both of the identification of the emergency support director and will have access to the.

same information that the mergency support director has, so that in effect that representative could serve as the verifying process within his own agency should there be any question as to idlether or not the person who picked up the phone as designated mergency support director and made a protective action reconmendation was doing so properly.

Tr.14, 783 (Rogan).

45. Mr. Rogan also agreed that deficiencies in the use of the radiological line, particularly in terms of receiving operational information, hanpered conrunications between Licensee and the Conmonwealth.

Mr. Rogan feels, however, that such cocmunication probles can be resolved through amended procedures. Tr. 23, 088-89 (Rogan). 'Ihe Board cannot understand how the probles of an overburdened line can be resolved l

through procedures. In any case, the Licensee has in no way d ecnstrated i that this problem has been corrected. Although Mr. Rogan suggested that

an additional dedicated line could be installed between Licensee and BRP, such a line has not been produced. Instead, Licensee's preferred solution was for the Comonwealth to dispatch its engineer to the ECF in order to " facilitate conrmnications" and to " enhance both the state's understanding and ours of the situation and the processes that were ongoing." Tr. 23, 089-90 (Rogan).

46. The Connetsealth also questioned the difference between division of responsibilities during the early hours of an emergency (between hours one and three) and at later times, when the Licensee agrees to divide responsibilities between the Emergency Director and the Emergency
Support Director. Tr. 23, 092-93 (R. Adler). Licensee's response, essentially, is that the need for broad managec
ent direction from the EOF expands greatly as an accident proceeds. Tr. 23, 093-96 (Rogan) .

Assuming this premise to be correct, the Conrunwealth next asked what the disadvantage was of delegating to an, interim emergency support director only the function of making protective action reconrmndations to the state during the early hours of an accident. Tr. 23, 096 (R.

Adler). Licensee's only response to this question was the pura judgmmt that it is desirable to vest responsibility for making protective action recocmendations to the state in the rest senior transge.ent official onsite. Tr. 23, 096-97 (Rogan) . In Licensee's vice, this consideration is core important than the reed to impreve the conrunication of the protective action recomendation to the Ccuncrealth. Tr. 23, 100 (Rogan) . In the vice of the Staff, Tr. 23,101 (Chesnut), and obviously the Connerwealth, the oppaite is true. This is where the Board's judgment nust focus.

47. The Board has given this controversy a considerable amxmt of

attention, and finds the question to be a close one. Initially, the Board was inclined to question the wiJam of interfering with Licensee's managarant decision as to where to repose decision-making authority during an emergency. Bis hesitation, howver, nust be balanced against the real and valid concerns identified by the Staff and the Comonwealth regarding the need for the EOF and the F2rergency Support Director during the early hours of an emergency. On balance, the Board finds that the reasoning presented by the Staff and the Cocoonwealth is sufficient to override Licensee's management prerogatives in this regard. %e Board has had the opportunity to observe both the Staff and the Cocm m ealth during the manage::ent phase of this proceeding. In no other instance did either party attempt to substitute their judg;mnt in place of Licensee's with regard to the managec:ent structure of El. Both parties obviously recognized the beneficial policy of allowing the maxima:n amount of manage::ent flexibility possible as long as the desired result of good managenent is achieved. L e EOF issue is unique, howcVer, in that it

! involves the interface between Licensee's managemnt structure and the structure of offsite emergency response organizations. It is only this factor that led the Staff and the Cocuonwealth to question Licensee's judgment.

48. %e Board's decision is based on a number of factors. First, i

the Board is persuaded that @e concerns raised by both the Staff and I

the Conurnealth are valid and need to be corrected. Considerable attention has been given in this proceeding to both onsite and offsite emergency planning as separate issues. Yet surprisingly little focus has been placed on the interface between the onsite and the offsite organizations. Le Board sees adequate staffing of the EOF, with a l

l

single responsible authority in charge of the interface, as a key elenent in this interface. Licensee has provided no alternative solution to these problens. Second, although the Board appreciates Licensee's objections to early vesting of authority in an interim emergency support director, this factor does not, in the Board's judgment, outwigh the critical need to provide a smooth interface between the onsite and offsite erergency response networks. Third, the Board believes that the question is decided, at least in part, by the placanent of burden of proof. The burden of proof is on Licensee to danonstrate the adequacy of the interface between onsite and offsite emergency respor_se organizations, as required by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(2), (3), (5), (6), and (8) . Licensee has not met this burden of proof. Rather it has danonstrated the adequacy of the interface envisioned by the Staff and the Conrotwealth.

Further, the opinions of the Staff and the Cottonwealth are supported by actual experience with drills and exercises as well as considered

~

judgment. Licensee's view is supported only by judgment.

49. The Board concludes that, prior to restart, Licensee must cocmit to the full staffing of the EOF, including the F;nergency Support Director, within about one hour of declaration of a site area energency.

This level of staffing is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that 1MI-1 can be operated safely without endangering the health and safety of the public.

50. The Board wishes to anphasize, however, that it does not intend to limit the flexibility of Licensee to vest decision-traking authority to any degree greater than necessary. Licensee is free to dictate any qualified official as F2rergency Support Director. This view is shared by both the Staff and the Cotterwealtli. Tr. 22, 979 (Tourtelotte); 22, 983, 23, 064-65 (R. Adler).

III. Municipal Plans *

51. The issue of adequacy of nunicipal plans has occupied a large portion of the hearings during the offsite energency planning phase.

The Board shares FDR's and the Comonwealth's concerns that absent .

written plans or implementing procedures at the nunicipal level, no

determination can be made regarding the ai
cunt of resources availabla to 1

implement a protective response at the nunicipal level. Nor can any determination be made of each nunicipality's awareness and acceptance of its unique responsibilities during a fixed nuclear facility energency.

Adler & Bath (3/16 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 44; Tr.19, 090 (Pawlowski); Tr. 20, 910 (Belser); Staff Ex. 21, at 7, 26; Tr. 20, 909 (Wertz). The concept of operations contained in state and county planning follows " accepted emergency managemenn practices" in placing initial responsibility for carrying out a protective response on the municipalities, with reliance upon county and state level resources a augment that initial response. Smith & lothrop, ff. Tr.17, 698, at 3; Adler & Bath (3/16 Testinony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 28; Belser, et al. , ff. Tr. 20, 787, at 5; Knopf, et al. , ff. Tr. 21, 816, at 11. The Board thus finds it important, fraa a logical standpoint, that the planning and preparedness at the municipal level be at least at the same par as that at the state and county levels. This is not presently the case. Staff Ex. 21, at 2, 4.

52. Planning Standard A of NUREG-0654 (10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(1))

requires that "[p]rimary responsibility for energency response . . . by State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones have

_ been assigned, [and] the energency responsibilities of the various

  • This section also covers subject matter identified in Contentions 14(0)_,14 (T).,14 (B),14(W),14(S) (in part), 6(F),14(I),14(C) (in part) .

l

supporting organizations have been specifically established . . .". FEMA has consistently str.ced that to the extent that mergency response responsibilities have been assigned to municipalities, the piredures for carrying out such responsibilities cust be reflected in the county plans. Tr.19, 213 (Bath); Tr.19, 025 (Bath); Staff Ex. 21, at 1 of uphte, 4, 26. In fact, the FDR reviewers would not recccrend that a county plan was adequate unless it incorporated the substance of those municipal procedures. Tr.19, 329 (Adler), h existence or development of the necessary implementing procedures at the nunicipal level is a prerequisite to their incorporation into any county plans.

53. The energency planning rule #urther requires a showing that the protective reasures chosen can and will be implemented. 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a) (1) . FDR's call for written municipal plans is entirely consistent with the rule's requirement. h mere assignment of responsibilities to the nunicipalities does not in and of itself dmonstrate an ability to carry them out. The coordinated response contemplated by the state and county plans cannot succeed unless all participants in the response effort are prepared. h June 2 exercise results highlight the need for articipalities to go through the planning thought process on erch of the responsibilities assigned to then, in order to be adequately prepared. h three municipalities that participated in the June 2 exercise have plans specific to fixed nuclear facility emergencies in place. Board Er. 13 (New Cumberland Borough, Iondonderry Township, and Elizabethtown Borough). Thus, the exercise showed both how prior planning and consideration provided for a goed response in critain areas, and the lack of planning diminished the effectiveness of the response in other l

areas. Specific areas of responsibility will be discussed in greater l

l 1

detail, infra. h Board finds that the nile's requirment of implementability can only be met by a demonstration that nunicipalities within the plume exposure pathway EPZ have developed the necessary implementing procedures. As one of the Comr. wealth's witnesses stated in discussing the importance of nunicipal plans. ". . . in orde- to evaluate a degree of preparedness, the mediu:n for doing so is something in writing."

Tr. 20, 910 (Belser); see also, Tr. 20, 909 (Belser), referring to Oran K. Henderson's* coment on local planning quoted at Tr. 20, 908.

54. 'Ihe plume exposure pathway EPZ for MI-l (as represented on the Comcruealth's unp, Con etw_alth Ex. 2.b) includes 38 nunicipalities, of which 25 have had some fonn of plans suhaitted to FER for review.

, Board Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, and C, Annex V; Board Ex.13. h 13 nunicipalities which have not suhaitted written plans are all located in York and Ihuphin Counties. Board Exhibits 5 and 6, Annex V. Both York and Dauphin Counties have assigned significant responsibilities to the nunicipalities within the plume exposure patirway EPZ in each county, including such areas as designating pick-up points for residents without transportation, identifying invalids, homebounds and nobility-impaired persons with special transportation needs, identifying necessary traffic control points within the nunicipality, coordinating route alerting as a means of notifying the public of an anergency, and identifying available and urrat equipment and personnel resources. Tr. 19, 025 (Bath); Tr.

19, 446-448 (Bath). Without written plans or implenenting procedures covedng these areas of responsibility, the ability of the 13 remining nunicipalities to perfonn their assigned duties promptly renins an unknown. E.g. , Tr. 22, 392 (Bath) . 'Ihe Board also notes that its brief

  • Mr. Henderson was the Director cf pet % at the time of the 'IMI-2 accident.

review of the plans contained in Board Exhibit 13 supported FEMA's observation that many of the existing municipal' plans are deficient in these particular areas. Staff Ex. 21, at 1 of update, 4.

55. Evacuation plans for the 'IMI-l pluma exposure pathway EPZ must provide for all segments of the public; one group identified by NUREG-0654 and FEMA as needing specific planning is that of persons who do not have transportation resources of their own. NUREG ^654, P' W Standard J, Criterion 10.g. and Appendix 4; Adler & Bath (3/16 Testimony),

ff. Tr. 18, 975, at 39. York and Dauphin Counties are relying on the municipalities to determine the location of pick-up points for such persons and to coordinate the means of transporting them. Board Ex. 5, at 8, Sections VI.C.9 and C.10; Board Ex. 6, at 6,Section V.C.8; Staff Ex. 21, at 19; Bath, ff. Tr. 22, 350, at 4; Tr. 22, 468, 22, 470 (Bath);

Belser, et al. , ff. Tr. 20, 787, at 9. 'Ihe pick-up points themselves are an " essential bit of information", which FENA expects will become a part of the public information distributed within the EPZ. Tr. 22, 425 (Bath); Tr. 20, 814 (Curry) . 'Ihe record in this proceeding does not reflect that pick-up points or transportation means have been identified

, for all municipalities. Tr. 20, 947 (Wertz) (Dauphin County has a total of 16 municipalities within EPZ); Staff Ex. 21, at 19; Tr. 22, 391 (Bath). Ibr has FDR established that all pick-up points have been identified despite the lack of municipal plans, so as to avoid "ad hoc management" at the time of an energency. Staff Ex. 21, at 19. In fact, FHR has stated that York County's plan, in particular, would not be

" fully adequate" until pick-up points are included, and a deaanstration l has been made that sufficient vehicles are available to service the pick-up points identified. Bath, ff. Tr. 22, 350, at 4; Tr. 22, 468, i

I

2T., 470 (Bath). And York County has expressed its reliance on the urnicipalities themselves to perform these functions. Tr. 20, 878 (Curry). In light of the estimated size of the population without transportation in York County alone, approximately 3,310 persons,* the Board is especic11y interested in assurances that adequate planning for the evacuation of this sector of the public has been accomplished. This is not possible without a full delineation of where the people are to be picked up, and a lawwledge of what resources are available to each municipality to transport them from these points.

56. A second category of persons identified in WREG-0654 as requiring special planning is that encompassing invalids, homebounds, and other mobility-impaired persons. WREG-0654, Planning Standard J, .

Criterion 10.d; Adler & Bath (3/16 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 30-31; Tr.19, 205 (Adler); 1. .19, 256 (Adler) . FDR's review of the York and Dauphin County plans revesled deficiencies in meeting the planning standard in this area, due both to lack of plans and inadequate plans at

, the nunicipal level.** The deficiencies resulted from both the failure to identify the actual persons requiring transportation, and the failure to determine the available and unmet resources. Adler & Bath (3/16 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 2 (outline), 30-31, 43-44; Staff Ex. 21, at 18. FDR felt this was a deficiency which would have to be ccrrected

  • This number is based on the figures found in the Parsons Brinkerhoff Evacuation Tima Study. Licensee Ex. 52, at 8. The following ERPA's are included in York County: 4, 5, 6, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41. It should be noted that Manchester Borough, though listed on p. 7, is not assigned an ERPA nutrber on p. 3.
    • This is another area where York and Dauphin Counties have assigned planning responsibility to the irdividual municipalities.

Board Ex. 5, at 8, Sections VI.C.8 and C.ll; Board Ex. 6, at 6,Section V.C.9.

to receive final approval.* Tr.19, 205 (Adler); Tr.19, 256 (Adler).

Pre-planning for invalids and other robility-inpaired persons is especially important due to the difficulty of quickly identifying this group and their unique transportaticn needs during an actual anergency. Tr. 22, 384-385 (Bath). 'Ihis was supported by the experience of the June 2 exercise. New Cumberland Borough waited until the exercise itself to do an assessment of who would need transportation and what kind of special assir.tance they would require; the process of just making the assessment took 1-1/2 hours. Staff Ex. 20, at 4. Icndonderry Township, on the other hand, had assimilated the necessary infornntion prior to the exercise and apparently suffered no delay in performing this function.

Staff Ex. 20, at 30. 'Ihe Board notes that without a documented attempt at the nunicipal level to develop lists of invalids, homebounds, and other mobility-impaired persons, and to identify the transportation resources required, there is no assurance that this segment cf the public can and will be evacuated during an emergency. Adler & Bath (3/16 Testinony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 43-44; Tr. 22, 391 (Bath); Tr. 22, 364 (Bath).

57. Municipalities have been delegated a major responsibility with respect to notification of the public of the existence of an energency.

Tr. 20, 877 (curry); Tr.17, 855 (Imison) . At the close of the record, route alerting ** was one of the primary methods of notification. Bath &

Adler (2/23 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 25; Staff Ex. 21, at 9.

  • Requirenents for " final approval" by FDfA will be viewed as requirenents for coupliance with the energency planning rule, since both processes apply the same planning smndards. Conpare 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b) with 44 C.F.R. 5350.5(a); Tr. 22, 527, 22, 529 (Dickey), for interim agency rule status of 44 C.F.R. Part 350.
    • Route alerting is a process by which a sound truck (s) drives along a pre-detemined route within the municipality, using a loudspeaker to advise the public to turn their radios to the Frergency Broadcast System (EBS) for further details. E.g., Staff Ex. 20, at 5; Tr. 22, 792 (flardy)

After installation and activation of a new siren systen by Licensee,* it is anticipated that the route alerting systen will be relied upon for suppleentary or backup notification capability only. Tr. 22, 793-94 (Adler); Tr. 22, 450 (Bath); Staff Ex. 21, at 9; Bath & Adler (2/23 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 22-23. It should be noted, however, that the full extent of reliance on route alerting cannot be determined until the siren systen is installed and fully tested.** Adler & Bath (3/16 Testirony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 14-15. As supplementary notification, the route alerting system must be capable of assuring 1007. coverage of the plume exposure pathway EPZ within 45 minutes of notification of a general emergency to the county. NUREG-0654, Appendix 3, Section B.2(c);

Staff Ex. 21, at 9. There is no question that the present level of planning for route alerting is inadequate due to the failure of many municipalities to predesignate routes and determine physical and personnel resources needed to accomplish the task within 45 nanutes. Staff Ex.

21, at 1 and 9; Staff Ex. 20, at 7, recomendation 8. The June 2 exercise highlighted the potential probles with route alerting, even in municipalities where attention had been paid to planning in this area.

Both Iondonderry Township and Elizabethtown Borough ran into problems completing the predesignated routes due to lack of available trucks. In Iondonderry Township, the fire truck had to respond to an energency part-way into the exercise. Staff Ex. 20, at 5. In E'babethtown Borough, the lack of vehicles allowed the alerting of only 3 out of 4

  • The NRC Staff has recomended that installation and activation of the siren system be required prior to restart. Chesnut, ff. Tr. 22, 881. See also 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Section D.3.
  • IEfA has not even set standards yet for fully testing siren systems, so it is unknown when this point will be reached. Tr. 22, 889 (Chesnut) . See discussion on Siren Notification Systen, infra.

pre-designated sectors in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />,15 minutes; it was estimated the ccxaplete exercise would have taken 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, 45 minutes. Staff Ex. 20, at 5-6. Without detailed planning at the municipal level, there is no assurance that a system which provides for notification of 100% of the public within 45 minutes is in place or ccn be implemented. See also, l

Tr. 19, 102 (Adler) .

58. h question of implenentability of a protective action ultimately rests with the availability of adequate resources to carry out the functions described in any plan. h reliance in the 'IMI-l area energency planning or response by the lowest-level government first enphasizes the need for municipalities to recognize their responsibilities and assess the adequacy of their personnel and equipment resources to meet these responsibilities. Adler & Bath (3/16 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 36; Tr. 20, 909 (Wertz). h county plans have assigned to municipalities the responsibility of' determining unmet needs and reporting them to the county, but the lack of municipal plans does not reflect whether this has been done. Board Ex. 5, at 8, Sections VI.C.9, C.10, and C.13; Board Ex. 6, at 6, Sections V.C.8 and C.10. Even those municipalities with written plans have not necessarily adequately identified their unmet needs. h Elizabethtown Borough plan provided for evaluation during the exercise of the need for extra buses and a:6ulances. 'Ihis was characterized by FB R as " unsatisfactory municipality / county coordination". Staff Ex. 20, at 27. 'Ihe previous discussion within this section has identified various types of personnel and equipment resources which should be planned for at the nunicipal level prior to an anergency. h Board has identified the following additional areas based on testimony presented during the hearings, but it is by no means

intended to be an exhaustive listing of possible unmet needs: traffic  !

control points and personnel (Adler & Bath (3/16 Testirony), ff. Tr.18,  !

975, at 55-56; Tr. 20, 943 (Belser); Tr. 20, 973 (Belser)); anergency services such as wrecker and fuel services (Belser, et al. , ff. Tr. 20, 787, at 4; Tr.17, 831 (Lamison); Tr.19, 202 (Adler)); buses and anbulances (Tr. 20, 807-808 (Curry); Tr. 19, 444 (Bath)).

~

59. On the basis of the record in this proceeding, to the extent i that nunicipal plans are non-existent or deficient and counties have not
done the planning for the nunicipalities, the Board finds that there has J

been insufficient showing that the capability exists at the nunicipal level to take the emergency actions assigned to them. 'Ihe Board notes 4

with favor the efforts being undertaken at various levels to irprove the i ,

extent of nunicipal p1r_nning: Licensee has retained an emergency planning consulting firm to provide its services to nunicipalities (Knc.? f, et al. ,

ff. Tr. 21, 816); the Contensmalth has in its Propo, sed Findings of Facts -

stated its objective of working with the counties to get all nunicipal plans cccpleted; and the County Coordinators have pledged their assistance to the nunicipalities in assessing resource deficiencies, in particular (Tr. 20, 799 (Curry)). 'Iherefore, the Board finds that planning and preparation in the following substantive areas cust be reflected at the nunicipal level:

1. identification of pick-up points for persons without transportation and assessment of available and unmet transportation needs;
2. identification of invalids, homebounds and other mobility-impaired persons and assessment of available and urnet transportation needs; 4
3. identification of routes which will provide for 100%

notification within 45 minutes and assessment of available and

unmet personnel and equiptent necessary to acconplish same; i

. .. - - - ~n. . . - , . - -

. - . - . - - - - . - . - - . . . - - - ..- -.-----.,w.--,-c.,-- -- ,

l

4. identification of unmet personnel and equirmmt needs for j all aspects of nunicipal response during a fixed nuclear incident mergency.

The Board directs the NRC Staff to nonitor the development of nunicipal plans within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and to advise the Conmission, in the context of its January 1,1982 status report,* of the progress being made. The Staff is specifically directed to determine whether each municipality within the plume exposure pathway EPZ is prepared to perform the above functions, and whether such preparation is reflected in the form of written plans or written impleenting procedures which are consistent with state and county-level planning.

IV. School Plans **

60. The concept of operations for evacuation of school children attending school within the plume exposure pathey EPZ surrounding 'IMI-l' places reliance upon individual schools to conduct the actual evacuation i

in coordination with the school districts and respective counties. Tr.

22, 395 (Bath); Tr. 22, 407 (Bath); Tr. 20, 902-03 (Curry, Wertz) . The present state of planning reflects the existence of " master plans" at the county level which identify the host schools or centers for evacuated school children, i.e., those points outside the plume ex usure pathway EPZ where parents can pick thei children up. E.g., Board Ex. 5, Annex 0 (York County). The responsibility for developing implementing procedures l

on a school-by-school basis, for providing coordination between risk and host schools, and for providing the bus resources necessary to effectuate an evacuation have been specifically delegated to the school

  • See Tr. 22, 924 (Chesnut).
    • This section also covers subject matter identified in Contention 6 (D) (3) , 14(V) , 14(AA) , 16 (T) , 14(B) (in part) , 16 (J) . .

l I districts. EA , Board Ex. 5, Annex 0, Sections II.C.1, C.2, and C.3; Board Ex. 6, Annex L, Sections II.B.1, B.2, and B.4. Most impucusntly, -

the decision of which schools within a district will be evacuated (e.g.,

o if a school straddles the EPZ, or if the children att e h g a school outside the EPZ reside within the EPZ) has also been delegated to the school districts. Tr. 20, 859 (curry); Tr. 20, 856-857 (Wertz); Tr. 20, 863 (Belser); Tr. 20, 866 (Curry). Based upon the record in this proceeding, the Board concludes that of the approximately 16 scheol districts affected, only 2 school districts have coupleted plans which are specific to a

~

fixed nuclear facility mergency, or which have been coordinated with the county-level ' baster plan". Tr. 20, 968-969 (Wertz); Tr. 20, 969-970 (Curry). Apparently the schools themselves also do not have plans or implementing procedures which are based upon the county-level ' baster 3

l plan". Tr. 22, 395 (Bath); Tr. 22, 407 (Bath) .

61. The evacuation of school children is another situation, similar to that described in the " Municipal Plans" section, where various important responsibilities have been assigned to school districts and e individual schools, yet little evidence has been presented to show that
the school districts or schools have accepted those responsibilities and 4 have the resources or capability to carry then out. See NUREG-0654, Planning Standard A, p. 31, and 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1) . The question of  ;

I whether the school evacuation portion of the 911-1 area emergency response l plans can and will be implemented is still open - one which cannot be answered until school district plans specific ts mclear emergencies

! (i.e. coordinated with the county " master plann") are available and reviewed. Tr.19, 025 (Adler)_; Tr. 22, 435-436 (Bath); Tr. 22, 430 1

(Bath); Tr. 22, 480 (Bath) . FEFA witnesses stated on a number of occasions i

l i

- - . . , , - - - . . - , . - - , - - - - - - . , . - . . . . - - - - - - - - . . - ~ . . . - .

^

4 e that they found this lack of plann$ng at the school or school district i

level to be an important deficiency which would render the county plans inadequate. Bath & Adler (_2/23 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975 at 55; Adler

& Bath (3/16 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 4, 56-57; Bath, ff. Tr. 22, 350, at 5 (see also Tr. 22, 401-402); Tr. 22, 436 (Bath); Tr. 22, 866-967 (Hardy); Tr. 22, 479 (Bath); Tr. 19, 267-268 (Bath); Tr. 19, 329 (Adler); Staff Ex. 21, at 26. To achieve a final finding of adequacy,*

the county plans would have to reflect that tra school districts or schools had recognized their responsibilities during a nuclear emergency and had documented adequate resources to inplement those responsibilities.

Tr.19, 215 (Adler); Tr.19, 214 (Pawlowski). Catmonwealth and County

witnesses also emphasized the desirability of having plars available to determine the level of preparedness at the school or school district

. level. Tr. 20, 909 (Belser); Tr. 20, 844 (Belser); Tr. 20, 909 (curry);

~

Tr. 20, 859 (Curry); Tr. 20, 909 (Wertz).

62. The Board agrees with FDfA and the other witnesses that plans or implementing procedures, at least at the school district level, are critical for conducting a coordinated evacuation effort. First, the estimated size of the school population of approximately 37,306 students **

represents a substantial portion of the public to be evacuated. Thus, the Board takes particular notice of the fact that inplementing procedures

for taking protective measures for this sector of the public are virtually i
non-existent. Second, the functions assigned to the school districts i

are important ones, and failure to perform them adequately and in a timely manner during an emergency could directly affect the success of

  • See footnote *, p. 36 suora.
  • This number is the sum of the enrollment data for schools located within the EPZ provided in the Parsons Brinkerhoff Evacuation Time Study. Licensee Ex. 52, Table 8, at 16-24.

r _ - , , . . --

an cacuation. The importance of the school district's initial function -

identifying those schools which will need to be evacuated - does not even warrant discussion. 'Ihe present state of planning includes a list at the county level of host schools or centers, but no complete listing of schools which will need to be evacuated. Pre-identification of affected schools is a logical planning task, which should be accomplished prior 'to the onset of a real emergency. Tr. 20, 859 (curry).

j 63. Along with the identification of schools which will need to be t

evacuated, the school pinnning nust demonstrate a coordination with the county-level " master plan"; i.e. , the school level planning nust recognize which host schools or centers are relevant and what routes will be taken to get there. Tr.19, 408 (Bath) . Since information regarding appropriate responses during an emergency reaches the principals and teachers of each school through the school district (Tr. 20, 843 (curry)), it seems wise to eliminate as many levels of infoitation-gathering as possible ,

q prior to an actual emergency. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the public information to be predistributed will include information regarding host schools or centers for students and appropriate action to be taken by parents. Tr. 22, 433-434 (Bath). The Board notes with concern that 4

this information cannot be provided until the school districts have

identified which schools will be affected, and failure to provide this

! information prior to an emergency may affect the parents' response.

64. The other primary function to be performed at the school level is identification of resources available to effectuate an evacuation.

Schools are expected to use their own buses to evacuate their stud ets, and to provide notification to the bus drivers in the event of an 1

emergency. Tr.19, 408 (Bath); Adler & Bath (.3/16 Testimony), ff. Tr.

4

, ~ ,---n - -, ,- , ~ m - + - - - - - - - , - = - --,m - ---

m e -- -

m-- -

18, 975 at 35. Without plans at the school or school district level, FDR has been unable to assess whether enough buses can be provided during an mergency to evacuate each risk school. Adler & Bath (3/16 Testinony), ff. Tr.18, 975 at 60; Adler & Bath (3/16 Testimony), ff.

Tr. 18, 975, at 35; Staff Ex. 21, at 7. Apparently, the lack of planning in this area caused some confusion during the June 2 exercise. Tr. 22, 865-866 (Swiren). Similarly, FDR has been unable to assess whether the schools and buses have the connunications means available to relate necessary information to the bus drivers. Tr. 19, 118-119 (Adler).

FH M feels it is " critical" to have this information in order to judge the adequacy of planning for the school population, since methods of notification of key emergency response personnel is a specific requirenent of NUREG-0654, Planning Standard F. Adler & Bath (3/16 Testimony), ff.

Tr.18, 975 at 56-57; Tr.19,121 (Adler).

65. One additional problen relating to schools was highlighted by the June 2 exercise and.will be discussed briefly. The June 2 exercise showed thac lack of adequate planning at all levels regarding schools caused " conflicting direction" which would have led to " serious confusion".

Staff Ex. 20, at 8. Specifically, the appropriate " chain of conmand" regarding the direction to close schools was unclear as between the Pennsylvania Departrent of Education ard the respective counties. Tr.

22, 865-866 (Swiren). h Board feels that this particular problan 4

regarding school evacuations will be resolved in the revised versions of the state and county emergency response plans. h Ccumanwealth has, in its Proposed Fir. dings of Fact, indicated that the decision to close or evacuate schools will be made by PER in consultation with the

, Pennsylvania Department of ihntion. The recomrendation will then pass

_44_

l L

' from PDR to the counties, ubo will contact the appwgiate school
districts, who will contact the affected schools.

l

66. The Board notes that FDR has placed the issue of improved coordination at all levels for school evacuations high on its list of -

i issues to be corrected first. Staff Fx. 20, at 1-2, Femwvb tions 2,

! 3, and 7; Tr. 22, 753 (Adler); Tr. 22, 867 (Hardy). The Board also notes that school districts have been characterized as "rather independent" and likely to exercise their independent j4=mt. Tr.19, 437 (Bath).

In light of this and in light of the virtual void of information regarding the extent of planning at the school district and school levels, the Board finds that there has been no showing that school children can and i

will be evacuated as planned for by the counties. Tr. 22, 395 (Bath).

Planning at the school or school district level is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that DE-1 can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public. The Board acknowledges that school district plans are in the process of being developed, with assistance from various levels: the energency managenent consultant hired by Licensee has provided a model school plan (Knopf, et al. , ff. Tr. 21, 816, at 8-9); the Cocmonwealth has in its Proposed Findings of Fact stated its objective of providing guidance to the school districts in order to cocplete the remaining plans, while at the same time urging the districts to expedit eir development by joint letter from PDR and the Department of Education; the County Coordinators have held meetings with the school district superintendents to encourage them to complete

! the plans (Tr. 20, 848 (Wertz); Tr. 20, 842 (Curry)) . The Board, however, i

l is concerned with results and not just efforts. Therefore, the Board finds that the state and county plans nust reflect a coordinated

]

l 1

decision-making procedure regarding the closing or evaucation of schools, prior to restart. In addition, the Board finds that planning and preparation for the evacuation of schools nust be reflected at least at the school district level prior to restart. The Board directs the IEC ,

Staff to certify to the Cour.Jssion that each school district is prepared to evacuate in accordance with the appropriate county " master plan",

that such preparation is reflected in the form of written plans or written implementing procedures at the school district level, and that such plans or implementing procedures have been connunicated to the affected schools.

l f

,a

V. Boergency Workers

67. Energency workers, as a category, are specifically referred to in the emergency planning rule and NUREG-%54. Planning Standard J of NUREG-0654* requires that "[a] range of protective actions have been developed for emergency workers...". The specific evaluation criteria make reference to the suggested use of radioprotective drugs for emergency workers as a protective action. NUREU-0654, Planning Standard J, Criteria 10.e and lv f. Planning Standard K of NUREG-0654** requires that the "[mleans for controlling radiological exposures, in an energency, are established for energency workers." The specific evaluation criteria refer to dosimetry, both self-reading and permanent record devices, as the suggested means of controlling radiological exposures.
68. The Conronwealth of Pennsylvania has incorporated both suggestions in its plans regarding energency workers during a fixed nuclear facility incident. Cmmonwealth Ex. 2, Appendix 16,Section V. In fact, since evacuation and sheltering are alnest by definition inappropriate for emergency workers, the Cuu.urmalth relies on the use of a thyroid prophylactic drug and dosime ry as the protective measures to be taken for this group.
69. At the close of hearings on emergency planning issues, serious problens regarding the capability to implement both methods of protection for energency workers had been identified. In addition to inadequate supplies of both the drug and dosimetry, the existing supplies hr.d not been fully predistributed to the energency response organizations, nor had adequate distribution plans for use during an emergency been developed.
    • This is the same language as used in the energency planning rule, 10 C.F.R. iS0.47(b)(11) .

FDR found that this state of affairs provided "relatively little assurance" that radioprotective drugs and dosimetry could be used as protective actions for emergency workers during an emergency, or that a "desirtble level of protection" wuld be achieved. Tr. 22, 772-773 t (Adler); Tr. 22, 764-765 (Adler) . Furthermore, FEMA rated the pre-distribution of the drug and dosimetry for emergency workers as one of .

the most important issues to be addressed after the June 2 exercise.

Staff Ex. 20, at 1-2, No. 5; Tr. 22, 753 (Adler) . <

, 70. The Board finds that improvements must be made in the area of p1atective actions and radiological exposure control for emergency workers. The individual types of protective measures will be discussed separately, infra.

1 A. Dosimetry l 71. The function of dosimetry is to determine the radiological 4

dose received by an individual. In the case of emergency wrkers, dosimetry ,

is the method used to determine the amount of exposure s/he is receiving, t

specifically for purposes of advising the worker to leave the plume exposure pathway EPZ once the pre-determined lwel of exposure has been

  • reached. Connonwealth Ex. 2; Appendix 16,Section V.B.
72. The state plan, as reflected in Connerrmalth Exhibit 2, presently calls for distribution of dosimetry to the emergency workers at the time of an incident. Conmonwealth Ex. 2, Appendix 16,Section V.B. Central storage of tne equipment would be at Fort Indiantown Gap, with distribution to the county, and from there to the individual ccergency workers. Tr.

22, 768-769. (Adler)_. FBR has been unable to assess whether timely distribution of dosimetry to the individual workers can be accomplished

]

under this plan. Staff Ex. 21, at 20. The June 2 exercise showed the l l

4 4

4 - - -

infeasibility of this particular plan of distribution. Althe @ a large ancunt oi dosimetry was predistributed to the counties in anticipation of the exercise, at least one county did not have any means of distributing the dosimetry equipment to the participating nunicipality. Tr. 22, 386 (Bath); Staff Ex. 20, at 21. FDR indicated that "{t]his would have been a major problen had there been an actual incident at 'IMI." Staff Ex. 20, at 21.

73. The Board agrees with FDR's frequent statenents that dosimetry uust be predistributed to the local level before there can be any assurance that the equipment will actually be available for use by the emergency workers. Staff Ex. 21, at 20; Tr. 22, 768-769 (Adler); Adler and Path (3/16 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 2 (outline), 31. Although the energency wrkers can still perform their assigned functions without dosimetry, the Board finds that predistribution to at least the county level is necessary to avoid having energency workers renain in the EPZ without protection. Tr. 22, 388 (Bath). The Board also finds that each organization to which predistribution is made nust have a plan or implenenting procedure for distribution to the individual energency workers in the event of an emergency. These actions are required before restart to provide reasonable assurance that the radiological exposure of the energency workers can be monitored, so as to protect their health and safety.
74. The second problen identified with dosimetry was the inadequate supply of permanent record dosimetry to distribute to all energency workers. Staff Ex. 21, at 15. Following the June 2 exercise, it was I

determined that an adequate supply of self-reading dosimet f (CDV-730's 1 1

and CDV-742'sl is available for pre-distribution to the counties for 1

1 emergency wrkers in the plume explosure pathway EPZ for 'IMI-1. Staff Ex. 21, at 15, 20; Tr. 22, 476 (Bath); Staff Ex. 20, at 21; Tr. 22, 386 (Bath). There is, however, a shortfall of permanent record dosimetry (TLD's). Tr. 22, 387 (Bath); Staff Ex. 21, at 15, 20; Tr. 22, 476 (Bath); Staff Ex. 20, at 21; Tr. 22, 771 (Adler) . TLD's are used as a warning mechanism regarding accumulated dosage. Tr. 20, 803 (curry).

75. We Board believes that a supply of both self-reading and permanent-record dosimetry, sufficient to equip each mergency wrker according to the state plan, should be available prior to restart. Bis is consistent with the emergency planning rule's requirment that adequate equipment to support the emergency response must be provided and maintained. 10 C.F.1L 350.47 (b)(8); hEREG-0654, Planning Standard H*;

Bath, ff. Tr. 22, 350, at 4; Staff Ex. 21, at 15. H e Board notes that FDR has identified possible alternate methods of compliance with this standard, given the lack of dosimetry equipment. These include rotating emergency wrkers nore frequently then otherwise planned for, or using one dosimeter for several eergency wrkers stationed in the same area.

Tr. 22, 772-773 (Adler) . FDR has not, however, indicated whether these alternatives are included in the state's planning, or whether they have been found adequate. Based on the record in this proceedir6, the Board cannot, therefore, rely upon these possible alternatives as constituting reasonable assurance that an adequate annunt of dosimetry will be provided to each eargency wrker during an mergency.

76. The Cotrouwealth has, in its Proposed Findings of Fact, made several cocrd.tments regarding the distribution of dosimetry. It has
  • The evaluation criteria for Plannirg Standard H indicate that this requirement is specifically intended to encct: pass radiological monitoring equipment, such as dosimetry. hTREG-0654, Planning Standard H, Criteria 10 and 11.

..s.. -- - s.- - - . - - > .a ,, - s.

4 4

coumitted to predistribute all necessary self-reading dosimetry (QN-BO's and QN-742's)- to the risk counties _ prior to restart. It is.

requesting additional supplies of 'IID's from FDR, and will predistribute 4 available TLD's ' to the county level as soon as possible. In addition, the Conmniealth has stated that it will assist the counties in developing plans for further distribution of the dosimetry during an emergency, and such distribution plans will be a part of the county plans when they are submitted to FDR for formal review. 'Ihe Comorsealth has also comitted ,

to review and revise, where necessary, its plans regarding rotation of emergency workers; this will be accmplished prior to restart.

77. 'Iherefore, the Board directs the NRC Staff to certify to the l Comission that the following itees have been accmplished prior to restart:

1

.l. Sufficient supplies of self-reading dosimetry have been predistributed to the 5 risk counties to equip each emergency worker fully according to the state plan; -

i .

2. To the extent that sufficient supplies of permanent i_ record dosimetry have not been predistributed, state and county

! plans include other means to provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of emergency workers will be insured;

3. Prior to restart each county plan includes procedures for further predistribution of dosimetry, or procedures for timely distribution of dosimetry to individual mergency workers during an emergency.

! B. Equipment Training 4

78. 'Ibe mergency planning rule requires that "[r]adiological emergency response training (be] provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency." 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(15); NUREG-0654, Planning
Standard O. Testimony presented by the Cocoonwealth indicated that, for i
the nost part, training programs for emergency response personnel had i

i i

been developed. Ianison (Training), ff. Tr.17, 818 at 2. Although not all emergency workers have received the necessary training, FDR inplied that the June 2 exercise results could be used to show that the emergency response personnel had the requisite knowledge, possibly despite formal training. Chesnut and Bath, ff. Tr.19, 626, at 16; Tr. 22, 800 (Adler);

Bath, ff. Tr. 22, 350, at 8,10-11; Tr. 22, 412 (Bath) . ,

79. The exercise results did, however, show a lack of training at the volunteer level regarding the proper use of personnel decontamination mcnitoring and record-keeping equipment, i.e. dosimetry. Thus, decontamination nonitoring personnel at one mass care center were ,

unfamiliar with the use of the equipment assigned to them. Staff Ex.

20, at 21; See also Staff Ex. 21, at 19. Similnvly, the Pennsylvania State Police had not been instructed to read their dosimeters periodically or to keep records of the readings. Staff Ex. 20, at 21. The Board recognizes that providing this training is probably a very simple task, yet the lack of such training totally negates the usefulness of the equipment. FER has indicated that cocpliance with the planning standard regarding adequate equipment includes provision of instruction or use of the equipment. NUREG-0654, Planning Standard H; Staff Ex. 21, at 2, 15, 19, and 25.

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80. Despite the availability of a home-study course on radiological

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monitoring pertaining to a nuclear war scenario, the Board finds that the record contains no reasonable assurances that appropriate instruction in the use of personnel decontamination monitoring equin,mt will be provided to energency wrkers on a timely basis. Tr. 20, 805 (Curry);

Tr. 20, 931 (Curry); Belser, et al. , ff. Tr. 20, 787, at 7. In its Proposed Findings of Fact, the Comuonwealth has stated th-t it is in the 1

. . I process of developing an instructor's course for individuals at the l state agency, county and nunicipal levels, to cover the use of dosimetry and personnel decontamination monitoring equipment. The intent of the instructor's course is to provide those individuals with a curriculum which they can use in training the mergency workers in their respective areas. The Connonwealth intends to offer the instructor's course once or twice prior to January 1,1982. The Board also notes that both County Coordinators who testified stated their personal conmitment to improving the level of trnining in their county. Tr. 20, 931 (Curry);

Tr. 20, 953 (Wertz).

81. Therefore, the Board directs the IRC Staff to certify to the Conr11ssion that, prior to restart, a conprehensive training program has been developed and is available to individual mergency workers, wilich trains them in the use of all appropriate dosimetry and personnel decontamination nonitoring equipment.

C. Potassium Iodide *

82. As reconmended in NUREG-0654, Planning Standard J, regarding protective actions for enagency workers, the Commonwealth has planned to predistribute a radio protective drug (potassium iodide or "KI") to all energency respon.:e organizations, for distribution to individual energscy workers during an energency. Cccronwealth Ex. 2, Appendix 16,Section V.A. , and Appendix 9, Appendix I; Cox, ff. Tr.18, 497, at 1; Tr. 22, 767 (Adler). FEMA has found the state and county predistribution plans for KI adequate. Tr. 22, 765 (Adler); Tr. 22, 420 (Bath); Bath, ff. Tr. 22, 350, at 1.
  • 1his section also covers subject matter identified in Contentions 6(E) , 14(M) . i
83. Be proble with the use of KI as the protective action for emergency workers arises due to lack of supply. Staff Ex. 21, at 18.

Be only type of KI which has been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for blocking uptake by the thyroid of radioactive iodine is " Byro Block", a pill which is prepackaged in appropriate amounts and containers. Cox, ff. Tr. 18, 497, at 1. Wese KI pills are produced by only one manufacturer, and the only supply presently available has a shelf life which. expires December 31, 1981. Tr. 18, 498-499 (Cox); Tr. 22, 768 (Adler) For this reason, the Cocmonwealth of Pennsylvania has not purchased a supply of KI, and thus none is available on a predistributed basis for mergency workers. An "ad hoc" procedure was usd for distribution of KI during the June 2 exerci,se, but the extent of simulation in the procedure and the Deceber 1981 shelf life

o. that supply do not provide the Board with any assurance that KI would actually reach mergency workers in time to be useful.* Staff Ex. 20, at 23; Bath, ff. Tr. 22, 350, at 1; Tr. 22, 765 (Adler); Tr. 22, 354-356 (Bath).
84. In trying to resolve this problem, the Board has looked to agency guidance on the use and importance of KI for emergency workers.

We Board recognizes, of course, that NUREG-0654 specifically reconmends the use of radioprotective drugs, and mentions the development of further guidance on the subject. NUREG-0654, at 63 n. 1; Bath and Adler (2/23

  • Although the KI was not actually distributed to mergency workers  ;

during the exercise, it was estimated that it would have taken from 4-6 hours for the supply to reach the individual needing it. Bath, ff. Tr.

22, 350, at 1. Taking into consideration the fact that emergency workers were already dispersed throughout the EPZ at their assigned positions when the supply would have been distributed, the Board does not attach much weight to those time estimations. Be Board also notes a potential conflict between the length of time required for distribution during the exercise, and the advisability of taking KI several hours before anticipated exposure for maximum thyroid blocking effectiveness. Tr. 18, 541 (Reilly)..

Testirony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 33. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Comnission's position is set out in an " interim position paper" dated May 1980.* That paper does not change the guidance provided in NURFG-0654 with respect to emergency workers. h FDR agency position also supports the use of KI for energency workers. Tr.19, 398-399 (Pawlowski).

Apparently the FDA has done a risk / benefit analysis which even supports the use of KI by the general public. Tr. 19, 399 (Pawlowski).

85. FDR reviewers of the plans and June 2 exercise have attached great importance to the use of KI as a protective action for emergency workers. The unavailability of KI, despite the #ull use of dosiretry, caused FDR to find exposure control of the field monitoring teams during the exercise to be inadequate. Staff Ex. 20, at 18. Similarly, FEBR would expect other protective measures to be provided for in plans, in the event that KI was unavailable. Tr. 19, 074 (Bath). The record does not reflect that other measures adequate to protect against radioactive lodine exposure have been provided for in the state or county plans.**
86. Based upon its review of the guidance regarding the usefulness of KI, and the fact that no provisions have been found in the emergency response plans for alternate reliable protective actions specific to radioactive iodine for emergency workers, the Board finds that the predistribution of KI is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the energency workers will be protected. Under
  • The Board took official notice of the Cocmission's interim position paper, SECY 80-257/257A. This is also the NRC guidance on which the Cocrouwealth based its decision to predistribute KI. Tr. 18, 523, 18, 526 (Cox)_.
    • There is no clothing which totally protects against radioactive iodine. Cmaare Staff Ex. 20, at 18, with Tr. 19, 380-382 (Adler, Pawlowski); mtison (Cctrand & ControlDf. Tr.17, 818, at 3. The relative merits of specialized breathing apparatus, access control and prophylaxis have not been developed on the record, nor are they included in the plans. Staff' Ex. 20, at 18; Tr.19, 075 (Adler).

ordinary circumstances, the Board wald find that predistribution is required prior to restart. However, in its proposed Findings of Fact, the Cmnotwealth has cocmitted to make KI available to the target. groups identified in its plan *, to the extent that the plan provisions are consistent with forthcoming FDA guidance. This comnitment is predicated upon the availability of a supply with a reasonable shelflife beyond

Decenber 31, 1981.
87. Therefore, the Board directs the FEC Staff to notify the Conmission within a reasonable time after a supply of KI becomes available, whether predistribution has been accomplished in accordance with the state and county plans, and consistent with the nest recent federal guidance available at that time.

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  • This includes emergency workers and institutionalized persons.

Connonwealth Ex. 2, Appendix 9, Appendix I,Section V.

.l VI. Public Frhention*

88. 'Ihe Board finds that a cocprehensive and timely public education program is essential to ensuring a successful public response in the event of an anergency at M-1. h M -2 accident highlighted the importance of dissaninating information prior to an actual energency situation regarding both the effects of radiation and the expected reactions of the public. Tr.17, 715 (Gen. Smith); Tr.19, 464 (Pawlowski).

Almost every witness who testified on the nature of public reactions drew a direct correlation between the amount and accuracy of info n tion provided to the public and the appropriateness of their reaction during an emergency. A, E Tr.17, 717 (Gen. Smith); Tr. 20, 863 (Belser); Tr.

19, 290 (Pawlowski); Staff Ex.19 (Witness Jaske); Eriksen, ff. Tr. 21, 686.

89. 'Ihe emergency planning rule sets forth a planning standard 3

which requires that "[i]nformation [be] made available to the public on l ca periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency ...". 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(7). h evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654 specify that such public information should include, at a minkm, general information on the effects of radiation, information on evacuation routes and protective measures available, and information for populations with special needs. NUREG-0654, Planning Standard G, Criterion 1. ' Ibis pt blic education program must be in place prior to the occurrence of an emergency. Chesnut &

Bath, ff. Tr. 19, 626, at 8.

  • 'Ihis section also covers subject matter identified in Contentions
14(Q),14(C) (in part).

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90. ne comomealth hes set forth a comprehensive public information program in Annex E (Fixed Nuclear Facility Incidents) to its Disaster Operation;: Plan.  % e Annex includes direct distribution to the public and media coverage. Comonwealth Ex. 2, Appendix 15,Section IV. De essential elements of the program are brochures prepared for each of the 5 risk counties which include evacuation routes and other pertinent information. E.g., Co _alth Ex. 4, 5, and 7. h se brochures have been distributed at least to the mmicipal level in most counties. Tr.

18, 046 (Comey); Tr.19, 053 (Adler). Be latest distribution in York County, for exanple, was Nova ber, 1980 Tr. 20, 799-800 (Curry). he Conromealth (PDR) has also prepared a booklet giving general educotional information on radiation. Comanwealth Ex. 3. %e record reflects that this booklet was last distributed in the 24I-1 area in September,1979.

Tr. 18, 065-067 (Comey).

91. FDR has reviewed the 5 county brochures ang1 the PER brochure and has found that a combination of the information in both is required for full coupliance with Planning Standard G. Staff Ex. 21, at 13; Tr.

22, 426 (Bath); Chesnut & Bath, ff. Tr. 19, 626, at 9; Tr. 18, 981 (Adler); Tr. 22, 799 (Adler); Tr.19, 291 (Pawlowski). Furthormre, FDR has found that implementation of the public education program is required prior to a formal finding of adequacy;* i.e., both the county and PDR panphlets unst be distributed to the entire permanent and transient population. Tr.19, 338 (Adler); Chesnut & Bath, ff. Tr.19, 626, at 8, 9; Tr.18, 983-984 (Adler); Tr. 22, 799 (Adler).

92. Be Lard's review of the entire record on anergency planning issues leads it to the conclusion that the county brochures may be outdated and inadequate. Tr.18, 048 (Camey) . The Dauphin County
  • See footnote *, p. 36, suora.

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Coordinator indicated that revisions to his brochure was anticipated, based upon changes reflected in the April,1981 draft of the county plan. Tr. 20, 962 (Wertz).* In addition, the County coordinators stated that pick-up points identified by the nut.cipalities i wuld become a part of the public education materials. Tr 20, 814, 20, 879 (Curry);

Tr. 20, 947 (Wertz). Some changes in the evacuation routes may be I

made following PDR's full review of the Parsons Brinkerhoff Evacuation Time Study (Licensee Ex. 52). Tr.19, 387 (Adler); Tr.18, 015 (Lothrop);

Tr. 18, 072 (Comey). FDR has stated that infomation regarding school  ;

evacuations should be included in the county brochures. Tr. 22, 433-34 (Bath); Tr.19, 636 (Bath). %e Board also notes that a review of the final versions of the public information pamphlet by FDR or the IRC 4

Staff is anticipated. Tr.19, 390 (Adler); Tr. 22, 916 (Chesnut.

93. Based on the above discussion, the Board finds that a combined distribution of updated county brochures and the PDR booklet is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be adequately protected, in that the public will have complete and accurate infomation available prior to the possibility of an energency at M E-1. 'Ihe Board finds further that this distri'oution must be accomplished prior to restart, in order to achieve the result cf educating the public prior to the possibility of an accident.
94. In its Proposed Findings of Fact, the Connonwealth has conmitted to the distribution of the updated PDR booklet end county brochures prior to restart. He Board also notes that Licensee has, by letter dated June 26, 1981, comitted to assume at least financial responsibility {

for such printing and distribution. Tr. 22, 878 (Chesnut).

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  • Based upon the Cocuenwealth's announced intention to submit  !

further revised county plans to FEMA for formal review later this year, the county brochures should reflect the most up-to-date information I 1 available. See Tr.19, 633 (Chesnut).

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95. Therefore, the Board directs the NRC Staff to certify to the Comission that the followi g items have been accmplished prior to i restart:
1. N 5-risk county brochures have been revised and updated;
2. h PE R brochure and updated county brochures have been distributed to the resident population
  • within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

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VII. Notification to Transients *

96. The Board has dealt with the t*ansient sector of the population in a separate sea an, because the issues relating to transients cover tw main substantive areas which cannot be easily disassociated: public education and notification. " Transients", as that term has been used in this proceeding, includes those,mebers of the public who do not permnently reside within the plume eg osure path ay EPZ; i.e., tourists or other visitors, and the non-residential work force. E_.g.,, Adler & Bath (3/16 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 6; Staff Ex. 21, at 13,18; Bach, ff.

Tr. 22, 350, at 1. The estimated size of this transient population is variable, from a minimum of approximately 9,016 people ** to a maximum of apr_oximately 23,918 people.***

97. NUREG-0654 makes specific reference to the transient population:

"The public information program shall provide the . . . transient adult population within the plume exposure EPZ an adequate opportunity to becoce aware of the information anrnally . . .

Signs or other measures ... shall also be used.

to disseminate to any transie.nt population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ apewetlate information that would be helpful if an mergency or accident occurs."

NUREG-0654, Planmng Standard G, Criterion 2.

". . . plans to impleent protective measures for the plume exposure pathay shall include: ...

Means for notifying all segments of the transient and resident populations."

NUREG-0654, Planmng Standard J, Criterion 10.c.

Clearly, the transient population is one of the segments of "the public" for whom public education and protective actions must be provided for

  • This section also covers subject matter identified in Contention 14(C) (in part), 6(D)(9).
    • This number is the sum of the estimated tourist / transient population and the estimated transient sployment xpulation data under a night scenario, as presented in the Parsons Brirkerhoff Evacuation Time Study. Licensee Ex. 52, Tables 5 and 6, pp. 10 and 12.
      • I_d., under day scenario.

l coupliance with the mergency planning rule. 10 C.F.R. SS50.47(b)(7) and (b)(10). Similarly, the transient population is part of "the public" for which notification of an emergency nust be provided within about 15 minutes. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Section D.3.

98. The method of notifying transients within the EPZ for 1MI-l in the event of an mergency is tied directly to the public ed'xation process for that group of people. Planning for notification of transients is a county responsibility. Tr.18, 048 (comey). The latect statement on county planning available to the Board indicates that the counties are relying on notel and hotel tranagers, park managers, and enployers to notify the transients on their prenises themselves in the event of an emergency, and to inform than at that time of the appropriate actions to take. Tr. 22, 372-73 (Bath). This notification should include i dissemination of predistributed public education materials to the transients.

21e responsibility placed en the individual managers and employers is a large one. In York County, e.g. , posting of the county brochure which includes instructions to turn on the radio ar.d evacuation routes (Ccxmotwealth Ex. 5) is no" anticipated. Tr. 22, 374 (B eh). Nor has the information contained in the county brochures been published in places with high visibility to transients, e.g. phone books.* Thus, at the time the siren sounds, the only source of information for the transient on what '

to do next is his/her " host" or enployer. Without having access to the public information brochure until the time of an emergency, the transient may not even know to turn the radio on, let alone which station would carry the EBS announcanent. Bath & Mler (2/23 Testinony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 22.

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  • The Board recognizes that the Comotwealth is working with Bell of Pennsylvania to place this information in phone books, but this appears to be an ongoing process with no known cocpletica date. Tr.

18, 049 (Comey); Tr. 20, 841-42 (Belser).

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99. FE% has stated that distribution of public education materials to the transient population is required before the public education and infonmtion program can be found adequate. IUREG-0654, Placining Standard G; Chesnut & Bath, ff. Tr.19, 626, at 8-10; Tr.19, 628 (Bath); Tr.19, 366, 19, 375 (Adler). FE% has also indicated that distribution of the inforrntion to the transient population nust be accccplished prior to an actual emergency. Chesnut & Bath, ff. Tr. 19, 626, at 9. Apparently, the plan of distributing at least the 5 risk county brochures to the various hotels, notels, enployers, parks, and other transient locations is acceptable to FD R. Tr. 22, 372-74 (Bath). This distribution has not, however, been accomplished yet.* Tr. 20, 965 Giertz); Belser, et al. , ff. Tr. 20, 787, at 6; Tr. D, 051 (Comey) .

100. With respect to the noti.'ication aspect of the transient issue, FER found the level of planning deficient when it first testified before the Board. Chesut & Bath, ff. Tr. 19, 626, at 10; Tr. 10, 103 i

(Bath); Tr.19, 628 (Bath). After reviewing the revised plans which do address transients, FDR still found the level of preparedness to be deficient. Staff F.x. 21, at 18; Bath, ff. Tr. 22, 350, at 2; Tr. 22, 375-77 (Bath). In fact, FD% stated that it had no present assurance that the responsible "bosts" (hotel and notel manag - s, enployers, etc.)

were aware of their responsibility to notify transients, or were capable of carrying out that responsibility. It thus had no assurance that transients would actually be notified during an emergency, or that they mtid actually receive the inforuntion necessary to respond appropriately.

i Tr. 22, 375-77 (Bath). Other than the York County Coordinator's statement that he meets frequently with irntstry officials to discuss emergency  !

l preparedness of all kinds, there is no indication on tFa record that I

  • See discussion of Public Ed1 cation, supra, regarding anticipated revisions to the county brochures.

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mnagers or sployers are aware of the need to notify transients during an emergency, let alone that they are prepared to do so. Tr. 20, 796 (Curry); Tr. 22, 375 (Bath).

101. The Board agrees with FC% that predistribution of the public information brochures to all transient locations is necessary before the requirments of the emergency planning rule can be deemed to have been met. 10 C.F.R. 550.4; (b)(7); Staff Ex. 21, at 13,18; Chesnut & Bath, ff. Tr. 19, 626, at 10. '1he Board also finds that there has been no showing that hotel and motel managers and sployers, etc. within the plume exposure pathway EPZ are capable of imple:enting the unique notification responsibility which has been assigned to thm. On the basis of the present state of preparedness regarding notification and education of transients,--i.e. , the " hosts" are unaware of their responsibility to distribute information during an emergency, nor is the information available to them to distribute--the Board finds that there -

is no reasonable assurance that any measures will be taken during an emergency at 'IMI-l to protect the health and safety of the transient population. 'Ihe Board finds that the level of preparedness regarding notification to the transient population nust be inproved prior to restart.

102. In its Proposed Findings of Fact, the Chuumalth has cocmitted to the distribution of updated county brochures to identified transient loc.ations (e.g. , hotels, motels, parks, mployers) within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Said distribution will be accomplished prior to restart. The Cormuruealth will also encourage the 5 risk counties and respective Chambers of Cocnrrce to follow up at each transient location to urge thmi to make provisions for informing guests or mployees in the event of an emergency at 'IMI-1. 'Iherefore, the Board directs the NRC i

Staff to certify to the Comission that the following items have been l i
accmplished prior to restart
1. Updated public infonnation has been distributed to

, identified transient locations within the plume exposure pathray i EPZ;

2. Steps have been taken to specifically inform the owner or key individual at cach transient location and business of theIr responsibilities in the event of an emergency at 'IMI-1.

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VIII. Access Control 103. B e emergency planning rule requires that "[a] range of protective actions have been developed for the plum exposure pathway EPZ for ... the public." 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(10); NUREG-0654, Planning Standard J. The protective actions included in the Comuotwealth's plans for the M-1 area are sheltering, evacuation and access control.

Cuuuute:.ith Ex. 2; Staff Ex. 21, at 17. Access control serves two important functions: exposure control and security. Staff Ex. 20, at

22. Le concept of access control is to station personnel around the perimeter of the plume exposure pathway EPZ to control entrance into the EPZ during 'heltering or evacuation, and after evacuation has been completed. The Board recognices the importance of limiting the number of people entering the EPZ area on the effectiveness of sheltering or evacuation as a protective action.

104. FER's review of the 1MI-l area plans and the exercise results highlights the present inadequacy of the access control plans. We plans themselves are sketchy and need considerable development. Staff Ex. 21, at 18; Tr. 22, 452 (Bath); Tr. 22, 774-75 (Hardy). Bey do not identify an adequate number of control points, nor has the large number of personnel required to unn the points been considered. Staff Ex. 20, at 22. Based upon the June 2 exercise, FDR also felt there was no assurance that access control could actually be implmented during an energency. Staff Ex. 20, at 22-23; Tr. 22, 774-75 (Hardy). Of the four representative access control points tested, two were disbanded and thus were not fully evaluated by FDR. Staff Ex. 20 at 22 (Lancaster County).

The two which FEMA did observe first-hand were unnned well before necessary, yet the barricades and traffic control devices never arrived.

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1 Staff Ex. 20, at 22 (Dauphin County). The Board agrees with FD% that the present level of preparedness for access control is Mequate.

105. 'Ihe plans for access control in the event of an mergency at M-1 have not been fully developed, nor has there been a deonstration of the capability to implement access control as a protective action.

The Board finds that development of a conprehensive access control plan, together with identification of adequate personnel to carry out the plan, is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that E -1 can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public. In its Proposed Findings of Fact, the Cut.uuusealth has conmitted to develop detailed access control procedures prior to restart, which would be incorporated into the state plan for suhnission to FER for formal review. These procedures will include an identification of the number of access control points required, their location, the number of persons required to man.the:n, and the source of such access control personnel.

Therefore, the Board directs the NRC Staff to certify to the Cocmission that the following itms have been accocplished prior to restart:

1. An access control plan has been developed and incorporated into the state plan which adequately covers the perimeter of the plume exposure pathey EPZ;
2. Personnel resources adequate to inplement the access control plan have been identified.

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IX. Siren Notification Syste* i 106. h emergency planning rule sets specific requirments regarding the capab'lity to complete initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Section D.3. This requirment was reviewed by the Canniission after prcmulgation of the emegency planning rule, and its utility and importance were reaffirmed. In re Final Rule on Emergency Planning, CLI-80-40, Dec eber 5, 1980, 2 NUC. REG. REP. (CCH) 130,558. h burden of derratrating the capability of 15-minute notification is on Licensee.

10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Section D.3.

107. The notification systen presently in effect within the M-1 plume exposure pathway EPZ does not cover the entire EPZ, nor does it meet the 15-minute requir ment. Tr.17, 878 (Iamison); Adler and Bath (3/16 Testimony) ff. Tr.18, 975, at 15; Pr.19,099 (Adler); Staff Ex.

21, at 9. Licensee has presented the Staff with a design study for a siren notification systen. Staff Ex. 23, at II-1. His study is founded upon various assurptions, the validity of whichhavenot been empirically verified. Staff Ex. 23, at II-2. h Staff has reviewed the proposed design and found that, on paper at least, it meets the criteria set forth in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3. Tr. 22,889 (Chesnut); Tr. 22,894 (Chesnut) . Licensee has cocmitted to install the proposed siren notification system; the anticipated completion date is August,1981.

Tr. 22,878 (Chesnut).

108. h e Staff has stated its position that the siren notification system nust be conpleted prior to restart of M-1. Chesnut, ff. Tr.

22,881. W e Board, of course, has no quarrel with this; the language of

  • This section also covers subject matter identified in Contentions 5(D), 14(T), 14(A) , 16(E), 16(M) . -

the rule itself manda*es this conclusion. Cmpletion of the siren notification systee., as that wrd is used by the Staff, includes proviaion of the physical and administrative means necessary to activate the system. Tr. 22, 891 (Chesnut); Tr. 22, 895-896 (Chesnut); Tr.19, 390-391 (Adler, Bath). Licensee has stated that this will be complead e part of the installation process. Tr. 22, 909 (Rogan); Tr. 22, 912 (Rogan).

109. h Staff has also stated that a final test to detemine how much of the population actually muld receive notification under the proposed systen is required at some point, but the methodology has not yet been developed by FH M. Tr. 22, 889 (Chesnut); Tr. 22, 891 (Cbasnut).

h Board does not feel that sound testing of each irdividual siren is adequate to denenstrate empliance with the notification requirement.

Tr.17, 857 (12mison); Tr.19,100 (Adler); Tr. 22, 889 (Chesnut); Tr.

22, 903 (Rogan) . Not only will this fail to provide a verification of the assumptions used in designing the systen, but any variations in sound dispersion caused by changed locations of individual sirens will be unaccounted for. Tr. 22, 903 (Rogan) .

110. h Board finds that a certification of capability to notify essentially 1007. of tha population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that ' DIE-1 can operate without endangering the health and safety of the public. h Board believes that such a certification should be possible based upon a review of Licensee's consultant's sampling of siren coverage, which will l be perfonned after installation to confirm the design todel. Tr. 22, 904 (Rogan); Tr. 2&.06-907 (Rogan).

I X. Miscellaneous Ccrmorrmalth Comitments 111. The Ocxmorwealth hat. made additional comitments in its Proposed Findings of Fact which address certain recomendations made by FDR following the June 2 exercise and certain Intervenor contentions.

Without discussing e:6 one at length, the Board finds that the following actions are necessary to provide reasonable assurance that M-1 can operate without endangering the health and safety of the public, and should be e complished.

A. Public Information Coordination

  • 112. One of the lessons learned from the M -2 accident was the need for in: proved coordination on the release of information to the public during an emergency. Tr.17, 715 (Gen. Smith); Bath & Adler (2/23 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 25-26. The energency planning rule requires that " procedures for coordinated dissanination of information to the public are established." 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(7); NLSEG-0654, Planning Standard G. The means of disseminating information to the public thanselves highlight the importance of good coordination at all levels. Each county has the authority and responsibility to inform the public during an anergency, both through the EBS announcenent and press releases. Bath & Adler (2/23 Testimony), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 25; Tr.

19, 094-95 (Bath). Although each county is expected to receive its information from a central source, PE R, the possibility exists for counties to give out inaccurate or inconsistent information. Tr. 18, 044 (.comey); Tr. 18, 094-95 (Camey); Tr.19, 094 (Bath).

113. The June 2 exercise indicated that many of the problens with coordination of public information during an emergency have not yet been

  • This section also covers subject matter identified in Contention 12.

fully resolved. In many instances, there was no consultation between the state and counties (and vice-versa) prior to the drafting of news releases, which resulted in incouplete and contradictory information being released to the public. Staff Ex. 20, at 11, 35; Tr. 22, 759 (Adler). FDR also noted a " total lack of coordination between jurisdictions on the timing and content of EBS releases and siren activation." Staff Ex. 20, at 33.

114. '1he Board agrees with FDR that this is an area of potential improvanent which should be given priority and addressed promptly.

Staff Ex. 20, at 1-2, Emmandation 3. It is the Board's understanding that planning is underway to develop further procedures for coordination betweea the Governor's office, the Public Information Officer (PIO) at PER, County PIO's, County Cocmissioners, municipal emergency managanent coordinators, municipal officials, the media and Licensee. 'We Conmxuealth anticipdtes that the revisions to the public inforration coordination portions of existing state and county plans will be reflected in the plans to be subnitted to FDR for formal review.

B. Cocmunications Drill

  • 115. The need for well developed ccumunications networks between response agencies is another lesson learned from 'D!I-2. Tr. 17, 715 (Gen. Smith); Tr. 18, 949-950 (Adler). The direct corollary to the existence of a network is the ability to understand the information which is being ccxmunicated. The energency planning rule addresses this

, problan by requiring " periodic drills ... to develop and maintain key l

skills"; additionally, any deficiencies identified in the exercises or

  • '1his section also covers subject ma.ter identified in Contention 14(N) , 16(C), 16(F) . i l

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drills cust be corrected. 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(14); NUREG-0654, Planning Standard N. h evaluation criteria of hMEG-0654 rem,and that

"[c]ocnucications with State and local governments within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone shall be tested monthly. . . .

Comunication drills shall also include the aspect of understanding the content of messages." NUREG-0654, Planning Standard N, Criterion 2.a.

116. h Com onwealth's emergency plans do provide for monthly connunications drills as required. Connonwealth Ex. 2, Appendix 14,Section II. A.1.a; Tr.17, 951 (Inmhon) . h June 2 exercise identified problems, however, in the ability of state, county and municipal emergency response organizations to canunicate adequately. Staff Ex. 21, at 11,

15. One aspect of adequate connunication is, of course, the length of time required to contact various response personnel. Bath & Adler (2/23 Testiw), ff. Tr.18, 975, at 6; T: .19,114 (Adler). Although contact was made in some counties during the exercise down to the nunicipal level, FEMA did not conment on the efficiency of the process. See, e.g., Staff Ex. 20, at 4; Tr. 22, 779-780 (Swiren, Hardy). In several counties, the full connunications network was apparently not tested.

Staff Ex. 20, at 33.

117. In terms of the substance of connunications during the exercise, various types of problems arose, hy included failure to relay cocplete information (e.g. , Staff Ex. 20, at 5), failure to relay information at all (e.g. , Staff Ex. 20, at 5,11), and misinterpretation of inforration (e.g. , Staff Ex. 20, at 3; Tr. 22, 778 (Adler)) . h result of these

problems was some confusion and some inconsistent protective action reconniendations anong the counties. E.g. , Staff Ex. 20, at 4 (Dauphin r.ounty's independent decision to shelter).

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118. FDR has recocmended that the connunication and coordination weaknesses identified by the exercise be improved "without delay". Tr.

22, 755 (Adler) One means of improving these skills is by additional drilling between all levels of goverment. Staff Ex. 21, at 2, 24; Tr. 22, 755 (Adler); Tr. 22, 756 (Hardy) . The Board agrees with FDR that such specialized drills should be undertaken prior to the testing of the entire energency recponse, as during an accident. Staff Ex. 20, at 14; Tr. 22, 756-758 (Hardy, Adler). The Connemealth intends to conduct at least one cocmunication> drill prior to restart. The drill will include, at a minimum, ccenunications between Licensee and PER, PER and each county emergency managerent coordinator (DIC), each county and its key elected officials and each municipal DE, each municipality and its key elected officials. PD R will encourage the counties and municipalities to extend the drill further, so as to test cocmunications to the EOC staff members. Due to the fur.damental inportance of prcnpt and accurate cocnunication during an ex.rgency (Tr. 22, 755 (Adler)),

the Board finds that this cocmunicatiers drill shall be conducted prior to restart.

C. National Guard

  • 119. An annex on mi.litary support hcs been added to each of the county plans and will be incorporated into te state plan prior to submission to FI2R for formal review. The operations plan for the National Guard will be an Appendix to the state plan; it will identify which batallions have been assigned to support each risk county and the

! time elenent which should be allowed for complete mobilization.

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This section covers subject matter identified in Contention 14(H) ,14(R), 14(X) .

I D. Protection of Farmers

  • 120. 'Ibe Contonwealth has somewhat changed its approach towards farmers and the protection of livestock. Farmers with livestock will be treated as anergency wrkers during any fixed nuclear incident facility.

Before restart, the state and county plans will include provisions for the distribution of dosimetry and potasslun iodide (KI) to farmers as needed during an energency. 'Ihe dosimetry and KI will not be.predistributed to individual farms; supplies adequate to equip one anergency wrker per farm will be credistributed to the county level. Farmers will be given the opportunity to obtain training at the local level regarding use of the dosimetry equipment.

Respectfully subnitted, jkf.uj U. AKu j'>n 05.chd b5 JnGs 1-1LOIELE STRAUBE ROBERT W. ADLER Attorneys for the Conmonwealth I

i This section cowrs subject matter identified in Contentions 2, 5(G) , 14(BB) .

l UITITED STATES OF R4 ERICA -

IUCLEAR REGIUA10RY CONISSION DEFDRE THE AIGIIC SAFE 1Y AllD LICEISIlU BOARD In the lhtter of )

)

IEIROPOT2 TAN EDISON 00! PAIN, )

) Docket tb. 50-289 (Three title Island Ibclear ) (Restart)

Station, l. hit Ib.1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the within Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law on Emergency Planning Issues was this day served on the attached service list by U.S. mail, postage prepaid.

]'tElL$L ,- {hac v' e.- -

MICHELE STRAUBE Attorney for the Connn.malth Date: $'lA E I

(lNI"E"D STAIES OF KIEPlCA NUCIL'a FJr,U'IAMTl C2tIISSION BUME ':HF. AIUIIC SAFLT( N:D LICCEI!C BCARD In de lhtter of )

)

IIIPDIVI.ITAN EDISGI C2!PNTi, )

) Ibcket Ib. 50-239 (Three File Island :bclear ) (Pestart)

Station, thit Ib.1) )

S127 ICE LIST Cecrge F. Trc tridge. Earpire Dr. Linda W. Little Shaw, Pit:ran, Potts & Trehridge Atomic Safety and licensing Board Panel 1800 ft Street, N.W. 5000 Her::itage Drive Washingten, D.C. 200C6 Paleigh, North Caroli:n 27612 P.s. Parjerie M. Aarodt Docketing and Sewice Section R.D. 05 Office of the Secretarf Coatesville, Pemsylvania 19320 U.S. Ibclear Prgulatorf Cctrdssion Ms, Gail Bradford "** " " " ' ' '

Anti-!bclear Croup Pepresenting Ellyn R. Weiss York (NCKf) Sheldon, Ha: non, Pois=an & Weiss 245 W. Philadelphia Street 1725 I Street, N.W. , Suite 506 .

York, Pemsylvania 17404 Washington, D C. 20006 Ms. Frieds Ecrryhill, Cairan Karin P. Shelden, Esquire (PN:E)

Ccalitien for Ibclear Powr Shelden Hazren, Pois=an & Weiss Plant Postpen eent 1725 I Street, ti.W., Suite 506 2610 Grcnden Drive Washingten. D.C. 20006 Wit:ingten, Delaware 19803 James A. Tcurtellotte, Esqaire

15. Pobert O. Pollard Office of the Ewcutive legal Director 609 tbntpelier Street U.S. :bclear Regulatory Carlssien Balti ore, Pa oland 21213 Washingten. D.C. 20555 Walter U. Cien, Esquire Jctri A. Ievin Esqaire Consre- Adeocate Assistant Councel Departra.t of Justice Pemsylvela Public l'tility Comission Strasterr/ Sq;are, lith Flocr P.O. Box 3265 Harrisburg, Pensylvania 17127 Marrist.:rg, Pcmsylvania 17120 Dr. Dauncey Kepford Pobert L. Knupp, Esqaire Judith H. Johnsrud Assistant Solicitor, County of :huphin Enviremental Coalition en !bclear P.O. Ecx P, 407 l brth Front Street Power Harrisburg, Pemsylvania 17108 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Pemsylvania 16801 Jchn E. Flinnich, CFairan Dauphin County Soard of Cctrissicners St. Ste/en C. Sholly Ihuphin Countf Courtbacse i

1.'nion of Concerred Scientists Front and Parket Streets 1725 I Street, N.W. , Suite 601 Harrisburg, Pe=sylvania 17101 E shington, D.C. 20006

. Jordan D. Ct nin@am, Esquire

! s. Iruise Bradford Attorney for Ncwberry Tow. ship "Dil Alert T.!!.I. Steering Carittee 315 Peffer Street 2320 ! brth Second Street Harrisburg, Pcmsylvania 17102 Harrisburg, Pemsylvania 17110

. Ivan W. Smith, Esquire, Quiran thrvin I. Leais Atemic Saferv and Ilconsirq Ecard Panel 6504 2radferd Terrace U.S. Ibclear Regulaterf Catrissicn PH1Malphia, Pemsylvania 191L9 Washingten, D.C. 205'5 Jane lae Dr. Walter H. Jorim R.D. 3, Bcx 3521 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Etters, Pensylvarla 17319 381 West Outer Drive Oak Ridge, Temessee 37820 'Ihras J. Gerine, Esqaire Ceputy Attorney Ce.ral. Division cf 1.ra Fccm 316, 1100 Ra:. ..md Eculerard

esark, Ns Jersey 07102

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