ML19340D335
| ML19340D335 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas, Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1980 |
| From: | Bouknight J BAKER & BOTTS, HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-A, NUDOCS 8012300318 | |
| Download: ML19340D335 (22) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h
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BEFCRE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ' 9%
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'G In the Matter of ) #-4 8
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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER ) Docket Nos. 50-498A COMPANY, et al. (South ) 50-499A Texas Project, Units 1 )
and 2) )
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TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING ) Docket Nos. 50-445A COMPANY, et al. (Comanche ) 50-446A Peak Steam Electric Station )
Units 1 and 2) )
MEMORANDUM OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT LICENSE CONDITIONS AND IN RESPONSE TO THE OPPOSING COMMENTS OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD OF THE CITY OF BROWNSVILLE Introduction On September 15, 1980, Applicants, the NRC Staff, and the Department of Justice filed a Joint Stipulation submitting to this Board a set of license conditions intended to settle the controversy among them, and believed to be within the public interest. That settlement has now been supported by every party ahich has inte vened or sought to intervene in this proceeding except one, and those supporting it include virtually every utility systcm in Texas, large and small, located within j five hundred fifty miles of the state border. 1/
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-1/ It is our understanding that the Border Cooperatives, an association of utilities located in or near the interstices between ERCOT and the Southwest Power Pool, have resolved their dispute with West Texas Utilities Co., and have asked to withdraw their intervention petition. sg z7 9' 8 () ] E E O O N
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only the Public Utilities Board of the City of Brownsville, l
Texas [ PUB], a small utility situated at the southernmost tip of .
Texas, some six hundred miles from the Texas-Oklahoma boundary ,
line, professes an interest not resolved by the settlement and seeks prolongation of this proceeding.
At the prehearing conference of October 24, 1980, the Boari requested the parties to file memoranda addressing the question of whether the settlement conditions are in the public interest and thus should be approved. (Tr. 1262.) Tne Board requested PUB, as the objecting party, to file its memorandum
'first. On November 12, 1980, PUB submitted to the Board a docu-ment styled as " Comments" opposing the proposed conditions.
Fully fifty pages of this pleading (pp . 31-80) consist of a
.i varnished version of PUB's Trial Brief on the merits. The remain-ing pages (pp. 1-30) address the settlement chiefly in the context of assumptions that PUB's views on the merits will somehow be sustained. Nowhere in this extraordinarily lengthy document does PUB directly address the question posed by the Board.
Houston Lighting & Power Company [ Houston) submits this i memorandum in response to the Board's request and in reply to the Comments of PUB. In Section I we identify the precise legal issues now before the Board, and the legal standards which govern approval of the settlement. In Section II we demonstrate that the settlement license conditions serve the public interest, work no prejudice upon PUB or any other entity, and, therefore, under the governing legal standard, should be approved. In
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Section III, we comment on PUB's antitrust allegations; we deal with these succinctly, both because the Board need not dispose of them at this point and because they do not merit -
a lengthy exposition.
t I.
Legal Issues Before the Board PUB's Comments appear deliberately crafted to cloud the legal issues before the Board at this stage of the proceeding.
On pages 4 and 5 of the Comments, PUB suggests that, since the proposed settlement conditions are submitted by the two. government parties on the basis "'that the licensing . . . under these condi-tions if approved . . . will not create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws or the policies thereunder in accordance with the standards set forth in Section 105 (c) of the Atomic Energy Act,'" the " Board has authority to compel the submission of, or itself promulgate, proper modifications to assure the attainment of the (government parties'] stated objectives." This misstates the applicable law, misrepresents the procedural context in which the settlement. conditions are before the Board, and is an improper effort by PUB to seize a victory on the merits it has not won and cannot hope to win on the basis of the case made in its comments.
i Contrary to PUB's intimations, the procedural and legal status of the proceeding is as follows:
I (1) No hearing has been conducted and no findings made under Section 105 (c) (5) , so that there is ru:
legal basis for imposing on any applicant any license.
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e 4-conditions different from those conditions which it has agreed to accept in settlement of its differences with the parties other than PUB. .
(2) While the government parties believe, and have advised the Board, that in light of the settlement conditions activities under the j South Texas Project licenses will not create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, no carty has suggested approval of the settlement would deprive PUB of its right to hearing and an opportunity, if it prevails, to seek additional relief, so long as PUB is able to frame legal issues which are appropriate for hearing and provide sufficient factual support for its claim so that "there exists a genuine issue to be heard."
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(10 C.F.R. 5 2.755) 5 l
(3) Precedent establishes that, at this stage, i
l he only question before the Board is whether the settlement reached among all parties is "within the
{ public interest" and thus should be approved as a settlement among those parties only.
J (4) If PUB persists in not joining the settlement reached by all other parties, the next order of business following action on the settlement is to establish procedures for resolving PUB's antitrust claims on I
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l 5-their merits, either upon a hearing or upon summary disposition.2/
The beginning point for analysis of the legal issues now .
before the Board is the statute itself. This proceeding arises under Section 10Sc of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), which provides for the Board, after holding a hearing, to i find whether activities under the license would " create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws...."
(42 U.S.C. S 213 5 (c) (5) ) . If that finding is made in the affirma-tive, the Board is authorized to impose upon the license "such J
conditions as it deems appropriate" (42 U.S.C. 5 2135 (c) (6) ) .
PUB is a party to the proceeding pursuant to Section 189a of the Act (4 2 U.S.C. S 2239 (A)) , and is entitled to a hearing under this provision 3/ if, and and to the extent that it can establish and support viable issues not resolvable otherwise.
The parties to the settlement have not requested that the l
Board make any judgment on the merits of the controversy or that i
it decide whether the settlement license conditions are "appro-l priate" to remedy any situation inconsistent with the antitrust
! law. Under the statute, the Board-could not deci/.e these questions l
As Houston has previously pointed out, PUB's, gross failure
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to meet the procedural requirements duly imposed by the l
Board is sufficient basis for disposing of PUB's claims on
! the ground of its default. See 10 C.F.R. 5 2.707.
3/ The statutory entitlement to a hearing extends only to genuine issues properly raised under the statute.
l See 10 C.F.R. S 2.755.
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. l prior to holding a hearing and making the findings prescribed in l
Section 105c (5) . 4/
With one exception, PUB, as a party to the proceeding but not to the settlement, remains in exactly t.he same position that it occupied before the settlement was reached. To the extent that it can raise genuine issues about matters which affect its interest, it is entitled by Section 189a to have those issues decided by hearing pursuant to Section 105c(5), and no party to the settle-ment has claimed otherwise. The one difference in PUB's posture is that, as a beneficiary of lif not a party to) the settlement, it should be required to take the settlement conditions into account as part of the " situation" which will ex'.st under the licenses in framing its contentions as to how that situation will be "incen-sistent with the antitrust laws." Whether PUB, against this back-ground, has met its obligation to frame contentions which entitle it to a hearing as a matter of law is a question entirely separate from whether the settlement between all of the other parties should be approved as "within the public interest." Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-74-47, 7 AEC 1158, 1159 (1976).
The standards for passing on a settlement reached by some but not all parties to an antitrust proceeding was considered by a licensing board in Catawba, supra. There the applicant, the
-4/ Where no antitrust hearing has been convened or where a hearing has been convened a settlement is reached oy all parties to the proceeding, the NRC is not required to make the finding prescribed in Section 105c. See Georgia Power Co. (Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2), LBP-74-52, 8 AEC 107 (1974); Construction Permits for Houston Lighting & Power Company, South Texas Project Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-498, 50-499, issued December 22, 1975; Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-75-24, 1 NRC 461 (1975).
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NRC Staff and the Departnent of Justice had agreed on certain license conditions as a basis for settlement of the issues among them. The applicant filed a motion seeking the Board's approval of the proposed conditions, and the cooperative intervenors opposed -
the motion on the grounds that the settlement was subject to certain conditions that might abort and because they might be pre-I judiced by the settlement.
The Catawba licensing board found that:
[T]he proposed conditions contained in the attached Applicant's ' Statement of Commitments' were made to resolve the differences between the Department of Justice, the Staff, and the Staff, and the Applicant and are a reasonable settlement of said differences within the public interest (Catawba, 7 AEC at 1159).
In considering whether che settlement met the standard the Board focused upon whether the intervenors would be " improperly pre-judiced or disadvantaged" by the proposed conditions. Finding no such prejudice or disadvantage, the Board directed that the settlement license conditions should be incorporated in all per-mits or licenses issued or to be issued to the Catawba plant.
Houston submits that the Catawba standard applies to the issue presented herein. The question now before the Board is I
whether the settlement is "within the public interest." It clearly should be found to be so. ,
l II The Settlement Serves the Public Interest and Does not Prejudice PUB l
l l PUB cannot and by not directly addressing the question does not, deny that the settlement conditions resolve the concerns in the Advice Letter which caused this proceeding l
to be commenced, and that, on their face, they serve the public l
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i interest. Instead, PUB's criticism is that the settlement i 1
does not go far enough, in that its conditions are less Draconian 1
i than those PUB would desire if it were to prevail on the merits.
But this argument misconceives the issue here. The settlenent is within the public interest, and PUB is unable to point to any prejudice inuring to itself or any other entity by reason of the settlement conditions, nor could such an assertion credibly be made. The settlement conditions accordingly should be approved. PUB's case on the merits can be resolved thereafter.
A. The Settlement Conditions Constructively Address the Issue Which Led to the Instigation of This Proceedinc This litigation arose from disconnections by Houston and TU when Central and South West Corp. , acting through its subsid-iaries, effectuated the midnight wiring of May 4, 1976. The Com-plainant parties have alleged that these disconnections resulted from an agreement between Houston and TU to disconnect under such circumstances. Although Houston denies these allegations and does not believe that its conduct has been inconsistent with the antitrust laws in any respect, it recogni:es that resolution of such a controversy by settlement as opposed to litigation, is in the public interest.5/ ,
Accordingly, Houston has agreed in settle-I ment of this case to abide by conditions which impose upon it substantial limitations and obligations. Those conditions. con-structively address the issues which gave rise to this proceeding l
l and are manifestly in the public interest.
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-5/ 10 C.F.R. S 2.759; Appeal Board Order dated April 15, 1950 at 4. Nothing in the discussion herein or in the settle-l
, ment conditions is intended to diminish Houston's adherence I to its position on the =erits-of this controversy in any i regard.
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4 9-1 Under paragraph IB(6) (b) of the South Texas Project settlement conditions, 6/ Houston is precluded from " enter (ing) into ar maintain [ing] any agreement or understanding with any other Entity or Applicant" jointly to disconnect "with the purpose of maintaining a non-jurisdictional status under the Federal Power Act," and is enjoined to act " unilaterally, not jointly." Under this provision, concerted disconnection is prohibited.
Moreover, the conditions also impose certain provisions designed to deal with proposed interconnections. Under these previsions, there are at least three ways such interconnections may come into existence.
First, they may come into existence voluntarily. Houston, in the past has tested interstate interconnections with Gulf States Utilities Company and has stated unequivocally that it would be willing to consider such interconnections as would improve its ability to operate its system and provide service to its rate payers in the most efficient and reliable manner possible. 7/
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l l -6/ All references to paragraphs in the conditions herein-after will be to those for the South Texas Project. In each instance, corresponding provisions are contained in the Comanche Peak conditions.
]/ PUB's assertion (Comments at 12) that counsel " avowed" before the Board that Houston would disconnect from any utility that establishes interstate interconnections is not correct. Counsel in fact indicated Houston would l objectively consider good faith interconnection proposals I (Tr. 1200). l
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Secondly, an interconnection may be obtained through
] FERC under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) .
This is a mechanism that did not exist in 1976, and it seems evident that had it existed then, this proceeding never would have come about. The settlement conditions preclude Houston
) frcm unreasonably opposing PURPA interconnection proposals, and create certain obligations regarding the costs of such proceedings. Paragraph IB (6) (a) .
Thirdly, even if FERC rejects an interconnection proposal as not in the public interest, Houston may declire to enter i
or maintain such an interconnection only if it is prepared to demonstrate to this Ccemission that its actions would not be inconsistent with the antitrust laws. Paragraph IB (6) (a) .
The result is that if an applicant opposes an interconnection proposal, it can be effectuated on the merits at FERC, and applicants are enjoined to abide by the decision. Further the '
proponent of the interconnection, as the Board noted, can get "another bite at the apple" in a proceeding before this Commis-t sion (Tr. 1296-97) wherein any antitrust concerns under the i facts then prevailing can be alleviated.
- Houston, ia short, has agreed to conditions which allay the concerns which caused this case to be originated and ,
which impose upon it limitations regarding interconnections in the future. And, contrary to PUB's statements (Comments at 10) ,
the settlement conditions provide that Houston must use its best efforts to amend its contracts to be consistent with those I
conditions. Paragraph IB (7) .
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1 The settlement conditions, moreover, extend beyond these central concerns to encompass provisions relating to wheeling and coordinating transactions between utilities, both within ERCOT and across interstate interconnections. Under the conditions, Houston (which has never refused a wheeling request) commits to wheel power between two or more entities in the South Texas area with which it is connected, and between any such entity and any entity outside of that area between whose facilities Houston's lines and others form a continuous 2
path. Paragraph I(B) (3) . Other conditions in the settlement 1
include provisions regarding future nuclear participation, the availability of TIS planning data and TIS membership, and the definition of circumstances in which applicants may not refuse joint ownership of transmission lines. These settlement conditions are injunctive, they create no rights in the applicants; they impose limitations and obligations. Other than those enjoined, they harm no one. Taken individually, and as a whole, they are clearly within the public interest.
B. PUB's Criticisms Are Without Substance i
PUB's criticisms of the conditions, at least insofar as they have any bearing upon Hou? ton, can be reduced to three wishes! (1) it would remove from Houston all freedom to
! decline interconnection proposals and would make the proscriptions regarding interconnections / disconnections absolute; (2) it
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s would have this Commission set rates for wheeling and other transmission services and apportion jurisdictional authority over such services as between FERC and the Texas Public Utilities Ccmmission [TPUC): (3) it would apparently have this Commission hold that the Offer of Settlement now before j FERC in the PURPA proceeding should be disapproved. Each of these criticisms represents a condition PUB would seek l
.r were it to prevail on the merits. 8/ Thus, in essence PUB is objecting to the settlement because it does not represent a complete victory for PUB. The decisive answer to such criticism is that PUB's claims on the merits can be disposed of in an appropriate manner, and approving the sett'.iment conditions will not impair that pcocess. Further specific flaws in PUB's argument are poin';ed out below.
(1) With regard to interconnection /discot.79etiens,
! while PUB's rhetoric at times is difficult to follow, its
- basic argument, as noted above, is that Houston should never be permitted either to disconnect from an interconnection i
or to refuse to engage in one. Leaving aside the patent absurdity of this contention, the argument that proscriptions on disconnections should be absolute does not gainsay that i
the substantial constraints imposed by the license conditions i
8/ The same applies to several other PUB criticisms which are too frivolous even to merit cursory attention.
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are within the public interest. PUB simply argues that i
if its theory of the case made sense, it might be entitled to more. That is hardly an argument against the implementation of the proposed settlement. 9/
Houston, like any responsible utility, believes it is entitled to the freedom to operate in the most efficient manner and to choose, consistent with the antitrust laws, the electrical and legal cperating mode which is most consistent with efficiency and its public obligation to serve its ratepayers at the lowest costs and in the most reliable
, manner. The public interest requires no less, and the settle-ment conditions permit no more. 10/
(2) PUB's argument that the Commission should set transmission rates has two facets: (a) PUB would prefer modification of some of the principles in the letter agreement between Houston, CSW, TU, and FERC Staff, dated September 11, 1980
[ Cameron letter] (b) though it claims all it desires is "transmis-si:n service at fair and practical rates" (Comments at 17), PUB apparently does not regard the rates generally set by FERC
- [/ PUB's contention that Applicants should be enjoined l
from any disconnection which encompasses a nuclear unit or a DC line is nothing more than the argument that disconnection should be totally barred, in another guise.
In a free market, no one is guaranteed that he can take actions affecting others without a response. Whether or not a response is warranted and consistent with the antitrust laws will depend on the particular circumstances.
l --10/ While with one breath PUB criticizes the settlement condi-tions for recognizing proceedings at FERC, with another it contrarily suggests that "it may ultimately appear appro-priate that the disconnection issue first be heard at FERC" and that the "NRC might thus defer its action until FERC has made its determinations" (Comments at 7).
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i and the TPUC to be fair and reasonable. -These criticisms misconstrue the Cameron letter and misapprehend the role of this Commission.
s The Cameron letter does not purport to set rates. It simply reflects a proposal which the signatories (with the encouragement of FERC staff) have agreed they will not retreat from at FERC. FERC is free to alter the rates in any manner it sees fit to ensure they are just and reasonable. PUB l
concedes it is entitled to no more. It is not the province of this Commission to set rates on the grounds that the metho-dology applied by those agencies which are statutorily em-powered to do'so is questioned by an intervenor.ll/ Nor is the Commission's role to delimit the jurisdictional authority of two other agencies. See Atomic Energy Act, Section 271, 42 U.S.C. 5 2018.
(3) PUB argues that the DC interconnections in the Offer of Settlement now pending at FERC are not in the public interest "as proposed" (Comments at 28), because, in PUB's view, AC interconnections or perhaps additional DC interconnec-tions might be preferable. This argument is misconceived.
First it assumes that implementation or acceptance by FERC of the Offer of Settlement is a condition precedent to the Jettle-ment conditions here. That is not the case. If FERC modifies.the 11/ Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Fteam Generating Station Unit No. 3', LBP-74-78, 8 AEC 718, I 734 (1974), aff5d, ALAB-258, 1 NRC 45 (1975) (" super-I vision over rates is the particular province of the Federal Power Commission and the Board is neither qualified nor auth.orized to pass on the appropriate- i ness of transmission rates").
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4 proposal or instead orders an AC interconnection, the condi-tions here remain in effect. Second, all that the conditions do is bind the parties to submit the DC proposal to .
FERC for a public interest determination. It simply cannot be inimical to the public interest to submit such a filing to a fede_al agency for it to evaluate under a federal statutory standard. Third, PUB is a party at FERC, and is free to show there what it will. To the extent PUB contends i that some configuration of synchronous ties hypothetically might be a desirable means of interconnecting ERCOT and the Eastern Grid,that is a matter that should be decided at FEEC in the first place, and has no relation to any claim PUB could credibly propound in this proceeding.12/
C. The Settlement Conditions Do'Not Prejudice PUB Finally, not only are the settlement conditions plainly within the public interest, but they do not work any prejudice or disadvantage upon PUB. The conditions do not compel PUB to do anything. Nor do they restrict PUB's ability to engage 4
--12/ PUB's argument that the proposed conditions are contrary to Section 221(d) of the Federal Power Act (Comments at 16) is frivolous. To the extent that the FERC orders Houston or any other party Lc provide transmission service pursuant to Sections 211(a) or (b), there is no question but that service could not be discontinued except in compliance with Section 211(d) . Nothing in the proposed license conditions is to the contrary.
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in any of its current or planned activities in any way.
The effect of the conditions, quite simply, is to impose upon Houston substantial limitations and obligations in ,
its dealings with utilities. They impose no obligations or limitations upon PUB. From PUB's standpoint, the conditions cannot be said to be harmful, nor does PUB even begin to
- attempt such a showing anywhere in its voluminous pleading.
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! III PUB's Antitrust Case is Deficient on its Face j As we have noted previously, the final fifty pages of l
i PUB's Ccmments consist of an embellished version of its initial Trial Brief on the merits. 13/ The strength or frailty of PUB's case on the merits is inapposite to the question now before the Board, i.e., whether the settlement agreement among the parties other than PUB should be approved as within the public interest. Houston will not add to PUB's distraction from the question at hand by engaging here in argument on the merits. The Board has already indicated that once it has ruled upon the settlement conditions, it will then consider how to resolve any issues that remain and whether such resolution would require an evidenciary hearing. 14/
--13/ Because PUB declined the Board's invitation to move for leave to raise new issues not addressed in its Trial Brief or Motion to Disapprove the Settlement, to the extent its embellishments raise new issues they are in open disregard of the Board's rulings and are a nullity. (Tr. 1255, 1257.)
14/
Order Denying HL&P's Motion for Clarification of October 24, 1980 Order, dated November 10, 1980.
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In this later context, it will be important for the Board to focus on PUB's failure to make out a viable antitrust issue of any kind, even to the point of failing to identify any relevant markets or any competition allegedly restrained, and neglecting to make any effort to show how its own interests have been affected. 15/ Instead PUB alleges that the situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws is "the fact of non-interconnection" (Comments at 61), and its case distills to the proposition that unilateral conduct in declining to interconnect or in avoiding regulation under the Federal Power Act is per se inconsistent with the antitrust laws. We are aware of no authority for such a proposition. And by defining tie alleged' antitrust inconsistency in this manner, PUB concedes that it is not a result of changes in the South Texas Project as the statute and the Notice of Hearing require in this proceeding at the threshold. g/
15/ PUB's assertion (Comments at 60) that, besides CSW's
~~
attempt to save its holding company, entities within and without Texas "have seriously censidered interconnec-tion" is simply wrong. Despite the existence of over a hundred depositions, PUB cites no fact witness for its assertion and instead refers to the deposition of Dr. Taylor, an opinion witness. His testimony, as l cited by PUB, related not to utilities seeking inter-connections, but to consideration of co-generation by two industrial customers, Diamond Shamrock and Dow Chemical.
Moreover, Mr. Knowles of Diamond Shamrock (on whom Dr. Taylor purported to rely) testified that his company deemed interconnections economically too costly.
(Knowles Dep. at 197-98.) PUB's misconception typifies the problems which ensue both from resorting to opinion testimony as to factual matters and from reliance on interpretation of depositions rather than live testimony.
S 2135 (c) (2) ;
16 / Atomic Energy Act, Section 105c (2) , 42 U.S.C.
43 Fed. Reg. 15811, 15812 (1979).
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Conclusion PUB's argument boils down to the proposition that it _
wants more than the settlement provides. As a non-party to the settlement it has not combated the strong showing made by the settling parties that the settlement is in the public interest, nor has it shown how approval of the settlement will cause it prejudice. These points are determinative on the issue before the Board. The question of whether PUB can frame any issue regarding its desire for more in a manner which entitles it to a hearing, remains to be determined by this Board hereafter. The Board should accordingly approve the proposed settlement conditions and deny the opposition submitted by PUB.
Reppectfully submitted, 1 '
, i l
IJ l'- -
J .' A . Bodknight, Jr, .
I ttorney for Houston Lighting &
Power Company i
OF CCUNSEL:
l Baker & Botts 3000 One Shell Plaza l Houston, Texas 77002 Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad & Toll 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 DATED: December 1, 1980 l
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
) -
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, ) Docket Nos. 50-498A et al. ) 50-499A
)
I (South Texas Project, Units 1 )
and 2) )
)
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMDANY ) Docket Nos. 50-445A et al. ) 50-446A
)
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric )
Station, Units 1 and 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing:
MEMORANDUM OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT LICENSE CONDITIONS AND IN RESPONSE TO THE OPPOSING COMMENTS OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD OF THE CITY OF BROUNSVILLE were served upon the following persons, by hand *, or by deposit in the United States Mail, first class postage prepaid, this 2d day of December , 1980.
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- .arshall E. Miller, Esquirs Fradric D. Chanania, Esquira U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Michael B. Blume, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Ann P. Hodgdon, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Glaser, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555
(*MichaelL.
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Roff Hardy Chairman and Chief Executive
- Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esquire Officer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Central Power and Light Company Washington, D.C. 20555 Post Office Box 2121 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel J.K. Spruce, General Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City Public Service Board Washington, D.C. 20555 Post Office Box 1771 San Antonio, Texas 78296
- Chase R. Stephens, Supervisor Docketing and Service Branch Mr. Perry G. Brittain U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission President Washington, D.C. 20555 Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Tower Mr. Jerome D. Saltzman Dallas, Texas 75201 Chief, Antitrust and Indemnity Grouc G.W. Oprec, Jr.
U.S. N'u clear Regulatory Commission Executive Vice President Washington, D.C. 20555 Houston Lighting & Power Company Post Office Box 1700 Irion Worsham, Esquire Houston, Texas 77001 J.
Merlyn D. Sampels, Esquire R.L. Hancock, Director Spencer C. Relyea, Esquire 1
Worsham, Forsyth & Sampels City of Austin Electric Utility 2001 Bryan Tower, Suite 2500 Post Office Box 1086 Dallas, Texas 75201 Austin, Texas 78767 Jon C. Wood, Esquire Joseph Gallo, Esquire Matthews, Nowlin, Macfarlane Robert H. Loeffler, Esquire David M. Stahl, Esquire
& Barrett 1500 Alamo National Building Isham, Lincoln & Beale 1120 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 325 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Washington, D.C. 20036 Charles G. Thrash, Jr., Esquire Michael I. Miller, Esquire E.W. Barnett, Esquire Theodore F. Weiss, Esquire James A. Carney, Esquire Gregory Copeland, Esquire Sarah Welling, Esquire J.
Baker & Botts Martha E. Gibbs, Esquire Isham, Lincoln & Beale 3000 One Shell Plaza One First National Plaza Houston, Texas 77002 Suite 4200 R. Gorden Gooch, Esquire Chicago, Illinois 60603 Steven R. Hunsicker, Esquire Baker & Botts 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D.C. 20006 i
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Kenneth M. Glazier, Esquire Don R. Butler, Esquire David A. Dopsovic, Esquire 211 East Seventh Street Frederick H. Parmenter, Esquire
{ Austin, Texas 78701 Susan B. Cyphert, Esquire Nancy A. Luque, Esquire Mr. William C. Price Robert Fabrikant, Esquire Central Power & Light Company Energy.Section Antitrust Division Post Office Box 2121 U.S. Department of Justice Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 P.O. Box 14141 Washington, D.C. 20044 Mr. G. Holman King West Texas Utilities Company Morgan Hunter, Esquire Post Office Box 841 Bill D. St. Clair, Esquire Abilene, Texas 79604 McGinnis, Lockridge & Kilgore Fifth Floor Jerry L. Harris, Esquire Texas State Bank Building Richard C. Balough, Esquire 900 Congress Avenue City of Austin Austin, Texas 78701 Post Office Box 1083 Austin, Texas 78767 W.S. Robson
, General Manager Joseph B. Knotts, Jr., Esquire South Texas Electric Cooperative, Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire Inc.
C. Dennis Ahearn, Esquire Post Office 151 Debevoise & Liberman Nursery, TX 77976 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washincton, ~
D.C. 20036
- Robert C. McDiarmid, Esquire
( Don H. Davidson City Manacer George Spiegel, Esquire Robert A. Jablon, Esquire Cith of Austin Marc R. Poirier, Esquire P . O'. Box 1038 Spiegel & McDiarmid Austin, Texas 78767 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W.
Suite 312 Jay Galt, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20037 Looney, Nichols, Johnson & Hays 219 Couch Drive Leon J. Barish Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Texas Attorney General's Office Post Office Box 12548 Knoland J. Plucknett Austin, Texas 78711 Executive Director Committee on Power for the South- William H. Burchette, Esquire west, Inc. Frederick H. Ritts, Escuire 5541 East Skelly Drive Law Offices of Northcutt Ely Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135 Watergate 600 Building John W. Davidson, Escuire Sawtell, Goode, Davidson & Ticili Tom W. Gregg, Esquire 1100 San Antonio Savings Building Post Office Box Drawer 1032 San Antonio, Texas 78205 San Angelo, Texas 76902 Douglas F. John, Escuire Leland F. Leatherman', Esquire McDermott, Will and Emery McMath, Leatherman & Woods, P.A.
1850 K Street, N.W. 711 West Third Street Washington, D.C. 20006 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 1
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