App 5A of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Structural Design Bases.ML19322A772 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Oconee |
---|
Issue date: |
12/01/1966 |
---|
From: |
DUKE POWER CO. |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
NUDOCS 7911210793 |
Download: ML19322A772 (5) |
|
|
---|
Category:PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT & AMENDMENTS (PSAR
MONTHYEARML19322A7561967-04-0101 April 1967 Suppl to Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR ML19322A7701966-12-0101 December 1966 App 2A of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Subsurface & Foundations. ML19322A7691966-12-0101 December 1966 App 1A of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Technical Qualifications. ML19322A7721966-12-0101 December 1966 App 5A of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Structural Design Bases. ML19322A7751966-12-0101 December 1966 App 5E of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Liner Plate Spec. ML19322A7781966-12-0101 December 1966 App 5F of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Reactor Bldg Instrumentation. ML19322A7571966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 11 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Radwaste & Radiation Protection. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7581966-12-0101 December 1966 App 2B of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Seismology & Meteorology. ML19322A7591966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 12 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Conduct of Operations. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7601966-12-0101 December 1966 App 2C of Oconee 1,2 & # PSAR, Groundwater Hydrology. ML19322A7611966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 13 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Initial Tests & Operations. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7631966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 14 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Safety Analysis. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7651966-12-0101 December 1966 App 2D of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Field Permeability Tests. ML19322A7661966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 15 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Tech Specs. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7681966-12-0101 December 1966 App 2E of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Geology. ML19322B5141966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 10 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Steam & Power Conversion Sys. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7711966-12-0101 December 1966 App 4A of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Once-Through Steam Generator. ML19322A7731966-12-0101 December 1966 App 5B of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Design Program for Reactor Bldg. ML19322A7741966-12-0101 December 1966 App 5D of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Qc. ML19322A7761966-12-0101 December 1966 App 5C of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Design Criteria for Reactor Bldg. ML19322A7821966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 3 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Reactor. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7841966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 4 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Rcs. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7861966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 5 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Containment Sys. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7871966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 1 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Introduction & Summary. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7881966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 6 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Engineered Safeguards. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7891966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 8 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Electrical Sys. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7901966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 2 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Site & Environ. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322A7911966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 7 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Instrumentation & Control. Includes Revisions 1-6 ML19322B5131966-12-0101 December 1966 Chapter 9 of Oconee 1,2 & 3 PSAR, Auxiliary & Emergency Systems. Includes Revisions 1-6 1967-04-01
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20206P1501999-01-0505 January 1999 LER 98-S03-00:on 981207,security Officer Discovered Uncontrolled Safeguards Info Drawing.Caused by Failure to Follow Established Procedures & Policies.Drawing Was Controlled by Site Security.With ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20198E6381998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-S02-00:on 981130,security Access Was Revoked Due to Falsification of Criminal Record.Individual Was Escorted from Protected Area & Unescorted Access Was Restricted. with ML20153G4601998-09-30030 September 1998 USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Rept, Vols 1-2 ML17354B0971998-09-0909 September 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Machining Defect in Certain One Inch Stainless Steel Swagelok Front Ferrules,Part Number SS-1613-1.Caused by Tubing Slipping Out of Fitting at Three Times Working Pressure of Tubing.Notified Affected Utils ML15261A4681998-09-0404 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 232,232 & 231 to Licenses DPR-38,DPR-47 & DPR-55,respectively ML20248F7441998-05-31031 May 1998 Reactor Vessel Working Group,Response to RAI Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity ML20247L9041997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Rept for Duke Energy Corporation & Saluda River Electric Cooperative,Inc,Financial Statements as of Dec 1997 & 1996 Together W/Auditors Rept ML20198J7651997-10-15015 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting 10-yr Interval Insp Program Plan Alternatives for Listed Plants Units ML20148S3141997-06-30030 June 1997 Ro:On 970422,Oconee Unit 2 Was Shut Down Due to Leak in Rcs. Leak Was Caused by Crack in Pipe to safe-end Weld Connection at RCS Nozzle for HPI Sys A1 Injection Line.Unit 1 Was Shut Down to Inspect Hpis Injection Lines & Implement Ldst Mods ML20148H2501997-06-0505 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Restructuring of Util Through Acquisition Of,& Merger W/Panenergy Corp ML20210E3591997-03-27027 March 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Sorrento Electronics Inc Has Determined Operation & Maint Manual May Not Adequately Define Requirements for Performing Periodic Surveillance of SR Applications.Caused by Hardware Failures.Revised RM-23A ML20134N7121997-02-20020 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Request 96-04 for Plant ML20138L2151997-01-31031 January 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1997 for Oconee Nuclear Station,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20138L2281996-12-31031 December 1996 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1996 for Oconee Nuclear Station,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20133C1231996-12-23023 December 1996 Informs Commission of Staff Review of Request for License Amends from DPC to Perform Emergency Power Engineered Safeguards Functional Test on Three Oconee Nuclear Units ML20115F2471996-07-0303 July 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Piping (Small Portion of Unmelted Matl Drawn Lengthwise Into Bar During Drawing Process) Defect That Existed in Bar as Received from Mill.Addl Insp Procedure for Raw Matl Instituted ML20107M8931995-10-31031 October 1995 Nonproprietary DPC Fuel Reconstitution Analysis Methodology ML17353A4341995-10-31031 October 1995 Rev 1 to BAW-2245, Initial Rt of Linde 80 Welds Based on Fracture Toughness in Transition Range. ML17264A1181995-07-31031 July 1995 Response to Part (1) of GL 92-01,Rev 1,Suppl 1. ML20086M0851995-06-29029 June 1995 DPC TR QA Program ML20077R3631994-12-31031 December 1994 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1994 for Bfnpp ML20236L5971994-12-29029 December 1994 SER in Response to 940314 TIA 94-012 Requesting NRR Staff to Determine Specific Mod to Keowee Emergency Power Supply Logic Must Be Reviewed by Staff Prior to Implementation of Mod ML20064L2001994-01-31031 January 1994 Final Rept EPRI TR-103591, Burnup Verification Measurements on Spent-Fuel Assemblies at Oconee Nuclear Station ML20062K7481993-12-0101 December 1993 ISI Rept for Unit 2 McGuire 1993 Refueling Outage 8 ML20056E5171993-08-31031 August 1993 Technical Review Rept, Tardy Licensee Actions ML20046C1291993-08-0202 August 1993 LER 93-007-00:on 930701,determined That Unit 1 Ssf Rc Makeup Sys Inoperable in Past Due to Design Deficiency.Operations Procedures Revised to Reflect Newly Calculated Operating Limits for Rc Makeup Pump,Rcps & RCS.W/930802 Ltr ML20056G0131993-07-27027 July 1993 Rev 0 to ISI Rept Unit 2 Oconee 1993 Refueling Outage 13 ML20044G5311993-05-26026 May 1993 Suppl to 921207 Part 21 Rept Re Declutch Sys Anomaly in Certain Types of Valve Actuators Supplied by Limitorque Corp.Limitorque Designed New Declutch Lever Which Will Be Available in First Quarter 1993 ML20126J5961992-12-31031 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Loss of RHR Cooling During Nozzle Dam Removal.Nozzle Dams May Create Trapped Air Column Behind Cold Leg Nozzle Dam.Mod to Nozzle Dams Currently Underway. Ltrs to Affected Utils Encl ML20117A5981992-11-23023 November 1992 Special Rept:On 921119,ability of Control Battery Racks to Withstand Seismic Event Could Not Be Confirmed & Batteries Declared Inoperable.Batteries Expected to Be Restored in TS Required Time ML20097G0421992-05-31031 May 1992 Analysis of Capsule OCIII-D Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station Unit-3 ML20077D0671991-11-15015 November 1991 Nonproprietary Version of Rev 0 to Boric Acid Corrosion of Oconee Unit 1 Upper Tubesheet ML20067A5241990-12-31031 December 1990 Final Submittal in Response to NRC Bulletin 88-011, 'Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification.' ML20042F3541990-04-30030 April 1990 Special Rept Re Failure to Prevent Performance Degradation of Reactor Bldg Cooling Units.Caused by Mgt Deficiency & Inadequate Program.Cooling Unit Declared Inoperable & Removed from Svc for Cleaning & Placed Back in Operation ML17348A1621990-03-27027 March 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Matls W/Programmatic Defects Supplied by Dubose Steel,Inc.Customers,Purchase Order,Items & Affected Heat Numbers Listed ML19332D5391989-10-31031 October 1989 Core Thermal-Hydraulic Methodology Using VIPRE-01. ML20042F2321989-08-31031 August 1989 Nonproprietary DCHF-1 Correlation for Predicting Critical Heat Flux in Mixing Vane Grid Fuel Assemblies. ML20205F3211988-10-10010 October 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Deviation from Tech Spec Concerning Ry Indicators Due to Operating Temp Effect on Analog Meter Movement.Initially Reported on 881006.Customers Verbally Notified on 881006-07 ML20154K2091988-09-0909 September 1988 Rev 0 to Response to NRC Bulletin 88-005,Nonconforming Matls Supplied by Piping Supplies,Inc at Folsom,Nj & West Jersey Mfg Co.... Proprietary Procedure 1404.1, Leeb Hardness Testing (Equotip).... Encl.Procedure Withheld ML20245D9541988-09-0606 September 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Condition Involving Inconel 600 Matl Used to Fabricate Steam Generator Tube Plugs & Found to Possess Microstructure Susceptible to Stress Corrosion Cracking ML20245B6061988-08-31031 August 1988 Inadequate NPSH in HPSI Sys in Pwrs, Engineering Evaluation Rept ML20239A6991987-11-30030 November 1987 Addendum 1 to Rev 2 to Integrated Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program (Addendum) ML20236T0791987-11-25025 November 1987 Advises LER 269/87-09,re Degradation of More than One Functional Unit of Emergency Power Switching Logic for Units 2 & 3,in Preparation & Will Be Submitted by 871215. Incident Originally Discussed in Special Rept ML20236Q9491987-10-31031 October 1987 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1987 ML20235W9611987-09-30030 September 1987 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1987 ML20234B1861987-08-31031 August 1987 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1987 ML20237K4761987-07-31031 July 1987 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1987 ML20236Y0221987-07-0808 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Clarifying Determination of Acceptability of Test Duration for Performance of Integrated Leak Rate Test at Plant ML20235S6311987-06-30030 June 1987 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1987 1999-01-05
[Table view] |
Text
-
O O
l l
l E
.E
-eE .
l i
O
~
3000 . 301 O
7911210 77 3
/3
. l
"'*'""""www "mv ,, , - - _ _ , _ ,_ , _ _
7 n
s/
m APPENDIX 5A STRUCTURAL DESIGN BASES The design bases for normal operating conditions are governed by the applicable building design codes. The basic design criterion for the worst loss-of-coolant accident and seismic conditions is that there shall be no loss of function if that function is related to public safety.
AEC publication TID 7024, " Nuclear Reactors and Earthquake", as ampli-fled herein will be used as the basic design guide for seismic analysis.
- 1. CLASSES OF STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS The plant structures and process systems will be classified according to their function and the degree of integrity required to protect the public.
These classes are:
1.1 CLASS 1 Class 1 structures and systeem are those which prevent uncontrolled release of radioactivity and are designed to withstand all loadings without loss of function. When a system as a whole is referred to as Class 1, certain l less essential portions (not associated with loss of function) of the system may later be designated under Class 2 or 3, as appropriate. Examples of Class 1 structures and systeem include the following:
Reactor building and its penetrations, Polar Crane, Reactor vessel and its internals including control rod drive assemblies, Recirculated cooling water systems, Reactor coolant system including vents and drains within containment, l Low pressure injection and decay heat removal system, High pressure injection and purification system, Containment safeguards systems including their i electrical distribution systems, Fuel storage system, Reactor control room and equipment, Waste disposal system.
1.2 CLASS 2 Class 2 structures and systems are those whose limited damage would not result in a release of radioactivity and would permit a controlled plant shutdown but could interrupt power generation. Examples of Class 2 structures and systers include the following:
(sg Secondary coolant system, I
l
() Electric power system,
Turbine, auxiliary and waste disposal buildings except as included in Class 1 above.
1.3 CIASS 3 Class 3 structures and systems are those whose failure could inconvenience operation, but which are not essential to power generation, orderly shutdown or maintenance of the reactor in a safe condition. They include all structures and sys~tems not included in Classes 1 and 2.
2 DESIGN BASES FOR CIASS 1 STRUCTURES 2.1 NORMAL OPERATION For loads experienced in normal plant operation, Class 1 structures are de-signed in accordance with design methods of accepted standards and codes ;
applicable.
2.2 ACCIDENT, WIND AND SEISMIC CONDITIONS The Class 1 structures are proportioned to maintain elastic behavior when sub-jected to various combinations of dead loads, accident loads, thermal loads and wind or seismic loads. The upper limit of elastic behavior is considered ,
to be the yield strength of the effective load-carrying structural materials.
The yield strength far steel (including reinforcing steel) is considered to be l the minimum given in the appropriate ASTM specification. Concrete structures l will be designed for ductile behavior wherever possible; that is, with steel l stress controlling the design. The values for concrete, as given in the ulti-mate strength design portion of the ACI 318-63 Code, will be used in determining ,
"Y", the required yield strength of the structure.
The design loads applied to the structures are increased by load factors based on the probability and conservatism of the predicted normal design loads.
The final design of Class 1 structures satisfies the following loading combina-tions and factors:
Y = 1/ 0 (1. 0D + 1. 0P + 1. 0T + E' )
Y = 1/0 (1,05D + 1.25P + 1.0T + 1.25E or W)
Y = 1/0 (1.05D + 1.5P + 1.0T)
Y = 1/0 (1.0D + 1.0Wt + 1.0Pi ) for Tornado Forces.
(Use 0.95 where dead load subtracts from critical stress. )
(Wind , W, to replace earthquake, E, in the above formula where wind stresses control)
Where Y = required yield strength of the structure as defined above.
D = dead loads of structure and equipment plus any other permanent loadings contributing stress, such as hydrostatic or soils. In addition, a portion of " live load" should be added when it includes piping, cable trays, etc.,
suspended from floors and an allowance should be made for future additional permanent loads.
P = design accident pressure.
T = thermal loads based on a temperature corresponding to the factored design accident pressure.
E = scismic load based on design earthquake.
, S A- 2 (Revised 4-1-67 )
O E' = seismic load based on maximum hypothetical earthquake.
W = wind load.
Wt = stress induced by tornado wind velocity (drag, lif t and torsion).
Pia stress due to differential pressure.
0 = capacity reduction factor.
6 = 0.90 for concrete in flexure.
@ = 0.85 for tension, shear, bond and anchorage in' concrete.
@ = 0.75 for spirally reinforced concrete compression members.
0 = 0.70 for tied compression members.
9 = 0.90 for fabricated structural steel.
@ = 0.90 for mild reinforcing steel (not prestressed) in direct tension excluding splices.
@ = 0.85 for mild reinforcing steel wit'. welded or mechanical splices (for lap splices, @ = 0.85 as above for bond and anchorage).
0 = 0.95 for prestressed tendons in direct tension.
The design ground acceleration at the site is given in Section 2.6, " Seismology."
Seismic loads on structures and components are determined on the basis of dynamic analysis using the average velocity and acceleration spectrum curves shown in Appendix 2B.
Where realistic evaluation of dynamic properties is not possible, the maximum value of the acceleration response curve for the appropriate damping factor is 1
DAMPING FACIORS Per Cent of l Item Critical Damping Welded carbon and stainless steel assemblies (This includes reactor internals, supports and similar weldments. ) 1 I Steel Frame Structures (Both welded and high strength bolted) 2 Reinforced concrete equipment supports 2 i Reinforced concrete frames and buildings 5 Prestressed concrete structures Under design earthquake forces 2 Under maximum hypothetical earthquake 5 Vital Piping 0.5 Seismic forces are applied in the vertical and in any horizontal direction. The l
horizontal and vertical components of ground motion are applied simultaneously j and the two components considered occurring in such a way that the stresses are
! directly additive.
The wind loads are determined from the fastest mile of wind for a 100-year occurrence as shown in Figure 1(b) of Reference 4. This is 95 mph at.the site.
O
- 1000o ~104 5A-3 (Revised 4-1-67) l
- - - - - - 7
3 DESIGN BASES FOR CLASS 2 STRUCTURES 3.1 NORMAL OPERATION For loads experienced in normal plant operation, Class 2 structures are designed in accordance with design methods of accepted standards and codes insofar as they are applicable.
3.2 ACCIDENT AND SEISMIC CONDITIONS For Class 2 structures, the working stress design method will be used and stress will be in accordance with ACI 318-63 and the AISC Codes.
4 DESIGN BASES FOR CIASS 3 STRUCTURES Class 3 structures are designed in accordance with design methods of accepted standards and codes insofar as they are applicable.
5 WIND LOADING FOR CLASS 2 AND 3 STRUCTURES The wind loads are determined from the fastest mile of wind for a 100-year occurrence as shown in Figure 1(b) of Reference 4. This is 95 mph at the site.
6 LOADINGS COMMON TO ALL STRUCTURES 6.1 ICE OR SNOW LOADING A uniform distributed live load of 20 pounds per square foot is considered for roofs as stated in Section 1203.2 of the Southern Standard Building Code.
6.2 FLOODING No loads are considered for floods or inundation. Refer to paragraph 5.1.2.3.4.
6.3 TEMPERATURE The station is designed for an ambient temperature range of 0 F to + 100 F.
7 MISSILE SHIELDING Missile barriers inside the Reactor Building are designed to absorb the energy by plastic yielding.
8 REFERENCES
- 1. Nuclear Reactors and Earthouakes, AEC Publication TID-7024.
- 2. Design of Nuclear Power Reactors Against Earthquakes, Housner, G. W., Proceedings of the Second World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Volume 1, Japan 1960, Page 133.
- 3. Behavior of Structures During Earthquakes , Housner , G. W. , Journal of the Engineering Mechanics Division, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers, October 1959, Page 109. .
- 4. Wind Forces on Structures, Task Committee on Wind Forces, ASCE Paper No. 3269.
o 305 3A-4 (Revised 4-1-67 ) bOOd .