ML19294B082

Response in Opposition to Licensee 800125 Objections to Emergency Planning Contentions.Revises Contention 4 Re Licensee Objection to Inform Public If Accidental Release of Airborne Gases Occurs

ML19294B082
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	01/31/1980
From:	Aamodt M AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML19294B083	List: ML19294B082 ML19294B094
References
NUDOCS 8002270104
Download: ML19294B082 (10)

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January 31, 19E UMDto i

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United States of America @: 3 Nuclear R'egulatory Cornission

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~c%,9 Eefore the Atomic Safety and Ticenrinz_ Beard 1d V>

D N In the Matter of ) a u\ b

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Metropclitan Ed!.sen Ccapany

$ Docket No. 50-2E9 (Three Mile Island Nuclear { (Res tart )

Ctation, Unit No. 1) J Intervenor Aanodt's Response to Iicensee's Cbjections to Ezergency Planning Contentions _ _ _ _ _

Itcensee in Response dated January 25, icer states on p. 8 that Aamodt provided no adequate explanaticn for delay in revising Emergency Flanning contentions. Intervenor apolcgizes to -icensee in that a direct explanation and request for extensien was not made to the licensee as well as to the Eoard. No slight was in-tended the Iicensee, nor disreEard for licensee's scheduler , As explained in a letter to the Eoard dated January 15,1 cec and en-closed with revision of emergency rianning ren+entions nalled to Cervice list, including W ashington, D. C . offices of hicencee's attorney, Intervenor was not present at the prehearing confcrence in Harrisburg when the date for recpence tc the Energency elan was s e.t . Intervenor was ill and her husband substituted for her as h'.s business schedule allcwed. Intervenor was not aware o.f the necessity to respond until after the deadline of December 19 had passed, therefere an extensicn of deadline could not be proterly requested. Intervenor doec not have the cervices of an attorney, nor cecretarial services ,

co that the burden of the volume cf nailings before and after the Christmas holidays was too great to adequately addrecs the nissed i c e ?.13.ne. _ ntervencr lives cn a farn v.ith anitals te te attended ,

and tha nany denands cf far.ily prevented tinely recpense. She

. err:ducticn and =ciling services cf Licencoe cannet te availed by 8 0 0 C 27 0 [ 0D$b-

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Intervenor due to special delivery requirements and location of Intervenor's residence. Intervenor has requested leniency in meet-ing deadlines where the forward going process of the hearing is not impeded.

It is apparent from rece i pt of recent mailings that the i

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discussion of revised Emergency Planning contentions is ongoing.  :

In the spirit of reducing further delay, and in nc way to -

usurp the Board's final authority in admission or denial, Intervenor -

puts _forth a response to licensee's objections and confusions. regard-ing Emergency Planning contentions 3,4,5 and 6. [

t-Centention 4 (Revised) It is contended that licensee has not made .

provision for timely dissemination of information in the event of accidental release of airborne radioactive gasses or particulates.

It is contended that licensee must make information available to the public which will allcw appropriate action to be taken to protect persons, livestock, foodstuff and feed in the event of a discharge of signifigant proportions. All data and plant operating personnel observations relative to all radicactive releases must be transmitted immediately and simultaneously to the NRC, Pennsylvania Pepartment of Envircnmental Rescurces, the ccamissioners of Dauphin, lork and Lancas-ter Ccunties and the licensee's nanagement. It is further contended that licensee must provide this capability b,efore restart of 'b I-1.

Intervenor contends that "all data and plant operating personnel -

E observations relative to all radioactive releases must be transmitted  :

innediately and simultaneously to the NBC , LER, ccanissicners of Dauphin, York and lancaster Counties and licensee's management."

' intervenor does not limit this information flow to "during an acci-dent" as licens ee s tated. Intervenor judges this modification to "e your suggested Emergency Plan implementation procedure critical to j the health and safety of the potentially-affected populaticn for the follcwing reascns: -

1. Initial classification of emergency status and subsequent requirr o notifications result frem the judgement of the -hift Luper-  ;

viscr er Emergency Director. As stated on p. 56 Eection 5." judgement cf Emergency Director is extremely important." Clearly this judgement

could be in error.

Effective public protective action is time dependent. Fro-2.

posed information flow, with required management approval in case of Alert, Site Emergency or General Emergency could cause serious delays.

3 As demonstrated during the Unit 2 accident, hicensee might be expected to place consideration of its public image before the .

health and safety of the public, and therefore, given time, " launder" _

data to the public detrement.

4 Considerable controversy exists relative to the hazard of varicus dos e rates. Concerned individuals should have the ability to protect themselves , their families and their livestock, 5 Direct notification to the ccmmissioners would insure information flow to local media, the only viable source of wide scale notification of impending danger.

6. Direct notification to the commissioners of all radioactive releases will prcvide a data base to aid the local communities in assessing the real cost-benefits of nearby nuclear generating staticns, particularly in light of the realistic cost of emergency preparedness. . .

Intervenor submits that the unique inappropriateness of licensee's ccaments concerning revised Contention 4 prcvides substanted support f.or its va'lidity. Intervenor does not contend for a potential in-formation flow deficiency "during an accident." Intervenor contends in the much more crucial area of " accident" definition ~. Stated in most simple terms, Intervenor contends that license ~e is biased in its perception of its responsibility tcward the public, and, as a result, might be expected to " launder" data which would signal an inrendine accident. Intervenor, therefore, contends that an appro-

riate mechanism be developed te keep licensee honest. That mech ,

anica wculd be direct ccmnunicatien of all radioactive release data directly to all interested evaluatory bodies simultanecusly.

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I-icensee is assuming that local officials are not interested in assessing information and acting upon their own cognizance. Recent actions of the commissioners of I.ancaster County in signing a contract

.to purchase monitoring equipment indicate that there was considerable body of public support for local day to day measurement of radicactivit (This vote was reversed by incoming cc=missioners , however it does not alter the. reasonihgnput ,forth. ) By bringing thfstinformation to the local.. level. the'pQbli6"h'asvth6hopportunitp'.to respond as indivi - .

duals who are being affected. Although releases may not be judged -

by top" officials to be of such proportion to initiate emergency procedures, there may be segments of the population who may wish to protect themselves or should be informed to do so. farmers may wish to protect their livestock and foodstuffs; parents may wish to protect childrens outdoors people may wish to curtail elective activities which would increase exposure.

Unless radiation data is measured and released directly at a local le"el, there may be little timeliness in the sense of real protection of the health and safety of the public.

The Department of Environmental Rescurces , althougFt tied fnta th e , Control;Rcmm . und,er gm.ergency .c ond1.tions , . s ta}es gn ,sec.tiop4, AppendixjD.gDER,Regoge,JX:g ,_ 3 . ; .g y. , .j , q _ .g ._

n g, 3 .. .

~~~ " Protocol for ippleqentation of..any protecti.ye aq. tion involving

~d' airy" products 6f sh9 a@i'culE'.'ral pr'ddact 'will' requiFsthe

. . evaluation ,of <the,, circ.umatance_s wi.th ,th,e,< appropriate'Cagg.gcy s

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E9f *1h,,gynp( 4ygpgt::ieht.;;6f,} Agric.u4tge.' '- - -

Underlining,of " evaluation" is supplied as Intervenor believes that it is a key werd that would allow "laund,ering" of data, and would not protect the safety and health of the public. This is cited as a single example.

icensee admits to distortion of infcrmation as a function of the number of steps betttwen the source and target. E cw e v e-r . 'even

under emergency conditions , Licensee proposes to remove the public at least four steps from the primary source of informa' tion. ' d e n ?-

(Section 4. Restart Flan Appendix B, pageJ4-JG In additien, Licensee employs tne phrase " approved bulletin", page 24, and states "The Media Center also receives its information from OESC, but does not release it until personnel CRC,2EAA and CELC)

.... are notified."

i From page 29, Licensee states in item 4: j It shall.be the responsibility of the Public Affairs Assistant to notify the~ Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission prior to public dissenination of statements and bulletins.when time permits."

From page 35, last paragraph:

"When the Ccmmand Center is fully established, it will receive from the OESC, prior.to release to the media, company statements and periodic bulletins for dissemination.Y From above on page 35:

"Outside working hours some time will elapse before the Cc.r.v.and Center is established."

From page 36, under President's (utillty) primary ' responsibility:

" personal media acquaintances and media representatives of national

~. a stature",

a .- m can be contacted

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. <.by this office, but local press are designated to 'aork with " offices in York and Lebanon. The President at the Command Center can communicate with the Govenor of rennsylvania or lieutenant Governor, the White . House, congressmen and state legic-lators , key leaders of business and industry, but local- goverments I and people do not have access at :this level.

It appears to Intervenor that the Licensee is notsofferingn the publicenuffidientnopportunity:to'be .informede tb' enchance -Their c a f etp".and .h ealth . .

Centention 5. It is centended that tresent evacuation rIans do not prcvide for care and/or : elecation o'f livestock. It is'further con-tended that such provision should be made before restart cf TMI-1.

I.icensee has not addresced Contention 5 in the Emergency .rlan, b

er ic included in the plans of ecunties and other agencies. Inter-venor finds no provision or even concern expressed for the safety  ;

i and health of farmers who without adequate provision for livestock,  !

would not be able to evacuate or take shelter. .i TMI-l is surr'ounded by farms as described in Emergency Flan '.

4.2.1.4: . j i

i "1. The Three Mile Island site is currently surro.un'ded by .i farm lands within a 10 mile radius. Eands are used for dairy cattle , tobacco, poultry, vegetables , fruit , corn, ,

wheat and other products."

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End Other products '"ald include beef cattle, horses , swine, goats i

,and-sheep. These and the dairy cattle are referred to as livestock in the contention.

The above sentences are the nearly.thecsumatotal cbncerning =

farms and farmers in the Emergency Flanning Zones. (Milk and produce -

protection problems were outlined in DER Response. ) Although Licensee provides information on the considerable investment of GPU/ Meted at TMI-l (Section 4, Appendix !5 , pages 21-22), a holding company in

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which many investcrs h, ave financial interest, newhere in the response was the investment of the people who own and live on farms in the area surrounding TMI-l mentioned.

Th e ' fanm e rs ' is also a sizeable invest- 2 ment, colletively, and individually, their only investment in most cares. '

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The livestock are a large part of that investment 'and an essential l l

part that allows for the profitability of the total investmet:t. It would not be sentimentality (unless humane concerns are considered by the reader to be included) that would influence,the farmer's decision to evacuate or remain, but a reasonable cencern for his ability to survive economically as well as physically.

It would seem to Intervenor that resolution of the very difficult

.treblem of evacuatien of livestock should not be. postponed t til the D ( q)l 16

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7 eventuality of an emergency, but should be addressed prior to restart since it involves the safety and well-being of section of the public heretofor.censidered worthy of consideration.

Ifdthe lackyof provision for evacuation of livestock implies that they are to remain, the response contai-ned in the DER plan contains no implementation of measures for mitigating ingestion ex- i posure (such as placing livestock on stored feed) for farms in the 50 mile EFZ and beyond. (Figure I-14 NUREG-0396 shows potentially ,

-high doses.out to over 100 miles.) DER plan, Section 4, hppendix i Section IX, poses some of the problems and makes some wishfulfilling comments , but it lacks real direction and guides for action. *i h e IET: !The DER =plah:referseto:'thenDepir.tment of Agriculture Fl an for i.mplementation as qboted prior.(p.4),'however this plan was not in-  !

cluded in the Emergency Flan. however,'in the Ccmmenwealth of -

Fennsylvania, Lisaster Operatien Pldn, Appendix D of dection 4, there is a~s tngle page, listed as Appendix and empty except for thetitle,EeeDepartmentofAgricultureFixedNuclear(acility Incident Flan (limited Distribution under Leparate Cover). Inter-

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venor has attempted to obtain this plan frem licensee, calling '

M. A. S haw at Gilbert Associates in Reading frcm whence the Emergency FlGn was distributed. Several individuals attempt'ed to assist in locating the plan but were unsuccessful. Robert Aahler, attorney for Met Ed called February 1,1980 to inform Intervenor that he had s not seen this plan and did not know if it existed or- was being pre-pared. Intervenor is therefore at a total loss to understand why licensee would ask to have Contention 5 eliminated since its concerns e are not considered in the Emergency Plan available to date.

An Emergency Flan for farmers would need to be:censidered by URC if the '. suggestions -of the RogcVincstudy for? siting cin -lcw 'prp-

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ulation areas means farm areas.

Contention 6. It is contended that present emergency plans do not-adequately provide for the health and safety of persons living more than 10 miles from TMI -1. Radioactive plumes pose substantial risk for distances far in excess of 10 miles. Adec uate detection and monitoring capability is not presently plannec to assess or predict risk to health and safety of persons in the path of plumes , nor is a . mechanism available to inform them of the danger to which they would be. exposed. It is further contended that emergency plans must be upgraded accordingly before restart of TMI-1.

Contention 6 is not satisfactorily addressed in Licensee's Emergency Plan, therefore Intervener believed there was no necessity to revise. Intervenor is unable to understand. hew emergency planning for a radius of cnly 10 miles is in accord with the health and safety of the population beyon'd.

All parties are familiar with recommendations of the Task Force of NUREG-0396 in III-8 that emergency planning zones be established for " initial planning studiesr. Further, Figure I-14 shows a de-crease of the probability of exceeding ingestion dose that does not diminish to any important extent to well beyond 50 miles. It is also stated (I-50) that beyond Ic miles there is little apparent distincticn in terms of projected early fatalities and injuries between evacuation and sheltering strategies (in case of a severe accident). Implied is that either evacuation or sheltering should be planned.

Since the August 9 order of the Ecard cal _ led for both long and short term planning, i. e., complete, and is serving to adjudicate the inadequacies of prior planning, as an outgrowth of ^.he TMI-2 accident. Intervenor is at a loss to understand why the residents cf the 10 mile EFZ would be evacuated to the im$ediate ' area beyond, which wculd be subject to hazards and would be withcut adequate planning te deal with them. It would seem that would significantly decrease the pcssibilities of adequately sheltering or evacuating the repulaticn residing beyond the 10 mile EF2, whi ig 3 Q1p dr m ing e g g! UJ  :=

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. 9 the cafety of those evacuated. -

In the days following TMI-2 accident, Intervenor and family were not able to obtain credible information, and chose, therefere, to evacuate. Assessment of radioactive plumes frcm plant release and meterological condition is based on a number of assumptions.

One is that the exposure of fanners, children and outdoors people is lumped with those who work or play in sheltered areas. Another is that measurement of a single radioactive iodine in milk is adequate

, and timely.

Contention 6 is calling for measures by Licensee and NRC to monbtor airbbrnanradioactive releases at many locations consistent with obtimum public protection. Intervenor suggests participation by the public in monitoring.

Intervenor does not find the concerns expressed in Contention 6 adequately addressed in the Emergency Plan.

Contention 3. It is contended that the licencee has not made adequate provision for assessing the potential risk to humans and animals from .

. accidental dischar' g e of airborne radioactive gasses or particulates.

It is contended that existing environmental monitoring plans do not call for

1. monitoring several important radioactive substances,

2. quantifying total emissiens fron a given discharge.

3 cefining danger to health and safety as a function of distance.

direction and time. .

Contention 3 is germaine to the protection of the health and safety of the population. U.pon it hangs the definition of emergency.

Intervenor needs additional time to develop the extent and risk of the inadequacies listed in centention and proposes to do this through

" discovery" and res earch. Intervenor requests. permission to continue with this contention.

Disccvery and research would include infcrmation en measurement of the iodines at the plant stack, through milk sampling; synergistic action in human respense to varicus combinations of discharges; long

.v ._

term effects of 1cw radiation exposure; statistical study of deaths where classified in vicinity of nuclear plants measurements of radioactive particulates in soil.

Respectfully submitted, 1 .

hy& .bu . dual Maracrie M. Aamodt

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i Dated February 2, 1980 i

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