ML19290B224
| ML19290B224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1979 |
| From: | Burt L MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912040481 | |
| Download: ML19290B224 (26) | |
Text
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.i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _
r E3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -c.
U 55 i M25 __
TO: DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR REAC'IOR REGULATION %
5 d 1'
'7 R3 -
RE: CONSTRUCTION PERMITS CPEN-135 U
~
CPPM-136 CS
)
In the Matter of )
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF )
NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) Docket Nos. 50-443
) 50-444 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )
)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE' S REQUEST FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DATED MAY 2, 1979 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, an intervenor in the construction permit licensing proceedings for the Seabrook Station, supports the request of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) for an order to show cause why the Seabrook construction permits should not be suspended or revoked for the following reasons: 1) the failure of the NRC to evaluate and determine the feasibility of evacuation and emergency planning beyond the Seabrook low population zone (LPZ), and 2) the failure of the NRC to evaluate the consequences of a Class 9 h
accident in its environmental reviews. W[p 2119 230 od;p ch-7912 040 h/$ /
SAPL has raised these issues in its Request for an Order to Show Cause, dated May 2, 1979. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts joins the arguments presented by SAPL in support of its Request for an Order to Show Cause, dated May 2, 1979, and by the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP).1/ Jul a contiguous state to New Hampshire, the Commonwealth joins in the concerns about adequate emergency planning articulated by the New Hampshire Attorney General in its Statement of Position. ! This memorandum comments on recent events and presents the Commonwealth's views on critical issues of public health and safety.
I. THE NRC MUST CONSIDER THE FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PLANNING BEYOND THE SEABROOK LPZ There is no question that the Commission n'st consider the feasibility of evacuatons beyond the present 1.25 mile LPZ for the Seabrook site. Since the issuance of the construction permits for Seabrook Units 1 & 2, new NRC requirements have been promulgated; they call for extension of the emergency 1/ See "NECNP Memorandum in Support of Seacoast Anti Pollution League Requests for Orders to Show Cause" (July 30, 1979). SAPL also has requested an order to show cause, dated March 12, 1979, concerning the financial qualifications of Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSCO). The Commonwealth is on record as supporting this request. See
" Response of the Commonwealth of M:r achusetts to SAPL's Reque st for an Order to Show Cause" (March 26, 1979).
2/ See " Statement of Position with Respect to the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Request for Show Cause Order Dated May 2, 1979," N.H. Attorney General (October 12, 1979).
2119 231 planning zone from the present LPZ to a radius of at least 10 miles around all reactor sites.1/
The unique characteristics of the Seabrook area, including the heavily populated beaches, limited egress routes and lack of shelter facilities, create major cbstacles to the development of emergency plans that assure protection of the public in the event of a serious reactor accident. The licensee 's own evacuation studies, on which the present emergency plans are based, indicate that nearby beaches could not be evacuated in the time now recommended by the Staff.S/
Because NRC policy requires a determination of emergency planning feasibility at the construction permit stage, this must issue be resolved before further construction renders an impartial decision impossible.
SAPL has presented a thorough background of the evacuation issue in its memorandum in support of its request for 3/ NRC policy Statement on Emergency Planning Zones, 44 F.R.
61123, Oct. 23, 1979; Information Report, SECY-79-450, p. 2, July 23, 1979; letter dated September 13, 1979, from Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Acting Director of the Division of Operating Reac tor s , to all operating nuclear power plants, Enclosure 7; Proposed emergency planning regulations for expedited rulemaking.
1/ The staff is now requiring a commitment f rom licensees to provide prompt notification to offsite authorities and to assure that such authorities have the resources to provide early warning and clear instructions to the public in the plume exposure EPZ within 30 minutes fs' lowing notification from the facility. See D.B. Vassallo, NRC-NRR, to R. M. Butler, Boston Edison Company, October 23, 1979 (NRC Docket No. 50-471).
2119 232 a show cause order. Br ie fly, from the initiation of the Seabrook construction permit proceedings, the NRC S ta f f has maintained it has jurisdiction to require a demonstration of the feasibility of evacuating persons beyond the LPZ because of the proximity of the Seabrook units to the coastal beaches and because of the limited road networks serving those beaches.
This position was supported by NECNP, the Attorney General of New Hampshire and the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety.E!
Although the Licensing Board admitted that evacuation beyond the LPZ would become advisable in the event of a Class 9 accident, the Board ruled and the Appeal Board agreed that existing NRC regulations did not require a consideration of emergency protection measures beyond the LPZ.5! The Commission subsequently rejected this narrow interpretation of Appendix E by issuing a proposed amendment to the emergency planning regulations designed to overcome the limitations imposed by ALAB-390. The proposed rule provided immediate
" interim guidance" and required an applicant to consider emergency planning beyond the LPZ," . . . based on the design E/ See Letter from ACRS reviewing Seabrook Application (December 10, 1974).
5/ See Public Service Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Ur.its 1 and 2),
LBP 76-26, 3 NRC 857, 871-875, 922-926 (1976); ALAB-390, 5 NRC 733 (1971) ; Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
2119 233 features of the facility and the physical characteristics of the environs in the vicinity of the site."2/
In 1976 a joint NRC/ EPA Task Force was organized to develop a basis for emergency response planning near nuclear power plants. The Task Force concluded that the consequences of a spectrum of design-based and Class 9 accidents should form the bases for emergency planning zones (EPZ's) with a 10 mile radius for a radioactive plume inhalation exposure pathway, and with a 50 mile radius for an ingestion exposure pathway.E/
As a result of NRC investigations into the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident and comments on the Task Force Report, the staff recommended that the Commission adoption of new emergency planning requirements, including the 10 and 50 mile EPZ's.E!
On September 13, 1979, the staff issued these proposals as "Near Term Requirements for Improving Emergency Preparedness" for all nuclear reactor sites.10/ Recently the Commission S/ 43 F.R. 37473, 37475 (August 23, 1978).
S/ " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local GJ *rnment Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396 (December, 1978).
S/ Information Report , SECY 79-450 (July 23, 1979).
1S/ Letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director of NRC Division of Operating Reactors, to all operating nuclear power plants (September 13, 1979). .
2li9 234 officially endorsed the EPZ planning guidance:
In endorsing this guidance, the Commission recognizes that it is appropriate and prudent for emergency planning guidance to take into consideration the principal characteristics . . . of a spectrum of design basis and core melt accidents.
44 F.R. 61123 (October 23, 1979)
On September 19, 1979, the staff issued new " Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0610), which replace the general classes of emergency action levels in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.101.11/ These guidelines, which are e ff ective pending completion of the expedited rulemaking on emergency planning in January, 1980, provide, inter alia, for specific actions to be taken by the licensee and local emergency personnel during a reactor accident, including " actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment in teg r ity, " i. e. , Class 9 accidents. The NRC 's recommended protective action for the public during such an accident is immediate sheltering, pending a determination tFar evacuation is required and can be completed prior to the transport of significant quantities of radioactivity to the affected area.
The sheltering facilities along the coast near the Seabrook Station are grossly inadequate to accomodate the 11/ The Commission has endorsed these " predetermined protective action plans for the EPZ's." 44 F.R. 61123 (October 23, 1979) 2119 235 number of people using the nearby coastal beaches. The Commission has recognized and discussed this problem, and the consequent need for feasible evacuation alternatives. In its August 1978 notice of the proposed amendment to Appendix E, the Commission endorsed consideration of emergency planning beyond the LPZ, noting that:
The NRC staff has found that there may be circumstances for which the available strategies for taking protective actions outside the facility site boundaries are limited. As an example, this occurs when large numbers of persons may be engaged in outdoor recreational activities in the vicinity of a plant, and it is clear that existing structures are insu f ficient to provide needed temporary shelter.
In such an instance, the sta ff [ sic] considered it appropriate to emphasize evacuation. 43 F.R. 37475 (August 23, 1978) (emphasis added).
The applicant or licensee, therefore, must demonstrate that the beaches within the emergency planning zone can be promptly evacuated to assure the safety of these people in the event of a signifi 2 ant radiolog ical release.
There are two principle reasons why an evaluation of emergency action capabi 3 ties at Seabrook should be initiated promptly. First, since the staff must ultimately determine the feasibility of evacuating tne beaches before Seabrook Station can begin operating, it is important that the analysis be completed before further investment and construction are wasted. More importantly, NRC decisions and reculations require that emergency planning feasi' .iity be addressed at the construction permit stage.
When reviewing an application for a construction permit, the Commission must at the very least determine whether 29 236
surrounding population densities, transportation routes, land use and other unique site characteristics might combine to render any emergency plan ineff ective.12/ The issue, therefore, is emergency planning feasibility, which is a site-specific matter that must be resolved by consideration of the demographic, meteorological and topological peculiarities of the area surrounding the proposed reactor. This subject is a necessary component of the larger issues of site suitability ( see 10 C. F .R. S 100.10 ) ) , reactor safety (see 10 C.F.R. S 50.34 [a] [10] and Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50) and the NEPA alternative sites cost / benefit analysis (see Supplementary Information to the proposed amendment to Appendix E, 43 F.R. 37473, 37474 (August 23, 1978)), all of which must be resolved prior to the issuance of a construction permit.11/ In add ition, an applicant for a construction permit is required under 10 C.F.R. 550.3 4 (a) to provide in its Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) a discussion of its " preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. " While 12/ Southern California Edison Company, et al., (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3), ALAB-248, 8 AEC 957, 962-63 (1974) ; Consumers Power Company, (Midland Plant Units 1 and 2) ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 342-43 (1973); 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Sections I-III . 13/ The proposed emergency planning regulations specifically require inclusion of a " preliminary evacuation feasibility analysis" in the PSAR prior to issuance of a construction permit. See Proposed Amendments to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, SII (H) ; Staff Paper for Commissioner review from R.B. Minogue, Director, Office of Standards Development. OSD's proposed amendments to Appendix E were drafted pursuant to the Commission's notice of expedited rulemaking on emergency planning, 44 F.R. 41483 (July 17, 1979). consideration of the operative details of such plans may be more appropriately deferred to the operating license stage, there must be at least some consideration given to the scope of these plans, and a threshold determination made whether the plans effectively extend to that portion of the public that can be said to be at risk in the event of a serious reactor accident. In short, if the feasibility issue is to be considered at all, it must be at some time prior to construction of a facility. To deal with this critical safety issue after a reactor is built illog ical, and it runs the considerable risk that the applicant's ongoing investment in the project will impermissibly affect the decision-making process.1S/ The urgency of an evacuation feasibility analysis might not be so acute were it not for the heavily utilized beaches near Seabrook, the lack of adequate sheltering facilities and the limited egress routes. When issuing the proposed rule requiring consideration of emergency planning beyond the LPZ, the Commission explained that one of its major objectives was
. . . is to assure that emergency plans exist which provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an acc iden tal release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant.
The intent of the Commission is to assure that the decisionmaking process for licensing nuclear power plants will include an analysis by the applicant and a review by the Commission of each nuclear power plant license or permit application to 12/ See Seabrook , CLI-78-14, 7 NRC 952 (1978). 2119 238 plan for taking suitable protective actions on a timely basis under accident conditions within and outside the proposed site. 43 F.R. 37474 (emphasis added). The Commission has listed the physical characteristics in the vicinity of a site which it feels are relevant to the evaluation of proposed protective actions: (t]he numbers and proximity to the site boundary of resident and transient persons and the relative speed with which warnings can be communicated to them, the availability and character of evacuation routes and means of transportation, the availability and locations of structures suitable for sheltering people . . .. Id. More recently, the NRC Siting Policy Task Force Report recommended: That Part 100 require that the physical characteristics of the EPZ, including the population distribution in relation to transportation routes and other topographic features, be such as to provide reasonable assurance that a relatively prompt evacuation of the EPZ, including transients would be feasible in the event of an accident. NUREG-06 25, p. 48. The Seabrook environs present major obstacles to the development of emergency plans providing " reasonable assurance that appropriate measures" can be taken on a " timely basis" in the event of a serious reactor accident. Within a 5 mile radius, there is an estimated summer peak population of over 100,000, the majority of whom are clustered in the beach areas.1E! It is not disputed that even when the seasonal population is time weighted, the population densities substantially exceed the population guidelines that normally 1E/ Seabrook. LBP-76-26, 3 NRC at 871-875. 2ll9 }}g trigger an evaluation of the risk of Class 9 consequences.15/ In addition, there are only 3 two _ane roads providing egress from the entire beach region. For an evacuation to be effective where little or no sheltering exists, people must be removed before the radioactive plume reaches the area. The NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, now endorsed by the Commission, estimates that a major release may begin within 30 minutes after an initiating event, and that a resulting radioactive plume may travel five miles 30 minu te s to two hou rs, and ten miles in two to four hours.11/ In other words, the Task Force recommends for emergency planning guidance a plume speed of 2.5 to 10 mph. Hampton Beach is only two miles east-northeast of the Seabrook Station, and this coastal beach runs south to Salisbury Beach, Massachusetts, only five miles from the reactor site. A plume traveling at a speed of 10 mph to the east-northeast could reach Hampton Beach within 15 minutes of a release; a plume traveling to the south-southeast at the same speed could reach Salisbury Beach in about 30 minutes. Under poor dispersion conditions associated with low windspeeds (2.5 mph), it would be necessary to evacuate the beach area within five miles in only two hours. The Applicant Public Service 15/ See Seabrook Alternative Site Study, NUREG-0501, p. A-60 (December 1978); Final Supplement to Final Environmental Statement (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 2), NUREG-0549,
- p. 4- 55 (May 1979).
12/ NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, NUREG-0396 at 20, see also Appendix I. 2119 240
Company's own preliminary analysis of the road network and the beach population east of the Seabrook site concluded it would take eight hours to evacuate any of the three 22.5 beach sectors to a distance of five miles f rom the reactor. AE/ P.S.Co.'s Supplemental Testimony presented one year later reduced the 5 mile evacuation time estimates for 45 bee;h sectors to 3.75 to 5.5 hours.12/ Thus, the applicant's own testimony indicates that it is not likely that beach sectors could be evacuated before the arrival of a radioactive plume, under seriout accident conditions. It can hardly be said that there is " reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an accidental release . . . and that " suitable protective actions (can be taken) on a timely basis . . .". See 43 F.R. 37474. SAPL and NECNP have requested the NRC to demonstrate that evacuation of persons within a 30 mile area surrounding the Seabrook site is feasible. While present Commission policy requires evacuation planning for about a 10 mile radius from the reactor aite, the actual size and shape of this EPZ must be determined on a site-specific basis. See 44 F.R. 61123. The Commonwealth believes that the intervenors' request is reasonable in light of current Commission policy and the high 1S/ Answer 13.9 to Staff Questions, Amendment 23 to the PSAR, p. S13-16, June, 1974. 19/ Applicant's Director Testimony No. 7, p. 19, In the Ma tter of P.S.Co. , Tr. p. 249 5+, June 5, 1975. _ 1, _ 2Ii9 24i
permanent and seasonal populations surrounding this coastal site. In order to evacuate a 10 mile sector, for example, it will be necessary to provide for prompt notification and traffic control in neighboring sectors within the 10 mile radius and in down-wind regions beyond the 10 mile radius. It therefore is necessary to analyze the major egress routes and population densities beyond ten miles in order to determine the feasibility of evacuating all persons within the EPZ. In this regard, the Commonwealth is critically concerned with the feasibility of evacuating Salisbury, which on a summer weekend has a population exceeding 50,000 persons. A substantial portion of these people are day trippers on the beaches. In addition, the town of Newburyport, located just south of Salisbury, attracts many summer tourists to the Parker River National Wildlife Refuge and Plum Island, both recreation areas of which have limited access to the mainland. South and west of Salisbury are some of the Commonwealth's most densely populated North Shore communities, many of which have historic and recreational tourist attractions, and limited road networks. The metropolitan Boston area is also within the 30-50 mile radius of the Seabrook site.2q/ Finally, an important f actor in determining the size of the evacuation zone is the probability of spontaneous or voluntary evacuation. Th is is especially true for the 2q/ Within a 30 mile radius of Seabrook, the staff has estimated there will be over 1.4 million people in 1985 and over 3 million in 2020. See Seabrook Alternative Site Study, NUREG-0501, P. A-60 (June 1978 ) . 2119 242
Seabrook environs where there are large numbers of seasonal transients. A proper feasibility analysis must evaluate and include the likelihood of substantial voluntary evacuation outside recommended evacuation areas which could inter fere with the prc mpt evacuation of sectors withom the EPZ.SAI II. CLASS 9 AOCIDENT CONSEQUENCES MUST BE CONSIDERED AT SEABROOK Recent events underscore the importance of a staff evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 accident at Seabrook Station in their NEPA cost / benefit analysis of alternatives. One f actor in this cost / benefit analysis is the risk imposed on surrounding populations in the event of serious reactor accidents. Since SAPL and NECNP presented their requests for show cause orders, the staff and a Licensing Board have officially identified the accident at TMI as a Class 9 acc iden t.22/ In addition, the Commission recently upheld the staff policy of considering the environmental consequences 21/ When pregnant women and pre-school children within 5 miles of TMI were advised to evacuate, there was a substantial number of additional evacuees within and beyond the 5 mile radius. A public opinion poll of residents living within 15 miles of TMI by the Social Research Center at Elizabethtown Co lleg e , PA , (April 9,1979) revealed that over half of all residents within 5 miles lef' the area and nearly one-third of the residents from 6 to 15 miles evacuated voluntarily. 22/ Pubic Service Electr ic and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1) (" Salem") NRC Docket No. 50-272, ASLB Order (September 10, 1979; "NRC Staff Response to Board Question No. 4 Regarding Occurrence of a Class 9 Accident at Three Mile Island , " Docket No. 50-272 (August 24, 1979). 2119 243 of Class 9 accidents under certain circumstances.23/ Furthermore, the Commission has just specifically endorsed the j t consideration of Class 9 characteristics for emergency planning l guidance (44 F.R. 61123, October 23, 1979). Because the staff must consider the environmental consequences of a Class 9 j accident for emergency planning, the staff will not be unduly burdened by evaluating these risks in the NEPA cost / benefit i analysis for alternative sites as well. Initially the Staff was precluded from considering Class 9 accidents in its environmental reviews because the probability of their occurrence was said to be too remote. The regulatory basis for ignoring Class 9 consequences was provided by the proposed annex to Appendix D to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. The Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) provided some justification 1 for this practice by quantifying the low probability of Class 9 l l accidents. Nevertheless, in practice the staff increasingly began to consider the potentially catastrophic consequences of such acc iden ts. As early as 1973, the Staff rejected a proposed i site at Newbold Island, because an alternative site was ' significantly less populous and therefore less vulnerable to the consequences of a major nuclear accident. Shortly therea f te r, Regulatory Guide 4.7 was issued, containing specific guidelines on the population density surrounding 21/ Off shore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants) Docket No. STN 50-437, CL1-79, (September 14, 1979). (" Offshore ! Powe r ") ! 2119 244 proposed nuclear reactor sites. Stating that "[a] reas of low population density are preferred for nuclear power station sites," Reg. Guide 4.7 specified that if projected population densities within a thirty-aile radius of the site exceeded 500 persons per square mile at the time of initial operation and 1,000 persons per square mile at its retirement, then "special attention should be given to the consideration of alternative sites with lower population densities. " Then, in the early site review for the proposed Perryman reactor in 1977, the staff initiated a Class 9 accident analysis after demographic studies revealed population densities in excess of the " trip levels" of Reg. Guide 4.7. The staff formalized this policy in Commiscian Action Paper, SECY 78-137. Whenever the population trip levels of Re). Guide 4.7 are exceeded, an " assessment of the relative differences in Class 9 accident risks should be included as one element of the site comparisons. " The staff 's concern "was not based on a uniquely high probabilit y of accident but rather on unique circumstances which increase the potential consequences and thus the overall risk. " In 1973 the NRC received the first application for a license to manuf acture a commercial floating nuclear power plant ( FN P) . Because such plants involved so unique a departure f rc land based siting, the Staff undertook an extensive study of the consequences of a Class 9 accident (the Liquid Pathway Generic Study, NUREG-0 440 [LPGS]), and in the FNP Final Environmental Statement found that 2119 245 the unlikely but possible occurrence of a core melt accident at estuarine and riverine areas could result in a direct release of radioactive material, such that the consequences to the environment would be unacceptable. FES III, p. XIV. The applicant then challenged the Staff's Class 9 analysis as prohibited by the proposed Annex to Appendix D. The Staff argued before the Appeal Board that it was already established policy, as revealed in its Standard Review Plan, to reject proposed sites in highly populated areas due to the potential consequences of Class 9 accidents. See ALAB-489 at 223, 224. The question was certified to the Commission which upheld the Staff 's consideration of Class 9 consequences. In its Brief to the Commission, the Staff explained: The premise for the Annex 's limitations on discussion of Class 9 accident risks must be that the risks for the reactor in question fall within the envelope of the risks for typical licensed power reactors. It just doesn't make sense to presume that the Commission was forever foreclosing any attempt to evaluate Class 9 consequences even if it could be shown that those consequences, and therefore the risks, for a particular application, were quantitatively and qualitatively different from practically all plants within the general envelope previously considered.
. . . Common sense dictates that there must be a point beyond which the consequences of a Class 9 accident become susceptible to candid evaluation in an environmental impact s ta temen t. And it should not matter whether the reactor in cuestion is a land-based plant or an FNP. Brief of the Staf f, page 36-37 (emphasis added).
Relying on its inherent policy-making authority, the Commission held it could not ignore what its own staff views as an environmental risk that requires specific mitigative actions. NEPA is based on the philosophy that the federal government should consider all available information about the 7-2l19 246
reasonably likely environmental consequences of its proposed actions and should take appropriate measures to mitigate or eliminate the adverse impacts of those actions when practical. Offshore Powe r Systems , sup ra , Slip, Op. at 7. The Commission announced its intention to leave the generic issue of consideration of Class 9 accidents at land-based reactors for rulemaking proceedings and concluded by asking the staff to:
- 1. Provide us with its recommendations on how the
. interim guidance of the Annex might be modified, on an interim basis and until the rulemaking on this subj ect is completed, to re flect developments since 1971 and to accord more fully with current staff po licy in this area; and
- 2. In the in te r im , . . . bring to our attention any individual cases in which (the Staff) believes the environmental consequences of Class 9 accidents should be considered. Id., at 9-10 (emphasis added).
By inviting the staff 's recommendation for interim guidance based on developments since the issuance of the proposed annex and on current staff policy, the Commission implicitly accepted the statf's policy in f avor of considering Class 9 consequences at its discretion, and in particular where the population guidelines of Reg. Guide 4.7 are exceeded. It is now clear that the sole justification for the original policy of the proposed annex is no longer valid. The probability of a Class 9 accident has now unmistakably entered the realm of " reasonable likelihood". First, the Risk Assessment Review Group concluded in NUREG-CR-0400 that the quantitative risk assessment methodology developed in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) was scientifically 2119 247 inde fensible, theraby undermining the quantitive basis for the low probability of Class 9 accidents. Now, by order of the Licensing Board in Salem,the accident at TMI has been officially recognized as a Class 9 acc iden t. 21/ It is well established that the NRC must consider any events that are " reasonably probable."21/ The Appeal Board in Of fshore Power Systems, recognized that NEPA mandates assessment of those environmental consequences that are reasonably anticipatable . .
. Moreover, the decisions to tie the need to discuss reactor accidents . . . to a showing of a reasonable likelihood of occurrence (is) an approach that has gained judicial acceptance (c ites omitted). ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 213 (1978).
The occurrence of a Class 9 accident at Three Mile Island establishes that there is a " reasonable likelihood" that such severe accidents can occur. NEPA, therefore, requires an evaluation of Class 9 accident consequences. Furthermore, the NRC Siting Policy Task Force has just issued its report (NUREG-0625) for review by the Commission. One of three primary goals was as follows:
"To take into consideration in siting the risk associated with accidents beyond the design basis (Class 9) by establishing population density and distribution criteria . . . Although [ Class 9] risk cannot be completely reduced to zero, it can be significantly reduced by selective siting.
NUREG-0625, p. iii (1979). di/ See footnote 22, supra at 14. 21/ Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island) Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. (Vermont Yankee) , ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 49 (1978). 2119 248 Spec ifically, the Task Force recommends revision of 10 C.F.R. Part 100 to provide a fixed exclusion and protective action distance and population density and distribution criteria to be developed by generic rulemaking proceedings. The Task Force re-affirns the staff policy toward consideration of Class 9 events: The Task Force concludes that the protection from Class 9 accidents originally intended to be provided by the population center distance should be restored
. . . The rationale for recommending population density and distribution limits both within and beyond the EPZ is to provide some additional assurance that the societal risk from Class 9 accidents for populations within about 20 miles of a nuclear plant is kept at reasonable levels.
NUREG-0625, Supra at 48. When the Commission recently endorsed the concept of EPZ's, it stated it is appropriate and prudent for emergency planning guidance to take into consideration the principal characteristics . . . of a spectrum of design basis and core melt accidents. 44 F.R. 61123 (October 23, 1979) (emphasis added). In the " supplementary Information" section of the notice of the proposed amendment to Appendix E, the Commission stated the protection of the public beyond the exclusion zone was one matter which may also be considered in identifying any potential emergency planning advantages or disadvantages of particular sites as part of the NEPA cost / benefit analysis of alternate sites. 43 F.R. 37474. In summary, the sta ff 's Class 9 policy and the Commission's concurrence is now clear. In its most recent alternative site study, (NUREG-0 501) , the staff's demographic analysis of Seabrook disclosed population densities in excess of Reg. Guide 4.7 trip levels for plant start-up and 21i9 249
retirement. The Staff 's refusal to consider Class 9 consequences runs counter to its prior decisions made in Newbold Island, Perryman, and Offshore Power, and is directly contrary to the current staff policy elucidated in SECY 78-137 and the Siting Policy Task Force Report. In view of the Commission's endorsement of this staff policy and the consideration of emergency planning disadvantages "as part of the NEPA cost / benefit analysis of alternate sites," it is the duty of the Staff to undertake a complete Class 9 analysis in conjunction with the evacuation feasibility evaluation. III. LEGAL AUTHORITY In consideration of the NRC's statutory duty to safeguard the public health and safety, it is the duty of the Staf f, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.202, to issue a show cause order and institute proceedings to evaluate the feasibility of evacuation and emergency planning beyond the LPZ at Seabrook and the environmental consequences of a Class 9 accident. It is well-established that emergency planning is a significant sa fety issue. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Unit 2), ALAB-474, 7 NRC 746 (1978). The Commission has a statutory duty to promote the development of atomic energy " consistent . . . with the health and safety of the public. " 42 U.S.C. S2013(d). The Commission itself has emphasized that public safety is the first, last and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or license to operate a nuclear facility. Power Reactor Development Corp. v. International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 402, 81 S. C t. 1529, 1532 (1961). 2119 250 IV CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts supports the requests by the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League and the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation immediately issue an order to Show Cause why the Seabrook construction permits should not be suspended or revoked. Respectfully submitted, auA 21 Laurie Burt Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division One Ashburton Place - 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2265 DATFO: (G cvs.w (4}i 3 c r tw, M,A 2119 251 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, LAURIE BURT, hereby certify that the foregoing " Common-wealth of Massachusetts Memorandum in Support of Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Request for an Order to Show Cause Dated May 2, 1979" was served upon the following be depositing copies the. eof in the United States Mail, postage prepaid this 16th day of November, 1979: Peter Bradford, Commissioner Marcia E. Mulkey, Esquire Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner Office of the Executive Legal Richard T. Kennedy, Commissioner Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Samuel Chilk, Secretary E. Tupper Kinder, Esquire U.S. Nuclera Regulatory Comm'n Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20555 Environmental Protection Division Office of the Attorney General Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman 208 State House Annex Atomic Safety and Licensing Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Karin P. Sheldon, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Sheldon, Harmon & Roisman 1025 15th Street., N.W. Dr. John H. Buck Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Board Panel Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D.C. 20555 Michael C. Farrar, Esquire Dr. Ernest O. Salo Atomic Safety and Licensing Professor of Fisheries Research Board Panel Institute U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n College of Fisheries Washington, D.C. 20555 University of Washington Seattle, Washington Ivan W. Smith, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Board Panel Sheldon, Harmon & Roisman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n 1025 15th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Marvin M. Mann Thomas Dignan, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Ropes and Gray Board Panel 225 Franklin Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Boston, Mass. 02110 Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket and Service Section James L. Kelly, Esquire Office of the Secretary Acting General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Office of the General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 2119 252
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D.C. 20555
& "* l LAURIE BURT Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Public Protection Bureau One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2265 2119 253}}